

**REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: AN
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY PERSPECTIVE**

A Dissertation

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Political Science

Submitted By

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
Tribhuvan University

Kathmandu, Nepal

April 2026

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own work and that it contains no materials previously published. I have not used its materials for the award of any kind and any other degree. Where other authors' sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized, cursive script that appears to read 'Chandan Singh Thapa'.

Chandan Singh Thapa

24 April 2026

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION


We certify that this dissertation entitled “Reforming the United Nations Security Council: An International Peace and Security Perspective” was prepared by Mr. Chandan Singh Thapa under our guidance. We hereby recommend this dissertation for final examinations by the Research Committee of the faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tribhuvan University in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTORAL OF PHILOSOPHY in POLITICAL SCIENCE.

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APPROVAL LETTER

The dissertation entitled "**REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY PERSPECTIVE**" was submitted by **MR. CHANDAN SINGH THAPA** for final examination to the Research Committee of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tribhuvan University, in fulfillment of the requirements for the **Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science**. I hereby certify that the Research Committee of this Faculty has found the dissertation satisfactory in scope and quality and has therefore accepted it for the degree.



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ABSTRACT

After the failure of League of Nations (called LoN afterwards), United Nations (UN) was established on 24 October 1945 with six principal organs - General Assembly (UNGA), Security Council (UNSC), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Secretariat. With both triumphs and setbacks, the UNSC has been instrumental in global crises. Its structure, however, is progressively out of date and represents the allied dominated world order of 1945. The necessity to confront changing economic and military power dynamics is emphasized in today's UNSC reform discussions. One crucial issue is the permanent members' veto power, which can prevent collective action. The Council's history, changing global politics, the rise of new powers, structural flaws, applications for permanent membership, and restructuring difficulties must all be taken into account during reform talks. While filling in the inadequacies in the current system, any reform plan must improve peace and security. To guarantee that their voices and interests are heard in international decision making, nations like Nepal which are landlocked, small, and without significant political clout must participate more in the UNSC. Therefore, reform is both required and inevitable.

Within domain of different factors necessitating the reforming of the UNSC, best model of reformation and significance of reformation of UNSC in view of threats related to contemporary world, researcher has set out 3 main objectives which are: a) To identify major drawbacks in United Nations Security Council structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security b) To provide appropriate models for the reformation of the United Nations Security Council's structure and its tools for the maintenance of effective international peace and security c) To explore the major impacts of reformation of UNSC structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security. In order to achieve the set out objectives of the dissertation, it is divided into seven chapters which are Introduction, Review of the literatures, Research Methodology, structural and procedural aspects of UNSC, its functioning mechanism and need of reformation in UNSC with view of Security Perspective, Models for the reforming the United Nations Security Council with view of international peace and Security Perspective, Significance of reformation of UNSC in Contemporary world: Impact analysis and future discourse in broader spectrum of security with final part of the dissertation Summary, Major Findings and

Conclusion. The dissertation has adopted qualitative approach of data collection and analysis using both primary and secondary data. The primary data are basically authentic UN publications and reports, sampling method for primary data is non probability purposive sampling where respondents are divided into five categories in terms of diplomatic assignment in UN and other related environment, participation in UN peacekeeping in different capabilities at policy and field levels to obtain facts about different dimensions of reforming of UNSC with view of security perspectives. The dissertation has adopted descriptive and exploratory research design. The study mainly revolves on analyzing the gaps in existing framework of UNSC in terms of maintaining peace and security in the world, identifies the effective way of dealing with security threats to human lives and explores the significance of reforming in contemporary world focusing on adverse implications of existing structural and procedural set up of UNSC including veto power vested in P5 countries, effectiveness of UNPKO, implantation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) duty, role of UNSC in maintaining Collective Security, identifications of possible models of reformation of UNSC, identifications of threats of the contemporary world and explores the significance of restructured UNSC for the betterment of future generations. The major findings of the dissertation are: a) there is need of structural change in current structure of UNSC and its tools used for global peace and security reviewing the change in world order since establishment of UN addressing sovereign equality, inclusion of rising global powers and balanced regional representation b) veto power vested in P5 members is detrimental when interest of P5 is linked with global security affairs and has deviated UNSC from carrying out its assigned responsibility as mandated in UN Charter c) there is need of amendment in UN Charter and there is a need to design the modality for implementation of collective security, R2P, peace enforcement. Peacekeeping operations d) ineffectiveness of peacekeeping missions has a detrimental effect in credibility of UN missions and they are main cause of rising anti UN sentiments. There is need to redefine peacekeeping and peace enforcement strategy and implementation roadmap addressing the gaps and lapses in peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions with effective UNSC resolutions e) reformation of UNSC is significant to address emerging global threats and security, to empower role of nations like Nepal other than P5 Countries in global peace and security related decisions, stop possible disintegration of UN and prevent rise of parallel international organization in replacement of UN.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page No.
DECLARATION	ii
LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
ABSTRACT	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	vx
LIST OF FIGURES	xvii
ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS	xix
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1-20
1.1 Background of the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	9
1.3 Research Questions	10
1.4 Objectives of the Study	11
1.5 Significance of the Study	11
1.6 Delimitations of the Study	12
1.7 Organization of Dissertation	13
1.8 Operational Definition of the Key Terms	14-20
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW	21-36
2.1 Theoretical Literatures	21
2.2 Empirical Literature	27
2.3 Synthesis of Literatures	33
2.4 Research Gaps	34-36
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	37-62
3.1 General Framework	37
3.2 Research Design	37

3.3 Research Philosophy	38
3.4 Nature and Sources of Data	40
3.5 Data Collection Method	42
3.6 Sampling	51
3.7 Data Analysis Methods	53
3.8 Study Area and Time	55
3.9 Methodological Limitations	55
3.10 Reliability and Validity of Data	56
3.11 Ethical Considerations	56
3.12 Theoretical Framework	57
3.13 Conceptual Framework	58-62
CHAPTER IV: STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS OF UNSC AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS TOOLS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY	63-185
4.1 Background and Historical Preview	63
4.2 Overview of Security Council, Subsidiary Organs and Committee	65
4.3 UN Charters Related with UNSC: Functional Correlation	70
4.4 Advisory Body	71
4.5 Function and Power of UNSC	71
4.6 Security Council Resolutions	73
4.7 Determining Threats to Peace and Security	74
4.8 Vote and Majority Required	74
4.9 Right to Veto	75
4.10 Abstentions from Voting	76
4.11 Major Responsibilities of UNSC: Security Perspectives	76
4.11.1 Contribution to World Peace Through Peace Keeping Operations	77
4.11.2 United Nations and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)	85
4.11.3 Collective Security, Peace Enforcement and use of Force	88

4.11.4 Sanctions against Countries Threatening World Peace	91
4.11.5 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Ban on Use of Lethal Weapons	92
4.11.6 Biological Weapons	94
4.11.7 Chemical Weapons	94
4.11.8 Fighting Against Terrorism	95
4.12 Achievement of UNSC	98
4.13 Main Outcomes from Key Informants Interview (KII)	103
4.14 Attempts and Initiations for Reformation of UNSC	104
4.15 Drawbacks in Existing UNSC System Necessitating of Reformation of UNSC and its tools for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security	111
4.16 Criticism of UNSC Actions: Case Studies with Security Perspective	151-184
CHAPTER V : MODELS FOR REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS TOOLS: AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY PERSPECTIVE	185-285
5.1 Structural Aspects of Reformation of UNSC	185
5.1.1 Broad Categorization	186
5.1.1.1 Zero Model or Status Quo Model	186
5.1.1.2 Parallel Enlargement: Plus Model	187
5.1.1.3 Kofi Anan's Model A and Model B	189
5.1.1.4 Italian Model	190
5.1.1.5 United for Consensus Proposal	191
5.1.1.6 G4 Proposals	193
5.1.1.7 Model X	193
5.1.1.8 MC.Eduardo Vargas Toro's Model	194
5.1.1.9 7-7-7 Formula Approach	195
5.1.2 Razali Plan	195
5.1.3 High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change	197

5.1.3.1 Broader Spectrum of Kofi Anan's Report: in Larger Freedom	200
5.2 Aspirants for the Permanent Membership of UNSC	202
5.3 Basis of Reformation: Viable Options	203
5.3.1 Analytical View of Different Criteria for P5 Members	204
5.3.1.1 Military Capability	204
5.3.1.2 Contribution to UN Budget	205
5.3.1.3 Global Economic Perspective	206
5.3.1.4 Contribution of Troops in UN Peacekeeping	207
5.3.1.5 Way Ahead for Enrollment of Additional Member in Permanent Category	207
5.4. Proposed Model	209
5.5 Status of Various P5 Countries in Reforming: Enrollment of New Members	211
5.6 Implications of Enlarged UNSC in Global Peace and Security Affairs	213
5.7 Main Challenges/Hurdles for Reforming UNSC	214
5.7.1 Challenges on Consensus	217
5.7.2 Regional Groups and Other Member State	218
5.7.3 The Veto Factor	219
5.7.3.1 Initiatives not to Use Veto	219
5.7.4 Finances	221
5.8 Ways to Enhance Effectiveness of UNPKO	221
5.8.1 Increasing Operational Outreach and Enhancing Force Mobility	222
5.8.2 Rapid Deployment in Need and Up Gradation of Standby Arrangements	223
5.8.3 Implementation of the Cruz Report: Transforming Peacekeeping Mindset	223
5.8.4 Command, Control and Accountability	224
5.8.5 Regional and Multilateral Coordination	225
5.8.6 Training, Personnel and Resource Optimization	225
5.8.7 Consultations between the Security Council and Troops and Finance	
Contributing Countries	226

5.8.8 Authorization of Anti Terrorist Mandate	227
5.8.9 Cooperation with Host State	228
5.8.10 Security and Managements of IDPs	228
5.8.11 Enhancement of Peacekeeping Capabilities in Africa.	228
5.9 Ways ahead for Strengthening POC	229
5.10 Ways ahead for Strengthening R2P	232
5.10.1 R2P and Strategy to Implement NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)	234
5.10.2 Combating Biological and Chemical Weapons: R2P Perspective	236
5.10.3 Action Plan for Global Terrorism/ Transnational Terrorism: R2P Perspective	237
5.10.4 Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Natural Disaster: R2P Perspective	238
5.11 Ways ahead for Strengthening Peace Enforcement: A Critical Tool for Collective Security, R2P and POC	240
5.11.1 Peace Enforcement and Coercion Theory	243
5.11.2 Gaps in Peace Enforcement	244
5.11.3 Strengthening Peace Enforcement Tool	245
5.11.4 Fostering Relationship with the Global Alliances: NATO	248
5.12 Implementation of Collective Security	249
5.13 Need of concrete Action Plan for the Implementation Strategy of High-Level UN Reports	250
5.14 Amendment Required in Different Charter of UN	256
5.15 Results: Outcome of Key Informant Interview with Diplomats/Scholars of Political Science/International Relation/ Conflict Studies	262
5.16 Analysis: Major Outcomes of Key Informant Interview with Diplomats/Scholars of Political Science/International Relation/ Conflict Studies	271

5.17 Results: KII Outcome on Various Aspects of Reformation: UN Civilian Staffs/Military Staff Officers, MILOBS/UNPOL/IPO	273
5.18 Analysis and Outcome of KII: UN Staffs at Different Capacities	281-285
CHAPTER VI: SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS OF REFORMING THE UNSC AND ITS TOOLS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY	286-329
6.1 New World Order and Trend in International Relation	287
6.2 Future Challenges of UNSC: Security Perspective	294
6.3 Consequences/Impacts of Reformation in UNSC and its Tools	297
6.4 Adverse Implication of Maintenance of Status Quo in UNSC and Its Tools: An International Peace and Security Perspective	298
6.5 Increasing Role of UNGA and Impact	306
6.6 Impact Analysis: Cooperation with Regional Organization	309
6.7 Implications of Reformation of UNSC and its Tools	310
6.8 Adverse Implications of Veto Power Elimination	311
6.9 Reforming the UNSC: Impacts and Opportunities for Nepal	312
6.9.1 Nepal and UN: Historical Perspective	312
6.9.2 Reformation of UNSC: Significance, Impact and Opportunities for Nepal	318-329
CHAPTER VII : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	330-342
7.1 Summary	330
7.2 Major Findings	332
7.2 Conclusion	339-342
APPENDICES	343-362
REFERENCES	363-426

LIST OF TABLES

	Page No.
Table 3.1 Nature and Sources of Data Based on Research Objectives	41
Table 3.2 KII: Diplomats, Military Attache and Academicians of political Science / International Relation/Conflict Studies	44
Table 3.3 KII: Top level Military and Civilian Official of UN Served in Different UN Missions	45
Table 3.4 KII Top level Military and Civilian Officials Worked in UNHQ, New York	46
Table 3.5 KII Contingent Commanders/Officers Corps UN Peacekeeping Operations	47
Table 3.6 KII UN Civilian Staffs/Military Staff Officers/UN Police/Military Observer Served in Different UNPKO	48
Table 3.7 Participants Details as Primary Source of Data Collection: KII	52
Table 4.1 Security Council Members in Non-Permanent Category	66
Table 4.2 Current Peacekeeping Operations	79
Table 4.3 Current Peacekeeping Operation Fact Sheet	80
Table 4.4 Trend of Veto Cast by Permanent Five Members of UNSC: 1946-202	123
Table 4.5 Peacekeeping Troops and Area of the Host Country	134
Table 4.6 Human loss In Contemporary Crisis of the World	179
Table 5.1 Model A	189
Table 5.2 Model B	189
Table 5.3 Italian Proposal	190
Table 5.4 Green Model (April 2005)	191
Table 5.5 Blue Model	192
Table 5.6 Leading Countries for United for Consensus (UfC) Group	193
Table 5.7 Model X	194

Table 5.8 Toro's Model	195
Table 5.9 Top Ten Military powers of the World	204
Table 5.10 Top Ten Contributors in UN Budge	205
Table 5.11 Top 10 Economy of the World in Terms of GDP	206
Table 5.12 Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UNPKO by Country and Post	207
Table 5.13 Proposed Model	210

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page No.
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework of the Study	61
Figure 4.1 Effectiveness of UNPKO	137
Figure 4.2 Major Operational and Logistic Challenges in Peacekeeping Missions	137
Figure 4.3 Performances of Different Units in UN Peacekeeping	138
Figure 4.4 Different Contingents Capability in Prompt Mobilization in Emergency POC Duty	138
Figure 4.5 Threats in Mission Area	139
Figure 4.6 Successfulness of UN Mission in Dealing with Security Threats	139
Figure 4.7 Enhancement of Capability of Peacekeeping Units	140
Figure 4.8 Necessity of Improvement in Structural set up for Continents of UNPKO	141
Figure 4.9 Support of the Host Nation to UNPKO	141
Figure 4.10 Sustainment of UN Mission in Typical Peace Enforcement Mission	142
Figure 4.11 Recommendation to Create Robust Multinational and Regional Force	142
Figure 4.12 Host Nation Support in Achieving Protection of Civilian Mandate	143
Figure 5.1 Effectiveness of the Present Structure and Procedural Provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to Address the World Security Issues	262
Figure 5.2 Requirement of Change in Present Structure of the UNSC to Function Effectively in Regards with Security Perspective of the Global Affairs	262
Figure 5.3 Addition Role to be given to UNSC to Meet the Present Challenges	263
Figure 5.4 Necessity of Amendment in UN Charter	263
Figure 5.5 Reason for the Efforts for the Reformation of the UNSC not Culmination to Fruitful End	264
Figure 5.6 Factors Necessitating Restructuring of the UNSC	265

Figure 5.7 Suggested Model for Reforming of UNSC	266
Figure 5.8 Basis for Reformation of United Nations Security Council	267
Figure 5.9 View on Veto Power Vested in Permanent five Members (P5) in Security Council	267
Figure 5.10 Challenges in Reformation of UNSC	268
Figure 5.11 Regional Power to be Enrolled as Permanent Member of UNSC	269
Figure 5.12 Basis of Passing Various UNSC Resolutions Provided that Veto Power is Amended	270
Figure 5.13 Necessity of Balancing Role of General Assembly and Security Council in Security Related Issues	270
Figure 5.14 Challenges Contemporary UN Mission is Facing While Carrying Out the Operational Activities as per the Mission	273
Figure 5.15 Comment on Operational Mentality of the Contingents Deployed in UNPKO to Achieve the Mission Mandate	274
Figure 5.16 Requirement of Change in UNSC Structure	275
Figure 5.17 Core Issues to be Addressed While Restructuring UNSC	276
Figure 5.18 Balancing Role of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and UNSC in Terms of Making Decision for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security	277
Figure 5.19 Main Reason for Status quo in Reform Effort of UNSC	278
Figure 5.20 Enlargement of UNSC Membership in both Permanent and Non -Permanent Category of Member States	279
Figure 5.21 Possibility to Deploy the UN Peacekeeping Force Promptly after Authorization from UNSC	280
Figure 5.22 UNSC being Successful in Maintaining the Provision of Collective Security	281
Figure 6.1 Global Participation of Nepali Peacekeepers	324

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACT	Accountability, Coherence and Transparency
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Countries
AU	African Union
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CPAS	Comprehensive Performance Assessment System
CRSV	Conflict Related Sexual Violence
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTC	Counter Terrorism Committee
CTED	Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate
EASF	Eastern Asian Standby Force
E-10	Elected Ten Security Council Members
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPON	Effectiveness of Peace Operation Network
ESCAPE	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
EU	European Union
EuMEP	European Middle East Project

EUOG	Eastern European and Other Group
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
G-4	The Group of Four Countries Claiming Permanent Seat in United Nations Security Council (Brazil, India, Germany, Japan)
G-77	The Group of 77
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRULAC	Group of Latin American and Other Countries
High Level Panel	High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
HIPPO	High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Rwanda
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IGN	Intergovernmental Negotiations
LoN	League of Nations
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MINUSCA	United Nations Mission in Central African Republic
MINUCRAT	United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MONUSCO	UN Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
NRF	NATO Response Force
OAU	Organization of African Union
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	The organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P5	Permanent Five Council Members
PBC	Peace Building Commission
PCRS	Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
POC	Protection of Civilians
QIP's	Quick Impact Projects
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RDMHQ	Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
S5	Group of five Small States
SAAG	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SG	Secretary General
SHIRBRIG	UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade
SWAT	Special Weapon and Tactics

TC	Trusteeship Council
TCC	Troops Contributing Countries
TPNW	Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon
TPP	Troops Contributing Countries
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
PCC	Police Contributing Countries
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UfC	Uniting for Consensus
UN	United Nations
UNCCP	United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
UN Charter	United Nations Charter
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNOSO	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNPO	United Nations Peace Operations
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VUCA	Volatile Uncertain Complex and Ambiguous
Vol.	Volume
WEOG	Western European and Other Group
WFP	World Food Program
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

After the devastating effects of the World War II(1939-1945), the need for a powerful international organization that can work to address global issues while serving as a watchdog for international peace and security became clear. Consequently, pioneer of the then allied power led by United States of America (USA) realized the need of strong international organization to make alliance stronger and make it capable to counter any possible threat by axis power. After ratifying the Atlantic Charter on 1st of January 1942 in Washington DC, allied power expressed their commitment to utilize their entire resources to counter axis power in need. The then United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave official name United Nations which was first used in the Declaration by United Nations on 1st January 1942. Subsequently, after having series of conferences by representative of allied power comprising 26 nations ,United Nations as international organization was established on 24 October 1945 with due endorsement of UN charter by founding 50 nations. UN was founded with the opening and very first preamble to prevent the succeeding generation from the scourge of war (UN Charter,1945). Upon objectively reviewing the UN's record ever since its inception, one will be able to find numerous instances where efforts have been made to bring about normalization of international conflicts. However, there are success stories as well as failures, and the latter give us a broad view of the flaws in the structure of the UNSC (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

Starting from eighteenth century, when we review the history of modern international system, Concert of Europe is considered very first organized and remarkable global effort. It was established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Nadin, 2017). Later, The International Peace Conference took place in The Hague in 1899 to develop a plan of action and various strategies for resolving conflicts amicably, averting war, and codifying the principles of various forms of combat. The Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes received acceptance at the conference. It commenced its operations in the year 1902. The main objective was to establish an international legal system and structure for settling disputes. In the year 1907, the Second Hague Conference occurred. These

conventions were the advancement of international agreements and declarations, which were made in terms of the formal articulation of the laws of war and the crimes associated with the laws of war under the domain of secular international laws. World War I (WWI), which began in 1914, thwarted the third conference that had been planned for 1915 (Best, 1980). As part of the global endeavor to create peace and create international laws concerning conflict, this initiative was extremely significant. In 1919, a similar institution named the League of Nations, was formed during the WW I as part of the Treaty of Versailles in order to promote international cooperation and to attain peace, stability and security. League of Nations stopped operating after failing to stop the Second World War for a variety of reasons. The UN was established officially on October 24, 1945, following the end of the Second World War. Thus, the termination of the WW II gave birth to a new international system called the United Nations (UN) (History of the United Nations, 2015).

Now, 193 countries are members of UN. All member states are represented in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which is regarded as a common discussion forum but is less effective than the UNSC at resolving international conflicts and preserving peace and security due to its limited role defined by UN charters. The UN operates in a wide range of sectors through its several agencies and main institutions. The United Nations currently has six main bodies: the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Secretariat, International Court of Justice, and Trusteeship Council (United Nations, 1945).

UNSC comprises of five permanent P5 members (China, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation- formerly Soviet Union and France) and ten elected (E10) non-permanent members (initially six). According to a gentleman's agreement that distributes the ten elective seats across the major geographic areas, the General Assembly selects half of the elected members each year. Five seats are allocated to Asia and Africa, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America, and two to Western Europe out of the 10 seats in the non-permanent category. A country must receive a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly to be elected. Following the English alphabetical order of its member States, the UNSC's permanent and non-permanent members alternate monthly holding the position of presidency (United Nations, 1945).

The basic principle of the UN is the equal sovereignty of all member states; however, this principle is seldom observed due to numerous reasons, including the

influential UNSC and, in general, the use of the veto on matters related to international peace and security. Following the end of World War II, a dramatic change in international affairs has occurred, with many states beginning to emerge as key actors in the context of global security. Despite the endorsement by the UN General Assembly and international community, the P5 states have the right to wield the power of the veto on any important matter that the UNSC deals with (Hurd, 2017). When one of the five permanent members exercises its veto, any UNSC resolution cannot be approved. Whether or not the opposite fourteen nations vote yes, one veto beat this overwhelming show of support. To act and stop the carnage in Syria, the Russian invasion of Crimea, and the most recent invasion of Ukraine, the UNSC tried to use chapter VII sanctions. However, China and Russia's vetoes prevented any international action in difficult humanitarian crises and even when a state's sovereignty was in danger (Personal Communication, June 25, 2024).

The 'primary' role of upholding global peace and security has been given to the UNSC under Article 24 of the UN Charter. The term primary implies that the UNGA has at least a secondary or remaining role in this area (Gharekhan, 2006). Despite the fact that objectives and guiding principles of UN are still crucial today as they were in 1945, several difficult problems have arisen due to the shifting global environment. The UN's current position and obligations must adapt to the changing environment. Such demands on the UN can only be satisfied by a system that is contemporary, futuristic, and effective. Since change is a reality, the UN itself needs to be changed in order to accommodate changes that will take place in the world. As far as the formation of the UNSC in 1945 goes, its restructuring has always been on the agenda for discussion, and many interests groups have put forward their issues regarding it in different forums. However, over the last few decades, no reform efforts have proved very successful. (Weiss, 2003).

There are various criticisms of the current composition of the UNSC, but the most contentious one is to the permanent membership, which is held by only five nations, known as the P5 members. The criticisms claim that the structure does not accurately represent current power structures and geopolitical realities and is skewed in terms of equitable and uniform geographic representation. Additionally, the Council must maintain its standing as an efficient institution of institutional governance in the international arena and uphold democratic principles and values while performing its

different duties. Additionally, it must continue to be effective while carrying out the numerous activities authorized by the UN charters, provide clarity in the way the various jobs are carried out, and take on responsibility for the world's people and its member states (Kugel, 2009).

The newly emerging regional powers, along with other members of UN, have raised some serious issues pertaining to the UNSC's structure and demanded more representation. In this regard, these powers demand that the UNSC must be reshaped as per the wishes of the entire membership in the matter of equal representation from the regional and geographical perspective. However, the debate on the proposed new membership still continues. There are still many unresolved issues regarding the expansion of the Council, which may affect the integrity of the UN. There have been clear demands by many nations for making the UN more democratic and successful (Zacher, 2020).

Strong aspirants are referred to as emerging economic and military powers in popular culture. Brazil, India, Germany, Japan, and the other three members of the Group of Four (G4) each support one another's candidacy. A movement opposing the G4's bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council, on the other hand, exists. Uniting for Consensus (UfC), often known as Coffee Club, is the name of the movement. This movement emerged in the 1990s in opposition to G4 member inclusion in any UNSC structural reform. Under the direction of Italy, its main goal is to oppose the G4's initiative and claim for permanent seats, and it is requesting unanimous global support prior to any decision being made to restructure the UNSC's current structural and procedural set up (Ariyork, 2005). There are several ideas for the UNSC to be reformed, including procedural changes like expanding it and removing the veto power authority possessed by P5. Reviewing these aspects, there is need to seriously think about kind of UN system to be implemented at the dawn of the twenty first century (Kayathwal, 1997).

There are numerous advantages to having equal regional representation in the UNSC with separate power. Due to the presence of regional power, it is said that dealing with transnational threats will be simple following the UNSC's reformation (Narasimhan, 1994). Due to their lack of influence in international politics, many of the world's small, least developed, and landlocked countries are denied a variety of opportunities and rights. The UNSC has to reorganize these nations participation in non

permanent categories, which undoubtedly provides them the opportunity to speak out concerns in international forums. As a sovereign nation and UN member, Nepal and other Nations in this category can benefit from the UNSC's reform by advocating the discrepancies faced by them in terms of right of landlocked country, various aspects of economic security as least developed country, safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity through effective implementation of collective security and security of small states. In recent years, debate and discussion over the United Nations system's renewal and reform has gained significant traction both inside and outside the organization (Vedantam, 1996).

The upkeep of world peace and security through various peace and security related actions by implementing its tools are another prime responsibility of the UNSC. This authority is specified in the Chapter VI, VII and VIII of UN Charter and includes various measures taken by UNSC for preserving international peace and security: initially pacific settlement of disputes followed by enforcing international sanctions, and approving military actions as last effort. Though original Charter don't mention specifically about peacekeeping missions, these provisions in UN Charter have been interpreted by UNSC in authorizing various peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in different interstate and intrastate conflicts (United Nations, 1945). After the speeding up of decolonization process, the number of members of UN started rising rapidly, posing new problems to the structure and decision-making process of the UN. The number of UN members rose from 51 to 114 during the period from the establishment of the UN in 1945 to the end of the first decolonization wave in 1963. After 20 years, more than half of the total membership of UN came from these two continents – Asia and Africa - while in the case of original members, there were only six nations from these two continents among the UN member states (Hurd, 2017).

The UN has been mainly successful in putting an end to some conflicts and wars since its founding. Despite successes, there have also seen several disastrous failures that resulted in millions of lives of innocent civilians (Fitzgerald, 2013). There are quite many cases when the UN response towards the global crisis was not effective: according to the major responsibilities of the UN Security Council, the UN responses towards the genocides in Rwanda, Sudan and Serbia are rather questionable. Indeed, despite having authorized several successful United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO), the UNSC has had to deal with quite many cases where UNPKOs were ineffective owing to

their inability to perform the POC operation. In order to solve international issues concerning the matter of peace and security, there should be a universal desire to take into account the opinion of the concerned state and other states. The problem lies in the fact that one particular nation, being powerful enough to use its veto right, can prevent the action of an international body (United Nations, 2000). It would seem that most of the sovereign states across the globe have the intention of going through the UN, being a supporter of democracy and human rights, with regards to their intentions. Considering the facts above, it can be stated that there is a considerable amount of problems within the structure of the UNSC that should be addressed to achieve its objectives of maintaining global peace and stability (United Nations, 2004).

It is clear that the example of the State of Palestine demonstrates a very problematic issue regarding the functioning of the UN Security Council. The fact that for decades there have been conflicts in the region, as well as the international community's support for Palestine, cannot lead to its entry into the UN as a full member state due to the fact that this would require a decision by the Security Council, where the veto power of permanent members has hindered such actions. For example, although Palestine has been recognized as a non-member observer state by the UN General Assembly with a huge majority vote in 2012, this does not imply full recognition of the State at the UN level (Security Council Report, 2024).

Other important events involve the invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the reaction of the UN Security Council towards the issue. The case highlighted the inability of the UN Security Council to act against aggression committed by one of its permanent members due to the power to veto by the latter. This event exposed the weakness of small states militarily and confirmed the assumption that power supersedes laws when it comes to international affairs. It, thus, follows that the concept of collective security remains difficult to apply outside the framework of the United Nations Charter (United Nations General Assembly, 2014). The world has learned important lessons from the Syrian war. Innocent citizens who are still the crises' primary victims are waiting for the UN to intervene effectively. What is the cause of this? Why isn't the world demanding serious changes to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and human rights violations? The world forum continues to receive inquiries from history regarding this catastrophe. Fatalities, refugees, displaced and other wounded casualties are in huge number making it worst humanitarian crisis of the

contemporary conflicts (Syria's war explained from the beginning, 2022).

There is no denying the fact that the Syrian conflict has escalated to become the worst humanitarian crisis of the twenty-first century. The role of the UN in this regard has been greatly criticized, and it stands among the biggest blunders of the United Nations according to its critics. It is an open secret for everyone in the world that Russia's utilization of its right of veto power in order to block UN action will lead to catastrophic consequences. Such events have thrown serious doubts on the 'Responsibility to Protect' decision taken at the 2005 World Summit (United Nations General Assembly, 2009). Another issue that raises doubts about the organizational and operational aspects of the UNSC is the Russian invasion of a sovereign state, Ukraine, on February 24, 2022, and the UN response aftermath. The implementation of UN Article 51 provision about collective self defense states Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (United Nations, 1945). UN Chapter VII Peace Enforcement measures and implementation of article 5 of NATO Attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies are the issues of an analysis in this study in this case since UNSC has authorized NATO actions of collective security and peace enforcement actions many times. Operation Desert Storm 1990/1991 lunched by US led NATO alliance to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi invasion authorized by UNSC resolution 678 is one of the pertinent example (Kirgis, 1997). Once more, when it is related to contemporary conflicts like Ukraine and Syria, the question is whether the UNSC is performing as intended. Was it intended to see instances where this body finds itself in a state of powerlessness due to its inability to do anything whenever the sovereignty of one of its member states is threatened? Such concerns have been raised regarding the actions taken by NATO in Iraq in 2003, in Libya in 2011, and in Afghanistan in 2001. Hence, the United Nations must be made to effectively and efficiently utilize all the available resources to handle such situations. That can only be accomplished by restructuring the Security Council in terms of structure and procedure so as to make sure that the peace and security of the world are safeguarded (United Nations, 2004).

2022 attack by Russia on Ukraine and ongoing war posing multiple security and economic implication to world has raised serious questions to UNSC and entire

international community where concrete coercive measure is not adopted from any side though NATO is in action indirectly. Some support within framework of proxy war by western allies in support of Ukraine is witnessed but organized and massive coercive action within framework of collective defense as mentioned in the UN charter is not taken. This has also posed the serious threat to sovereignty of the less powerful states over mighty states with superior military power and weapon technology. Russia being itself a veto power for sure not ratifies any steps taken by UNSC within the legal provision entrusted by the mandate since any steps taken against the aggressor requires the affirmative vote of all P5 members (United Nations General Assembly, 2022). The world is also presently witnessing the devastating humanitarian crisis of recent clashes between Israel-Palestine-Hamas (2023) and Israel offensive actions in Gaza strip. Despite of the repeated efforts by UN and widespread criticism worldwide, the cease fire and humanitarian intervention could not be materialized due to veto power imposed by US in UNSC.

In nutshell, emerging security threats in asymmetric forms and conventional threat as the aggressor to threaten the sovereignty of the independent sovereign states both needs restructured UNSC. Recent conflict in Sudan (2023) which is consequence of clash between paramilitary force and military force has also posed a serious humanitarian crisis in Sudan. The implication of this type of conflict in reference to POC demanding effective security and humanitarian assistance and delay in deployment of the peacekeeping force to prevent further humanitarian crisis also needs to be analyzed thoroughly to provide the structural and procedural roadmap for the future UN to deal with such situations.

So, while talking about reforming the UNSC with security perspective ways to enhance effectiveness of UNSC major tools to deal with internal peace and security issues concerning maintenance of collective security, R2P, POC and appropriate use of veto power in international peace and security needs to be thoroughly analyzed. This dissertation is about reforming the UNSC in terms of implementing its major tools for the maintenance of effective global peace and security so that it is established as a credible organization. It also tries to explore the factors necessitating reforming the UNSC, identifies the security threats of the contemporary world and proposes the possible models for the reforming of UNSC tools with security perspective. In this dissertation, adverse security implications of current structural set up UNSC, implication

of veto power in global peace and security affairs, effective implementation of Protection of Civilian(POC) and Responsibility to Protect(R2P) , protection of sovereignty of states against external aggression under framework of collective security has been studied in detail . Gaps and lapses in above areas of major responsibilities of UNSC is identified and areas of improvement required in effective functioning of UNSC as a global umbrella organization of maintaining global peace and security affairs has been explored.

In 1955, Nepal and Sri Lanka became members of the United Nations, both from South Asia (Anupam, 2020). In global arena, Nepal falls under category of least developed, landlocked, small and country affected dangerously with climate change. In addition, being a topmost contributor in United Nations Peace Operations a vital tool of UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security, Nepal and countries falling in similar categories also have great concerns about opportunities to be created by reformation in UNSC.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

With the emergence of new economic and military powers since the UN's founding in 1945, there have been substantial shifts in the global order and power dynamics. Additionally, the nature of conflicts has changed from interstate to intrastate. With new powers calling for more representation, UNSC reform has become a crucial topic as a result of these changes in global politics. The calls centre on improving the Council's operational procedures and expanding membership in an equitable manner. Global terrorism, state-sponsored ethnic cleansing, genocide, threats to sovereignty, and intrastate conflicts are some of the new threats that have emerged as a result of the changes in global order and security dynamics. The limitations of the UNSC's post-World War II tools are made clear by these difficulties. Since the UN was established in 1945, in a political and security environment, change and flexibility are crucial. To effectively sustain international peace and security, UN Secretary General reports such as the Cruz Report and Kofi Annan's report emphasize the necessity of modernizing UNSC procedures.

Protecting sovereignty through collective security and defense (Article 51 of UN Charter) and guaranteeing R2P and POC through peacekeeping or peace enforcement are two of the UNSC's main tools for the establishment of international peace and

security. In the context of rising credibility question on UN itself, the need of revitalizing these tools for the maintenance of international peace and nonetheless, the P5 members' veto power is still crucial. When P5 interests are involved, as in Syria and the Israel-Palestine issue, a single veto stymies global action and jeopardizes common security. There is minimal research on veto-less decision-making or empowering the UNGA in peace and security, even though the majority of reform ideas maintain the P5 veto power. Furthermore, there are no obvious solutions for when a P5 state itself breaches international peace.

This study therefore seeks to identify gaps in existing collective security and defense mechanisms, and propose stronger alternatives. Similarly, in peacekeeping or peace enforcement for R2P and POC, P5 vetoes often obstruct efforts to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity. This dissertation analyzes these gaps, explores alternatives to the veto grounded in democratic decision-making and sovereign equality, and evaluates the potential of the UNGA as a more representative peace and security body. It also assesses shortcomings in authorized UN missions where ineffective force deployment undermines credibility. Overall, UNSC tools for the maintenance of international peace and security mainly collective security, R2P, and POC require revitalization with doctrinal clarity and result-oriented mechanisms to address contemporary threats, which remain insufficiently, addressed in high level UN documents such as Kofi Annan's 'In Larger Freedom'.

1.3 Research Questions

Identifying the core issues of reformation of UNSC's structural aspects and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security in multidimensional aspects following research questions has been formulated.

- (a) What are the major drawbacks in United Nations Security Council structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security?
- (b) How best reformation of the United Nations Security Council structure and its tools can be performed for the maintenance of effective international peace and security?
- (c) What are the major impacts of reformation of United Nations Security Council structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

General objective of the study is to study the effectiveness of UNSC's tools in terms of its major responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The specific objectives of the study are as follows.

- (a) To identify major drawbacks in United Nations Security Council structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security.
- (b) To provide appropriate models for the reformation of the United Nations Security Council's structure and its tools for the maintenance of effective international peace and security.
- (c) To explore the major impacts of reformation of UNSC structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security.

1.5 Significance of the Study

One of the most hotly contested global topics of our day is the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since the UN's founding in 1945, shifting global conditions have had a substantial impact on its composition and operations, necessitating reform. Given that the effectiveness of this important international body is still impacted by structural flaws, member states might gain valuable lessons from studying UNSC reform. The Security Council, the UN's most potent decision-making body, has long been essential to preserving world peace and combating threats. But its track record over the last 20 years calls into doubt its efficacy and legitimacy. Its inherent flaws and structural restrictions make it difficult for it to adjust to modern problems. It is now crucial to restructure the Council's membership to take into account the realities of the twenty-first century, guarantee wider representation, and take into account the goals of all member states, not just the P5.

Based on tenets like peaceful coexistence, sovereign equality, and the UN Charter's commitment to avert war for future generations, the necessity for UNSC reform must be considered in the context of the current global order. It is crucial to have equitable representation based on geographic and regional balance. Small, landlocked, and least developed nations like Nepal could gain from increased representation by using the forum to advance their issues and interests. The historical context of the UNSC, the evolution of world politics since 1945, the emergence of new powers, the shortcomings of the current structure, the claims of prospective permanent members,

and workable reform ideas appropriate for the current geopolitical environment are all covered in this paper. With an emphasis on conflict resolution and international security, it examines the need, extent, and difficulties of reform.

The findings draw attention to weaknesses in the UNSC's operations, procedures, and structure while highlighting the necessity of bolstering its collective security, peacekeeping and enforcement, R2P, and POC instruments. This dissertation also emphasizes the UNGA's function in striking a balance between its obligations to maintain international peace and security. UNSC reform is particularly important because Nepal is the nation that contributes the most troops to UN peacekeeping, and bolstering peace operations improves Nepal's reputation internationally. In the end, this dissertation makes the case for a resurgent, inclusive, and functional UNSC that can handle today's security challenges. It adds to ongoing international discussions and initiatives to redesign the Council in accordance with current geopolitical realities by investigating workable reform models. Many efforts were carried out to change structural and procedural change in UNSC to make it more effective and inclusive but have not been materialize due to various interests. Hence, creating new sustainable, effective, and empowered UNSC structure following democratic norms of operating with inclusive representation of globe to deal with multidimensional issues of security and rights of member states is essence of present world. So, the researcher strongly believes outcome of the research and models proposed for reforming of the UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace definitely be useful in global effort of reforming UNSC in various dimensions.

1.6 Delimitations of the Study

The research is delimited thematically to a targeted analysis of particular instruments and facets of the UN Security Council for the preservation of global peace and security. It specifically focuses on the structural implications of the current UNSC, including its composition, modes of decision-making, and veto power on international peace and security. Furthermore, the study discusses the notions of peacekeeping/ peace enforcement missions, collective defense and collective security, along with the Council's responsibilities in carrying out the Protection of Civilians (POC) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which requires international armed forces mobilisation. Though it discusses the enlarged models by different reports and stakeholder nations, it does not recommend the structural set up of enlarged UNSC rather it aims to study effect

of the enlarged Council in implementation of its tools for the maintenance of global peace and security.

With the majority of the KII and qualitative survey being conducted with Nepali key informants who have substantial UN exposure and diplomatic experiences, the study mostly uses secondary data sources, such as official UN reports, high level reports, scholarly works, and policy documents, and excludes direct interviews with UNSC diplomats or state representatives. Geographically, the study has a worldwide viewpoint, although it also carries out implication of UNSC's tools reformation for the countries like Nepal.

Other tools and mechanisms of the UNSC are recognized but not specifically and thoroughly examined, including the role of the Council in non-proliferation, counterterrorism, climate change, sanctions regimes, ad hoc tribunals, arms embargoes, and the proper structure of the UNSC in the evolving global order, which includes additional member states based on a variety of criteria. Therefore, it is important to consider these parameters when interpreting the research's findings and suggestions, as they might not be immediately applicable to all of the Council's resources or initiatives.

1.7 Organization of the Dissertation

In order to have logical findings on research objectives set out in this dissertation, various chapters are organized.

Chapter I. Introduction of the study gives background knowledge of the UN system as well as Security Council and highlights key issues intended to find out in research as well as objective of the study, limitation as well as significance and relevancy of the research topics in the present context.

Chapter II. Review of the literatures explains the various relevant literatures reviewed to identify the gaps in existing empirical and theoretical literature, find a concrete scope of the research to be carried out based on the gaps identified during review, generate broad framework of study, and have conceptual framework of the study.

Chapter III. Methodology of the study deals with various methods adopted for the research, types of method of the data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

Chapter IV. Structural and procedural analysis of UNSC and effectiveness of its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security deals with general idea

about six principal organs of the United Nations and various roles performed by them focusing primarily on UNSC. This chapter also explores the present organizational set up of UNSC, its detail role and provisions mentioned in Charter related to UNSC. This chapter also analyzes the role played by UNSC in mitigating both inter-state and intra-state conflict and paves the way for the essence of reforming. After finding gaps in the present structural and procedural aspects of UNSC structure it deals with the various factors which necessitate the reforming of UNSC with international peace and security perspectives. It also examines the various efforts made for reforming of the United Nation since its establishment. In addition, it explores various complexities prevailing within the present world politics to restructure the United Nations Security Council. This chapter provides road map for the future course to be taken to identify the challenges, overcome those challenges and create appropriate model for reforming the UNSC.

Chapter V. Models for reforming the UNSC with view of international peace and security perspective deals with the various dimensions of Security Council Reforms in terms of conflict mitigation, various models proposed for reformation of existing structural, procedural, and working mechanism of UNSC. This chapter gives concrete idea about the best way to restructure UNSC in terms of procedural and structural aspects within scope of International Peace and security perspective.

Chapter VI. Significant impacts of reforming the UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security deals with the various dimensions of the changing trends of conflict, defines the broader spectrum of security in the contemporary world and approaches to be taken by UNSC to deal with those conflicts and opportunities created by revitalization of the United Nations Security Council in maintenance of global peace and security. In addition, this chapter discusses about prospect of inclusive UNSC which ensures the representation of categories of the states like Nepal in least developed, landlocked, and small nation along with other opportunities provided by reformation of UNSC. It also incorporates overall findings of the dissertation.

Chapter VII. Summary, major findings and conclusion finally summarizes the entire dissertation and draws out the major conclusions.

1.8 Operational Definition of the Key Terms

In this dissertation, following related key words has been defined and elaborated.

Asymmetric war: Asymmetric warfare refers to a style of conflict involving belligerents with considerably different levels of relative military strength, strategies, or tactics.

Inter State conflict: Military confrontation between different states over an area is known as interstate Conflict. Civil wars, independence wars, and minor conflicts with few casualties are not included in this.

Intra State conflict: A war between organized factions within a country is an intrastate conflict. One side's goal may be to seize power in the nation or a particular area, to secure the independence of that area, to alter governmental regulations, or to pursue any other political goal.

Cease fire: The term cease fire refers to several different ways of stopping or pausing hostilities, including truce, capitulation, and armistice.

Ethnic cleansing: Ethnic cleansing is a planned action by one ethnic or religious group to drive the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from a certain geographic area using violent and terror-inspiring means.

Crime against humanity: Rome statute of International Criminal Court (1998) defines 'crime against humanity' as any means of the various 12 acts like murder, extermination, enslavement, extrajudicial killings, crime of apartheid etc when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.

Genocide: UN Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide defines genocide as any acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.

UN Charter: The United Nations was founded on the principles set forth in its Charter. Due to its special international status and the authority granted by its Charter, which is regarded as an international treaty, the United Nations can act on a wide range of topics. As a result, the UN Charter is a part of international law and is binding on all UN Member States.

UN mandate: In the Context of UN, a mandate typically refers to the decision that grants a permission to UN body to carry out its activities.

Peacekeeping Operations: In order to aid regulate and end a current or future armed conflict between or between nations, peacekeeping refers to the deployment of national or, more frequently, multinational forces under UN umbrella. Regional organizations may also carry out peacekeeping operations, and in some circumstances, single governments have as well. Most of the peacekeeping operations are carried out with UN approval and are frequently directed by the UN. It is usually under Chapter VI of UN charter.

Peace building: By bolstering national skills for conflict management at all levels, peace building by UN seeks to lower the danger of conflict escalating or re escalating while also laying the groundwork for lasting peace and development. By addressing fundamental problems that have an impact on how society and the State function, peace building initiatives aim to strengthen the state's ability to carry out its fundamental duties in an appropriate and effective manner.

Peace Enforcement: In Peace Enforcement, variety of coercive tactics, including the use of force, are used to enforce peace. The Security Council must expressly approve Peace Enforcement. When necessary, the Council may make use of regional organizations and agencies to carry out enforcement actions that are under its purview and the UN Charter. Because peace enforcement frequently requires more resources than peacekeeping forces have, it is best carried out by more powerful forces. It is usually under Chapter VII of UN charter.

Preventive diplomacy/conflict prevention and mediation: In order to avoid intra- or inter-state tensions and conflicts from turning violent, conflict prevention strategies are used. Using the Secretary-General's good offices, sending UN missions ahead of time, or engaging in conflict mediation under the Department of Political Affairs' direction are all examples of conflict prevention measures. A diplomatic strategy known as preventive diplomacy aims to restrict the spread of conflicts when they do arise, prevent new conflicts from erupting between parties, and stop existing conflicts from becoming larger ones.

Peacemaking: Peacemaking typically requires diplomatic action to bring adversarial parties to a negotiated settlement and addresses ongoing disputes. It is possible for the UN Secretary-General to use his or her good offices to aid in the conflict's settlement.

Protection of civilian: All aspects of a peacekeeping mission, including civilian, military, and police duties, fall under the umbrella of the Protection of Civilians (POC) responsibility. Many times, peacekeeping missions are permitted to use all necessary means, including the use of deadly force, to stop or stop threats of physical violence against civilians, if they do so within their scope of operations and without jeopardizing their relationship with the host government.

War crimes: War Crimes are extreme violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that put protected people and/or things in danger or violate key international norms, and for which offenders may be held personally liable.

Responsibility to protect (R2P): A political commitment to put an end to the worst types of violence and persecution is embodied in the duty to protect. It was a product of the 2005 World Summit, in which more than 170 heads of state participated. It argues that it is the duty of every State to defend its citizens from crimes against humanity, such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes.

Military Contingents: Military Units deployed in Peacekeeping missions from various Troops Contributing Countries are called Military Contingents

Regional organization: To encourage political, cooperative, and economic integration among member states within a certain geopolitical boundary, regional organizations are created. However, the boundaries and demarcations that define a specific and distinctive geography, like continents, or geopolitics and economic blocs, define their membership.

Collective security: An attack on one state will be seen as an attack on all states, according to the fundamental tenet of collective security. All nations will care about each other's security as if it were their own security at risk as security becomes everyone's priority.

Chapter VI: Chapter VI of UN related to UNSC is also called pacific settlement of disputes. As per the provision stated in this Chapter, the Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Chapter VII: Chapter VII of UN related to UNSC is characterized by action with respect to threats to the Peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. According to article 39 of UN charter, The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall

make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII: Chapter VIII of UN is referred to regional arrangement for the settlement of disputes. It states that nothing in the current Charter prohibits the creation of regional organizations or arrangements for resolving issues related to maintaining international peace and security that are appropriate for regional action, provided that these organizations or arrangements and their operations are in line with the goals and principles of the United Nations.

Contingents: Military Battalions which are deployed in UNPKO are referred as Contingents.

Permanent five members (P5): The Security Council has five permanent members-the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom-collectively known as the P5. Any one of them can veto a resolution.

Veto power: A specific voting right known as the right to veto was conferred to permanent five member states of the Security Council. The drafters agreed that the resolution or decision would not be adopted if even one of the five permanent members of the 15-member Security Council voted against it.

Elected 10 (E10 members): Elected Ten members are ten non-permanent members of UNSC which are elected by 2/3rd majority votes of UN General Assembly. They are elected for two years term on regional basis- five from Asia and Africa, two from Latin American States, one from Eastern Europe States and two from Western Europe and Other States. They participate in UNSC decision making but don't have right of veto.

Intelligence: Intelligence refers to credible and valid information achieved from reliable source. Raw information is processed in different analytical process resulting in intelligence.

Robust peacekeeping: UN peacekeeping missions are not a means of enforcing laws. However, if necessary to protect themselves or carry out their mandate, they may deploy force at the tactical level with the Security Council's approval. The Security Council has granted UN peacekeeping operations robust mandates in some tense circumstances, empowering them to use all necessary means to thwart violent attempts

to obstruct the political process, defend civilians from imminent physical attack, and/or support the national authorities in upholding law and order.

Sector Commander: Military Commander of the designated Sector within the setup of military structure of UN mission.

Force Commander: Topmost Military official appointed in the mission who exercises overall control over the military contingents, military staff officers and liaison officers.

Host nation: Host Nation refers to the Country where peacekeeping/ peace enforcement missions are deployed.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon (NBC Weapon): Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons release radioactive, chemical, or biological agents to harm or contaminate or damage targets.

Weapon of mass destruction: A nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, or other device designed to cause widespread devastation is referred to as a weapon of mass destruction.

Status of force agreement (SOFA): A status of forces agreement (SOFA), which outlines the legal arrangement between the host government and the UN, including the application of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, is required for each peacekeeping mission.

Status of mission agreement (SOMA): An agreement between an international organization and a State in which the former has deployed a mission, typically in effect for a specific but renewable period, that regulates the rights, duties, obligations, and activities of that mission vis-à-vis the host State is referred to as a status of mission agreement.

Status of unit requirement (SUR): The general employment concept, capabilities, capability standards, and tasks for the unit are described in this Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR). Contingents deployed in the UN missions are obliged to carry out operational activities as stated in the Status of Unit Requirement.

Memorandum of understanding (MOU): (MOU) generally refers to the agreement between a nation that provides troops or police and the UN regarding the

personnel, large pieces of equipment, and self-sustainment capability to be deployed as part of a single military or police contingent to a specific peacekeeping mission.

Terrorism: Terrorism is defined as the deliberate use of violence to spread terror among a people and so achieve a specific political goal. Right- and left-leaning political organizations, nationalist and religious organizations, revolutionaries, and even governmental entities like militaries, intelligence agencies, and police have all engaged in acts of terrorism.

Counter terrorism: All efforts carryout out to defeat terrorism is called Counter Terrorism.

Reforming the United Nations Security Council's structure: Reformation of UNSC structure is not focused in recommending or exploring inclusion of any state and suggesting concrete structure of UNSC in permanent and non permanent category, however only existing structural and procedural gaps in functioning mechanism UNSC and its implications to global peace and security affairs has been studied . It also covers reformation required in UNSC's tools for the maintenance of international peace and security in view of prevailing and emerging security threats with respect to its major international peace and security related responsibilities as stated in UN Charter.

International peace and security perspective: Promotion of key responsibilities a of UNSC for the maintenance of global peace and security through international armed forces mobilisation with legitimate authority of UNSC resolution which includes : POC and R2P duties , non use of veto for POC/R2P against spirit of UN Charter, safeguarding sovereignty of nations from any external aggression.

Major tools of UNSC for maintenance of international peace and security: Use of veto Power by P5 member international peace and security affairs, promotion of collective security and collective defense, authorization of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions for R2P and POC through international armed forces deployment in conflict zone. This also includes robust armed intervention in collective security, collective defense and peace enforcement.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical literatures

Kant (1795) discussed about the theory of political idealism. The theory strongly believes in the norms and demonstrates the firm stand opposing the international conflicts and any sort of war and believes in peaceful coexistence and harmonious relations amongst the nation states eliminate distrust and conflict in international community promoting morale values. It strongly supports the presence of international institutions like UN and binding international laws across the globe. The idealist approach advocates on the power of the moral and ethical value which can not only be developed by the country self but also helps entire world to eradicate evils like war, injustice, use of brutal force, autocracy, atrocities and human rights violation. The theory is relevant to discuss these factors within UN system and find possible approach for betterment in order to meet the challenges posed by the contemporary world.

Proudhon (1840) declared himself as propagator of theory of anarchy and stated that real laws of society are not dependent and related to authority and generator of these laws is the society itself. Miller (n.d.) further explained about nature and characteristics of this theory. In other sense, in absence of authority or the governing body also natural social orders are generated. Anarchism as political theory believes in the absence of central authority or legitimate government to rule. Anarchy in international system also doesn't recognise the existence of international and regional organisation like UN to govern, rule or regulate the states. The promoters of anarchism states UN as controlled by the powerful states and unable to respond effectively in any international crisis where there is involvement of powerful states. This type of situation has created states to believe in self-help doctrine and they are involved in unhealthy competitions to strengthen their security. Hence, theory of anarchism itself supports the drawbacks in present UNSC structure and demands restructure UNSC which attempts should be to establish self as global authority body of governance in crisis.

Kaplan (1955) developed six models of international system. The core belief of international system theory is that international relation operates on a system and states are the basic actors of this system. His six models are also considered to be reflection of global political organization which are balance of power system, loose bipolar system,

tight bipolar system, universal actor system, hierarchical system/ Unipolar World Model and Unit veto system (Kaplan, 1955). According to Kaplan international system consists of different actors and sub system. Set of international actors are again divided international actors and super national actors. He has considered USSR, UK and France and alliances like NATO as super national actor. Amongst those systems universal system recognizes the existence of international organization like UN which can effectively handle global political affairs.

Morgenthau (1948) describes the realism as one of the pertinent theories of international relation. The theory states conflict between the states as well as struggle for power is rooted in human nature where human beings are involved in power seeking and state as human community reflects that nature. According to him the primary concern of the state is to promote national security and visualizes alliances between the states are short term where ultimate interest is concerned with own security and promoting own national interest. The theory describes human nature as evil and selfish. It doesn't recognize the fact that the international institution like UN can impose authoritative directions of international law so anarchy is related accordingly, and mighty states can drive their activities in the way they desire. Theory of realism recognizes state as the powerful actor and mainly revolves around the fact that every state is adhered to and driven by its national interest. When realist theory is related to role of different countries under UN umbrella, they are also pursuing their national interest using the platform of UN in different organs and departments.

Kindleberg (1970) formulated hegemonic theory which was later developed as hegemonic stability theory by George Modelski, Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner in mid 1970s. This theory mainly emphasizes on the existence of single mighty power which can influence the world economy and security or in the other sense it believes in the unipolar world. The decline of hegemonic power results in instability in the world since there will be the situation of power clash and competition against other states in bipolar and multipolar world. Hegemonic stability theory strongly supports the unipolar world. Hegemonic stability theory in context of reforming UNSC can be related to the hegemony of P5 nations in dealing with global security, political and economic affairs. But if viewed from another perspective, non uniformed power distribution in the name of veto power amongst the P5 nations has brought a multi polarity in UNSC, interest of different nations within P5 countries is different which is deviating UN while

performing its primary responsibility of establishing global peace and security. Hegemonic attitude seems dominant in maintaining its power influence over the weaker states.

Waltz (1979) propagated theory of neo-realism which is also considered as structural realism. The theory identifies power politics as most significant factor in international relations. There are six fundamental concepts in neorealist school of thought: anarchy, structure, capability, the distribution of power, polarity and national interest (Waltz, 1979). Waltz explains basic components of international politics not non state actors like EU, UN, NATO, MNC and other NGOs and insists in state centric world. He considered function of each nation is same and it does not differ with power of nation. So, in his view weaker states are same as mighty. Though function of state is same but there is difference in capabilities. This type of armament race will create an environment to create lethal weapons which will have adverse effect in global security. By virtue of acquired capability states behaves itself in international arena and try to impose hegemonic behavior in international politics. Capability enrichment makes a state powerful in international politics. States are interested towards their security with respect to the other states and it creates unhealthy competition. Here, UNSC structure can be considered as multipolar where equal power of veto is vested amongst P5 members. The veto power nations can impose veto on any substantial issues like enrollment of new states in UNGA, enlargement and structural reform of UNSC and passing any UNSC resolution against the invasion of sovereign states by mighty states, grave humanitarian issues caused by state and non-state actors and international sanctions against state posing threat on international security.

Waltz's theory of defensive realism states anarchical nature of international system compels states to be more concerned for the maximization of their own security and aggressive foreign policy is counterproductive. For ensuring their security, they adopt mild and reserve policy. Theory of defensive realism defines primary goal of states as survival and security, and it is not necessary to adopt the aggressive posture for ensuring own security. Aggression, expansion, and competition are likely to provoke other states to response the aggressive behavior from the other state as a result conflicting environment and security dilemma become more complex. The adherence to balance of power concept encourages states to adopt moderate foreign policy instead of aggressive foreign policy. States are primarily interested in maintaining existing balance

of power. Maximization of own security is a tool which reduces the competition in international relations. The nations are involved in maximization of their own security without adopting aggressive strategy (Waltz, 1979).

Onuf (1989) has analyzed theory of constructivism and emphasized on the presence of global and regional security communities which are driven through shared norms and collective interest. It emphasizes on the fact that nation's foreign policy is always driven by interest of it but there is significant role of historical traditions, cultural and social aspects. In opposition of the neo-realist school, this theory believes in the fact that rules and norms are the factors which guides states what to do and not to do. International relations are socially constructed and international laws, sovereignty and diplomatic norms are the vital factors shaping the behavior of States.

Mearsheimer (2001) has discussed about theory of offensive realism stating that for their own security states general tendency is to maximize the power and this tendency is continued since greed of acquiring power is unlimited and their aspiration is always to become influential as well as dominant power in international system. Here, hegemonic attitude, dominance and aggressive strategy are a tool to ensure security of specific nation state. To gain this status, states formulate offensive strategy. He has defined global power politics in terms of bipolarity, balanced multi polarity, and unbalanced multi polarity (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Palmer and Perkins (2001) highlight how balance of power theory has been practiced in international system. He has carried out detail examination and thorough analysis of three vital dimensions national interest, national policy and instrument of power which every nation has to take consideration to promote self in national, regional and international forums. When we talk about the structure of UN and power vested in different bodies, there is no check and balance in the decision taken by UNSC in dealing with the international peace and security affairs and other vital decisions like enrollment and recognition of new member states as member of UN. In addition, any structural reforms of the UN are also authorized by UNSC by virtue of its power to deal with any substantial issues.

Tsebeli (2002) has described veto player as one who has in his power to prevent change from status quo. The theory is very relevant to the present status of issues related to reforming of UNSC. Despite of repeated attempts by different stakeholders, the issue

of reforming has not come to the concrete end due to the tendency of reluctance by the P5 countries. They have authority to impose veto in vital issues related to UN actions related to international peace and security as well as enrollment of new member states in UNGA and enlargement modality of UNSC. The P5 has authority to impose the policies or any procedural change in current provisions that make any substantial changes. As theory describes, P5 seems in favor of status quo, and they don't want to share the power and many privileges they are enjoying since the establishment of UN. The theory further explains veto power as a tool to enhance the interest of specific nation.

Harvey (2005) has elaborated various dimensions of neoliberalism which is opposing theory of realism and neo-realism. The theory strongly supports that despite of anarchical international system cooperation between the nation states is possible in multidimensional areas. States has to follow the widely accepted norms and values set by international institutions and work under international institution. It highly emphasized the role of international institutions to promote peace, security, stability, cooperation between the states and global change.

Palmer and Perkins (2007) interpret collective security stated in UN charter mentioning that for the concept of collective security to be effective it must be capable enough to withstand and repel any type of aggression by powerful states or the combination of states against any member state and full effort and appeal should be rendered to make counter action validated and justified in the international forum. Capability to withstand any type of aggression is by virtue of UNSC resolution and commitment to provide military and all sorts of assistance by P5 countries and all member states of UN. It can validate the actions taken since all the member states are signatories to the provision stated in UN charter. Seeing the tendency of UN counter actions in some of the aggression of the past, its capability to withstand any type of aggression under the provision of collective security is in question. The core concepts of collective security and collective defense is same in terms of joint security measures, but collective security is the global concept to cater with all forms of possible threats whereas collective defense is considered as alliance security where some group of countries forms alliance in terms of their common security against any aggression. The provisions stated in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or former Warsaw pact before the disintegration of USSR can be considered as the collective defense concept. Alliances formed on the concept of collective defense can create multi polarity which is

considered to be less stable in terms of international peace and security.

Stolberg (2010) considers state as the main actor in international system. He emphasized that state as the legal actors under the norms and values of international system has legitimate authority to govern its people and in due course of governance they have authority to use force in legal way. In his view, other states of the international system have to accept their sovereignty. Sovereign equality of all member States means all States have equal status in terms of sovereignty and there is no discrimination amongst them in international forums, the aspect is well defined principally in UN charter.

Tammen, Kugler and Lemke (2017) have mentioned the power transition theory as a structural model which helps to analyze the shift in global power dynamics. Power transition theory discusses on the change of international hierarchy and mention about ascending and declining powers in due course of time. He states it as a probabilistic theory and tool of foreign policy both. As probabilistic theory it is useful to predict conflict and cooperation at international, regional, national as well as sub national level. As a tool of foreign policy, it also shapes the alliances and counter alliances shift. This tendency is also a concern related to security and stability of the world. The power dynamics and interaction in international relation will not be a constant factor and changes with time. Superpowers in world politics will not be same always. The rise and fall of power happen and there will not always the situation of status quo. When power transition theory is related to reforming of UNSC, incorporation of new permanent members in UNSC seems a discussion issue since emerging power like India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan are strongly raising voice that they are in competing power status with P5 members like China, Russia, Britain and France and deserve permanent membership in UNSC.

Hooghe, Lenz and Marks (2019) have mentioned about the post-functionalist theory of International Organization. The book tries to highlight the differences between different international organization in terms of the membership and governance model. The theory defines post functionalist theory of governance as collective decision making in the expectation of obedience. The theory also strongly supports governance as system which ensures sense of physical security and security in all dimensions including education, economic, social, cultural areas. When we discuss about answer to decision making procedure of UNSC, we can see that UNSC decision are not as per the collective

interest. Any substantial decision issues and issues related to international peace and security needs consent of all P5 members.

Mariotti (2020) has mentioned about the genesis and historical development and different approaches related to this theory. Elite theory which was developed by the Italian theorist at the end of nineteenth century and beginning of twentieth century believes in the fact that power is in the hand of some elites who are wise, enlightened and in few numbers. When this theory is related to UNSC structure, the P5 countries possesses the position of political elites in decision making whereas E10 countries are non-elites in terms of power authorized with them.

In the context of corporate world Kowalski (2021) in his article has defined business reforming or any organisational reform as a process that can address unsatisfactory status quo which in other sense is unsatisfactory performance. He has highlighted the need of meticulous strategic planning with full of innovative ideas. Primary theoretical basis of reforming of any organisation is that the current organisation has not performed accordingly because of the policy gaps in its implementation or within the domain of current policy and organisational structure, organisation is not able to cope up with the roles and responsibilities it must perform as per the situational demand. Reforming of UNSC is also to be viewed with policy gaps existed in charters and demand created by present world to deal with multi-dimensional aspects of security.

2.2 Empirical Literatures

Reninger (1988) mainly projects the theme of the roundtable conference organized by UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research) and USSR association for the United Nations in Moscow in the year 1988. It includes the series of background papers concerning political and military aspects of military security, world economic problems and global approach to development and North-South relations and challenge to the United Nations. The book has not amply covered concrete framework required in the structural change in terms of Security Council and also drawbacks in the present provisions and expanding the role of Security Council in wider perspective of security.

Franek and Morrison (1995) state the need of reforming of the UNSC and issues to be addressed while reforming it. According to them, when considering the

composition of the UNSC, among other views, the following points arise: the establishment of permanent regional seats (to be rotated among the members of various regional groups), the role of the veto as anachronistic and undemocratic and its possible abolition, the fact that the present P5 members happen to also be nuclear-weapon states, and of course, which country or countries would receive permanent membership, if any at all (Franek and Morrison, 1995). Permanent members are assured representation on any UN Committee, enjoy extraordinary access to information, and can influence events worldwide most notably with their veto, which gives permanent members enormous bargaining power in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. In determining who should be granted permanent seats, the focus tends to be on whether a country is capable of carrying out the responsibilities of a Security Council member. This is useful in analyzing the relevancy of veto power while recommending suggested model and alternatives to issue of veto power.

Vedantam (1996) highlights about the successes and failures of the UN creating awareness about what the UN actually is and what could realistically be expected to represent in future. The objective is to discuss some proposals for reforming and renewing the UN system for a much more active role by the world organization in the future. The book also raises the questions about the UNSC that what exactly should be the criteria for permanent membership whether based on population or economic power. The book is useful in analyzing the historical perspective of UN's involvement in various conflict resolution missions and draw deduction on different strengths and weaknesses.

Kayathwal (1997) highlights the reforming of the United Nations in order to meet both political and economic challenges. It has also suggested several reform proposals concerning Security Council, peace keeping operations and financial constraints faced by the United Nations. A chapter in this book entitled 'reforming the United Nations' calls for the strengthening of major United Nations bodies to carry out policy work related to the world development issues.

Saroohi (1999) highlights about the exercise by UNSC of its Chapter VII power for the restoration of international peace and security. He critically analyzes the legal analysis of institutional mechanism used by UNSC for achieving its mandate and explains various cases how UNSC is delegating authority to various subsidiary organs, member states and regional blocs as well allies due to lack of own resources and

standing military force.

Sutterlin (2000) deals about the paradigm shift in nature of conflict from interstate to intrastate and challenges faced by UN to deal with conflicts. He focused its study in finding the scopes for the improvement of UNSC in post-cold war era which is characterized by the conflicts and security threats of different nature demanding new security approach to deal with. Carrying out the historical analysis of UN involvement, the book emphasizes on implementation of lesson learnt from preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, peace building and peace enforcement which were practiced by UN in different regions with conflicts of varied nature in order to meet with the realities of paradigm shift in the concept of security.

Eitel (2000) covers mainly about UNSC structure and working methods, its future contribution to international law and possible challenges to the development of international law. The writer analyses how UN actions and provisions mentioned in UN Charter are interlinked with International Laws. The writer mainly emphasizes that action of UNSC and provisions mentioned in different UN Charter should promote international law despite of being a political organ. The article is very useful to study structural and procedural part of functioning within UNSC, power dynamics among P5 members and discrepancies between P5 and non-permanent members and future road map of UN to promote international law.

Gharekhan (2006) describes the functioning of the most important organ of the UN i.e., UNSC. It describes in systemic chronology how the UNSC handled the crisis and come to the decision of their response modality in different conflict effected regions of the world since the end of cold war era. The conflicts covered in the book include the first Gulf War 1991, Rwanda Genocide, Iraq intervention by NATO forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom etc. The main issue raised in the book is about effective functioning of UNSC while dealing with different international crisis.

Luck (2006) provides comprehensive coverage about operation of UNSC in alignment to the mandates given to it, principal aim of establishment and evaluates the performance of Council in different span of time. It also highlights the necessity to transform its role in order to cope up with the emerging challenges. Author also highlights the need to evaluate the performance and future course to be taken for effective functioning in order to meet global aspirations. He adds that council has faced

many upheavals since its establishment, stood firm and recommends the change to meet challenges and drive the future course with confidence.

Cox (2009) highlights mainly about various proposals for the reform of the UNSC, the positions of different P5 members like USA, Russia and Britain, issue of veto power, various models for the reforming of UNSC including regional plans for the inclusion of member state in regional basis for the expansion of UNSC. The article narrates and analyses various proposals for the reform of UNSC. The article gives good background knowledge about working mechanism of UNSC as well as different models for reforming of UNSC however detail rationale about reforming of present UNSC structure, eligibility criteria for permanent members by different emerging as well as different regional powers, strength and weaknesses of veto power vested to P5 members of UNSC narrating detail historical account of using it in national interest is not covered well.

Rodriguez (2010) analyses the various attempts made for reforming of UNSC giving main emphasis on intergovernmental negotiations launched in 2009. It covers the scopes which includes background, UNSC reform till world summit outcome 2005, the main negotiating groups and proposals, the facilitators' report and analytical overview of the intermediary/interim approach, impact of intermediary approach on issues under negotiations with concluding comments. Dissertation also covers drawbacks of present UNSC structure and mainly analyses the different proposals like High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, In Larger Freedom Report and World Summit Outcome 2005. It also provides coverage on different negotiating groups and proposals like The G4, Uniting for consensus, The African Group along with other proposals and issues. Under Chapter the Facilitators' Report and Analytical Overview of the Intermediary/ Interim Approach, it covers UNGA's 61st session and the Facilitators Report, UNGA's 62nd session, origin of intermediary/Interim Approach, main elements of the interim approach, intergovernmental negotiations and stands of main negotiating parties on the issue.

Snyman (2012) states reforming of the UNSC as one of the crucial and pressing international issue of contemporary world. It states that the changing international realities since its inception in 1945 had a big impact on the functioning and structure of the UN and reform of the international institution is therefore increasingly proposed and debated. The article highlights about importance and role of regionalism in reforming of

UN. The article further states that in the negotiations surrounding the drafting of the UN Charter, the struggle between universalist and regionalist sentiments was prominent. Although the Charter displays distinct Universalist features, subsequent practice indicates that more weight has been given to regionalism by the UN than an obvious reading of the Charter suggests. The composition, structure and decision-making processes of the UN display certain regionalist features.

Niemetz (2013) discusses about increasing legitimacy of UN decision making procedures in dealing with various issues related to global peace and security which is mainly the domain of UNSC. Writer tries to address four issues which are: UNSC membership and voting, working methodology, inter-relation between UNGA and UNSC and UNSC relation with civil society. The writer foresees possible approaches for the reform of UNSC which will provide credibility and accountability to all the actions taken by UNSC in issues of global peace and security to UNGA, global public forum, all UN members and NGOs deployed across the globe which will consequently make UN's decision making procedure legitimate, widely accepted, accountable and effective. The dissertation doesn't provide comprehensive model of UNSC which could address the current discrepancies in decision making of UNSC in the issues of global peace and security.

Khan (2015) emphasized on necessity for the expansion of UNSC, various attempts made for the reform of UNSC and examines the crucial aspect of effect on global security affairs after expansion of UNSC. It also examines how South Asian region and regional rivalry Pakistan is being influenced if India becomes the permanent member of UNSC as per the reform proposal and structural change. The thesis examines the reform issues in the chapter named The UNSC's role in conflict resolution, need for the expansion of the UNSC, current reform proposals: analysis and implications. The thesis lacks the concrete historical account on reform efforts since establishment of UNSC, complete coverage of UNSC response in various crises including response in Syrian civil war, Crimea crisis and suggested model of representation based on various reform proposals.

Einsiedel, Malone and Ugarte (2015) covers mainly about competing interest on the Security Council, addressing thematic issues, enforcing council mandates, evolving institutional factors and key country cases. Similarly, Nadin (2016) provides comprehensive coverage of present status and future possibilities of UNSC reform. This

book mainly focuses on varied responsibilities of UNSC, historical background and genesis of reform efforts, framework for the expanded council, issue of reforms related to working methodology and enhancing various agencies. The author has tried to reflect the reality of present world and compares with the structure of UNSC where great powers having parallel status with some countries in P5 category are excluded in permanent structure of UNSC. It also states that council does not reflect the power dynamics and geopolitical reality of twenty first century.

Indian Journal of International Law (2017) mainly focused on ineffective response of UN Security Council in Syrian crisis and use of veto power by some P5 members for their national interest. This article states how UN is paralyzed in responding to humanitarian catastrophe of Syria. The article is greatly useful in deducting alternatives to UN Security Council role with response to crisis resulting humanitarian catastrophe if consensus has not been there within P5 members.

Dorosh and Ivasechko (2018) discuss about critical analysis of UNSC performance during Russian Federation's military aggression against Ukraine which was initiated with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The writers criticize UNSC becoming irresponsive deviating from the mandates of maintenance of international peace and security. They strongly argue that due to involvement of veto power country i.e., Russian Federation UNSC remained ideal and could not intervene a serious breach of international peace and security.

Autesserre (2019) mainly focused on deep insight of UN peacekeeping efforts in order to maintain peace and security in conflict torn areas and highlights the underlying causes of peacekeeping missions which were not able to carry out their mandate due to varied reasons. He contends that in many deployments, they are powerless to significantly stop violence as it occurs. In other instances, they assist in holding elections and claim victory, but the underlying problems that sparked the conflict are still unresolved, making the situation precarious and likely to quickly return to violence.

Muhammad (2020) focuses mainly on African view on reforming of UNSC. The article mainly highlights about the different criteria justifying the involvement of African Nations as the permanent membership of UNSC. The article quotes the proposal made by the then secretary General of UN Kofi Anan who had also proposed the plan

for the enlargement of UNSC and also advocated for the involvement of African Nations.

The empirical literature reviewed above has traced out the different dimensions and approach for reformation of the UN and UNSC. Every literature has highlighted that structural and procedural change in UNSC is inevitable due to change in world order since establishment of UN in 1945. Threat to international peace and security has also been changed from interstate conflict to intra state conflict. The warfare today can be defined in terms of asymmetric, hybrid and irregular warfare. To meet the challenges posed by security complexities UN has to reform it in order to meet these challenges effectively. The world has witnessed the inter-state conflict also in limited form where the conflict between the states is also not in the form of total war. One of the main concerns is to bring harmony and cordial relationship between the states and promote the provision of collective security, sovereign equality and establishment of democratic norms and values while exercising global governance by UN in international issues.

2.3 Synthesis of Literatures

The dissertation focuses on various key issues related to reformation of UNSC and revitalization of its tools: veto power, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions for effective POC, R2P and collective security for the establishment of global peace and security. The reformation in UNSC mainly revolves around security implications of current structural and voting procedures and role of UNGA in decision making while dealing with international peace and security affairs. Existing literatures lacks concrete modality of revitalized and robust peacekeeping/peace enforcement tool when nation itself is perpetrator in deteriorating international peace and security posing serious threat to POC and R2P. The majority of reform proposals preserve the veto power by current P5 members. Clarity is required in the aspect that whether enlarged UNSC with veto power without adopting democratic norms of the decision making in substantial issues is appropriate to solve the problem faced by UNSC in dealing with various threats detrimental to international peace and security again. G4 (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan) stand for the enlarged UNSC including them as rising power is opposed by Uniting for consensus group (UfC). The modality for the enhanced role of UNGA and strengthening 'Uniting for Peace' tool of UNSC remain not deliberately

addressed. The concrete framework for the implementation of collective security by using international force with global commitment and ownership also requires clarity. There are very few discussions on reformation of UNSC and its impact and significance to Nepal in terms of collective security and top contributor in UN peace operations.

Moreover, literatures strongly suggest that 'change in UNSC is inevitable'. They also strongly emphasize that structure of present UNSC needs to be enlarged with additional members in both permanent and non-permanent category and gives general idea on revitalizing peacekeeping missions, R2P and POC tools.

2.4 Research Gaps

The UN Charter's objective of collective security/defense and sovereign equality has not been implemented as per the global expectation. The UNSC voting process, the frequent use of veto power by P5 members-even during humanitarian crises like Syria-and the disproportionate representation of member states in permanent and non-permanent categories all demonstrate the glaring discrepancy between theory and practice. When state sovereignty is at risk, such as in Ukraine, similar flaws arise in the application of collective security. Even though everyone agrees that change is constant, there hasn't been any major modification to the UNSC's structure since 1945. The UN Charter is vague about when structural and procedural reviews should take place, despite the fact that organizational change should be periodic and should adjust roles and duties to changing environments.

The majority of the reviewed material emphasizes the need for reform by highlighting the shortcomings of the current UNSC organization and its peace and security capabilities. There are still gaps, meanwhile, in the areas of collective security implementation, alternatives to the veto system, and the efficiency of POC, R2P, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Furthermore, more research is necessary to fully understand the importance of UNSC reform in the unique context of Nepal. These research gaps offer an opportunity to investigate ways to improve the effectiveness of the UNSC and its instruments in preserving global peace and security.

- (a) Entrusting global peace and security affairs only in UNSC undermines the Sovereign Equality of All Nations as mentioned in the UN Charter. It maintains hegemony of UNSC as a whole and P5 nations sidelining global umbrella

organization of all nations UNGA. Effective international peace and security needs global participation and ownership. There is need of study on balancing the role of UN General Assembly and Security Council to address global security affairs adhering to 'Balance of Power Theory'. There is also need on study for strengthening 'Uniting for Peace' tool of UNGA which empowers it on global peace and security affairs.

(b) Veto power which is a mighty tool given P5 nation of UNSC is mostly utilized in the promotion of their national interest adhering to the theory of 'Realism'. This authority is not given to other 10 elected members of UNSC. There is some disastrous humanitarian crisis witnessed due to exercise of veto power by a single P5 country of UNSC. Appropriate modality for decision as well as action in global peace and security related affairs by UNSC under the norms of globally accepted democratic norms of governance is required.

(c) Sovereignty of UN members is protected through the concept of 'Collective Security' and 'Collective Defense'. There is gap observed in implementation of 'Collective Security' and 'Collective Defense'. 'Might is Right' and ineffectiveness of UNSC to safeguard the sovereignty of weaker nation when mighty nation is aggressor has raised big question mark on credibility of UNSC. The ways ahead for strengthening 'Collective Security' and 'Collective Defense' needs to be studied in detail for future of UN.

(d) Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are vital tools of UNSC. They are principal means for the implementation of POC and R2P through various peace operations. There are many gaps observed in UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. There is lack of concrete peace enforcement model and global commitment. Appropriate model of strengthening peacekeeping and peace enforcement operation is required. Despite of global effort, maintenance of status quo in UNSC structure and decision making mechanism in global peace and security affairs have raised many issues related to sustainability of UN. Significance as well as impacts of reforming UNSC and its tools with international peace and security perspective needs to be studied to prevent it from becoming second 'League of Nations'.

(e) UN was formed during post WW II scenario based on geopolitical and geo strategic reality of that time and there are many gaps observed in UN

charter based reviewing present geopolitical, geostrategic and world security dynamics. Study on identification of gaps in Charter of UN, rewriting the Charter as per the spirit of democratic norms and values and ownership of all the member states to establish peace, security and stable world is required to enhance the credibility of UN in global forum.

(f) Countries falling under small, least developed, affected by climate change and significant contributor in UNPO like Nepal has two major concerns on reformation of UNSC and its tools for the establishment of global peace and security: safeguarding sovereignty with strengthened collective security and its participation in global peace and security affairs as pioneer troops contributing country in UNPO. Thus, there is need to study on significance of reformation of UNSC and opportunities for countries like Nepal.

Other researchers have done a lot of research in restructuring of the UNSC in structural aspects i.e. models for the addition of new members in permanent and non permanent category. In contrast, this dissertation has focused in finding the critical gaps in implementation of UNSC's tools – veto power, collective security, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, POC and R2P and finds out the way for the effective implementation of these tools for the maintenance of the international peace and security. In addition, significance of reforming the tools of UNSC and its implication to small country like Nepal is studied.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 General Framework

This chapter has provided a framework of methodology adopted in due course of research to fulfill the research objectives. It comprises of research design, research philosophy, nature and sources of data, data collection method, sampling, data analysis method, study area and time, methodological limitation, reliability and validity of data, ethical consideration and conceptual framework of the study.

In this dissertation, the researcher has specifically dealt how the present structural and procedural aspects of UNSC have affected UNSC tools in carrying out its roles and responsibilities effectively for the establishment of global peace and security. To make the scope of dissertation concise amongst wider dimensions of security affairs within domain of UNSC, effect of conflict on human physical security and sovereignty of UN member states has been kept as central theme and analyzed within perspective of the implication of veto power in global security affairs, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) duty, collective security, effective functioning of UN peace operations with respect to the Protection of Civilians (POC) and peace enforcement operations. In due course, researcher endeavors to fulfill the research objectives with the chapters which have been organized thematically.

3.2 Research Design

The research design of this dissertation is qualitative, descriptive and exploratory. The methodology describes and analyzes pertinent theories of IR like theory of realism, constructivism, power transition theory, hegemonic stability theory and theory of neoliberalism. In addition, theories like sovereign equality of all nations mentioned in UN Charter are analyzed correlating with both independent and dependent variables identified. Documents related to UN charter, various UNGA resolutions, published high level reports related to reformation of UNSC, various articles, books and dissertations on related issues. In addition, views of Subject Matter Expertise (SMEs) as key informant having exposure of UN environment and working mechanism has been documented and analyzed through Key Informant Interview (KII) with both structured and semi structured questionnaires. Questionnaires are open-ended and close-ended questions on various issues of reforming UNSC and its tools linked with international

peace and security.

The research process starts with the collection of relevant data, then analysis and assessment to compose a coherent picture of the problem and ends finally with evaluation of views and findings of other researchers in order to draw conclusions about the necessity of reforming the UN Security Council in changing world order with global peace and security perspective. Questionnaires and issue of discussions are mainly focused on key areas of security: collective security, implication of veto power in global security affairs, enhancing effectiveness of UNPKO in Protection of Civilian (POC), Responsibility to Protect (R2P), terrorism, transnational challenges and other areas of emerging threats.

The research follows inductive approach of discussions and analysis related to pertinent issues of the reformation of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security. The relevant data collected after having thorough analysis and interpretation leads to findings and conclusion in the form of theoretical insights supported by evidence that guide useful reform suggestions of UNSC's tools for the establishment of global peace and security.

3.3 Research Philosophy

The existence of UNSC, its authority and various tools for the establishment of international peace and security is enshrined in UN Charter. The need of reforming the UNSC and its tools is emphasized in various high level reports of the UN itself, dissertations, books and research articles as well. The gaps and lapses in UNSC's performance have been observed in carrying out its various responsibilities related to international peace and security. Hegemonic status quo mentality of P5 has been observed to preserve present structural and procedural aspects of UNSC. There also exists strong stand of emerging powers to curtail hegemony of P5 in global peace and security affairs and reform UNSC and its tools as per the change in global threat and security dynamics. Realist ontology views UNSC as a tool for great power interests rather than committing for international peace and security, liberal institutional ontology emphasize on sovereign equality of all nations and democratic UNSC and constructivist ontology emphasize on role of international organizations, civil society ,shared beliefs, global norms and humanitarian principles. Hence, ontological approach is that there are multiple realities or truth in the various issues of reforming UNSC and

its tools in the context of changing global power dynamics with view of international peace and security. This dissertation adopts the belief of epistemology that knowledge related to reformation of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security could be acquired with extensive analysis of the case studies related to UNSC involvement in global security affairs, observation and interactions with subject matter expertise and interpreted to discover the main problem. Hence, combination of this ontological and epistemological stand both makes the research paradigm of this dissertation as constructivism i.e. reality is not singular in nature, there are many realities on the issues related to reformation of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security and knowledge acquired through interaction with key informants and subjective interpretation of available data.

Here ontology of reformation of the UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security is shaped by the epistemology i.e. ways of acquiring knowledge. Dissertation follows philosophical approach of interpretivism which emphasize on subjective interpretation relying on qualitative data.

The dissertation essentially adheres to the change is inevitable philosophical stand point. This viewpoint has its roots in a number of philosophical, sociological, and political ideas that contend that change is an inherent and essential component of international relations, government, and human growth. The reform of the United Nations Security Council can be successfully approached from the philosophical perspective that change is unavoidable. This viewpoint promotes understanding of the need for evolution and adaptation in response to shifting social norms, evolving security threats, and the dynamics of international relations. Since the United Nations' founding in 1945, the field of international relations has experienced substantial upheavals. These developments-such as the rise of non-state actors, new powers, and changing security threats like cyber warfare and terrorism-show that the systems in place to uphold global peace and security need to alter. Examples from history, such as modifications to the UN's peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts, the introduction of collective security, the rise of the new ideas of POC and R2P for humanitarian intervention, and the growth of the UNSC and General Assembly membership, show that reform is frequently a reaction to shifting global dynamics. According to this, the UNSC must also change. When it comes to the fundamental concerns of UNSC reform, the constructivism theory is likewise as relevant. It asserts that social constructions, such as

identities and conventions, influence international relations. Since it highlights how changing norms (such as human rights and humanitarian intervention) can spur reform in global organizations like the UNSC, the notion that change is unavoidable is consistent with constructivist philosophy. According to critical theory, calls for reform as a response to social justice and equity concerns may result from the inherent inequalities and power imbalances in the current UNSC structure (such as the veto power held by five permanent members), highlighting the necessity of change in the pursuit of justice. In this perspective, Hegelian Dialectic and Heraclitus Philosophy are also equally applied. The Hegelian concept of thesis-antithesis-synthesis suggests that conflicting ideas lead to change and development. When this dialectic is correlated in the context of the UNSC, it can be interpreted that the existing structure (thesis) faces criticism (antithesis), leading to discussions about reform (synthesis). This dynamic process illustrates that change is a fundamental aspect of progress. Heraclitus' Philosophy formulated by the ancient philosopher Heraclitus famously stated, Everything flows; nothing stands still, emphasizing the constant state of change in the universe. This idea can be applied to international governance, where the need for reform in the UNSC is a reflection of the fluid nature of global politics.

3.4 Nature and Sources of Data

Study of the reformation of the UNSC and its tools for the establishment of international peace and security in changing world from the security perspective requires primarily qualitative analysis. Data used in this dissertation have been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data have been collected basically from KII questionnaire with personnel involved in UN Headquarters-New York, UN missions and diplomatic assignment in different capacities. Secondary data are mainly from published books on UNSC reforms, journals, articles, High level UN reports, thesis, dissertations and other online sources on related topic.

The collected data has been used to describe the necessity of reforming of the UN Security Council through thorough analysis of its performance in judicial use of veto power authority vested in P5 members in maintenance of international peace and security, promotion of collective security, R2P and POC through peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement UN missions.

Table 3.1*Nature and sources of data based on research objectives*

Research Questions	Chapters and Discussions	Nature and Sources of Data
What are the major drawbacks in United Nations Security Council structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security?	Chapter 4: Background of the UN establishment and thorough study of its functioning mechanism and Chapters, Finding the gaps Veto factor vested in Permanent five members and its implication with Security Perspective. UN peacekeeping efforts, Gaps in peacekeeping operations and grounds of improvement	Primary / Secondary Data Primary: KII with high level UN officials, Diplomats, Peacekeepers Secondary: UN official Websites, UN General Assembly Discussions, Reports of High-level panel on Threat Challenges and Change, SG Kofi Anan Larger Freedom
How best reformation of the United Nations Security Council structure and its tools can be performed for the maintenance of effective international peace and security?	Discussions on various models of restructuring Size of enlarged UNSC Possible alternative of Veto power Way to enhance the effectiveness of UNPKO	Primary / Secondary Data Primary: KII with high level UN officials, Diplomats, Peacekeepers, Military Staff officers, Officers Served in UN Headquarters, High level UN military appointment holders Secondary: UN official Websites, UN General Assembly Discussions on UNSC reform, proposal of different interest groups, Reports of High-level panel on Threat Challenges and Change, SG Kofi Anan Larger Freedom, Collections of proposal in global policy forum, Dissertation and Thesis in relevant issues

What are the major impacts of reformation of United Nations Security Council structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security?	Contemporary world scenario and power dynamics Threats of the contemporary world and challenges to UN Ways to Address threats of the contemporary world. Democratic practice of the governance Sovereign Equality in Charter and in practice Significance of reforming UNSC: Opportunities and relevancy in Nepalese context	Primary / Secondary Data Primary: KII with high level UN officials, Diplomats, Peacekeepers, Military Staff officers, Officers Served in UN Headquarters, High level UN military appointment holders Secondary: UN official Websites, Reports of High-level panel on Threat Challenges and Change, SG Kofi Anan Larger Freedom, Dissertation and Thesis in relevant issues, Writings by Nepalese scholars
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Source: Created by Researcher

3.5 Data Collection Method

3.5.1 *Primary Data*

Since the reforming of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security is only known to those personnel who have knowledge of the functioning mechanism of UN and has also worked in the UN environment. The sources of primary data are following.

- (a) Civilian official served as key appointment in UN headquarters New York and other UN appointment.
- (b) Staff officers served in high level appointment in UN headquarter New York and different UN missions.
- (c) Academicians of International Relation, diplomacy and Political Science having knowledge of UN system and official served in diplomatic assignment in different countries.
- (d) Various peacekeepers from the different countries served as military staff officer, military observers and peacekeeping forces.
- (e) Significant appointments as force commander, deputy force commander, sector commander, deputy sector commander in different UN missions.

- (f) High level military official served in peacekeeping directorate and peace operations training centers.

The key informants have significant UN experiences and ample knowledge of UN environment and UNSC's working mechanism. Most of the informants are graduates of army command and staff course from Nepal and abroad which also give them ample knowledge on policy aspects of UN and its bodies. In addition, diplomats and defense attachés and scholars of international relations/ political science have thorough knowledge on policy related issues of UNSC and world power dynamics.

The crux and main theme of similar view in every question have been organized and grouped to discuss and analyzed in the related discussion. The second category of Key informants are high level UN appointment holders, military staff officers worked in UNHQ, permanent military representation at New York. Rational of selection of this group is that they have both knowledge of procedural and structural aspect of UN. Most of the respondents are from Nepal serving in different capacities. However, researcher has also explored the opinion of international dignitaries to his level best. In terms of the response from the international SME's dignitaries, views of coworkers of the researcher in his four previous UN peacekeeping mission experience have been fully utilized. The questionnaires are divided on the expertise basis where general questions in the form of mostly closed ended questionnaire and some open-ended questionnaire are asked to diplomats in capacity of the past and serving ambassadors and military officials in diplomatic assignments as defense attaché in different countries. Five sets of questionnaires are prepared. It is divided into different subsets of gathering opinion from focused group and key informant.

3.5.1.1 Key Informant Interview (KII)

The insights and description of key informants contributed to the richer understanding of the data, and various practical aspects related to reforming of the UNSC with view of structural and procedural aspects. For this purpose, key informants were divided into different categories depending upon their expertise in the subject matter with reference to the different aspects of reforming of UNSC. KII was conducted as semi-structured interview through open and closed questionnaire, personal visits, telephone calls and emails. Mainly the key informants based on their qualification were asked about the drawbacks in the structural setup of the UNSC, their view on veto power and implications to global security affairs, modality of the reforming of UNSC in terms

of permanent and non-permanent members, role of UNGA and UNSC and their analysis about the present world order. The key informants having significant experience of the UN environment has been interviewed through structured/semi structured questionnaires with open ended/ close ended questions. The interview and written response via email is used to collect insightful view of the respondents and has been analyzed and expressed in the appropriate discussions. Two categories of the key informants are involved during in depth key informants interview, and they have full flexibility to give additional remarks to get their extensive view not limiting to the questionnaire prepared. First category of the key informants are high level UN military appointment holders which includes deputy sector commanders and equivalent high level military ranks, sector commanders, director of directorate of peace keeping operation center, commandant of peacekeeping training school, deputy force commanders and force commanders.

Table 3.2

KII-Diplomats, military Attaché, and academicians of Political Science/ International Relation/Conflict Studies

Key Areas of Concerns	Types	Data collection Method	Numbers
	Serving Military Attaché other than UNHQ New York	In-depth Interview	3
	Ex Military Attaché other than UNHQ New York	In-depth Interview	3
	Academia of International Relation/Political Science/Conflict Studies	Interview	5
	Total		11

Source: Created by Researcher

Functioning mechanism and procedural aspects of UNSC has been mainly asked to top level military and civilian officials served in UN headquarter, Military officials worked in high level appointment such as deputy sector commander and similar capacity appointment, military attaché to UNHQ New York, Director of DPKO-Nepali Army, Commandant's of BPOTC-Nepali Army and other international school of peace keeping affairs, Sector Commanders, Deputy Force Commanders and Force Commander

as key informant where in-depth interview was carried out with open ended questionnaires. These key informants are selected based on the significant exposure to UN environment and their knowledge on functioning mechanism, structural set up and their knowledge about peacekeeping affairs. The majority of the appointment holders are selected on merit based on their knowledge on various dimensions of the UN environment. The following are details of the respondents.

Table 3.3

KII Top level Military and Civilian Official of UN Served in Different UN Missions

Areas of Concerns	Types	Data collection Method	Numbers
1.Veto power its effectiveness, impact on maintenance of global peace and security, view on alternative of the veto power	High level Civilian officials served in UN	In-depth Interview	1
	Military officials as capacity of Force Commander		2
	Military Officials served as capacity of Deputy Force Commander		1
2. Structural issues related to enlargement of council’s members and	Military officials Served as Sector Commander		3
	Military Officials served as		1
3. Role of UNGA and UNSC in maintaining global peace and security	Director: Directorate of Peacekeeping Operation, Nepali Army, Nepal		
	Military officials Served as Deputy Sector Commander and other significant appointment in similar capacity		7
Total			15

Source: Created by Researcher

Table 3.4

KII High level Military and Civilian Officials Worked in UNHQ, New York

Areas of Concerns	Respondents Detail	Data collection Method	Numbers
1. Structural and procedural mechanism of functioning of UNSC	Civilian Official Served as Permanent Representative in United Nations Headquarters, New York	Interview	1
2. Challenges of Peacekeeping Operations and Way to enhance it Models of reforming of UNSC	Military Officials served as Defense Attaché in New York	Interview	2
	Military/ Police officials worked as Staff appointments in UN Headquarters New York.	Interview	11
	Total		14

Source: Created by Researcher

Structural setup current UNSC provision of veto power authority has been asked to all respondents in order to gather their view and derive the general opinion. Military staff officers (MSOs) and various appointment holders at UNHQ New York also be one part Key Informant Interview mainly in the structural, procedural aspects and also to examine the effectiveness of UNPKO. Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations under various mandate has been asked to various field level UN officer peacekeepers in various capacities which is useful in streamlining the mindset and professionalism of the peacekeepers, identification of gaps in various UNPKO and suggests the way UNSC has to adopt to deploy effective, efficient and Robust peacekeeping force to carry out assigned mandate efficiently. The analysis of the data from primary source has helped to validate the deductions obtained from secondary sources.

Another cluster of KII was conducted dividing the respondents on the expertise basis. This KII is mainly focused on the enhancement of different peacekeeping operations to maintain the task of protection of civilians and effective mobilization of peacekeeping forces to carry out operational task to fulfill responsibility to protect

(R2P) duties. The participants include the contingent members from Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. The participants involved were Contingent commanders, independent company commanders, subordinate commanders, and officer corps of contingents. These informants were given both open ended and closed ended questionnaire to give their extensive view on effectiveness of different UNPKO and to some extent structural and procedural aspects of UNSC functioning. The Officer Corps use to undertake extensive training in their respective peacekeeping training center hence they are also aware of UN environment and functioning mechanism. The respondent detail of this KII is as per the following table. A set of questionnaires were prepared by using Google survey form as a contributing tool to collect relevant data. Here officer corps who participated in different UN peacekeeping operations have been asked different aspects about the effectiveness of the different UNPKO with security perspective, gaps and challenges identified in current peacekeeping operations and their recommendations to make peacekeeping operations more effective to deal with threats of the contemporary world. The questionnaire of Survey has been analyzed during to appropriate discussions in the relevant chapters. This technique was used mainly to analyze the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations, challenges faced by them and to know their opinion about the gaps in present peacekeeping missions. This has led to some findings about the effectiveness of UNPKO and way ahead.

Table 3.5

KII Contingent Commanders/ Officers Corps UN Peacekeeping Operations

Areas of Concerns	Participants Details	Data collection Method	Numbers	UNPKO mission Experience
1. Effectiveness of UNPKO in order to fulfill the mission of mandate of Protection of Civilians and R2P	Contingent commanders	Google survey	5	As Contingent Commander, Staff Officer and Contingent Members
2. Challenges of				

UNPKO				
3. Way to enhance the effectiveness of UNPKO to deal with the prevailing security threats to local populations	Operation officers/Key appointment holders	Google Survey	5	As Operation Officer, Staff Officer and Contingent Members
	Other officers	Google Survey	20	Contingent members and staff officers
Total			30	

Source: Created by Researcher

Another key informant are UN civilian staffs/military staff officers /UN Police/UN military observers who served in different capacities in force headquarters and sector headquarters of the different UNPKO. As per the job nature, these categories of the respondents know the core issues of the UNPKO, its effectiveness and grounds for improvement. They also have the significant knowledge on structural aspects, working mechanism and procedural aspects of UNSC which has been very useful to validate the deductions from the secondary sources. The details of the respondents are shown in following table.

Table 3.6

KII UN Civilian Staffs/Military Staff Officers /UN Police/Military Observer Served in Different UNPKO

Areas of Concerns	Participants Details	Data Collection Method	Numbers	UNPKO Mission Experience
1. Effectiveness of UNPKO to fulfill the mission mandate of Protection of Civilians and R2P	Military staff officers worked as branch chiefs in Sector and Force Headquarters	Google survey	5	
2. Challenges of UNPKO				
3. Way to enhance the effectiveness of UNPKO to deal with the prevailing security threats to local populations	Military staff officer worked in operation branch	Google Survey	2	
4. Structural gaps in	Military Staff officers worked in intelligence	Google Survey	5	

UNSC	branch			
5. Procedural Aspects of UNSC	Military officers in branches	Staff in other	Google Survey	28
6. Issues related to veto power, its implications and relevance				
7. Alternatives of veto power				
Total				40

Source: Created by Researcher

3.5.2 Secondary Data

3.5.2.1 Literatures and UN Based Reports

There is plethora of secondary data in different forms. In review of the literature section review of theoretical and empirical literatures has been carried out critically to find out gaps in existing literatures and find future scopes for research. Different segments of the reviewed literature have also provided relevant qualitative data in relevant chapter of this dissertation. In addition, some dissertation and thesis with related research topic has also been analyzed to come up with the core areas of reforming of UNSC with security perspective. Official press releases of UNGA related with reforming of the UNSC in different time periods are also good source of qualitative data which provides the official view of UN forum in terms of reforming of UNSC. Speeches of high-level Secretary General Officials and their analysis assisted in giving the view and arguments of top UN officials in the related issues. Group of states have also given their view about the reforming issue as official verdict from various interest groups such as G4, African Model, Toro's model, proposal of Uniting of Consensus group, S5 model etc assisted in analysis the various models of reforming in structural set up of the current UNSC. Debates carried in UNGA session about reforming of UNSC has been very useful in analyzing the viewpoint of various member states and their issues as well interest in reformation of UNSC. Data will also be collected from the various UN related official documents, case studies of the UN involvement in various conflict zone areas and effort to maintain international peace and security. The views of various countries and models developed by different individuals and advocacy groups also analyzed thorough analysis of the effectiveness of un peacekeeping operations, analysis of the UN

Charter, Contributions in the United Nations and status of different countries, effectiveness of veto power and its effectiveness as well as how it has impact on global peace and security, the way to make UN peacekeeping operations effective, the efforts of different panel in UNGA, reports of the High Level Panels etc have been analyzed. There is plethora of UNSC reform suggestions addressing respective issues, including the Council's members and representation, working methodology, relationship between the working mechanism of UNGA and UNSC, empowering the UNGA in decision making process, the P5 roles and responsibilities, and pros and cons of the veto power. The Global Policy Forum (2016) has been considered as one of the prominent sources to reflect the view of different interest groups, scholars and high-level diplomats and different regional organization of the world. The statements given by UN Ambassadors, world leaders, UN officials and regional organizations is gathered in different series where there is reflection of different models and positions of different stakeholders. Though it is difficult to analyze all the proposals and statement, crux and outcome has been examined in the relevant chapters which has guided towards logical answer to the research questions. These sources have been examined, and needful deductions also carried out. The prominent proposal selected to know the stand of the various interest groups and the official statement from the various panels formed within UN system. Those proposals are Group of Four (G4), The African Union, the Uniting for Consensus, and the United Nations High Level Panel Report. These proposals have been widely accepted in different academic writing and taken as reference as different reforming model of the UNSC. Case studies related to the practice of veto power by P5 members and its implications in global peace and security, gaps in UN peacekeeping operations, analysis of charters of the UN within parameter of theoretical and practical perspective, analysis of the different reform proposal by various sessions of general assembly, analysis of the contemporary threats and designating structural set up to mitigate the threats, selection criteria for the permanent membership of the UNSC is required to come through the logical conclusion and recommend future path for UN which ensures global peace security and sustainability. Hence extensive review of the literatures related to these aspects must be analyzed.

3.5.2.2 Case Studies

To critically analyze the effectiveness of different UNPKO and to give a concrete recommendation to enhance the effectiveness of UNPKO, the case study of the different UN missions in terms of success and failures has been carried out. Similarly, some deadlocks of the global security and other issues due to imposition of veto power by P5 member states has been also carried out. Non responsiveness of UN in different conflicts which has been prerogatives under collective security, Responsibility of Protect(R2P) and Protection of Civilian (POC) have been analytically studied to find the gaps and shortfalls which are deviating UN from carrying out its mandated task. The case studies are also vital part of the discussions in the relevant chapters to come at the logical deduction and conclusion.

Case studies are used for analyzing the effectiveness of different peacekeeping operations. Why the present peacekeeping operations are not able to mitigate the conflict and effectively carry out Protection of Civilian (POC) duty are also major concerns related to making major effort of UNSC in maintaining global peace and security effective. This has helped to understand the threats and challenges and suggests the mitigating majors and way ahead how the peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions authorized by UNSC can be effective to deal with the security threats of the contemporary world. This has ultimately led to the suggestion that how we can conceptualize and make peacekeeping missions robust. Case studies are thoroughly analyzed since the inception of UN peacekeeping operations which measure the effectiveness of major tool of UNSC in maintaining international peace and security. In addition, how veto power has been utilized by different members P5 countries and circumstances leading to use it have been analyzed which measures the effectiveness of veto power and its outcomes.

3.6 Sampling

The research demands knowledge of the functioning mechanism and dynamics of UN system, understanding the role and responsibility of UNSC, dynamics of UN peacekeeping Operations, UN Charter, veto power dynamics and impact in achieving UN goals. So, there is need of subject matter experts to give the rational view about various issues related to the UNSC and its reforming. So, no probability purposive sampling is chosen for research strategy. To deal with research questions it is not worthy

to do random sampling for the purpose of primary data collection since the outcome of view of personnel without knowledge of UN system and functioning mechanism, emerging security and world power dynamics don't carry more sense. Hence sample has been chosen from the personnel who have exposure of UN environment. Overall, respondents are divided into five categories: civilian as well as military diplomats and academicians of Political Science/ International Relation/ Strategic Studies/Conflict Studies to deal with structural and procedural aspects of UNSC and contemporary world power dynamics, contingents members deployed in the field to assess the effectiveness of UNPKO, UN Civilian Staffs/Military Staff Officers/UN Police to assess the policy on peace operations and implementation of peace operations, high level UN appointment holders to assess structural, procedural aspects of UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as ways to enhance UNSC tools for maintenance of International peace and security. Finally, officials served in UNHQ New York and key institutions of UN peace operations were interviewed to share their personal experiences and close observations about various dynamics of reforming the UNSC and ways to enhance its effectiveness. During study period of the dissertation total 110 respondents have been interviewed as Key Informants, details of which are reflected in the following table.

Table 3.7

Participants Details as Primary Source of Data Collection: KII

Participants Categories			Data Collection Technique			Numbers
Peacekeeper Contingents Commanders	Officers and participated in various UN missions	Corp of Contingents	Key Informant structured and questionnaires	Interview with close ended		30
Diplomats, Academicians of International Relation/ Strategic Studies/Conflict Studies	Military Attaché and	Political Science/ Strategic	Key Informant structured and questionnaires	Interview with close ended		11
UN civilian staffs/Military Staff Officers/UN Police/Military observers worked in Force and Sector HQ of UN missions			Key Informant structured and questionnaires	Interview with close ended		40

High level UN Military Appointment in UN missions and other key appointments in the related UN environment	Key Informants in-depth interview	15
High-level UN officials and Official worked at United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) New York in different capacities.	Key informants in depth interview	14
Total		110

Source: Created by Researcher

The questionnaires for the KII are detailed in Appendix A-E.

3.7 Data Analysis Methods

The data received from primary sources were interpreted by using analytical and comparative method. The interviews on audio were transcript and analyzed in the relevant chapters. Qualitative data analysis method was used to reach the conclusion objectively. Since the primary data is based basically in in-depth interview with personnel having significant United Nations experience, there are no extensive survey using large samples. Views of the different key informants have been analyzed and interpreted. Collected data had been checked, revised, edited, and updated. Quantitative data had been analyzed by developing tables. They were categorized and then tabulated according to frequency and percentage to make it easy to understand. Different types of tables are presented to get the required information as mentioned in the objectives. Some required tables were also analyzed in chart. The crux of the views and responses through KII in relevant issues have been assimilated and interpreted in concise form to have qualitative deductions.

3.7.1 Thematic Analysis

Key themes pertaining to UNSC reform were chosen for thematic analysis, and it was explored how these reforms could improve the effectiveness of UNSC instruments for preserving global peace and security. Academic articles in globally renowned journals, high-level UN reports, dissertations, theses, discussions in various UNGA plenary, claimants of the various power blocs, books, and opinions from strategic, operational, and tactical level UN officials were among the many types of data gathered for this analysis. Following the gathering of pertinent information from the relevant

literature, recurrent themes were found and thematic analysis was used. The key themes identified are:

- (a) Wider representation in UNSC based on sovereign equality, regionalism and rising powers since status quo structure of UNSC does not represent the power dynamics of contemporary world and difficult to cope up with the emerging threats.
- (b) Impact of underrepresentation in UNSC and its impact on collective security/defense and humanitarian intervention.
- (c) Either veto power is used by P5 for the promotion of their vested interest or as per the spirit of UN Charter. Whether veto power is detrimental to global peace or security
- (d) Effectiveness of UNSC tools for the maintenance of international peace and security since there are question marks on the effectiveness of vital tools of UNSC: Peacekeeping, peace enforcement for POC and R2P, collective security/defense.
- (e) Necessity of the increased role of UNGA in international peace and security affairs. The debate is ongoing to increase the role of UNGA in international peace and security affairs in order to balance the decision of UNSC. This also adheres to 'balance of power theory'. 'Uniting for Peace' tool when UNSC is indecisive needs to be revitalized to increase the role of UNGA in global peace and security affairs.

3.7.2 Content Analysis

In order to examine and interpret the content of textual data, such as written documents, key informant interview transcripts, or other verbal communications with various respondents, qualitative content analysis is used. To obtain insight into the meaning and context of the information, a systematic approach to identifying patterns, concepts, and wider themes within the data has been used and the interpretation has been made in line with that.

3.7.3 Narrative Analysis

To comprehend how research participants create stories and narratives from their own unique experiences and viewpoints, narrative analysis is applied. In order to avoid

predetermined and biased data, due consideration and cross-checking with other pertinent facts have been made. The interpretation in narrative analysis has two levels. Prior to the researcher's interpretation, research participants first provide their own experiences and viewpoints in several questionnaires regarding a certain topic. Journal entries, talks, reports, transcripts of in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions all serve as sources for narratives.

3.7.4. Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis method was used to analyze the interactions with the respondents. During analysis, it focused on the context in which the communication between the researcher and the respondents occurred.

3.8 Study Area and Time

The aim of this dissertation is to find out the need of reforming of UNSC in changing global order analyzing through the security perspective. This research paper covers major factors necessitating the structural and procedural change in existing structure and working mechanism of UNSC and its tools for the establishment of global peace and security, analyzes the needs for reforming it and summaries the major findings in ensuring effective and efficient global security by the implementation of UNSC's tools.

This study area is mainly UN field missions, United Nations Headquarters New York, conflict affected area of UN missions, and conflict affected areas without intervention of UN. The data was collected during 2016-2025. The eligibility parameters and selection criteria for collecting primary data are commanders, subordinate commanders, staff officers, diplomats, official served in high level UN appointments. Secondary data are mostly from the trusted UN websites, UNGA discussions, reports issued by different high-level dignitaries who further meet eligibility criteria. Since these respondents have ample knowledge of UN system, they are important for providing authentic information for research.

3.9 Methodological Limitations

There is budgetary constraint to explore different part of the conflict affected areas of the world where UN is involved in international peace and security duties as well as UN headquarters, New York. However, researcher has explored interactions with different key informants during his participation in different United Nations

peacekeeping missions. Sample selection is non-probability purposive sampling based on KII with subject matter expertise (SMEs) in UN environment, diplomatic assignment and scholars having knowledge of international security affairs. Also, it was difficult to collect the official view of present P5 countries, all claimants and major aspirant countries in permanent and non permanent categories. However, secondary data in the form of High Level Reports, reports of UNGA sessions and other literature compensates the lack of extensive field visit. This research is more based on secondary sources than the primary sources. Majority of the respondents are from Nepal but their expertise level in terms of academic qualification, UN experience and knowledge about UN working environment are assumed sufficient to draw back the deductions on respective research objectives since respondents are graduates of university, worked as high level UN appointment in different capacities, well exposed to UN environment and also some respondents have diplomatic experiences. However, few international Key Informants were also approached to have their impartial view in different aspects of the research problem.

3.10 Reliability and Validity of Data

The data are fully reliable as the primary data in the form of KII through various questionnaires given to respondents has been collected in the presence of researcher himself. The data represents the view of key informants having enough knowledge about UN and its functioning mechanism. Secondary data were collected from the authentic websites of the UN, different press releases of the UNGA, Speeches of the Secretary General, and debates in the UNGA by different member states. In addition, different authentic research papers and research articles from the world-renowned journals have added more on reliability and credibility of the data. The data collected are valid comparatively for the long time since world power dynamics analysis of the historical perspective in reforming efforts of UNSC and its endeavors to maintain global peace and security be relevant for comparatively for the longer period. The data collected reflects the world power dynamics since 1945 which further strengthen the reliability and credibility of data.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

The study has been carried out following the required ethical considerations to the best of the author's knowledge. All the sources of data referred to this research paper

are given due recognition. To the best knowledge of the author, this study doesn't intend to have any known harm to the subject. For the correct citation of works of other individuals, assistance of APA format has been applied.

3.12 Theoretical Framework

Theory of realism describes human nature as evil and selfish. It doesn't recognize the fact that the international institution like UN can impose authoritative directions of international law so anarchy is related accordingly, and mighty states can drive their activities in the way they desire. Theory of realism recognizes state as the powerful actor and mainly revolves around the fact that every state is adhered to and driven by its national interest. When realist theory is related to role of different countries under UN umbrella, they are also pursuing their national interest using the platform of UN in different organs and departments. Kindleberg (1970) formulated hegemonic theory which was later developed as Hegemonic stability theory by George Modelski, Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner in mid 1970s. This theory mainly emphasizes on the existence of single mighty power which can influence the world economy and security or in the other sense it believes in the unipolar world. Hegemonic stability theory in context of reforming the UNSC can be related to the hegemony of P5 nations in dealing with global security, political and economic affairs. But if viewed from another perspective, non uniformed power distribution in the name of veto power amongst the P5 nations has brought a multi polarity in UNSC.

Onuf (1989) in his Theory of Constructivism emphasizes on the presence of global and regional security communities which are driven through shared norms and collective interest. It emphasizes on the fact that nation's foreign policy is always driven by interest of it but there is significant role of historical traditions, cultural and social aspects. In opposition of the neo-realist school, this theory believes in the fact that states are not the vital factors in international relations instead non-state actors comprising international communities and organizations play vital role in international politics. This theory highlights the role of the non-state actors like United Nations (UN), Amnesty international, Red Cross, and International Labor Organization (ILO) etc. Palmer and Perkins (2001) highlight how Balance of Power theory has been practiced in international system. He has carried out detail examination and thorough analysis of three vital dimensions national interest, national policy and instrument of power which every nation has to take consideration to promote self in national, regional and

international forums. When we talk about the structure of UN and power vested in different bodies, there is no check and balance in veto power imposed in any issue of international peace and security concern and other the decision taken by UNSC P5 members and other substantial decisions like structural reform and enrollment and recognition of new state as member of UN.

United Nations Charter promotes the Sovereign Equality of all Nations. But in decision making related to international peace and security P5 members are dominant. E10 members and decision of UNGA is not binding. So, there exists gap in the spirit of UN charter and its practical implementation in the decisions related to international peace and security which is essential to address. The universal law and universally accepted theory on change Change is inevitable and change is constant has not been implemented in the case procedural aspects of decision making and structural aspects of P5 members in UNSC. Since its establishment in 1945, a lot of changes has been witnessed in the world economic, political and power dynamics but this status quo has posed some adverse implications in international peace and security demanding reformation in UNSC and its tools for the establishment of global peace and security.

3.13 Conceptual Framework

The review of the theoretical and empirical literatures has identified different gaps in reformation of UNSC with security perspective. The performance gap of UNSC in maintaining peace, security and stability in the world and cause factors for UNSC underperformance needs to be explored. The solution suggested should justify the underperformance of the past as well as it should be strong enough to deal with the security threats posed by the present world. The effect factor of veto power vested in P5 countries also need to be examined thoroughly to find the practical and acceptable approach in its alternative. The fundamental principles of UN and analysis of its extent of application in practice provides the way to promote its principles both in written and practice. For the conceptual framework broader spectrum of security demanded by present world order and necessity of reforming UNSC and its tools has been conceptualized as the core problem and various factors demanding pragmatic approach to deal with security threats demanded by present world in terms of broader spectrum of security and other factors demanding need of structural reform in UNSC has been interlinked. This study has carried out the analysis of both theoretical and empirical


literatures and interpreted into various aspects of reforming of the UNSC in the changing global order with view of international peace and security perspective.

The universally accepted fact or theory about change in any system and organization is that change is inevitable and change is constant. No vital change in UNSC structural and procedural aspects has been observed since its establishment in 1945. Despite of change in conflict dynamics from interstate to intrastate and emergence of emerging security threats like global terrorism, pandemic, climate change threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, increased trend of intervention on sovereignty and territorial integrity of sovereign states, UNSC as principal organ of UN to maintain international peace and security has not revitalized its tools of peacekeeping, peace enforcement R2P, POC and promoting collective security. The main relevant theories like hegemonic stability theory, power transition theory, sovereign equality of all members of UN, realism theory and constructivism theory which provide broad concept on status quo factor in reformation of UNSC on various structural aspects, need of change and revitalized role of UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security. The high level reports like Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for All by former Secretary General of the UN Kofi Anan have also given many viable recommendations for enhancing effectiveness of various tools of UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security. Different plenary at UNGA sessions about reformation in UNSC structural and procedural aspects and the proposals by G4, UfC, S4 and African Union group of countries also gives broad concept on global aspirations and stand of different claimants on different issues of reforming of UNSC. The cause factors for demanding structural and procedural reforms in UNSC reforming has been listed as independent variables and effect factor of security lapses due to present UNSC structure and functioning mechanism necessitating reform in UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security has been identified as dependent variables. Research has been carried out emphasizing various factors related to these variables and their inter connectivity. The independent variables are:

- (a) Change in world order since establishment of UN.
- (b) Changing nature of conflict and threats to international peace and security.
- (c) Emergence of new economic and military powers.
- (d) Veto power vested in P5 countries and its implications.
- (e) Performance lapses in UNSC due to structural and procedural drawback in present UN organization.

(f) Promotion of UN principles in practice.

The dependent variable is: Reforming the UNSC and its tools in changing global order in view of International Peace and Security. Overall conceptual framework including key theories and variables used in this dissertation is reflected by following figure.

Figure 3.1*Conceptual Framework of the Study*

Source: Created by Researcher

As stated in figure above the conceptual framework states hegemonic stability theory and theory of realism insists that P5 members of the UNSC strongly support the status quo in present UNSC structure and they want to maintain hegemony in global peace and security affairs by preserving special privilege of veto power in pursuit of their national interests. Theory and principals are seriously undermined in global peace and security affairs if they don't aligned with the national, regional and international interests of the P5 nations even in case of humanitarian disaster. This is the main hurdle for the reformation of the UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security. Theory of sovereign equality of all nations strongly insists the increased role of all the members of the UN represented in UNGA and emerging powers in global peace and security affairs. Neoliberalism theory demands the increased role of international organization like UN to foster cooperation, harmony and deal with global peace and security affairs. As per the power transition theory, there is need of transition in power as per the change in power dynamics of the globe. Drastic change in global power dynamics since establishment of UN, change in conflict nature with emerging security threats, adverse implications in global peace and security affairs due to status quo in UNSC structural reformation and its tools and need of strong effective global governance body dealing with international crisis demands reformation of the UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IV

STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS OF UNSC AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS TOOLS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

This chapter describes about UN structure, different organs and their generic role and responsibilities. With specific focus to UNSC, it explores the detail role and responsibility of the UNSC as authorized by UN Charter. The different subsidiary bodies of UNSC assigned for various roles and responsibilities has been discussed and analyzed. It carries out the analytical study of the roles and responsibilities of UNSC with respect to the security perspective which are: UNPKO with special emphasis on Protection of Civilian (POC), Collective security, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and explains how UNSC is carrying out those roles and responsibilities. It has also carried out study on the critical strength of UNSC in carrying out those responsibilities and identify the general gaps which demands reforming of UNSC mainly in domain of its effort for the establishment of global peace and security. After analysis of the critical strength and gaps in structural and procedural aspects of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security, various factors necessitating reformation of UNSC within domain of security perspective has been identified. Within domain of security perspective, a brief case studies of UNSC's involvement /non-involvement in some crisis, performance and impact evaluation since its establishment with respect to the specific case has been analyzed based on fact and figures. The detail analysis of veto power authority in terms of merits and demerits provide the broader understanding of its effectiveness, relevancy and its impact to UNSC in carrying out various roles and responsibilities.

4.1 Background and Historical Preview

The League of Nations (LoN) came before the UN. The LoN was formed on January 10, 1920, as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that ended World War I. The main goal of this international organization was to maintain peace in the world. The organization's covenant made clear its main goals, which included preventing wars through collective security and disarmament and resolving international conflicts through discussion and arbitration (United Nations Office at Geneva, n.d.). Further issues discussed within the same treaty included working conditions, proper treatment of

the aboriginal population, illicit trade of drugs and humans, weapons industry, health care, prisoners of war, and minority groups protection in Europe. From September 28, 1934, to February 23, 1935, the highest membership of 58 was reached. Ultimately, the League was unable to prevent the Axis countries from engaging in war during the 1930s, even though there were a few successes and a couple of defeats experienced earlier during the 1920s. In addition to Germany, other countries such as Spain, Italy, Japan, and others withdrew from the League. It is clear that the onset of the Second World War revealed the fact that the main mission of the League in preventing future wars had not been achieved. Following the end of the Second World War in April 1946, the UN succeeded the League, which lasted for 26 years, and took over most of the organizations created by the League (United Nations Office at Geneva, n.d.).

The LoN had an executive council with only major powers as members, a General Assembly that would represent all member states, and a permanent secretariat. The territorial integrity of other members was to be respected and preserved as against external aggression and member nations were to disarm to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. Before engaging in hostilities, all states were compelled to file grievances for arbitration or judicial review (United Nations Office at Geneva, n.d.). A permanent court of international justice would also be created in order to settle disputes between the conflicting parties. Despite all the efforts made by Wilson to form and promote the League, the United States did not join the League. For his contribution towards forming the league, President Wilson received the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1919. The League could not succeed in preventing the Axis powers from going to war due to a number of failures during the 1930s even though it had some successes in the 1920s. Amongst those wars that the League decided not to mediate prior to the Second World War were the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish Civil War, and the Abyssinian War (Mazower, 2012).

Along with Germany, Spain, Italy, Japan, and other nations left the League. The start of the Second World War demonstrated that the League's fundamental goal of averting any further world wars had been unsuccessful. The League existed for 26 years before being replaced by the United Nations (UN) in April 1946, which also took over many of the agencies and organizations the League had formed. There were several reasons for this failure, many of which had to do with basic weaknesses in the organization, such as a voting mechanism that made ratifying resolutions difficult and

inadequate representation of international countries. Furthermore, the United States' refusal to join the League severely limited its authority (United Nations Office at Geneva, n.d.). League of Nations could not stop WW-II. UN was created immediately after the end of WW-II when Europe had faced an unprecedented loss both on human and infrastructure of their cities. World did not want another WW. Therefore, sole purpose of creating the UN was not to repeat the mistake of LoN. UN charter gave UNSC the sole responsibility of maintaining International Peace and Security. Also, the P5 retained the veto power (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

The six principal UN bodies are the General Assembly, Security Council, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and Secretariat. All of the member states of the UN are represented in the General Assembly, which serves as its principal deliberative legislative body. It may address any issue raised by the UN Charter and offer advice to UN Members, with the exception of disputes or circumstances that the Security Council is currently considering. Each country, regardless of size, gets one vote in the Assembly, and crucial issues are decided by a two-thirds majority. Every year from September through December, the Assembly convenes. A majority of UN Members, the Security Council, or the Assembly may all call for special sessions to be held (United Nations, 1945). The UNGA elects 10 non permanent members of UNSC which are also called Elected 10 (E10) members (United Nations, n.d.).

4.2 Overview of Security Council, Subsidiary Organs and Committee

The UN Charter states that the Security Council is called upon when peace is in danger and that all of its decisions are binding on the entire member states (Daghammarsjold Library, 2023). Prior to taking more direct action, the Council first encourages disputing parties to settle their differences amicably through negotiation or mediation, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter. The Council has the authority to authorize the deployment of peacekeeping forces to unstable areas, impose sanctions or embargoes, or arrange truces when necessary (Chesterman, 2008). When the UN was established in 1945, the UNSC was intended to be the primary institutional instrument for maintaining peace. While Chapter VII gives the Council special authority to identify risks to peace and to enact enforcement measures, such as economic or military penalties, member states assigned this primary responsibility under Article 24 of the Charter (Sarooshi, 1999). This capacity emphasizes the UNSC's political decision-

making process and its latitude in determining global reactions (Bailey & Daws, 1998).

The Security Council had eleven members at first, five of whom were permanent and six of whom were not. The membership grew to 15 after a 1963 General Assembly amendment, consisting of 10 elected non-permanent members with two-year terms based on geographic distribution and five permanent members: the United States, China, France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom (The UN Security Council, 2020). With the exception of procedural issues, decisions need nine affirmative votes, and any permanent member's veto prevents action. The Council's crisis management efficacy is nevertheless influenced by this veto authority (Luck, 2006). Disparities in non-permanent membership still exist despite its mandate of sovereign equality. Systemic disparities in representation and the recurrent election of some governments are highlighted by the fact that 60 countries have never been elected to the Council. The credibility and inclusion of UNSC decision-making are seriously called into doubt by this tendency. These discrepancies highlight the conflict between the political reality of power distribution inside the UN system and the Council's desired universality (Chesterman, 2014).

Table 4.1

Security Council Members in non-Permanent Category

Region	No of Countries Elected	Remarks
Africa and Africa	5	One Arab nation alternative year amongst Asia and Pacific region
Eastern European group	1	
Western European and other group	2	Other group include Canada, New Zealand, Australia (Allied forces of another region than Europe)
Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)	2	Including Mexico
Total	10	

Source: Adopted from <https://research.un.org/en/unmembers/scmembers>, 2023

The United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) non-permanent member election

format is set up to provide regional representation. Even though this strategy captured the balance of power in the world between 1945 and 1965, its applicability today deserves reexamination. Given their size and the seriousness of the wars that originate there, Africa and Asia in particular need to have their seat allocations reevaluated. In addition to improving legitimacy, reforming this election mechanism would allay claims that the Council is still a holdover from post-World War II geopolitics (Luck, 2006). The UNSC has solidified its institutional dominance over other UN bodies in terms of peace and security. The UN Charter, which continues to be the most authoritative source on the Council's responsibilities and powers, was planned and draught with this supremacy in mind. Sections that explicitly address the Council's duties, including as its special power under Article 42 to permit the use of force to preserve or restore peace and security, are codified in Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the Charter (The UN Security Council, 2020). This responsibility includes diplomacy, sanctions, and peacekeeping missions, including the sending of armed contingents (Sarooshi, 1999).

The UNSC's actions reflect the UN's collective will in this area since all members of the UN General Assembly have agreed to the UNSC's role in preserving world peace and security. The Council has a range of conflict-resolution options at its disposal, from negotiation to coercive measures, and it has the authority to deal with any state that is thought to be a threat to international peace. The UNSC usually uses mediation, referral to the General Assembly, or delegations of its own members to try to reach an initial settlement when a disagreement is presented to it (Bailey & Daws, 1998). The Council may authorize the use of force or impose economic punishment if these procedures are unsuccessful. Prior actions have included sanctions on nations that violate non-proliferation agreements or engage in persistent violations of human rights (Functions and Powers, n.d.). Subject to General Assembly agreement, the UNSC can also suggest suspending or expelling members who consistently violate the Charter (Bailey & Daws, 1998).

One of the UNSC's most prominent tools for carrying out its mandate is still peacekeeping. The Council authorizes a variety of missions through resolutions, and the success of these missions influences how the UN is viewed internationally. Modern conflicts are more intra-state, asymmetric, and characterized by volatile, unpredictable, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) situations, whereas operations during the Cold War were mostly inter-state in nature. The credibility of UN peacekeeping has been

weakened by these circumstances as well as anti-UN sentiment in a number of host nations. This circumstance emphasizes the necessity of determining operational gaps and creating practical plans to improve the quick and efficient deployment of peacekeepers (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). Robust peacekeeping has been suggested as a way to increase mission credibility and results, with a focus on a proactive stance, highly skilled and driven soldiers, and unambiguous directives (Thapa, 2024). Given the enormous sums of money allotted to peacekeeping each year, operations must produce measurable outcomes in terms of civilian protection, stability, and humanitarian access in order to maintain the confidence of host governments, local communities, and foreign stakeholders (Durch & Berkman, 2006).

Additionally, the UNSC has special decision-making power. According to the Charter, it has the exclusive power to make decisions that are legally binding on all of its members and to approve the use of force to uphold world peace and security. At least nine members must agree to these choices, including the five permanent members (P5) who must concur. Although abstention may permit a resolution to pass, this approach essentially gives the P5 veto power over substantive decisions (Procedural vote: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2024). The P5's established role-whose composition hasn't altered since the UN's inception-highlights the Council's inflexibility. With their severe humanitarian ramifications, the current crises in Israel-Palestine, Ukraine, and Syria have heightened calls for restricting or halting the use of veto power in issues pertaining to collective security, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the Protection of Civilians (POC) (Gowan & Stedman, 2018).

These points, when taken together, underscore the pressing need for reform within the UNSC. It would enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UNSC's mandate under the UN Charter if it took a fresh look at the veto, representation issues, and legitimacy in peacekeeping operations (Weiss, 2003).

4.2.1 Subsidiary Organs and Committee

Rule 28 of the UNSC's interim rules of procedure echoes Article 29 of the UN Charter, which gives it the authority to form subsidiary organs required to carry out its responsibilities. While the rotating President of the Council heads standing committees, all 15 members engage in current committees and working groups, and chairmen or co-chairs are chosen annually by a Note of the President (Subsidiary organs branch, n.d.).

Committees and working groups are examples of subsidiary institutions that deal with substantive concerns like sanctions, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping, as well as procedural ones like documentation, protocols, and off-site meetings. Such organs are best represented by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which operate judicially apart from States and the Council but are nevertheless financially and administratively dependent on the UN (Murphy, 2013). The following are the subsidiary organs and committee

(a) Counter-Terrorism Committee: Established after the September 11 2001 attacks, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) enhances UN Member States' capacity to prevent act of terror, guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). Its Executive Directorate (CTED) supports implementation by evaluating states and providing technical assistance (Subsidiary organs branch, n.d.)

(b) Non-Proliferation Committee: In accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1540 (2004) on April 28, 2004, stating that the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as their delivery systems poses a threat to global peace and security. (Subsidiary organs branch, n.d.)

(c) Military Staff Committee: The Military Staff Committee advises the Security Council on military requirements, command of forces, arms regulation, and disarmament. Established on February 4, 1946, it is the Council's longest-running subsidiary body (United Nations Military Staff Committee, n.d.)

(d) Sanctions Committees: Sanctions pressure states or entities to comply with Security Council goals without using force, serving as a key enforcement tool. The UN's global reach makes it well-suited to implement such measures, which include economic restrictions, travel bans, and diplomatic limitations when diplomacy fails (Subsidiary organs branch, n.d.)

(e) Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies: Standing Committees are unrestricted and typically created to handle specific procedural issues, such as the recruitment of new members. Ad hoc committees are formed to address the particular challenges for a brief period of time.(Subsidiary organs branch, n.d.)

(f) Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions: UN peacekeeping combines military, police, and civilian personnel to maintain security, support political processes, protect civilians, and aid in DDR, elections, human rights, and rule of law. Political missions complement peacekeeping, engaging in conflict cycles, facilitating negotiations, and promoting long-term peace-building. Special Political Missions (SPMs) oversee human rights, institution-building, political reconciliation, and coordinate development and humanitarian efforts (UN Political Missions, 2022).

(g) International Courts and Tribunals: In response to widespread violations of humanitarian law, the United Nations set up the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994. The ICTY prosecuted serious crimes from the Yugoslav conflicts, while the ICTR addressed genocide and other grave offenses in Rwanda, delivering the first international genocide verdict in 1998. Both tribunals aim to hold perpetrators accountable and promote lasting justice and peace (Subsidiary organs branch, n.d.)

4.3 UN Charters related with UNSC: Functional Correlation

Articles 23–54 of the UN Charter describe the institutional and functional provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is derived from Chapters V–VIII of the UN Charter. There are exceptions for self-defense (Article 51) and council-approved regional enforcement measures (Article 53), even though the UNSC still has main enforcement authority. In contrast to the League of Nations, Chapter VII developed a more advanced framework for collective security, establishing the Security Council as the primary body in charge of establishment of global peace and security (United Nations, 1945).

In addition to its main duties in peacekeeping, the Council has an impact on important internal UN operations. Its importance in UN governance is highlighted by the fact that decisions pertaining to the selection of the Secretary-General, admission of new members, suspension of privileges, and expulsion of states require the approval of the Security Council (Bourantonis, 2005). All P5 members must consent to the Charter amendment process, which reflects their special veto power over substantive resolutions (Luck, 2006).

Both the concentration of power among the largest powers and proportional representation of UN membership are embodied in the organization of the Security Council. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China were granted permanent membership and veto power in order to ensure their active participation in post-World War II global administration. This architecture is in line with realist theory, which holds that great countries can only effectively operate global institutions provided they grant them resources and authority. The P5 has sway over judgments made by the ICJ, ECOSOC, and specialized agencies, among other UN entities, in addition to their statutory authority (Hurd, 2007).

The efficiency and representativeness of the Council are essential to its efficacy. The Council's small size enables it to act quickly in times of crisis, fulfilling its executive authority under Article 24. Additionally, six (now 10) non-permanent members guarantee geographical balance and wider credibility. The UNSC essentially maintains its major position in international peace and security by striking a balance between authority and power, allowing for decisive action while upholding UN member legitimacy (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

4.4 Advisory Body

An international advisory organization of UN that promotes peace consolidation in post-conflict states is the Peace Building Commission (PBC). Gathering pertinent parties, including international donors, financial institutions, national governments, and nations that provide troops, organizing and mobilizing resources, and offering advice on integrated post-conflict recovery strategies are among its main duties. It also identifies any gaps that could endanger a lasting peace (United Nations, 2005). The PBC is an advisory group that helps the Security Council and the General Assembly. It helps the international community support long-term peace building efforts by bringing together political, financial, and operational players (United Nations, 2005).

4.5 Function and Power of UNSC

Under the United Nation Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:

- (a) To maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

- (b) To investigate any dispute or situation this might lead to international friction.
- (c) To recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement.
- (d) To formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments.
- (e) To determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken.
- (f) To call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression.
- (g) To take military action against an aggressor.
- (h) To recommend the admission of new Members.
- (i) To exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in strategic areas.
- (j) To recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice. (UN Security Council (UNSC): Composition, functions, organs, criticisms, 2023).

The Second World War was still raging, with clear winners and losers, when the UN Charter was being written. With a view to administering or governing the international system, it was intended for the victorious states-at the time, the great powers of the world-to exercise global leadership. Additionally, it was believed that a number of international bodies could better support the international order that was established in 1945. The establishment of a worldwide organization, whose institutional framework would allow collaboration between the allies of the conflict to continue without interruption, may more effectively achieve this goal in the area of world peace and security (Bourantonis,2005)

The UNSC is a hybrid of a secret diplomatic congress and a parliament. Its processes and operational practices can be perplexing and enigmatic. While the Council votes on its decisions in open sessions, the majority of its time is spent in closed-door informal meetings where ambassadors discuss, bargain, persuade, and pressure one another without the presence of television crews, newspaper reporters, and, of course, the other UN member states. In accordance with Article 23(1) of the UN Charter, all members of the organization agree that the Security Council represents all members

when making decisions and have assigned it primary responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. The Council must be set up to be able to operate continually if it is to fulfill its obligation to uphold global peace and security. According to Article 28(1), there must always be a representative from each member of the Council present at the organization's headquarters. Unlike other UN bodies, the Security Council is always in session and convenes whenever necessary. (Bourantonis, 2005)

4.6 Security Council Resolutions

Although the P5 paralyzed the UN Security Council during the Cold War, it was revitalized after the Cold War ended, with an increase in resolutions (especially under the enforcement chapter VII of the UN Charter), peacekeeping missions, and sanctions regimes, and an accompanying decrease in the use of veto by the permanent members. The average number of resolutions issued annually from 1946 to 1989 was only fifteen, but since then, the average has climbed to almost sixty, and the Council has shifted from making roughly one decision per month to one every week. These are important points to recognize (Islam, 2018). The rising number of UNSC Resolutions pertaining to global peace and security strengthens the UNSC's authority and legitimacy as a security organization (Islam, 2018).

Furthermore, the UNSC has adopted over 2,000 resolutions relating to conflict and post-conflict situations around the globe (Bessho, n.d.), as sustaining international peace and security is its responsibility under the UN Charter. With regard to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, the Security Council adopted 35 out of 65 resolutions in 2008 (53.8%), and 22 out of 47 resolutions in 2009 (46.8%), during the 2008–2009 period alone (Department of Political Affairs, n.d.). The report *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* says that the UNSC also passed a number of resolutions that allowed UN peacekeeping missions. The Council agreed in 2009 to send the first UN military unit to help the EU's operations in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFORChad/CAR). This has to do with the mission that was based in the Central African Republic and Chad. The United Nations peacekeeping missions in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Darfur/Sudan (UNAMID), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Lebanon (UNIFIL), and Sudan (UNMIS) were all given permission to take enforcement action by the Council (Department of Political Affairs, n.d.).

4.7 Determining Threats to Peace and Security

Article 39 of the UN Charter states The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN,1945).

Therefore, the Security Council is the single lawful authority with responsibility for determining threats to peace or breach of peace or act of aggression, as per the mandate. This is shown not only in the mandate but also in how the UNSC performs its duties. For example, the Council expressed its concern about emerging or growing security threats in West Africa, particularly terrorist activities in the Sahel band, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, and illicit drug trafficking. The Council found that ongoing dangers to international peace and security came from the circumstances in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, the Central African Republic and the region, Darfur/Sudan, Lebanon, and Sudan (Department of Political Affairs,n.d.).

The UNSC also places a strong emphasis on matters that could pose a threat to international peace, such as the use of sexual assault or rape as weapons of war, as well as women, international security, and peace. The Council also focuses on emerging security issues, such as how climate change is a threat to global security and how human security issues like poverty, hunger, and disease are a security risk (Islam, 2018).

4.8 Vote and Majority Required

Article 27 of the UN has stated about voting procedures in UNSC.As stated in article 27 of the United Nations

- (a) Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
- (b) Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
- (c) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. (United Nations Security Council: Voting System, n.d.)

A substantial question that must be resolved by a majority vote of the members is whether the issue is procedural or substantive. A resolution will also be rejected if seven members abstain or vote against it. The council's choice is enforceable in court. The Security Council's decision must be accepted and carried out by United Nations members, according to Article 25 of the UN Charter. (Verma,2021)

4.9 Right to Veto

The five countries-China, France, the USSR (replaced by Russia in 1990), the United Kingdom, and the United States-were named Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) and given the right to veto due to their significant contributions to the creation of the United Nations (United Nations Security Council: Voting System, n.d.). A substantive decision can be blocked by any P5 member using this veto, even if 14 of the 15 Council members are in favor of it. If a member disagrees but does not want to use its veto power, it may abstain, which would enable the resolution to receive the necessary nine votes in favor. The veto has often exposed a flaw in the UN system: the P5's geopolitical objectives frequently take precedence over humanitarian considerations, paralyzing the organization and making it impossible for it to take effective action in times of crisis (Personal Communication, 25 June, 2024). Although this process protects the interests of large countries, it can hinder efficient conflict resolution, as demonstrated by the ongoing Israel-Palestine crisis and the Syrian conflict (Personal Communication, 28 Nov, 2023).

The veto system was created to uphold the great power harmony concept in light of the League of Nations' shortcomings, namely the expulsion of the USSR in 1939, which undermined collective security (Okhovat, 2011). Despite being a colonial power, France was granted permanent membership at the UN's creation, demonstrating how geopolitical factors significantly impacted the P5 organization. Critics contend that the veto system still impedes democratic decision-making inside the Council, despite the fact that developed countries like Germany and Japan, as well as up-and-coming nations like India, Brazil, and Nigeria, also deserves permanent seats (Thapa, 1996).

Existing decision-making mechanism does not allow reaching peaceful solutions - as long as the UN has the mechanism where different actors can block different processes, then the UN will constantly be stuck in a decision-making process with room to veto (Personal Communication, 25 Jun, 2024).

The UN is confined within a structure that restricts its ability to resolve crises since, in reality, the veto guarantees that P5 countries can defend national interests, but this frequently comes at the expense of prompt humanitarian action. Therefore, anytime P5 interests clash, the UNSC is likely to stay stuck in decision-making procedures as long as veto power is in place (Personal Communication, 25 Jun, 2024).

4.10 Abstentions From Voting

In the Security Council, there are two types of voting abstentions. First, in accordance with Article 27(3) of the Charter, Council members who are parties to a dispute shall abstain when voting on decisions under Chapter VI or Article 52(3). This became referred to as a compulsory abstention in Security Council. Second, members may abstain if they do not want to vote in favor of or against a substantive proposal. This was thereafter referred to as a voluntary abstentions (United Nations, 1945). Votes of approval are defined as an affirmative vote of nine (originally seven) members, including the concurring votes of the Permanent Members in Article 27(3) of the Charter, using two separate qualifying phrases. In San Francisco, the sponsoring nations gave the impression that Article 27(3) should be read to mean that important decisions need to be unanimously approved by the five permanent members and at least two non-permanent members. (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

4.11 Major Responsibilities of UNSC: Security Perspectives

The UNSC and its approach to keeping peace have made peace operations a fundamental part of the UN's active presence in the world. The list of mandates has grown longer in an effort to better the approach to a lasting peace, and span from defending civilians to aiding state-building initiatives (Sonnback, 2020). The main duties of the UNSC from a security perspective are to protect the sovereignty of small states through collective security, impose sanctions on nations endangering international peace and security, take action against ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (R2P duty), maintain strict oversight over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and combat international terrorism (United Nations, 1945).

4.11.1 Contribution to World Peace through Peace Keeping Operations

4.11.1.1 History of Peacekeeping

In 1948, the Security Council authorized the deployment of military observers to oversee Israel's ceasefire with its Arab neighbors, marking the beginning of United Nations peacekeeping. This turned out to be the UN's first peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Since then, hundreds of thousands of military men, tens of thousands of UN police, and civilians from more than 120 countries have participated in more than 70 missions. Over 3,000 peacekeepers have lost their lives while doing their duties (our history, n.d.).

UN peacekeeping, which began with an emphasis on traditional interstate observation, has developed into multidimensional operations meant to carry out comprehensive peace agreements and establish the groundwork for long-lasting peace. Instead of only addressing interstate conflicts, these missions are increasingly addressing civil and intrastate issues (our history, n.d.). These days, the Secretary-General oversees these activities under the direction and management of the Security Council, with the General Assembly handling financial oversight (Peacekeeping operations, 2023).

UN peacekeeping deployments can be generally classified into those with multidimensional or political mandates. While multidimensional missions like MONUSCO (DRC), UNMISS (South Sudan), MINUSMA (Mali), and CAR deploy both armed troops and civilian components, political/diplomatic missions are primarily unarmed and combine civilian and military observers. Operating in complicated circumstances where force may be employed for purposes other than self-defense, these integrated operations prioritize the Protection of Civilians (POC) as a primary mandate (Bellamy & Williams, 2021).

Close coordination between host-state authorities and missions is necessary for modern peacekeeping. It is essential that peacekeepers and civilian pillars involved in peace building, governance assistance and capacity-building collaborate on planning. The legitimacy and efficacy of the mission are supported by adherence to the fundamental values of consent, impartiality, and minimal use of force. In order to combat armed groups and improve civilian security, operations such as MONUSCO and MINUSMA show collaboration with host governments (Paris, 2010).

Peacekeeping quickly grew after the Cold War. Budgets increased from US\$230

million in 1988 to between US\$800 million and US\$1.6 billion in the 1990s, despite the fact that only 20 new missions were created between 1948 and 1993. In Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America, and Cambodia, these missions facilitated peace agreements. Longstanding operations like the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) were among the 12 missions with 110,000 personnel operating by May 2023 (Islam, 2018).

4.11.1.2 An analysis of Performance of UN Peacekeeping Mission

Many people consider the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to be among the most effective UN peacekeeping missions. More than 200,000 individuals lost their lives in Liberia's first and second civil conflicts (1989–1996 and 1999–2006), while 500,000 were internally displaced and 850,000 became refugees. Over 101,000 militants were demobilized and disarmed by UNMIL and other organizations between December 2003 and October 2004. According to a 2006 U.N. study, 88% of Liberians recognized gains in human rights, 92% supported police retraining initiatives, 90% were happy with the peace agreement's implementation, and 94% said UNMIL increased security (Are United Nations' Peacekeepers missions effective?, n.d.).

Another example of a successful UN peacekeeping force is East Timor. After nearly 100,000 people were killed during the decades of Indonesian rule (1975–1999), the UN supervised the 1999 referendum, in which 78% of voters supported independence. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, or UNTAET, was set up soon after to run elections, keep the peace, and lead the country to independence in 2002. The International Stabilization Force stepped in 2006 following more disturbances, but according to a 2008 U.N. study, residents preferred U.N. troops over the ISF (Are United Nations' Peacekeepers operations effective?, n.d.).

Several missions under Chapter VI-monitoring ceasefires, DDR procedures, and integration of armed groups-have effectively fulfilled their goals, proving that not all missions are failures (Durch, 2006). But terrorism and a lot of armed groups make it harder to do business in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. Terrorist organizations have consistently threatened peacekeepers, particularly in Mali, highlighting the fact that armed groups cannot be eliminated by military means alone and that negotiated

ceasefires and political agreements are essential to advancement (Thapa, 2024).

Additionally, UN peacekeeping has improved host-state capabilities in the areas of justice, security, and governance. Despite controversy, missions like the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) all effectively departed after completing their original mandates. In 2010, the Secretary-General referred to MINURCAT's closing as a unique operation focused solely on civilian protection without an explicit political mandate in a report to the Security Council (Closure of MINURCAT, n.d.).

In addition, mission leadership's diplomatic efforts have been crucial-albeit less obvious-in defusing tensions and averting additional bloodshed. Even diplomatically mandated non-armed political missions have successfully concluded their exits and earned quiet victories. Prolonged deployments are not an inherent failure, but rather reflect the complexity of host-state situations, as demonstrated by long-standing operations like UNIFIL, UNTSO, and MONUSCO (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). The political environment, conflict dynamics, and resource limitations influencing each operation must thus be taken into account for evaluation of UN missions. The list of ongoing peace operations and factsheet reflecting is as per the table below.

Table 4.2

Current Peacekeeping Operations

Country and Region	Acronym	Established Year
Central African Republic	MINUSCA	2014
Cyprus	UNFICYP	1964
Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUSCO	2010
Golan heights	UNDOF	1974
India and Pakistan	UNMOGIP	1949
Kosovo	UNMIK	1999
Lebanon	UNIFIL	1978
Middle East	UNTSO	1948

South Sudan	UNMISS	2011
Sudan Abyei	UNISFA	2011
Western Sahara	MINURSO	1991

Source: Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet as of 28 February 2023 Adopted from [peacekeeping_missions_fact_sheet_february_2023.pdf](#)

For the dissertation discussion on analyzing the effectiveness and recommending the ways for the effective and efficient performance in pursuance of the mission mandate, peacekeeping missions having the POC mandate and under Chapter VII have been considered since they carryout significant gravity with respect to the security domain of the UNSC. The respondents from respective peacekeeping missions have given their view on the various dynamics of peacekeeping missions, effectiveness, and way ahead. The following table depicts the various dimensions of UNPKO.

Table 4.3

Current Peace Keeping Operation Fact Sheet

Facts about Current Peace Operation	Number	Remarks
Number of Peace Operations	12	
Troops	63921	Approved Budget 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022: 6.38 billion USD supports 10 out of 12 missions.
Police	7813	
Military Staff Officers	2111	
Military Observers	1062	
Total Uniformed Personnel	74907	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is funded through UN regular Budget.
Countries Contributing Uniformed Personnel	121	
International Civilian Personnel	3820	
Local Civilian Personnel	8176	
Total Personnel Serving	86903	
Total Fatalities in Current Peace Operations	1620	

Source: Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet as of 28 February 2023 Adopted from

peacekeeping_missions_fact_sheet_february_2023.pdf

The information in the table above demonstrates the extent of financial investment and the substantial human resources that the United Nations (UN) has committed to pursuing peace. This demonstrates the organization's continued dedication to maintaining and re-establishing global peace and security. Nonetheless, the consistently high death toll among peacekeepers is indicative of the substantial operational hazards present in modern deployments. To secure the safety and efficacy of peacekeepers in the field, this in turn calls for the introduction of novel approaches to peacekeeping, such as improved security measures and creative operational frameworks (Howard, 2008).

Since their founding, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have undergone significant change and are now governed by a variety of mandates. These range from traditional missions, which include policing buffer zones and facilitating peace negotiations (like UNPRESEF in Macedonia and UNIFIL in Lebanon), to observer missions, which are mainly restricted to monitoring ceasefires or troop withdrawals (like UNMOT in Tajikistan and UNMOP in Croatia). By tackling the underlying causes of conflict, multidimensional missions, often known as second-generation operations, use a more thorough strategy (e.g., UNMIT in Timor-Leste and ONUSAC in the Republic of the Congo). Last but not least, Articles 25, 42, and 43 of the UN Charter provide enforcement missions-such as UNMIS in Sudan and UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina-to employ force when required without the warring parties' approval (United Nations, 2023).

Traditional, consent-based mandates have clearly given way to more comprehensive, multifaceted enforcement operations during the last 20 years. As the international community's expectations for the protection of civilians continue to rise, this reflects both the lessons learnt from the failures to prevent atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bellamy and Williams, 2015). As a result of the deployment of more ambitious and resource-intensive missions with strict enforcement objectives, UN spending on PKOs has increased dramatically since the late 1990s. Two of the most expensive UN operations to date are UNMIS in Sudan and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).

UNPKOs have been given specific POC mandates by the Security Council,

which frequently calls for deployments with strong contingents and enforcement capabilities. The effectiveness, sustainability, and accountability of peacekeeping forces are also called into doubt, even though this strategy expands their operational scope (Fortna, 2008). Notwithstanding these developments, UNPKOs still have to contend with structural issues like inconsistent troop quality, Security Council political restrictions, and limited long-term influence in fragile states. These problems show how crucial it is to combine local ownership and peace building tactics with peacekeeping missions in order to achieve long-term effects. Even strong and well-funded mandates may fall short of their goals or fail to establish lasting peace in the absence of such integration (Paris, 2010).

4.11.1.3 Protection of Civilian (POC)

The UN mandate defines Protection of Civilians (POC) as integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission's capabilities and areas of deployment through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly force, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state (Protecting Civilians, n.d.). Peacekeeping missions with POC mandates must protect civilians who are in danger of physical harm, according to Security Council resolutions that are specific to the mission. Different POC methodologies may be included in individual requirements to help guide implementation efforts, and their phrasing may differ as well. These specifications, however, do not lessen the host state's fundamental obligation to protect citizens on its soil. Missions are often permitted to use all necessary means, including the use of lethal force where required, to protect civilians from physical injury under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping, 2022).

The UN's experiences in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) in the mid-1990s illustrated the disastrous effects of inadequate POC mandates. Armed groups regularly targeted civilians, committing serious human rights violations and sexual violence. Similar trends were also noted in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, highlighting the necessity of more robust mandates with unambiguous permission for peacekeepers to take decisive action (United Nations, 2019). POC is now the main mandate and a key indicator of mission success in the current missions of UNMISS (South Sudan), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of

Congo), and MINUSCA (Central African Republic) (United Nations, 2023).

In response, the UNSC has adopted resolutions to combat sexual violence and other abuses during armed conflict, improved mandates, and given civilian protection top priority on its agenda. In addition to provide technical, logistical, and capacity-building help, peacekeepers are supposed to support host governments by acting physically to protect civilians as a last resort (Protecting Civilians, n.d.). However, the safety of people is still essentially the responsibility of the host state. Missions may take independent action while, whenever possible, assisting the state's protection operations when the state is incapable or unwilling to protect citizens or when its own forces are in danger. Particularly in ethnically motivated conflicts when host nation troops may target particular groups, this duality poses a continuous operational difficulty. Under such circumstances, the effective mobilization of peacekeeping forces becomes extremely complex, necessitating robust troop contingents and clear mandates (Autesserre, 2014).

UN peacekeeping operations must adhere to the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy when supporting host state or non-UN security forces. From the outset, missions must prioritize activities that strengthen the host state's capacity to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). High-level engagement, information sharing, and political leverage are essential tools, but missions must also be prepared to physically intervene to protect civilians when these measures fail or time does not permit. Quick deployment and interposition of mission troops can sometimes deter host state forces from harming civilians, while in other cases a visible show of determination is required. Where host state authorities remain intransigent, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) provides strategic guidance and advocates for Security Council support (United Nations, 2019).

The UN's vulnerability was highlighted by failures in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia when missions lacked adequate capability or a clear mandate. Reforms to improve peacekeepers' capacity to protect civilians were prompted by these experiences (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009). Modern missions started to incorporate explicit civilian protection mandates as peacekeeping missions progressed beyond traditional ceasefire monitoring. A significant doctrinal shift was marked, for instance, by UNAMSIL's 1999 operation in Sierra Leone, which was the first to be specifically tasked with protecting people from imminent physical danger. The majority of the more over 100,000 uniformed UN troops stationed throughout the world by 2009 were carrying out POC

missions (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009).

The ability of peacekeeping operations to safeguard civilians is a critical component of their legitimacy and credibility. Both local residents and outside observers form expectations of safety in areas where peacekeepers are stationed. Missions that fail to address pervasive violence run the danger of losing their credibility and jeopardizing the peace process they are supporting. POC is therefore both a humanitarian need and a strategic requirement for maintaining political momentum, fostering confidence, and advancing lasting peace (Karim & Beardsley, 2016).

POC is also essential to a long-lasting political agreement. Legitimate governance cannot result from peace agreements that permit persistent violence or systematic breaches of human rights. State institutions and the rule of law may not establish themselves in regions where civilians are still in danger. Therefore, when peacekeeping efforts fall short of expectations, the entire UN system is at danger for damage to its reputation (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009). The UN's reputation has already been harmed by previous failures, underscoring the importance of POC to the organization's primary goal of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war (United Nations, 2000).

UN missions must thoroughly evaluate operating conditions before to deployment in order to establish the right force numbers and capacities in order to handle these difficulties. Clear requirements for POC and surge units (SUR) are necessary to guarantee that contingents can react quickly. In order to preserve operational efficacy and accountability, mission performance should also be assessed in relation to POC results. To do this, POC strategies must be updated at the policy and implementation levels to take into account the threats and operational realities of today (Thapa, 2024).

4.11.2 United Nations and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Prior to the 2005 World Summit (which came after the 2000 Millennium Summit), the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change urged the permanent members, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses (United Nations, 2004). Following the summit, the Small Five (S5), a grouping of the governments of Switzerland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Costa Rica, urged permanent members to refrain... from using a veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Members of the public have made such requests during open discussions on working practices (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020).

S5 dissolved in 2012, but at the beginning of 2013, a number of states formed a caucus with the aim of proposing new ideas to enhance Security Council working methods. The caucus adopted the S5 agenda, particularly its position regarding the veto. In May 2 of the same year, twenty-seven states from various regions established the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT) group. The group aimed to enhance Security Council working methods, including measures on the limitation of the veto power. The Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT) group began the code of conduct for members of the Security Council on action against crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes (ACT Group, 2015). The code is intended to inspire the Council to act swiftly and decisively to stop or prevent the commission of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. All Council members, however, as well as any other state that may eventually join the Council, are required to abide by the code. It invites the permanent members to voluntarily pledge not to exercise their veto power in situations involving crimes involving mass atrocities. The two permanent Council members, France and the United Kingdom, as well as eight elected members, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tunisia, approved the Code of Conduct at the start of 2020 (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020).

Since the middle of the 2000s, permanent member France has pushed for a voluntary veto restraint. A ministerial-level event on this topic was arranged in September 2014 by France and Mexico in conjunction with the 69th session of the General Assembly. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, the High Commissioner for Human Rights,

then made a statement endorsing the French plan. The co-chairs requested that the P5 voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the veto in case of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes on a large scale. This was stated in a summary of the meeting. However, only the UK has backed the plan out of the permanent members (OHCHR, 2014).

The majority of member states within the United Nations agree that it is necessary to update the composition of the Security Council, although there will be no shortage of aspirants who are not impressed with any of the many proposals made to date. While some would increase the number of permanent members on the Council, other proposals suggest establishing an additional category of elected membership which could be re-elected. Smaller countries have been concerned with improving procedures (Weiss, 2013). However, in early 2022, both U.S. President Joe Biden and UN General Assembly President Csaba Korosi stated that overhauling the Security Council should be a top priority. In his speech to the UN in 2022, Biden urged the P5 nations to avoid abusing their veto power and asked for the Security Council to be expanded, notably by including more members from Africa and Latin America (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020).

4.11.2.1 Outcome of the world Summit 2005 and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

A Special Adviser nominated by the Under-Secretary-General oversees the United Nations' specialized office on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the prevention of genocide. On issues pertaining to avoiding genocide and maintaining governments' duties to safeguard their citizens, especially those at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, this adviser answers directly to the Secretary-General. The concept of Responsibility to safeguard (R2P) arose from member states' obligations to safeguard society's most vulnerable citizens while adhering to human rights laws, the law of armed conflict, and international humanitarian law (Genser, 2018).

At the 2005 World Summit, which was attended by representatives of every UN member state, it was made clear that the host government is primarily responsible for protecting civilians in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. R2P represents a moral and political commitment to stop and prevent the most severe types of mass violence and repression. By offering a framework for

proactive protection, the principle enhances member states' current responsibilities under international humanitarian and human rights law. The international community's shortcomings in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda and the Balkans, highlighted how urgently a strong system to stop mass atrocities is needed (United Nations, 2005).

In a similar vein, NATO's military intervention in Kosovo, which was denounced as a breach of the ban on the use of force, sparked important debates on how the international community ought to react to ongoing abuses of human rights. The international community should help governments fulfill their protective commitments and strengthen their ability to prevent atrocities, according to the World Summit Outcome Document. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon provided a thorough plan for implementing Responsibility to Protect (R2P) across the United Nations system in his 2009 report, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* (Evans, 2008).

Three pillars form the foundation of the R2P framework. The first pillar lays out the state's fundamental duty to defend its citizens against crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. To help governments meet this duty, the second pillar advocates for capacity-building and international assistance. The third pillar emphasizes that the international community must act swiftly and forcefully to defend its inhabitants when a state fails to do so, using all of the tools provided by Chapters VI through VIII of the UN Charter. This theory upholds the idea that accountability is a necessary component of sovereignty and that a state's failure to protect its inhabitants results in a lingering international duty to stop mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2009).

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which emphasized that sovereignty, encompasses duties to citizens and collaboration with the international community, further developed the idea of the responsibility to protect. While governments are still responsible for protecting their citizens, the international community has a residual obligation to step in when states are unable or unwilling to do so (ICISS, 2001). Later UN reports, such as Secretary-General Kofi Annan's *In Larger Freedom* (2005) and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change's *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (2004), confirmed that state sovereignty comes with responsibilities and that the international community can only step in, mainly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, when a state fails to fulfill these obligations (Gautam, 2018).

In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1), member states explicitly supported Responsibility to Protect (R2P), underlining their duty to safeguard populations against crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The responsibilities of countries, regional organizations, and the international community in protecting populations were outlined in paragraphs 138 and 139, which focused on collective international action when national authorities fall short of this obligation. Beyond conflict management, R2P expands the conventional definition of security to include human security, which includes protection of vulnerable populations, food, health, and economic stability (United Nations, 2005). It outright opposes authoritarian governments' abuse of power to commit or enable crimes against their people. When local authorities fail to safeguard individuals, the international community is required to step in through Responsibility to safeguard (R2P). Implementation is still unequal, though, as the UN's ability to carry out its protective mandate is frequently hampered by the political interests of strong nations, as seen in the crises in North Korea, Yemen, Syria, and Myanmar. However, R2P emphasizes prompt and consistent international action by offering a moral and legal framework to protect the ideals of the UN Charter (Hehir, 2013).

In UN peacekeeping missions, R2P is strongly related to the Protection of Civilians (POC) framework. R2P is special in that it permits international action without host-state agreement when the state is incapable or unwilling to defend its citizens, even when both seek to prevent mass crimes. This qualification emphasizes R2P's proactive involvement in averting widespread human rights breaches and protecting human security. The R2P principle, which combines political, moral, and legal responsibilities, is a revolutionary approach to world government. Even though there are still implementation issues, especially because of political limitations, it is still a useful tool for safeguarding vulnerable groups and advancing the basic goals of the UN Charter (United Nations Peacekeeping: Protection of Civilians, 2022).

4.11.3 Collective Security, Peace Enforcement and Use of Force

As far as the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, force may become necessary under the drafters of the UN Charter. Any working system of collective security, whether it is the more narrowly defined or our broader definition of it, has to incorporate the justified usage of military force. However, the criteria for the usage of such force, as well as its

application on different occasions, represent one of the more difficult contemporary policy issues. It is vital that there be universal agreement about the use of force being both legally and morally justified if the objective is to secure world peace. One requirement without the other in the realm of international law will make the former less effective for both the safety of states and individuals (United Nations, 2004).

Article 2.4 of the UN Charter expressly forbids member states from using or threatening to use force against one another, with the exceptions of self-defense under Article 51 and the use of force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII (and, indirectly, by Chapter VIII for regional organizations) in response to any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. In the first 44 years of the UN, member States routinely broke these restrictions and employed military action many times, with little or no Chapter VII resolutions being passed by a paralyzed Security Council and little or no credible protection provided by Article 51 (United Nations, 1945). But since the conclusion of the Cold War, there has been a growing desire for a global order based on the rule of law. The assumption that security is best maintained by a balance of power or by a single superpower, even one with good intentions, is not widely accepted on a global scale (Evans, 2004).

Moreover, there is the provision of collective defense and collective security under the umbrella of the NATO alliance, under the leadership of US. Comparison between the collective security and collective defense provision of NATO and UN should be made. NATO holds great power in the UNSC. Among the P5 members, three of them that include France, the United States and United Kingdom are leading countries within the NATO allies. NATO forces have been authorized by UNSC for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security on various occasions including Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Libya (2011). NATO's role in the Gulf War (1990-91) for the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi invasion is another example of the collective security (NATO, 2010).

The fundamental tenet of NATO's founding treaty is collective defense. It continues to be a special and timeless tenet that unites its members, promising them to defend one another and fostering a sense of unity inside the Alliance. An attack against one ally is regarded as an attack against all allies under the doctrine of collective defense. Article 5 states that in the event that an armed attack occurs against a NATO ally, all other members of the alliance shall view this as an armed attack on all members

and shall take any necessary steps to support the attacked ally (Collective defense and Article 5, 2023). The NATO article 5 states the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (NATO,1940).

Following 9/11, the Council resolved on collective action after the allies had talks. In accordance with its rights and obligations under the United Nations Charter, the United States could potentially take autonomous action. Following the conclusion that the attacks were foreign-initiated, NATO decided on a set of eight measures to bolster US policy on October 4. It initiated Eagle Assist, it's first-ever counterterrorism operation, at the request of the United States, and ran it from mid-October 2001 until mid-May 2002 (Collective defense and Article 5, 2023). This marked the initial deployment of NATO military resources to bolster an Article 5 action. In reaction to the assaults on the United States, the Alliance initiated Operation Active Endeavour, its second counterterrorism operation, on October 26. NATO's Standing Naval Forces dispatched patrolling and shipping monitoring elements to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to identify and prevent terrorist activity, particularly illicit trafficking. The effort was extended to cover the whole Mediterranean in March 2004 (Collective defense and Article 5, 2023).

Despite the fact that NATO allies have only ever used Article 5, they have frequently coordinated collective defense measures. Three times at Turkey's request, NATO has implemented collective defense measures: during the Gulf War in 1991, when Patriot missiles were deployed; during the Iraqi crisis in 2003, when an agreement was reached on a package of defensive measures and the conduct of Operation Display Deterrence; and in 2012, in response to the Syrian situation, when Patriot missiles were deployed (Collective defense and Article 5, 2023).

NATO undertook the largest boost in collective defense since the Cold War in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the emergence of security threats from the south, including vicious attacks by ISIL and other terrorist groups across many

continents. For example, it created a 5,000-strong Spearhead Force under the NATO Response Force (NRF), a highly prepared and technologically advanced multinational force, and tripled the strength of the NRF. It also sent multinational combat groups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In reaction to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, and in keeping with its defensive strategy to safeguard all Allies, NATO is implementing further measures to bolster defense and deterrence throughout the Alliance (Collective defence and Article 5, 2023). NATO has interpreted and referred to UN article 51: Collective Self Defense for its offensive actions like in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria but follow up peace enforcement operations of UNSC remains vague (Dinstein, 2017).

The world's major countries, particularly the P5 members of the UNSC, have always set the course for the UN Collective Security system. Since they can only profit from the system when the interests of any of the big gives, particularly the United States, are at risk, small and medium countries feel excluded from the Collective Security arrangement. Its shortcomings do not, however, negate the system's utility. The UN Collective Security system is still important and necessary, but its serious flaws must be fixed by acknowledging the additional responsibility to stop the spread of terrorism and WMDs, which were not originally intended, and by expanding the Security Council to include states' political interests that are thought to be behind these new security threats (Hurd, 2007). Therefore, it is crucial to emphasize the necessity of implementing a measure to boost confidence among UN members in order to create the necessary unity and collaboration for long-term world peace and security. This would initiate real reforms as now advocated by UN members, particularly those from Asia, Latin America, and Africa, with the Security Council being expanded and represented according to geographic location and power dynamics (Ebegbulem, 2011).

4.11.4 Sanctions Against Countries Threatening World Peace

In accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may act to preserve or restore global peace and security. In accordance with Article 41, sanctions procedures cover a wide range of non-violent enforcement tools. Since 1966, the Security Council has enacted 31 sanctions regimes against countries and organizations, including Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti (2), Angola, Liberia (3), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Iran, Somalia/Eritrea, ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, Iraq (2), DRC, Sudan, Lebanon,

DPRK. (Sanctions, n.d.). According to the UN Charter, the Council may decide to use enforcement measures such as economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, severance of diplomatic relations, blockade, or even collective military action in order to maintain international peace and security (United Nations, 1945). The primary goal is to target those responsible for the international community's condemned policies or practices while minimizing the effects of the actions taken on other segments of the population and the economy (Cortright & Lopez, 2002).

The Security Council has used sanctions in many ways to reach different goals. The effects have been different depending on the type of sanctions. Some were broad, like trade and economic sanctions, while others were more specific, like travel bans, banking or commodity limits, and arms embargoes. The Security Council has put sanctions in place to encourage peaceful changes, stop unconstitutional changes, fight terrorism, protect human rights, and stop the spread of weapons (Sanctions, n.d.). There are now fifteen active sanctions regimes that help stop terrorism, stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and settle conflicts peacefully. A non-permanent member of the Security Council is in charge of the sanctions committee that watches over each regime. Eleven teams, panels, and monitoring groups help twelve of the fifteen sanctions committees. The Council applies sanctions with ever-increasing cognizance of the rights of those targeted (Sanctions, n.d.). The General Assembly urged the Security Council, with the Secretary-General's backing, to make sure that equitable and transparent processes are in place for the imposition and withdrawal of sanctions imposed in the 2005 World Summit declaration. The establishment of a de-listing focal point and the Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee are two instances of this tactic in action (Sanctions, n.d.).

4.11.5 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Ban on use of Lethal Weapons

With the ability to destroy entire cities, kill millions of people, and permanently damage the environment and future generations, nuclear weapons continue to be the most deadly weapons in existence. Humanity is seriously threatened by their very existence. There are apparently still over 13,080 nuclear weapons in the globe, and more than 2,000 nuclear tests have previously been carried out, despite the fact that they have only been deployed in war twice (Nuclear Weapons – UNODA, n.d.). Nuclear disarmament is the ideal answer to such grave dangers, but achieving this objective has proven incredibly challenging. The United Nations has sought to prevent nuclear

weapons since its founding. A Commission was established by the UN General Assembly's first resolution in 1946 to study atomic energy and suggest policies for its control and only peaceful application (Disarmament, n.d.).

Nepal has continuously shown that it supports nuclear non-proliferation and the observance of pertinent international agreements. At the height of the world armaments competition, King Mahendra made this clear in his 1967 speech to the UN General Assembly. Although partial accords like the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty were encouraging, he noted that they were still insufficient and voiced concern over the superpowers' nuclear programs and their sluggish disarmament progress (Shah Dev, 1967). Nepal's strategy, which is balanced and supports both Indian and Pakistani initiatives, reflects the moral agency of tiny states in nuclear diplomacy and shows that it is trying to negotiate the regional security context while adhering to universal disarmament values (Thakur, 2017).

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was signed in 1996 but is still pending, are among the numerous international agreements that have been established to stop nuclear testing and proliferation (Disarmament, n.d.). The UN's ongoing watchfulness against non-state entities pursuing WMDs is demonstrated by the Security Council's extension of the 1540 Committee's mandate through November 2032 (Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – Security Council, 9205th Meeting, 2022). Despite the structural dominance of nuclear-armed states, these changes are part of a larger trend that shows middle and minor countries are frequently driving regional disarmament attempts and nuclear-free zones (Rizvi, 2020).

Paradoxically, the world's major suppliers of munitions continue to be the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the very bodies charged with maintaining global peace and security. Military spending keeps increasing even in the face of repeated global financial crises. The achievement of the Ban Landmines Treaty and grassroots efforts for nuclear disarmament serve as examples of how civil society has frequently acted as a catalyst in important disarmament discussions that take place outside of UN frameworks (Gautam, 2018).

This change is in line with academic research that argues for a human-centric

model of security that prioritizes collective safety and human development over national armaments (Paris, 2001). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that increasing responsibility and efficacy in disarmament forums requires including gender views and wider involvement (Miller, 2021).

Global cooperation is required to deal with the existential issue presented by nuclear weaponry. Nevertheless, as long as the major nations remain in control of weapons manufacture and spending, there will still be no improvement. There needs to be engagement from the international community, especially the United Nations, by integrating the civil society input and taking non-proliferation actions (Fihn, 2017).

4.11.6 Biological Weapons

The horrors of World War I led to a global ban on biological weapons. People have known for a long time that using them is against moral and human rights laws. A broader class of weapons that also includes chemical, nuclear, and radioactive weapons is known as weapons of mass destruction or unconventional weapons, of which biological weapons are a subset. The threat of biological agents being used in a terrorist attack is believed to be growing, and their usage is a major concern (WHO, 2019). Biological weapons spread pathogens or toxins that can hurt or kill people, animals, or plants. They can be very contagious and deadly. These weapons could help diseases spread around the world faster by letting them across national borders. If state or non-state actors intentionally let poisons or biological weapons loose, the results could be disastrous. In addition to the terrible death toll, these kinds of events can lead to food shortages, environmental disasters, huge economic losses, widespread illness, anxiety, and a lack of trust in the government. The signing of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 marked the end of long-term efforts to get rid of these weapons of mass destruction. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) makes it very clear that you can't make, buy, sell, store, or use biological and toxic weapons. It was the first international agreement on disarmament to ban a whole group of weapons of mass destruction (Disarmament , n.d.).

4.11.7 Chemical Weapon

Chemical weapons are still used today. They were first used in World War I when both sides used deadly gas to cause unbearable pain and death on the battlefield. These weapons were basically just regular bullets, like artillery rounds and grenades, with

well-known chemicals added to them. Phosgene (a choking agent), mustard gas, and chlorine were some of the chemicals used. The results were often terrible and random. As a result, about 100,000 people died. More than a million people have died from chemical weapons since World War I. The Chemical Weapons Convention, which was signed in 1993, finally put an end to years of work to get rid of these weapons of mass destruction (Disarmament, n.d.).

The Chemical Weapons Convention seeks to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting their development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use, while also ensuring the destruction of existing arsenals. In doing so, it aspires to remove the threat of chemical warfare altogether. In contrast, the 2003 NATO-led invasion of Iraq was driven largely by suspicions that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction, yet no concrete evidence was found after the conflict. Reflecting on the war, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair later acknowledged that mistakes had been made in the course of the intervention (Iraq Inquiry, 2016). However, he maintained that he did not regret the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Blair said in an exclusive interview with CNN's Fareed Zakaria, I can say that I apologize for the fact that the intelligence we received was wrong because, even though he had used chemical weapons extensively against his own people, against others, the program in the form that we thought it was did not exist in the way that we thought (Mullen, 2015).

4.11.8 Fighting Against Terrorism

All 15 members of the Security Council, both permanent and non-permanent, make up the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates are also members as of May 2023, in addition to the P5 countries (Members of Counter Terrorism Committee, n.d.). Supported by the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the CTC is essential in helping Member States create integrated and comprehensive national counterterrorism policies and put in place systems that deal with the conditions that encourage terrorism. This illustrates how international counterterrorism efforts have changed significantly, shifting from disjointed and reactive tactics to comprehensive and preventive ones (Kfir, 2020).

In line with their duties under international law, the Security Council has urged Member States to develop such all-encompassing and integrated strategies through resolutions 1963 (2010), 2129 (2013), 2395 (2017), and 2617 (2021). By analyzing national threat assessments, contexts, and compliance with international standards like the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Bogota Principles, and CTED's Technical Guide, CTED evaluates Member States' counterterrorism efforts on behalf of the CTC (Members of Counter Terrorism Committee, n.d.). Research indicates that this whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is more successful in tackling the underlying causes of violent extremism because it emphasizes multidisciplinary strategies that integrate law enforcement with socioeconomic, political, developmental, human rights, gender, and rule-of-law measures (Schmid, 2013).

Along with promoting coordination through mechanisms like the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact's Working Group on National and Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategies (NARS), which CTED chairs and the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism serves as vice-chair, CTED also identifies best practices to share with other Member States (Members of Counter Terrorism Committee, n.d.). In addition to encouraging whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, this coordination promotes complementarity and coherence among Compact entities. Accordingly, CTED has placed a greater emphasis on resilience-building, a concept that complements conventional security measures by prioritizing the strengthening of communities against radicalization and terrorist recruiting (UNODC, 2021).

It has become easy for individuals and objects to move across borders due to globalization. Terrorist mobility is not an exception. For this reason, it becomes vital to have efficient border control in the prevention of the flow of cargo and people through illegal ways. It becomes especially important since such movements involve foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The challenge of securing air, land, and sea borders poses great difficulty for the member states. With the difficulty some countries experience in conducting passenger screenings, cargo examination, and matching passengers with databases of their country or internationally, aviation security remains a threat. Maritime border security requires substantial investment in technology and other resources (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

CTED's evaluations of States' adherence to the border-security requirements of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) have exposed these gaps, which have made it

difficult to implement later resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017) However, other states have bolstered border security by requiring transit visas, confiscating passports, and using INTERPOL databases more effectively to find and identify FTFs (Members of Counter Terrorism Committee, n.d.).

Increasing the usage of databases on lost or stolen travel papers and providing frontline immigration officers with access to the INTERPOL I-24/7 encrypted communication network have been identified as excellent practices. Collective attempts to stop the spread of terrorism are undermined by the fact that many States still do not have access to these vital databases, such as the Al-Qaida sanctions list and the ISIL (Da'esh) database (Members of Counter Terrorism Committee, n.d.). The difficulties of governing international security are highlighted by this uneven implementation, which also emphasises how crucial it is for Member States to provide resources and establish capability (Bures, 2012).

CTED assists in identifying best practices and suggesting improvements to national resilience, even as it concentrates on advising and assessing Member States' counterterrorism measures. According to studies, incorporating human rights, social, and developmental methods into security frameworks enhances the durability of counterterrorism measures and lowers the possibility that complaints may turn violent (Heydemann, 2014). This all-encompassing strategy is in line with larger UN reform discussions that advocate for a balance between preventive, community-based tactics and coercive actions in frameworks for peace and security (Heydemann, 2014).

Issues relating to counterterrorism also intersect with peace operations. Within regions of conflict such as Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, terrorist threats have become a focus for peace operations in spite of the fact that the usual UN peacekeeping mandate does not include counterterrorism. It is suggested by scholars that incorporating counterterrorism, community engagement, and intelligence in peace operations can help in preventing terrorist threats from undermining the peace operations mission, but engaging in counterterrorism itself may place peacekeepers at risk of losing their neutrality (Karlsrud, 2018). The new development highlights the need for an appropriate mandate that takes into consideration the growing presence of terrorist elements in relation to the impartiality of the UN in peace operations missions (United Nations, 2020).

4.12 Achievement of UNSC

The United Nations (UN) has made significant strides towards decolonization. Nearly 750 million people lived in colonial-administrated regions when it was founded in 1945. Today, less than two million are still governed in this way. The UN's human rights framework is based on the fundamental right to sovereignty and self-determination. Four consecutive 'International Decades for the Eradication of Colonialism' and the historic 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' were among the historic resolutions on decolonization that the General Assembly enacted (United Nations, n.d.). The Special Committee on decolonization regularly invites representatives from these territories to participate in its annual sessions, while also periodically reviewing the list of non-self-governing territories. By allowing recently decolonized states to join the UN in line with the Charter's requirements-which call for ratification by all permanent members (P5) and an affirmative vote of at least nine of the fifteen Council members-the Security Council (UNSC) has also played a significant role (Balakrishnan, 2021).

Even though this is not the ultimate solution to ending wars, there has been a considerable decrease in the number of interstate wars along with the number of fatalities since 1945. This reduction was due to several reasons, but UNSC has played a vital role in preventing any large-scale invasion, which could lead to annexation of an independent state. The 1990-1991 Gulf War, which marked the application of collective security by the United Nations, serves as a prime example. With the passage of resolution 678 under Article VII of the UN Charter, military action was allowed against Iraq for its withdrawal from Kuwait (United Nations Security Council, 1990). With superpowers working together to stop aggression, this episode was generally seen as a test of the UN's ability in the post-Cold War era. However, detractors contend that the US-led coalition acted primarily outside the Council's supervisory authority, illustrating the conflict between unilateral hegemonic methods and the principles of collective security (Morris & Wheeler, 2007). In a similar vein, the Council was able to approve enforcement measures under Chapter VII during the Korean War in 1950 because of the Soviet Union's brief boycott. This made it possible for the adoption of three important resolutions that authorized the use of armed force with UN authorization. The operation demonstrated the limits of the Charter principle that collective action requires the permission of all permanent members, even though it was a practical example of

collective security (Luck, 2006). Because of the bipolar rivalry between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, the UNSC was frequently seen as a paralyzed body. The extent of this paralysis is demonstrated by veto data, which show that 279 vetoes were issued between 1946 and 1990, 124 of which were by the USSR and 82 by the US (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020). During that time, the Council only permitted enforcement steps under Chapter VII in extraordinary situations, such as when placing sanctions on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia or against North Korea. This pattern mirrored what many academics refer to as institutionalized stalemate, in which superpower competition limited the Security Council's influence. Nevertheless, even amid its limitations, the UNSC contributed to a reduction in interstate war frequency and provided a forum for negotiation, conflict management, and information gathering to lay the groundwork for peace (Luck, 2006).

For many years, the UN was successful in keeping tensions between the superpowers from rising. Because of the Security Council's political commitment in the 1960s and 1970s, direct conflict between the US and the USSR was avoided. As newly independent nations applied to join the post-war security system, decolonization increased the number of UN members at that time. These governments' internal nation- and state-building processes now depended on maintaining peace and stability. Nonetheless, during the 1990s, the Council's expanding responsibilities and more intricate mandates have prompted concerns about its capacity to react to emerging crises in an unbiased and efficient manner (Bourantonis, 2011). Most people agree that the UNSC is currently the most potent security body in the UN system. However, concerns about its legality and neutrality still exist. Examples like the Rohingya issue, Iraq, and Syria demonstrate the Council's incapacity to prevent unilateral action or break veto-driven impasse (Islam, 2018). Notwithstanding these drawbacks, Article 24(1) of the Charter states that the UNSC is still primarily in charge of preserving world peace and security. The Charter's structure, processes, and authority are outlined in chapters V, VI, and VII (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

An examination of Security Council operations identifies both its strengths and weaknesses. A quantifiable achievement of UN decolonization methods may be seen in the sharp decline in the number of colonial territories, which went from 750 million people under colonial rule in 1945 to less than 2 million today (United Nations, n.d.). Similarly, the emergence of UN mediation tools and collective security principles has

coincided with a decrease in the frequency of interstate conflicts after 1945 (Hegre, 2014). Nonetheless, systemic impasse is highlighted by veto usage data from 1946 to 1990: The Council's ability to enforce its mandate was limited by 279 vetoes that prevented it from acting on numerous crises (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020). Case examples like the Korean and Gulf Wars qualitatively demonstrate the Council's reliance on great-power consensus as well as its capacity to mobilize collective security. Interventions following the Cold War demonstrate that the UN runs the risk of being perceived as an instrument for unilateral hegemony rather than a neutral security mechanism if it does not have supervisory control over coalitions (Weiss, 2018). These data imply that although the UNSC has significantly, albeit unevenly, influenced world peace and security, reform is still required to improve its legitimacy, oversight ability, and crisis-responsiveness.

The relationship between the UNGA and the UNSC is governed by rules in Chapter IV on the UNGA, among other chapters of the Charter. Chapter VIII contains clauses that specify the UNSC's authority and obligations in relation to regional agreements (United Nations, 1945). Four following facts under the Charter are particularly important for comprehending the authority and capabilities of the Security Council.

- (a) First, although having a small membership (originally eleven, now fifteen), the Security Council represents all UN members when taking action (Article 24(1)).
- (b) Second, Article 2(6) makes it clear that even states outside the United Nations are expected to follow its core principles when this is necessary to maintain international peace and security. At the same time, the Security Council is empowered to adopt decisions that are not limited to its own members; rather, they are binding on all UN Member States, as reflected in Articles 2(5), 25, and 49.
- (c) Third, the right of the Security Council to decide is constrained by the authority granted to any permanent member to veto important Council resolutions (Article 27(3)).
- (d) Fourth, the Security Council must be able to work continuously (Article 28(1)), in contrast to the other major UN bodies that typically only meet at set

times during the year (United Nations, 1945).

The matters brought before the Security Council can be understood along a spectrum of seriousness, as suggested by the language of the Charter. At one end are relatively general matters, questions, or situations, which may escalate into disputes, and further into threats to or breaches of the peace, with acts of aggression representing the most severe category. Although these distinctions in terminology may seem subtle, they can carry practical implications for both procedure and the range of actions available to the Council (United Nations, 1945).

For instance, Article 27(3) provides that when an issue is formally recognized as a dispute, any Council member directly involved must abstain from voting on substantive decisions under Chapter VI or Article 52(3). By contrast, enforcement measures under Chapter VII are only possible once the Council determines-whether explicitly or by implication-that a situation amounts to a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Broadly speaking, the Council's functions under the Charter can be grouped into three areas: actions directed at parties involved in a dispute, its relationship and coordination with the General Assembly, and measures that apply to all Member States: Measures directed at the parties- The Security Council 'shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties' to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means (Article 33(2)) (Sievers & Daws, 2014). It may, in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, call upon the parties to a dispute to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable (Article 40). At any point during a dispute-or a similar situation-the Council has the ability to suggest suitable procedures or methods to help the parties reach a resolution, as reflected in Article 36(1). It may also propose specific terms of settlement when it considers them appropriate under Article 37(2). Additionally, when all parties involved request it, the Council can offer recommendations aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement, in line with Article 38(United Nations, 1945). It 'shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes' through regional arrangements or agencies (Article 52(3)). It may make recommendations or decide on measures not involving the use of armed force (Articles 39 and 41) or decide on such military action as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (Articles 39 and 42) (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

Measures in relation to the General Assembly-According to Article 11(2), the

UNSC may present the UNGA with issues pertaining to the upkeep of global peace and security. It has the authority to advise the UNGA on matters such as the admission, suspension, or expulsion of members (Articles 4 to 6), the Secretary-General's appointment (Article 97), the participation of non-members of the United Nations in the election of members of the International Court of Justice (Articles 4(3) of the Statute of the Court), the amendment of the Statute of the Court (Article 69 of the Statute of the Court), and compliance with court rulings. The Security Council performs its obligations on behalf of all UN Member States for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24(1)), and Member States have agreed to accept and carry out the Council's decisions in accordance with the Charter (Article 25) (United Nations, 1945).

Member States shall 'give every assistance in any action' the Council takes in accordance with the Charter (a positive obligation), 'and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action' (a negative obligation) (Article 2(5)). These interconnected obligations reflect one of the core principles underpinning the United Nations. They are further strengthened by Article 49 of Chapter VII, which makes it clear that Member States are required to cooperate and provide mutual assistance in implementing measures decided by the Security Council (United Nations, 1945). In addition, the Charter assigns the Council a broader responsibility toward all Member States: under Article 26, it is tasked with putting forward plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments.

Initial attempts to put this provision into practice, particularly those made before 1952, did not achieve the intended results. The UN Charter nevertheless establishes a clear procedural framework within which the Security Council is expected to perform its functions (United Nations, 1945). This framework outlines key aspects of the Council's meetings: they may be convened at any time (Article 28(1)); they can be held periodically with representation at the governmental level or by specially appointed delegates (Article 28(2)); and they are not confined to UN Headquarters, as meetings may take place elsewhere when necessary (Article 28(3)) (United Nations, 1945). Furthermore, Articles 29 and 30 empower the Council to establish subsidiary bodies and to determine its own rules of procedure. It also has the discretion, under Article 31, to invite any UN Member State to take part in its discussions when it considers that the interests of that state are directly affected (United Nations, 1945). As opposed to this, any

State that is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council...shall be invited to participate in the debate regarding the issue (Article 32) (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

However, despite receiving criticism, challenges, and limitations, UNSC stands out as the most important and prominent body for ensuring international peace and security in today's geopolitics. Apart from settling conventional disagreements, the UNSC acts as the primary mechanism for recognizing and managing any threats to international peace and security ranging from climate change and humanitarian emergencies to the use of the responsibility to protect doctrine and employing force to preserve or restore international peace (Weiss, 2018). The UNSC also assumes responsibility for the peaceful settlement of disputes and collective security actions among the Members States. It is arguable whether the UNSC remains neutral due to great power politics, but its absence would make the world an anarchic and chaotic place considering the lack of a legitimate global organization to oversee international peace and security matters (Weiss, 2018). It has been the most important body to maintain world peace, security, and stability through its different tools – R2P and POC through peace enforcement and peacekeeping operation, collective security etc. It is the last hope for tens of thousands helpless people in the world. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General writes that 'healthy and sustainable societies are based on three pillars: peace and security, sustainable development, the rule of law and respect for human rights. There can be no long-term security without development; there can be no long-term development without security' (Annan, 2015). It is, therefore, the UNSC needs to be saved and nurtured for the betterment of the world's people (Islam, 2018).

4.13 Main Outcomes from KII

The view of majority KII respondents about effectiveness of UNSC has been summarized as below.

- (a) UNSC is partially effective in carrying out its various roles and responsibilities.
- (b) It has many success stories in terms of collective security and maintenance of peace and security in the conflict-ridden areas through various UNPKO.
- (c) The UNPKO in terms of maintenance of international peace and security are partially effective.

- (d) Veto power vested in UNSC has been used for the interest of P5 nations.
- (e) There should be increased role of UNGA in peace and security affairs.
- (f) As per the emerging security threats, role of UNSC and its functions must be reframed and redesigned to deal with them effectively.

4.14 Attempts and Initiations for Reformation of UNSC

Since the signing of the UN Charter, there have been persistent calls for reform and amendments, with particular attention focused on reorganizing and strengthening the Security Council. Over the years, numerous papers have been published, meetings convened, and working groups formed to examine a wide range of proposals (Caglayan, 2007). These have included reforming the UN's financing system, altering the composition of the Security Council, streamlining the Secretariat, defining a more effective role for the Trusteeship Council, revitalizing the General Assembly, and addressing other institutional matters. Although many of these efforts have been innovative and carefully considered, most proposals-aside from a few minor exceptions-have not been implemented, leaving the United Nations to navigate its challenges on a largely ad hoc, year-to-year basis (Caglayan, 2007).

One of the few topics where revisions have previously been successfully advocated is the makeup of the Council. There are two major time periods that can be used to describe earlier reform initiatives. The years 1945 through 1965 will be discussed first, followed by the years 1965 through 1992. Some important reform projects were carried out during the Cold War period (Caglayan, 2007). There have been many debates on how to enhance the efficiency of the United Nations. Many solutions have been proposed over time. As expected, the majority of reform ideas revolve around increasing the membership of the Council. It is pertinent to note that there have been six major reforms carried out by the United Nations since its inception more than five decades ago. It is evident that some reforms proved to be more successful than others. It is also worth noting that the United Nations Charter has seen only three revisions. All of them had something to do with the number of seats. Two of them were revisions of the UN Economic and Social Council while one involved the Security Council. The Security Council Reform initiatives have been classified into three categories in this study. First, the earlier reform initiatives will be discussed. Second, the more recent ones will be discussed, followed by the evaluation of earlier reforms (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

4.14.1 Attempts for Reformation of UNSC (1945-1965)

As the Republic of China, France, USSR, the UK, and USA were the five permanent members of the UNSC and the remaining six members were temporary, the total number of UNSC members at inception was eleven, showing the power equation following World War II. Nevertheless, by mid-1950s, the situation of the Council's international membership was threatening the structure of the Council. In the early 1950s, eighteen Latin American countries requested the first official reform, citing dissatisfaction with the ability of the Council to reflect the membership of the UN (Weiss & Daws, 2018). The organization's makeup was drastically altered by the decolonization process. UN membership increased from 51 to 113 states between the organization's inception in 1945 and the end of the first wave of decolonization in 1963 (United Nations, n.d.). The General Assembly to Council ratio was significantly changed by this enlargement, going from 1:4.63 to 1:12.86, highlighting the need to almost triple UNSC membership in order to ensure fair representation (Caglayan, 2007).

The Council was under increasing pressure to adjust as the number of African and Asian states increased. In 1963, forty-four African and Asian governments proposed an amendment that increased the number of non-permanent members from six to ten. As a result, the Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members by General Assembly resolution 1990 (XVII). Subsequently, the five permanent members still needed to concur on substantive judgments, but nine members had to vote in favor of procedural decisions. The extent of institutional change was constrained by opposition from the permanent members and their allies, despite the fact that this reform recognized the UN's demographic reality (Caglayan, 2007).

Additionally, Nepal was instrumental in promoting representative reforms, especially in support of the People's Republic of China's admission. Prime Minister B.P. Koirala claimed at the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 29, 1960, that the UN would not adequately reflect world political realities and would stay unfinished unless China was granted its proper seat. He emphasized that when 630 million people were denied access to the UN's benefits, it was unable to adequately carry out its mandate. By portraying these exclusions as barriers to the UN's legitimacy and universality, he further emphasized Mongolia's rightful claim to membership (Koirala, 1960). This reflects the broader expectation of smaller and non-aligned states that the UN's structures should evolve in parallel with its growing and diversifying membership

(Luck, 2006).

Despite these reforms, the ratio of UN membership to Council representation continued to widen, rising to 7.53 after the 1963 amendment (Caglayan, 2007). The slow pace of change has perpetuated concerns regarding the Security Council's capacity to reflect the priorities of its diverse membership, especially in light of the shift in global power from the transatlantic to the Indo-Pacific region (Weiss, 2020). As far back as 1945, the GA/SC ratio stood at 1:4.63. This shows that there was a relatively equal level of representation. However, this ratio was upped to 7.53 in 1963 and currently stands at 1:12.86. This means that the disparity between membership and representation within the Security Council has nearly tripled, thus statistically proving the need for greater representation within the Council. It is clear from the statistics provided above that, while the UN boasts a universal membership, the Security Council is trapped in the architecture of the mid-twentieth century (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

4.14.2 Attempts for Reformation of UNSC (1965-1989)

Notwithstanding repeated requests from poor countries, attempts to broaden the Council are membership-especially its non-permanent membership-have not yet succeeded. Ten nations proposed expanding the Council's membership from 15 to 21 seats in order to better reflect global representation after the UN's membership reached 152 states in 1979 (Fitzgerald, 2013). Five from Africa, four from Asia, three from Latin America and the Caribbean, one from Eastern Europe, and two from Western Europe were among the suggested distributions. In 1980, the resolutions were delayed since the necessary majority could not be attained, despite the support of eleven additional states (Fitzgerald, 2013). Despite the General Assembly's expanding membership, this stalemate highlights the institutional difficulties of UNSC change (Luck, 2015).

Although the United Nations has been instrumental in ending conflicts around the world, its record also includes mistakes that have resulted in the lives of millions of civilians (Fitzgerald, 2013). Discussions concerning the Council's composition and suitability for addressing today's security issues have heated up as a result of these contradictory results. Three significant changes have been made to the UNSC since it was founded: the number of non-permanent members has increased from six to ten; the PRC has been recognized over the ROC; and the Russian Federation has succeeded the USSR. These examples demonstrate the possibility of change and provide guidance for

upcoming reform initiatives (Malone, 2020).

The numbers speak for themselves, showing clearly that whereas the UN has expanded greatly, from its initial membership of 51 states in 1945 to an over 190 today, the makeup of the Security Council has remained virtually unchanged, aside from the enlargement of the non-permanent membership in 1965. The cases of the PRC and Russia illustrate that, if necessary, reforms can indeed occur when political will and cooperation between key countries are established (Weiss & Daws, 2018). Nonetheless, even though there was considerable backing from developing countries, plans for expansion of the non-permanent members in the 1970s and 1980s were defeated due to the inherent resistance from the Council to any change to the balance of power. From the figures, reform appears only to be achievable when such would benefit the P5's own interests and not those of the general membership (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

4.14.3 Attempts of Reformation of UNSC Since 90s

The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in UN peacekeeping missions with more intricate mandates, such those in Cambodia and Mozambique, which rekindled Member States' interest in reform and increased the Security Council's significance (Kugel, 2009). Expanding Council membership across permanent and non-permanent categories and updating its working methods, which are still provisional after more than 60 years, are the two primary reform objectives that have remained constant (Gautam, 2018). Although there is agreement that reform is necessary in these two areas, there is still dispute over the extent, details, and order of reforms (Sievers & Daws, 2014). The UNGA established the Open-ended Working Group for the Reform of the Security Council in 1993, and a number of recommendations have been put forth, but no practical substitute has been found (Kugel, 2009).

The Security Council established new peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Angola during this time, which heightened discussions about reform and encouraged Brazil, Japan, India, and Germany to apply for permanent seats and veto power (Kugel, 2009). After Boutros Boutros-Ghali was appointed Secretary-General in 1992, reform talks were rekindled, and An Agenda for Peace, which updated the Council's composition and processes, was the result. Similar to this, Member States' dissatisfaction with their diminishing control over Council decisions-which were increasingly made in private consultations-was reflected in the 1979 General Assembly

agenda item on equitable representation and increased membership of the Council, which was revisited in 1992 (Sievers & Daws, 2014). Demands for increased access to decision-making and openness were emphasized by these developments (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

Under Kofi Annan, who prioritized enhancing the UN's coherence and furthering human rights, particularly in his landmark report *In Larger Freedom*, the reform movement regained momentum in the early 2000s (Kugel, 2009). Annan's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change put forth two expansion formulae to boost membership to 24 seats with varying allocations of permanent and non-permanent seats as part of the 2005 World Summit preparations. Nevertheless, the summit's deliberations between the member states ended without a consensus (Kugel, 2009). Concurrently, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group, which consists of Canada, Colombia, Pakistan, Argentina, Italy, and others, argued against the expansion of permanent membership and in favor of raising the number of non-permanent seats to 20 (Kugel, 2009).

There has been little progress in the intergovernmental talks that were started in accordance with Resolution 62/557. The main focus of the 2009 initial rounds was outlining the perspectives of the Member States; however, entrenched viewpoints and suggestions that were too different prevented any real progress (Kugel, 2009). The significance of Security Council Reform and the need to increase its representation were reiterated in subsequent informal plenary and negotiation rounds in 2010 and 2011, but they also exposed severe divisions that prevented significant progress (Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform, 2011). Interest groups are still promoting their ideas, but there is still no agreement on working procedures, veto reform, or membership categories (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

A significant increase in Member State submissions and suggestions for Security Council Reform coincides with the growth of UN peacekeeping missions from less than a dozen missions to over 20 between 1990 and 2010 (United Nations, 2023). Likewise, the concentration of reform discussions around significant institutional events (1992, 2005, 2009) suggests that calls for a more open and representative Council are fuelled by increased UN activity and crises (Weiss, 2015). This trend implies that discussions on reform are both procedural and responsive to changes in the governance of global security, reflecting the strategic considerations of Member States (Smith, 2022).

4.141.4 Current Status

Agenda items 121, fair representation, and possible UNSC's expansion, were the main topics of the UNGA's July 27, 2016, plenary session. By acclamation, the session made an oral resolution to continue the intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) process, host an open-ended working group on the subject, and reiterate the UNGA's jurisdiction over representation problems (Shambaugh, 2016). Whereas the UfC group pushes for an enlargement of the Council without expanding its number of permanent members, Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan (the G4 countries) remain strong supporters of permanent membership. Any meaningful progress made has been hampered by conflicts among Member States that can be seen from the differences mentioned above (Hosli et al., 2011).

Deliberations at the 77th session, especially in meeting GA/12473, emphasized the need to restructure the Council in order to keep the UN relevant in the twenty-first century. The use of veto power in situations of mass crimes continued to be a contentious issue. Member states stressed more African representation and backed expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership (Concluding debate on Security Council Reform, speakers in General Assembly urge more representation for developing countries, ending of permanent members' veto power, 2022). Concerns regarding legality, fairness, and the extent of veto rights were raised by the active participation of representatives from Georgia, Ukraine, Ghana, Russia, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Iran, and France. For example, France emphasized bolstering the legitimacy of the UNSC and its ability to uphold global peace and security, whereas Iran characterized the veto as a privilege rather than a right. The G4 countries' candidatures and the call for more African participation continued to be significant topics (Concluding debate on Security Council Reform, speakers in General Assembly urge more representation for developing countries, ending of permanent members' veto power, 2022).

Post-Cold War reform initiatives appear to be different from previous models, according on historical comparisons. Although the 1963 enlargement was used as a model, the current geopolitical landscape, which includes autonomous African and Asian republics as well as lessened North-South divides, drastically changes the dynamics of reform. While big countries continue to have conflicting interests, especially with regard to veto power and the mode of expansion, the end of bipolarity has made it more

difficult for smaller states to establish effective coalitions. With small and medium states still having sway but facing structural barriers to implementing Charter revisions, current reform discussions show both continuity and change (Çağlayan, 2007).

Representation, openness, decision-making power, and regional inclusion remain the main focuses of recent reform efforts. Expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership, reviewing veto procedures, improving regional participation, and modernizing working procedures are some of the suggested changes (Thakur, 2019). Global emphasis on reform has been maintained through intergovernmental negotiations, high-level bodies, notably those appointed by Secretary-General António Guterres, and advocacy organizations like UfC. There hasn't been any noticeable change in entrenched viewpoints, particularly among the five permanent members, despite decades of discussion (Thakur, 2019).

The UNGA continues to be the major platform for stating opinions, making suggestions, and engaging in reform negotiations. Since 1993, all 193 Member States have been able to engage in its Open-ended Working Group and intergovernmental negotiations, which emphasize reaching consensus while highlighting enduring differences. Membership categories, veto powers, regional representation, Council size, and working techniques were the main topics of the most recent sessions, which included the 78th UNGA in 2023 (United Nations, 2023). Discussions emphasized the need for a more inclusive, transparent, and representative Council that can handle modern global issues including climate security, the efficacy of peacekeeping, and new geopolitical developments, even if they mostly restated historical stances. A study of UNGA interventions from 2010 to 2023 shows that both G4 and African bloc countries consistently participated, indicating a strong relationship between lobbying for reform and peacekeeping involvement (United Nations, 2023). While incremental reforms, like updated procedures and improved regional participation, continue to be the most practical route for short-term success, the UNSC's structural inertia is shown by the ongoing lack of agreement on veto powers and permanent membership. This pattern demonstrates that reform is a gradual, iterative process that is influenced by changing Member State goals as well as geopolitical power dynamics (Weiss, 2021).

4.15 Drawbacks in Existing UNSC System Necessitating of Reformation of UNSC and its Tools for the Maintenance Of International Peace and Security

It has long been believed that one of the stated goals of the UN is to promote democracy. Despite upholding the ideal of Sovereign Equality of all Nations in its Charter, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is sometimes criticized for its undemocratic structure. This criticism mostly focuses on the five permanent members' (P5) veto authority, which allows any one of them to thwart important decisions (Gautam, 2018). Therefore, even a single P5 state vetoes resolutions pertaining to the UNSC's key missions, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the Protection of Civilians (POC), and Collective Security, which prevent the UNSC from passing or implementing them. In a much larger, more democratic international society, the veto's initial purpose of guaranteeing major countries' membership in the UN and averting a recurrence of the League of Nations' failure has largely lost its significance (Gautam, 2018).

At first, it was said that the veto was required to make sure the major powers of the day felt a stake in the UN's success. Without it, the organization's viability might have been threatened by significant states refusing to join. But there has been a significant shift in the global context. At its founding, the UN had 50 members; today, it has close to 200. Global democratic standards have been strengthened, and new economic and military forces have surfaced (Bourantonis, 2005). However, a locked-in provision in the UN Charter solidifies the advantages of the P5 by prohibiting structural changes to the UNSC without their unanimous consent. As a result, the Council continues to maintain an inner circle with unique authority, which seems more out of step with the shifting balance of power and equality standards in global governance (Bourantonis, 2005).

The legitimacy of the UNSC has been called into question by changes in the balance of power during and after the Cold War. Germany, Japan, and a number of southern hemisphere republics rose to prominence as Britain and France gradually lost their position of relative dominance. Due to their Axis role during World War II, Germany and Japan were denied permanent membership; nowadays, they are significant financial contributors and powerful figures in international affairs (Bourantonis, 2005). The UN's membership and geopolitical mix were drastically changed by the wave of newly independent governments that followed decolonization in the 1960s, primarily from Africa and the developing world. Pressure for UNSC reform increased after the

Cold War, when the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke up to form new states. Russia, which took the seat from the USSR, now uses its size and population as the primary justification for permanent membership; rising nations like India also use this justification when they want permanent seats (Bourantonis, 2005).

Along with power changes, there have been increasing calls for structural and procedural changes at the UNSC. Luck (2003) claims that scores of independent commissions... have put forward literally hundreds of proposals to improve the UN's responsiveness, efficiency, and equity. Increasing the number of permanent members has been one of the main proposals. The conflict between permanent and nonpermanent members' privileges, which existed from the UN's inception, still exists today. A review conference to amend the Council's composition, including adding permanent seats for Latin American governments, was anticipated by delegates at the San Francisco Conference shortly after the Charter's approval. However, the P5 thwarted any reforms by tying any changes to their own approval (Luck, 2003). Scholars argue that this veto-centric approach resembles a rebirth of nineteenth-century Concert of Europe politics not matching with 21st-century democratic values (Soderbaum & Tavares, 2011).

The sense of imbalance is supported by empirical evidence. More than 250 draft resolutions that were vetoed between 1990 and 2020 dealt with humanitarian crises, sanctions, and interventions in mass atrocities—all of which are crucial to the UN's peace and security mandate (Security Council Report, 2021). Additionally, patterns show that rather than upholding universal values, the majority of vetoes were used to safeguard national or allied interests. In the eyes of smaller and more recent member states, this damages the UNSC's legitimacy. Japan and Germany rank among the top three donors to the UN budget, significantly outpacing several current permanent members, according to financial contribution data (UN Financial Contributions Report, 2022). The importance of reform is highlighted by the gap between decision-making authority and material support (Hurd, 2014).

However, a review of membership composition and veto patterns reveals an increasing legitimacy crisis. The current UNSC design makes it extremely difficult for the body to respond swiftly to events that impinge on its Charter-derived obligations despite its continued indispensability in the process of sanctioning peacekeeping missions and punishments. The overreaching influence wielded by the P5 has undermined the UN's democratic ethos and threatened collective security. Without

substantial changes, member states might increasingly opt to sidestep the UNSC in preference for informal alliances or regional organizations, putting the UN's preeminence in world security strategy in jeopardy. This is due to the disparity between institutional structures and contemporary power politics. In effect, revamping the UNSC becomes a matter of effectiveness and organizational longevity beyond issues of fairness. The analyses and interpretations above reveal the following as the key weaknesses of the current UNSC framework and mechanisms for preserving international peace and security (Weiss, 2003).

4.15.1 Strengthening Role of General Assembly

With universal membership, the UNGA addresses a broad range of global issues that are crucial to the UN's mission. Even though the UNGA selects the ten non-permanent members of the UNSC, the UNSC still has the last say in most matters concerning world peace and security (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023). The UNGA's ability to influence policy has been constrained by this structural arrangement due to the veto power of the P5 members. Consequently, improving the UNGA's effectiveness, efficiency, and relevancy is crucial. By strengthening its working procedures, increasing its power to select the Secretary-General, and revitalizing its capacity to monitor decision implementation, it would be possible to ensure that discussions move past meaningless debates and towards tangible outcomes (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023).

All states have equal participation in the UNGA, but the UN's core tenet of sovereign equality is compromised by the UNGA's incapacity to act as a fully empowered decision-making body. In order to facilitate fair participation and expedite deliberations, the UNGA should establish smaller, more flexible groupings that are accessible to all members while avoiding the domination of more vociferous nations (Weiss, 2015). The UNGA currently rules by simple or two-thirds majority, depending on the topic, when it comes to proposals on peace and security or elections to the UNSC. Time could be saved and the authority of UNGA decisions increased by fostering consensus rather than depending only on formal votes (Weiss, 2015). Additionally, the UNGA should have greater explicit authority to step in when the SC is paralyzed by a P5 veto in order to reinforce its mandate in circumstances of aggression, threats to peace, or breaches of peace (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023).

The UN Charter's underlying ideal of sovereign equality is becoming more and more incompatible with the power dynamics of today, where the P5 shapes important international decisions. Since the UNGA's strength is in guaranteeing that every member state, regardless of size or importance, has a voice, this has led to calls for change to give it a larger role (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023). In addition to enhancing the UNSC's discussions, better communication and more collaboration between the UNGA and UNSC would motivate the UNGA to provide timely and pertinent suggestions (Luck, 2020).

States are increasingly in favor of changes to the SC's composition. While many other members support limiting the veto reach, the G4 countries-India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany-have supported one another's applications for permanent membership (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023). Reducing the veto power would improve accountability and transparency, especially when there are widespread human rights abuses or when a resolution has the backing of two-thirds of the GA (Chesterman, 2018). Despite being the only UN body with the authority to use force to uphold global peace and security, the UNSC has come under fire for permitting deadlocks on matters like Israel-Palestine, Ukraine, and Syria, where numerous P5 vetoes have caused humanitarian crises and damaged the Council's reputation (Thapa, 2023).

It is necessary to strengthen the institutional framework that holds the SC responsible. To make sure the SC's suggestions are applied to the Council's work, the GA ought to conduct a more thorough assessment of the SC's yearly reports. Non-permanent members would feel more invested in world peace and security if GA and SC presidents and top officials met on a regular basis to discuss important issues and set agendas (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023). This would foster an environment of open communication more informed and coordinated action would be possible if specialized UN agencies, like the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNHCR, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, were included in the SC's resolution-setting process. This would not compromise the primary missions of these organizations (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023).

In addition, the UNGA ought to be given more power than only choosing non-permanent UNSC members. Given the international issues of terrorism, arms proliferation, refugee crises, and climate change, it is imperative that its deliberative norms be strengthened. Transparency, accountability, and group decision-making might

all be improved by a permanent coordinating mechanism that integrates the activity of all UN agencies and subsidiary entities (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023). Nepal has continuously pushed for the GA to be strengthened in this way. In order to solve the world's urgent issues, Prime Minister B.P. Koirala emphasized during the UNGA session in 1960 that the UN's authority must be increased and that universal adherence to its rulings would strengthen its legitimacy (Koirala, 1960).

Member states' unhappiness with the SC's inaction as a result of the P5 veto is growing, according to an analysis of voting trends and GA-SC exchanges between 1990 and 2023 (Global Policy Forum, 2022). Consensus decision-making speeds up decisions, but without SC backing, real implementation is still inadequate, according to an analysis of GA emergency extraordinary sessions (UN Department of Political and Peace Building Affairs, 2021). This suggests that improving UN reaction to international crises requires structural reform, especially lowering veto power and institutionalizing UNGA-UNSC cooperation. According to the statistics, increasing the GA's authority and implementing accountability measures for the SC would enhance multilateral outcomes and rebuild trust in the UN's fundamental collective security role (Chesterman, 2018).

4.15.2 Emergence of New Economic and Military Powers

The P5 members were chosen based on their participation in World War II. Since then, a lot has changed in terms of the advantages of global power, both economically and militarily. Other countries have made their demands for permanent membership in the Security Council known, including Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan, India, South Africa, and Nigeria. It is impossible to ignore the economic contributions made by the member nations to the general functioning of the UN (Snyman, 2012). Germany and Japan, which both have robust militaries, are the two nations that provide the most money to the UN's overall economy after the United States. They could even be compared to the P5 members in terms of several metrics for gauging a country's power abroad. G4 (Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan) is the collective platform of the countries pursuing their desire to join the Security Council as permanent members. The rise of the G4 countries shows that these nations are vying for permanent membership in the UN through a common forum and shared agendas (Snyman, 2012).

4.15.3 Regionalism: Underrepresentation of Regional Powers in UNSC

The UN has grown significantly from 51 to 193 member states since its founding. Calls to change the UNSC, especially with regard to permanent membership to provide equitable geographic representation, have increased as a result of this expansion. Although organized regional organizations were not anticipated under the original UN framework, the emergence of regionalism inside the UN system was hinted at by early Latin American state initiatives at the San Francisco Conference. Regional organizations eventually evolved into unofficial party systems, affecting elections for UNSC seats, Secretaries-General, and other UN jobs (Sievers & Daws, 2014). For example, states in Eastern Europe frequently sided with the Soviet Union, but the United States and its allies in Europe and Latin America formed a Western bloc that opposed the Soviet bloc. By the 1950s, an Arab-Asian organization had formed, which after the Bandung Conference in 1955 changed its name to the Afro-Asian organization. During the surge of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this group experienced significant growth. It divided into separate African and Asian groups by 1970 (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

Subsequently, representative regional African and Asian states then came together to form the Arab Group. Known as the Asia-Pacific Group, the Asian Group changed its name in 2011 to specifically acknowledge Pacific Island nations as members. Pacific countries' growing influence in international decision-making processes was reflected in this shift. With member nations realizing the value of fair representation in UN elections, regional organizations became crucial. According to Sievers & Daws (2014), the requirements for Security Council membership, which were originally founded on contributions to peace and security, gradually gave way to equitable geographical distribution (Article 23(1)).

International relations are currently shaped by both regionalism and globalization. It has been said that globalization is a new form of regionalism that became popular in the middle of the 1980s. In order to prevent marginalization, states are depending more and more on regional cooperation, which has affected how the UN operates and how global governance is structured. The joint UN-AU mission in Darfur serves as an example of how regional organizations are now essential partners in preserving peace and security. States' readiness to cede some facets of sovereignty to regional organizations in order to tackle common issues was demonstrated by this

cooperation (Snyman, 2012). Despite the conclusion of the United Nations operation in Darfur, the ongoing violence between military and paramilitary forces has left Sudan enmeshed in a humanitarian disaster. This demonstrates how UN field operations and decision-making are still influenced by regionalism (Snyman, 2012).

With three members from Europe, one from America, and one from Asia, the UNSC's permanent membership currently mirrors the power dynamics that existed after World War II. Neither Africa nor all of Latin America and the Caribbean have a permanent member, despite having 54 states. Although they provide some representation, non-permanent seats have little say in UNSC decisions (Mishra, 2007). Furthermore, despite their important global roles, strong economies like Germany and Japan are still not eligible for permanent membership. The initial bias of the UN's founding structure in favor of Allied powers is reflected in this exclusion. In order to satisfy the aspirations of under-represented regions, particularly Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it has become imperative that the UNSC be reformed (Mishra, 2007).

Although the UN's membership base changed during the decolonization era, newly independent nations from Asia and Africa were left out of the 1945 global power-sharing agreement. Leaders from these areas thus felt excluded and unfairly treated (Khan, 2015). In today's UNSC reform debates, fair representation for all regions has taken centre stage (Swart & Perry, 2013). For instance, African leaders insist that their continent be given permanent representation at the UNSC, particularly as the continent has been disproportionately represented in UNSC decisions regarding military operations and peacekeeping (Okhovat, 2012). Since the exclusion of important regions can result in less cooperation in executing resolutions, the legitimacy and authority of the UNSC run the risk of being compromised in the absence of proper representation (Hurd, 2007).

Furthermore, a larger global movement towards inclusive governance shapes the discussion surrounding UNSC reform. According to scholars, the Council runs the risk of becoming irrelevant in the face of power realities in the twenty-first century if structural changes are not made to account for regional justice (Weiss, 2020). According to a different opinion, fair representation not only increases the legitimacy of UNSC decisions but also their efficacy because more diverse perspectives provide more long-lasting results (Hurd, 2017). The rationale for adding more permanent seats from Asia,

Latin America, and Africa is strengthened by these reasons. It is especially noticeable that the African continent does not have permanent membership. Despite being the largest regional bloc in the UN with 54 countries, it is not represented on the Council's highest decision-making level. Both functioning and fairness are called into question by this omission. African governments may perceive UNSC resolutions as externally imposed rather than jointly accepted if change is not implemented, which would undermine legitimacy and compliance (Khan, 2015).

The UNSC's numerical disparity emphasizes how serious the issue is. Africa makes up 28% of the UN's member nations as of 2023, but it has no permanent seats on the UNSC, whereas Europe, which has fewer states, has 60% of the permanent membership. In a similar vein, Latin America and the Caribbean have no permanent representation, but Asia, which has almost 50 UN members, has one. This discrepancy shows how post-World War II power systems still exist (Weiss & Daws, 2018). Africa and Asia would each receive at least one or two extra seats if permanent membership were reorganized proportionately today, while Europe's hegemony would decline. An arrangement like this would strengthen the legitimacy of UNSC decision-making and more accurately represent current world reality (Zacher, 2020).

4.15.4 Size of the Council in Comparison to Overall Membership of the UNGA

The disparate representation in the UNSC has been made worse by the expansion of the UN. The UN's overall membership has significantly increased since its founding in 1945, but the UNSC has remained largely similar, with the exception of an expansion in the nonpermanent category in 1965. The United Nations now has 193 members, up from 51 in 1945 (McDonald & Patrick, 2010). When the UNSC was first established, one UNSC seat equated to 10 UN members; however, in modern times, one UNSC seat equates to more than 40 UNGA members (Hurd, 2008). The UN member nations have been prompted by this imbalance to call for the UNSC to be expanded in both permanent and nonpermanent categories. The UNSC's limited size relative to the UN's total membership, according to proponents of UNSC reform and growth, has weakened the power and credibility of the council. For starters, the implementation of the UNSC's resolutions and decisions depends on the backing of the UN member states, particularly the strong middle-tier nations. Another is that the United Nations is not a second international government. This imbalance has spurred the UN member countries to demand that the UNSC be extended in both permanent and nonpermanent categories.

According to advocates for UNSC reform and growth, the UNSC's small size in comparison to its entire membership has diminished the council's authority and credibility. First and foremost, support from UN member states, particularly the powerful middle-tier countries, is necessary for the execution of the UNSC's resolutions and decisions. Another is that the UN is not an additional global authority (Hurd, 2008).

Reform advocates, including the G4 and the AU, contend that the UNSC's diminutive size has harmed the body's effectiveness and legitimacy. They contend that the absence of the present regional and global powers, which make significant economic and military contributions to the UN, causes the council's decisions to lack wider backing. These nations may reduce or stop funding for the council if they are not represented in the executive body, which would have a detrimental effect on how well the international organization functions (Khan, 2015). From above analysis, in terms of regionalism and increased number of Member States, it can be stated that UNSC organization is not regionally balanced in terms of representation.

Size of Council in comparison with overall membership of UNGA must not follow the numerical comparison, but since 1965 there is no increment in non permanent category also. P5 member status has remained unchanged. There is even acceptance within P5 circle that Africa and Asia is underrepresented in non permanent category. Prominent powers are established in parity of some of the P5 members. So, there is continuous advocacy by G4, UfC, S5, L69 and African Union to represent UNSC in judicious proportion reflecting the present day globe. The fact is that more global ownership and acceptance ultimately strengthens security umbrella, contributes to peace and stability in states, sub regions, regions and ultimately in global context (Luck, 2006).

4.15.5 Inequality among Members of the UNSC

Major deficiencies that increase the need for change at the UNSC are the privileges and powers enjoyed by permanent and nonpermanent members. Members of the international organization who were either dissatisfied with the current global power structure or were not there when it was formed demand that their nations play a constructive role (Hurd, 2008). Although it is unfair and goes against the sovereign equality of the member states, the aspirant states acknowledge that the current power structure cannot be changed. Instead of abolishing the veto power, some nations urge

that the council be expanded. Likewise, there is a significant disparity between permanent and nonpermanent members (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

The emerging powers that are not represented as permanent members are upset by this difference and call for changes and bigger responsibilities in global decision-making. According to Luck, It is quite conceivable that some constituencies will be gravely disappointed with the UN's power-sharing arrangements and/or its success at any moment in time because of the variety of its membership and the ambitious nature of its objectives. Calls for reform have frequently been sparked by ongoing dissatisfaction or sentiments of disenfranchisement (Luck, 2003). The power and privileges of permanent and nonpermanent members differ substantially, except from veto powered permanent members are frustrated and call for improvements. In addition to having veto power over changes to the Charter and the appointment of the UNSG, countries that hold vetoes also have a lot of influence because they are permanently seated at the U.N. headquarters, as opposed to nonpermanent members who rotate every two years. Nonpermanent members' two-year terms are over by the time they become familiar with the council's working process (Caron, 1993). Furthermore, the nonpermanent members are unable to match the size of the bureaucracies and staff that the permanent members individually employ. Caron claims that the permanent members of the Council have a disproportionate amount of power to affect the result of its proceedings because of their staffing capacity (Caron, 1993). These nations do not keep a sizable staff and equivalent diplomatic weight because the nonpermanent members serve on the council for a relatively short time. Due to the P5's natural advantage over permanent members, decisions made by council can be heavily influenced (Caron, 1993).

4.15.6 The Veto Power Factor Vested in P5 Members of UNSC

The permanent five (P5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are granted the special privilege of veto power. The most powerful Allied countries were given permanent seats on the Council when the UN Charter was being draught immediately following World War II because it was thought that these seats were essential to preserving world peace and security. The rivalry between the US and the USSR, however, started to influence the Council's decisions and activities as the Cold War progressed (Mazower, 2012).

The UNSC, which was intended to be a responsible body to protect world peace, ended up being a venue where competing national interests frequently prevented decisive action. Vetoes on controversial international issues have often made attempts to enact resolutions ineffectual over the years. The Council's capacity to take action in the face of urgent conflicts is nevertheless impacted by this persistent practice, which is primarily motivated by the P5's strategic objectives. As a result, a number of crises have grown in size and severity, having detrimental effects on international peace and security (Iyase, 2017).

Many contend that the veto power no longer accurately represents the realities of contemporary international affairs, which has led to growing discontent with this structure and ongoing requests for reform. Critics point out that the UN system has proven successful when dealing with smaller states or when the P5 states had no direct stake in a crisis, but it has continuously failed when these powerful members' national interests were at risk. In these situations, the veto has been employed as a political tool to influence or delay action, leading to protracted hostilities and occasionally humanitarian disasters. A recent illustration of how a single P5 member's veto might impede international efforts towards peace and stability is the Gaza–Israel conflict (Personal Communication, 13 Dec, 2023). This dynamic underscores the broader perception that unless the concept of P5 membership becomes more inclusive or fundamentally restructured, the UNSC risks further erosion of its credibility and effectiveness (Weiss, 2020).

Any one of the five permanent members may veto a resolution, rendering it void, but decisions on substantive issues must have at least nine votes in favor from the Council's fifteen members, as stipulated by the UN Charter. In recognition of their crucial contributions to the founding of the UN and maintaining postwar security, the USSR (which was replaced by the Russian Federation in 1990), China, France, the United Kingdom, and the US were first given this unique status (The UN Security Council, 2023). The drafters concluded that the right to veto, which accompanied permanent membership, would protect the critical interests of large states and allow for agreement on important security matters. However, because permanent members have the option to abstain from voting, a resolution can pass without their explicit support, turning this system into a weapon of selective engagement (Voting System, n.d.).

International security governance has been significantly impacted by the cumulative effect of veto usage. The veto has been used more than 300 times since the USSR's first known use on February 16, 1946, when it blocked a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Syria and Lebanon (Iyase, 2017). This pattern has highlighted a broader criticism that the veto system perpetuates inequality among member states, allowing the P5 to project authority, protect their interests, and occasionally impede collective action (Luck, 2006). Essentially, the UN Charter's fundamental principle of sovereign equality has been undermined by the veto power. The well-known saying, Power corrupts, but absolute power corrupts absolutely, summarizes how this privilege has been used quite nicely. Without significant change, the UNSC runs the risk of losing its credibility in handling the most pressing issues facing the globe and becoming seen less as an impartial arbiter and more as a platform for power politics (Thakur, 2016).

4.15.6.1 Analysis of Veto Power Exercise by P5 Nations: Historical Perspective

Chapter V of the United Nations Charter has explained about the roles and responsibilities of the UNSC. It also explains about overall functioning mechanism and procedural aspects like voting procedures applicable within UNSC (United Nations, 1945). Chapter V, Article 27 of UN Charter states voting procedures as:

- (a) Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
- (b) Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members UNSC (United Nations, 1945).
- (c) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting (United Nations, 1945).

Utilizing the prerogative stated in the third provision stated above, permanent members of UNSC have been using veto power in various UNSC resolution based on their various stands and interests (Security Council Report, 2023). Since the veto effectively prevents the UN from taking action against permanent members and their supporters, many political scientists and opponents of the P5 members who oppose the veto power system believe that it is the most undemocratic aspect of the UN and the

main cause of inaction on war crimes and crimes against humanity. The following table shows the data on vetoes used by the permanent five members of the UNSC (P5) between 1946 and 2023 (Security Council Report, 2023).

Table 4.4

Trend of Veto Cast by Permanent five Members of UNSC: 1946-2023

Country	Total Veto Cast		Total
	Since 1991 Dissolution of USSR	Before Dissolution of USSR	
Russia/USSR	32	120	152
United States	18	69	87
China	16	3	19
United Kingdom	0	32	32
France	0	18	18

Source: Adopted from <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick,2023>

The USSR exercised most of the vetoes during the early years of the UN's formation, and most of them were used to prevent the admission of new members. The USSR/Russia has exercised the most vetoes over the years, a total of 121, or nearly half of all vetoes. On March 17, 1970, the US exercised the first of its 82 vetoes to date. The USSR had already exercised 107 vetoes by that point. More frequently than any other permanent members since 1970, the US has used its veto to prevent measures that it views as harmful to its close friend Israel's interests (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020). UK has exercised its veto for 29 times; the first occasion was on October 30, 1956, during the Suez Crisis. France used the veto for the first time on the Spanish Question on June 26, 1946, and has since exercised it a total of 16 times. China has exercised its veto 17 times, the first of which was on December 14, 1955, when the Republic of China (ROC) cast it, and 16 of which have been cast by the People's Republic of China since that country succeeded the ROC as a permanent member on October 25, 1971 (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020).

The veto has been exercised 51 times by all members of the UN Security Council since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the most recent change in membership occurred in December 1991. This is far fewer than the number of vetoes used during the

UN's formative years and the stormy Cold War era, when dominant (veto) powers competed with one another. Since then, the UN has evolved from a fledgling group to a widely regarded institution that has significantly advanced global cooperation, including the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the eradication of smallpox, and the millions of people saved from starvation by the World Food Programme, to name a few achievements (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020). Every veto, which signifies a decision not to act, prevents the Security Council from carrying out its duties. Additionally, as the world becomes more divisive once more, the number of vetoes in the Security Council is significantly rising. 32 of the last 46 draft resolutions that were vetoed after the Cold War concerned the Middle East. Of these, 15 involved Israel and 16 were related to Syria. This should not come as a surprise given the partnership amongst the permanent members based on shared political and economic objectives in the area. The Balkans and the Mediterranean region, which has six vetoes, are second on the list (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020). The final category, Global, represents a draft resolution that addressed terrorism generally, rather than concentrating on a particular conflict or regional context. This clear geographic bias shows that vetoes are more often used to advance the national interests of the veto power countries than to identify the best way to maintain peace and stability. Following the Cold War, new patterns in how the various permanent members exercise their veto have also been seen. Since voting against condemnation of the US invasion of Panama on December 23, 1989 (S/21048), jointly with the US, France and the UK have not exercised their veto power. (The veto: UN Security Council working methods: Security Council report, 2020).

The Syrian war can be credited with the rise in the number of vetoes by Russia and China since 2011. The Russians have cast 26 vetoes, 18 of which have been cast in favor of Syria since 2011. The Chinese have voted against ten of their twelve vetoes between 2011 and today, with Venezuela being another case, and the other two in relation to Korea. Four out of five vetoes used by Russia after 2011 are on resolutions relating to the Ukrainian situation, one resolution on the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, sanctions against Yemen, and one for Venezuela. Besides two votes in the Israel/Palestine matter, the United States has vetoed seventeen resolutions since 1991. Because of the continued coordination in voting by Russia and China, there are twice as many vetoes in 2019 compared to 2018, when three draft resolutions were

vetoed (Security Council Report, 2023). The United States has not exercised its veto in 2019; however this may just be because contentious draft resolutions by Russia failed to garner the necessary support despite the United States' disapproving votes. The vetoes of 2019 highlight the ongoing and potentially widening divide between Russia and China and the rest of the Council. The future trajectory of this trend is yet to be determined (Stop illegitimate vetoes - For a United Nations that is united. For a Security Council that promotes security, 2017). The use of the veto has drawn criticism frequently, especially since Permanent Members have used it frequently to block actions that are against their own national interests (for instance, the US vetoed 44 Security Council resolutions that directly targeted its ally, Israel, between 1972 and 2022). It is commonly acknowledged that the threat or use of the veto can occasionally be weaponized to the harm of global peace and security (Permanent five and the veto, 2022).

When there is enough political will, the Security Council has the legal authority to prevent or stop many situations that could have catastrophic effects on communities, nations, and regions all over the world. This is true even though expectations for the Security Council have likely exceeded those of the UN Charter's authors, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Concurrently, there is a general dissatisfaction with the Council's performance when it declines to assume such a role. A staggering number of lives have been lost as a result of the absence of response to the commission of mass atrocity crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes), which have practically gone unchecked in places like Rwanda, Darfur, Syria, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Yemen. The use of the veto or the threat of the veto by one or more of the permanent members is a primary cause of the Council's inaction a lot of the time. (Trahan, 2020).

When we see the trend of veto cast by different P5 members, national interest of the specific country seems supreme ahead of global security affairs. Criticizers of the veto power says that veto power has been misused deviating from the primary mandate of UNSC. Due to the veto factor, functioning mechanism of UNSC has been also reviewed as undemocratic even during the globally accepted trend of practicing democratic norms and values in decision making. Veto power has been one of the key factors demanding the reforming of the UNSC.

4.15.6.2 Implications of Veto Cast on Global Security Affairs

At a time when the Security Council (UNSC) is still sharply split over the worst threat to world peace since World War II, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted resolution A/77/L.52. The veto frequently leaves the Council powerless in situations involving the most serious breaches of international humanitarian law, according to the larger UN membership. Effective responses to the crises in Gaza, Darfur, Syria, and Ukraine have been postponed or obstructed due to ongoing disputes among the permanent members (General Assembly adopts landmark resolution aimed at holding five permanent Security Council members accountable for use of veto, 2022). For instance, on February 25, 2022, Russia rejected a resolution calling for its withdrawal and denouncing its invasion of Ukraine as an act of aggression. Even by sending the case to the International Criminal Court, which has jurisdiction over acts of aggression, the Security Council been unable to condemn Russia, as this decision glaringly illustrated. However, just five states (Belarus, DPRK, Eritrea, Russia, and Syria) opposed the resolution that the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a week later, calling for an immediate end to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This shows that the international community supports Ukraine, but it also highlights the shortcomings of the Security Council's processes (General Assembly adopts landmark resolution aimed at holding five permanent Security Council members accountable for use of veto, 2022).

When a permanent member exercises a veto, a recent procedural resolution mandates that the president of the general assembly call a meeting within ten working days. Although some have praised the resolution as an accountability tool, it is still non-binding and does not require the General Assembly to take action or the Permanent Member to offer an explanation. Proponents contend that by allowing all 193 UNGA members to express their concerns, these discussions foster inclusivity and openness. Opponents argue that it could exacerbate polarization and replicate current procedures, like the Explanation of Vote typically provided by Permanent Members (General Assembly adopts landmark resolution aimed at holding five permanent Security Council members accountable for use of veto, 2022). Whenever there is a use of a veto by any of the permanent members, there is now a procedural resolution requiring the president of the general assembly to convene a session within ten working days. Even though the resolution has been commended as a way of making permanent members accountable for their vetoes, it still remains non-binding since it does not obligate the United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA) to do anything or force the Permanent Member to make a statement. Those supporting this mechanism believe that by giving all 193 UNGA members a chance to voice out their views, it encourages inclusiveness and transparency (United Nations General Assembly, 2022).

The inability of the international community to stop atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia prompted the creation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) policy in 2001. R2P, which was formally accepted at the World Summit in 2005, aims to guarantee coordinated action against crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (What is R2P? 2022). However, even in times of mass atrocities, the veto often prevents the UN from acting decisively, compromising its fundamental duty to uphold global peace and security. Similar to this, Article 27 of the UN Charter allows parties to a dispute to abstain from voting; but, because of its vague meaning and non-implementation, Permanent Members have been able to circumvent this clause in cases when it affects their national interests. As a result, veto power has frequently made it more difficult for the UN to uphold peace, carry out collective security, and defend vulnerable civilians (Hurd, 2007).

Ongoing crises are a clear indication of this deadlock. By March 2023, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, located in the United Kingdom, reported that over 503,000 people have died in Syria, including over 162,000 civilians, with many of these deaths being attributed to government forces (Why has the Syrian War Lasted for 12 years? 2023). UN rights chief deplores Ukraine death toll one year after Russian invasion, 2023. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights acknowledged at least 8,000 civilian deaths in Ukraine since February 2022, with actual figures probably higher. Similar to this, thousands of people have been killed or injured in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most notably during Israel's Operation Protective Edge in 2014 and the protests along the Gaza border in 2018 (McCarthy, 2021). These numbers demonstrate the enormous human cost of conflict and the repercussions of the UNSC's inactivity. The veto authority today seems to serve only the national interests of Permanent Members, despite its initial purpose of ensuring stability by giving big countries a key role. The UN system is paralyzed by its use-and even the fear of its use-which thus hinders prompt action to safeguard vulnerable populations. Since all P5 members must agree for Charter revisions to be implemented, significant change is unlikely, despite proposals for improvements such limiting the number of vetoes a state

may use each year or demanding General Assembly approval for their use (Chesterman, 2021). Veto power has also had undemocratic effects in the selection of the UN Secretary-General. For example, in 1996, the United States blocked Boutros Boutros-Ghali's reappointment despite almost unanimous support (Personal Communication, 09 May 2024). Given these concerns, there is increasing agreement that in order to maintain the legitimacy of the UNSC, the veto power should only be exercised in very specific and uncommon situations. The geopolitical landscape of the 2020s is very different from that of the post-1945 era, with internal conflicts, terrorism, and unconventional threats replacing interstate wars (Luck, 2019). The disparity between elected and permanent members will keep undermining the UN's legitimacy and ability to uphold international peace and security until the veto is changed or eliminated.

The UN's incapacity to act decisively is directly linked to the use of veto power, as evidenced by the statistics on deaths and humanitarian problems in Palestine, Syria, and Ukraine. The startling numbers of civilian deaths, displaced people, and recorded human rights abuses underscore the insufficiency of the current system and the price of passivity. Originally designed as a stabilizing device, the veto has turned into an instrument of paralysis that threatens collective security and erodes confidence in the UN's impartiality as an adjudicator. The UN runs the risk of becoming even less relevant in dealing with contemporary conflicts and humanitarian crises if structural change is not implemented to restrict or condition the veto (Security Council Report, 2023).

A non-amendment suggestion put forward by one of the reform proposal relates to the revitalization of Chapter V, Article 27(3), of the UN Charter, where it is stated that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting on matters concerning Chapter VI. Academic research suggests that this article was insufficiently applied and that applying this obligation more strictly might increase the efficiency of the UNSC in managing conflicts (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024). Following the implementation of this obligation will involve obliging parties to abstain from voting if they are parties to a particular dispute, thus avoiding political paralysis. While in relation to Chapter VII decisions, parties to disputes still maintain their right to vote and use the veto, in the case of Chapter VI, the Security Council will be able to adopt decisions regardless of the position of a P5 state (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).

4.15.7 Effectiveness of the UNPKO

Nowadays, the permission of the parties involved in a conflict serves as a major foundation for peacekeeping operations. However, serious problems occur when violations of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework are committed by the state itself. It becomes challenging to carry out a mission's practical components without the host country's support. In these situations, successful peace enforcement frequently requires a highly skilled and well-equipped regional or alliance force, like NATO or the African Union (Personal Communication, May 23, 2023). The intensity of mission mandates and the amount of funding allotted determine the UN's capacity to lessen conflict. As a result, the UN must take into account how various policy approaches affect mandates, resources, and response timeframes from the start of a crisis to the deployment of missions (Hegre, Hultman & Nygard, 2017).

Nepal has continuously pushed for successful and efficient UN deployments as one of the biggest donors to UN peacekeeping missions. The goals of peacekeeping missions must be well-defined, realistic, and prioritized, and they must be adequately and consistently funded. Additionally, missions ought to assist host governments in their endeavors to establish sustainable development and enduring peace. The Security Council's complete control over peacekeeping operations, with distinct duties and responsibilities for all key players, is equally important. Any discrepancy between mandates and available resources could jeopardize peacekeepers' safety and undermine the mission's efficacy (Gyawali, 2021).

The UN must also consider the time needed to deploy missions after a war begins, as well as how institutional restrictions affect mandates and resources (Coning, 2019). By studying operations in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, South Sudan, and other contexts, the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) has helped to uncover trends in peacekeeping (Conning, 2019). According to research, ensuring security and a productive working environment requires greater cooperation amongst UN agencies like ECOSOC, UNICEF, UNHCR, and WFP. More thorough responses to contemporary security risks would be made possible by such integration (De Coning, 2018). A worldwide coordinated problem-solving mechanism that can successfully handle the complex risks inherent in modern peace operations is needed to address these changing problems.

The professionalism and readiness of peacekeepers are equally crucial. Mission performance is hampered by problems including disobedience, nonoperational tendencies, and uneven command structures. Force Commanders must have complete authority and stronger command-and-control systems. Penalties for noncompliance and the meticulous finalization of national caveats and the Status of Unit Requirement (SUR) are part of this. Given the growing complexity of threats in conflict areas, standardizing equipment and enhancing military professionalism are essential (Personal Communication, April 27, 2023). In order to combat changing terrorist and insurgent threats-which occasionally exhibit conventional military traits-peacekeepers must likewise modify their techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) (Williams & Karim, 2020). Additionally, in order to improve situational awareness and operational effectiveness, modern operations need to incorporate C4ISR capabilities (Bove, Ruffa & Ruggeri, 2020).

It is important to establish efficacy in peace operations early on. According to current research, a mission's strategic impact in lowering conflict dynamics within its operational region over a specific time period-taking into account both its mandate and available resources-is referred to as efficacy. Analytical techniques including explanatory factor evaluation, effect identification, and context analysis aid in assessing a mission's efficacy. This involves determining if a mission promotes lasting peace, improves stability, safeguards civilians, lessens sexual and gender-based violence, or minimizes violence. The six key elements of the commonly used explanatory framework in peace operations are political primacy, mandates and resources, people-centered approaches, legitimacy and credibility, coordination and coherence, and the women, peace, and security agenda (Holt & Taylor, 2009). Effectiveness evaluations would be substantially enhanced by systematic data collection, management, and analysis of peace operations, especially their effects on local institutions and populations (Conning, 2019). Consistent procedures for arranging and disseminating performance data are still lacking in organizations conducting international peace operations, nevertheless. This gap has been encouragingly addressed with the recent introduction of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) in UN peacekeeping missions (Conning, 2019).

4.15.7.1 UN Peacekeeping: UN Missions Considered Unsuccessful

UN missions have been frequently criticized for their alleged inefficiency and

lack of responsiveness, even in the face of noteworthy achievements. The UN has frequently been charged with not carrying out its mission to uphold peace and avert violence throughout its existence. Under UN supervision, multiple wars have broken out all over the world since its founding in 1945, killing millions of people and displacing large populations (Twelve times the UN has failed the world, 2018). A notable example is Somalia, where civil violence between competing clans grew more intense after Mohamed Siad Barre's rule was overthrown in 1991. Initiated in December 1992 to deliver humanitarian aid amidst civil unrest and widespread famine, the UNOSOM peacekeeping mission was beset by frequent attacks on UN staff and communication failures with the government. This failure is thought to have resulted in the deaths of 500,000 civilians (Twelve times the UN has failed the world, 2018).

New security issues and intrastate conflicts, especially ethnic and nationalist violence in formerly communist republics, were brought about by the post-Cold War global order. After the Cold War ended, these tensions that had been long ignored during superpower rivalry suddenly flared up. This dynamic is best shown by the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which led to a flurry of violent civil wars and self-determination movements (Twelve times the UN has failed the world, 2018). The UN's small and fragmented reaction to Yugoslavia's breakup demonstrated how flimsy its peacekeeping apparatus is. The 1992 Agenda for Peace, which envisioned a more powerful UNSC freed from the stagnation of the Cold War, was accompanied with optimism, but reality was very different. The Council took quick action in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but it was far more cautious in its handling of Bosnia (Twelve times the UN has failed the world, 2018). The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the implementation of a weapons embargo in 1992 exposed the institution's shortcomings. The UN's credibility suffered as a result of member nations' national interests limiting its enforcement authority. NATO's first-ever use of force, the airstrikes in 1994, was a watershed because it enforced a UN resolution and demonstrated that only NATO could stop Serbian aggression. The Security Council's management of post-Cold War wars is among the most controversial in its history because of the failures in Bosnia, which were mirrored in Somalia and Rwanda (Twelve times the UN has failed the world, 2018).

These institutional shortcomings were further highlighted by the massacre in Rwanda. While UN forces either withdrew or remained inactive, about 800,000 Tutsis were killed and 250,000 women were sexually assaulted between April and July 1994

(Twelve times the UN has failed the world, 2018). UNAMIR commander Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire frequently alerted UN headquarters to the threat of mass violence and asked for reinforcements. The P5, who saw Rwanda as having no strategic significance, lacked political will, as seen by their disregard for these pleas (Khan, 2015). UNAMIR's ability to take action was further undermined by the Belgian withdrawal of its most successful force, the paratroopers. According to academics, this is a collective failure of the entire UN system, from the Secretariat to the Security Council, made worse by the great powers' lack of interest (Melvern, 2019).

The devastating events at Srebrenica in 1995, where Bosnian Serb forces massacred 8,000 Muslim men and boys in a UN-designated safe zone, were also influenced by institutional flaws. Dutch peacekeepers, who were understaffed and underarmed, were unable to stop the slaughter ('Twelve times the UN has failed the world', 2018). UN peacekeepers were ill-equipped to deal with widespread atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda because their strict mandates only permitted the use of force in self-defence or to evacuate foreigners. Effectiveness was further hindered by the cultural mismatch between peacekeepers and the local populace, as well as by the large operational areas and small unit size (Balakir, 2021).

The UN's reputation has suffered as a result of these shortcomings, especially in war areas like Gaza and Ukraine where prejudice and inertia are still seen. Veto-wielding powers, according to critics, selectively decide which areas of peace and security are given priority (Personal Communication, June 18, 2024). As the First World War gave rise to the League of Nations and the Second World War to the United Nations, addressing these systemic flaws calls for a thorough overhaul of the international security framework. The necessity of institutional adaptation in the face of evolving global conditions is highlighted by this cyclical trend (Weiss, 2016). Furthermore, although being presented as protective operations, humanitarian interventions like France's Operation Turquoise in Rwanda have come under fire for protecting offenders and enabling their escape into neighboring governments where instability persists (Mills, 2019).

These instances show how the UN's neutrality can be distorted or compromised by peacekeeping failures that reflect both procedural shortcomings and the national interests of strong member nations. These instances also highlight recurrent themes of weak mandates, bureaucratic inertia, and selective political participation by strong

governments. The best predictor of mission failure, according to an analysis of archival records, mortality statistics, military deployment data, and UNSC resolutions from Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, is the misalignment of mandates, resources, and political will. These incidents also show that future reforms need to address the political limitations imposed by the Security Council and major powers in addition to enhancing operational capabilities. Without these adjustments, peacekeeping operations run the danger of failing in new war zones (United Nations, 2000).

4.15.7.2 Challenges of current Peacekeeping Operations

The circumstances in which current peacekeeping missions with Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates work are unstable, uncertain, complicated, and unclear. With several armed organizations operating over vast geographic areas, threats to local communities are becoming more complex. While rural violence leads to widespread internal displacement into metropolitan centers that are seen as safer because of the presence of both government and UN forces, frequent violations of human rights and international humanitarian law worsen instability. In light of these growing difficulties, protecting internally displaced people (IDPs) has thus emerged as a top priority for both host governments and UN forces, who continue to make every effort to uphold peace, security, and stability (Personal Communication, May 23, 2023).

Modern missions' operational realities are defined by sparse soldier deployments dispersed across enormous spheres of responsibility. Due to financial limitations, the UN is unable to send enough troops to conflict areas, which limits its operational reach and leaves sensitive and distant places unprotected. This predicament compromises the capacity of UN forces to carry out their mandates in full and exposes vulnerable populations to armed groups' persistent breaches of human rights (Howard, 2019). Peacekeeping operations with objectives like POC require troop strength to be adjusted to operational commitments, unlike diplomatic or political missions, which can be successfully carried out with small policy-level teams. These difficulties are best shown by missions in South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali (Personal Communication, May 14, 2023). The existence of several armed groups, terrorist organizations, and transnational networks defines the operational conditions in these missions. Mali's MINUSMA operation, for example, continues to be one of the riskiest in UN history, with terrorist assaults killing the greatest number of blue helmets (Smith, 2020). The M23 rebels in the DRC remain a

security challenge for MONUSCO, and the nature of their activities being transnational complicates stabilization operations. Likewise, there are insecurities, ethnic tensions, and extremism in CAR and South Sudan, where peacekeeping forces and civilians are deliberately targeted. Here, safeguarding the local population against attacks by armed and terrorist groups is the common goal of United Nations personnel and local governments (Karlsrud, 2018). However, the scope of the challenges makes mission planning more challenging and poses issues about balancing troop strength, skills, and mandate with the ground situation (Autesserre, 2014; Williams, 2013).

Table 4.5

Peacekeeping troops and area of the host Country

Country	UN Missions	Strength of the Uniformed Personnel	Area of the Host Country
Central African Republic	MINUSCA	17,420	622,436 sq km
Democratic Republic of Congo	MONUSCO	16,316	2,345,095 sq km
South Sudan	UNMISS	19,101	644,329 sq km

Source: Compiled by Researcher based on Country profile and UN website

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate> ,2024

As seen from the above table, the number of personnel from the UN sent for operations in vast areas to counter different elements of threats that continually threaten the safety of civilians is inadequate. Deployment and adequate size of force in a peacekeeping operation are essential in making it effective (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Among the significant problems that exist for United Nations peacekeeping operations is ethnic violence. Ethnic violence leads to deaths among civilians in many of the countries affected by war (United Nations, 2000).

The occurrence of CRSV is extremely high, and the vulnerable group is made up of women and children. The presence of different ethnic groups is among the reasons that lead to ethnic violence. This is why peacekeepers must do all within their powers to protect endangered populations despite resource constraints. Effective conflict management is hampered by the size and severity of ethnic conflicts and the limited personnel levels available in many operations (United Nations, 2015). Therefore, in

order to create amicable ties amongst various ethnic groups, civilian components of UN operations must execute extensive community-awareness programs, encourage community engagement, and create action plans. Peacekeepers require advanced equipment and vehicles that are tailored to the terrain and threat environment as conflict dynamics continue to change. Policymakers and planners would benefit from a thorough analysis of operating conditions, including the capacities of terrorist and armed groups, in order to standardize vehicles and equipment for usage in high-risk situations (Tardy, 2011). Mobility, agility, and proactive posture are critical capabilities for modern peacekeepers which strengthens them to expand operational area and react rapidly to threats against local populations (Benabdallah, 2021).

In difficult mission areas like MINUSMA and CAR, peacekeepers are regularly exposed to indirect fire, small arms, complex attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The death toll raises as armed groups and terrorist organizations increasingly target UN staff members. This situation has negatively impacted peacekeepers' morale, further reducing their operational effectiveness. To counter this trend, missions need to develop updated operational strategies to deal with emerging threats and get continuous training on the tactics of armed groups (Williams, 2013). It is also crucial that the rules of engagement be made clear, including the circumstances under which lethal force may be used for mandated protection and self-defense. The UN claims that MINUSMA is still among the most lethal peace missions for blue helmets. 168 personnel have died as a result of hostile activities since the organization was founded in 2013 (Mali: Three UN peacekeepers killed in explosive attack, 2023). As of June 11, 2024, 1,130 peacekeepers had been killed as a result of hostile, malevolent acts (Total fatalities since 1948, 2024). These numbers highlight how serious the threat is and how complicated modern mission situations are.

Political disagreements or rifts with host governments may prompt peacekeepers to leave some UN missions, leaving acute security gaps that put local communities at greater risk. These withdrawals frequently allow terrorist organizations and armed groups to increase their operational reach, further destabilizing areas that are already at risk (Thapa, 2024). Since logistical and procedural preparations at UN Headquarters usually take six months to a year, it is rarely possible to replace troops quickly from other Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs). The operational difficulties that the remaining soldiers face are exacerbated by this lag. Additionally, TCCs are becoming

less willing to send troops on high-threat missions. The UN's capacity to successfully carry out its protective missions is weakened by these structural and political limitations, which also impede prompt reinforcement (Thapa, 2024). People in rural regions are forced to migrate to urban centers as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) due to persistent insecurity. IDPs are nonetheless susceptible to attacks by armed groups even if urban areas frequently provide somewhat more security. Due to overlapping operational obligations and military shortages, it is not possible to continuously provide security to all IDP camps (De Coning, 2019). The UN mission in South Sudan provides a unique example of relative success, with IDPs housed in well-organized camps with static protection supplied by both police and military forces. This strategy demonstrates how, in spite of resource constraints, creative management and efficient deployment can reduce vulnerabilities (De Coning, 2019).

UN peacekeeping has grown more resilient and diverse, functioning in areas where governments have failed or are failing. However, big Western powers frequently contribute very few troops, especially for missions that carry a significant danger (Personal Communication, June 18, 2024). Instead, under circumstances established by wealthier member states, smaller armies and forces from poorer countries continue to shoulder the load. Achieving global peace and security is still a distant goal as long as major powers do not take strategic and operational engagement seriously, despite the fact that UN peace operations have been restructured to increase the effectiveness of TCCs in operational areas (Personal Communication, June 18, 2024).

Various elements affect the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, among them mobility of the operation, ratio of troops to size of area under consideration, and willingness of TCCs to send their forces to high threat areas, according to an analysis of the current mission environment. A continuous disparity between mandates and capability has been shown from statistics relating to deployments, internal displacement people (IDPs), and peacekeeper fatalities. The effectiveness of United Nations mission is hindered by the disparity mentioned above both as far as legitimacy of operations and deterrence. Improved mission planning through the application of dynamic operational approaches, context-based force generation, and better community engagement would bring tremendous positive results. Inability to protect people at risk during the most dangerous conflicts of the contemporary age will result in UN peacekeeping being unable to perform this crucial task (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Durch et al., 2003).

4.15.7.3 KII Outcome on Effectiveness of UNPKO

Figure 4.1

Effectiveness of UNPKO




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (60 percentage) are in view that UNPKO are partially effective in providing security to local population while minimum (3.3 percentage) of peacekeepers are in the view that UNPKO are ineffective in protecting local population.

Figure 4.2

Major Operational and Logistic Challenges in Peacekeeping Missions



Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (60 Percentage) are of the view that following are the operational and logistic challenges.

(a) Restriction on freedom of action and freedom of movement by host country

security forces.

(b) Limited Operational Outreach due to various threats.


(c) Lack of operational intelligence and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) devices.

(d) Lack of modern vehicles and Equipment's.

(e) Lack of Human Intelligence in area of operation

Figure 4.3

Performance of different units in UN Peacekeeping




Source: Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (80 percentage) respondents are in view that there is capability difference in different contingents in terms of operational effectiveness while minimum (20 percentage) of the respondent say all contingents are equal in terms of operational effectiveness.

Figure 4.4

Different Contingents Capability in Prompt Mobilization in Emergency POC Duty




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (80 percentage) are of the view that there is need on

improvement of professionalism and determination to carry out peacekeeping operational duties to fulfill mission mandate of POC.

Figure 4.5

Threats in Mission Area




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (50 percentages) say security Threats to local populations in the mission are as follows:

- Ethnic clashes.
- Threat from various Armed Groups.
- Meager presence of the government forces posing additional security threat.
- Threats from Terrorist Armed Groups.

Figure 4.6

Successfulness of UN Mission in dealing with Security Threats




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (60 percentages) are of the view that UN mission

was partially effective in dealing with security threats and protecting local population.

Figure 4.7

Enhancement of Capability of Peacekeeping Units




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (70 percentages) are in the view that following are the ways to enhance capability of UN peacekeeping force.

- (a) Adequate maneuver troops with mission specific training. Majority of maneuver troops for operational duty of Protection of Civilians.
- (b) A subunit of specialized troops to carry out special missions embedded in contingents.
- (c) Adequate terrain friendly mechanized vehicle with mine protection capability.
- (d) Adequate Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance- C4ISR equipment.
- (e) Adequate Specialized intelligence manpower and detachments.

Figure 4.8

Necessity of Improvement in Structural set up of Contingents of UNPKO




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (66.7 percentages) are of the view that present structural set up of contingents is adequate to deal with prevailing security threats.

Figure 4.9

Support of the host nation to UNPKO




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (93.3 percentages) said that host nation is partially supportive to UNPKO. It means there are grounds for the improvement of relationship between the host countries and UN missions.

Figure 4.10

Sustainment of UN Mission in Typical Peace Enforcement Mission




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents(60 percentage) are in view that for carrying out typical peace enforcement mission, robust multinational and regional forces are required to deal in such situations.

Figure 4.11

Recommendation to create robust multinational and regional force




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (43.3 percentage) are of the view that instead of

creation of integrated standing UN and regional force earmarking the separate force from the regional and global power and seeking commitments from them, maintenance of the standby force always to be deployed in short notice is viable option.

Figure 4.12

Host Nation Support in Achieving Protection of Civilian Mandate



Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (33.3 percentages) are of the view that host nation is supporting the mission as per following.

- (a) Integrated and joint Operations.
- (b) Sharing of Intelligence.
- (c) Non restriction on freedom of movement and freedom of action

Similarly, 23.3 percentages have emphasized on integrated and joint operations.

4.15.7.4 Overall Analysis of Outcome on KII: Peacekeeper Officer Corps

The focused Group Discussion was carried out amongst peacekeepers deployed in various missions in different capacities. Those were the contingent commanders, Operation officers and other officers in different capacities having field experience of UNPKO. The outcome can be summarized as:

- (a) Present peacekeeping operations are partially effective. The deduction is that there is need of improvement.
- (b) There is need of capability enhancement of the peacekeepers to operate effectively.
- (c) The operational mentality of some peacekeeper is not committed towards their duty and operational activities.
- (d) There is need of improvement in the attitude of the host country.
- (e) POC duty is not effectively carried out due to limitation of troops, various operational and administrative constraints.
- (f) There is limitation of troops in emergency mobilization and rapid deployment.
- (g) There is need to improve the standard of peacekeeping troops for effective mobilization (Personal Communication, 2024).

4.15.7.5 UNPKO and Challenges for POC

Since 1999, POC has been the primary mandate of United Nations multifaceted peacekeeping operations, and more than 96 percent of troops currently serve in missions under this mandate. A wide range of risks to civilians and an increasingly complicated operational environment are faced by UN peacekeeping missions (MINUSMA-BROADCAST, 2023). The POC is basically guided by the following principles.

- (a) Protecting civilians is the primary responsibility of host governments.
- (b) Where the government is unable or unwilling to offer protection, peacekeepers with a mandate to protect civilians have the authority and duty to do so within their means and areas of deployment.
- (c) The mandate to protect civilians encompasses an active responsibility to protect for the entirety of the mission, not just as a military task.
- (d) In accordance with humanitarian principles and in collaboration with humanitarian actors, civilians are protected.
- (e) The mandate to protect civilians is in accordance with the fundamentals of peacekeeping, such as the host state's agreement, impartial mandate execution, and the use of force only when necessary for self-defense or as directed by the Security Council.

(f) As per Security Council resolutions, the mandate to protect civilians is a top priority (MINUSMA-BROADCAST, 2023)

Implementing the POC mandate is the responsibility of the Head of the Mission (SRSG). Senior leaders from the civil, police, and military sectors say that POC should be given priority in mission plans, paperwork, and tactics. To make POC work well, missions should choose POC advisers and POC focal points, make a POC strategy, set up POC planning and coordination forums, set up an early warning system, and do threat assessments that look ahead on a regular basis (UNDPO, 2020). The POC framework can be better understood as a layered strategy that blends preventive, responsive, and corrective measures rather than as a rigid set of actions. It works on three levels that are all connected, and each one strengthens the others to make a more complete protection system. The first level, which is all about talking and getting involved, shows that people are trying to stop threats before they turn into violence. In practice, this means working with armed groups on a regular basis, helping to resolve conflicts and mediate disputes, and regularly pushing host governments to keep their promises to protect civilians. It also includes efforts to bring people together, strategic communication, and regular monitoring and reporting on human rights. These measures are intended to not only manage conflict dynamics but also to create an environment that greatly lowers the risk of harm to civilians (UNDPO, 2020). Tier II is primarily accomplished through a protective presence, including permanent static Bases and patrol in accordance with POC mission, positioning between civilian and threats, the threat or use of force, and aiding the safe passage of refugees. Tier III focuses mostly on corrective action to stop conflicts that endanger life or any kind of physical violence against the local populace. Security Sector Reform (SSR), rule of law initiatives, community violence reduction, increasing capacity of state actors, and developing capacity of civil society are the methods used to attain tier III (MINUSMA-BROADCAST, 2023).

Regarding POC, MONUSCO, MINUSMA, AMISOM, and UNMISS have fallen short of regional and global standards. Many civilians have been directly and indirectly safeguarded by the activities, but they do not always have the means or ability to do so. The significant significance that non-military initiatives or methods other than physical protection have played in most the aforementioned peace operations is one thing to keep in mind in this context. In many cases, a variety of conflict resolution, good offices, and local peace efforts have significantly reduced threats to people and prevented violent

conflict. The majority of these operations do admirable work in fields like child protection (where MONUSCO's contribution to the decline in the employment of child soldiers in the DRC is particularly significant), human rights, and sexual violence associated with armed conflict (Conning, 2019).

The UN's protection mandates are generally designed to safeguard individuals facing an imminent threat of physical harm. However, in practice, many missions have struggled to respond effectively to violence against civilians, even when authorized to use force. Notable examples include MONUC in the DRC and UNAMID in Darfur, both of which were criticized for failing to provide adequate civilian protection. To ensure the effective implementation of the POC agenda, mandates need to provide concrete guidance for peacekeepers. They should clearly outline the circumstances in which force may be employed while allowing sufficient discretion for personnel to act appropriately in complex and rapidly evolving situations, so that peacekeepers are not left inactive when protection is urgently required (United Nations, 2015).

The steps that lead from UNSC mandates, through UN mission planning and deployment after its action, to the establishment and management of operational activities on the ground, must be recognized and followed. Over the course of a year, key components connecting Security Council mandates and peacekeeping efforts on the ground were investigated, and glaring loopholes that jeopardize peacekeeping forces' ability to protect civilians were discovered. The recognition of this chain of events and improvements in it should result in three things: first, a better comprehension of the difficulties by all protection actors; second, the provision of the necessary political support and resources by the Member States; and third, improvements in the execution in all peacekeeping missions (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009).

Peacekeepers often have a hard time protecting civilians, especially since they often only step in as a last resort during wars and humanitarian crises. Even big missions are stretched thin because they have to cover such large areas and populations. For instance, MONUSCO has about one peacekeeper for every 4,800 people and one for every 135 square kilometres, even though it has more than 17,000 people working in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has more than 82 million people living in 2.3 million square kilometres (United Nations, 2024). These problems are even worse in areas where instability is common, which is often caused by weak infrastructure and small local security forces. Successfully addressing these obstacles requires careful

planning and strategic deployment to maximize civilian protection. Equally important is fostering a clear understanding among local governments, communities, and the international community about both the vital role peacekeepers play and the realistic limitations of their capabilities (United Nations, 2024).

The interactions between governments and armed opposition groups are central to models of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the impact of fighting on individuals goes beyond the actual battle itself. The quest for political dominance often leads to the murder of civilians by governments and armed groups. Yet, to what extent are peacekeeping forces effective in safeguarding individuals from any physical harm? In the first place, it is good to know that peacekeeping missions have achieved some degree of success in reducing the incidence of violent conflicts. Armed factions get opportunities and incentives to attack civilians during armed clashes (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013). The civilian population likewise suffers less when regular conflict is less intense. Careful analysis indicates that peacekeeping operations with explicit protection mandates can meaningfully lessen the severity of violence against civilians, helping to reduce human suffering. That goes hand in hand with our findings that more robust missions are more effective in limiting the intensity of conflict (Hegre, Hultman & Nygard, 2017).

By keeping armed conflicts under control, citizens are given indirect protection from violence. Peacekeeping efforts in armed conflict can also more specifically improve the security of civilians. In the majority of enforcement missions, troops are allowed to intervene alongside armed parties to protect civilians. They place restrictions on when peacekeepers can use more force without violating the core principles of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeepers do not have to watch silently as attacks on civilians take place. Additionally, due to the increased emphasis on the protection of people, the UN peacekeeping missions have established military doctrines specifically created to deal with this purpose (United Nations, 2008; United Nations, 2015). POC is another way the UNPKOs may contribute to a more peaceful world research indicates that the expected sequence of steps meant to ensure civilian protection—from early planning to UNSC decisions and their implementation by peacekeeping missions—often fails to function effectively. Several critical issues contribute to this gap. Planning that informs UNSC deliberations and the design of peacekeeping operations does not always sufficiently consider the specific threats facing civilians. Under the UN Charter, the UNSC bears

primary responsibility for global peace and security, including authorizing UNPKO. The language used in UNSC's resolutions defines mission objectives, shapes the deployment and design of operations, and guides the work of mission leaders and personnel on the ground (United Nations, 2023). This language is usually put together over weeks or even months of work by the UN Secretariat before the Council adopts it. But research shows that pre-mandate planning and risk assessments don't usually focus on protecting civilians in a systematic way. This means that these kinds of concerns are often not given enough attention in mission mandates, operational strategies, organizational structures, and the way resources are used (United Nations, 2023).

The UN Secretariat and field missions often don't understand what the UNSC means by POC mandates. The Council's inconsistent use of the word in different situations is a big part of why this is so unclear. Sometimes, POC is seen as a broad moral commitment against violence against civilians. Other times, it includes the UN's broader humanitarian and peace-building efforts. In more practical terms, though, it is also used in a more limited way to mean physical protection, which is mostly provided by the military and police parts of peacekeeping missions. This difference in meaning has made it hard to understand and carry out (Holt & Taylor, 2009). The Council has also used the phrase Protection of Civilians to talk about mission goals and to spell out specific tasks in mandates. Because of these differences, planners, implementers, and other important stakeholders have understood the phrase in very narrow and very broad ways, and they have not been able to agree on how to organize their work. Council members have frequently cited the 1999 Sierra Leone mandate as an illustration of a directive aimed at protecting civilians, underscoring the necessity for peacekeepers to proactively prevent and terminate extreme violence (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). The concept of an objective limit, which was novel at the time, remains a valuable framework for understanding protection. It looks at things like the area, the mission's goals, and the resources that are available. This framework basically says that missions should not only protect people in the operational area, but they should also try to stop violence against the population from spreading. It is even more complicated because the UNSC doesn't have a clear understanding of the situation. Even though the language of the mandate is clear about the physical protection of civilians, senior UN officials in the Secretariat and in field missions do not always agree on what the mandate means (Bellamy & Williams, 2015).

The UNSC doesn't often ask how the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat make sure that peacekeeping missions do a good job of protecting civilians, keeping track of progress, or working together with other groups, like the host government or the parties to the conflict. This lack of clear direction shows that people are not sure what the Council wants to do, which has led to big holes in policy, planning, and mission readiness—things that the Secretariat is mostly responsible for. The 2008 Capstone Doctrine says that protecting civilians is a top priority for all missions, but it doesn't give an operational definition that could help with planning (United Nations, 2008). Mission planners often have a hard time figuring out who is protected, from what threats, and under what conditions because there is no clear definition of what protection of civilians means in practice. As a result, orders to protect civilians are often not turned into plans that can be put into action. This lack of clarity also affects how resources are used: the planning process doesn't take into account the extra resources needed to carry out protection mandates, which means that missions are not ready when they are sent out. The report also points out certain pivot points in the planning cycle where concerns about civilian safety should be taken into account, but they aren't being addressed well enough before missions start (Williams, 2018).

In UNPKO, planning ahead is crucial for POC to ensure missions can act effectively. This involves strategies that match the mission's goals, a solid understanding of the area, knowledge of safety measures, and the ability to use available resources wisely. One ongoing issue is that uniformed soldiers and senior mission leaders receive minimal training on protecting civilians before missions begin. When the UNSC, the Secretariat, Member States, or the UNGA's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) fail to provide clear guidance, mission leaders and contingent commanders often must make significant decisions about strategy and tactics on their own (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). Even very skilled leaders may have trouble coming up with cohesive and effective measures if they don't all agree on what civilian protection means, how it should be put into action, or whether it is a priority. As a result, gaps in policy guidance, preparation, and readiness make it much harder for peacekeeping missions to turn their orders into real actions on the ground. The main goal of UN peacekeeping is to carry out Security Council orders in ways that protect civilians (Bellamy & Williams, 2015).

Even though the UNSC gives orders, peacekeeping personnel have to deal with a lot of troubles with mission planning, preparation, and oversight. Field staff often has to tackle day-to-day tasks, come up with plans for enforcing mandates, and deal with threats to civilians (Williams, 2018). Even though these problems are big, many dedicated and creative people keep working on them, coming up with new ways and tools to keep people safe. However, their efforts work best when they have support from the whole institution, which is still not consistent (Williams, 2018). The gaps found at the field level have been recognized, especially the lack of mission-wide strategies for protecting civilians. Most UN peacekeeping missions don't have detailed plans that coordinate how mission resources are used every day to stop violence or make it clear how to respond to a crisis. Some missions have started to make tools and tactics on the fly, but these are usually reactive rather than part of a planned approach. (Williams, 2018).

Leadership is a big part of how POC is talked about. Senior civilian and military commanders have very different ideas about what civilian protection means and how important it is. When leaders do recognize its importance, plans and strategies tend to come up. In the end, senior leaders have the final say on whether and how protection measures are put into place, even when missions have special civilian protection units. Mission structures and resources are just as important. Even the best-planned mandates and most skilled leaders may not be able to get meaningful results if they don't have enough organizational capacity, personnel, and logistical support (Williams, 2018). Good protection relies on collecting and understanding trustworthy data. However, many missions lack the tools or skills to gather and comprehend the information they need. This makes it hard to identify daily threats or predict crises that could quickly lead to violence. The UN has recognized the need for better intelligence and situational awareness for civilian protection (Williams, 2018).

A closer look into the functioning of the UNSC reveals the importance of the veto power enjoyed by its P5. The veto right gives any of the states mentioned an opportunity to halt the adoption of substantive resolutions irrespective of the level of support received from other members of the Council. While the veto mechanism was initially meant to ensure the collaboration of major countries in promoting peace and security around the world-especially when imposing sanctions or using military force-the power brings about certain structural implications. In the case of UNPKO and POC,

where prompt and coherent action is crucial, the use of the veto becomes problematic (Hurd, 2014).

When looking at the function of the veto, one may note that the tool often results in delays and deadlock situations, which make it impossible for the Council to provide timely assistance. As evidenced by various empirical data gathered during multiple armed conflicts, the political discord between the P5 often hinders collective measures aimed at solving pressing problems. In addition to reducing the efficiency of the body in question, the veto power makes it difficult for the UNSC to act responsibly, thus damaging its reputation and reputation (Hurd, 2014). The effects are most clear in areas of conflict. When decisions are postponed or blocked, it often results in no action on the ground. Delays like these can seriously harm people, especially civilians at risk of violence. The veto also tends to shift the Council's agenda in a selective manner. Some issues receive more attention than others because they align with the P5's strategic goals. This uneven focus undermines the principle of collective security. It raises concerns about how consistently the Council engages in various crises (Weiss, 2018).

Several reform ideas have arisen to address these issues. Many consider that adding rising powers to the UNSC's permanent membership would make it more representative and justifiable in today's world. Another proposal is to limit the use of the veto. This could entail asking countries to willingly abstain from using it in cases of mass atrocities or requiring broader concurrence before it can be applied. However, these changes are politically challenging because they rely on the P5's consent. Another practical option is to give regional organizations more authority. This could enhance regional control and facilitate responses to conflicts, especially in terms of protecting civilians (Weiss, 2018). Any changes to the veto power or alternative arrangements would require consensus among P5 and also it requires amendments to the UN Charter. The imposition of veto power in view of POC makes the credibility and legitimacy of UN in peril (Personal Communication, June 23, 2023).

4.16 Criticism of UNSC Actions: Case Studies with Security Perspective

There have been many crises that the council has encountered in the last decade when handling the issues relating to maintaining international peace and security. Some of the criticisms concerning the UN Peacekeepers' failures and the UN's response in handling international crises and humanitarian disasters are outlined in the subsequent

paragraphs. One of these criticisms refers to the provision outlined in the Charter. Although the provision in the Charter has an honorable cause, its interpretation in practice differs greatly. The provision in the Charter has a good intention, but there will always be ambiguity in its implementation (Weiss, 2003). Collective security is a way to keep the peace in which countries agree to work together to fight any country that is thought to be an aggressor. It puts aside worries about settling disputes, upholding the law, or ensuring justice in favor of stopping violence by using a huge international force against any aggressor. In all of these cases, collective security has completely failed, even though it is a key part of the League of Nations Covenant and is written down in a slightly different way in the United Nations Charter (Frankel, 2024).

Nations have not been able to come to a consensus on a clear definition of aggression, nor have they implemented the idea that aggression must be dealt with regardless of the identity of the aggressor. As a result, the international collective security force envisioned in the Charter has not been established. This is because there is no international government that has the authority to decide matters on a global scale. Political differences among the major countries have prevented the successful use of the UN Charter's enforcement provisions, which call for the imposition of military and economic penalties. This emphasizes how laws must reflect underlying political realities in order to be effective (Frankel, 2024).

In a series of massacres and other occurrences during 1990, many civilians died in Rwanda because of the ethnic strife. Rwanda remains one of the worst chapters in UN history because the Security Council did little to stop genocide before it started. The events of 1995 showed a major failure of international protection. Bosnian Serb forces took control of UN-designated safe areas in Bosnia. This led to the systematic execution of thousands of men and boys, even with the United Nations present (United Nations, 1999). Retaining Regional Stability In the early 1990s, the Bosnian War severely destabilized the entire Balkan region (Malone, 2006). The 2003 US led intervention in Iraq continues to spark significant debate, especially regarding its legal justification under international law. The US claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction as the main reason for military action. However, later developments did not confirm these claims. Without solid evidence, doubts arose about the legal basis for the intervention. Additionally, the lack of clear authorization from the UNSC prompted many to argue that the use of force did not meet established legal standards for collective security

(Gray, 2018). The UN, particularly the UNSC, failed to prevent or effectively respond to the intervention, exposing weaknesses in its ability to enforce its own principles and norms(Gray, 2018).

This episode is often cited as an example of how major powers can act outside the established framework of collective security; thereby challenging the authority and credibility of the United Nations system (Gray, 2018). There are many questions about NATO intervention in Libya. In February 2011, the Qadhafi regime violently suppressed peaceful rallies in Benghazi, targeting civilian opponents of the authority. In Resolution 1973, the UN Security Council establishes a no-fly zone over Libya and gives member nations the authority to take all necessary measures to defend civilians and places inhabited by civilians from attacks or threats of attacks. In support of UNSCR 1973, NATO decides on March 24, 2011, to impose the no-fly zone over Libya as ordered by the UN. In March 31, 2011, NATO assumed exclusive command of the global military operation concerning Libya. Subsequently, NATO air and naval forces start using force to defend civilians in Libya (NATO, 2015). The United Nations Security Council officially approved the intervention in Libya with the goal of protecting civilians, but there has been a lot of debate about how the mandate was carried out since then. Critics say that NATO went too far with its mission by turning a limited protection mission into a larger campaign that helped change the government, which led to the fall of Muammar Qadhafi. This perceived expansion of the mandate has brought up important questions about how UNSC resolutions are understood and carried out. Libya has continued to have security problems in the years since, which shows how these problems will affect the country's political stability in the long run (Bellamy & Williams, 2013).

Since 1947, State of Palestine has strongly claimed the membership of UN. It is evident that a state having already non-member observer state status in UNGA is not fully recognized as sovereign nation because authority to do so is vested upon UNSC. This is an example which demands democratic procedures of working mechanism in UNSC during passing of any resolutions and decision on enrollment of new member state. Single veto power of P5 country can obstruct such vital global issue (Quigley, 2013). President Bashar al-Assad's administration in Syria faced an unparalleled challenge to its rule in March 2011 when nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations broke out. The demonstrators called for an end to the authoritarian policies of the Assad administration, which have been in place since Hafiz al-Assad, the president of Syria,

took office in 1971. The Syrian government heavily utilized police, military, and paramilitary personnel in order to repress protests by violence. In 2011, opposition militias started to emerge, and by 2012, the dispute had developed into a formal civil war (Syrian Civil War, 2024).

With analytical perspective, present crisis in Syria is an example of ineffectiveness of UN due to structural drawbacks and right provided to P5 members of UN Security Council to impose veto power in UNSC resolution. UN is unable to send peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission in Syria leading to the deaths of millions and other adverse humanitarian complexities making it significant failure of UN in human history. With this background, case studies within scope of role of UNSC for maintenance of international peace and security has been studied with respect to the gaps and shortfalls of UNPKO, Responsibility to Protect, Collective Security . It is not possible to analyze and narrate all case studies demanding the role of UNSC in disputes of the world threatening peace and security. Citing the above examples, for this dissertation, the prominent and most burning case studies of the world within scope of security perspective which are within prerogative of UNSC to resolve are discussed to find out the gaps, drawbacks and shortfalls in functioning mechanism as well as procedural aspects.

4.16.1 UNSC and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

4.16.1.1 Role of UN UNSC in Case of Syrian Crisis (2011-at Present)

The Syrian crisis, which began in 2011 during the Arab Spring, has become one of the most complicated and long-lasting conflicts of the 21st century. It has deep internal divisions and a lot of outside involvement (Phillips, 2016). The Syrian people have suffered greatly, with more than 400,000 deaths, more than 5 million people fleeing to other countries, and about 6.3 million people being forced to leave their homes in Syria. This humanitarian crisis shows how badly the UN Security Council has failed to take action that matters (Phillips, 2016). Carla del Ponte's resignation from the UN commission of inquiry on Syria shows how frustrated international officials are with the lack of action. Del Ponte explicitly criticized the Security Council, expressing that she had hoped to persuade it to pursue justice, yet during her seven-year tenure with the Commission, progress remained negligible, leaving both justice and peace unrealized (Del Ponte, 2020). Most likely, justice won't be done, at least not in the near or mid-

term. The case of Syria has not yet been brought before ICC, in contrast to the relatively quick construction of such courts for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It is uncertain whether the Security Council will request a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a war crimes tribunal. It is feasible that a procedure may be started in the distant future (akin to the situation in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge are only now being punished for atrocities committed in the 1970s). The UNSC's refusal to act in favor of justice on this occasion is a component of a larger failing (Nadin, 2017).

The Council initially failed to intervene, then failed to prevent. Before or after the event, the conditions in New York and on the ground have never been favorable for taking any significant action. It is possible that Article 2(7), which forbids meddling in a member state's internal affairs, would have been used if the Council had carried out its duty to avert the conflict. By the time the Security Council received an update from Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe on April 27, 2011, the conflict in Syria had already escalated beyond the early stages of protest. The widespread demonstrations that began in mid-March had set in motion a violent cycle, suggesting that the international response may have arrived too late to influence the trajectory of events (UN Security Council, 2011). An international council of 15 in New York was unlikely to influence a resolution once a conflict has started and has progressed to the stage of armed revolt. The odds are much lower if the major member states are not interested (and thus unwilling to invest diplomatic resources) or are not united (Nadin, 2017).

Changes in the Syrian conflict show both the strengths and weaknesses of the UN system. All of these things were done with good intentions: Kofi Annan's six-point plan, sending the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), making it easier for people to get help, and setting up the OPCW-UN Joint Mission to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons. Even with these steps, the Security Council has mostly had trouble responding well. It has only passed a few resolutions, and many of them have not been put into action well or at all (Nadin, 2017).

The structure of mediation is another problem. The UN Special Envoy for Syria, which has been held by Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and Staffan de Mistura in turn, was not officially created by a Security Council mandate. This shows how disconnected the world's response to the crisis has been. The Council's response has also been greatly affected by the frequent use of the veto. There have been eight vetoes about Syria so far.

China and Russia have blocked six draft resolutions together. This trend shows how the permanent members' differences in politics have made it harder for the Council to work together and make decisions (Nadin, 2017).

The first set of vetoes, which took place between October 2011 and February 2012, stopped resolutions that called for sanctions against the Assad government and contained words of condemnation from passing. A blocked resolution from July 2012 would have sanctioned the Assad regime for the sustained movement of military forces accompanied by the utilization of heavy weaponry in and near populated areas. Another veto was used in May 2014 to prevent a resolution calling for the ICC to be notified of the situation in Syria. The Council tried to pass two resolutions about the situation in Aleppo in October and December of that year (Nadin, 2017). The first draft was one that lambasted the Syrian government. In contrast, the second draft suggested the implementation of a seven-day ceasefire in order to provide humanitarian assistance.

The spread of chemical weapons and the use of gas by militants in Khan Sheikhoun have been the topics of the last two vetoes cast by Russia. The former draft attempted to punish regime officials who produced and used chemical weapons (Nadin, 2017). Would the situation change if these resolutions were passed? Without Chinese and Russian obstructionism, the Council's course of action would have been different. These vetoed resolutions probably wouldn't have brought about peace in Syria, either. This raises the question of whether we should lower our hopes for UNSC. Is it conceivable, in the modern period, for an institution created by states for states to resolve a complex problem involving several local and regional actors? In light of complicated situations, the story of Syria demonstrates the limitations of international governance instruments (Nadin, 2017).

It is hard to judge how well the UNSC has dealt with the Syrian crisis. It is not enough to just say that its actions were effective or ineffective to understand how complicated things are. The Council's decisions were affected by a number of political and institutional factors that were all connected to each other. These factors made it harder for the Council to find a long-term political solution. The next part will talk about the problems inside the Council that made it harder for them to make real progress in ending the conflict (United Nations, n.d.). It might be essential to briefly discuss the Council and its processes before getting to the meat of the issue. One of the six main UN entities, the UN Security Council is primarily in charge of maintaining world peace and

security (Jafarova, 2014). It is a rather small club with only fifteen member states: ten elected members with two-year mandates and five permanent members. The UNSC framework gives its P5 members veto power, which gives them a significant say in important decisions. Between 2011 and 2013, during the height of the Syrian crisis, the Council's elected (non-permanent) members underwent several rotations, but these changes had little effect on the Council's general operations (Hurd, 2014). In practice, the institutional dynamics and decision-making patterns of the Security Council remain largely consistent, as the influence of the P5 continues to outweigh that of the rotating members. This highlights a structural stability within UNSC, where changes in elected membership do not significantly alter outcomes, principally in situations created by deep geopolitical divisions (Hurd, 2014).

A look at how well the UNSC does its job shows that it often can't respond quickly and effectively to major global security crises, especially when the P5 have different interests at stake. This tendency to hesitate or backpedal has long made the Council less effective and still makes it hard for it to act quickly in situations that are very political. Because of this, the Council often uses a variety of tools to make its point, and each one has a different level of authority and political weight. These are press statements, presidential statements, letters from the president of the Council, and formal resolutions. They are listed in order of their legal importance (Hurd, 2014).

Most of such instruments, which include press releases and presidential statements, require consensus among all fifteen members; however, they are non-binding. This makes them flexible but reduces their effectiveness. On the other hand, Security Council resolutions remain the most important decisions and the only binding ones made by the council (Sievers & Daws, 2014). However, these resolutions require the votes of no fewer than nine members of the council, all of whom must come from the five permanent members of the council. Such a requirement makes it extremely difficult to pass crucial resolutions, especially those that call for action under Article VII of the UN charter (Sievers & Daws, 2014). As a result, the very mechanism intended to ensure great power agreement can become a barrier to decisive action, highlighting the structural limitations of the Council in addressing complex conflicts (Hurd, 2014).

States can use their veto to block any resolution they see as conflicting with the strategic or political interests of the Security Council's permanent members. When the

Council needs to make decisions about critical security issues, this method of decision-making can greatly weaken its ability to function (Jafarova, 2014). The UNSC is viewed as a place where power politics happen. This is mostly because the permanent members often use the organization to further their own interests. According to Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council can take steps to protect international peace and security, such as cutting off economic ties, suspending transportation and communication links, or breaking diplomatic ties (United Nations, 1945). In addition, should the UNSC consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 42) (Jafarova, 2014).

It was challenging to get a consensus on Chapter VII measures, especially when P5 nations had divergent opinions. The UNSC attempted three legally binding resolutions on Syria between October 2011 and July 2012. The first, dated October 4, 2011, hinted at probable economic and diplomatic penalties against the regime if unrest persisted for more than thirty days. On February 4, 2012, a second draft established a twenty-one-day deadline for action. Russia and China opposed all three resolutions in an effort to stop the Libyan intervention from happening again. The third, which was held on July 19, 2012, was more thorough and addressed accountability, outlined a transition process, and included the Geneva Communiqué (United Nations, 2012). The Assad regime was harshly criticized in all three draft resolutions, which held it primarily accountable for the widespread violence and the worsening circumstances that the Syrian people were experiencing. In reality, the UNSC frequently only reaches consensus on matters that are acceptable to all five permanent members, which restricts its decision-making to the lowest common denominator. Due to this institutional framework, it is almost impossible to take stronger actions that would require using Chapter VII powers. Because of this, there has been less in-depth discussion of political solutions to the Syrian war. Instead, more attention has been paid to the current humanitarian crisis and, later, to worries about getting rid of chemical weapons (United Nations, 2012).

After April 19, 2013, the Joint Special Envoy stopped giving regular briefings to the Security Council. Instead, key humanitarian figures like OCHA Head Valeri Amos, UNHCR High Commissioner Antonio Guterres, and the SRSG on Sexual and Gender-

Based Violence, Zainab Hawa Bangura, gave more frequent updates. Guterres made a very clear point during a briefing on April 18, 2013, that was later widely quoted in the Council, especially by those who wanted stronger intervention: Let's be very clear: there is no humanitarian solution to the Syrian crisis (Jafarova, 2014). This statement made it clear that nothing was being done at the international level (Barnett, 2013). The Council made a presidential statement on October 2, 2013, that only talked about the humanitarian aspects of the conflict and called for immediate action to ease the suffering of the Syrian people. After a lot of talking and the second Geneva summit, the Council was finally able to pass its first humanitarian resolution on Syria, S/RES/2139, on February 22, 2014. (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

As was previously said, after Syria's effort to eliminate its chemical weapons entered the scene, the UNSC's discussion centered on this specific issue. Although numerous commentators and decision-makers (as well as some UNSC members) have urged repeatedly against letting the problem of chemical weapons overwhelm the need for finding a political solution to the crisis, such pleas appear to have gone unanswered thus far (Jafarova, 2014). Unfortunately, decisions regarding the Syrian issue were best negotiated outside UNSC because the interested P5 countries (particularly Russia and China) did not realize the immediate need of Chapter VII sanctions. The Geneva Communiqué of June 30, 2012, which was the first sincere effort to build the fundamentals for the political process and a transitional administration in Syria, and the Geneva Agreement of September 14, 2012, are two striking examples (Jafarova, 2014).

4.16.1.2 UNSC Authorized NATO Intervention in Libya(2011)

On March 17, 2011, the UN approved military intervention in Libya to safeguard civilians in response to violence that had broken out between government forces and opponents a month earlier. NATO launched the operation two days later, establishing a no-fly zone and using aircraft to assault government forces. After seven months of NATO operations, Muammar Gaddafi was slain, and Libya was taken over by rebel forces in October 2011(NATO,2011). By preventing a bloodbath in Benghazi and assisting in the replacement of the autocratic Gaddafi government with a transitional council dedicated to democracy, the intervention was quickly lauded by Western politicians and media as a humanitarian victory. Given this apparent success, many experts now use Libya as an illustration of how to use the concept of Responsibility to

Protect (R2P). Before accepting such results, it is essential to conduct a more in-depth review of the net humanitarian impact of NATO action in Libya (Kuperman,2012).

While most of these instruments such as press or presidential statements require unanimity among all fifteen member-states, they do not constitute legally binding decisions. As such, their implementation becomes easier but equally less effective. In contrast, Security Council resolutions represent some of the most critical and legally binding decisions by the Security Council. However, a minimum of nine votes must be cast in favor of each of these resolutions, including all votes cast by the five permanent member states. It becomes extremely difficult to achieve these resolutions in controversial political matters, particularly when the resolutions concern actions taken under Article VII of the UN Charter (Sievers & Daws, 2014).

NATO subsequently began Operation Unified Protector with the stated goals of enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the threat of attack. Although the eventual outcome of the intervention challenges this interpretation, it provides the first indication that NATO's mandate was framed with an emphasis on the R2P. Scholars such as Pattison have defended NATO's involvement in Libya, arguing that it can be justified if understood as an operation strictly guided by R2P principles (Pattison, 2010). According to Pattison, the actions of the Gaddafi government met the criteria established by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) for legitimate humanitarian intervention (Pattison, 2010). Gaddafi had, as was already mentioned, made his sentiments about the protests clear by ordering his supporters to go out and cleanse the city of Benghazi. This was demonstrated by the Gaddafi regime's subsequent indiscriminate shelling of Misrata, which showed that the intervention to save the Libyan people was legitimate.(Green,2019)

It should be emphasized that under the R2P theory, NATO is likewise accountable for helping to protect populations when it intervenes. NATO essentially failed to keep this obligation to protect these people throughout the operation; by populations in this context, we mean all the people who are based within the state. Reports of rebel opposition organizations torturing people because of their skin tone serve as evidence of this. Sub-Saharan immigrants were severely persecuted by the Gaddafi dictatorship before to the upheavals, and their legal right to seek and receive protection was not acknowledged (Green, 2019).

Furthermore, a report conducted by the UN stated that Sub-Saharan Africans constitute a large number of the detainees, in some cases accused or suspected of being mercenaries. According to allegations, rebel soldiers have raped black African women in the refugee camps outside of Tripoli, forced black Libyans out of entire cities, and engaged in the torture of some detainees. These results demonstrate that NATO failed to appropriately intervene in accordance with its duty to protect the Libyan people despite its active military involvement with the Gaddafi dictatorship (Green,2019). Furthermore, many of the sub-Saharan African reports on torture name the perpetrators as rebel groups, which raised problems for NATO because these groups received help from NATO for regime change. NATO's goal was weakened because the fact that rebel groups were torturing members of minority ethnic groups, many of whom were civilians, went against the idea of the duty to protect and raised questions about whether regime change was indeed necessary. Furthermore, by torturing civilians, the rebel activities are compared to the Gaddafi regime (Green,2019).

Hence, UNSC authorized NATO intervention was mingled with regime change. The rebel groups were equally responsible of violation of IHL and human rights. From NATO side it was under framework of R2P. The critics say it was more directed towards regime change and was not focused on protecting civilians targeted by the rebel groups (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

4.16.1.3 Myanmar: Rohingya Case

The Rohingya are one of Myanmar's numerous ethnic minorities and have been called one of, if not the, most discriminated people in the world by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. They claim to be descended from Arab traders and other groups who have lived in the area for many years and have their own language and culture. But the Rohingya are not recognized as a people by the government of Myanmar, a country with a large Buddhist population. They were even left out of the 2014 census (Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis,2020). It views them as unauthorized Bangladeshi immigrants. Rohingya have moved across the area in large numbers since the 1970s. Their numbers are frequently significantly greater in estimates than in official statistics. Before the most recent crises, thousands of Rohingya fled Myanmar in recent years to avoid inter communal violence or allegations of security force mistreatment (Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis,2020).

The Myanmar government has a history of oppression and discrimination against Rohingyas. They are the group with the biggest population of stateless people in the world, and they were denied citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law. In order to avoid genocide, Rohingyas as refugees are housed in overcrowded camps in Bangladesh. At least 500,000 destitute people have begun migrating to Bangladesh. Intimidation, looting, and village burning have also been reported (Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, 2020). During the crisis, human rights violations, especially sexual violence, disproportionately affected women, children, and the elderly. At least 6,700 Rohingyas died in the first month following the violence, including at least 730 children under the age of five, according to evidence from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (MSF, 2017). According to Amnesty International, Rohingya women and girls were also raped and mistreated by the Myanmar military (Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, 2020).

The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar highlights serious challenges in the international community's ability to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. In August 2017, large-scale military operations carried out by Myanmar's armed forces led to the mass displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims, many of whom fled to neighboring Bangladesh under extremely dangerous conditions, traveling by land and sea (Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, 2020). The UN later called these actions a textbook example of ethnic cleansing, which shows how big and bad the violence was. Later legal events showed that the world was still worried. In January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Myanmar temporary orders telling it to take immediate steps to stop genocide against the Rohingya community (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018; International Court of Justice, 2020). Even with these changes, the Myanmar military has always said that its operations were aimed at insurgent groups and has denied purposefully targeting civilians. Similarly, Aung San Suu Kyi, once widely regarded as a global symbol of human rights, publicly rejected allegations of genocide before the ICJ. This divergence between international assessments and national narratives illustrates the complexity of accountability and the limitations of global governance mechanisms in addressing such crises (Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, 2020).

These shocking results spurred international organizations to make some groundbreaking advancement. The UN Security Council has sharply denounced the brutality

against peaceful protestors in Myanmar and expressed grave concern over the limitations placed on hospitals, civil society organizations, trade unions, and media as anti-military protests continue throughout the nation. A group of Rohingyas brought a criminal complaint against the military and civilian authorities in Myanmar. Despite making a significant international advancement, nothing has changed over the past three years. (Verma, 2021) International organizations and the UN have strongly condemned the atrocities done against the Rohingya population, but they still happen. Under the R2P framework, the UN has not taken any concrete action in response to the atrocities committed against the Rohingyas. Investigators from the United Nations came to the conclusion in an August 2018 report that the Myanmar military had committed mass murders and sexual assaults with genocidal intent. Building on these conclusions, The Gambia, a small West African state with a majority of Muslims, filed a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on behalf of several other Muslim-majority nations, requesting immediate action to stop the Tatmadaw while a thorough investigation was conducted (International Court of Justice, 2020).

When Aung San Suu Kyi appeared before the International Court of Justice in December 2019, she rejected the allegations that Myanmar had committed genocide against the Rohingya population (International Court of Justice, 2020). However, the court's initial decision in January 2020 mandated that Myanmar take immediate action to protect the Rohingya from persecution and death. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has the power to prosecute people charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity, whereas the International Court of Justice (ICJ) exclusively decides disputes between nations. In November, the group gave the go-ahead for a thorough probe into the Rohingya situation in Myanmar (International Court of Justice, 2020; International Criminal Court, 2019). The International Criminal Court (ICC) said it had jurisdiction over the case even though Myanmar itself is not a member since Bangladesh, where the victims sought refuge, is a member (Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, 2020).

4.16.1.4 Palestine: Dispute in Middle East

There have been numerous occasions when the Council has talked about the problems in the Middle East region and Palestinians. The deafening silence of the Security Council on the Israel/Palestine issue is indeed very disturbing. In case of any war-like situation in the region, the Council has demanded ceasefires from the belligerent parties. Furthermore, it has also deployed military observers along with its peacekeeping forces to the region. It has adopted resolution 242 (1967) and resolution 338 (1973) (United Nations Security Council, 1967; United Nations Security Council, 1973).

The Council has consistently voiced concern over developments in the region, rejecting attempts by the Israeli government to alter the status of Jerusalem and calling for a halt to settlement activities deemed to have no legal validity. It has also reaffirmed the Fourth Geneva Convention's relevance and called for the return of Palestinians who have been deported. In addition to these positions, the Council has consistently pushed for the quick resumption of talks in the Middle East peace process so that the parties can reach a quick and complete agreement (United Nations Security Council 1967-2016). The Council reaffirmed its commitment to a two-State solution through resolutions 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003), which called for Israel and Palestine to live peacefully next to each other within borders recognized by the United Nations (UNSC, 2002, 2003). It also backed the road map that the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia, and four other countries) came up with. The Council has open debates on the subject from time to time and gets updates once a month. In 2011, President Mahmoud Abbas asked the UN to let Palestine join. The Council is now looking at this request. In resolution 2334 (2016) (The Question of Palestine and Security Council, 2023), the Council told Israel to stop all settlement activities right away and completely (United Nations Security Council, 1967-2016).

An examination of the UNSC's involvement in the Israel–Palestine conflict indicates that the United States' utilization-and frequent intimidation-of the veto has significantly influenced the Council's constrained reaction. The United States has blocked dozens of draft resolutions about Israel since 1967. This is a large part of all the vetoes cast in the Council (Malone, 2004). This recurring dynamic has had wider institutional consequences. Within the Security Council, meaningful action on the

Israel–Palestine question is often constrained by the persistent possibility of a veto, which discourages the adoption of resolutions. Consequently, much of the diplomatic effort and norm-setting activity has gravitated toward other UN forums-most notably the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council-where decision-making is not subject to veto constraints (United Nations Security Council, 2020).

When looked at analytically, this change helps explain why these forums have come up with so many resolutions. A lot of them sound like broader international worries about long-term occupation and fit with the anti-colonial view that became popular in newly independent countries starting in the 1960s. A similar pattern was observed during apartheid period in South Africa (United Nations Security Council, 1977). By comparison, the UNSC-despite adopting key actions such as Resolutions 242 (1967) and 2334 (2016)-has struggle to turn its decisions into tangible results. Despite of continuous effort, ongoing settlement expansion by Israel reflects the UNSC's inability to enforce its mandates (United Nations Security Council, 2020).

These aspects shows deep structural drawback in UNSC. P5 members hold significant power in decision-making, and their ability to use the veto has made the Council appear unbalanced and inconsistent. Some people criticize the United Nations for issuing too many resolutions about the Israel-Palestine issue, but these criticisms often overlook that the UNSC's role is quite limited. Research, including studies by groups like the European Middle East Project (EuMEP), shows that the Council's involvement in this matter has been consistently restricted over time. This limitation raises concerns about the UNSC's inability in solving one of the longest-standing conflicts (European Middle East Project, 2020). Evidence indicates that the UNSC has faced challenges in implementing a consistent and impartial strategy in resolving the Israel–Palestine conflict. Among 596 resolutions related to various conflicts, the Council has passed only one resolution passed on Israel-Palestine conflict. This shows that the Council's formal responses don't match the size of the conflict. The Council's limited success in making sure that its decisions are carried out is also a big problem, as it has made people question its reliability and consistency as an institution (O'Neill & Rees, 2005).

This also makes it harder to make the common point that the UN unfairly targets Israel with too many resolutions. These kinds of claims usually talk about what groups

like the UNGA or the Human Rights Council do, but they don't mention how little the UNSC does, which is the UN's most important group for peace and security. When the role of the Security Council is examined more closely, the problem appears less about over attention and more about inconsistent-and at times intentional-withdrawal from meaningful engagement (Malone, 2004). The limited use of binding resolutions, coupled with weak enforcement, reflects how the strategic priorities of the P5 frequently override the need for timely action, relegating urgent concerns to the margins. As a result, serious situations are left insufficiently addressed and seldom produce tangible outcomes. Seen this way, the Israel–Palestine situation is not an isolated case but a reflection of a deeper structural constraint within the UNSC, where political interests frequently take precedence over its mandate to respond firmly in the interest of international peace and security (Hurd, 2014).

The General Assembly first discussed the question of Palestine in 1947. It adopted Resolution 181 (II), which recommended dividing the territory into two states: one for Arabs and one for Jews. It also suggested placing Jerusalem under a special international system. After the conflict in 1948, the Assembly established the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) through Resolution 194 (III) (1949). This Commission aimed to help reach a final settlement and reaffirm the rights of Palestinian refugees to return and receive compensation. In the same year, the Assembly created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to meet the needs of Palestinian refugees (United Nations General Assembly, 1947, 1949a, 1949b).

In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) put the issue of Palestine back on its agenda. This reaffirmed the international community's recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination, independence, sovereignty, and entitlement to their land, as stated in Resolution 3236 (XXIX) (Kattan, 2012). In 1975, the Assembly set up the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to deal with these problems in a more organized way (Quigley, 2010). Since then, the Assembly has made many decisions and passed many resolutions about the Palestinian question during its regular, special, and emergency sessions. On November 29, 2012, Palestine was given non-member observer state status. This was the significant initiation in its international recognition (UN General Assembly, 2012). Key issues consistently rose by the Assembly and its subsidiary bodies, like the

Human Rights Council; include the Palestinians' right to self-determination, control over natural resources, humanitarian assistance, and protection for refugees and internally displaced persons. They also address broader topics such as Israeli settlements, the chances for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and the status of Jerusalem. These recurring agenda items highlight the ongoing global focus on both the legal and humanitarian aspects of the Palestinian situation (Quigley, 2010).

Despite of the stand of global forum, UNGA and from the humanitarian perspective, State of Palestine has not achieved the status of the sovereign nation in UN. This is because of the veto power imposed by US in favor of Israel. The toll of human life since the dispute, IHL and human rights violation has posed serious question on the functioning of the UNSC, role of UNGA, legitimacy of veto power authorized to P5 members and unconditional authority given to UNSC in enrollment of new member states and resolving the disputes (Hurd, 2014). If the current provisions of veto power and functioning mechanism of UNSC is not revised this type of disputes and humanitarian crisis contrasting to national interest of P5 members will go forever. This shows that the provision is against UNSC main effort to maintain international peace and security determining threat to peace and any breaches to international peace and security. Hence, veto power is causing UNSC and UN as a global umbrella organization of sovereign countries dysfunctional in terms of maintaining global security affairs which are having contrasting interest of P5 members. UN structural and procedural mechanism must be changed for more secure world (Hurd, 2014).

Since 7 October 2023, conditions for human rights in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, have deteriorated sharply. On that day, Palestinian armed groups-most prominently the Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas's military wing-alongside both armed and unarmed civilians, launched attacks that affected both civilian populations and infrastructure, as well as military sites in southern Israel (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2023). These developments have exacerbated an already fragile humanitarian and security environment, highlighting the urgent need for both protection of civilians and adherence to international humanitarian law (B'Tselem, 2023) The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has revealed that Israeli bombings in Gaza had claimed the lives of 133 of its employees (Siddiqui, 2023).

Since Israel started bombing Gaza after Hamas's 7 October 2023 strikes, at least 20,000 Palestinians have been reported murdered in the region as of December 20, 2023.

(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2023). The Gaza Health Ministry, which is run by Hamas, says that since the start of the current fighting, with the exception of a brief seven-day ceasefire, about 300 people have died every day. Almost 70% of those deaths have been women and children, which shows how badly the conflict has affected civilians. This situation demands necessary steps to protect vulnerable groups according to international humanitarian law (Gaza Health Ministry, 2023). Children in Gaza are suffering greatly because of the war. According to figures given by the health ministry in 2022, about half of the population of the region is under the age of 18. According to the health ministry, more than 52,000 people have been hurt during the fighting so far. Although the exact number of children injured is unknown, as of November 3rd, there were reportedly 24,173 injured people, including 8,067 children, 5,960 women, and 10,146 males (Thomas, 2023).

Israeli offensive actions included, among other things, a rise in the use of military tactics and weaponry in law enforcement situations, the use of excessive or needless force, which is illegal, to put down Palestinian protests, and the imposition of extensive movement restrictions based on discriminatory grounds. The situation was made worse by widespread arbitrary detentions, ensuing illegal detentions, and reports of Palestinians being tortured and subjected to other cruel treatment by Israeli forces. These actions fueled fears of collective punishment. Attacks by settlers escalated rapidly, resulting in additional Palestinian community displacement, notably the exodus of Palestinians from Area C in the West Bank (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2022). According to Israeli Forces, their efforts in the West Bank are preventive rather than a reaction to a real decline in the region's security. In addition, the severity of the transgressions and the Israeli officials' threats of reprisal are raising emotions and fostering an environment that could blow up an already unstable situation. The situation was already dire, but unless Israel takes immediate action to comply with international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and protect the rights of protected persons, Palestinians will continue to live in constant fear of the discriminatory use of State force and settler violence against them (Flash report on the human rights situation in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, 7 October - 20 November 2023, 2023).

The US vetoed the resolution proposed by the UAE on December 8, 2023, which called for an immediate humanitarian truce between Israel and Hamas. The UK chose to abstain. The other thirteen members of the Security Council supported it. Making sure

the US doesn't veto the resolution once more has been the main goal of the subsequent negotiations. In this instance, taking into account the UK's abstention, all 13 UNSC members voted in favor of the humanitarian ceasefire; but, the US's veto authority as a P5 member of the UNSC prevented it from coming to pass (Will the US again veto the UNSC resolution on Gaza?2023). Worth mentioning is that the proposal is for the humanitarian ceasefire and veto has been casted against the humanitarian purpose. Till now all efforts by international community and UNSC other members to settle the ongoing dispute and prevent devastating humanitarian crisis failed due to the repeated cast of veto by US reviewing the interest of its close ally Israel. This trend has made Israel-Palestine crisis has been an unsolved issue since 1948 (Hurd, 2014).

4.16.1.4.1 Nepal's Position on Israel-Palestine Conflict

Diplomatic relations between Israel and Nepal have developed gradually over time. Israel established its embassy in Kathmandu in March 1961, while Nepal reciprocated by opening its embassy in Israel three decades later, in 1993, reflecting the steady growth of bilateral engagement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal, 2023). Nepal and Israel established diplomatic ties in 1960. Nepal was unique in South Asia until recently because of its acceptance of Israel's existence and ongoing diplomatic relations with the country. At a period when the world had not yet recognized Israel as an independent state, BP Koirala, the first democratically elected prime minister, did. In 1960, Koirala made an official visit to Israel, and three years later, King Mahendra Shah, did the same (Khanal, 2015). Israeli and Palestinian populations continue to suffer from protracted hostilities and violence. Nepal reiterates its long-standing support for a two-state solution that would allow Israel and Palestine to live together safely and peacefully inside recognized international borders. On October 7, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal firmly denounced the attack that Hamas planned in Israel. Nepal participates in UN talks about Israel and Palestine on a regular basis and is often presented with several proposals on the subject. Nepal supports Palestine on humanitarian reasons in some areas, but it does not officially recognize Hamas, which has ruled the Gaza Strip since 2007 (Bhattarai, 2023).

Nepal's stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict resulted from a challenging choice. There have occasionally been strong domestic detractors of it. The battle involves a complex web of international law, politics, history, humanity, intense passion, and the high power game. Nepal does not assert that their assessment is the only accurate one

(Khanal, 1996). It was a simple, straight line maneuver between endorsing the rights of Palestine and acknowledging Israel as a legitimate state and member of the UN. It is encouraging that, within this framework, a solution is grudgingly emerging through direct talks between the Israelis and Palestinians and good offices from the US and other countries. The unfortunate process and the election of an ultra-conservative administration in Israel recently served as a harsh reminder that progress has not yet reached an irreversible degree. Between his party's election manifestos and a number of international accords, Binyamin Netanyahu is juggling the need to transition from faith-based contributions to more rational ones under the strain of the US-led international community. For a solution to be long-lasting, justice must be served as well as perceived to be served (Khanal, 1996).

Aligned with the principles of the UN Charter, Nepal has consistently championed the peaceful resolution of international disputes, while emphasizing the protection of the sovereignty of smaller states and upholding the equal rights of all peoples (Permanent Mission of Nepal to the UN, n.d.). The chairman of Nepal's delegation, then-prime minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, underlined during the 19th NAM summit in Uganda that his nation, which values peace, is against all forms of international conflict and geopolitical rivalry. The state of affairs in Gaza and the Ukraine is really distressing. Nepal believes that stability and peace in the Middle East will result from a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, which would allow them to live together in safety and peace within internationally recognized borders in accordance with relevant United Nations decisions (Dahal, 2024).

4.16.1.5 NATO Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq: Legitimacy

4.16.1.5.1 Intervention in Afghanistan

In 2001, the United States, with the backing of NATO and a coalition of over 40 countries, launched a military intervention in Afghanistan as part of its broader War on Terror. Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014) and later Operation Freedom's Sentinel (2015–present) have been going on for almost twenty years. More than 100,000 civilians and more than 60,000 security personnel have died as a result. When the Taliban took over in August 2021, U.S. troops left Afghanistan for good. However, Operation Freedom's Sentinel is still going on, but only in a limited over-the-horizon way. It focuses on counterterrorism and intelligence operations that take place outside of Afghanistan (Connah, 2021). Critics say that the United States and its Western allies have

gone too far in using Just War stories to justify intervention and the use of force. This shows how military strategies, stories, and justifications may have made Afghan state institutions weaker. Post-war recovery has been crucial for Afghanistan (Connah, 2021).

Article 51 of the UN Charter, which addresses the topic of self-defense, is one of the substantive laws cited to support the need for the invasion. We have called up reserves to boost our military capability and the defense of our homeland, the US President George W. Bush declared in a speech given after the initial attack on Afghanistan. The US considered that its actions were justifiable on the basis of self-defense, as can be seen from this comment and others by George W. Bush. This excuse was employed due to the claim that if Afghanistan was not contained, additional terrorist attacks would take place in the US and other countries across the world (Khan, 2013).

At the time of the 9/11 attacks and the invasion that followed, the Taliban was the only form of government in Afghanistan, but Al Qaeda was not. As a result, the war in Afghanistan, which aims to eliminate a non-state entity, can be considered to be outside the bounds of necessity and proportionality. This is due to the fact that Al Qaeda did not have the same level of sway and power as the Taliban in Afghanistan, making it possible for an invasion to be viewed legally as being excessive and so illegal (Khan, 2013).

The idea of state sovereignty is another important factor to take into account here. The US's refusal to extradite individuals it believed to be terrorists connected to the 9/11 attacks and living in Afghanistan at the time led to the invasion of that country. However, it appears that negotiations might have been continued through communication and diplomacy rather than jumping to the conclusion that an invasion was the only way for the US to accomplish its goals. This is due to the fact that, in accordance with international law, peaceful alternatives to military conflict resolution should be explored before using force (Khan, 2013).

Article 2(4) of the UN charter affirms this and states that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. However, because the US government believed that it was acting to stop further loss of civilian life caused by the perceived future threat of Al Qaeda; such action was not taken (Khan, 2013). Because of

the dubious methods employed during military involvement, the War on Terror has obviously had a negative impact on the moral standing of the West. For their efforts to permanently incapacitate Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders and their Taliban enablers, the USA in particular has paid a heavy price (Jacobson, 2010). Unsurprisingly, the West's appetite for military intervention has decreased as a result of the protracted military operations in Afghanistan and their failure to meet the desired goals. The US public is more opposed to the use of military action in the future after learning about some of the atrocities committed during the military operation in Afghanistan (Connah, 2021).

4.16.1.5.2 Iraq Invasion by NATO

The worldwide war on terror has effectively replaced the post-war concept of collective security and has emerged as its unifying principle in 2003. The United States has often chosen to act on its own to protect its national interests and security, without needing permission from the United Nations Security Council (Chesterman, 2004). In 2003, the U.S. went to war in Iraq without the approval of the Security Council. They said that terror was a global threat that needed to be dealt with on its own. This method showed how important it was to take self-directed steps when it was impossible to get help from more than one country (Chesterman, 2004). The 2003 invasion of Iraq brought the idea of preventive war to the world's attention. This idea is not compatible with collective security or current international law in general (Chesterman, 2004).

The UN Charter, which was written to protect future generations from the scourge of war, says that member states must not use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in ways that go against international law (United Nations, 1945). The Kellogg-Briand Pact had also said that war was not a way for countries to get what they wanted (Henkin, 1979). The Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy, on the other hand, introduced the idea of preventive war, which said that military action was okay even if there wasn't clear proof of an attack happening soon. Apart from foundational legal instruments like the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Nuremberg Charter, the UN Charter, and the framework of the International Criminal Court, this approach marks a clear shift away from the long-standing norm against the use of force. It suggests that coercive measures are once again finding space in international politics, despite the legal principles designed to restrict them (Pape, 2005).

The US, along with the UK, Australia, and other coalition partners, sent troops to Iraq after the 9/11 attacks and the release of its new security doctrine. This was done without clear permission from the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Numerous international legal scholars have deemed this intervention unlawful, constituting an act of aggressive war (Chesterman, 2004). The UNSC couldn't or didn't want to stop what the coalition was doing, and it didn't condemn the operation (Malone, 2004). Furthermore, by later acknowledging the legal duties and jurisdiction of the occupying forces under unified command, the Council effectively conferred retrospective legitimacy to actions executed without its prior approval (Chesterman, 2004).

The passing of Resolution 1546 on June 8, 2004, which officially ended the occupation on June 30, 2004, added to this legitimizing framework (Malone, 2004). This series of events shows how the Council protects powerful countries' unilateral actions on the world stage. President George W. Bush's speech in November 2003 shows how the U.S. wants to act on its own and how the United Nations wants to be in charge (Chesterman, 2004). It also shows how power politics still have a lot of sway in the Security Council, which is a sign of the world order after the Cold War (Malone, 2004). The big difference between the Security Council's strong role during the Gulf War and its limited response in 2003 shows how the UN's guiding principles and the political priorities of its most powerful member states are still at odds with each other. (Chesterman, 2004; Malone, 2004).

4.16.1.6 Annexation of Crimea by Russia 2014

The war in Ukraine's Donbas region has killed almost 14,000 people, and the overall security situation in Europe since the end of the Cold War has also gotten worse, especially since Russia took Crimea, which was the biggest land grab in Europe since World War II. The end of the Maidan Revolution in late February 2014 was marked by the political turmoil that followed President Viktor Yanukovich's departure from Kyiv and his subsequent arrival in Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014). In response, the Ukrainian parliament (the Rada) appointed an acting president and prime minister to assume interim leadership, navigating the country through a period of acute political and security instability (Allison, 2014). They made it clear that they wanted to bring Ukraine closer to Europe by saying they would sign an association agreement with the EU. There

wasn't much proof that ethnic Russians in Crimea were in danger, but Moscow was worried about what might happen to them. The Russian government called the referendum and annexation an act of self-determination, even though it looks like less than half of the people in Crimea actually voted to join Russia. The Kremlin only uses the idea of self-determination when it suits them. For example, when the Soviet Union fell apart, Moscow fought two bloody wars to stop Chechen independence from Russia (Pifer, 2022). On the Crimean Peninsula, armed men quickly took control of important buildings and checkpoints. They wore Russian battle fatigues without any identifying markings, but it was clear they were professional soldiers. The nickname for them in Ukraine was little green men. President Vladimir Putin initially categorically denied that these were Russian soldiers, but eventually acknowledged their identity and praised their commanders (Pifer, 2022).

The process was rapid. Russian forces had the whole peninsula under control by the beginning of March. The Crimean Supreme Council decided to request membership in Russia on March 6. The council set a referendum for March 16 and gave voters a choice between returning to Crimea's 1992 constitution, which provided the peninsula a great deal of autonomy, or joining Russia. There was no checkbox for those who wanted Crimea to remain a part of Ukraine under the current constitution (Pifer, 2022).

The Crimean parliament made an effort to establish its independence almost immediately after it was granted, even going so far as to formally declare it on May 5, 1992, only to later backtrack the next day. The Crimean Constitution, which had just been established, was modified on May 6 to recognize Crimea as a part of Ukraine, but one with significant autonomy. The Ukrainian parliament officially acknowledged Crimea's status as a Autonomous Republic in June 1992, but the dispute over the extent of the Crimean government's authority persisted until December 23, 1998, when the Verkhovna Rada approved a new, less ambitious constitution that had been approved in Crimea two months earlier. (The Ukrainian parliament must ratify the Crimean Constitution, according to Article 135 of the Ukrainian Constitution.) Over the past sixty years, certain Russians have periodically asserted that the 1954 transfer was not legal. Nevertheless, a treaty recognizing Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula was signed by Russia and Ukraine in 1997 (Hylton, 2014).

The Crimean Constitution empowers the regional parliament to hold referenda, but only on issues within its legal authority. The decision to conduct a referendum on

joining Russia, as planned for 16 March 2014, exceeded this authority and was therefore widely regarded as unconstitutional. Russia's entry into Crimea may be seen as an element of a larger strategy aimed at gaining more leverage within the emerging political landscape in Kyiv following the events of 2014. Instead of focusing solely on securing Crimea as a strategic asset, the Russian state acted with the intention of positioning itself in such a way that it would affect processes taking place within Ukraine. The acquisition of Crimea and the use of instability in eastern and southern regions provided Russia with sufficient bargaining power to apply continuous pressure on Ukraine government. On the other hand, there have been several occasions when Russian policymakers have preferred Ukraine's decentralization either via federalization or confederation model (Charp & Colton, 2014). Under these circumstances, Ukrainian regions with predominantly Russian speakers would enjoy considerable autonomy when dealing with politics and economy. It could be argued that from the point of view of Moscow, this scenario would still provide sufficient influence while not requiring control over certain regions (Allison, 2014). Russia most likely believes that it can achieve effective and long-term control over Ukraine's major strategic decisions, including future steps toward European integration, because of its essentially unchallenged influence in Crimea and maybe in other regions (Konończuk, 2014).

The Crimean referendum was held in total chaos, and there were no credible international observers overseeing the process. The participation of 83 percent of the voters was claimed by the local authorities, while 96.7 percent of the votes supported joining Russia. However, these numbers seem unlikely considering that ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars accounted for approximately 40 percent of the population in the peninsula. The leaked report two months later prepared by the Human Rights Council at the request of the Russian president estimated the voter participation at 30 percent of the population, with about 50 percent voting to join Russia (Charap & Colton, 2014). The referendum was performed amidst chaos, and no reliable international observers oversaw it. 83 percent of the citizens participated in the voting, while 96.7 percent of them supported joining Russia. However, it is unlikely that such results could be achieved in light of the fact that Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars comprised 40 percent of the peninsula's population. After a few months, the leaked report prepared by the Human Rights Council on the behalf of the Russian president

stated that only 30 percent of the population participated in the referendum with only 50 percent supporting joining Russia (Pifer, 2022).

Also, Crimea was the only part of Ukraine where ethnic Russians made up the majority. In 2014, they made up more than 60% of the population there. It is also true, though; that the independent republics that formed after the Soviet Union fell apart in December 1991 recognized each other within their own borders. Russia's seizure of Crimea from Ukraine violated, among other agreements, the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances for Ukraine and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia (Pifer, 2022).

Consequences and political context of war might be different. Because of the repeated veto cast by Russian Federation UNSC could not take concrete actions under framework of R2P and Collective Security. At the time of invasion, Crimea was Ukraine territory as a result of the geographical distribution after disintegration of USSR recognized by global forum. There might be various options for intervention by UNSC including military intervention which is another part of the conflict but the procedural aspect of veto power prevailing within existing UN charter stopped all actions (Luck, 2010). In 2014, Nepal made the decision not to vote on the UN Resolution over the annexation of Crimea. In this crisis, Nepal adopted the neutral policy (Lamichhane, 2022).

4.16.1.7 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was a major international crisis that had serious effects on people's lives and the economy. The conflict showed that the UN Security Council can't keep the peace and security around the world when a permanent member acts on its own. Many people think that this is a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, which says that countries can't use force against another country's territorial integrity or political independence (Charap & Colton, 2022). Despite the escalating crisis in Ukraine, the UNSC maintained its operations, including renewing mandates for peacekeeping missions and implementing its first sanctions regime in five years.

Despite adopting 54 resolutions in 2022, which is only slightly below last year's tally, the ongoing crisis had caused tensions between states, especially the five

permanent members (P5), with the latter decreasing their informal consultations, which sometimes put politics ahead of diplomacy (United Nations Security Council , 2022). Furthermore, divisions could be seen even amongst the elected members, where India, sitting on the Council in 2021-2022, was criticized for failing to condemn Russia's action, and some others voiced less opposition compared to the U.S. and Europe. The aforementioned developments affected discussions of both thematic and country-specific issues during negotiations over Council deliverables. The decrease in presidential statements dropped sharply from 24 in 2021 to 7 in 2022, marking the fewest such statements in the 29 years since the introduction of the practice (Saad, 2023).

As stated by Rashmin Sagoo, Director of the Chatham House International Law Programme, the Russian attack on Ukraine is considered a violation of the UN Charter and general principles of international law, comparing it with the US invasion of Iraq and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Sagoo, 2022). Nonetheless, a prompt response of the international rule of law to that situation included the global sanctioning of Russia on a level unprecedented in history, which resulted in massive withdrawal of companies from the country. In February 2022, UNSC adopted a resolution against Russia's actions, but it failed because of the Russian veto; any attempt to refer Russia to the ICC would most probably face the same problem. There were discussions on setting up an ad hoc court to prosecute the crime of aggression, thus demonstrating considerable political willingness despite the arguments on the matter. International humanitarian law also applied, as reports emerged about possible war crimes committed during the war. The ICC received the largest state party referral regarding those crimes, and ICJ ordered Russia to stop its military actions (ICJ, 2022).

Reaching consensus on Security Council decisions concerning Ukraine proved particularly challenging, given the direct involvement of a permanent member in the conflict and the wide divergence of member-state positions. In 2022, four of the seven draft resolutions that failed to pass were related to Ukraine. Two of these, proposed by Albania and the United States, sought to condemn Russia's military aggression and the referendums held in its occupied territories in late September, but both were blocked by Russia. Conversely, Russia submitted two draft resolutions-one addressing the humanitarian situation and another alleging military-biological activities in Ukraine-but these too were rejected by other Council members (United Nations Security Council, 2022). Neither of them passed because they didn't have enough support from Council

members. Since the start of the war, the Council has issued only one outcome on Ukraine: a presidential statement adopted expressing the Council's support for the Secretary-General's efforts in the search for a peaceful solution (Saad, 2023).

Since the end of the Cold War and the start of talks between the US and Russia to cut back on nuclear weapons, the threat of nuclear weapons seemed to have gone down. But over the past year, Russia has made a lot of nuclear threats. Some are subtle, some are meant to make things worse, and some are aimed directly at NATO countries like the UK. Warnings from Western leaders, like US President Joe Biden, who said that the chances of nuclear war are at their highest point in 60 years, have put nuclear issues back on the international agenda (Lewis, 2023). While such threats are not unprecedented, questions remain regarding their credibility and appropriate responses. Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director of the International Security Program, emphasizes that these warnings must be taken seriously, while also recognizing them as partly performative tactics aimed at rallying domestic support in Russia and intimidating Western states (Lewis, 2023).

4.16.1.7.1 Nepal's Stand in Russian Invasion of Ukraine

During voting in the UNGA, Nepal vehemently condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine, is what Nepal asked of Russia. Not all Nepalese, nevertheless, agree with the government's position on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. On this issue, political leaders-particularly those on the left-tend to be more critical of the government (Jha, 2022). It is questioned if Nepal, a supporter of a non-aligned strategy, has changed its mind and decided to fall into the geopolitical traps set by the United States of America. In his first interview with the media, Nepal's then-foreign minister Narayan Khadka defended his country's position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, saying that while it opposes the invasion of Ukraine, Nepal has not chosen a side between Russia and Ukraine. Additionally, he stated that Nepal has always supported the UN Charter, human rights, and the peaceful coexistence of tiny nations; as a result, the country's vote against Russia in the UNGA should not be interpreted as a departure from its long-standing non aligned stance (Jha, 2022)

4.16.1.8 Human Losses in Contemporary Conflict: Non Intervention of UNSC

The following table depicts the devastating human losses in the contemporary world crisis where UNSC was not able to impose effective military intervention within domain of peace enforcement, collective security and R2P. This figure poses a critical question mark about functioning of UN as per the spirit of the Charter.

Table 4.6

Human Loss in Contemporary Crisis of the World

Country/Area	Casualties	UN Mission Involvement	Remarks
Renewed Israel-Palestine conflict since October 7 2023	34735	No	More than 13,117 children and 8,400 women, 91,195 injured and 8000 missing; Data as of 06 April 2024
Russo-Ukraine War	10,582	No	Civilian casualties in Ukraine only, Casualties in military side not included, data as of February 15, 2024
Syrian Crisis	507,000	No	Figures including 343,000 combatants also -More than 164,000 civilians killed including 25000 children and 15000 women, 7.2 million IDPs: data as of 14 March 2024

Source: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/10/9/israel-hamas-war-in-maps-and-charts-live-tracker>, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/>, <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2476786/middle-east,2024>

4.16.1.9 Gaps in present structure and tools of UNSC

The strategic landscape has changed and this makes it difficult to assess how to develop the UN's various decision-making mechanisms, but that there is a very clear need to change these is quite obvious (Personal Communication, 25 Jun, 2024). When it comes to tackling the issue of war and approving the use of force, the Council has come under heavy fire for both being legitimate and effective. Both when it took action and when it didn't, it received criticism (Zaum et. Al., 2008).

How well the UN Security Council (UNSC) handles international crises have been extensively discussed considering that this institution fails again and again to take decisive measures when dealing with conflicts. One of the main reasons for such problems is linked with the indifference shown by the major powers involved as well as the rejection from the parties involved but, especially, with the fact that the threat or actual use of veto comes into play. This is clearly demonstrated by cases like the conflict between Iran and Iraq or the 1994 Rwanda genocide (Zaum et al., 2008). The responsiveness of the Council is further hampered by its dependence on member countries for intelligence, thus making the body incapable of performing its own analysis and subjecting itself to political or inaccurate information. On many occasions, the UNSC succeeds in setting goals but struggles in determining strategies that will be used to achieve them. While resolutions may be passed, there continues to be disagreement on how they should be enforced, especially when it comes to the employment of force, which may lead to the body being paralyzed or resorting to an excessive interpretation of its mandate, like in the case of the 2003 Iraq invasion (Zaum et al., 2008).

The performance of the Council is further influenced by the contradictory nature of the involvement of the United States, which on one hand appreciates the importance of the UNSC for legitimacy but on the other hand sees it as a hindrance to its strategic maneuvering. This dichotomy, which can be observed since the time of the Korean War up until today, contributed to the belief that the UNSC functions as a power-political body instead of functioning as a neutral governing agency (Zaum et al., 2008). The Council has also been hampered by the disregard of member nations for implementing their own resolutions because of sanctions and embargo violations. The uncertainty associated with missions such as the controversial dual-key arrangement in Bosnia undermined the mission's effectiveness (Zaum et al., 2008). In addition, controversies such as the oil-for-food scandal in Iraq and the behavior of peacekeeping forces have compromised the legitimacy of the institution and raised questions about implementation standards (Zaum et al., 2008). Generally, the Council is often utilized as an archive of failures when states lack the political will or as a source of culpability when solutions are not found elsewhere. From the Council's involvement in conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Rwanda, and Darfur, it is clear that it has been ineffective in fulfilling its mandate (Zaum et al., 2008).

It is absurd to think that such criticism only originates in the US. There are several countries and intellectual traditions that have harsh criticisms about the UN's security performance. Even if all of these criticisms are accurate, the Council is not necessarily a failure. It's crucial to understand how people are rating the Council when they say it's failed and what their assessment entails. If a high standard is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Council, such as the establishment of the rule of law as an alternative to the use of force, the replacement of national defense initiatives, or the provision of the ambitious collective security plan that the UN Charter is generally understood to represent, then it is evidently ineffective. On the other hand, if success is determined by whether it has contributed in any way to the stabilization and advancement of international relations in at least some of the crises it has faced, then it has at least achieved partial success (UPSCTREE, 2016).

Despite constantly demonstrating a strong commitment to address global concerns, the UN's system currently has some severe weaknesses. First of all, new, pressing global issues are endangering the system's effectiveness and stability. One example is the growth of security threats like global terrorism and the illicit arms trade. The limitations of the UNSC's power and the UN security system as a whole in preserving international peace and stability have been exposed by these occurrences. It is challenging for the UN to come up with an effective plan of action to deal with threats from non-state actors (who are not affiliated with any political entity or geographical territory. Many analysts identify the absence of a standing global military force as the primary weakness of the UN security system. The UN Charter's framers originally envisioned a military structure directly accountable to the Security Council (Arts. 43 and 45), designed to conduct collective military operations aimed at restoring international peace and security (Malone, 2004). The idea, meanwhile, was dropped because its Member States were averse to creating a combined force. The UN military system would have required sufficient finance from its Member States in addition to having a greater potential for devastation than national forces. The UN's lack of democratic supervision and accountability is a second issue that affects the framework of the organization. With P5 holding more influence and privileges than the non-permanent members (such as the veto power), the Security Council's membership still reflects the power dynamics of 1945. The makeup of the Security Council seems out of date given

how drastically power has evolved over the past few decades and how widely equality between sovereign states is valued in the international community (UPSCTREE, 2016).

The lack of a means to give the rulings of the ICJ more weight is the third major weakness in the UN system. It was decided at the time of the ICJ's founding that states would have to consent to the Court's jurisdiction before it could hear their cases. This was the result of two situations. First of all, there was no international organization that could force nations to respect and abide by ICJ rulings. Second, they opposed any attempt to restrict their sovereignty because they were jealous of their power and independence (UPSCTREE, 2016). By doing this, no mechanism to guarantee obedience to the Court's judgments was formed, and as a result, its decisions are still implemented at the discretion of the Member States. Due to the exposure of these shortcomings, the international community has called for a structural and significant revamp of the UN system. Undoubtedly, UN has undergone several important changes since its foundation. There is still more effort to be done to improve its efficacy and make sure that it is successful in responding to current security issues, global difficulties, and foreign threats. The founders first intended to build a military structure directly under the direction of the Security Council in order to successfully carry out the collective military efforts to restore peace (UPSCTREE, 2016).

Additional 10 members in the UNSC do not have the veto power. This has given dignity and some sort of respect to other member states. These states can bring ideas and suggestions but such member states cannot impress the P5 states as they dwell on interest of their country and their allies only. When interests supersede logic, the voice of E10 will never be heard (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024). Power between UNGA, E10 and P5 is ideally not balanced but we need to accept the reality of the world where big and powerful countries will have more say in any issues or decision making. This is how the affair of the world is being run from time immortal. Let's hope to reach a time where every country, small or big, will have equal say in all the issues (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

The analysis of the primary and secondary data discussed above states that present UN structure and provisions which were set up in post WW II scenario has several drawbacks in achieving its primary aim of maintaining internal peace and security, protection of human rights and sovereignty of the state. Current structural and procedural set up as of provisions stated in UN Charter (1945) are not complying with

power dynamics, geopolitical reality and ways to deal with emerging security threats which has created major drawbacks in implementation of its provisions mentioned in Charter and field. Major drawback is veto power authority vested in P5 members of UNSC where vested interest of one of the P5 member could paralyze the global aspirations to maintain peace, security and stability. It has adversely effected the effective implementation of UNSC's tools to protect sovereignty of state through collective defense, prevent ethnic cleansing, genocide and crime against humanity through R2P, POC by authorization of effective peacekeeping/ peace enforcement measures. It has subsequently impacted the effectiveness of UNSC's tools for the establishment of the global peace and security. The status quo in structural and procedural set up of UNSC and in formation of enlarged UNSC through addition of rising, regional powers and stakeholder countries has also posed adverse implications in implementation of its tools for the maintenance of global peace and security. UN was successful in implantation of collective defense and other peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations where P5 will were complying like in Korean War(1949-53, USSR abstain), liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi invasion(1991) and other successful peacekeeping/ peace enforcement missions. UNGA which is umbrella organization of all sovereign nations of the world has no executive role for the maintenance of international peace and security. In addition non permanent members are also less effective due to Veto authority of P5 members. These provisions are against the global practice of democratic norms and values of decision making. There are many irrelevant and outdated provisions in UN Charter like mentioning enemy States (United Nations,1945) which have created confusion and ambiguity in implementation of UNSC's tools for the maintenance of global peace and security.

The drawbacks in implementation of UNSC's tools for the maintenance of global peace and security needs to be addressed to achieve the UN's aim and objective to create global peace, security and stability and prevention of wars as stated in preamble of the Charter to prevent the subsequent generation from scourge of war. There is need to reform UNSC structural and procedural set up through enlarged UNSC to take global ownership in international peace and security and revitalize its tools Collective Defense/Collective Security, POC and R2P through effective peacekeeping/peace enforcement. The rewritten Charter of UN must have clarity in implementation of UNSC's tools for the maintenance of global peace and security.

There are gaps in functioning mechanisms, procedural aspects, structure, and effectiveness of UNSC's tools veto power, collective defense/collective security, POC and R2P by peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions while dealing with global peace and security affairs. When we discuss about the structural set up of UNSC it is not balanced reviewing the current power dynamics of the world, regional representation, representation of countries in accordance with contribution to UN militarily, financially and in alignment with the spirit of sovereign equality of the all member states.

CHAPTER V

MODELS FOR REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS TOOLS: AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

In previous chapters, mainly the gaps in existing UNSC's structure and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security in various dimensions have been identified. This chapter has proposed the best possible models and approaches to be taken to reform UNSC and its tools after identifying those gaps and lapses. Modification of the structural set up of UNSC for the global ownership peace and security affairs, alternative for veto power, role of UNGA in global peace and security affairs, effective approach for the peacekeeping/peace enforcement, R2P, POC and collective security have been proposed. This Chapter reviews the various reform models presented at the interval of times by different group of countries, panels and individual.

5.1 Structural Aspects of Reformation of UNSC

Due to rising concerns about the UNSC's efficacy and representativeness, restructuring the body has been on the UN's agenda for decades. In response to these worries, the UNGA formed an Open-ended Working Group in 1993, which is open to participation from all Member States, to examine suggestions for increasing the Council's membership and to take into account more general concerns about its composition and operation (United Nations General Assembly, 1993). The Working Group has published several publications on the subject and offered specific recommendations about the Council's working procedures. The Working Group's suggestions were adopted, which increased the openness and transparency of the Council's processes. The Working Group has also served as the primary platform for discussion of various reform models that have been put forth. Although widely acknowledged for its contribution to enhancing the Security Council's working procedures, the Working Group operates by consensus (Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change, 2002). Despite numerous attempts, consensus on a widely recognized procedure for the Council's enlargement has not yet been reached. The Working Group's lengthy deliberations over the past ten years have trapped it in a circle of complex procedures and elusive solutions for which it has received harsh criticism both inside and outside of the United Nations (Weiss, 2003).

The new claimant countries' membership validity should also be discussed here. Other procedural reforms within the charter related to UNSC should also be addressed, where it is suggested that the role of UNSC be further strengthened in terms of widening the scope of security. In addressing UNSC reform, two important aspects need to be considered: structural and procedural. The former refers to the expansion of UNSC both as far as permanent and non-permanent membership is concerned. The latter aspect focuses more on the procedures used in the functioning of UNSC, such as the veto power and how much effect does it exert on the decision-making process (United Nations, 2004). Ever since the 1990s, inter-state wars have reduced, while intra-state wars have increased significantly. Human rights violations are now increasing; as people are getting killed by their fellow citizens through their military forces (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020). The cold war that had ended with the disintegration of former USSR in the 1990s has been revived with the rise of China. The theatre has changed and perhaps the actors are changed. Similarly, with two wars that were fought recently i.e. war on Ukraine and Gaza, the impact has been felt globally both in terms of economy and humanity. The world will have to see how the multi-polar centers react to these wars and the China-US rivalry. Can UN play a role in this? It is felt that it can make a big noise in the UNGA but the UNSC, the only organ that is created for global security can do very little as it is seriously handicapped by veto power (Personal Communication, June 18, 2024).

5.1.1 Broad Categorization

5.1.1.1 Zero Model or Status Quo Model

Because they don't allow any changes to the number of permanent members, the current solutions are called zero models. Some people say that giving developed countries new permanent seats will only make the Council have more economically developed countries. This is why the United Nations doesn't just include rich countries; that wouldn't be fair or democratic. Mexico, Turkey, and Italy created Zero Models. Despite differences in detail, the three countries' ideas were similar in substance. Italy presented the model and actively promoted it (Weiss & Daws, 2022). The Turkish model was remarkably similar to the Italian and Mexican models, all three of which had certain distinguishing characteristics. Italy suggests that the UNSC membership increase be equal to that of 1965. Italy argues that a possible expansion might be restricted to only temporary seats. Ten additional seats should be added to the existing ten

nonpermanent ones. The UNSC should have thirty new non-permanent members, thus each of the ten seats should be shared by three nations (Weiss & Daws, 2022). The thirty states should be chosen in accordance with the model's potential geographic distribution for regional representation. Every 10 to 15 years, the states should be reevaluated, and new ones elected using impartial criteria. The Turkish plan gives rotating regional non-permanent seats, which follows the same reasoning as the Italian proposal. It was founded on global as opposed to local factors. Turkey has proposed expanding the UNSC by adding ten non-permanent seats, without specifying regional allocations. Instead, it recommends that these seats be distributed among forty eligible states, taking into account factors such as population size, geopolitical significance, military and economic capacity, contributions to international peace and security, and other organizational objectives, while ensuring equitable geographic representation (United Nations, 2023). Every 12 to 16 years, the forty-state rotation list should be decided. The Mexican approach originated similarly, rejecting more permanent seats for the Council. However, it is not completely the same as those proposed for Italy and Turkey. The main difference is that it proposes adding four new permanent seats alongside an additional seat to be rotated between Japan and Germany every two years (Luck, 2021).

5.1.1.2 Parallel Enlargement: Plus Model

The plus or parallel enlargement approach emphasizes an increase in permanent as well as non-permanent members on the UNSC simultaneously. This proposal intends to enhance representation in the Council through striking a balance between having new permanent members and an increase in rotating members (United Nations, 2005). These approaches attempt to enhance participation without introducing totally new kinds of memberships and rotating systems. Small and mid-size states, Non-Aligned Movement members, a few AU members, Germany, Japan, and Nordics are some of the entities that subscribe to such an approach. Several European nations, including Slovenia, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and Belgium, have been in favor of a similar plus approach but with an emphasis on establishing new permanent members distributed in different geographic locations (Bourantonis, 2005).

Since Germany and Japan have always been cited as suitable choices, the criteria used in choosing additional permanent members include global power and the assurance and capability to assist in maintaining world peace and security. In order to maintain the balance and representativeness, it is advisable to add three other permanent members

from Latin America, Asia, and Africa at the same time increase non-permanent membership. The Non-Aligned countries such as Cuba emphasize representativeness and urge caution not to limit permanent membership to developed countries. Likewise, Singapore and Indonesia argue for selection criteria based on objective measures and power shifts to be incorporated in permanent and non-permanent memberships. Some member countries suggest that, in instances of controversies, it is best to consider an initial expansion of non-permanent membership only. This approach highlights collaboration in order to avoid power consolidation among the UNSC members and achieve balanced representation (Bourantonis, 2005).

In the case of classification of reform proposals, the model suggested by Stoett (1995), i.e., regional, functional-incentive, and great power models, continues to hold relevance. For instance, some scholars argue that the Great Power Model is inconsistent with principles of sovereign equality and encourages militarism as it institutionalizes state hierarchy, where military and economic power becomes paramount. On the other hand, the Regional Model involves dividing the world into regions of significant influence that have the power to veto and are represented on the UNSC. However, this proposal is criticized by France and Great Britain, as it undermines their veto power while improving legitimacy and responsiveness, though it carries the risk of creating intraregional rivalry (Stoett, 1995). The Functional-Incentive Model argues that membership in the UNSC depends on such criteria as contribution and attributes like population and funding. In essence, this theory is accused of exacerbating inequality by using the notion of common seats, which enables states to pool resources in order to meet requirements (Kennedy, 2018).

A study of such models uncovers one important lesson: the challenge of balancing effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy in UNSC reforms. It is evident through Stoett's model that various reform paradigms such as regional representation, contribution based, or hierarchical structures are likely to face challenges of effectiveness versus equity as plus models stress proportional inclusion (Stoett, 2005). Consequently, consensus on UNSC reform will most probably be achieved by integrating various reform strategies into a new model in which representational equity and effectiveness work together to maintain Council legitimacy and efficacy (United Nations, 2004).

5.1.1.3 Kofi Annan's Model A and Model B

In a plan known as the larger freedom, which is a new modified version of Razali 1997 plan, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan urged the UN to come to an agreement on increasing the council to 24 members on March 21, 2005(Anan,2005).

Table 5.1

Model A

Regional Areas	No of States	Permanent seats (Continuing)	Proposed new Permanent seats	Proposed two-year seats (non-Renewable)	Total
Africa	53	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6
Europe	47	3	1	2	6
Americas	35	1	1	4	6
Total	192	5	6	13	24

Source: Walter Hoffmann and AycaAriyork, Special Paper No 4, Security Council Model, Center for reform education.p.7.

Table5.2

Model B

Regional Area	No of States	Permanent seats (continuing)	Proposed new permanent seats	Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)	Total
Africa	53	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6
Europe	47	3	2	1	6
Americas	35	1	2	3	6
Totals	192	5	8	11	24

Source:Adapted from Walter Hoffmann and AycaAriyork, Special Paper No 4, Security Council Model, Center for reform education.p.7.

Model A envisions an expanded Security Council through the addition of six new permanent members, though without extending veto privileges to them. These seats would be allocated on a regional basis, with two assigned to Africa, two to Asia and the Pacific, and one each to Europe and the Americas, alongside three extra non-permanent

seats. In contrast, Model B rejects the creation of new permanent members and instead introduces a category of eight semi-permanent seats with renewable four-year terms, evenly distributed across Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and the Americas, in addition to one further non-permanent seat. In both models, the total number of member states on the Council would rise to 24 (United Nations, 2005). Nevertheless, there is an important point regarding both models that cannot be overlooked. First, both models would no longer employ the system of regions that was traditionally adopted by the UNGA to elect non-permanent members after 1965. Second, Model A would encounter opposition because of the creation of additional seats, which would not come with the right to use the veto, hence causing the need for a veto in the future (United Nations, 2005).

5.1.1.4 Italian Model

Rather than adopting a continental framework, the model advanced by the Italian government relies on the existing regional groupings that have been used to elect non-permanent members since 1965 (United Nations, 2005).

Table 5.3

Italian Proposal

Regional area	No of States	Current National Seats		Expansion Regional Seats	Total
		Permanent	Non permanent	Permanently Assigned to Regional Groups	
Asia	54	1	2	3	6
Africa	53	0	3	3	6
GRULAC	33	0	2	2	4
WEOG	29	3	2	1	6
Eastern Europe	22	1	1	1	3
Total	191	5	10	10	25

Source: Walter Hoffmann and Ayca Ariyörük, Special Paper No 4, Security Council Model, Center for reform education.p.7.

The Italian proposal maintains the existing regional group structure-Asia, Africa, Western Europe and Others, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean-and allocates ten additional permanent seats (without veto power) to these regions rather than to specific countries (United Nations, 2005). The Italian Model stipulates that each

regional group will be responsible for the operational management of the seats and that each area will design the rules and procedures with the necessary checks and balances to avoid national occupants of the seats and guarantee regional representation (Dervis, 2005). The Italian model's application suffers from its fundamental flaw. Managing a Security Council seat regionally is beyond the capabilities of the current member nations (Dervis, 2005).

5.1.1.5 United for Consensus Proposal

A coalition of nations led by Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Kenya, Italy, Spain, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea called Uniting for Consensus quickly after the Italian proposal and put forth the Blue and Green Models for discussion in opposition to expanding the Security Council's permanent Category (Model A)(Hoffmann and Ariyork,2005).

The Green Model organizes the Council along the existing five regional groupings, broadly aligning with the Italian proposal in terms of overall size and balance. It proposes the addition of ten seats, but unlike the Italian model, these are allocated to individual states rather than to regions. All new positions are non-permanent, with two-year elective terms, thereby avoiding the creation of an intermediate category with renewable four-year mandates as suggested in Model B. At the same time, the model allows for the possibility that regions may establish specific criteria governing the re-election of designated seats (United Nations, 2005).

Table 5.4

Green Model (April 2005)

Regional Area	No of States	Permanent	Non- Permanent		Total	Elected Seats as % Regional Groups
			Current	Expansion		
Asia	54	1	2	3	6	9.4
Africa	53	0	3	3	6	11.3
GRULAC	33	0	2	2	4	12.1
WEOG	29	3	2	1	6	11.5
Eastern Europe	22	1	1	1	3	9.5
Total	191	5	10	10	25	10.8 (Overall)

Source: Walter Hoffmann and Ayca Ariyörük, Special Paper No 4, Security Council Model, Center for reform education.p.3

Like Model B, the Blue Model adds a third category of seats with longer terms (3 or 4 years) and increases the number of seats in the two-year term group by 2 or 3. It asserts that by increasing the two-year category, it will both answer the concerns of similar countries while also serving the interests of larger countries by providing seats with longer terms (Hoffmann & Ariyörük, 2005).

Table 5.5

Blue Model

Region	No of States	Current		Expansion (Non-Permanent)		Total	Elected Seats as % Regional Groups
		Permanent	Non permanent	Longer Term	2 years		
Asia	54	1	2	2	1	6	9.4
Africa	53	0	3	2	1	6	11.3
GRULAC	33	0	2	2	0	4	12.1
WEOG	29	3	2	1 (or 2)	0	6	11.5
Eastern Europe	22	1	1	1		2	9.5
Total	191	5	10	10		25	10.8 (Overall)

Source: Walter Hoffmann and Ayca Ariyörük, Special Paper No 4, Security Council Model, Center for reform education.p.3.

The Blue and Green Model's reliance on the previous geographic divisions is one of their drawbacks. Because three of the five veto powers are from Europe and smaller governments in both Western and Eastern Europe are given seats, the Security Council's five regional groups are sometimes criticized for having a more Euro-centric makeup (Hoffmann & Ariyörük, 2005). The global status of leading countries of the Uniting for consensus group is illustrated in the following table.

Table 5.7*Leading Countries for United for Consensus (UfC) Group*

Country	Region	Contribution on UN Budget	Military strength in terms of Firepower and Military technology	Contribution in UN peacekeeping
Argentina	GRULAC	0.432%	35	43
Canada	WEOG	2.92%	22	67
Italy	WEOG	3.75%	10	25
Malta	WEOG	0.016%	-	-
Mexico	GRULAC	1.842%	31	91
Pakistan	Asia and Pacific	0.085%	13	3
South Korea	Asia and Pacific	1.994%	11	37
Spain	WEOG	2.973%	27	38
Turkey	WEOG	1.328%	8	64

Source: online portal www.globalfirepower.com, 2023**5.1.1.6 G4 Proposals**

The G4 nations suggested in May 2005 that the Security Council be increased from 15 to 25 members by adding four non-permanent and six permanent seats. There would be two permanent seats from Africa, two from Asia, and one each from Western Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The extra non-permanent seats would be dispersed around Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe (United Nations, 2005).

5.1.1.7 Model X

In the same way as model B and the blue model do, model X establishes a new renewable category to include the member nations that give the most to the UN financially, militarily, or politically (Hoffmann and Ariyork, 2005).

Table 5.7*Model X*

Regions	Current Permanent	Two Years Term Non- Renewable	New Four Years Renewable Term	Total Council Members
Asia (43)	1	2	2	5
Africa (53)	0	3	2	5
Europe(47)	3	2	0	5
Americas and Pacific(48)	1	3	1	5

Source: Walter Hoffmann; A competing Model: A Security Council with 20 members, 2005

Model X introduces a system of renewable, regionally allocated seats that seeks to balance continuity with broader representation, without conferring permanent status on any single state. Allowing the regional groups to nominate candidates for re-election in the new system ensures that there will be continuity in institutions but also allows rotation in states that have shown notable contributions in the past (Hoffmann & Ariyork, 2005). Allocating five more seats on a renewable basis over a four-year period, with two seats each for Africa and Asia and one joint seat between the Americas and the Pacific, would ensure that the Council will be comprised of twenty members. The most important aspect about these seats is the freedom granted to regional groups to decide whether incumbents should be re-elected in these seats (Hoffmann & Ariyork, 2005). Model X does not include an additional renewable four year seat in the region of Europe, since it already has an over representation of permanent seats in the Council. However, the model is open to the idea that someday the EU may replace the UK and France and apply for a permanent seat (Luck, 2006).

5.1.1.8 MC.Eduardo Vargas Toro's Model.

Eduardo Vargas Toro's model has emphasized the fact that a UNSC expansion that prioritized functional representation in addition to geographical would be advantageous. He divided the eight groups of the 25-member UNSC in his hypothetical model, which does not include any permanent seats, as follows (Vargas Toro, 2005).

Table 5.8*Toro's Model*

Proposed Groups	Approximate Seats
European Group	2 to 3 seats
North American Group	1-2 Seats
Latin American Group	3-5 Seats
African Group	3-5 Seats
Asian and pacific Group	6-7 Seats
Arab States Group	1-2 Seats
Land Locked States Group	1 Seat

5.1.1.9 7-7-7 Formula Approach

Another reform proposal, known as the 7-7-7 formula, was put forward by former Singaporean Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani in 'The Great Convergence'. This approach is considered by some scholars as a practical option for restructuring the UNSC and outlines a specific model for reforming its composition (Mahbubani, 2013).

- (a) Seven veto-wielding permanent members (Brazil, China, India, Nigeria, Russia, USA and the EU)
- (b) Seven semi-permanent members, drawn from the world's middle-powers according to population and GDP but without veto authority and
- (c) Seven members, chosen at random from all other nations, who are not permanent, Members would be chosen for two-year terms from their respective constituencies to serve as semi-permanent and non-permanent members (Gautam, 2018).

5.1.2 Razali Plan

When Malaysia's Ismail Razali, the UNGA's president at the time, presented a reform proposal to the Open Ended Working Group in 1996–1997, it was the first significant attempt to make headway on permanent and non-permanent membership issues at the same time. Razali introduced a draft resolution on March 20, 1997, that was intended to break the three-year impasse on UNSC reform. He suggested a three-step

procedure (Thakur, 2011). During the first phase, which would take place between June and September, the UNGA would approve a resolution adding four new non-permanent and five new permanent members to the Council. Member states would choose particular applicants for the additional seats in the second phase, which is set for February. In addition; Razali suggested three new permanent seats for Asia, Africa, and Latin America, two industrialized countries—generally believed to be Germany and Japan—and non-permanent seats for Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean (Thakur, 2011).

The Razali Plan sought to place limits on the exercise of veto power by existing permanent members, while simultaneously denying any such privilege to new members, particularly in the context of Chapter VII provisions. Given that Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to impose sanctions and authorize the use of force in response to threats to international peace and security, this restriction reflects an attempt to curb unilateral obstruction in critical decision-making processes (Razali, 1997). One noteworthy change was that the first two phases could be adopted with the support of only two-thirds of the members present and voting, instead of $2/3^{\text{rd}}$ of the UNGA. Only the amendment resolution putting the framework into effect required two-thirds of all member states, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter (Luck, 2006).

The idea had a number of essential components. First, the Council would have 24 members, which would include four non-permanent seats and five more permanent seats. Second, while new permanent members would not have the ability to veto at first, incumbent permanent members would be encouraged to use their veto power sparingly (Weiss, 2015). Third, both new and existing permanent members would be subject to the same premium surcharges for peacekeeping evaluations. Fourth, the reforms would be evaluated at a review conference held ten years following approval. Lastly, in order to improve accountability and transparency, Razali suggested 18 procedural adjustments (Weiss, 2015).

The approach accommodated differing state interests and was the most complete compromise attempted to date. It was hailed as a concrete step towards ending the reform deadlock by Germany and Japan. However, it finally failed because the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) refused to provide collective support, even though they were in a position to gain from more representation. While each country had individually backed similar ideas, many NAM countries resisted official endorsement of Razali's

proposal, partly because they feared entrenching the hegemony of industrialized nations (Schrijver, 2006). Furthermore, the idea was also rejected by Pakistan and Italy, arguing that it would create new hierarchies. There was thus no vote on this proposal (Bailey, 1998).

In failing to achieve its objectives, however, the Razali Plan represents a sincere effort at bringing together diverse perspectives on reforming the Security Council and predicts future debates over legitimacy, representation, and power balances. It is clear that the conditions under which reform can succeed have only become more relevant with the occurrence of subsequent crises, including the divide that has characterized the Iraq War (Hurd, 2014). For promoting Council reform today, it stresses the importance of renewed dialogue, cooperation, and institutional adaptability (Bertrand, 2019). The Razali Plan demonstrates that, without the support of key actors, even carefully conceived reforms can falter. A review of UN documentation from the 1997 debate shows that while there is much rhetoric about expanding the body, there is significantly less collective consensus over specific frameworks (United Nations General Assembly, 1997).

5.1.3 High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change

More than ten years of extensive discussions have failed to bring any concrete results regarding the reform of the Security Council. The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his report on enhancing the role of the UN published in September 2002 that the process of Security Council Reform had come to an effective deadlock point (Annan, 2002). The UNGA's Open-Ended Working Group held lengthy talks, but no agreement was reached on increasing the number of Council members. In response to widespread concerns over the legitimacy and inclusivity of the Security Council, Annan emphasized that the size and composition of the Security Council appear to be insufficiently representative in the eyes of much of the world (Annan, 2002). This was in line with the September 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, which demanded that the Council undergo a thorough reorganization to accommodate modern world circumstances (United Nations, 2000).

Annan called a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in September 2003 because of the Security Council's ongoing disputes, particularly in the years before the Iraq War. In order to enable more effective collective responses to

changing global threats, it was tasked with creating a new global security consensus and suggesting institutional reforms, including particular changes to the UN's key organs. The 16-member Panel, which was chaired by former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, represented regional balance by include representatives from major powers, Asia, Africa, and Latin America (United Nations, 2004). However, the Panel's notable absence of important candidates for permanent Security Council membership—such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Germany—highlights the contentious nature of representation (Weiss, 2005).

The Panel's report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, which was published in December 2004, outlined a four-part agenda. While Europe has stabilized, new dangers including terrorism, civil wars, and regional instability have also emerged, according to the first section, *Towards a New Security Consensus*, which examined changes in the international system since the Cold War (United Nations, 2004). An effective system of collective security must be based on justice, efficiency, and legitimacy, the report emphasized, highlighting the interconnectedness of nations and the connection between poverty and violence (United Nations, 2004). Similar research has emphasized that organizations like the UNSC run the risk of losing their credibility when dealing with complicated international issues if they don't have fair representation and sound decision-making (Weiss, 2015).

The second part of the Panel listed current concerns, including as terrorism, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, transnational organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction, and it recognized that both state and non-state actors threaten international peace and security. In anticipation of what later research would refer to as the human security paradigm, this expanded the UN's conventional focus on interstate warfare to include intrastate and transnational threats (Paris, 2001). While admitting the uncertainties surrounding anticipatory or preventative self-defense against non-imminent threats, the third section, on *Collective Security and the Use of Force*, endorsed Article 51 of the UN Charter. This conflict has frequently been mentioned as a major barrier to changing the governance of global security (Luck, 2006).

A Peace Building Commission and improved collaboration with regional organizations were among the institutional reforms suggested in the fourth section, *A More Effective United Nations for the Twenty-First Century*. The Panel's proposals on membership enlargement exposed significant divides, even while it reiterated the

importance of the Security Council in striking a balance between principle and power (United Nations, 2004). The report outlined four guiding principles for reform: ensuring greater representation of the developing world; preserving the effectiveness of the Council; making it more democratic and accountable; and bolstering participation of the UN's most important financial, military, and diplomatic contributors. As per academia, such rules and regulations may be considered as an effort towards achieving harmony between institutionalism and realist perspectives of world governance (Hurd, 2007). Among the countries that emerged as frontrunners for becoming permanent members were Brazil, India, Japan, and Germany (United Nations, 2005). These countries, however, faced opposition from some powerful nations such as China, Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, and Argentina, which objected to their candidature (Center for UN Reform Education, 2023). Apart from conflicting interests, several other options were also raised, such as that of Italy, which demanded a single seat in the European Union (Weiss, 2005). However, the report provided no road map for bringing these conflicting ideas together, therefore its recommendations failed to end the impasse over veto power and enlargement (United Nations, 2004). Such a standstill demonstrates how ingrained power disparities impede institutional innovation inside the UN system, as noted by Falk and Strauss (2011).

Broader institutional flaws were also brought to light by the Panel, including the General Assembly's lack of focus, its poor assistance for post-conflict states, and the underutilized potential of regional organizations. It emphasized that the UN would continue to operate poorly unless Member States committed the required effort and funds. This study is consistent with other studies that link institutional efficacy to long-term political intent and major powers' distribution of resources (Chesterman, 2011). The need for P5 consensus for structural reform has prevented the Panel's recommendations from being fully implemented, despite the fact that it emphasized the indivisibility of security-tying state and human security to economic development and human rights (United Nations, 2004).

In order to combat transnational threats in the twenty-first century, collective security must combine conventional military cooperation with international tactics. The Panel acknowledged that no state can protect itself in isolation and that fair burden-sharing and reciprocal danger recognition are necessary to build a new security consensus. The chances of long-term cooperative security will be undermined in the

absence of such consensus, since mistrust and unilateralism will rule. The UN's reputation ultimately rests on its ability to develop as a forum for inclusive, group problem-solving, as modern scholars stress (Newman, 2016). Information gathered from the Report of the Panel and subsequent studies reveal the continuing problem of disconnecting the political will to undertake institutional changes from knowledge of the changing face of collective security. The implementation has been hindered by geopolitical rivalries which have been on-going, specifically that of permanent seats in the SC, despite the detailed analysis made by the Panel and proposed guidelines for Security Council Reform (Weiss, 2005).

5.1.3.1 Broader Spectrum of Kofi Anan's Report: In Larger freedom

In his report entitled *In Larger Freedom*, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan accorded equal weight and attention to all three pillars of development, security, and human rights that were underpinned by the rule of law (Annan, 2005). He took inspiration for the report's title from the wording of the UN Charter, highlighting the close connection between development, security, and human rights. According to Annan, the UN could only fulfill this common goal if it were redesigned as a powerful tool for collective action in which nations cooperated to promote greater freedom (Annan, 2005).

The study, which was divided into four major sections, started with *Freedom from Want*, which offered specific steps for carrying out the agreement that developed and developing countries had made at Monterrey three years prior. In order to enhance governance, enforce the rule of law, fight corruption, and accomplish the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, developing nations were asked to implement bold national initiatives. In the meantime, wealthy nations were urged to provide aid, improve debt relief, and restructure global commerce to level the playing field. Annan specifically pushed for immediate duty- and quota-free access for exports from least-developed countries (LDCs), the completion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations by 2006, and the achievement of the official development assistance objective of 0.7% GDP by 2015 (Annan, 2005). A major theme was sustainable development; Annan cautioned that if resource depletion and environmental degradation persisted unchecked, progress would be hampered. He called for a more inclusive post-2012 framework encompassing all important actors, even if he applauded the Kyoto Protocol's implementation. He emphasized that the Kyoto Protocol was only in effect until 2012 and did not apply to

major emitters (Annan, 2005). This demonstrated the increasing global agreement to combine development policy with climate action (Sachs, 2005).

In order to respond quickly to natural or man-made disasters, the report also suggested establishing a \$1 billion voluntary emergency fund, which would capitalize on the UN's comparative advantage-its ability to mobilize quickly. This plan foreshadowed the more institutionalized approach to humanitarian financing later taken by UN agencies and was motivated by the Organization's successful but ad hoc response to the Indian Ocean tsunami (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). States were urged to embrace a new security consensus by viewing any threat to one as a threat to all in the second section, *Freedom from Fear*. Annan urged them to complete and put into effect important international agreements, such as the comprehensive convention on terrorism, the nuclear terrorism convention, and a fissile material cutoff pact. This demonstrated a more general change in international security theory towards the prevention of catastrophic risks by collaborative action (Luck, 2006). R2P has emerged as a fundamental framework for coordinated international response to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The report emphasized that governments should respect democratic values, human rights, and rule of law. Acknowledging that the main task lies on states, Kofi Annan pointed out that, in cases where states fail in fulfilling their commitments, it is then up to the international community and the United Nations to act. It was a significant change in the international norm of state sovereignty, which incorporated the idea of state accountability into the principle of sovereignty (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002).

The final part of the document *Strengthening the United Nations* suggested some ideas about enhancing the effectiveness and coherence of the organization. Ahead of the September summit, Annan advised Member States to rejuvenate the UNGA, to enlarge the membership of UNSC in accordance with present-day geopolitical reality, and agree upon one of the proposals presented in the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes (Weiss, 2015). Annan also recommended establishing a small and credible Human Rights Council elected by two-thirds of the UNGA membership replacing the failed Commission on Human Rights (Weiss, 2015). Another proposal by Annan included the restructuring of the Secretariat to enhance its efficiency, accountability, and transparency and also strengthen the role of ECOSOC in coordinating the development plans of the UN. In addition, the secretary general

reiterated the fact that the goals of the Millennium Declaration and MDGs would be achieved only if immediate actions were taken by Member States. From Annan's view point, achieving human security and sustainable development was not possible without cooperation among nations. The proposals put forward by Annan, just like other reform proposals, depended greatly on political willingness, especially from the P5 members (Anan, 2005).

It is clear from the report that Annan did try to combine the three pillars of the United Nations into one cohesive strategy that would help coordinate them and make them successful. Despite being practical and comprehensive in nature, his proposals did have some hurdles, including the rivalry between nations and the necessity of reaching a consensus, especially from the P5 countries (Hurd, 2014).

5.2 Aspirants for the Permanent Membership of UNSC

Among other nations, the ones which are most actively seeking permanent representation at the UNSC are Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan, who are collectively referred to as the Group of Four or G4. The first one, Brazil, the largest state in South America, advocated for itself as the potential member of the council due to its size and regional prominence (Yusuf, 2012). The latter one, India, is considered to be the most populous country of Asia and largest democracy in the world. As a declared nuclear power with highly developed technology, Germany perceives its right to the permanent seat in the council as rightful one. Along with Japan, it is an integral part of the Group of Eight (G8), the coalition of eight richest countries, including Russia that emerged following World War II (Yusuf, 2012).

The G4 nations have suggested a certain plan of reform; however, this proposal is referred to as G4 + 1 since they proposed a single permanent seat for a country in Africa. The possible candidates for such permanent membership could be South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt, considering their economic and military power, along with regional significance (Yusuf, 2012). As noted earlier, there exists another powerful alliance, namely, the UfC, which can be considered to compete with the G4 on the regional level (Yusuf, 2012). It is an alliance of close to forty countries, including Spain, most of Europe Union, and other countries. It was created as a response to the suggestion made by the G4 nations for reforms. The alliance suggests that the number of seats on the Security Council should be expanded by ten, thus allowing for twenty non-permanent

members on the Council along with P5 (Yusuf, 2012).

5.3 Basis of Reformation: Viable Options

It is critical to make a proper assessment of the abilities of the nations that are aspiring for permanent and non-permanent seats in the UNSC. This must be done to maintain objectivity and measurability in the process. The following criteria should guide this evaluation.

- (a) An ability to commit its military capabilities, including manpower, to support United Nations missions whenever necessary, especially during anti-terrorism campaigns (Challenges of Reforming the UN Security Council, n.d.).
- (b) The capacity and willingness to share the financial burden of global security, especially in developing and sustaining international counter-terrorism frameworks (Weiss, 2013)
- (c) The ability and commitment to contribute to peace building costs, including support for post-conflict recovery, rehabilitation of affected civilians, and reintegration of former combatants where necessary (Call & Cousens, 2008).
- (d) A strong and credible presence in international affairs, supported by a stable democratic system and a robust economy. At the same time, reforms should ensure fair and balanced regional representation to address existing geographical imbalances in the Security Council (Challenges of Reforming the UN Security Council, n.d.).
- (e) In line with the principle of equitable representation, the Security Council should include a mix of developed, developing, and emerging states to enhance its legitimacy and democratic character (Luck, 2006).

It is necessary to compare representation in the UNSC with the current makeup of it especially with regard to permanent members. These days, the majority of the permanent members are nations that are major donors, have a big say in world politics, and have a sizable military that allows them to send highly skilled and well-equipped soldiers to various peacekeeping, peace enforcement, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and collective security missions. However, since developing nations from Asia and

Africa often supply the majority of peacekeeping troops, evaluating permanent membership purely on troop contributions may not be possible (Bellamy & Williams, 2021).

Furthermore, strong regional powers, regional organizations, big global powers, or potent alliances like the NATO frequently possess the capacity to deliver significant, effective forces in complicated security scenarios. The UNSC has always asked for troop contributions from individual governments to support peacekeeping missions in such complicated situations (Murithi, 2019). This pattern is best illustrated by the deployment of French troops to MINUSMA and the contributions of Swedish and British specialized forces that carried out high-risk operations within the same mission. Similar to this, regional forces have been crucial in the establishment of hybrid missions in Africa, such the UN-authorized African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Murithi, 2019).

The UN system would be more inclusive and have a stronger capacity to make choices that meet the security concerns of these state groupings if it were expanded to include least-developed, landlocked, and climate-vulnerable nations. Furthermore, assigning non-permanent seats to the leading nations that contribute troops and to representatives of the host countries of peacekeeping missions would allow them to contribute practical experience and contextual knowledge that could lead to a better understanding of conflict dynamics and more successful conflict resolution.

5.3.1 Analytical View of Different Criteria for P5 Members

5.3.1.1 Military Capability

When we analyze the status of the various countries in terms of military might the following table shows that India and Japan lie within 5 and are ahead of The United Kingdom and France which are current P5 members. The prominent aspirant of P5 member from South America Brazil is not in race of top ten military powers but it is considered a regional power and providing very effective and quality peacekeeping.

Table 5.9

Top ten Military Powers of the World

Country	Region	Rank	Remarks
USA	North America	1	Current P5 UNSC

Russian Federation	Europe	2	Current P5 UNSC
China	Asia	3	Current P5 UNSC
India	Asia	4	Non P5
South Korea	Asia	5	Non P5
United Kingdom	Europe	6	Current P5 UNSC
Japan	Asia	7	Non P5
Turkie	Europe	8	Current P5 UNSC
Pakistan	Asia	9	Non P5
Italy	Europe	10	Non P5

Source: <https://www.forbesindia.com/article/explainers/top-10-countries-with-most-powerful-military-strength/89891/1> as of 31 May 2024

When we talk of the military might in terms of capability, strength and equipment, the operational readiness of the developed military is high in case of emergency mobilization. The commitment towards UN responsibility and involvement within domain of own military strategy will decide this.

5.3.1.2 Contribution to UN Budget

The biggest contribution to the UN is still the United States. In 2022, it made contributions totaling over \$18 billion, which made up one-third of the money for the body's overall budget (How much does the U.S. contribute to the UN?2024). When we see the current status of the Countries in terms of contribution in UN budget Germany and Japan are in stronger position than current P5 members United Kingdom and France which is furthermore illustrated by the following table.

Table 5.10

Top Ten Contributors in UN Budget

Country	Contribution of UN Budget by Year			Ranking as per Year	Remarks
	2020	2021	2022	2022	
USA	-	-	1813	1	

China	336.78	347.25	438.20	2	
Japan	240.25	247.72	230.78	3	Non P5
Germany	170.84	176.16	175.55	4	Non P5
United Kingdom	128.12	132.10	125.68	5	
France	124.19	128.05	124.04	6	
Italy	92.77	95.66	91.61	7	Non P5
Canada	76.70	79.08	75.49	8	Non P5
South Korea	63.60	65.57	73.94	9	Non P5
Spain	60.20	62.07	61.30	10	Non P5

Source: Adopted from <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/unfunding-by-country>, 2023

5.3.1.3 Global economic perspective

When we analyze the top economies of the world in terms of GDP, Germany and Japan are ahead than France, United Kingdom and Russia-the current P5 members of UNSC.

Table 5.11

Top 10 Economy of the World in Terms of GDP

Rank	Country	GDP (USD Billion)	GDP Per Capita (USD Thousand)	Remarks
1	United States of America	28,783	85.37	
2	China	18,536	13.14	
3	Germany	4,590	54.29	Non P5
4	Japan	4,112	33.14	Non P5
5	India	3,942	2.73	Non P5
6	United Kingdom(U.K.)	3,502	51.07	
7	France	3,132	47.36	
8	Brazil	2,333	11.35	Non P5

9	Italy	2,332	39.58	Non P5
10	Canada	2,242	54.87	Non P5

Source: <https://www.businessinsider.in/top-10-largest-economies-in-the-world/articleshow/70547252.cms>, 23 June 2024

5.3.1.4 Contribution of Troops in UN Peacekeeping

Current P5 members are not in top contributors in UN peacekeeping operations. The aspirant of permanent member India is 4th largest contributor in peacekeeping operation. Nepal is ranked number one T/PCC contributor in UNPKO as of now.

Table 5.12

Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UNPKO by Country and Post

Country	Experts on Mission	Formed Police Units	Individual Police	Staff officer	Troops	Total	Remarks
Nepal	40	180	58	109	5,736	6,123	Ranking-Number One
Bangladesh	54	317	40	118	5,409	5,938	
Rwanda	33	1,071	91	76	4,658	5,929	
India	43	139	12	134	5,214	5,542	
Pakistan	50	0	0	93	3,563	3,706	
Indonesia	18	140	68	39	2,450	2,715	
Ghana	49	269	42	83	2,193	2,636	
China	26	0	8	46	1,799	1,879	
Morocco	13	0	2	38	1,659	1,712	

Source: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/01_contributions_to_un_peacekeeping_operations_by_country_and_post_73_april_2024.pdf, 30 April 2024

5.3.1.5 Way Ahead for Enrollment of Additional Member in Permanent Category

The proponents of the reform process contend that the nations that make greater

financial and military contributions need to be represented on the UNSC and given a bigger voice in international decision-making. For instance, Germany and Japan are the next-largest financial contributors to the UN's assessed budget after the United States (Bourantonis, 2005). These nations make substantial financial contributions, but they are not represented on the Council and are therefore not involved in its decision-making. The developing powers that significantly contribute to the upkeep of international peace and security, according to those who favor the UNSC's expansion, ought to be involved in the decision-making process at the UNSC (Freiesleben, 2013).

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change emphasizes the importance of recognizing the contributions of member states when considering UNSC reform. It is noteworthy that those countries that make huge financial, military, and diplomatic contributions to the UN by financing the budget assessed by the organization, participating in the peacekeeping mission, engaging in voluntary activities and promoting the goals of the UN must be given adequate recognition. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that there are also requirements to take into account the countries having vast numbers of their population and strong military capability, contributing to international peace and security but not represented in the Council at all (United Nations, 2004).

To begin with, India, being the most populous country, has been actively engaged in contributing to the peacekeeping missions conducted by the UN throughout its history. The country may eventually get discouraged by its continuous absence from the Security Council. On the other hand, the relative power of some P5 members, especially France, Russia, and Great Britain, is declining rapidly, whereas the economic and military potential of emerging powers continues to grow steadily. All these changes provide additional arguments for expanding the membership of the UNSC. Some researchers believe that increasing the number of representatives will positively impact the efficiency and legitimacy of the body (Thakur, 2017).

Both the UNSC's decision-making system and the extent to which member states execute such decisions affect its effectiveness. With an executive committee that is relatively small, the body can provide rapid response to threats, thus ensuring global peace and security. Nevertheless, when member states that have been deliberately left out from being part of the committee fail to comply with the decisions made by the committee, such resolutions become inconsequential. Countries that do not have a stake

in the enforcement of UNSC's decisions might also oppose them, reducing the effectiveness of the committee. Increasing the membership of the body will make the UNSC more credible since it will be better able to represent today's world reality. This will boost the effectiveness of the organization (Weiss, 2013).

5.4 Proposed Model

Various models are proposed for the reforming of the UNSC. Now a day, it has become a matter of debate in annual meeting of UNGA where various groups propose their own model for the reforming of UNSC. The models proposed are not also complete enough to address the aspiration of various interest groups and it is difficult to address the aspiration of all claimants and G4 are pursuing their own agenda which is making reforming process further complicated, and it has also given ground to P5 members maintaining status Quo. Reforming is required in broader democratisation of UNSC, regional balance, and incorporation of new economic and military powers. the above discussions shows that Japan and Germany are strong candidates for the permanent members of UNSC since their positions in contribution to UN in terms of finances as well as status in global power dynamics is significant. Brazil seems in lead from the GRULAC group. Within the African context, South Africa remains a prominent regional leader, distinguished by its economic influence, active role in continental governance institutions, and relative democratic stability (Yusuf, 2012). Also, South Africa is often included in multilateral decision-making such as the G20, the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the UNSC, and climate change negotiations. The G20 includes nineteen of the world's largest economies in addition to the European Union. However, Nigeria is also emerging power in Africa and claim in parity with South Africa in terms of regional power. India is opposed by China as they are the regional rivalries in south-Asia and by the broader concept on over viewing the above factors writer propose the following model for reforming of UNSC. Existing permanent members of Security Council are suggested to be continued since they are still influential in world and their contribution in United Nations is also significant. The criteria should be made such that 4 out of P5 country endorsed their name from the specific region and elected by 2/3rd majority of General Assembly. Veto power is suggested to be eliminated and 3/4th majority concept in permanent membership and overall, 2/3rd majority concept in permanent/non-permanent category should be implemented to check the interest of the specific country. Suggested composition of the

Security Council is tabulated below.

Table 5.13

Proposed Model

Permanent Members	Region	Non-Permanent Members	Remarks
China	Asia Pacific	Asia and Pacific-3	
France	Europe	WEOG-2	
United Kingdom	Europe	EUOG-1	
USA	North America	Africa-3	
Russia	Europe	GRULAC-2	
Japan	Asia Pacific	Arab League-1	
Germany	Europe	Least developed country 1	
Brazil	GRULAC	Land locked country 1	
India	Asia Pacific	Amongst Topmost Contribution in UNPKO-1	
South Africa	Africa	Small Nations-1	
Nigeria	Africa	Conflict Effected Host Country of UNPKO-1	
Total	11	17	28

Source: Researcher Own model

This model guarantees the representation of least developed, land locked, small nations and largest contributors in UNPKO in the non-permanent category of the UNSC. This model is supposed to assist these categories of countries like Nepal to raise their voices to promote their right in international forum effectively. Nepal also falls under the category of top most contributors in UNPKO which further advocates the Nepal representation since UNPKO are the vitals tools of UNSC to maintain international peace and security. Other proposed model does not ensure the representation of these countries. The rational for this proposal is that only representation on the regional basis and inclusion of rising powers of the world is not enough to solve the discrepancies faced by different categories of nations. As per the spirit of sovereign equality of all

states, co-existence, and mutual respect and to foster harmonious relationship between all states, representation of all categories of states in UNSC as non-permanent members is necessary.

In researcher opinion, some of the vital and logical factors for selecting criteria for the permanent representation at UNSC are overall economic contribution to UN and various agencies, military strength, and commitment to provide robust force if UN needs to restore international peace and security, potentiality of the country as economic and military power and to some extent participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

5.5 Status of Various P5 Countries in Reforming: Enrollment of New Members

President Joseph R. Biden's speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2021 expressed the United States' support for the democratization of the Security Council through the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent membership, thereby recognizing the current reality of the world (Biden, 2021). It was important to represent African, Latin American, and Caribbean nations, along with traditional contenders like Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan, which comprise the G4 alliance that vies for each other's permanent membership (Biden, 2021). Although the speech was not as progressive as some had hoped for, it was in line with past efforts by the US government to gain support from small and newly developed nations for its policies, especially concerning Russia and the war in Ukraine. In this regard, various developing nations have been pushing for UNSC expansion, while President Zelenskyy of Ukraine believes that either Russia must be expelled from the council or it must be disbanded (Zelenskyy, 2022)

President Joe Biden noted, The United States is committed to this important effort, even when it has been clear that in actual practice the US government has shown little support for the cause (The White House, 2022). In truth, according to the US representative at the 75th UNGA General Debate held in 2020, the US is open to a modest enlargement of the UNSC, only on condition that such an enlargement does not weaken its impact or compromise the veto. Similarly, according to statements made by the US Secretary of State on behalf of his government at the 76th UN General Assembly in 2021, the United States remains consistent with the Biden administration's position against altering the existing structure or veto powers of the permanent members of the

UNSC (U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2021). As a result, Biden's strong public support for UNSC reform has contradicted the US's traditional position. Achieving unanimous agreement on the need for such reforms, on who should be allowed to sit on both new permanent and non-permanent seats, on the future structure of the body, and on the revision of the veto system presents significant challenges for the proposed expansion process (Darnal, 2022).

China has consistently advocated for measured reforms of the Security Council, stressing the need to enhance representation for developing nations, with particular attention to the interests of small and medium-sized states (Permanent Mission of China to the UN, 2021). However, it has remained notably silent regarding India's bid for a permanent seat (Albanai & Marschik, 2022). The issue has been examined by Tareq MAM Albanai and Alexander Marschik, co-chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on UNSC reform, along with Wang Yi, director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, highlighting the ongoing debate surrounding equitable representation in the Council (Wang, 2022). According to the Chinese diplomat, the Security Council Reform should uphold fairness and justice, increase the representation and voice of developing countries, and allow more small and medium-sized countries to have more opportunities to participate in the council's decision-making. However, although advocating for reforms, China has obstructed talks on the extension of the UNSC. If there is insufficient Asian participation and no African representation, the UNSC may be writing itself out of existence as the global economy and population migrate toward the Indo-Pacific (Wang, 2022).

Nathalie Broadhurst Estival, France's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, stated that France endorses the candidacy of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan as permanent members for permanent seats, while Barbara Woodward, the UK's Ambassador to the UN, expressed her nation's support for both permanent African representation on the Council and the membership bid of the G4 nations (India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil) (WION Web Team, 2023).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has emphasized the necessity of reforming the UNSC to ensure greater inclusion of states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, reflecting Moscow's support for broader geographic representation within the UN's principal decision-making body (Lavrov, 2021). After meeting with his South

African colleague, Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, who hosted the Russian Minister for bilateral talks covering a range of topics, Lavrov gave a press conference. Lavrov said, We strongly support the additional seats for developing countries because the key issue of the (UN Security) Council today is the under-representation of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Lavrov, 2021). He was echoing previous calls made by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Business Standard, 2023).

Brazil, Germany, India, Japan being the close ally of USA in the contemporary world financially and militarily, the support of these nations as permanent members seems rational. However, again, lacking such veto power will create an obstacle since the existing provision will continue. In addition, there is the likelihood that France and Britain, who are important NATO member states, will favor the G4 proposal; nevertheless, their support will depend on the permission granted by China and Russia. The entrenched divisions within the P5-effectively pitting the United States, the United Kingdom, and France against China and Russia-continue to pose a significant obstacle to the admission of new permanent and non-permanent members (Malone, 2020).

5.6 Implications of Enlarged UNSC in Global Peace and Security Affairs

As stated, this dissertation does not aim to recommend any state as permanent or non permanent member of UNSC. Rather, it aims to analyze the global peace and security implications of different enlarged models and proposed model. The veto refrained system in enlarged UNSC and enhanced role of UNGA in global peace and security affairs creates global ownership in peace and security affairs. UNSC bears authority to act in R2P, POC and collective security and veto refrained system is detrimental in curtailing the vested interest of P5 members. With these provisions, UNSC is able to act in cases like Syria, Ukraine and Palestine. For this global commitment and concrete actionable framework for R2P, POC and Collective Security is required.

The use of collective security methods substantially affected by the UNSC enlargement due to the addition of new permanent and non-permanent members in terms of collective defense, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) approach, and the Protection of Civilians (POC) mission. On the positive side, the expanded UNSC can lead to increased normatively of its decisions, thereby boosting compliance with humanitarian

interventions and collective defense initiatives, especially in case if additional permanent and non-permanent members will be from the Global South (Zacher, 2020; Malone, 2004). The presence of additional members contribute to the increased political will to accept mandates under R2P and POC, which can assist in reducing the perception that the Permanent Five hold hegemony in the Security Council. On the negative side, UN expansion can result in the perpetuation of the status quo of the decision-making process, especially if new permanent members are granted veto power or join existing political blocs within the Security Council, thereby causing different interests and limiting consensus in authorizing collective action in the context of conflicts (Zacher, 2020; Malone, 2004).

An expansion of the UNSC comes with both institutional challenges and possibilities regarding peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Inclusiveness in the Council may help create more realistic mandates, thus enhancing peacekeeping operations, making them more effective and efficient and helping build relationships with troop-contributing countries, which are often emerging economies. It would also allow for more context-specific peace enforcement operations and improved implementation of POC policies (Weiss, 2018; Bellamy & Williams, 2015). However, a larger UNSC could make the discussion of funding, rules of engagement, and creation of mandates more challenging, and thus the outcomes achieved could be uncertain or flawed. They could thus adversely affect the efficiency and coherence of the operations. Moreover, if an expanded UNSC does not fix institutional weaknesses and creates deadlock, it would not necessarily be able to respond to new threats to global peace and security (Weiss, 2018; Bellamy & Williams, 2015).

5.7 Main Challenges for Reforming UNSC

One of the most complicated and contentious topics in international governance are still the reform of the UNSC. It confronts significant challenges stemming from geopolitics and vested interests, in contrast to other UN bodies that can be reformed by consensus. Conflicting national aspirations, opposing perspectives, and member state priorities are characteristics of reform discussions. As a result, significant reform of the Council has turned into a political battleground in which nations vie for control of the UN's most powerful apparatus (Zacher, 2020).

Proposals regarding voting rights, membership structure, or functions of the organization have far-reaching consequences for both the permanent and non-permanent

members of the Security Council. The impact of these proposals goes further than that since the proposals affect other United Nations organizations such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and specialized organizations. State interests seem to be the driving force behind the process of negotiations over the issue of reform as seen from the reform discussion. Countries seem to look at the proposals with regards to their chances of being permanent members of the Security Council as suggested by David Malone (2004). As Luck observes, National Interest shapes positions on reform, whereby each country or group analyzes the advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of its own position. There being no way for one single proposal to please everyone at the same time, such an inherent mechanism helps explain why there is lack of unanimity (Luck, 2006).

The conflict between efficacy and legitimacy is at the core of the reform conundrum. The Council would be more representative if it were expanded, but decision-making efficiency would suffer as a result. The risk of growth without function is demonstrated by historical examples like the LoN, where increased representation eventually slowed down decision-making. Edward Carr was right when he cautioned that executive performance is not always correlated with abstract representation. As a result, discussions about the number of states and the criteria for their representation in the Council are still ongoing. Since calls for reform are frequently made but never implemented, legitimacy issues have not been addressed despite decades of debate (Luck, 2006).

Structural constraints within the Charter itself are perhaps the greatest barrier to reform. Any amendments require the approval of two-thirds of the General Assembly and unanimous ratification by all five Permanent Members, as outlined in Article 108 of the Charter. In effect, this means that the P5 have the power to veto any reform proposals, ensuring that their special status will not be threatened. This protection, which was purposefully created in 1945 by the US, UK, and USSR, was incorporated into the UN's institutional structure. This structure has resulted in an inherent blocking mechanism, as Bourantonis (2005) points out. According to academics, this is a reflection of a more serious weakness in the structure of international institutions, where regulations are made to uphold the supremacy of superpowers rather than to promote the interests of all parties (Ikenberry, 2011).

Even speculative reform options pose challenging issues. Whether the P5 consent

to having their privileges diluted by the addition of additional permanent members and issue of consent to the growth of temporary seats that would reduce their power remains burning questions. Increased membership would also necessitate adjustments to the thresholds for making decisions, which would compromise the Council's capacity to act decisively. According to Bourantonis (2005), there may even be a sixth veto because new state coalitions could obstruct consensus. This is in line with more general complaints about institutional deadlock in international organizations, where growth usually results in paralysis rather than effectiveness (Hurd, 2008).

Additionally, performance reviews have damaged the credibility of the UNSC. During the Iraq War, for instance, some states contended that the Council had not fulfilled its most fundamental responsibility, which was to stop aggression, particularly from powerful nations. Weiss (2003) highlights how nations manipulate institutions to suit their own interests, reflecting political reality in the Council. Similarly, Islam (2018) draws attention to the ongoing North-South split that is mirrored within the Council and across UN organizations. This demonstrates the Council's inherent susceptibility to politicization, which erodes the international community's perception of it (Newman, 2007).

The first visible symptom of dysfunction remains the veto. Gareth Evans was correct in his assessment of how the effectiveness of the council had been undermined throughout history due to the abuse of enormous power. Instances of these include the cases where China and Russia prioritized their national concerns over international intervention regarding the Syrian conflict and the genocide of the Rohingya people. Even worse, the ideological impasse of the UNSC was further exacerbated by the Cold War period (Weiss & Daws, 2018). By withdrawing from the UN under President Donald Trump through cuts to the contribution and politicizing issues like Jerusalem and Iran, and with the Iraq War indicating that the US government would not hesitate to ignore the UNSC at all, the capability of the council becomes even weaker considering the US' 22% contribution to the operational expenses and 28% to peacekeeping efforts (Patrick, 2017).

Meanwhile, new powers like Brazil, Japan, India, and Germany are still vying for permanent membership. Although pressure for reform may build as global power moves, the existing Charter structure renders such reform unlikely (Personal Communication, May 5, 2023). More creative strategies, including limiting the use of

veto power in times of mass atrocity or establishing seats that are renewable for a set period of time, are thought by scholars to provide gradual reform (Williams, 2021). As Thakur (2017) notes, the UNSC's structure still reflects a world order from 1945 rather than the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century.

In the end, the continued existence of these challenges begs the issue of whether reforms will inevitably result in better UNSC performance. According to critics, the deeper systemic inefficiencies might not be addressed by expanding membership or transferring veto powers. Despite structural limitations and political self-interest, the UNSC continues to be the world's preeminent authority on peace and security. As long as reform demands are not addressed, its legitimacy will be questioned (Personal Communication, June 18, 2024).

These discussions indicate that both political and institutional obstacles are hindering any efforts at reform within the UNSC. The ability to effectively make changes is hampered by issues of efficacy and self-interest despite the need for legitimacy. The veto system acts as a constitutional safeguard against reforms.

5.7.1 Challenges on Consensus.

The UNSC does not adequately reflect the global landscape of today. It is insufficiently representative of emerging countries, which make up more than half of the world's population (Toro, 2008). Indeed, the differing interests of the member states are known to make it impossible to reach any form of consensus regarding the issue, thus hindering the implementation of changes considered necessary (Weiss & Daws, 2018; Malone, 2004). Many reform efforts have been centered on these deficiencies (Bourantonis, 2005). In the most recent case, the proposals came from various clusters of countries. While the G4 nations proposed an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories alongside working mechanisms, the UFC group favored the latter's development (Luck, 2011). Some African countries called for an increase in permanent seats due to previous injustices (Bourantonis, 2005). Meanwhile, the S5 cluster of nations called attention to the improvement of working mechanisms (Security Council Report, 2020). L69 sought an expansion of the UNSC to about 25 members comprising both categories of member states (Luck, 2011; Weiss & Daws, 2018). Each nation has its own views, and the debate continues. Although the process is ongoing, all the nations should raise their objections. Analyzing the current scenario, it appears that

reaching international agreement on reform-related topics is exceedingly challenging. Therefore, for the UNSC's reform to advance in the future there needs to be significant agreement among these parties. Reaching a political agreement on who gets in is the issue because there is fierce competitiveness and internal strife among claimants, counterclaimant groups, and the current P5, not a lack of agreement on the necessity of enlargement. Over the following five, six, seven, and eight years, expansion may be possible. However, due of tensions within the UN over who would obtain those coveted permanent seats; it truly will be a food fight. (Personal Communication, 13 Dec, 2023).

5.7.2 Regional Groups and other Member State

The topic of global consensus was covered in the previous sentence. Although there is ideological drift between the various governments in the global arena, this drift also exists within the region. Every continent may request an equal number of permanent members when the question of regional representation arises. Since three countries from Europe are already permanent members of the Security Council, other continents may request this privilege. As a result, the problem of how to distribute permanent membership fairly will be contentious and could endanger the reforming process (Luck, 2006). Most of the Member States concur that some regions of the world, particularly in Africa and Latin America, are gravely underrepresented by the current distribution of permanent seats in the Council. However, smaller states, such those in the Caribbean, and East European nations also feel left out. The benefits and drawbacks of expanding geographical representation are identical because doing so would entail expanding numerical representation as well (Luck, 2006). For any region to have adequate representation on the Security Council, member states must agree to pool sovereignty, share seats, or use alternative means such that their delegates represent not only themselves but also the whole region. The need for member states to come together is also evident in another problem associated with reforms in the Security Council, which involves the existence of different suggestions that cannot easily reach an agreement among regional blocs on one particular nation's permanent membership (Luck, 2006).

5.7.3 The Veto Factor

The P5 countries, which individually enjoy a veto power, finally made their positions clear with regard to reforms in the UNSC. It seems that one of the major reasons for the failure of progress is the demand by the wealthier and stronger nations to retain and even increase their influence at the United Nations. On the other hand, there is an effort being made by the less wealthier and weaker nations to ensure a democratic process of decision-making (Weiss & Daws, 2018). The P5 can use veto to prevent action on any important matters, such as the selection of the Secretary General, changes to the UN Charter, and UNSC reforms(United Nations, 1945). A single veto-wielding state could completely frustrate the desire of the vast majority of the world community and halt any multilateral response in its tracks. This obstruction, which has prevented the UN from acting on important issues since its establishment, needs to be gradually removed. The risk of a blockage would only rise with the addition of new veto-wielding permanent members, severely paralyzing the organization.(Debate: UN Security Council Veto,n.d.).

The implications of veto factor in global peace and security in amply discussed in the previous chapter. When discussing the UNSC's reform from a security viewpoint and the numerous challenges involved, the veto power is at the heart of most issues. There are several sincere ideas, high level papers, and conversations at UNGA but the P5 members of the UNSC struggle with disagreement, conflicts of interest, and self-serving interests when it comes to the implementation of UNSC's reformation. Without the agreement of all permanent members, the UN cannot make crucial decisions on rebuilding its structure, governing procedures, and changing its Charter. One of the crucial issues is getting membership of UN. Any rising States or territory with global recognition even having recognition of overwhelming majority of UNGA cannot get membership of UN without the approval of all P5 members. State of Palestine is an example.

5.7.3.1 Initiatives not to use Veto

During the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, President François Hollande advanced the proposal to restrain the use of veto power by permanent members in cases involving mass atrocities, reflecting France's effort to promote greater accountability within the Security Council (Hollande, 2015). He questioned how the UN

could remain inactive while grave crimes were occurring and emphasized that France aimed to set a precedent by pledging not to exercise its veto in the event of a major humanitarian disaster (Hollande, 2015). Currently, the project being jointly managed by France and Mexico has the support of 106 countries. In a similar line, there has been a lot of support for the code of conduct developed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) group, which France endorses (5 Things to Know About France and Veto Power, 2023). France has advocated for the permanent members to willingly give up their veto authority ever since the middle of the 2000s. A ministerial level gathering on this subject was organized by France in September 2014 in conjunction with the 69th session of the General Assembly. Mexico also took part. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed support for France's initiative to restrict the use of the Security Council veto in situations involving mass atrocities, underscoring the human rights rationale behind calls for veto restraint (UNOHCHR, 2015). He endorsed the call for permanent members to exercise restraint and uphold humanitarian principles, reinforcing the argument for greater accountability within the UNSC (Al Hussein, 2015). The P5 was asked by the co-chairs to voluntarily and collectively pledged to avoid veto in case of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes on a large scale. However, only the UK has backed the plan out of all the permanent members. Additionally, in 2015, the UN Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group proposed a Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, urging all permanent and elected members of the UNSC to abstain from voting against any credible draft resolution meant to stop mass atrocities (The Security Council Working Method-The Veto, 2020).

Discussions and analysis urges the maintaining necessary provisions for non-implementation of veto in R2P duty and in pursue of maintaining collective security when sovereignty of the small states is in peril by the invasion of mighty states. This must be developed as norms of UNSC decision making process. Similarly, any act of the state or non-state actor threatening the world peace by sponsoring the global terrorism, weapon of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons should not be preserved by veto cast by any P5 members. There must be unhindered UNSC enforcement action to counter these threats.

5.7.4 *Finances*

UN depends upon the funding and armed forces of the member states in order to function effectively (Weiss & Daws, 2018). Most of the missions sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council are financed by the advanced nations (Luck, 2011). For their contributions, they expect to have significant roles in the decision-making process. Financial contributions made to the UN are irrational in nature (Bourantonis, 2005). The influence of major contributing nations has been exerted on the efficiency of the organization either directly or indirectly (Weiss & Daws, 2018). Third-world/developing nations are not properly represented and require proper representation in the UN Security Council (Bourantonis, 2005).

The matter gets further complicated due to regional, economic, and political divisions among the members. The present members of the P-5 have a considerable role in the economic affairs of the UN (Weiss & Daws, 2018). If any negative action is taken against the UN by any of these five nations in terms of UN economics, it would be extremely hard for the UN to survive (Luck, 2011). However, the present P-5 nations can expect huge financial contribution from the aspiring countries for becoming permanent members of the UNSC (Bourantonis, 2005). The issue of regionalism or any other concept cannot justify the selection of a country with low financial contribution to the UN's economy as a permanent member of the UNSC (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

5.8 Ways to Enhance Effectiveness of UNPKO

The UN Security Council (UNSC) still relies heavily on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) to safeguard world peace and security. These operations go beyond conventional peacekeeping to include civilian protection, peace enforcement, and peace building within the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) paradigm. Despite their success, previous peacekeeping missions have revealed critical weaknesses that undermine their efficiency. These failures, including the Rwandan genocide, the Bosnian conflict, and MINUSMA operations, underscore the need to critically assess and fortify UNPKO. The ability to prepare and react promptly to crises using proactive approaches and leveraging local capabilities is the core focus of this review (Personal Communication, June 25, 2024).

The UNPKO has traditionally been heavily reliant on international troops, often favoring those from Western nations. The alternative to this traditional model, which is

also sustainable, would be the development of capacity and accountability within regional organizations, particularly the African Union (AU). Before any involvement by the UNPKO, regional troops can function as rapid responders, filling in the gaps through their ability to train, provide logistics, and engage with civilians and police units. Since the UNSC is responsible for negotiations, sanctions, and the use of military force, missions generally take months or even years to deploy. This strategy was successfully employed by the AU in Darfur, ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, and France in Mali (Personal Communication, 25 June, 2024).

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5.8.1 Increasing Operational out Reach and Enhancing Force Mobility

Operational reach and mobility are important factors that determine UNPKO performance. The deployment of highly mobile, specialized, and well-trained forces is necessary to enable the ability to react quickly to threats against civilians. Resources like Special Forces, reconnaissance teams, rapid deployment units, and Formed Police Units (FPUs) with SWAT capabilities must be committed by member states (United Nations, 2021). To maximize operational adaptability, deployment arrangements should be adaptable at the battalion level, reflecting Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and Status of Unit Requirement (SUR) agreements (De Coning, 2019).

Peacekeepers are often forced to carry out ordinary administrative tasks rather than participate in proactive field operations because to a lack of troops, logistical difficulties, and financial restraints. Employment of mobile operational components in administrative duties results in limited human resources allocation to successfully completing POC and R2P requirements. Additionally, increased outreach to vulnerable and distant groups can bolster UN credibility and avert massacres (Personal

Communication, June 25, 2024).

5.8.2 Rapid Deployment in Need and Up Gradation of Standby Arrangements

By anticipating the military, police, and logistical capabilities that member nations could provide at a level of readiness, the UN Standby Arrangements (UNSAS), which were created in 1994, aimed to enhance mission readiness (United Nations, 1994). Nearly 80,000 personnel had been offered by 62 states by the end of 1996. The 1994 Rwandan genocide showed that theoretical readiness alone could not guarantee timely or effective action, as delays in UNAMIR's deployment led to massive civilian casualties (Prunier, 1995).

To address these shortcomings and reduce operational delays, the UN established the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) and the Multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) (Durch, 2006). With the help of seven nations, SHIRBRIG sought to deploy for Chapter VI missions in six months, while the RDMHQ expeditiously deployed about 20 military and civilian officers in compliance with Security Council resolutions. Operational effectiveness remained hampered by political limitations and sluggish military mobilisation in spite of these reforms. A more assertive peace enforcement strategy that complied with international humanitarian law was demonstrated by the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was tasked with eliminating armed groups like the M23, FDLR, and Lord's Resistance Army (Farrell & Charlesworth, 2016).

The significance of combining operational capabilities with unambiguous political authorization has been brought to light by such missions. While maintaining the flexibility of the Troop and Police Contributing Country (T/PCC) model, the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) improves planning, performance evaluation, and interoperability by registering member states' military, police, and civil defense units across four readiness levels (Karlsrud, 2018). However, political will, logistical preparedness, and member nations' ability to convert pledges into real deployment are what make PCRS effective. Due to political, economic, and legal limitations, proposals for a UN Standing Army are still primarily theoretical (Weiss, 2012).

5.8.3 Implementation of the Cruz Report: Transforming Peacekeeping Mindset

One of the most important studies of UNPKO deaths and operational

shortcomings was the Cruz Report (Cruz & Philips, 2017). 943 of the more than 3,500 peacekeepers who died between 1948 and 2017 were killed in violent incidents. According to the report, peacekeepers became reactive and risk-averse as a result of UN operations being carried out with defensive postures inappropriate for asymmetric threats, a phenomenon known as the Chapter VI Syndrome. These kinds of mindset affected field operations, mission planning, and contingent preparation, seriously impairing the execution of the mission mandate (Cruz & Philips, 2017).

According to the Cruz Report, peacekeepers must take the initiative to neutralize threats and carry out operations that dissuade adversaries in order to maintain a proactive and strong operating posture. Aggressive, mission-specific tactics that restrict armed groups' mobility of movement must take the place of defensive postures. Since generic training is insufficient to respond to contemporary asymmetric threats, contingents need capabilities that are specifically suited to the terrain and mission-specific dangers, such as urban, desert, and jungle contexts. Leadership and accountability are essential as well; although institutional protections reduce hesitation, decision-makers at all levels, from UNHQ to the commander in the field, need to be authorized to use force effectively under the mission's mandate (Cruz & Philips, 2017). Political considerations and inquiries should not impede operational decision-making. Another critical aspect concerns the coordination of civilian and military activities; since greater understanding of the situation and winning local approval are key to success; operational plans must incorporate non-lethal functions such as reconnaissance and information dissemination. If completely executed, the Cruz Report's recommendations will change UNPKO culture and operations, improving the effectiveness, safety, and operational stability of missions (Personal Communication, June 25, 2024).

5.8.4 Command, Control, and Accountability

A well-defined command and control structure is essential for an effective UNPKO. While troop-contributing states maintain control over individual contingents, the UN Force Commander maintains operational control (MOFA: Current issues surrounding UN peace-keeping operations and Japanese perspective, n.d.). National caveats and SURs need to be standardized and precisely specified in order to minimize operational delays and ambiguity and maximize mandate execution. To guarantee compliance and preserve UN legitimacy, accountability mechanisms-such as sanctions for reluctance to act in POC and R2P contexts-are crucial. In order to respond quickly to

emergencies, force deployment also necessitates integrated reserve forces at the sector and mission headquarters levels. Even in high-threat situations, missions are guaranteed to retain operational flexibility thanks to a specific central and regional standby framework (Thapa, 2024).

5.8.5 Regional and Multilateral Coordination

Working together with regional organizations improves legitimacy, operational efficacy, and quick response. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), IGAD, AU, and ECOWAS offer venues for capacity-building, training, and assistance with regional peacekeeping. While interagency cooperation with humanitarian organizations like UNOCHA enables integrated humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, coordination between UN missions and host states guarantees efficient civilian protection (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). An essential part of such a process is that of peace building, which comprises demobilization, reintegration, legal reform, election assistance, refugee repatriation, and promoting reconciliation. Successful implementation of holistic approaches through a combination of both political and military interventions, as well as humanitarian assistance, can be seen in missions such as MINUSMA in Mali, ONUMOZ in Mozambique, and UNTAC in Cambodia. QIPs and continuous engagement with the local population through community interaction build trust and legitimacy of the mission (United Nations, 2008).

5.8.6 Training, Personnel, and Resource Optimization

The efficiency of UNPKO is highly dependent on the people that make up its personnel. Training centers for troops and staff officers provide essential pre-deployment training. An internationally coordinated training effort is vital in ensuring that there is a uniform interpretation of the rules of engagement, civilian protection, and cooperation in operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2015). Resource optimization is essential, and this involves ensuring optimal mobility, deployment of personnel, and modernization of equipment. Gowan (2015) states that effective mandate implementation and quick responses to emergencies can be assured through the appropriate deployment of scarce resources.

An examination of previous UNPKO missions reveals that the primary reasons for mission inefficiency and an increase in civilian mortality were inadequate training, a poor operating posture, and delayed deployment (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). Missions

with proactive, robust mandates and rapid response capabilities have higher success rates in both civilian protection and mission fulfillment (Jorgensen, 2023). Furthermore, evidence suggests that regional integration and integrated civil-military efforts significantly enhance operational results (Williams, 2016). The Cruz Report's doable recommendations for altering UNPKO culture and practice greatly boost operational efficacy and credibility when paired with modern technologies and rapid deployment platforms (Cruz & Philips, 2017).

Armed elements operating in most complex contemporary UN missions are using various modern technologies and equipment. They move quickly and with great mobility. The peacekeeping force should have state-of-the-art C4ISR equipment to combat these threats that put the local population at danger. Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is referred to as C4ISR (what is C4ISR?, 2023). Advanced C4ISR capabilities confer a strategic advantage by enhancing situational awareness, deepening understanding of the operational environment and adversary, and compressing the interval between detection and response (Alberts & Hayes, 2003). Accurate and timely information about the armed elements and their plans will help peacekeepers take proactive measures, which are crucial in reducing the threat that terrorist organizations and other armed elements pose to the civilian community. Long-range communication technology, tactical and strategic UAVs, and reconnaissance helicopters are important tools for improving peacekeeping troops' C4ISR capabilities (what is C4ISR?, 2023).

In addition to C4ISR assets provision of modern sophisticated weapons, terrain friendly mechanized vehicle and Attack Helicopters with night vision capability will further enhance the capability of peacekeeping forces. Availability of modern equipment, armament and vehicles will facilitate prompt and swift mobilization of peacekeeping forces during operational mobilization and in any contingencies (what is C4ISR?, 2023).

5.8.7 Consultations between the Security Council and Troops and Finance Contributing Countries

To increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, the UNSC should consider the scarcity of both human and financial resources as well as employee safety when it makes decisions about such operations. In order to accomplish this, talks must

take place between the UNSC's members, the nations who provide troops, and any other relevant nations that provide money to peacekeeping missions. Japan values the president of the UNSC's remarks from March 1996, which confirmed that council members should consult with key contributors. When an operation first begins, money is most urgently needed because it's crucial to quickly acquire the necessary equipment and transport it. For example, in order to guarantee that funds are accessible promptly, it is essential that the PKO Reserve Fund, whose creation Japan has proposed, be completely funded (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020).

The payment mechanism for UNPKO contributions should be enhanced (for example, by annualizing the budgeting) as part of the initiatives to ensure early payment of arrears. The actions taken by the nations themselves to make up their debts are of utmost importance. The PKO budget should also be simplified by making improvements to the manual used to compile it, etc. Since each increase in the PKO budget imposes a greater financial burden on UN Member States, there needs to be a general streamlining; in particular, the budgets of current peacekeeping operations with lengthy missions need to be reviewed. Additionally, procedures for purchasing goods and hiring staff should be made clearer, and any inconsistencies should be remedied. The processes for the United Nations' reimbursement of costs involved in sending out staff need to be made clearer, and reimbursements should be processed more quickly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020). Japan's position maintains that Member States' contributions to the peacekeeping budget should correspond to the relative weight of their economies within the global system, while also emphasizing the particular responsibility of the Security Council's permanent members in financing such operations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020).

5.8.8 Authorization of Anti Terrorist Mandate

In mission like MINUSMA, various terrorist groups are operating who are threatening life of local population and peacekeepers as well. Peacekeepers are in constant threat of attack from various Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and complex attack. MINUSMA mission required counter-terrorist mandate to peacekeepers. This has limited the operational activities of the troops. Hence, depending upon the nature of the threat prevailing in mission area, mandates should be authorized accordingly for the effective functioning of the peacekeepers (Thapa, 2024).

5.8.9 Cooperation with Host State

The host nation is primarily in charge of safeguarding UN employees and citizens. The host nation and the UN mission should work together to fulfill the mission's mandate and safeguard the local populace. In rare instances, the host government may also be antagonistic to certain ethnic communities (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024). In this situation, the operational environment of the mission becomes more challenging. When the host state limits the peacekeeping force's unhindered movement and action, the operational environment becomes more challenging, preventing peacekeepers from fully fulfilling their mandate. Hence, to establish harmonious relationship with host nation, Strategic, Operational and Tactical engagement at political as well as military level is required (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

5.8.10 Security and Managements of IDPs.

Being in group and cluster, they are in threat of attack by different revenge groups. South Sudan model of collaboration is exemplary in terms of protection of IDPS. Integrated approach of UN mission and Humanitarian actors give a better result in management and ensuring security of IDPs. Giving physical security to IDPs in UN designated camp safeguarded by UN troops is typical best practice which needs to implement in other missions like MINUSMA mission Mali (Thapa, 2024).

5.8.11 Enhancement of Peacekeeping Capabilities in Africa

European powers, particularly the United Kingdom and France, began exploring more practical approaches to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa in response to recurring instability, especially in the Great Lakes region. Reflecting this growing concern, the United Nations Secretary-General's report of November 1995 emphasized measures such as strengthening cooperation through expanded personnel exchanges between the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This evolving policy discourse was further advanced by the United States' proposal in late 1996 to establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), which stimulated broader international debate on mechanisms for rapid response in African conflicts (Williams, 2007). A stand-by force made up of officers from African countries with a strength of around 5,000 people is the core concept behind the ACRF. While several African nations welcomed

this program, other nations, including France, expressed skepticism about it. In general, Japan supports the initiatives done by the concerned nations, but given the limited availability of people and other resources, it also promotes coordination among these various concepts (MOFA: Current Issues surrounding UN Peace Keeping and Japanese Perspective, 1997).

In today's context, the peacekeepers are subjected to work in more and more dangerous and difficult situations. There is a requirement of stronger Armies with more fire power and intelligence but this is available only in the West. Western nations do not commit their armies. Therefore, UN is depending on middle income nations and poorer nation's army i.e. the inadequately trained and armed Armies of the member nations. Even the middle income nation's peacekeepers have started behaving differently. They do well if the sailing is well. If the situation goes bad, they also listen to home governments, not the UN. Regional Organizations are supposed to be good theoretically but they are under paid and ill equipped (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

The possibility of a lasting peace is increased by comprehensive strategies that integrate political processes, humanitarian aid, and peace building initiatives, as exemplified by missions like ONUMOZ in Mozambique and UNTAC in Cambodia (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). Incorporating regional organizations, international humanitarian players, and host-state collaboration guarantees consistent operational strategies and reduces effort duplication, which improves civilian protection and stabilizes post-conflict societies. UNPKO's operational preparedness is further strengthened and a more effective reaction to new threats is ensured by investing in mission-specific training, contemporary C4ISR capabilities, and rapid deployment reserves (Jorgensen, 2023).

5.9 Ways Ahead for Strengthening POC

There are a number of steps that must be taken higher up the chain to ensure that missions have the authority, willingness, knowledge, preparedness, and capacity to carry out their mandates. Peacekeeping missions should close these gaps to ensure they can respond to the special demands involved in protecting civilians in a crisis. The United Nations must make sure that the following fundamental elements are present for all peacekeeping missions with a mandate to protect civilians because they are essential to the success of a mission and because UN peacekeeping missions can offer a unique role

and set of capabilities in doing so. The POC is the primary responsibility of the host government. As they are unable or unwilling to do so, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection (Personal Communication, 13 Dec, 2023).

POC has emerged as a central focus of peace operations, enjoying broad political, legal, and moral backing. Nearly every UNPKO since 1999 has included this mandate, AU operations actively work to protect civilians, the EU has conducted emergency missions for that purpose, and NATO is formulating a policy on it (Fortna, 2008). Equally important, there is now recognition that a comprehensive whole-of-mission approach is essential for effective civilian protection (Fortna, 2008). Physical protection through the military use of force is sometimes necessary, but often active police patrolling, human rights monitoring, and community engagement will be more effective (Personal Communication, 24 Jun, 2024).

The UNSC should be well-informed before its deliberations on peacekeeping mandates, while the threats to civilians should be considered right from the start of planning. The planning process should involve an elaborate POC. The Context of UNPKO missions' objectives, political dynamics, and humanitarian dynamics are affected by the mission's security within the mission area. The UNSC should seek information from its mission regarding a detailed briefing of the vulnerabilities and threats that the population under their mandate faces in the mission area. This information is critical in ensuring that the UNSC member states determine the threat (criminality, ethnic conflicts, violence, or deprivation), the capabilities of the warring parties, and mandate any planned missions. The UN has partially succeeded in POC (Cruz, Phillips, & Parsons, 2017). It has failed when the rebels are relatively stronger than the UN troops. UN has been good where the TCCs are committed and loyal to the UN system and the chain of command. Generally, we see more TCCs willingness to participate on less dangerous situations. When the situation worsens the so called stronger and better equipped Armies of member countries either withdraw their troops or remain uncommitted to the tasks. They listen to home government than the UN. If situation does not change we will see more unsuccessful missions that bring shame to the UN (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

To safeguard civilians, the Security Council must be clear about what it expects from peacekeeping missions. As was already said, peacekeeping operations now focus more on protecting people and are more multifaceted and interconnected than their

traditional function of monitoring peace agreements. This tendency calls on the Council to be more explicit about how civilian protection should be given top priority and carried out by peacekeeping forces. This is especially important in view of the conflicts with other statutory goals that may develop in complex post-conflict contexts marked by flimsy host nation consent and cooperation or determined spoilers. The Council must regularly consider the implications of employing the same mandate language for different missions on people, peacekeepers, and the operations. It is best to give that attention before field crises occur (United Nations, 2015).

The Council also needs to support missions that experience difficulties in protecting people and regularly monitor the implementation and impact of mandates on the ground. The Council should request a report from the Secretary General on mission plans for protecting civilians as well as any difficulties encountered in balancing the mission's other obligations with the protection mandate. The UNSC has a special responsibility to support the political process that serves as the foundation for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, to assist Member States in providing appropriately qualified and equipped military and police personnel, and to directly support missions. For peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat must take seriously the safety of civilians. 10 years of missions with these objectives have passed, yet the DPKO has failed to develop guidelines for the protection of people. (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009).

Civilians must be better protected by peacekeeping forces. All missions must evaluate the risks and dangers to the populace and design mission-wide strategies that account for those vulnerabilities, despite the inherent limits of UN operations. Such tactics should, where appropriate, involve a whole spectrum of actions to assist and provide protection, guarantee security, and support actions that render offenders or potential offenders incapable of posing a threat to the populace. Such strategies can only be developed and put into action if missions are open to doing so, believe they have the authority to do so, have employees with the necessary skills and expertise to accomplish their strategic goals, and each mission has the right leadership. In this aspect, leadership is very important. Better candidates and better preparation are required for mission leaders. They must be held responsible for developing mission-wide strategies, carrying those out, and reporting on the outcomes (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009).

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rebels are relatively stronger than the UN troops. UN has been good where the TCCs are committed and loyal to the UN system and the chain of command. Generally, we see more TCCs willingness to participate on less dangerous situations. When the situation worsens the so called stronger and better equipped Armies of member countries either withdraw their troops or remain uncommitted to the tasks. They listen to home government than the UN. If situation does not change we will see more unsuccessful missions that bring shame to the UN (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

After analysis of the various aspects related to mitigate the gaps and lapses in current UNPKO and complex threat dynamics, various factors are identified as ways to enhance the effectiveness of UNPKO to safeguard noble cause of POC. Firstly, there is need of enough Maneuver troops keeping primacy of POC in each mission demanding the military operations. UN mission should not compromise with host government in fulfilling POC mandate. There is requirement of clear strategy to mobilize Standby Army/ Regional force in case of emergency mobilization in complex humanitarian crisis caused by conflict. In addition, there is requirement of no veto in R2P and POC duty and mobilization in R2P and POC duty should be the unconditional mandate. A highly dedicated professional and well-equipped peacekeeping force keeping noble cause of in peace in supreme priority and quality peacekeeping with quality peacekeeping force will perform peace operation and challenging tasks effectively. Reviewing the presence of terrorist threatening POC mandate, anti terrorist mandate is required to UN missions to counter terrorism.

5.10 Ways Ahead for Strengthening R2P

The R2P is a political principle that countries around the world have agreed to follow in order to stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It says that countries are responsible for keeping their people safe, and when they don't, the rest of the world has a duty to step in. R2P can be put into action at the local, national, and international levels (Bellamy, 2009). Here are a few strategies to improve its application:

(a) Overall Capacity Enhancement: The UN, especially its UNSC and OHCHR, requires adequate funding to watch out for and resolve any R2P cases. Once intervention becomes necessary, multidisciplinary teams consisting of peacekeeping forces, humanitarian agents, and legal specialists should be

dispatched to deal with emergencies. The early warning system needs to be put into place so that the early signs of mass atrocities could be spotted and the necessary actions taken immediately (United Nations, 2009). To resolve the grievances before they become violent, the preventive mechanism requires effective communication among governments, civil societies, and disadvantaged groups. The United Nations can also offer technical support and resources to help states develop the necessary capacity to ensure the protection of their populations. Conducting training programs for security forces regarding human rights and R2P is essential for raising awareness about the importance of R2P (United Nations, 2009).

(b) Establishing Legal Frameworks: Strong punitive measures must be used against those who cause significant losses in civilian life. In order to establish accountability procedures for those who commit atrocities, the UN must increase adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights legislation. Urge states to pass legislation demonstrating their dedication to R2P and permitting the prosecution of atrocity perpetrators (United Nations, 2005).

(c) Regional and Global Cooperation: Promotion of R2P should be seen as a collective effort, and hence the UNSC should work in collaboration with all regional and international agencies on many levels. In order to demonstrate international unity and commitment to R2P, governments which are ready to respond collectively in cases of violation should create alliances among themselves. There are several ways in which the UN can foster cooperation with regional/global agencies to enhance the promotion of R2P. One way is collaborating with regional bodies like the AU and EU; another is working with NGOs and local organizations to advocate for R2P, and also holding governments accountable to their responsibility regarding the same (United Nations, 2005). Except few, most of the UN Peace Operations are doing great job in terms of containing the situation and controlling further damage in terms of human casualty and material destructions. However, the problems may not be solved only by the efforts of UN missions which may require extensive engagement of the regional organizations as well as regional and world powers (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023). There are voices raised to enlarge the SC to reflect the new power dynamics of the world. It gives impressions that

countries like India, Brazil and some others countries who are economically and militarily strong enough to be included in the enlarged SC working for it. This could be a desire of those countries but the SC will be unwilling to enlarge it. By enlarging it and by giving veto power to some more sovereign member state it will further complicate the entire UN system. This cannot give the desired result (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

(d)Supervision, Monitoring and Investigation: As the world's leading body for preserving global peace and security, the UNSC must establish reliable mechanisms for keeping an eye on violations of human rights and guaranteeing responsibility for acts conducted under R2P. In order to hold offenders accountable for crimes against humanity, support independent investigations and international tribunals (United Nations, 2005).

(e) Robust R2P to Deal Emerging Challenges: There is need of robust R2P approach to deal with complex threats and especially when state itself is perpetrator. Hence, UNSC has to update the understanding of R2P to encompass various forms of offense endangering civilian life by state, non-state actors and terrorism (United Nations, 2009).

5.10.1 R2P and Strategy to Implement NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)

Within the broader realm of R2P, the utilization of tactical and strategic nuclear arsenals by both state and non-state actors poses an extraordinary and existential challenge for civilians and world peace. Escalating geopolitical conflicts between nuclear-armed and nuclear-capable states such as North Korea, Russia, Iran, and the US, coupled with the current Russia-Ukraine crisis, have further raised the alarm bells for the vulnerability of the nuclear regime. Under these circumstances, it becomes imperative to fortify the UN Security Council's (UNSC) position and solidify the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime to avoid any catastrophic humanitarian disaster. Despite being the bedrock of the international nuclear regime, the NPT requires additional stringent measures for enforcement, monitoring, and political will from both nuclear-armed and non-armed countries (IAEA, 2022).

A stronger global approach involves the creation of binding international agreements reiterating the collective commitment of nations to preventing the

proliferation of nuclear technology as well as the total non-utilization of nuclear armaments against the human race. It will help solidify principles that have been somewhat captured in international humanitarian laws and the humanitarian impacts argument, along with a new legal instrument that is the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, 2017). Supporting this is the enhancement of inspection mechanisms under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is important for establishing transparency in nuclear matters. Lastly, the UNSC needs to have the power to mete out appropriate punishment, through imposition of sanctions among others, to nations who violate non-proliferation principles, such as those implemented under Resolution 1540 and North Korea sanctions (UNSC, 2004).

Furthermore, combating any form of clandestine or hidden nuclearization process necessitates a proactive approach toward intelligence sharing and prevention diplomacy, especially in turbulent zones where ambiguity regarding nuclear arsenals raises the potential for misjudgment. This needs to be coupled with a mandatory commitment by all states involved to provide a complete accounting of their nuclear weapons stockpiles, thus minimizing doubt and promoting strategic stability. Over time, a systematic process of nuclear arsenal reduction and, ultimately, total elimination should be followed, in accordance with the requirements of Article VI of the NPT and backed up by international law and moral pressure. Together, these approaches highlight the need for strengthening multilateral organizations and emphasizing the critical position of the UNSC in advocating for nuclear disarmament, as part of the R2P doctrine (ICJ, 1996).

Maintaining global peace and security, respecting humanitarian ideals, safeguarding civilians, advancing sustainable development, fostering state trust, and averting armed conflict are the fundamental objectives of disarmament. At the UN General Assembly (UNGA), nations that are close to significant nuclear powers have typically voiced strong support for disarmament (Sharma, Deo, & Joshi, 2023). Notably, the P5 nuclear states have also voiced support, with China leading in frequency-mentioning disarmament 254 times, particularly in 1986 (24 mentions) and 1987 (23 mentions) during the Cold War, urging the United States and the Soviet Union to take the lead (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023). China has also emphasized that all states should have a voice on disarmament due to its impact on their security interests. UNSC

Resolution 1540 recognized nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as significant threats to international peace and security, a concern that has been reiterated in subsequent resolutions (United Nations Security Council, 2004).

Despite this acknowledgment, progress on disarmament within the Council has remained limited, contributing to stagnation in nuclear reduction efforts (Sharma, Deo, & Joshi, 2023). This inertia is partly explained by the composition of the P5, all of whom possess nuclear capabilities, with four also ranking among the world's highest military spenders in 2021. In the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1172, voicing concern over the risk of a regional arms race and reaffirming the importance of the NPT and CTBT as central pillars of the global non-proliferation regime (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023). The resolution highlighted the UNSC's limited effectiveness on disarmament, as comparable scrutiny was not applied to the P5. Moreover, the P5 frequently argue that the global security environment is not favorable for disarmament, contributing to delayed decisions and a constrained agenda (Sharma, Deo, & Joshi, 2023).

5.10.2 Combating Biological and Chemical Weapons: R2P Perspective

In relation to the chemical warfare in Syria, the application of weapons of mass destruction poses a serious threat to existing international norms of prohibiting such actions. Mass atrocities according to the concept of R2P can be seen in such situations, especially where they are purposely aimed at the civilian population (United Nations, 2005; OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism, 2017). However, armed action according to R2P poses various problems in terms of legality, because all interventions must be approved by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Bellamy, 2015). In that regard, the war in Iraq in 2003 offers lessons on what happens where international consensus is ignored in relation to accusations of weapons of mass destruction. It was argued by both the U.S. and NATO that the production of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein was underway, but that claim eventually proved false (Iraq Survey Group, 2004; Chilcot Inquiry, 2016). On the contrary, according to the 2016 report on the Iraq Inquiry, the then-Prime Minister of UK Tony Blair made several errors during his decision-making process regarding military interventions (Chilcot Inquiry, 2016). This implies that, in situations where the use of R2P principle in dealing with the issue of possible WMDs is considered, it is vital to have sufficient evidence to substantiate such claims (United Nations, 2005; Bellamy, 2015).

To deal with the ongoing challenge of the use of chemical and biological weapons, a comprehensive approach by the UNSC is imperative. Firstly, the application of coercive measures towards violators should take place within a system of clear and reliable intelligence sharing to prevent any form of unilateralism. Secondly, the imposition of stringent punitive measures towards states and non-state actors that perpetrate mass atrocities involving chemical or biological weapons should be pursued. These include imposing sanctions and prosecuting perpetrators of mass atrocities under the Rome Statute. Thirdly, measures that strengthen inspections under OPCW should be enforced in real time to curb any attempts to develop and use such weapons secretly (OPCW, 2023). Lastly, in situations of utmost gravity where there is an urgent threat of crimes against humanity involving such weapons, military intervention under R2P could be applied, provided that such action is authorized by the UNSC. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 forms the basis of international law regarding the prohibition and accountability of chemical weapons (OPCW, 2023). In addition, the UN Security Council Resolution 2118 on Syria emphasizes the determination of nations to eradicate the use of chemical weapons through joint efforts in law enforcement (UNSC Resolution 2118, 2013).

5.10.3 Action Plan for Global Terrorism/Transnational Terrorism: R2P Perspective

The threat posed by terrorism in contemporary times is a multifaceted one, entailing the existence of dynamic networks, ideologically motivated individuals, and increasingly sophisticated methods employed by terrorists. The ongoing existence of terrorist organizations that span the globe only serves to increase the possibility of another attack of the magnitude witnessed during 9/11. This will be due to the continued use of technology by non-state actors in a bid to facilitate terrorist activities in areas with poor governance and porous borders (UN General Assembly, 2006). For there to be any success against terrorist activities, it is important to go beyond rhetoric and institute a counter-terrorism approach characterized by operational depth through increased organizational capacity. This can be achieved through the expansion of the capacity of the UN Counter Terrorism Committee at the field level, and also through setting up a multilaterally mandated counter terrorism force (UN General Assembly, 2006).

In addition to this, cooperation with regional bodies and neighboring countries continues to be critical, since many times terrorism may become part of the regional

security environment, necessitating cooperative intelligence and joint operations. Last but not least, any strategy to defeat terrorism would have to include capacity building in terms of training and equipping the national security forces, especially those of weak states, in line with the priorities set by the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which stresses prevention measures and capacity building (UN General Assembly, 2006).

Terrorism has no religion, caste and creed and no political intent. Solidarity and global consensus are required to combat terrorism with holistic approach. The terrorism is highly discussed issue in UNGA. The discussion has been heightened after the attack of 9/11. UN peacekeeping and counter terrorist mandate is little bit contradictory. There is high possibility of not sending troops by TCCs under counter terrorist mandate. Countering terrorism is basically responsibility of host nation. They have to consider safety and security of the troops (Personal Communication, 23 Jun, 2023).

5.10.4 Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Natural Disaster: R2P Perspective

Many notable connections can be found if we explore the connection between R2P and climate change. Climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities by causing resource shortages, displacement, and increased competition for resources such as fertile soil and water. These stresses have the possibility of escalating and even creating conflict situations that may require the application of R2P. An example is how violence and unrest have been tied to droughts that have occurred in the Sahel region. A large number of people who will be displaced as a result of climate change are expected to become climate refugees. If these displacements lead to persecution, then the methods of R2P will be needed (IPCC, 2022).

Some states may find it difficult to handle the effects of climate change, especially those that are tiny or have few resources. Consequently, states may experience an erosion of their capacity to adequately protect and provide for their populations. In such circumstances, there may be a compelling case for international engagement to assist and safeguard vulnerable communities. Climate change further intensifies this challenge by posing serious risks to fundamental human rights, including the rights to life, health, and adequate shelter (IPCC, 2022)

There can be a compelling case for including climate action into R2P since it focuses on preventing major harm to populations. In addition to direct acts of violence, states may also be held responsible for their failure to lessen the effects of climate change on communities that are already at risk. Global cooperation is needed to combat climate change, which is consistent with R2P. The possibility of situations that trigger R2P may be decreased with the aid of international cooperation in managing and mitigating the hazards associated with climate change (Scott, 2015). While direct violence and humanitarian crises are the main concerns of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), climate change is becoming more widely acknowledged as a major contributing factor to these crises. Proactively addressing climate change can be viewed as a component of a larger commitment to safeguard populations and respect international security and human rights standards. States and the international community must see climate action as essential to the goal of safeguarding vulnerable populations as a result of this intersection (Scott, 2015).

Climate change has been discussed at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) since the 1970s, gaining increased attention as the threat of global warming became more pressing. Mentions of climate change surged in 2007, when the UNGA theme was Responding to Climate Change (716 mentions), and reached a peak in 2009 with 773 mentions. This increase followed the release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Fourth Assessment Report, which highlighted the severity of climate risks and outlined adaptation and mitigation strategies. Subsequent agreements, conferences, and committee initiatives have further shaped climate discussions at the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly, 2009). Mentions declined in 2020 as global attention shifted to the COVID-19 pandemic. Climate change disproportionately affects certain countries, reflected in higher mentions by vulnerable states. Island nations such as Tuvalu (250 mentions), Micronesia (241), Samoa (220), Kiribati (170), and Dominica (142) cited the issue most frequently, whereas the combined mentions by the P5 countries totaled only 159 (Sharma, Deo, & Joshi, 2023). In its speech at the UNGA in 2018, for example, Tuvalu said, It is our humble hope that the entire Security Council membership can agree to include climate change as a permanent agenda item. It called upon the UNSC to appoint a special reporter to produce a regular review of global, regional and national security threats caused by climate change (Government of Tuvalu, 2018).

Climate change is discussed by the UNSC because of its far-reaching destabilizing consequences, despite the UNSC having considered this matter for the first time in 2007. Since then, the UNSC has had debates, briefings, and regional resolutions on how climate change is harmful. Nevertheless, the UNSC has not passed any thematic resolution that considers all the climate change security challenges. In the context of the UNSC, such challenges are referred to as non-traditional threats (United Nations, 2021). In 2021, a resolution proposing climate-related security risks as a core part of the UN's conflict-prevention strategies was vetoed by Russia. While most members supported the resolution, India opposed it and China abstained, arguing that the UNSC is not the appropriate forum for this discussion (Sharma, Deo, & Joshi, 2023). Some observers have termed the UNSC's response to climate change a 'no-response'-i.e., reacting to crises due to climate change without overtly acknowledging climate change insecurity (Sharma, Deo & Joshi, 2023).

After analysis of the various discussions, it could be stated that climate change is a major threat which lead to severe danger to mankind and has significant implication on R2P. There is need of effective action plan against climate change. Firstly, National, regional, and global actionable as well as implementable strategy is required to fight against climate change. For this, UN should lead the global strategy. UN has to act as capacity enhancer and watchdog to collect fund, bring comprehensive program and campaigns. There is need of solidarity and commitment from industrialized countries to adhere reduction of carbon emission and collaborate with global effort to combat climate change. When there is disaster beyond national capacity, UN has to lead on wide scale disasters. In addition, UN has to act as coordination center for the mobilization of multinational force in wide scale disaster response whenever required. Since, region and state itself are vital assets to deal with climate change induced R2P duties, capacity enhancement of the state/ region for combating climate change, natural disasters and environmental hazards.

5.11 Ways Ahead for Strengthening Peace Enforcement: A Critical Tool for Collective Security, R2P and POC

There is a fundamental difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Applying or threatening military force is how peace enforcement enforces adherence to resolutions or sanctions. The primary objective of peace enforcement is to compel non-compliant parties to adhere to a ceasefire or truce, thereby establishing the security

conditions necessary for the effective implementation of subsequent peace operations. Its defining feature lies in the authorization to use coercive measures, including lethal force where necessary, particularly in hostile environments, to ensure mandate implementation (United Nations, 2008). They are able to establish the security circumstances necessary for their own success and are not entirely dependent on the belligerents' assistance. All of the fundamental peacekeeping principles are broken by this fundamental disagreement (Street, 2023). The Security Council can take steps to keep or restore international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These kinds of actions can include military action by other countries or economic sanctions. The Council also sets up Special Political Missions and UN Peacekeeping Operations. So, in terms of policy, the UNSC can do a lot, but in practice, it's not very good (Personal Communication, 13 Dec, 2023).

The UN itself does not have the capability to carry out peace enforcement missions. As such, it must depend on the capability of the Member States in carrying out such tasks. Thus far, the result has been mixed in regard to the undertaking. The legal basis that provides the framework under which the Security Council can take enforcement action is provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter(United Nations, 1945). Despite ongoing challenges in peace building, these efforts have helped countries move beyond conflict and create conditions for stable development. However, their effectiveness largely depends on the broader political context and the coherence of peace efforts within the country (Paris, 2004) This reality presents peace operations with a significant challenge to achieving their mandates, and it is for this reason the effectiveness cannot be measured in solitude (Personal Communication, 13 Dec, 2023).

Implementation of Chapter VII needs powerful Armed Forces by TCC under the total control of UN. When performance is evaluated, track record is not encouraging. Combating terrorism, preventing genocide and ethnic cleansing require a stronger, better-resourced, and more effective UN peacekeeping force. These are difficult and challenging works. The west and the US are unwilling to send their forces in such area of operations. That means, UN has to deal with second or third best available in the world. The fighting capacity and the chain of command have to be fully complied with the UN mandate. UN cannot do anything if the TCCs disobey its own SRSG/FC's order in the field. This means the UN remains weak in the conflict zone and continues to do their best in the given circumstances (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

For their operations, peace enforcement agencies do not need or often will have complete consent. As a result, they will struggle to maintain strict impartiality and are probably going to encounter active opposition from one or more of the parties involved. Any belligerents who believe they could achieve substantial advantages through more fighting are likely to view an intervening force as an enemy, even if it proportionately applies restraint against all sides (Street, 2023). Furthermore, even if a side is aware that it is gaining from the intervention, it may still believe that the intervening force is gone too far to aid the enemy. Last but not least, in certain situations, it can be required to step in and save a weak, defenseless party from complete destruction. Since the restraint will be imposed exclusively to one side, there won't even be the illusion of impartiality in this situation. In modern siege warfare, when famine is employed as part of a larger military plan, even the act of providing humanitarian aid might be viewed as unwelcome interference (Street, 2023).

International legality is typically established through a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which may authorize the use of all necessary means to implement its decisions. However, legal authorization does not automatically ensure legitimacy. Peace enforcement operations often remain contested, particularly when the conflict does not pose a clear threat to the national interests of intervening states or to regional stability (Chesterman, 2001). The conflict prone countries must be supported in advance, so that they do not get into unmanageable conflict. Proactive action can save more than the reactive response. As the saying goes, a stitch in time saves nine, a rogue state can be encouraged to change with the UN support and bring political change in the state. If UN does nothing and waits after the country plunges into complex civil war situation, it not only takes long time to recover but many lives and property would be lost. Recovering from deadly conflicts may take decades (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is empowered to take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security, ranging from economic sanctions to the use of military force. It also mandates UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions. While the Council possesses broad authority in policy terms, its effectiveness in practice is often constrained by internal divisions among its members (Weiss, 2013).

Securing domestic and international public support is a crucial element of peace

enforcement. Its primary military objective is to create and sustain a secure environment that enables diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian efforts to function effectively. In this sense, peace enforcement serves as a tool for ending conflict rather than resolving its underlying causes (Street, 2023). It differs from war in both its political objectives and its reliance on restrained use of force to maintain legitimacy. It is also distinct from peacekeeping, as it operates in hostile environments where traditional peacekeeping missions are not viable. The conflict in Bosnia illustrates the risks of deploying peacekeepers in unsuitable conditions. Although peacekeeping and peace enforcement may share similar long-term goals, their methods are fundamentally different (Durch, 2006).

5.11.1 Peace Enforcement and Coercion Theory

Deployment of force during peace enforcement, given the inherently political nature of peace enforcement, is best viewed as coercive diplomacy. According to George and Simons, coercive diplomacy employs the actual or threatened application of limited force for diplomacy purposes in order to compel an adversary to cease its aggressive behavior without defeating it (George & Simons, 1994). It combines the threat of punishment with incentives and persuasion to influence compliance with specific demands. In this approach, carefully calibrated and limited uses of force may be necessary to reinforce the credibility of such threats (Tubbs, 1997).

Although debates have long persisted over the scope and character of UN peacekeeping, there is now broad agreement on its foundational principles. The 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine) offers a widely accepted framework, despite certain limitations. It emphasizes that peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the principal parties to a conflict; in the absence of such consent, an operation may shift in nature toward peace enforcement (Sheeran & Case, 2014).

Proponents of peace enforcement argue that traditional UN peacekeeping missions are ill-suited to address evolving conflict dynamics, particularly in parts of Africa where armed groups employ terrorist tactics. UN peacekeeping doctrine-grounded in consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force-does not align with counterterrorism objectives, which often require more robust and offensive mandates.

Maintaining impartiality remains essential for fostering sustainable political solutions, yet the coercive elements inherent in peace enforcement risk undermining this neutrality (Street, 2023).

African Union (AU) peace support operations, by contrast, frequently adopt a peace enforcement model that involves direct engagement with armed groups, often incorporating counterterrorism elements. This approach differs significantly from UN peacekeeping, which is designed to sustain existing peace or assist fragile peace processes. Allocating core UN funding to AU missions that at times resemble active combat operations would mark a significant shift in UN practice. Such developments, combined with growing institutional support for peace enforcement, could signal a gradual transformation of UN peacekeeping and an increased emphasis on counterterrorism roles (Street, 2023). Traditionally, the UN Security Council has viewed peacekeeping as a non-enforcement mechanism intended to create the conditions necessary for durable political solutions, rather than to impose peace through force. This understanding was reaffirmed by the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations in 2015 and continues to shape contemporary policy perspectives (Street, 2023).

Peacekeeping is generally defined as military or paramilitary activity conducted with the consent of the principal parties, aimed at monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and supporting diplomatic efforts toward long-term political settlements. While peacekeepers may assist in maintaining law and order, their role does not extend to coercing parties into resolving their conflicts (Sheeran & Case, 2014).

5.11.2 Gaps in Peace Enforcement

The existing peace enforcement mechanism of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) faces several gaps and challenges are described subsequently. Firstly, UNSC resolutions often lack specific, actionable language, leading to confusion among peacekeeping forces and the international community. Secondly, mandates may not account for evolving situations on the ground, limiting the flexibility of peacekeeping operations (United Nations, 2008). Peace enforcement operations are often underfunded, leading to shortages in vital resources, including personnel, equipment, and logistical support. Some member states may not have the necessary military capabilities or resources to contribute effectively to peace enforcement operations. Likewise, Peace

enforcement operations may not receive adequate support from regional and international actors, leading to duplication of efforts or gaps in coverage (HIPPO, 2015). UNSC oversight of peacekeeping operations is insufficient, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability. Peacekeeping operations may not plan for long-term engagement and transitions, leading to abrupt withdrawals and potential instability. In addition, Peacekeeping Operations may lack clear exit strategies, leading to confusion about their role and responsibilities during transition phases (United Nations, 2008).

These gaps and challenges underscore the need for a comprehensive and systemic reform of the UNSC's peace enforcement mechanism to ensure more effective and sustainable peacekeeping operations (United Nations, 2008; HIPPO, 2015).

5.11.3 Strengthening Peace Enforcement Tool

Strengthening the peace enforcement capabilities of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a complex endeavor that involves addressing various political, operational, and resource-related challenges. UN doesn't have capability for peace enforcement missions. Therefore, it has to rely on the Member States having such capability and willingness. Till now, a mixed result has been obtained from such practices (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023). Some strategies that could be considered for enhancing the effectiveness of UNSC peace enforcement are discussed subsequently. Firstly, UNSC resolutions must ensure that peace enforcement mandates are clearly defined, specifying the objectives, rules of engagement, and limits of force (United Nations, 2000). There is need to develop flexible mandates that allow peace enforcement operations to adapt to dynamic situations on the ground (United Nations, 2015).

In addition, it is required to establish comprehensive training programs for troops before deployment, focusing on conflict resolution, civilian protection, and humanitarian law. Conduct joint exercises among contributing nations to improve coordination and interoperability of peacekeeping forces (United Nations, 2015). Similarly, there is also need of creating incentives for member states to contribute troops and resources to peace enforcement missions, which may include funding, logistical support, or political recognition (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). Likewise, fostering cooperation with regional organizations, such as the AU or the EU is supportive to enhance local ownership and political support for enforcement actions (United Nations, 1992). Securing dedicated

funding streams for peace enforcement missions to ensure that operations have the necessary resources for personnel, equipment, and logistical support have positive impact on overall operational capacity (United Nations, 2015).

UN mission has to establish rapid response contingents that can be deployed quickly to crises, equipped with necessary resources and capabilities utilizing technology for surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence-gathering to enhance situational awareness of conflict zones. The integration of drones and autonomous systems for monitoring and operational support-where appropriate and with due consideration of ethical implications-is essential for modern UN peacekeeping operations (United Nations, 2015). Likewise, UN has to create independent mechanisms to review peace enforcement operations and assess their effectiveness, accountability, and impact on civilian populations. Ensure that all peace enforcement actions adhere to human rights standards and international law to maintain legitimacy and public trust (United Nations, 2015). In addition, engaging with local communities and civil society organizations helps generate critical insights and build cooperation, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of enforcement and stabilization efforts. Conduct campaigns to communicate the goals and benefits of peace enforcement operations to local populations, helping to build support and understanding (United Nations, 2015).

There are still concerns over the UNSC's ability to carry out its judgment when it deems that action must be approved. Recently, multinational troops have overseen deciding whether to sanction the use of armed action to maintain the peace. When forces are authorized with the cooperation of the parties to a conflict, they are more usually sent to help execute a peace accord or monitor ceasefire lines after hostilities. These blue-helmeted peacekeepers are under direct UN authority and are dressed in UN uniforms (UN, 2004). The propensity to refer to peacekeeping missions as Chapter VI operations and peace enforcement missions as Chapter VII operations, meaning consent-based or coercion-based, respectively, has clouded discussions on the requisite capacities. This abbreviation is frequently used to distinguish between operations that only entail the use of deadly force in self-defense and those that do not. Both descriptions are partially inaccurate (UN, 2004). A distinction exists between operations where the effective use of force is integral from the outset-such as responses to cross-border aggression or sudden escalations in violence, where multinational forces are increasingly mandated-and those where there is a reasonable expectation that force may

not be necessary, as in traditional peacekeeping missions tasked with monitoring ceasefires or supporting peace implementation. Nevertheless, both categories of operations require authorization from the Security Council, except in cases of self-defense under Article 51. In practice, it has become customary to provide Chapter VII mandates for both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, even if this approach is not always favored by troop-contributing countries (UN, 2004).

This reflects the reality that even relatively stable environments can quickly deteriorate due to spoilers who undermine peace agreements and threaten civilians, making it essential for missions to retain the credible capacity to use force when required. On the other hand, it is possible to overstate the distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates. There is no question that peacekeeping missions operating under Chapter VI (and thus operating without enforcement powers) have the legal right to use force in self-defense, and it is generally accepted that this right extends to defense of the mission (UN, 2004). Making sure that the deployed forces have the necessary resources and an appropriate, clear, and well-understood mandate that is applicable to all the changing circumstances that could reasonably be anticipated is the real challenge in any deployment of forces in any configuration and for any role (UN, 2004). There is still a greater need for personnel than there is currently a ready supply for both full-scale peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions. By the end of 2004, there were 16 missions worldwide involving more than 60,000 peacekeepers. If international attempts to resolve many protracted wars in Africa proceed as planned, a significant increase in the number of peacekeepers will be required soon. Without a corresponding increase in manpower, United Nations peacekeeping runs the risk of repeating some of its biggest mistakes of the 1990s (UN, 2004).

In many countries, armed forces remain structured around Cold War-era roles, resulting in fewer than 10% of personnel in uniform being readily available for active deployment at any given time, thereby limiting the overall capacity for global deployments (UN, 2004). In addition, few countries have the necessary transport and logistical infrastructure to move and supply those who are available. The availability of peacekeepers must increase if peacekeeping, and in extreme situations, peace enforcement, are to remain a reliable and popular tool of collective security. The developed States have obligations in this regard and ought to exert more effort to

convert their current force capacity into contingents that are appropriate for peace operations (UN, 2004).

After analyzing above discussions, it can be stated that strengthening the peace enforcement capabilities of the UNSC requires a multifaceted approach that combines clear mandates, robust training, political will, technological enhancements, accountability, and engagement with local communities. By addressing these aspects systematically, the UNSC can improve its ability to respond effectively to conflicts and contribute to global peace and security.

5.11.4 Fostering Relationship with the Global Alliances: NATO

More often than not, contemporary large-scale disputes outstrip the limits of traditional peacekeeping missions of the UN (Bellamy & Williams, 2013) and necessitate the application of enhanced enforcement measures through the lens of collective security policy. In particular, NATO's role in the described conflict has illustrated an opportunity to utilize alliance's military capabilities as a complement to UNSC's initiatives (Gheciu, 2005). Thanks to its organizational cohesion and quick deployment potential, NATO is capable of implementing complex and intense military operations that are beyond the mandate and capability of peacekeeping troops (Gheciu, 2005). The successful completion of missions such as the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 or the military operation in Libya, which included the establishment of a no-fly zone, illustrates the point (Gheciu, 2005). These examples show how cooperation with NATO might prove helpful in operationalizing the concept of collective security in terms of bridging the gap between normative prescriptions and their military implementation. In this case, NATO helped to convert theoretical coercive norms into reality (Gheciu, 2005).

Furthermore, the limitations faced by conventional UN peacekeeping missions in intense conflict zones stress the importance of cooperation and flexibility in institutions. The increased use of parallel forces, for example French military interventions, to maintain stability in volatile regions where UN forces have insufficient abilities is evident from the missions in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Williams and Bellamy, 2013). Conventional peacekeeping forces that were formed to address low-intensity and consent-oriented situations do not work well in situations involving enforcement, asymmetric threats, and weak state governance. Therefore, forging partnerships with NATO will not only increase efficiency but will bring about an

understanding of the necessity of reforms within the UN Peacekeeping mission structure, including improvements in equipment, command chain, and rules of engagement. The inclusion of NATO's advanced technological prowess, intelligence capabilities, and command system in UNSC-mandated missions can lead to improved performance in such missions and result in restructuring of peacekeeping principles (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Gheciu, 2005).

5.12 Implementation of Collective Security

Implementation of collective security by UNSC is not very effective, especially in the areas where at least one of the P5 countries' interests is connected. Also lack of resources makes the response less effective. However, the UN has done a significant job in controlling the damage. If there was no UN, the world situation could have been very different. Something is better than nothing (Personal Communication, May 05, 2023). Sikkim was annexed, Bangladesh was carved out of Pakistan, Tibet was taken over by China, Kurdistan is fighting for their land and UN did nothing and it will not do anything in future. If major powers or P5 powers are involved in it the UN does nothing. Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo are other examples where UN has paid only lip services. Nothing has been done against Israel who has systematically destroyed Gaza. If the West and USA does not see it reasonable to engage, the UN can do nothing (Personal Communication, June 18, 2024). Implementation of Collective security is solely based on the interest of the super powers. If there is interest of superpower, UN takes collective security action and works (Personal Communication, June 23, 2023).

Ukraine crisis has posed serious threat to collective security and capability of UN to authorize the enforcement actions mandated by the charters. The charters are not out of date. They have also visualized the threat to sovereignty to small states and also kept security of small states in priority. But practical implementation of it is another problem when comes the issue of major power of the world Effective implementation of collective security will make world safe (Personal Communication, December 13, 2023).

From various analysis and interpretation conducted in this dissertation regarding the topic of collective security, it can be seen that effectiveness of collective security under the framework of UN is highly limited due to various structural and political limitations, including the veto power and lack of any enforceable measures (Personal

Communication, June 18, 2023). The main requirement that would ensure the effectiveness of collective security in the world will be the revision of the UN Charter in order to ban or limit the use of veto when collective security measures are concerned to prevent any deadlock situations that arise from aggressions (Personal Communication, June 18, 2023). In addition to the above point, compulsory abstentions in disputes between the parties will enhance procedural objectivity and legitimacy of decisions made by the UNSC. As for the reforms mentioned above, there should be additional emphasis put on preserving the integrity and legitimacy of sovereign rights of states as the key principles that should not be violated when addressing the issues of collective security (Personal Communication, June 18, 2023).

Apart from institutional reform, the implementation of collective security entails the application of a comprehensive combination of coercive and diplomatic mechanisms. The use of a structured coercion framework that includes diplomatic isolation, exclusion from participating in any international organizations, and imposition of strict economic sanctions can be used as a deterrence tool to prevent attacks. Moreover, forcing attacking nations to refrain from taking decisions in UN institutions is another mechanism of achieving collective security (Personal Communication, June 23, 2023). The use of coercion measures is not enough since diplomatic negotiations at national, regional, and international levels need to be done in order to reduce tensions between conflicting parties. Enforcement measures including deployment of multinational military force should be considered as a last option because diplomacy and sanctions are more appropriate approaches. In other words, the implementation of collective security should be balanced in the sense that all the three components legality, restraint, and enforcement capabilities are combined to achieve this goal (Personal Communication, June 18, 2023).

5.13 Need of concrete Action Plan for the Implementation Strategy of High-Level UN Reports

There are some high-level reports officially initiated by UN for reformation and up gradation of capability visualizing future threats. Creation of Task force and committee, Periodic progress reports are required otherwise, it will be limited to paper only. The report of the high-level panel on Threat Challenges and Change and Our Common agenda have to great extent identified the contemporary security, economic,

health hazards, environmental hazards and other multidimensional aspects of threats and challenges to the contemporary world. There are many recommendations and action plan given. The implementation of them will assist in creating secure and harmonious world. The reports are comprehensive, implementation of them will take time but the issue is that there should be seriousness and genuine efforts to implement (United Nations, 2004).

According to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, any occurrence or phenomenon that causes mass casualties, affects human welfare, or undermines the ability of states as the basic components of the international system is considered a threat to international security (United Nations, 2004). In light of this definition, there are six categories of threats that should be considered by the international community at present and in the future decades. They include social and economic challenges that undermine the security and development of people around the world, including poverty, epidemic diseases, and ecological destruction. Whereas internal disputes, including civil wars and genocides, present major threats to the civilian population and statehood, interstate disputes remain a continuing challenge to international security (United Nations, 2004). Also, a critical security threat with dire consequences associated with it is the proliferation and eventual use of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons. Terrorist activities are continuously evolving as a global security threat through exploiting networks for operational, technological, and ideological support. Lastly, transnational crime undermines state stability further through corruption and illicit trafficking across borders (United Nations, 2004).

According to the report, over its first six decades, the UN has played a significant role in reducing and managing threats to international security. Despite notable failures and limitations, its overall contributions remain substantial and often under recognized. This record provides grounds for optimism that the Organization can adapt to effectively address emerging challenges in the twenty-first century. The central task for the UN and its member states is to ensure that distant threats do not escalate into imminent dangers, and that imminent threats do not become catastrophic. Achieving this requires a comprehensive framework for preventive action that addresses the full spectrum of threats and reflects their varied impact across different regions. Above all, it calls for strong leadership at both national and international levels to respond early,

decisively, and collectively including nuclear terrorism, before they reach their most destructive potential (United Nations, 2004).

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) offers a detailed institutional critique and reform blueprint for the United Nations, pointing out inadequacies in structures, functions, and legitimacy within various organs and sectors of operations. Collectively, these observations suggest that although the UN has been involved in resolving global insecurities in the past, its institutional setup has failed to adapt adequately to the challenges of the twenty-first century. A notable point raised in this report is that the General Assembly has lost its vitality and does not pay adequate attention to the most pressing global matters (United Nations, 2004). This observation is consistent with the academic analysis that the General Assembly, being a deliberative organ, suffers from a lack of decisiveness during crises due to its inclusivity (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

At the same time, there is the proposal for the establishment of a more proactive and credible Security Council, noting the imbalance between the responsibility to decide and the contribution to the budget, military capabilities, and diplomatic presence. This suggestion reflects the long-lasting legitimacy crisis regarding the structure and functions of the Security Council. According to Chesterman (2016), the lack of credibility in the UN Security Council hampers the implementation of its resolutions, especially those related to humanitarian and security operations. Furthermore, Hurd (2007) emphasizes that legitimacy in international organizations is linked to justice and representative character, supporting the Panel's recommendation to change the structure. The Panel also mentions a big institutional gap regarding the issue of addressing states under pressure and the problem of post-conflict situations, which usually lack attention and necessary resources. This claim is supported by empirical studies showing that post-conflict peace building activities are fragmented and short-lived (Paris, 2004).

Moreover, the inadequate use of regional and sub-regional institutions is identified as an oversight on the part of burden-sharing and local conflict resolution. This indicates a changing perspective on multi-level governance in the field of peace and security, wherein regional organizations like the African Union and ECOWAS have shown certain comparative advantages when it comes to early intervention and contextual legitimacy (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). It thus becomes imperative for the strengthening of UN-regional organization collaboration in order to ensure operational

efficiency. The suggestion by the Panel on new institutional structures that would deal with economic and social challenges widens the scope of security from the traditional realm. This is aligned with the concept of human security according to which poverty, disease, and environmental degradation pose the same threat to stability as armed conflict (UNDP, 1994).

Matter of equal importance is the criticism about the legitimacy problem that plagued the Commission on Human Rights. It was the reason why the Human Rights Council was created in 2006 to address the legitimacy problem and other problems relating to accountability. Nonetheless, academic criticisms indicate that there were still issues about politicization and selective application within the new entity (Alston, 2006). Lastly, the Panel recognizes the importance of creating an effective secretariat that can make decisive decisions as a team. Leadership and administrative capability are key considerations when discussing UN reform issues (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

It has given road map for the reformation of UN in multidimensional sectors which includes reforming of UNSC and amendment in Charter. There is requirement of implementation plan for future betterment. On the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, held during the COVID-19 pandemic, Member States committed to strengthening global governance for both present and future generations and requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations to address emerging and ongoing challenges (UN75 Declaration, A/RES/75/1). In response, the Secretary-General presented his 2021 report, *Our Common Agenda*, which serves as a call to accelerate progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and advance the commitments outlined in the UN75 Declaration. The report presents a vision for the future of global cooperation, emphasizing the need for more inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism to better serve people and the planet. It also proposes measures to address gaps and emerging risks since 2015 and calls for the convening of a Summit of the Future in 2024 to further these efforts (Guterres, 2021).

On the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Member States committed to strengthening global governance for present and future generations and requested that the Secretary-General provide recommendations to address both current and future challenges (UN75 Declaration, A/RES/75/1). In

September 2021, the Secretary-General responded with *Our Common Agenda*, which called for accelerating the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and advancing the commitments made in the UN75 Declaration. The report outlined proposals to address emerging gaps since 2015, including the convening of a Summit of the future in 2024, preceded by a ministerial meeting in 2023, and the adoption of an action-oriented Pact for the Future through intergovernmental negotiations (Guterres, 2021).

The Secretary-General emphasized that humanity's future depends on solidarity, trust, and the ability to work collectively. No single country, however powerful, can resolve these global challenges alone. He proposed updating disarmament strategies to ensure human, national, and collective security, including broader support for non-proliferation, the eventual elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, effective regulation of conventional and emerging weapon technologies, and measures to prevent cyber attacks and limit risks from lethal autonomous weapons systems. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2021 was highlighted as a historic step toward a world free of nuclear weapons (Guterres, 2021).

The report also addressed the evolving nature of global threats, including terrorism, climate change, transnational conflicts, cyber insecurity, and emerging technologies, emphasizing that traditional approaches to prevention and resolution are often inadequate. It called for strengthened cooperation at both national and regional levels, predictable financing for Chapter VIII peace support operations, and greater UN support for regional security and peace building capacities. While multilateralism has prevented world wars and nuclear use over the past 75 years, new risks, including protracted conflicts, displacement, and environmental instability, threaten the promise of the UN Charter, making urgent and collective action essential (Guterres, 2021).

To effectively deal with the emerging security threats, it is essential for the UNSC to undergo structural and procedural reforms. Firstly, expanding the permanent and non-permanent membership of the UNSC to include a more diverse and representative range of nations would enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness. This should consider emerging powers and regions with significant global influence. Secondly, ensuring greater transparency, inclusivity, and participation in the decision-making processes of the UNSC would improve its efficiency. Enhanced cooperation and

coordination with regional organizations, such as the AU or the Arab League, could also strengthen the UNSC's ability to address specific regional challenges (Personal Communication, June 18, 2024).

Moreover, the UNSC should adapt to new security dimensions, such as cyber security and environmental issues. Creating specialized committees or working groups within the UNSC that focus on these emerging threats could provide dedicated expertise and facilitate timely and effective responses. Additionally, encouraging preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and promoting sustainable development could be key components of the future UNSC's approach to addressing security threats holistically. (Personal Communication, 18 June, 2024). Various actions need to be taken in order to deal with the challenges posed by the modern world due to the changing nature of modern conflict—characterized by terrorism, state weakness, and hybrid warfare—that have revealed deficiencies in both structure and doctrine in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). One of the problems faced here is that of an unclear counter-terrorism mandate in peace operations like those carried out in Mali, which have resulted in lack of coherence and inefficiencies among peacekeepers. With growing engagements by UNPKO in high-intensity areas, it becomes necessary for the core principles of impartiality and use of minimal force to be revisited in a well-defined theoretical and conceptual framework. The inclusion of rapid-deployment units and establishment of clear rules of engagement would be effective in achieving this goal (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). In addition, there is a need for reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), especially its decision-making processes, such as observing strict abstentions and limited use of veto in issues of collective security.

Despite the need for coercion, it is still important to focus on negotiations and engagement, alongside appropriate punishment in the form of sanctions and ostracization of aggressors within international business and economic networks (United Nations, 2004). Furthermore, effective collective security requires enforcement mechanisms that can act quickly on humanitarian issues, particularly in cases where delays contribute to mass murders. In these circumstances, working in cooperation with regional organizations and military coalitions proves to be one of the possible strategies to follow, in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (United Nations, 2005). It becomes especially relevant if the government of a country itself commits acts of violence against its citizens, thus making it necessary to employ stronger means of

ensuring peace in accordance with R2P (Personal Communication, 18 June, 2024).

This can be done by relying not only on capability but also by bringing about a change in norms, placing global security above national interests. Similarly, the application of recommendations by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, together with measures like Our Common Agenda, is crucial in addressing new challenges such as climate change, disaster situations, and nuclear proliferation (Guterres, 2021). The suggestion of a counterterrorism force composed of highly advanced armies is yet another aspect that highlights the necessity of creating special units within the United Nations organization (Personal Communication, 18 June, 2024).

5.14 Amendment Required in Different Charter of UN

Organizations like the League of Nations and United Nations are typically founded following major wars and are designed to meet the demands of the victorious nations. In most cases, when an organization is being structured, the anxieties and experiences of the conflict are considered. For example, Articles 14, 53, and 107 of the UN Charter include provisions specifically targeting the Axis powers of World War II, namely Germany and Japan. This indicates that one of the Charter's central objectives was not clearly defined at the time of its drafting (Schermers & Blokker, 2011). From a neorealist perspective, the concepts of ally and enemy need to be reconsidered, as their meanings have shifted significantly since the Cold War. In the 1990s, the UN operated in an international environment marked by considerable uncertainty and changing power dynamics (Mearsheimer, 2001).

In the late 1950s, the United States succeeded in relocating the Security Council seat designated for Eastern Europe to Asia, responding to growing demands for Asian and African representation. However, as African, Eastern European, and Asian states continued to push for greater inclusion, this adjustment proved to be only a temporary solution. To address these pressures, the number of elective members was increased from six to ten, expanding the Council from eleven to fifteen members (Malone, 2004). The Council's composition has undergone significant changes three times: in 1965, Articles 23 and 27 of the UN Charter were amended to raise the number of elected members to ten; in 1971, the General Assembly recognized the delegation from the People's Republic of China as the official representative of China, replacing the representative of the Republic of China, thus avoiding contentious issues regarding

admission or expulsion of members. Similarly, after the fall of the USSR in 1991, the Russian Federation assumed the former Soviet seat with minimal controversy (Malone, 2004).

During the Cold War, the Security Council struggled to function as a unified body. In the early stages of the conflict, the United States used the Council in its disputes with the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union frequently blocked resolutions, creating the impression of ineffectiveness. Later, as the US faced tensions with many Third World states in the 1970s and 1980s, it began exercising its veto power. Despite these challenges, the Council still adopted 31 decisions during the Cold War, including cooperation between the superpowers on the Arab-Israeli conflict, collective security actions in Kuwait and Korea, and the imposition of sanctions (United Nations, 2008). Following the Cold War, the Council regained functionality, aided by a new era of cooperation initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, when the Soviet Union declared its readiness to reengage with the United Nations (Malone, 2004).

The UN has been perceived to resist any changes and adaptations. The body has shown signs of resistance, hesitation, and incapacity in relation to adapting and evolving. Even the creativity and activities of the United Nations have been hindered by bureaucratic culture. Because of several restrictions that have been posed on the organization due to the rules and conventions of the charter, including the absolute dominance of veto power, the member countries have sometimes been incapable of enforcing the change (Weiss, 2013). Lack of implementation of UN's human rights values among non-majority population is another deficiency in the organization. Some of the worst cases of human right violations in today's era, like the Rwandan genocide, have remained unprotected, and unchecked, mainly because the UN has not been able to intervene (Weiss, 2013).

In a similar way, it is clear that there exists an inadequacy with regard to addressing various dangers of the contemporary era. There have been failures of the United Nations in meeting the goals laid down in the Charter, such as ensuring conflict resolution in amicable manner and promoting peace in the region. Although this goal has not been mentioned directly, terrorism is implied to be one of the major causes of regional wars, mass killings of innocent civilians, and economic destabilization of the countries under terror attacks. Furthermore, the UN has failed to achieve its objectives

related to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear arms and disarmament (Weiss, 2013). There still exists a problem with the ongoing arms race and its danger to peace at the global level. It was stated that the Member States should work together in promoting the work of the UN regarding the achievement of peace and development for all, given the fact that this organization holds a pivotal position in international politics and needs to be strengthened (United Nations, 2005).

It is not an easy process to amend the UN Charter. For example, in spite of the fact that the WW II ended 70 years ago and the war's losers joined the UN decades earlier, the P5 powers' refusal to change the Charter has prevented the removal of sections 53 and 107, which refer to them as enemy states. There is little likelihood that the Security Council will undergo significant transformation during our lifetimes. On the other hand, a number of useful reforms and adjustments can be implemented, particularly in situations where the P5's interests are not immediately threatened (Gautam, 2018).

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change has identified and recommended several areas for potential revision of the UN Charter. Since its adoption in 1945, the Charter-amended three times in 1963, 1965, and 1973-has guided the organization's principles and actions. These amendments demonstrate that the UN General Assembly and the P5 possess the authority to modify the Charter when necessary, provided there is the approval of a majority of permanent members. While the Charter is considered a rigid legal framework, it is not immutable. The Panel's report highlights several shortcomings in the current Charter that require attention to enhance the UN's capacity to address contemporary global challenges (United Nations, 2004). Those shortcomings are discussed as follows.

- (a) To prevent retrospectively compromising the legal provisions of articles 53 and 107 (which refer to enemy States), changes to these articles need to be made. The Charter should represent modern goals and not those of 1945.
- (b) The Trusteeship Council chapter 13 ought to be dropped. The United Nations Trusteeship Council played a significant role in assisting the world's transition out of the colonial era and guiding numerous instances of successful decolonization. Any effort to revert to colonial ideologies and practices should be rejected by the United Nations (United Nations, 2004).

(c) All references in Articles 26, 45, and 46 to the Military Staff Committee (Article 47) should be removed. The function envisioned for the five permanent members' Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 is no longer relevant. Better military advice for the Security Council recommended by panel separately (United Nations, 2004).

(d) However, the Panel is of the opinion that the Charter still offers a solid legal and policy framework for the management of collective security, allowing UNSC to address both ongoing and emerging threats promptly and effectively to international peace and security. The Charter was also foresighted in recognizing how much social and economic progress depends on global peace and security (United Nations, 2004).

(e) All Member States ought to recommit themselves to upholding the goals and tenets of the Charter and putting them into effective practice by balancing political will and available resources. Sustained and coordinated leadership, both within individual states and among them, is essential to achieving effective collective security in the twenty-first century and ensuring a future that is secure and sustainable (United Nations, 2004).

Alternatively, the reforms being suggested can be viewed within the wider framework of making the UN an even more legitimate and effective institution of global governance. Specifically, the reforms could make the office of the Secretary-General more legitimate and empower him/her to play a more proactive role in terms of conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution. This would go hand-in-hand with the idea of having standing UN military forces that would be able to act quickly and efficiently in response to challenges to international peace and security rather than depend on contributions by individual states to respond to emergencies (Thapa, 1996).

Another crucial point related to the reforming of the global institution would include the development of its legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of power similar to the ones within national governmental institutions to increase effectiveness, legitimacy, and enforcement capacity. For example, the idea of allowing greater access to institutions such as the United Nations University as well as establishing bodies similar to a World Food Bank can demonstrate that development, education, and

humanitarian aid should be integrated into the global governance system to solve problems caused by poverty and inequality (Thapa, 1996).

Normatively and legally, therefore, these proposed reforms highlight the urgent need for reform of some important sections of the UN Charter. Moreover, it becomes equally crucial to reevaluate the issue of the principles of self-defense so as to rule out any possibilities of abuse. Reform in terms of enhancing the powers of the General Assembly in respect of controlling and regulating international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund will further serve the purposes of democratizing the world order. Binding international law is yet another requirement to make sure of compliance and accountability of all member nations of the UN (Thapa, 1996).

While writing the UN Charters, axis powers of that time (Germany, Japan, and Italy) were considered as the enemies. Since these powers were the defeated powers of the WWII, this provision was stated in the charter. The reality now is different since world power dynamics and world order has been changed. Germany and Japan are significant power of the world and their contribution to UN is significant (Weiss & Daws, 2007).

One of the vital aspects is financial contribution to run organization all the axis power of the WW II are within topmost contribution to UN in terms of the finances. Now they are significant power of the world having remarkable contribution in United Nations. Japan, Germany, and Italy are now close allies to NATO countries (Weiss & Daws, 2007). Even this irrelevant provision in the charter is not amended. From the discussions carried out, continuation of veto power will jeopardize the spirit of UN to maintain international peace and security, the charter related too it should be amended with appropriate options acceptable and ratified by UNSC and UNGA (Malone, 2004).

Amending the UN Charter, particularly regarding the Security Council, highlights a tension between legitimacy and effectiveness. The Council's legitimacy is questioned because it grants disproportionate influence to its permanent members, particularly those with veto power. However, major powers are unlikely to accept reforms that would dilute their authority, which is why the veto remains in place. This inherent tension is likely to persist, and current reform efforts aim to enhance legitimacy without undermining efficacy-primarily by limiting the number of additional seats to

ensure that consensus among members remains achievable (Malone, 2004).

The Gaza Israel conflict has clearly shown how the veto of one P5 member can hinder the peace and prosperity. Thus, the concept of P5 either needs to be more inclusive or scrapped (Personal Communication, 13 Dec, 2023). Casting veto even in appointment of UNSG is another undemocratic approach demanding amendment in UN Charter. During appointment of Boutros Boutros Ghali as SG for 2nd tenure in 1996, out of 15 members of UNSC, 14 said yes while US said no. As a result, his nomination was not approved. This is reality. Hence, veto has been a main paralyzing factor in substantial decision. Practical impossibility is seen in amendment of Charter since the consent of all P5 is required. Ideally there should not be veto power but difficult to amend and implement this (Personal Communication, May 9, 2024).


From discussions and analysis above, a holistic amendment in different issues of Charter is required to establish UN as a whole and UNSC in specific as global body to deal effectively in international peace and security affairs deemed necessary. Amendment must bridge the gap between the principles mentioned in the Charter and in practice. Firstly, the structure of UNSC must be inclusive with additional members in permanent and non permanent category representing different part of the globe to address the spirit of sovereign equality of all nations.

There should be provision of mandatory periodic review of UNSC structure. In addition to UNSC, role of UNGA must be ensured in decision making in global peace and security affairs. The amendment of Charter needs to ensure the provision of 'Uniting for Peace' tool as decisive and binding tool when UNSC remains indecisive. Compulsory abstention of any permanent, non permanent member of UNSC or member of UN in decision making when individual state is part of conflict prevents UNSC being paralyzed with single veto. Russo-Ukraine war could be taken as example where Russia is violating sovereignty of Ukraine but itself is casting veto to pass any related resolution. In amended Charter, clear provision of no veto in R2P, POC, Collective Security or any sort of humanitarian intervention ensures UNSC effectiveness for the establishment of international peace and security.

5.15 Results: Outcome of key Informant Interview with Diplomats/Scholars of Political Science/International Relation/Conflict Studies

Figure 5.1

Effectiveness of the present structure and procedural provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to address the world security issues




Source : Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of respondents (83.3 percentage) are of the view that current structural and procedural aspects of UNSC is partially effective while few are in view of effective/ineffective.

Figure 5.2

Requirement of change in present structure of the UNSC to function effectively in regards with security perspective of the global affairs




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (75 percentages) are of the view that present structure of UNSC must be changed.

Figure 5.3

Additional role to be given to UNSC to meet the present challenges




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (66.7 percentages) are of the view that UNSC to be given with additional role of food security, social economic privilege to underdeveloped country, dealing with transnational crime and human trafficking, environmental security, anti-terrorist mandate and action for state sponsored terrorism as well as security of land locked, small and least developed states.

Figure 5.4

Necessity of amendment in UN Charter




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (75 percentages) say non- relevant provisions in current Charter like provision of veto power, consent of all permanent members to enroll new member states and affirmative vote of all permanent members for any substantive decision and authorization of peacekeeping/peace enforcement mission needs to be amended.

Figure 5.5

Reason for the efforts for the reformation of the UNSC not culminating to fruitful end




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (41.7 percentages) are in view that conflict of interest amongst P5 members and ineffectiveness of leadership are the main reason for the efforts for the reformation of the UNSC not culminating to fruitful end.


Figure 5.6

Factors necessitating restructuring of the UNSC




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (75 percentages) are of the view that UNSC structural and procedural arrangements are according to the political situation of 1945 aftermath WW II so should be changed with time as per the changed global power dynamics and change in world order. Since there is no significant reforming since establishment of UN and there is drastic change in world order, so change is required.

Figure 5.7*Suggested Model for reformation of UNSC*


Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (58.3 percentage) are of the view that UNSC must be enlarged ensuring the equal regional representation in permanent member with renewable membership of non-permanent states of same proportion, Inclusion of all categories of states like land locked, least developed and small states is vital. Balanced power must be given to each permanent and non-permanent category states, during reformation of UNSC regional representation as well contribution of states economically and militarily to UN nations which can act in global security issues effectively must be balanced.

Figure 5.8*Basis for reformation of United Nations Security Council*

Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (66.7 percentages) are of the view that regional representation, contribution to UN economy, military capability to deal with international conflict and contribution to peace keeping missions should be the basis of restructuring of UNSC.


Figure 5.9*View on veto power vested in Permanent five members (P5) in Security Council*

Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (66.7 percentages) are in view that veto power is a restriction on effectiveness of UNSC and has adverse implication on functioning as per the spirit of UN; it is also a tool to promote the vested interest of the P5 states and has jeopardized the functioning of UNSC.

Figure 5.10

Challenges in reformation of UNSC




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (75 percentages) are of the view that dominance and interest of superpower, veto power authority of P5 states, tendency of maintaining status quo by P5 states, many claimants and lack of global consensus and opposition by the regional power and conflict of interest to enroll rival countries as permanent member of UNSC are main challenges in reformation of UNSC.

Figure 5.11

Regional power to be enrolled as permanent member of UNSC




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (63.6 percentages) are of the view that G4 countries Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan should be enrolled as permanent member of UNSC and there should be one from Africa amongst South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt.

Figure 5.12

Basis of passing various UNSC resolutions provided that veto power is amended




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (58.3 percentages) says that passing UNSC resolution by two-third majority of both permanent and non-permanent states of UNSC is viable option since 2/3rd majority is most practiced democratic decision-making process.

Figure 5.13

Necessity of balancing role of General Assembly and Security Council in security related issues



Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (83.3% percentage) say there should be increased

role of General Assembly in dealing with international peace and security affairs.

5.16 Analysis: Major Outcomes of Key Informant Interview with Diplomats/Scholars of Political Science/International Relation/Conflict Studies

UNSC structural and procedural arrangements are according to the political situation of 1945 aftermath WW II so should be changed with time as per the changed global power dynamics and change in world order. Since there is no significant reformation in UNSC since establishment of UN and there is drastic change in world order, so change is required.

Almost 81.8 percentage of respondents opted that UNSC is partially effective to deal with various security threat of the contemporary world. 72.7 percentage of the respondents are in the view that present structure of UNSC must be changed to respond effectively with various threats of the contemporary world. 72.7 respondents are in the view that UNSC must be given additional responsibility to deal with various security threats of the present world which includes food security, prevention of transnational crime and human trafficking, Environmental security Anti-Terrorist mandate and actions for state sponsored terrorism, security of landlocked-small and least developed countries. 81.8 percentage of respondents expressed that there is need for the amendment of UN charters which are irreverent in the present day context. The major concern is on elimination of veto power authority vested in the P5 members of UNSC. The present structure and procedural provisions of UN Security Council need to be reviewed and redefined based on the regional and global changing security environment .The latest development on science and technology and races on production of the Defense /Nuclear weapons and Equipment are alarming the regional and see global security as such. Unless there is no banned on the production of Defense Weapons and Equipment, it seems difficult for UNSC to address the world security issues. The UNSC is not effective to stop the war and bring peace in the world when one of its permanent members is a part to the conflict or in case of some geopolitical issues that directly affects them or their ally. It has to go through the procedure when it requires huge amount of budget and, in practical seek permission from the contributors. The UNSC is effective against small conflict only but again geopolitics has its role to play.

There are so many unsolved issues/ disputes in the world which are existing since the establishment of UNSC. Therefore, huge numbers of scholars are advocating

for the restructure of the UNSC, and vested interest of new emerging power countries like India, Brazil, Japan, German etc are seen significant, who wants their role in UNSC as the size of their economy and military power. The Permanent Membership (P5) needs to be reviewed. The rights of Veto power vested to P5 to be revised. Further, Permanent members of UNSC should have equal regional representation in order to maintain and balance the power. More focus should be on political engagement rather than military engagement. The provision of veto power must be removed from P5 countries and there should be more representation from continents/regions in the permanent members. Recent conflicts of Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine-Hamas have shown that there need to be changes in the functioning of UNSC with the notion that all countries equal and problems need to address in a just manner irrespective of the size and power of the country. The key outcomes of the KII regarding models for the reformation of UNSC are following:

- (a) The main reason for the successful execution of reforming of UNSC is conflict of interest between P5 countries, ineffectiveness of leadership, lack of global consensus and ineffectiveness of UNGA. Amongst these reasons conflict of interest between P5 countries is the main reason posing hurdle for the reforming of UNSC.
- (b) Council must be enlarged ensuring the equal regional representation in permanent member with renewable membership of non-permanent states of same proportion, Inclusion of all categories of states like land locked, least developed and small states is vital.
- (c) There is need of balanced power to permanent and non-permanent category nations in UNSC while dealing with global peace and security affairs.
- (d) The representations need to be ensured balancing regional representation as well contribution of states economically and militarily to UN. Such nations can act in global security issues effectively.
- (e) Alternative of current provision of veto power are two-third majority of both permanent and non-permanent states of UNSC. Since 2/3rd majority is most practiced democratic decision-making process. Continuation of current provision and furthermore any action by UNSC should be ratified by UNGA with 2/3rd majority is also option for the alternative of current provision of veto power.


Majority of the respondents are in the view that there must be increased role of UNGA in dealing with global security affairs.

(f) The global security environment has changed with the time significantly. The purpose and objectives of the UNSC was quite effective and relevant aftermath of WW-II. However, it has been almost eight decades. So, required to be reviewed and restructured to make compatible with the time, changes in regional and global security situations and requirements. The ineffectiveness of the UNSC to deal the current situation of war and peace is the answer as to why reform of the UNSC is required. Since its inception seven decade ago many war were fought, geography has been changed, the power balance in terms of economy and militarily of the whole world is at the brink of the change. The monopoly or vested interests of the P5 itself is the hurdle to the reform of the UNSC. Reforming is essential; however, creation of rules that becomes binding factors for the nation is also important. Otherwise, effectiveness of the UN cannot be enhanced.

5.17 Results: KII outcome on Various Aspects of Reformation- UN Civilian Staffs/ Military Staff Officers, MILOBS/UNPOL/IPO

Figure 5.14

Challenges contemporary UN missions are facing while carrying out the operational activities as per the mission mandate.




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (75 percentages) are in opinion that lack of

cooperation from host country, lack of intelligence, lack of adequate maneuver troops and huge area of responsibility and lack of modern equipment as well as terrain friendly operational and logistic vehicles are the major challenges in contemporary UN missions.

Figure 5.15


Comment on operational mentality of the contingents deployed in UNPKO to achieve the mission mandate



Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (40 percentages) are in view that some contingents lack operational mentality and don't carry out operational activities effectively to achieve the mission mandate. They think UN mission as privilege and welfare. While close to that (33.3 percentages) say that some contingents are highly operational and dedicated to carry out the assigned responsibility. As per the view of different Military staff officers deployed in various peacekeeping missions there is need of improvement in operational mentality of peacekeepers which is most to carryout effective peacekeeping duty in the field.

Figure 5.16
Requirement of change in UNSC structure




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (80 percentages) are in the view that there is need of restructuring of UNSC as per the drastic change in world order since establishment of the UN and as per change in power dynamics of the contemporary world.

Figure 5.17

Core issues to be addressed while restructuring UNSC



Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (45 percentages) are in the opinion that following are the core issues to be addressed while restructuring of UNSC.

(a) Reforming of the UNSC is to be carried out to ensure wider representation of different categories of states like regional powers, land locked, small and least developed states.


(b) Reforming of UNSC is to be carried out to enhance the effectiveness of United

Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and carryout the responsibility of collective security to safeguard the sovereignty of the weaker nations against mighty states.

(c) Reforming of UNSC is to be carried out to make UN more effective to deal with security threats of contemporary world and effective implementation of Protection of Civilian (POC) and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) duties.

Figure 5.18

Balancing role of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and UNSC in terms of making decision for the maintenance of international peace and security




Source : Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (77.5 percentages) are in the opinion that being the global umbrella organization of all sovereign countries of the world and to ensure the sovereign equality of all nations as mentioned in UN charter, decision of UNSC should be ratified by 2/3rd majority of the UNGA to be functional.

Figure 5.19

Main reason for status quo in reform effort of UNSC




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (42.5 percentages) considered the following factors as the reason of reformation of UNSC not getting enough paces and is in status quo position.

- (a) Conflict of interest amongst P5 nations and lack of consensus.
- (b) P5 nations want to preserve power.
- (c) Ineffective role of UNGA.
- (d) Lack of determination, initiative, and leadership amongst P5 members

Figure 5.20

Enlargement of UNSC membership in both permanent and non-permanent category of member states




Source : Personal communication result,2024

Majority of the respondents (50 percentages) are in the view that enlargement is required in both permanent and non-permanent category with veto power to additional member states.

Figure 5.21

Possibility to deploy the UN peacekeeping force promptly after authorization from UNSC




Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (77.5 percentages) are in the view that 'Prompt deployment of force is not possible since it must go through the process of force generation and willingness of the host country in this situation is vital aspect. Even there is standby force, the deployment of the force takes time and impact on conflict ridden country due to delayed deployment in terms of humanitarian crisis will be great.

Figure 5.22

UNSC being successful in maintaining the provision of Collective Security



Source: Personal communication result, 2024

Majority of the respondents (80 Percentage) are in the view that UN is partially successful in fulfilling the mandate of collective security.

5.18 Analysis and Outcome of KII: UN Staffs at Different Capacities

This Key Informant Interview was carried out with UN Civilian Staffs, Military Staff Officers and UN police. Being staff officers in different capacities they have thorough knowledge of dynamics of peacekeeping Operations. The following is the overall analytical deductions from KII.

- (a) UNPKO is partially effective. There is need of improvement in performance of UNPKO.
- (b) Major Operational Challenges include Lack of cooperation from the host country, Lack of Intelligence, Lack of Adequate maneuver troops and huge area of responsibility and Lack of modern equipment and terrain friendly vehicle and equipment.
- (c) UN is partially successful in maintaining Collective security mandate. Hence there is need for the improvement for collective security.
- (d) Peace enforcement and emergency mobilization mechanism of UN needs to be improved.

- (e) Enlargement in UNSC is necessary in permanent and non-permanent categories.
- (f) Operational effectiveness of the troops deployed in UNPKO needs to be uplifted.
- (g) There is need of increased role of UNGA in decision making. (Key Informant Interview-UN Staffs at different capacities, 2023)

The UN is currently vacillating between being indispensable and irrelevant. It is by no means essential, at least when it comes to international security, given that the superpowers have frequently disregarded its principles and regulations. It also doesn't matter since, like it or not, it is still the only international organization charged with preserving peace. Nowadays, it would be more true to claim that the UN is intransigent. The institution is aging and was designed for a different era; it is either incapable or unwilling to adapt to the changing times and conditions. It has steadfastly refused to change and adapt in the face of numerous, interconnected pressures to do so—held captive by the priorities and whims of a select few. Furthermore, unless this monopoly is broken, the UN will progressively lose its relevance and become an institution that is too large and complicated to be abandoned yet too slow and antiquated to be of any use in the modern world (Tharoor & Sharan, 2020).

In the days ahead, given the altered circumstances, the United Nations—the most important international organization whose existence is intertwined with that of humanity and the planet we live on—can play a proactive and innovative role in advancing global peace and economic prosperity for all of its peoples. Since the 21st century has already begun, only under the auspices of a stronger, more functional, and revitalized United Nations can the dreams that humanity has nurtured over the years to coexist in peace and prosperity by eliminating the forces that have led them to tragedies in the past be realized (Thapa, 1996). Although the UNSC has played a role in ending numerous conflicts through its actions under the UN Charter, it has been unable to halt the Israel-Gaza conflict, highlighting its limitations. The more than 40 vetoes cast by the United States on resolutions concerning Israel underscore the deep divisions within the Council and its challenges in achieving consensus (Personal Communication, 13 Dec, 2023).

Discussions carried out in this Chapter and analysis indicates that there is need of enlarged UNSC with rising powers of the world and current regional representation in

non permanent category also needs to reconsider keeping in view of recognition of states like small, landlocked, peacekeeping troops contributor etc. P5 members who are vital in this decision are also aware of this. They have different stands on enrollment of the States and lack of consensus has derailed the entire process. The enlarged council has positive implications in maintaining global peace and security since it increases the wider ownership to emerging global and regional powers in international peace and security affairs. It increases legitimacy and collective decision making. The new members in permanent and non permanent category have also commitments in terms of troops and finances like existing P5 and other powers in dealing with threat to global peace and security. Alternative to veto power with compulsory abstain from party to the conflict and decision making with global democratic norms and process like 2/3rd majority, 3/4th majority or nullification of single veto system enhances the democratic and collective decision making. In addition global umbrella organization of all sovereign nations of the world UNGA doesn't have decisive role in global peace and security affairs. It can only draw the attention of UNSC. It has taken some vital steps like recognition of Palestine non-member observer state and 'Uniting for Peace' resolution when there was threat to sovereignty of the state and matter concerning breach of international peace and security. Without approval of UNSC, Palestine has not got the full membership and 'Uniting for Peace' resolution also is recommended approach not binding action for UNSC. The decisive role of UNGA in addition to UNSC, further balances the power of UNSC and makes global aspirations binding to UNSC action subsequently giving solution for veto power deadlock as witnessed in contemporary conflicts. No veto provision in collective defense, R2P and POC further strengthens UNSC's tools of peace enforcement for the maintenance of global peace and security.

There are critical gaps in robust peacekeeping and ambiguity lies in peace enforcement model. These must be addressed with clarity in mandate to ensure result oriented presence of UN forces in conflict zones. For Collective Defense and peace enforcement measures, there is no UN dedicated standing Army rather it relies on current UN standby arrangement system(UNSAS) and UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (UNPCRS) as committed by the different member states and decision is solely with them. Here if the interest of the committed State is against it, there is no obligation to mobilize troops in international crisis. These provisions don't address the prompt mobilisation in case of emergency due to current delayed deployment model.

The delayed deployment could cause grave humanitarian crisis in critical situation, if not timely reacted. The drawbacks necessitates the framework and policies for unconditional mobilisation of UN troops in enforcement actions in shortest possible time with commitment from major powers of the world and other interested States in Collective Defense, R2P and POC actions under peacekeeping/ peace enforcement model. National interest is primary to States but major powers and emerging powers of the world must adhere to global interest, international legitimacy and UN Charter.

Existing literatures and research works lacks inclusion of different categories of countries of the world that have different security concerns. The suggested model includes the countries from landlocked, least developed, small, top contributor in peacekeeping mission except P5, representation from conflict affected countries with UN peacekeeping missions, Countries affected with climate change in non-permanent category which ensures the broader representation from different countries of the world having varied security interest. Models suggested in additional permanent category has recommended to include emerging powers of the world which are in parity with existing P5 members and balancing balanced regional representation from Asia, Europe, Africa, North America, and South America which is like existing literature and research works but finding in dissertation emphasizes on equal power to additional permanent states. When we talk about permanent members in two categories with different power causes power struggle and rivalry in future. Equal power sharing amongst all permanent members is a distinguished finding of the dissertation.

Based on the case study and trend of veto power casted by P5 members, this dissertation doesn't advocate the authority of veto power. Majority of the existing literatures and research works, and even Secretary General Reports recommend continuity of veto power to present P5 nations and non veto to additional proposed permanent members. Based on the study and analysis of the data, the dissertation has stated that provision of single veto paralyzing the entire effort of UNSC in specific crisis is a most dangerous factor in negotiating future conflicts effectively and will be severely jeopardize UN core values and principles.

Existing literatures like High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change by UN (2004), in Larger Freedom by Anan (2005) lacks the concrete recommendation of peace enforcement model in prompt deployment in need rather advocating different standby system. Current trend of peace operations suggest that UN operates on the

consent of host countries. But when host country is hostile and failure to protect civilians and involved in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity as stated in R2P a highly effective conventional and multinational coalition type of peace enforcement force is required. Existing literatures lacks in generation of such forces and no peace enforcement model paperwork are observed. Existing doctrinal and implemented peace operations are based on the consent of host nations. Withdrawal of UN mission on the request or urge of host nation even though humanitarian situation deteriorating degrades the trust and credibility and makes UN mission failure.

In enhancement of the capability of UN peace operations, this dissertation strongly insists that there are many gaps and lapses in doctrinal and implementation aspects. In terms of doctrinal aspects like Status of Unit Requirement (SUR) which defines the capability and equipment standard of the troops must comply with the standard required in the field. Peacekeeping troops need a very high level of international military professionalism to operate in multinational forum. There is lack of Command-and-Control mechanism. The force commander who is in charge of all military operations exercise Operational Control over the troops and command aspects is vested to host country. There should not be any terms of references / national caveats but TCCs and PCCs must abide by UN standard caveats. This dissertation insists on Quality and Effective Peace Operations with Required Maneuver Units and Reserves.

Implementation of Collective Security is also one of the core responsibilities of UN. This dissertation one of the key findings is that like peace operations doctrinal and implementation aspects, UNSC should work on implementation of collective security. Likewise, same issues are applied in mobilization counter-terrorist forces and quality and effective standby UN forces.

Overall, Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, POC, R2P and Collective security are not viewed as global interest but most of the times involvement in global security affairs is driven by national interest. In terms of global peace and security aspects must be given equal importance as national interest. Any effort by nation driven by national interest jeopardizing global, peace, security, stability and protection of civilians needs to be neutralized effectively by combined efforts of UNSC and UN as a whole.

CHAPTER VI

SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS OF REFORMING THE UNSC AND ITS TOOLS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Previous chapter provided the model for the reforming within the existing set up. It also discusses on various efforts and initiations. This chapter has mainly focused on the scope of wider dimension of security, threats of the contemporary world and highlights the significance of the restructured Security Council in the contemporary world. This chapter is the impact study and future course of action of the restructured UNSC based on the possible model of reforming/reform in multidimensional area discussed above. It will comprehensively cover the approach to be taken amidst the emerging threats of the contemporary world. This chapter is a glimpse, how the future UN should be based on the discussion in the previous charter which has identified gaps and lapses in existing UN system and states that change in UNSC is inevitable for future secure and stable world.

The current crisis of Ukraine has posed big question mark on the credibility of UN and global forum. The statement is coming to boycott Russian Federation from UN or even dissolving UN. Discussions on the prospects of implementation strategy of recommendations given by Kofi Anan in larger freedom, Report of the high-level panel on threat challenges and change and present SG's report: Our common agenda within security perspectives: Collective Security, Responsibility to Protect(R2P), Protection of Civilian through Peace Operations. In his remark at climate ambition summit (2023) present UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres emphasized that the future of humanity depends on the choices made today, warning that urgent action is needed to secure a safer and more sustainable world (Guterres, 2023).

This reflects the leadership vision and commitment that delay in change will have detrimental effect for future world. The issue is that we have framework, a good strategy in paper but the particle implementation of it needs multilateralism, global consensus, commitment, and cooperation. This chapter will also deal with consequence analysis due to maintenance of status quo neglecting core security issues like enlargement of council including rising powers and use of veto power in crisis threatening global peace and security. As it is amply discussed that use of veto power in collective security, R2P, POC and nuclear threats is deviating UN from carrying out its

core responsibilities of maintaining international peace and security, the future steps to be taken by all concerned stakeholder principally P5 members, rising powers of the world, UNSG and UNGA will provide clear roadmap for future United Nations. Consequences of maintaining the status quo include emerging global powers boycotting the UN, creating competing regional organizations, and refusing to cooperate with the UN. To create the UNSC of the twenty-first century, serious consideration must be given to the implications of redesigning the UNSC in structural and procedural dimensions as well as its significance in confronting rising threats. In the fifty years after the Charter was adopted, the globe has undergone significant upheaval, and the UN has established numerous agencies, task groups, and committees to address the issues at hand. Deep-sea mining, avoiding a space arms race, biological diversity, global warming, international terrorism, and other concerns that could barely have been predicted in 1945 are among the issues that the Organization and its 185 Member nations must deal with today (Ghali, 1996).

The UN authority needs to be strengthened and expanded in order to truly address the world's issues, especially the issue of global peace and prosperity. If all powers, big and small, willingly and obediently accept the decisions of the UN, this authority will be reinforced and enhanced (Koirala, 1960). In fact, after reformation also, the decisions of UNSC for the establishment of international peace and security and also performing other assigned to be made binding to all member state to establish it as credible, effective and powerful global governance body.

6.1 New World Order and Trend in International Relation

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s reshaped international relations in important ways. With the Soviet Union pulling back its military presence from Eastern Europe and parts of the developing world, long-standing geopolitical tensions began to ease. This shift opened space for democratic reforms in many countries that had previously been under Marxist rule. At the same time, several conflicts in the Third World-many of which had dragged on due to Cold War rivalries-began to move toward resolution as external support for opposing sides declined (Baylis et al., 2020). A significant decline in inter-state wars, some of which were brought on by the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers' ideologies, was a side effect of the fall in East-West hostility. Even the notion that force, in this case defined as military might, has outlived its usefulness in world affairs has become trendy. And it's true that defense spending has

drastically reduced in several countries throughout the world. Despite a dearth of examples to the contrary (such as China), this tendency seems to be holding. However, asserting that there is peace in the world right now would be foolish (Yilmaz, 2008).

While the Cold War marked the end of one phase of struggle, it also brought about the emergence of others that were being kept under wraps throughout. The disintegration of the Soviet Union revealed the existence of some conflicts that had previously been subdued. The wars in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh are examples of such conflicts (Yilmaz, 2008). At the same time, violence persisted or escalated beyond this region, with ongoing struggles like separatist movements in India, Sri Lanka, and Sudan continuing largely unaffected by the earlier superpower rivalry. Beyond these ethno-political conflicts, new and complex challenges to global peace became more visible, including competition over scarce resources, the rise of terrorism, enduring inequalities between the Global North and South, and the spread of religious extremism. These developments suggest that while the Cold War's end reduced some forms of tension, it also introduced new layers of instability in international relations (Yilmaz, 2008).

In the post-Cold War era, the P5 have largely sought to preserve the existing structure and working methods of the UN Security Council, as these arrangements continue to serve their strategic interests. At the same time, divisions among them—particularly between the United States, United Kingdom, and France on one side, and Russia and China on the other—have increasingly shaped Council dynamics, often creating two informal blocs (Yilmaz, 2008). Despite these tensions, the period saw a noticeable rise in UN peace operations, reflecting a degree of cooperation among major powers, especially in the 1990s. The end of the ideological rivalry also facilitated the global spread of Western political and economic models, alongside a marked expansion of U.S. influence, particularly in regions such as the Middle East and the Caucasus. Events like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War, followed later by U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, reinforced this dominant position in the absence of a comparable rival (Yilmaz, 2008).

However, this concentration of power produced mixed outcomes. On one hand, the relative dominance of the United States and Western-led institutions contributed to a degree of international stability and encouraged the use of multilateral mechanisms, including the United Nations, to manage conflicts. On the other hand, it also generated

resistance and new forms of insecurity. Many of the emerging threats in this period-such as terrorism, internal conflicts, and identity-based violence-have proven difficult even for major powers to control. In particular, the rise of intra-state conflicts, often driven by ethnic tensions, struggles for self-determination, or political dominance challenged earlier assumptions that nationalism and ethnicity had lost their relevance in global politics (Baylis et al., 2020).

There was a growing sense toward the end of the Cold War that the world was gradually moving away from narrow nationalism and toward a more internationalist outlook. On both sides of the divide, it became common to speak of the decline of ethnic and nationalist identities, driven by fears of nuclear confrontation, a stronger global emphasis on democracy and human rights, deepening economic interdependence, and the wider acceptance of universal norms. Yet this expectation proved overly optimistic. In reality, a fresh wave of ethno-political movements began to surface across different regions, including Central Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe-most notably in the Balkans (Yilmaz, 2008).

At the same time, the nature of conflict itself was changing. Wars between states were becoming less frequent, while conflicts within states came to dominate, accounting for the vast majority of major armed confrontations worldwide. Despite this shift, the international community was not fully prepared to respond. Institutions like the United Nations had originally been designed to manage inter-state wars, historically seen as the primary threat to global peace. Moreover, major powers often showed reluctance to intervene in internal conflicts, partly due to concerns over sovereignty and partly to avoid the risks and costs involved. This hesitation was reflected in policies such as the United States' PDD-25 under the Clinton administration, which set strict conditions for participation in UN peacekeeping operations (The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 1994).

In practice, this meant that the international community often chose to remain on the sidelines unless such conflicts escalated significantly. However, intra-state conflicts can be just as destructive and far-reaching as traditional wars. Although they may appear local at first, they frequently take on an international dimension due to global interconnectedness. External involvement-whether through political backing, economic aid, military support, or even providing safe havens-can quickly transform local disputes into broader regional or international crises (Yilmaz, 2008).

Undoubtedly, effectively managing intra-state conflicts requires a clear understanding of their root causes alongside the adoption of suitable strategies to halt violence and sustain peace. In this regard, the deployment of peacekeeping missions in internal conflicts has, to a considerable extent, proven beneficial for the international community (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023). In the post–Cold War period alone, around 50 peace operations have been undertaken, with 14 still active as of July 2023. The contributions of thousands of military personnel and civilian staff have been crucial in containing violence and preventing its escalation, thereby saving countless lives (Fortna, 2008; United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023).

At the same time, it is important to recognize the inherent limitations of United Nations peacekeeping. As many scholars observe, peacekeeping functions more as a palliative measure than a definitive solution. It does not resolve conflicts outright; rather, it creates a temporary space of stability in which political actors can pursue negotiated settlements without the immediate pressures of ongoing violence and destruction (United Nations, 2008). Expanding peacekeeping mandates beyond this role, however, raises concerns about the gradual militarization of what is fundamentally intended to be a stabilizing and neutral instrument. This tendency reflects a broader pattern in international conflict management, where militarized responses are often prioritized over non-violent and context-sensitive approaches (United Nations, 2008).

Consequently, there is a growing recognition that peacekeeping alone is insufficient. Sustainable resolution of intra-state conflicts require comprehensive peace building efforts that address underlying political, economic, and social grievances. Although UN peace operations have increasingly incorporated peace building tasks—such as election monitoring, institutional reconstruction, and governance support—the overall capacity of the international community to implement these measures effectively remains limited (Paris, 2004). Another significant challenge to peace in the post–Cold War era is the rise of religious militancy. In many instances, religiously framed conflicts have supplanted the ideological rivalries that once defined global politics. Some analysts argue that cultural and civilization divisions have replaced the Cold War’s ideological fault lines, with religion playing a central role in shaping identities and intensifying conflicts. Huntington (1993) famously contends that religion creates sharper and more exclusive distinctions among people than ethnicity, fostering a strong us versus them mindset that deepens divisions between communities.

This perspective, while debated, finds some support in the policies and rhetoric of certain states and movements. Governments in countries such as Iran and Sudan, along with various Islamist movements across the Middle East and beyond, have at times framed conflicts in cultural or civilization terms. Such narratives often contribute to an environment of religious militancy-sometimes labeled as fundamentalism-where perceived injustices against Muslim populations by Western powers or their allies are invoked to justify resistance, and occasionally violence. Although direct large-scale clashes between Asian and Western civilizations have been relatively limited, the idea of an underlying civilization tension continues to influence both academic and policy discussions (Huntington, 1996).

In the contemporary era, many Asian nations have grown increasingly hesitant to adopt Western cultural norms, particularly in terms of human rights interpretations and the structuring of political and social institutions. This trend reflects a broader assertion of local identities and values, shaped by historical, cultural, and religious contexts (Acharya, 2014). At the same time, religious extremism continues to pose a serious challenge, with some groups remaining resolutely committed to achieving their objectives through violence. Several high-profile events illustrate the lethal intersection of religion and violence. These include the killing of Muslim worshippers in Hebron by a Jewish extremist, the explicit support for violence by Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic factions during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, and the July 2005 London subway bombings-all resulting in significant civilian casualties (Juergensmeyer, 2003). Such events demonstrate how religious identity can sometimes be exploited to justify extreme acts of intolerance and terror.

Religious fundamentalism has served as a critical ideological foundation for some of the most dangerous terrorist organizations today, including Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad (Hoffman, 2006). Members of these groups often perceive violence as a religious duty, believing that participation in what they consider a holy struggle guarantees spiritual reward in the afterlife. This mindset reduces moral restraint and fear of death, increasing both the likelihood of committing violence and the willingness to die while doing so (Juergensmeyer, 2003). Beyond religious motivations, terrorism more broadly has emerged as a major threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era. While acts of terror have occurred throughout history, the scale and impact of the

September 11 attacks elevated terrorism to a central concern for global security, highlighting the need for responses that address both ideological motivations and broader socio-political conditions (Cronin, 2009).

There is also notable change in world power dynamics since establishment of UN in due course of time. In summary, the following factors characterized the global politics and power dynamics of present world (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

(a) End of Colonialism. Since 1945, colonial empires have been disintegrating, resulting in the independence of many countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. The dynamics of world power were dramatically affected by this change (Hobsbawm, 1994; Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

(b) Again, Shifting towards Bipolar Cold War. The majority of the post-World War II era was shaped by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. With NATO representing the Western bloc and the Warsaw Pact representing the Eastern bloc, the world was essentially split into two groups (Stent, 2023). For many decades, this bipolarity had an impact on international politics and many conflicts of the world. Although the collapse of the USSR brought an end to bipolarity, the USA and the NATO alliance have been significantly threatened by the China-USSR partnership in many issues of international affairs. Russia remains a key partner for China in its determination to create a multipolar world order in which the United States and Europe no longer set the agenda or the rules (Stent, 2023). This alliance and rising powers like China progressive growth in economic, military and other multidimensional aspects is likely to create bipolar world. The consequences of polarity are well reflected by Pre Cold war era. This will create more power struggle, conflict of interest and pose additional challenge to UNSC in dealing with international crisis (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

(c) Emergence of New Powers. On the world stage, new powers have developed over time. While India, Brazil, and other countries have grown in importance, China has emerged as a significant economic and military force. The power structure has been diversified by these emerging forces, posing a threat to traditional powers' hegemony (Ikenberry, 2011; Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

(d) Shift in Economic Centers. There have been substantial changes in the global economic environment. The United States ascended to become the world's preeminent economic power after World War II, but since the late 20th century, the advent of other economic behemoths like Japan, the Asian Tigers, and most recently, China, has changed the distribution of economic power (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

(e) Rise of Regional Organizations. Regional organizations have grown in stature and clout, impacting global governance and power relations. Examples include the EU, ASEAN and AU. These groups frequently aim for regional collaboration and integration (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

(f) Globalization and Interdependence. Globalization has increased the level of connectivity around the planet. The flow of ideas, products, and services across international borders has been aided by developments in technology, transportation, and communication, increasing international interdependence. The world order has been shaped by this interconnectedness, which has affected power dynamics (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023; Steger, 2017).

(g) Non-State Actors and Transnational Issues. None-state actors have risen to prominence and had an impact on world events. Examples include multinational corporations, NGOs, and terrorist organizations. Additionally, transnational problems such as pandemics, terrorism, cyber warfare, and climate change have become urgent issues that cross international boundaries and undermine established power systems (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023; Baylis et al., 2020).

(h) Power Shifts in the UN. Since it's founding, the United Nations has changed as member states' spheres of influence have shifted. The UN Security Council has been called for revisions to better reflect the current power dynamics in the world because of the emergence of new powers (Fassbender, 2011; Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

(i) Multilateralism and Global Governance. Global governance and multilateralism have become more significant throughout time. International organizations like the United Nations, World Trade Organization (WTO), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) are essential for promoting collaboration,

resolving disputes, and tackling global concerns (Keohane, 2002; Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

The interstate conflict dynamism has been reemerged after Russian annexation of Crimea and ongoing war with Ukraine. It has heightened the possibility of nuclear war. The various sources and evidence indicate that West has been providing high level of support to Ukraine to counter Russian invasion. The war has become a matter of prestige between the NATO allies and Russia. There is threat of reemergence of cold war era and paralyzing the UNSC again. The cautious drive is required with consensus intensifying diplomatic engagement to bring this conflict into logical end. Every conflict is terminated by political dialogues and engagement (Allison, 2017; Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

Reforming of UNSC has two parts in this change in global context i.e., change in structural set up by addition of permanent and non-permanent states and developing action plan as enforcement/ diplomatic and preventive model to counter various threats. Adaptation of traditional security measures like traditional peacekeeping operations must be changed to address the prevailing threats (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

6.2 Future Challenges of UNSC: Security Perspective

Intrastate conflict is the principal type of conflict in the modern world. The dynamics of intra-state conflicts appear to have supplanted Cold War-era ideological confrontations as the main causes of present wars. The emergence of significant ethno-political conflicts worldwide is often fueled by a combination of factors, including the aspiration to assert cultural identity, experiences of discrimination, and the presence of anti-democratic governance, economic underdevelopment, unequal national wealth distribution, unresolved historical grievances, and support from external actors (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). By examining these conflicts and trying to identify some key characteristics in common, it is possible to draw the conclusion that these conflicts are also interrelated. One could argue that ethnic political problems cannot be settled solely through violence. To address the fundamental causes of intra-state disputes, local and foreign players must engage in multi-level initiatives during the resolution process (Yilmaz, 2007). Nowadays, there are many different intrastate disputes.

To counter the emerging threats like state sponsored and global terrorism,

solidarity amongst the P5 members of UNSC and effective robust international military mobilization authorized by UNSC in coordination with regional powers is required. New paradigms shift in peacekeeping is required by materializing counter terrorist operations since in some of the UN missions like MINUSMA- Mali, peacekeeping forces has to operate against armed groups as well as terrorist organizations. This aspect should be explored, since terrorism is a main threat factor in the contemporary world having worldwide nexus (Personal Communication, 18 June, 2023).

International armed intervention within the framework of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, R2P or collective security should not be NATO led, but multinational robust and well equipped UN force. The UN concept of impartiality should not be considered in the context of terrorism and R2P duties. Any element threatening the peace and security under domain of R2P, and terrorism UN should be considered as threat to peace and UN peacekeeping/peace enforcement forces needs to mobilize all capability to counter those with utmost effort. World is witnessing genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Myanmar, Palestine, Syria. The question is always there about UN response and posing serious widespread concerns about effective functioning of it. The criticism always persists there, is it a global forum or only interest fulfilling organization of P5 countries. Israel-Palestine prolonged conflict has also posed serious questions in response of UN within scope of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), POC. The question will be there why there was UN response in Libya within prerogative of R2P why not in Syria, Palestine and Myanmar. Why there was collective security imposed in Korean War (1949-1953), liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi invasion (1991) and why not in ongoing Russo-Ukraine war. In backdrop of this, following are the future challenges of UNSC with international peace and security perspective (Personal Communication, 18 June, 2023).

(a) Rising anti-UN Sentiments. Rising anti-UN sentiments have posed serious questions on the effectiveness of contemporary UNPKO. Some UNPKO deployed for decades and no significant progress in conflict prevention. UN missions are successful in traditional approach of peacekeeping under Chapter VI. Not in most of the peace enforcement. The recent withdrawal of MINUSMA mission Mali without significant achievement in security situation of Mali and preparation for the withdrawal of MONUSCO mission in Democratic Republic of Congo as well as gradual drawdown of other UN missions across the different

part of the globe is an indicator of declining UNPKO credibility as a tool to establish peace, security and stability in conflict effected regions (Personal Communication, 27 April, 2023).

(b) Collective Security. The bitter reality of the fact that sovereignty of small states is still in threat and interstate wars is still prevalent in present world is reflected by Ukraine crisis. Despite of two successful actions on repelling aggression of North Korea and Chinese aggression against South Korea in 1950 and liberation of Kuwait. UN is unsuccessful in Ukraine Crisis and annexation of Crimea. It is bitter fact that if aggressor has been different than Russia, the level of intervention would have been different (Personal Communication, 25 June, 2023).

(c) Emergency Response in Humanitarian Crisis. There is long bureaucratic process of force deployment in crisis. Ongoing crisis in Sudan is the example. Delay in deployment has adverse implications on timely humanitarian response. Delayed response has caused devastating effects in human life (Personal Communication, 27 April, 2023). Effective implementation of R2P is still a challenge. In relation to countering global terrorism, UN has strategy and vision for the capacity enhancement but the practical application of it is challenge. It is limited to financial contribution and technical assistance. State Sponsored Terrorism is also prevailing and considered as prominent security threat. Proxy Wars which is well witnessed in Ukraine crisis and also collective defense measure through emergency enforcement model is not implemented by UNSC (Personal Communication, 27 April, 2023).

(d) World is in constant threat of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapon. A single use of it will destroy the world. The crisis of Ukraine and nonintervention by NATO and UN is because of the deterrence factor that Russia will use nuclear weapon. North Korean nuclear program is not under control of the UN and international forum, and it is posing continuous threats to regional and global security (Sagan, 2018).

(i) Climate Change, Environmental hazards, and Disasters. Climate change has been the greatest threats for future world. The impact can't be negotiated with use of military power and technological innovation but through awareness

and preserving environment and global commitment to reduce carbon emission. Implementation Strategy is there but there is gap in practical implementation raising global fund. UNSC can play the role of supervisory and binding resolution to all the member states (IPCC, 2023).

In addition, management of IDPs and refugees due to various crisis is still a great challenge. A comprehensive approach is required to overcome those challenges for better future.

6.3 Consequences/Impacts of Reformation in UNSC and its Tools

The UNSC's current makeup and organization have drawn criticism for being antiquated, inefficient, and undiversified. To make the UNSC more reflective of the world community, it might be modified to add new permanent or permanent-observer members. It has been said that the P5's veto power is undemocratic and keeps the UNSC from acting decisively when the international community is united. By limiting or eliminating the veto, reforms could increase the UNSC's accountability to the global community (Malone, 2004). More representative and diverse members would give a reformed UNSC legitimacy. The international community would have more faith in the UNSC's capacity to handle the changing security issues confronting the globe as a result. One of the main criticisms of the UNSC has been its incapacity to avert conflicts. A strong early warning system, improved communication and mediation techniques, and the use of peacekeepers to stop disputes from getting worse are a few examples of reforms that might be implemented (Malone, 2004).

At the moment, traditional security concerns-like territorial disputes-are the main focus of the UNSC. The UNSC's mandate to handle global issues like pandemics, environmental degradation, climate change, and violations of human rights could be expanded through reforms. In order to guarantee that every member state has a say in UNSC discussions and decision-making, reforms can involve more inclusive and participatory decision-making procedures. Changes could enhance cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and other organizations involved in global governance, including the World Economic Forum, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the World Health Organization. A revamped UNSC might be crucial in establishing and upholding global standards, encouraging collaboration, and advancing human rights. By attending to the requirements and issues of tiny states, regional

organizations, and civil society, reforms could advance global governance (Weiss & Daws, 2007).

6.4 Adverse Implication of Maintenance of Status Quo in UNSC and Its Tools: An International Peace and Security Perspective

The voice for the reformation in UNSC can't be ignored. There is high possibility of boycotting/non-cooperation of UN by rising powers of the world if proper recognition is not given to them. There will be great implications if Germany, India, Brazil, Japan and African powers boycott or show tendency of non cooperation to UN. The following are the implications of maintenance of status quo in existing structural and procedural aspects of UNSC (Personal Communication, 23 May, 2023).

Inability to conduct reforms of the UNSC may prove disastrous for the whole UN system by posing major challenges to the sustainability of financial and operational processes at the UN level. Due to the outdated nature of its structure and unbalanced power distribution between member states, the credibility of the UNSC is becoming a question mark for many nations, which may make them less ready to finance UN efforts in various fields. Such a tendency will have serious repercussions on the activity of different UN organizations as well as their efficiency and sustainability in addressing various global crises. Besides, the inefficiency of the current decision-making process, caused by political deadlock and lack of consensus, often results in the allocation of resources on a wrong basis, thus creating additional problems for the UN (Weiss, 2013).

Moreover, the issue of non-reform in the UNSC has deep-rooted effects on UNPKO and world peace and security. The problem of veto politics, as well as its ineffectiveness, will be an obstacle to quick decisions regarding the deployment of forces in the conflict area, thus affecting both the legitimacy of the mission and force deployments in general. Furthermore, the non-reform undermines the UN's efforts to address emerging threats and dangers that require immediate response. From a systemic point of view, the lack of reforms leads to the development of new geo-political divisions with the formation of a three-pole global order, which is increasingly inclined towards rivalry and insecurity (Personal Communication, May 23, 2023). Existing structure of UNSC is detrimental in maintenance of collective security, R2P and POC when national interest of existing P5 contrasts. The meaning is not that UN is complete failure. But when the interest of P5 comes in implementation of these primary

responsibilities of UNSC for the establishment of global peace and security, UN effort is made ineffective by exercising veto power (Personal Communication, 23 May, 2023).

As Turkey commemorated the centenary of its modern republic, Presidential Communications Director Fahrettin Altun emphasized that the country is actively positioning itself to contribute to the emergence of a reconfigured global order (Altun, 2023). The spokesman said this is because the UN Security Council and similar international structures are unable to solve global problems in full and have even begun to deepen them and lead to crises. It is clear that it is necessary to establish new international organizations, consistent with the spirit of the new century and new era, taking into account new balances, Altun said in a commentary published on his government's website (Brugel, 2023).

Altun underscored that Türkiye is adapting its policies and strategic outlook to align with an increasingly complex international environment characterized by multiple actors and overlapping dimensions of power. He linked this approach to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's long-standing assertion that the world is bigger than five, a phrase used to criticize the dominance of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom(Erdoğan, 2023). Erdoğan has consistently employed this slogan to advocate for a more inclusive and representative global governance system. Reinforcing this critique, he argued in September that the UNSC has drifted away from its core responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, instead turning into an arena where the competing geopolitical interests of the major powers collide (Altun, 2023). We must immediately restructure institutions under the UN roof responsible for ensuring world peace, security, and welfare, Erdogan added. We must build a global governance architecture that is capable of representing all origins, beliefs and cultures in the world (Brugel, 2023).

There is an increasing sense that the global community is beginning to look beyond the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), largely because its decision-making has been repeatedly stalled by the use of the veto. This dysfunction has been especially visible during major crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine conflict, where the Council failed to act decisively, leading many to question its relevance and credibility. At the same time, meaningful reform-particularly the

expansion of permanent membership-remains highly unlikely. The existing permanent members have little incentive to support changes that could weaken their privileged position, while many states in the General Assembly are unconvinced, viewing such proposals as benefiting only a handful of ambitious countries rather than the wider international community (Gowan, 2020). The legitimization of the G-20 as a global arbiter in international affairs will create a multilateral instrument where all members are equal (Shreenivasan, 2022).

The UN was founded on the principle of respecting state sovereignty, but the failures witnessed during the Rwandan genocide and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia forced a major rethink of this idea. This led to the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005, which reframed sovereignty as a duty rather than an absolute right. Under R2P, states are expected to protect their populations, and if they fail, the international community may intervene-even to the extent of overriding sovereignty to prevent mass atrocities. However, the 2011 intervention in Libya revealed the complexities of this approach, as a mission that began with humanitarian intent shifted toward regime change, sparking ongoing debate about the limits and risks of such interventions (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). At the same time, persistent gridlock in the Security Council has pushed the General Assembly to take on a more active role. Frustrated by veto-driven paralysis, especially during the Ukraine war, member states revived the Uniting for Peace mechanism to bypass Council inaction. The General Assembly responded by overwhelmingly condemning Russia's invasion and later introduced measures requiring justification for the use of the veto, reflecting a broader effort to hold major powers accountable (Patrick, 2023).

Despite these developments, meaningful reform remains elusive. International institutions like the UN are inherently resistant to deep structural change, largely because powerful states benefit from the existing system. Historically, only major global shocks have enabled significant transformation, as seen after World War II. Although the war in Ukraine has exposed serious weaknesses, it has not yet generated the momentum needed for comprehensive reform, making the continuation of the status quo the most likely outcome-albeit with declining effectiveness and legitimacy (Patrick, 2023). There is also no clear substitute for the Security Council, which continues to serve as a central pillar of global governance. Yet failure to adapt could gradually weaken its authority. Disillusioned states may begin to disengage or pursue their interests through

alternative mechanisms, while noncompliance with Council decisions could become more common, undermining its role in maintaining international order (Patrick, 2023).

Efforts at reform are further complicated by entrenched power dynamics. The permanent members remain unwilling to dilute their authority, and regional rivalries divide those seeking permanent seats. Disagreements over fair representation continue to stall progress, suggesting that reform cannot be achieved through normative arguments alone but must address the underlying realities of power politics. In this context, shifting global power dynamics-accelerated by the Ukraine war-may offer a limited window for reconsidering existing structures (Mbete, 2023). Despite its shortcomings, the UNSC remains an indispensable institution. It has played a significant role in managing conflicts and maintaining a degree of global stability since its creation. While often criticized, its absence would likely lead to a far more fragmented and unstable international system. However, its effectiveness depends heavily on cooperation among the permanent members, which has been severely strained in recent years, particularly following Russia's actions in Ukraine (Guihong, 2023). Whether this global upheaval presents a favorable opportunity to seek substantial UN Charter change is the current debate (Novosseloff, 2023).

In response to these challenges, some regions have sought to strengthen their own influence. African states, for example, have improved coordination among their representatives and regional bodies to ensure their perspectives are reflected in Security Council deliberations. This growing cooperation highlights an emerging trend toward more regionally driven approaches to peace and security (Adebajo, 2023). If reforms continue to stall, the Council risks losing further legitimacy. Regional organizations may increasingly act independently, even without UN authorization, particularly in urgent crises (Kolosovskiy, 2023). At the same time, the frequent use of the veto-whether to protect national interests or shield allies-has reinforced perceptions that the Council primarily serves great power politics. This pattern, evident in multiple conflicts, has deepened doubts about its ability to respond effectively to contemporary global challenges (Dayal, 2023).

Should P5 members and veto powers follow double standards, true peace and security cannot be achieved around the world (Weiss, 2013). In some of the countries that are facing conflicts, the involvement of the UN is influenced by the Western world in terms of where the organization needs to get involved and where it needs to step

aside. In many instances, international rules and conditionality tend to be structured in such a way that they compel the states which have been affected by conflict situations or recently gained independence to have the same kind of political and economic structure as prescribed by donors or the Western world (Krasner, 1999).

This inequality has sparked criticism that the powerful countries can utilize international organizations, including the UN, to push for political reform in weaker nations while having more leeway when dealing with their allies, thus exacerbating normative inconsistencies in international politics (Zacher, 2000; Weiss, 2013). According to the critics, such dynamics perpetuate the existence of an imbalanced international order where any kind of reforms in institutions are restricted by the interests of the system itself. The notion has been gaining traction in academic circles that structural power in the UN system helps maintain the status quo and limits transformative changes. Thus, from such a perspective, substantial changes in the international political structure are unlikely until a significant event shakes up the order of things, as history has shown many times before (Weiss, 2013).

6.4.1 Risk of Parallel Organization Against UN

Due to increased polarity, misunderstanding in global forums and distrust amongst P5, undressing of the representation of the rising power of the world, there is risk of dissolving and creation of parallel organization. The relevancy of the UN as global umbrella organization is very high, the collapse of which will promote to world anarchy. Heightened tension amidst Russo-Ukraine War: Ukraine questioning of the P5 membership of Russia since there was no formal amendment of charter during the recognition of Russian Federation as Permanent member of UNSC. It was done only through official letter which stated just to replace the name of USSR by Russian Federation based on consensus amongst all states of former USSR after disintegration (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

Rise of BRICS is another strong economic alliance. Economic interests are supreme in the present context. Emergence of such alliances may challenge the existence of UN. BRICS are even talking about using another currency alternative to the US dollar. This will bring another competitive environment in US dominated economy. Additionally, China and Russia have increased their efforts to promote the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS, two international organizations they

lead that do not include the West. They view these coalitions as crucial components of their post-west multilateral global order vision (Stent, 2023). At the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg-attended in the absence of President Vladimir Putin-it was announced that six countries, namely Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, would be admitted into the bloc in 2024. In addition, a significant number of other states-reportedly around nineteen-had already expressed formal interest in joining. This expansion signals BRICS' growing appeal as an alternative platform in global governance (BRICS, 2023). However, it also raises important questions about how prospective members, particularly those maintaining close strategic and economic ties with the United States, will navigate their dual alignments in an increasingly multipolar international system (Stent, 2023).

Due to increased regional cooperation, regional alliances will reduce dependency on UN and affect its legitimacy. Likewise, delayed response in humanitarian crisis degrades the legitimacy and credibility of UN and creates frustration amongst various stakeholders. Ineffectiveness of UNPKO and dependency in alliance like NATO will further degrades the UN actions (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024). Creating alternative arrangements to maintain the international peace and security is a tall order. If one cannot make the existing UN work how can we guarantee that a newly created arrangement will work? What will the world's reaction to create a parallel world body for the job the UN has been trusted for? There will be a total confusion in the world. Neither a new system will be created nor would the old system be allowed to work. In the bargain, the people of the weaker and poorer states will suffer more (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024).

6.4.2 Continuity of State Sponsored Mass Atrocities: Adverse Implication to POC and R2P

In lack of capable force for peace enforcement, there is possibility of state sponsored mass atrocities in the name of ethnicity, religion, caste creed etc. UNSC will continuously lose its ability to intervene without consent of the host nation. Lack of timely intervention poses adverse implications on POC and R2P. Timely intervention is possible only if UN build strong framework of international alliance and owns global support in it. The existing structure often results in stalemates, especially when a permanent member exercises its veto. This can prevent timely and decisive action

needed to protect civilians in conflict zones or to intervene in humanitarian crises, undermining the principles of POC and R2P (Bellamy, 2009). In the absence of reform, the national interests of the permanent members of the UNSC might still have a greater effect than the interests of the international community as a whole. This can result in selective crises interventions, where certain issues—often involving less politically powerful nations—get attention and action while others are disregarded. Human rights and humanitarian law abuses may rise as a result of the UNSC's incapacity to handle emergencies efficiently. The safety and welfare of civilians are jeopardized when conflicts worsen without intervention, which runs counter to POC's goals (Bellamy, 2009).

Global R2P norms may be weakened if the UNSC is not reformed. The normative foundation supporting the R2P may become less credible if the council is perceived as being ineffectual or biased in its initiatives. This might make states less likely to take their R2P responsibilities seriously, which could result in less coordinated efforts to stop mass atrocities. Instability in the region could result from the UNSC's inability to adequately handle new or continuing crises. POC efforts may be made more difficult by this instability, which may result in greater refugee flows, cross-border violence, and more significant humanitarian crises (Bellamy, 2009). Because impacted countries and citizens may believe the UNSC is incompetent or unresponsive, a lack of reform might cause disenchantment with international organizations. This can make it more difficult to build relationships and mobilize support for humanitarian actions in POC and R2P by impeding cooperation and coordination (Luck, 2006).

6.4.3 Continuous Threat on Sovereignty of Small States

If the existing UNSC structure is maintained, it might undermine the goals of collective security by putting the interests of strong states ahead of those of the international community, which would result in delay, inefficiency, and unfair treatment when it comes to dealing with security concerns. The UNSC might be strengthened and made more successful in addressing global peace and stability by undergoing reform to make it more inclusive, representative, and responsive to contemporary security issues. By excluding their voices, reducing their ability to influence decisions, and exposing them to international decisions that might not represent their needs or interests, the UNSC's status quo, which concentrates authority in the hands of a few strong states, can

erode the sovereignty of smaller states (Hurrell, 2007).

Selective reactions to challenges to international security may arise from the P5 members' propensity to rank security matters according to their own geopolitical interests. The idea of communal security, which aims to address dangers in an equitable and unbiased way, may be compromised by this. It frequently happens that the security concerns of larger states are prioritized above those of smaller or weaker governments. For instance, the P5 may obstruct such action in other situations where they have less stake in it, but they may also use military action in other situations (like as operations in Iraq or Libya). Perceptions of unfair treatment may result from this, undermining confidence in the UNSC's capacity to act in the best interests of all states (Mearsheimer, 2001).

With discussions above it is analyzed that Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Israel offensive drives in Middle East are promulgating might is right and lack of UN international intervention has posed serious question mark on the collective security mechanism of UN. Further delay in strengthening collective security and collective defense mechanism threatens the sovereignty of the small states and promotes the principle of 'Might is Right'. Making the global commitment on force structure and force contribution for the effective implementation of collective security is demand of today's world.

6.4.4 Anti UN Sentiments: A Significant Impact of Underperformance of UN

The United Nations peacekeeping operation in the DRC that began as MONUC in 1999 and was subsequently transformed into MONUSCO is among the longest lasting and largest operations in the UN's history. Even with all the effort and resources deployed over an extended period of time, the operation has constantly been plagued by criticism for failing to effectively protect the civilian population. This issue has come to a head in recent years when protests broke out in the streets over the issue (Kniknie, 2022). However, a rising number of public debates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have pointed to the indirect facilitation of armed groups like the M23 and even the presence of foreign influence, particularly from Rwanda, on some occasions by MONUSCO. While these allegations lack credible proof, their recurrence reveals the legitimacy problem that exists in the execution of international peacekeeping missions. This case demonstrates the tendency for peace operations to become part of contested

stories of sovereignty and foreign involvement, where perception may play just as important a role as reality. In this regard, the most pressing issue that MONUSCO must overcome is that of legitimacy (Kniknie, 2022).

A similar pattern of disillusionment can be observed in Mali, where the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed in 2013 to support both national and international efforts against insurgent groups. Although initially welcomed, the mission has gradually lost public support. With over 14,000 personnel, MINUSMA became one of the UN's largest and most dangerous operations, suffering significant casualties. Yet, despite this heavy presence, many Malians perceive the mission as ineffective, particularly in preventing attacks by extremist groups affiliated with ISIL and al-Qaeda. Criticism has intensified over instances where violence occurred in close proximity to UN bases without timely intervention, reinforcing the perception that peacekeepers are unable-or unwilling-to fulfill their protection mandate(Mali protesters demand exit of UN peacekeeping mission, 2023). As a result, public sentiment has shifted markedly, with sections of the population now viewing the mission as part of the problem rather than the solution, and calling for its withdrawal (Karlsrud, 2015).

Following the government request and as per the UNSC resolution MINUSMA mission officially closed on 31st December 2023 after operating there for ten years. These are some examples of decreasing trend of trust and credibility in UNPKO. Enhancing the capability of UNPKO participating contingents making environment with true spirit of POC and R2P becomes an effective. The wave of Mali seems shifting towards DRC. If this trend is continued UNPKO seems to be in status gradual closing. Remaining active force involvement mission like MINUSCA, UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNISFA etc has to carry out various activities effectively as per the mission mandate in order to maintain trust and credibility of UN (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2024).

6.5 Increasing Role of UNGA and Impact

The UN Charter gives power to the UNSC and not to the UNGA. UNGA has no mandate to strategically and operationally to engage in peace and security affairs of any sovereign country for the international peace and security. UNGA is limited in deliberation and drafting and passing mandates (Personal Communication, 18 Jun, 2024). Despite the representation from 193 member states, the UN Charter limits UNGA

to an advisory role and grants UNSC executive powers to take decision in matters pertaining international peace and security. Along with the power to advise the UNSC and member states on any questions or any matter within the scope of the present Charter, (United Nations, 1945). The UNGA only has a secondary role in matters of peace and security. However, unlike UNGA, UNSC is endowed with a wide range of authority under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter and is primarily responsible for maintaining global peace and security (United Nations, 1945). The ICJ made it abundantly clear in its 1962 expenses opinion that the UNGA is also to be concerned with international peace and security and that the UNSC's responsibility is primary rather than exclusive (White, 2015). Similarly, Para 1, Article 12 of Chapter IV of the UN Charter provides freedom of action to UNSC by limiting the actions of the UNGA. It states that While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the UNGA shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the UNSC so requests (United Nations, 1945).

The UNGA and UNSC, as the two main organs of the United Nations, each play an essential role in addressing global security affairs. While the UNGA offers a platform for inclusive discussions, the UNSC is accountable for maintaining international peace and security. Maximizing synergy between these bodies is vital to meeting the complex and evolving security challenges facing the international community. The limitation of the UNSC's decision-making process, particularly regarding the veto power, remains an ongoing area of debate and potential reform (Personal Communication, 17 Aug, 2023). Additionally, the Uniting for Peace resolution, adopted on 3 November 1950, empowers the UN General Assembly to step in when the Security Council is deadlocked, particularly due to a veto by a permanent member, and cannot address threats to international peace. In such circumstances-whether involving a threat, breach, or act of aggression-the Assembly is authorized to take urgent measures and propose collective action to its member states aimed at maintaining or restoring global security. This mechanism effectively allows the broader UN membership to circumvent Council inaction and play a more proactive role in conflict management. (Functions & Powers of the General Assembly, n.d.).

Over time, there has been a concerted effort to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of the UN General Assembly. In the declaration marking the organization's

seventy-fifth anniversary (Resolution 75/1), world leaders committed to upgrading the UN and reaffirmed their dedication to ongoing efforts aimed at revitalizing the Assembly's role, authority, and efficiency (Enhancing the Role, Authority, Effectiveness and Efficiency of the General Assembly, n.d.). Priorities to improve the practices and working methods of the Main Committees, enhancing the role of the General Committee, strengthening the role and authority of the President, and examining the Assembly's role in the process of selecting the Secretary-General were identified and are being worked upon (Functions & Powers of the General Assembly, n.d.).

In recent sessions, the General Assembly has taken several landmark steps to strengthen its functionality and credibility. These measures include establishing a formal code of ethics and an oath of office for Assembly Presidents, as well as creating a framework for open and candid discussions with prospective leaders. Additionally, the practice of convening high-level thematic debates has emerged as a tangible outcome of these revitalization efforts, reflecting a broader push to make the Assembly's work more substantive, transparent, and engaging. Also, it has become customary for the Secretary-General to regularly update Member States on his recent endeavors and travels during unofficial General Assembly gatherings (Functions & Powers of the General Assembly, n.d.).

Before 1965, the UN Security Council consisted of 11 members, of which six were non-permanent. Following an amendment to Article 23(1) of the UN Charter, enacted through General Assembly Resolution A/RES/1991(XVIII), the Council expanded to 15 members, reflecting the growing membership of the United Nations and the need for broader representation. Complementing this, the Assembly's 1950 resolution 377A (V), better known as the Uniting for Peace resolution, empowers the General Assembly to act when the Security Council is unable to exercise its primary responsibility due to a lack of unanimity among the five permanent members. In such cases, the Assembly can recommend collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security (United Nations, 2022).

Traditionally, the Security Council decides when and where UN peace operations are deployed. However, when the Council is unable to act, the Assembly has historically stepped in. A notable example is the establishment of the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Middle East in 1956. Additionally, the Assembly may convene in an Emergency Special Session if requested either by nine Security Council members or a

majority of UN member states. To date, 11 such sessions have taken place, eight of which were initiated by the Security Council (United Nations, 2022).

Most recently, on 27 February 2022, the Security Council, recognizing that a lack of unanimity among permanent members had prevented decisive action, called an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly under Resolution 2623 (2022). On 1 March 2022, the Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Russia's aggression against Ukraine and demanding a full withdrawal of Russian forces from internationally recognized Ukrainian territory. In April 2023, responding to continued criticism of the Council's inaction, the Assembly passed a landmark resolution requiring that any use of the veto by permanent members triggers a special debate within ten working days. While these resolutions carry symbolic and political weight, they remain non-binding, meaning member states are not legally obligated to implement them (UN News, 2023)

The revitalized role of UNGA is required to reflect the aspiration of global forum in vital decision making within UN system. The revitalized role of UNGA has following implications includes acting as check and balance factor for hegemony of P5 while taking decision. UNSC should work as executive and role of UNGA must be as parliament. This provision will work under principal of balance of power between executive and parliament. In addition, it promotes universal principal of democratic governance, accountability and transparency in decision making and ensures respect for the sovereign equality of all nations as per the spirit of UN Charter. UNGA's decisions are accepted globally which further increases the credibility of UN. The balance between UNGA and UNSC in decision making in international peace and security affairs is a theoretical issue - the reality is another. The global structure has fundamentally changed and with that said, the world's decision-making humanitarian agencies must analyse, change and make decisions (Personal Communication, 25 Jun, 2024).

6.6 Impact Analysis: Cooperation with Regional Organization

Regional powers are very instrumental in resolving disputes in specific regions. There is significant achievement of collaboration of UN with regional organizations like African Union like in African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) later transformed as The African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). These two missions are well funded and administratively supported by the UN and authorized by UNSC. There is good framework of authorizing hybrid missions comprising regional forces and UN

forces collaborating each other in establishment of peace security and stability in the conflict affected areas of the region and United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is a perfect example (Apuuli, 2015).

Till now UN has extensive collaboration with NATO, EU and African Union but there is need of expansion of scope of collaboration with other regional organization with doctrinal clarity foreseeing any contingencies in the region. ECOWAS and IGAD in Africa are influential sub-regional organization having capability of military deployment to establish peace and security in the sub-region UN (International Crisis Group, 2023). Recent Coup in Niger (June 2023) and ECOWAS deterrence to impose economic sanctions and if required carry out military intervention against military Coup is an example how sub-regional alliance is effective tool of deterrence. Similar deterrence mechanism and use of diplomatic and military tools to establish peace and security in terms of R2P, Collective Security and POC can be implemented. The scope of expansion of UNSC collaboration with regional organizations like ASEAN, SAARC, and GRULAC can be explored with concrete framework and documents in lead of UN (International Crisis Group, 2023).

After analyzing above discussions, it can be interpreted that regional powers if enrolled as permanent members of UNSC can take lead in the region for the maintenance of peace and security affairs which ensure effective implementation of Chapter VIII mandate-regional arrangement for the settlement of disputes. The gravity of the security threat and management of the crisis could be effectively dealt by regional cooperation, and they are proven very effective in region led UNPKO for example: AU led missions. Regional forces can perform the task of enforcement mission in high intensity conflicts. Likewise, the cooperation between UN and regional cooperation creates synergetic effect in solving the crisis of the region. Permanent members from the Asia, Africa and Latin America regions as per the enlargement model further foster the relationship between UN and the region. The delegation of diplomatic negotiations and authority to deal with regional actors is also effective way to deal with any disputes in the region. Overall, regional arrangement is decentralized solution of the conflicts.

6.7 Implications of Reformation of UNSC and its Tools

There exist many potential benefits to reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the processes employed in keeping the international peace and

security order. Regional balancing through incorporating new emerging powers in the UNSC will promote representation and legitimacy, which will help the international community take more ownership of the process of conflict resolution. In addition, this will ensure that other forms of security that may not be captured by traditional notions of national security – such as human security – become part of the formal discussion and deliberations; thus, eliminating the incentive to form parallel institutions. Another benefit is increased participation of nonpermanent members from nations that provide peacekeepers, developing nations, and those experiencing conflict (United Nations, 2004).

These reforms, which include reconsidering the veto system as well as introducing more democratic ways of voting, have been proposed as necessary for making the work of the UNSC more responsive and effective especially when dealing with issues such as POC, R2P, and protracted conflicts (Annan, 2005). These reforms will also make it easier to deal with other outstanding global problems such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the issue of statehood, and UN membership. According to the empirical findings, what the situation on the ground is suggests that even though there have been recommendations of reforms which emphasize the necessity of enhancing legitimacy and efficiency; reforms are bound by strategic considerations (Voeten, 2005).

6.8 Adverse Implications of Veto Power Elimination

The disintegration of League of Nations which was forerunner of UN is a big lesson learnt. The UN as global organization has contributed a lot for mitigating the effects of conflict. Even in the present crisis of Syria and Israel-Hamas conflict humanitarian assistance given by UN has saved the life of many people (Personal Communication, 09 May, 2024). The present P5 countries are significant contributors of UN budget and also prominent military powers and great assets in resolving large scale conflicts like in Korean War (1949) and Kuwait liberation from Iraqi invasion (1990). If veto power is eliminated, there is possibility of possible consequences. There is high possibility of boycotting UN by existing P5 member. Consequently, it imposes adverse implication on overall effectiveness of UNSC. Contribution of troops in international crisis significantly drops out. This has adverse implication in effective response in safeguarding sovereignty of nations under framework of collective security and other humanitarian interventions. Boycotting UN by existing P5 member impacts huge

financial crisis to run UN bodies due to inadequate funding since present P5 members are significant contributors in overall UN economy. Likewise, some P5 nations are significant contributors in UN peace operations. Their non cooperation causes adverse implications to the UNPKO/ enforcement actions since there is less chance of contributing by existing P5 (Personal Communication, May 09, 2024).

In worst case scenario, disintegration of UN like League of Nations is likely to occur. Global, regional and sub regional organizations are emerging. Current veto power authority holder can raise parallel international organization and alliances like BRICS (Personal Communication, May 09, 2023). There is possibility of emergence of conflicting bipolar/ multipolar world leading to eminent threat of large-scale conflicts. Two opposing alliance of USA, UK, France, India, Germany, Japan, NATO countries and their traditional ally's vs Russia-China-North Korea is highly likely to form. Both alliances are prominent nuclear power and the tension between these allies is a great threat to human security. At present context also, they are principally undeclared political alliance. There will be always possibility of these being declared alliances in relation to world political and security affairs. UN has though endeavored to bring traditional rivalries like Russia-China and USA, UK, France in common global peace and security affairs as P5 members of UNSC. Reverting to cold war era and there is possibility of adverse implication in global cooperation as well as prosperity (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

The veto Power vested in the P5 countries have several drawbacks which prevents any action against the powerful countries and their allies which makes the performance of the UN poor on several occasions. However, it is a kind of lifeline to save the UN from failure and breakdown like the League of Nations. If there was no system of Veto Power, the UN could have been a failure a long time back because any powerful country can leave the UN when a resolution against its will or interest is being passed in the UNSC (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

6.9 Reforming the UNSC: Impacts and Opportunities for Nepal

6.9.1 Nepal and UN: Historical Perspective

The UN has served as both a sounding board and a last option for small nations like Nepal when it comes to expressing their goals as a nation. Since Nepal is doing its job more effectively than other countries, particularly in the field of peacekeeping, the

UN's legitimacy stems from this. The profile of UN activities in Nepal, the views and perspectives of Nepalese leaders and scholars on the UN system, and their developing consensus and policies regarding the UN activities are hard facts that sufficiently highlight how Nepal shared and participated in the global system shaped by the UN (Bhatta, 2013).

Nepal was not one of the founding members of the United Nations (Dhungel, 2021). Additionally, it had to wait ten years for UN entry after applying for membership. In December 1955, Nepal became a member of the UN. Ever since joining the UN, Nepal has consistently taken part in the yearly General Assembly meetings. Ministers, heads of state, and the Permanent Representative have all led Nepalese delegations to the UN General Assembly. Nepal has been actively engaged in negotiations on behalf of the collective interests of the Group of 77, China, Landlocked Developing Countries, Nonaligned Movement, and Least Developed Countries. During the negotiations for the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPOA), Nepal chaired the group of LDCs (United Nations, 2020). Additionally; Nepal had the honor of chairing the Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances that led to the unfortunate death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General at the time, in a plane crash near Lusaka in 1961. This duty was given to Mr. Rishikesh Shaha, who was the head of the Nepalese delegation to the 16th GA session (Nepal and the United Nations, 2017). Nepal was elected as non permanent member of UNSC twice in the year 1969-70 and 1988-89. Since its enrollment in UN, Nepal played significant role in different UN forums in USSR intervention in Hungary and Suez Canal crisis (Anglo-French-Israel intervention in Egypt) where Nepal condemned the intervention and advocated for the sovereignty and independent foreign policy of small state (Nepal and the United Nations, 2017).

In the sphere of disarmament and arms control, Nepal has equally demonstrated its concern as a small independent state for its security in particular and that of the other UN members in general, by taking a stand on a more comprehensive scheme of global disarmament measures. It is worth noting in this context that Nepal was not only one of the original signatories to the Moscow test ban treaty but also did express its regret in regard to the Chinese noncompliance for the same (Shrestha, 1972).

Nepal played a leading role in the negotiations of the Istanbul Programme of Action in 2011 and contributed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, among others. Nepal is serving as a member of the United Nations Human Rights

Council (HRC) for the term 2018-2020 (Message from the ambassador, 2020). In order to promote its national interest and deprivation from different rights being small, least developed and country severely affected by climate change, Nepal can use the effective platform of UNGA and other committees to exercise its soft power of diplomacy (Personal Communication, 05 May, 2023).

Based on the most recent data from the UNPKO website, Nepal surpassed Bangladesh to become the nation that contributes the most troops. Nepal began contributing to UN peacekeeping operations in 1958 by sending five observers to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). The Nepal Army states that in 1974 the Purano Gorakh Battalion was dispatched as the first Nepali unit in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF-II), Egypt. According to the office of the UN peacekeeping operations, by the end of November 30, 2023, Nepal was already the top troop-contributing country in terms of the deployment of both military and police. By November 30, as many as 6,247 Nepali military and police personnel (Armed Police Force and Nepal Police) were serving in various conflict zones (Nepal becomes top troops contributor to UN Peacekeeping Mission, 2024).

UNSC being principal Organ for the maintenance of international peace and security and peacekeeping/peace enforcement is a major tool for it, Nepal bears huge potentialities to become UNSC non permanent member in terms of troops contributor in international crisis. The influential and effective participation has been displayed by Nepal in different UN forums. The significant participation of Nepal in UNPKO also demands her increased role in UNSC for the maintenance of global peace and security. In addition, the security of Nepal as small state is ensured by effective collective security mechanism. The Nepali people view the UN as a source of hope for humanity to work toward resolving today's issues, despite doubts and challenges. In keeping with this philosophy, Nepal has consistently said that the only alternative to the UN is still strong UN since it first joined the organization (Thapa, 1995). The UN serves as a forum for Nepal's exposure to the outside world, and as such, its ongoing input has had a significant impact on the topics and ideas discussed in the country's governance and development processes (Maskay, 1996).

Despite having limited economic and military power, Nepal is well aware of its responsibilities as a UN member and the role it must play in its deliberations. Its role within the UN will always be guided by the aforementioned concerns and ideals. When

assessing global concerns, Nepal believes it is critical to employ independent judgment. Nepal evaluates international issues without aligning itself. Nepal maintains its independence of judgment when assessing global issues as they arise, instead of pre-committing to support one side over another, which is why we don't identify with any of the major blocs (Koirala, 1960). Nepal sincerely thinks that this is the only way we can objectively and detachedly look at the issues that occasionally confront the world community. Nepal has never shied away from using precise and unambiguous self-references. It has assessed every worldwide issue impartially, without regard to the fear or inclination of any one person. Nepal has faithfully and continuously adhered to this policy because it believes that it is the only way the UN can conduct official business, as evidenced by its positions on the crises in Hungary and Suez, as well as the conditions in Lebanon and the Congo (Koirala, 1960).

Therefore, achieving peace and non-interference in both words and deeds is the most significant goal that the least developed nations may wish to pursue on a global scale. In addition, they would push for acceptance of the values of justice and equality for people of all racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Lastly, they clearly want cooperation in the name of human fellowship, despite the wide range of differences they represent. Depending on the complexity of the issues they are currently facing, this cooperation can take many different forms (Shah Dev, 1981). In addition to offering governments like Nepal a sense of protection, the UN also grants them equity by allowing them to take part in UN procedures alongside some of the major world powers (Shrestha, 1972).

The government of Nepal, along with representatives of other like-minded states, released a declaration during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis opposing the military interventions carried out by the Soviet Union in Hungary and the Anglo-French-Israeli alliance in Egypt. Nepal garnered recognition for its opposition to these interventions through its vote, and other powers came to understand that they could not always rely solely on India. The statement that was supplied was brief and merely mentioned that we voted because we were afraid that similar things will happen in other countries, like Nepal (Shah, 1997). When it came to the issue of decolonization, USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev (1958–1964) wanted to present a resolution in his name in the UN. However, permanent representative of Nepal, Rishikesh Shaha, informed him that there was no procedure for passing a resolution at the UN in the name of a person, even though

everyone supported defoliation if it came from a state. Although Khrushchev was incensed at Shaha, B. P. Koirala subsequently informed him that the Nepali diplomat's statements aligned with the policies of the country's government. Shaha in his autobiography- *Looking Back at My Own Career* (1997) told that he was seriously misbehaved by Khrushchev in UN forum (Acharya, 2022).

Nepal is a major proponent of UN reform as well. Speaking during the 19th NAM Summit in Kampala, Uganda on January 19, 2024, the chairman of the Nepali delegation, who was then Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, stressed the importance of organizations like NAM in the UN's transformation. It was his opinion that NAM ought to be more involved in UN reform. In order to guarantee long-lasting peace and shared prosperity, he continued, our multilateral institutions should be inclusive, transparent, and democratic (Dahal, 2024). The fight for independence by those living under colonial authority has been one of Nepal's main areas of involvement in the UN. She has opposed colonialism in the UN with vigor and has been involved in nearly all decolonization initiatives. Nepal was one of the forty-three nations that sponsored the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples resolution at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1960. She sponsored a second resolution on the application of the Declaration against Colonialism the following year, along with 37 other Afro-Asian members. This resolution called for the formation of a special committee consisting of 17 members to offer recommendations and recommendations on the advancements made in this regard (Shrestha, 1972).

Nepal expressed her solidarity for Algerians fighting French colonial control at the UN by raising her voice. The French policy of integrating Algeria into metropolitan France was referred to by her spokesperson as a unilaterally declared policy. Nepal joined the list of supporters of the 18-power draft resolution that called for UN support to bring about a permanent and peaceful settlement of the Algerian question. On December 5, 1957, she and sixteen other powers sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly's first committee that demanded recognition of the Algerian people's right to national self-determination (Shrestha, 1972). The General Assembly, however, was unable to approve the proposal. Nepal strongly promoted the inclusion of the Algerian issue on the General Assembly's agenda and allied herself with all efforts to bring about Algeria's independence. She was one of the 24 Afro-Asian members that urged the

General Assembly in 1960 to acknowledge Algerians' right to self-determination and to carry it out through a UN-supervised vote (Shrestha, 1972).

Nepal also backed the UN's efforts to put South Africa under the Trusteeship regime. She proposed a resolution in October 1959, together with other Afro-Asian members, expressing concern about the state of affairs in South West Africa. The resolution extended an invitation to the South African government to hold talks with the UN. Additionally, she was one of the proponents of the December 19, 1961, 35 Power resolutions. The resolution requested that the 17-member special committee for South Africa visit South West Africa and make arrangements for the removal of all South African military personnel from the region and the release of all political detainees. Additionally, a general election based on universal suffrage under UN supervision was called for under the resolution (Shrestha, 1972). The South African government's persistent unwillingness to cooperate in putting the Assembly's resolutions into effect was denounced by Nepal and forty-four other powers in a resolution they tabled the following year. One of the sponsors of the November 5, 1963, 38-power resolution on South West Africa's right to independence and self-determination, which called on all states to abstain from giving South Africa weaponry and oil, was Nepal. Nepal was one among the proponents of a 79-power resolution on South West Africa in May 1967, which formed an 11-member UN Council for South West Africa and gave it authority to administer the region with the greatest possible participation from the populace in order to provide for the region's independence by June 1968 (Shrestha, 1972).

One of the five members of the Ad Hoc committee on the Oman issue that the General Assembly selected in 1963 was Nepal. The report advised that the British presence in any form must terminate as a precondition to any solution, even while it held that the United Kingdom's relationship with the sultanate was particularly special and that the sultanate was neither a colony nor a protectorate in the official sense. It also pleaded with the UN to set up a committee of Good Officers to support negotiations. The Nepalese delegation urged the General Assembly to form a Good Offices Committee and pushed hard for the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations to be implemented in December 1965 (Shrestha, 1972).

In June 1966, the Special Committee on Apartheid submitted a second report to the Secretary General, and she served as rapporteur once more. The primary economic partners of South Africa, which include three permanent members of the Security

Council, were criticized in the report for their lack of success. In addition to requesting that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France follow UN rulings, these countries were also asked to move quickly to withdraw from South Africa. The committee asked the Secretary General to establish an international conference on apartheid in South Africa and advocated for effective political, moral, and material support to those fighting against the policies of apartheid (Shrestha, 1972).

Nepal took on the roles of Acting Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the special committee on apartheid in 1967. The delegation from Nepal expressed sorrow that certain powerful nations were using their banking and financial activities to support the apartheid regime. He mentioned two further factors that supported apartheid: Portuguese colonization and the illegal regime that still exists in Southern Rhodesia. In her capacity as the special committee's acting chairman, Nepal expressed her satisfaction with the Soviet Union's accommodating response to the General Assembly's decision to expand the committee. She also regretted the ineffectiveness of certain permanent Security Council members in addressing the apartheid issue (Shrestha, 1972). Nepal emphasized the apartheid policy's economic justification, calling it a plot to ensure continued control by the western world over the rich gold and diamond mines in the southern African region. A specific worldwide program on apartheid during the 1968 worldwide Year for Human Rights was proposed by the Nepalese delegate, and it was included in the General Assembly Resolution on Apartheid on December 13, 1967 (Shrestha, 1972).

Nepal's commitment to principles of UN was also emphasized by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli during his addressing in 73rd session of UNGA. During his addressing, reiterating Nepal's profound commitment to the principles and purposes enshrined in the UN Charter, he underscored the centrality of the United Nations as the most legitimate multilateral forum to deliberate on the challenges that we all confront globally. He said that the obligation of all Member States is to preserve the sanctity of multilateralism and uphold respect for international law, adding that the problems that we confront today at global scale can only be overcome by global collaboration in absolute trust and confidence. The prime minister declared as he wrapped up his speech that the twenty-first century ought to be remembered as a history of cooperation and harmony; of prosperity, inclusion and development; and of justice and fairness (Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

6.9.2 Reformation of UNSC: Significance, Impact and Opportunities for Nepal

Nepal being least developed, landlocked and small state, reformation in UNSC has vital implications. As of now, it is topmost contributor in UNPKO. This number one status has raised the reputation of Nepal international arena. So, Nepal has established herself a key stakeholder in maintenance of international peace and security (Personal Communication, 02 Sep, 2025). Significance of reformation of UNSC in the contemporary world, its impacts and opportunity provided to Nepal is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

6.9.2.1 Promotion of Various National Interest and Effective Implementation of its Foreign Policy

Being a small power sandwiched between two enormous neighbors and having a low economic standing, Nepal has always had security, status, and development issues. The preservation of her sovereignty and territorial integrity, projecting her independent identity in the comity of nations, and accelerating economic development through international peace and cooperation have been her foreign policy goals, and she has seen the UN as the perfect tool to achieve these goals. Nepal has used the United Nations as a significant platform and tool for her foreign policy. She has the same rights to vote and speak as the more powerful nations in the world within the UN. Seeking to strengthen the United Nations as an efficient tool for the maintenance of global peace and security has been the foundation of equality with the goals of world policy (Shrestha, 1972).

In order to prevent territorial fragmentation, a redesigned UN architecture must place a greater emphasis on the management of global interests, or global governance, which includes both state and citizen security. From the standpoint of developing nations generally, and Nepal specifically, it is imperative to expand the purview of multilateral aid, unconditional aid, in order to enable democratic governments to tackle the crises of stability, development, and governance. It is anticipated that turning the armaments race into peace dividends will increase the massive surplus wealth needed for global collaboration. How landlocked Nepal manages to play its historic role as an independent player, rather than a dependent pawn, in the game of power politics is an equally delicate subject (Dahal, 1996).

6.9.2.2 Promotion of Rights of Landlocked, Small and Least Developed Countries

As an Asian country whose neighbors were for centuries deprived of their freedom by colonialism and whose own freedom was more than once menaced by it, it was but natural for Nepal to side wholeheartedly with the various moves in the United Nations against colonialism and racialism. A developing country herself, she has also strongly supported greater participation of the United Nations in the task of economic development of the developing countries. Because of her land-locked position, Nepal's economic development largely depends upon adequate transit facilities which are vital for the diversification of her foreign trade. She has therefore been particularly active in raising the problems faced by land-locked states in the United Nations and its specialized institution like the UNCTAD and ESCAPE. In this matter she has successfully collaborated with other developing land-locked states (Shrestha, 1972).

Although international convention, in accordance with the international law, has accepted the principles of freedom of transit, many countries are still facing difficulties regarding free and fair access to seas and thus their international trade has been badly affected similarly, special and preferential treatment to less developed countries on tariff and trade has not yet been materialized. In such situation, Nepal, therefore, expect from the concerned countries more responsible approach and co operational financial institutions, agencies and donor countries to recognize the debt burden of the least developed countries and to be more considerate while prescribing burdensome conditions that affect the country's abilities to invest on social development (Adhikari, 1997). In the opinion of Nepali delegation the United Nations must be strengthened to include, among other things, a world police force for the administration of economic aid, without any semblance of political interference, to the three-quarters of the world in which poverty is a rising danger to the peace and prosperity to all (Koirala, 1960).

Nepal has been unable to take part in all of the discussions held by the United Nations on a wide range of subjects. Nepal needs to make a list of priorities and stick to it. Nepal should have a significant role in a number of areas, including human rights, economic and social development, international law governing the use of rivers and access to the sea, democracy, and peacekeeping. As a result, Nepal's delegation to the UN General Assembly ought to consist of a small team of experienced experts who can both offer ideas and gain from the talks there (Acharya, 1996). The UN system must provide a mechanism for landlocked nations. In order to allow these nations

to benefit from the maritime resources, these procedures will mainly encourage them to guarantee unhindered passage and trade. This will protect landlocked countries' interests and provide them the edge they need to be important and successful in the international arena (Sangroula, 2025).

6.9.2.3 Opportunity to Exercise Effective Diplomacy

Nepal's foreign policy has treated the UN with seriousness and saw it as a significant collective tool of peace. A more powerful UN is the only option available to replace the current one. Whatever its immediate purpose, Nepal has been firmly positioned as a country concerned with peace thanks to King Birendra's Peace Zone proposal, which was supported as a result of individual active diplomacy by a significant portion of the international community, including the permanent members of the Security Council (Bhatta, 2013). The current stance strikes a compromise between India's strategic concerns about the idea and the recognition by several member countries of Nepal's unique need for peace. Again, Nepal has contributed consistently to the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations whether in the form of cease –fire inspection or in the more involved operations such as those in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. It is a matter of satisfactions by world community as loyal, efficient and impartial. But Nepal has possibly reached a point where the prospect of larger potential involvement requires a more informed understanding of all the implications (Khanal, 1996).

Nepal also takes its engagement with the UN and the global community very seriously when it comes to development in general and that of landlocked nations in particular. From experience, being landlocked is a major disadvantage for Nepal. It has been making great efforts to increase global awareness of it. In order to reduce the impact of the handicap, its efforts are focused on the agreed-upon codification of the rights of land-locked nations. According to Khanal (1996), it has made a significant contribution to the discussion of the topic in international forums.

Nepal demonstrated its formidable diplomacy during its first UN term by opposing UN Charter violations. In response to the USSR's intervention in Hungary in October 1956, Rishikesh Shaha, the permanent representative of Nepal to the UN, said that the UN still needs work to be perfected as a tool for defending small nations'

interests and their right to freedom from encroachment by the powerful and wealthy (Shah, 1997). Furthermore, he stated that small countries like Nepal had no other option but to turn to the United Nations during their difficult and trying times, notwithstanding its imperfections as an instrument. A nation such as Nepal, which adheres to a policy of non-alignment and no military pacts of any kind, and which seeks to pursue an independent foreign policy of judging every international issue on its merit, without committing itself beforehand to any course of action for or against anyone, finds a special significance and meaning in the price that Hungary had to pay for the profession of her neutrality and freedom (Shah, 1997).


The main tenets of Nepal's foreign policy were enunciated in this statement: (a) the country's faith in the UN; (b) the freedom and security of small countries like Nepal; and (c) non-alignment, which is defined as judging every international issue on its merit, without committing itself beforehand to any course of action for or against anyone. Notably, Shaha began endorsing the non-alignment doctrine in 1959—well in advance of the group's first summit, which took place in 1961 (Acharya, 2022). Nepal's foreign policy is impartial, non-aligned, autonomous, and balanced. Our foreign policy is predicated on sovereign equality, respect for one another, reciprocity, and amicable conflict resolution. One of the main cornerstones of Nepal's foreign policy is the non-alignment maxim. Nepal adheres to the timeless principles of Harmonious Coexistence as imparted by the peace icon, Gautam Buddha. Similarly, our everyday lives have been governed by the principles of Unity in Diversity and Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, which means the world is one family. Since the beginning of time, these principles have been ingrained in our socio cultural ethos (Dahal, 2024). After reformation of UNSC, a more equitable decision-making process, with reduced dominance of the P5, would allow Nepal's security concerns to be addressed more fairly and strengthen its diplomatic leverage by elevating its global stature in multilateral forums (Personal Communication, 02 Sep, 2025).

6.9.2.4 Stakeholder in Global Peace and Security Affairs: Influential State in Global Forum by UNPKO

Nepal has consistently reacted favorably to all UN calls, including those issued with little notice. Nepalese peacekeepers are stationed in some of the riskiest and most intricate security settings. Without imposing any restrictions on national sovereignty, Nepal deploys its peacekeepers to improve their effectiveness. We have made it clear

that, should the UN request it, we are prepared to deploy 10% of our whole armed force to peacekeeping operations. The Kigali principles for the protection of civilians have already been approved by Nepal (Gyawali, 2021).

Currently the UN's peacekeeping apparatus is like a fire brigade that begins to look for fire fighters and fire engines only after a fire has already engulfed a neighborhood. What the UN needs is a small but agile standing force that can be deployed immediately after a Security Council decision, even as further reinforcements are being mobilized. In the long run, it would be cheaper to have a standing peacekeeping force than the current ad hoc arrangement. Even small powers like Nepal could contribute to a standing peacekeeping force and feel proud they have a stake in the success of the UN (Gautam, 2018). For Nepal, UNSC reform would enhance legitimacy of peace operations and strengthen opportunities for troop-contributing countries. As one of the top peacekeepers, Nepal would gain greater recognition, influence in decision-making, and possibly more leadership appointments (Personal Communication, 02 Sep, 2025).

Figure 6.1*Global Participation of Nepali Peacekeepers*

Source: Nepali Army website: https://www.Nepalarmy.mil.np/page/na_in_un,2024

6.9.2.5 Key Claimant as Non Permanent Member of UNSC as Topmost Contributor in UNPKO

As the top troop contributing nation, Nepal is a strong candidate for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in accordance with the idea of equitable representation, especially in the inclusion of top contributors to international crisis management. Nepal's longstanding dedication to world peace and stability is demonstrated by the fact that, as of 2023, it was one of the leading providers of military and police troops to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023). In addition to acknowledging Nepal's important role, the adoption of rules that priorities the inclusion of such notable contributors as

non-permanent members would guarantee Nepal's successful involvement in international peace and security decision-making processes.

6.9.2.6 Opportunities to Modernize Nepali Army and State Ownership

NA needs to be modernized in order to execute complex PKOs in the future. BPOTC was developed by NA to improve UN mission performance. Nepali peacekeepers are making every effort to maintain the peace and global security. The pattern of peacekeeping and the changing global environment have created new difficulties, expanding the range, intricacy, and severity of the issues (Tamang, 2009). Up grading the standard of peacekeeping/ peace enforcement forces serves as opportunity for modernizing Nepali Army. The performance of Nepali Army in global peace and security affairs is praiseworthy and highly acclaimed. Quality, effective and well equipped peacekeeping force from Nepal becomes opportunity to modernize Nepali Army also. Reform of UNSC's UNPKO tool would also provide Nepal with valuable opportunities for capacity building through access to advanced training, resources, and technology, thereby reinforcing both its peacekeeping effectiveness and national security preparedness (Personal Communication, 02 Sep, 2025).

6.9.2.7 Advocacy for Security of Small States and Collective Security

Adverse situation for security of small states leads to the general loss of faith in the United Nations itself as an effective instrument of peace. This breeds an atmosphere of mistrust. Big powers are not likely to be so disillusioned because they have built their security systems outside the United Nations. But those like Nepal who came to the United Nations with a total trust are bound to be differently affected. Nepal is not suggesting that all is well with the United Nations except for the big powers. It is not even suggested that all would be well with the Asian, African and other countries were it not for the big powers. We live in area too tense with internal suspicious and distrusts to believe that. Nepal doesn't believe either that the good-neighborly conduct among nations other than the super powers has always been ideal. There are political pressures, economic pressures and pressures of trade and commerce. The truth of the matter is that the developing nations in general and the small nations in particular have found themselves subjected to various direct and indirect pressures (Shah Dev, 1967).

There is a stake in peace for every small nation, but peace is especially important for small emerging nations like Nepal, which must deploy all of its material and human

resources for growth. Peace is something we all deeply care about, but Nepal is powerless to maintain it on our own. Because it offers us a sense of collective protection against outside intrusion and meddling, as well as the peace that is so essential to our progress, the United Nations is therefore of greater than usual importance to us. To put it succinctly, we have entire faith in the United Nations (Shah Dev, 1967). Safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity from any sort of external aggression is of vital importance to small country like Nepal. The collective security provisions stated in UN charter ensures the security of small states and has great value to Nepal. Balanced representation in the Council would reduce dominance of major powers and create fairer policies benefiting small states like Nepal. Reforms would ensure that global security decisions reflect broader consensus, thereby indirectly protecting Nepal's sovereignty and interests. Additionally, it would enhance Nepal's diplomatic stature, provide space to highlight security concerns of small nations, and strengthen Nepal's contribution to global peace and security (Personal Communication, 02 Sep, 2025).

6.9.2.8 Opportunity to Safeguard Nation from Devastating Effect of Climate Change

Despite contributing very little to global emissions, Nepal is directly, disproportionately, and negatively impacted by climate change. Owing to an incredible injustice that has been placed upon us, people suffer immensely from climate-related disasters such as landslides, floods, wildfires, glacial lake outbursts, drought, etc. This is so obviously unfair (Dahal, 2023).

The international community and developed economies are urged to provide LDCs with more equal, dependable, and sufficient resources and technologies so they can adapt to the catastrophic effects of climate change. Nepal and other nations are abandoned to fend for themselves. As a result, Nepal reiterates the various recommendations. Firstly, the promises made by developed nations and their deeds do not line up. They really need to set higher goals and keep their word and provide equitable financial arrangements free from restrictions, limits, and compliances; they need to ramp up climate finance to make up for the US \$100 billion shortfall and double the adaptation money by 2025. Nepal demands donations in order to solve this situation. The loss and damage fund needs to be dependable, easy to use, and sufficient for nations with high altitudes and low-income areas. The GST report needs to provide everyone with a clear road map, and we need to move quickly and together as a team (Dahal, 2023).

Nepal strongly recommends the necessity of initiating a dialogue on mountain and climate change to realize the suffering of the mountainous communities and find workable solutions to bring them out of trouble (Dahal, 2023).

6.9.2.9 Uplifting Different Instruments of National Power Including Economic Security Being Least Developed Country

'Mechanism to enable and oversee the international economic assistance system' is something that the UN system needs to develop. Legalization of the UN system's duty to rescue the world's least developed nations and people living in extreme poverty is necessary. Despite the fact that a greater portion of the world's population is starving, rich nations refuse to take responsibility. In addition to encouraging corruption in developing nations, their rent-seeking mindset is introducing the colonial mindset of rich nations into these nations. Therefore, the UN agency needs to monitor such actions in the areas of economic aid and international relations (Sangroula, 2025).

Nepal has unquestionably accepted her membership in the UN which was only possible after a great effort. She took this very seriously and made an effort to participate as actively as she could for a small, developing, landlocked nation that was only now beginning to emerge from years of isolation from the main currents of global politics. She has taken these actions not only to further her own interests but also to make the greatest possible contribution to the goals that she genuinely values. She understands that participating actively in the UN will enable her to better represent her unique national identity and raise her profile internationally. Consequently, this would also enhance her economic growth and security. When the main powers realized she was an independent global figure, they had to show a strong interest in both her protection and economic growth (Shrestha, 1972).

6.9.2.10 Safeguarding from Terrorism and Transnational Threats

Nepal has ratified seven international instruments aimed at combating terrorism. In order to fight and combat international terrorism, Nepal emphasizes the balanced execution of all resolutions, mandates, and strategic measures adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council. In order to stop young people from becoming radicalized and falling into the hands of terrorists, Nepal offers its support to UN-led programs. To effectively combat transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, the illegal arms trade, money laundering, and the smuggling of dangerous

chemicals, Nepal understands that strong coordination and cooperation-with the UN at the forefront-are essential. Effectively combating terrorism and transnational organized crime requires promoting improved real-time intelligence sharing, creative solutions, best practices, and lessons learned across Member State counter-terrorist authorities both locally and globally (Thapa, 2023).

Nepal is very prone and vulnerable to terrorism and transnational threats due to its geo political and geo strategic locations. It is considered as safe place for the terrorists and other transnational threats due to open and porous border. The past incidents like high jacking of the Indian Airlines flight on 24 December 1999 by terrorist group which alarmed the region and international community also revealed Nepal vulnerability to the terrorist activities. United Nations have also envisaged the terrorism and transnational threats as serious issue and strengthened global and regional mechanism for combating terrorism and transnational threat also supports Nepal's effort to combat terrorism and transnational threats which are equipped with sophisticated technology. This is overall a joint effort (Thapa, 2023). It helps to strengthen harmonious relations between neighboring countries. A strong collaboration and joint mechanism is required for the effective response against it. Nepal have immense opportunities from the UN's initiations, strategies and approaches to combat terrorism and transnational threats by up gradation of capabilities of the security and intelligence agencies and fostering sub regional, regional as well as international cooperation (Thapa, 2023).

The discussions and analysis carried out in this Chapter indicates that there is significant impact of reformation of UNSC and its tools for the establishment of global peace and security. UN's credibility is degrading due to ineffective action of it in Collective Defense, POC and R2P. Many critics say UN as defunct citing its ineffective response in Russo-Ukraine war and recent humanitarian disasters of Syria and Gaza. Reformed UNSC with limited veto power refrain UNSC's decision making in case of grave humanitarian crisis and facilitates the action to establish global peace and security. Hence, it enhances the credibility of UN and establishes it as effective global governance body. There are many regional bodies and alliances emerged, ineffective UN could give space to these organizations as parallel bodies which could be mitigated by reformed UNSC and its tools. Many critics has also discussed on possible disintegration of UN as like LoN which could be prevented by reformed UNSC. Nepal as topmost contributing country in UNPKO is strong claimant for the non permanent membership

of UNSC based on accepted and renewed criteria. This has great significance as international recognition and credibility. In addition, strengthened collective defense ensures the protection of sovereignty and possible external invasion due to varied interest. Significantly, this chapter has explored impact and opportunities for Nepal in terms of safeguarding sovereignty, continuity of its status in global peace and security affairs with quality peace keeping/ peace enforcement missions, exercising its effective diplomacy and modernization and also exploits the opportunity to become non permanent member of UNSC.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary

UNSC role in global security perspective has larger connotation and encompass vast area of research. To make dissertation specific, this study has confined its scope in reforming the UNSC in structural and procedural aspect and its tools for the maintenance of global peace and security. For this, this dissertation is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter covers the introduction section which mainly deals with background of the issue; research questions research objectives, statement of the problem, significance and delimitation of the study and chapter organization of the dissertation. It also includes operational definition of key terms included in dissertation. With appropriate research methodology, dissertations aim to answer the three research questions and fulfill the research objectives framed accordingly with discussions and analysis organized in three subsequent chapters where each chapter dealt with each research question and objective.

In chapter II, both empirical and theoretical literatures relevant to dissertation were reviewed. Pertinent theories like power transition theory, hegemonic stability theory, theory of sovereign equality of all nations, realism theory constructivism theory were analyzed tracing out relevancy and critical factors to various issues of reforming of UNSC. Other theoretical reviews were also carried out to extract the key issues of reformation in UNSC tools in maintenance of global peace and security. Empirical literatures were mainly UN related articles, books, dissertations and thesis, high level reports of SG, views of the different claimant groups as permanent members of UNSC and their rivalries and discussions carried out in different sessions of UNGA. The main research gaps concluded after reviewing theoretical and empirical literatures include balancing the role of UNGA and UNSC to address global security affairs adhering to 'Balance of Power Theory', correct alternative to veto power, protection of sovereignty of States by strengthening 'Collective Security' and 'Collective Defense', strengthening Peacekeeping and peace tools of UNSC, significance as well as impacts of reforming UNSC and its tools with international peace and security perspective and significance of reformation of UNSC and opportunities for Nepal.

In Chapter III After finding research gap reviewing theoretical and empirical

literature, appropriate research methodology adopted to answer the research questions and research objectives. Primary data has been collected by means of KII who served in UN with different official capacity and UN peace keeping missions and other assignments both from Nepal and abroad. The researcher has used secondary sources in the form of UN related books, high level UN reports, dissertations, relevant articles, and journal with information relevant to the topic of this research. A conceptual framework was formulated based on pertinent theories of International Relation, dependent variables and independent variables related to various issues demanding reformation of UNSC and its tools for the preservation of global peace and security. Pertinent theories discussed were hegemonic stability theory, theory of sovereign equality of all nations, balance of power theory, theory of realism, neo-liberalism theory and constructivism theory. In Chapter IV, by analyzing performance of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security since its establishment in 1945, this dissertation has found the gaps and lapses in functioning mechanism of UNSC especially implication of veto power and current structural set up in international peace and security. In addition, researcher has also analyzed the effectiveness of major tools of UNSC which are R2P, POC through peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, collective security and collective defense. With these discussions, factors which demand the reforming of UNSC, ways for the reformation of UNSC and its tools and impacts of reformation has been explored.

In Chapter V, keeping international peace and security in central theme, discussions were carried out about appropriate model of UNSC which can meet the global aspiration, global ownership and true representation of the current world to carry out its primary role of maintaining global peace and security. Chapter VI discusses and analyzes significance and impact analysis of reformed UNSC in changing trend of conflict and global power dynamics. It mainly deals about possible disintegration of UN due to losing credibility and rise of parallel international organization in replacement of it. Reviewing the impacts and opportunity of reformations of UNSC and its tools pertinent issues of collective security and its relevance to small country like Nepal and prospects of effective role in global peace and security affairs has been discussed, analyzed and interpreted accordingly. Discussion, data analysis and interpretation carried out in various chapters related to research objective has paved the way for logical findings and conclusion.

7.2 Major Findings

1. Major Drawbacks in United Nations Security Council Structure and its Tools for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security

There is status Quo mentality and reluctance to accept the change in world order by P5 members. The world has changed a lot since establishment of UN. The universally accepted philosophy 'Change is Inevitable' also demands change in UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNSC structure and its working mechanism need reformation to meet the necessity of present world order. There are many changes in world power dynamics in terms of military and technological might as well as economy to support UN. There are other rising powers of the world having parity with some of the P5 members in most of the eligibility criteria as prominent powers. The global umbrella organization must meet the aspiration of globe and work as per the charter not on the vested interest of P5 member states. Change in world power dynamics and emerging complex threats also necessitates inevitability of change in structural and procedural aspects of UNSC.

While carrying out various peace and security related duties with existing working mechanism of UNSC, national interests are dominant over the humanitarian crisis, world peace, security, and stability. Response in humanitarian crisis, POC, R2P and collective security are not considered as core fundamental guiding principles and ethical values. Adhering to the core principle of realism, P5 countries are looking after their interest within UN. The guiding principle of UN follows theory of neo liberalism and constructivism keeping humanity, world is one family (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam) but in contrast theory of realism is practiced. Many incidents of UN incompetence in addressing emerging complex security issue also clearly demands new UN structure and working mechanism and revitalized tools for the maintenance of international peace and security. The mighty veto power vested to P5 countries of the UNSC has also been used as tool to promote national interest of those countries. In some cases, world has faced serious humanitarian catastrophe because of the interest of these countries and imposition of veto to fulfill their national interest. It has created big question mark on the credibility and legitimacy of UN in global arena. Hence, to eradicate the effect of veto power in global security affairs reformation in veto power authority needs to be revised based on democratic norms and values of decision making.

World power dynamics has changed a lot since 1945. UN was formed under complete dominance of allied powers but axis powers which were and are significant power players in economic and military domain were excluded in the UNSC structure. There are many emerging powers which deserve as members of UNSC. To make UNSC more inclusive as well as to ensure wider representation of the globe, it is required to ensure the representation of least developed, landlocked countries and developing nations in UN Security Council adhering to the theory of 'Sovereign Equality of all Nations' as mentioned in the UN Charter. Rising Powers of the world and their inclusion in UNSC as the permanent members balances the power dynamics. It facilitates their ownership and contribution in global efforts of UN in multidimensional facets including establishment of global peace and security. The theory of 'Balance of Power' is lacking in application within existing structural and working mechanism of UNSC.

Ineffectiveness of UNPKO in some cases has posed challenge to the credibility of UN. Reforming of UNSC with revitalized and action orienting UNPKO strategy is required. Changing dynamics of the threat also requires reformation of UNPKO strategy and implementation plan. POC issue is greatly undermined in UNPKO. The revitalization of peacekeeping strategy and implementation is required for the effective implementation of POC mandate. There is major drawback in implementation of Peace Enforcement as tool of UNSC to maintain international peace and security. UN is a promoter of democracy and good governance but working mechanism of UN Security Council does not promote democratic norms. Not adopting the universal practice of democratic norms in decision making is major drawback in functioning mechanism of UNSC.

Collective Security mentioned in the chapter is not strictly implemented when there is involvement of powerful nation as aggressor threatening the sovereignty of nation with inferior military might. UNSC lacks global commitment framework of armed intervention for the implementation of collective security for safeguarding the sovereignty of small states. Hence, to implement collective security as one of the strong tools of UN to safeguard sovereignty of the member states reforming of UNSC is required. Nepal as small state with inferior military has great concern over implementation of effective collective security. In addition, UNGA is a global forum representing all the member states of the world where as UNSC has only 15 members out of 193 members of UNGA. Not authorizing any role to global umbrella organization

of all sovereign nations of the world UNGA in decision making related to international peace and security is one of the significant drawback of existing UN system. To promote the role of UNGA in decision making in international peace and security affairs and to promote democratic norms and values, reforming of UNSC is required. It promotes the 'theory of balance of power' and 'Sovereign Equality of all Nations'.

The underperformance of vital tools of UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security: R2P, POC, UNPKO/ peace enforcement and collective security has significantly degraded the image of UNSC. To uplift the image and credibility UN, reformation is required. The emergency peace enforcement mechanism of UN has serious flaws and there has been catastrophic consequence of delayed UN response of UN in some crisis. Reforming is required to enhance the emergency response mechanism of UNSC. Nepal has great scope to exercise its diplomacy using UN platform by mobilisation of effective Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement force.

6.10.2 Models for the Reformation of the United Nations Security Council Structure and its Tools for the Maintenance of Effective International Peace and Security.

Balanced representation in both permanent and non-permanent category is appropriate model for the reformation of UNSC which ensures global ownership and commitment in international peace and security affairs. In UNSC structural reformation, inclusion of landlocked, small, and least developed and conflict affected countries in non-permanent category ensure their voice and concerns in global forum effectively. Nepal is a strong claimant in non permanent member category which will be very strong platform to exercise its foreign policy and promote national interest. UN Charter rewriting is required to address the outdated provisions not relevant to the present context of changed global order, power dynamics and complex emerging threats. Amendment in UN charter is also required to include models identified for the reformation of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Veto power authority with P5 members of UNSC has catastrophic effects in conflict preventions in some cases of core values and principal of UN related to POC, R2P and collective security. No veto provision to P5 members UNSC is an appropriate model for the reformation of UNSC. Veto power authority is the core problem related to the UN response in maintenance of global peace and security. A single veto as a hurdle

factor in decision making procedure of UNSC is against spirit of UN charter, universal democratic norms and values of decision making. Provision of no veto in Responsibility to Protect (R2P) issues, implementation of collective security and promotion of self-defense, denuclearization, eradication of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and peace keeping and enforcement missions for the Protection of Civilian (POC) are effective ways to negotiate devastating effect of veto imposition against spirit of UN charter and enhance the effectiveness of UNSC's tools for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Clear statement in UN charter about condition of no veto is required to avoid ambiguity in casting veto. In order to overcome the deadlocks where single veto has paralyzed the global effort, revitalization of Chapter V, Article 27(3) is not sufficient rather there is need for rewriting Chapter VII or peace enforcement arrangements stating compulsory abstain of the party to the conflict. This arrangement reduces the deadlocks like in Syria, Palestine and Ukraine. Humanitarian assistance employment of buffer zone forces and enforcement forces is facilitated by it. In addition, enhanced and revitalized role of UNGA is required to ensure one of the prominent principles of UN charter 'Sovereign Equality of all Nations'. While dealing with international peace and security affairs, the provision for UNSC to adhere and oblige to unanimous decision of the UNGA promotes democratic norms of decision making and 'world is one family' (Basudhaiva Kutumbakam). It also promotes 'Balance of Power Theory'.

Making 'Uniting of Consensus' tool of UNGA to deal with international peace and security affairs when UNSC is indecisive is one of the ways to empower the role of UNGA in international peace and security affairs. Involvement of parties to the conflict and perpetrators in decision making related to concerned international peace and security affairs is against the principal of impartiality. Had it been clearly stated in the charter, the story of UN response in Syria and Ukraine would have been different. Regional organizations are most effective to deal with various crisis within regions. An extensive framework for the UN-Regional organization cooperation and elaboration of scope in regional arrangement of disputes under Chapter VIII is one of the viable ways to strengthen the tool of UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Provision of UN standby regional/ global Rapid Reaction Force through regional organization and Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) is required to deal effectively in emergency response. UN has no standing army for mobilization in extreme situation.

Delay in mobilization has adverse implication for the security of population in danger. Since normal deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces in the field takes a long process existing mechanism doesn't address the swift, quick, flexible, and agile deployment of UN troops in the field in need. There is need to revitalize response by creating effective Rapid Deployment Force. Antiterrorist mandate to UN peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions in UN missions like MINUSMA (Mali) is required to deal with terrorist groups posing threat to innocent civilian. Domain of POC and R2P umbrella needs to incorporate antiterrorist mandate in applicable UN peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions. Robust peacekeeping with robust mentality of peacekeepers is required to operate in present complex international conflict environment. Well trained and well equipped troops are required with selfless service of operating in conflict. Most of the units deployed in UN mission have bulk of their troops deployed in administrative duties. A framework is required to minimize the fighting soldiers in administrative duties and increase the number of the fighting troops in the field.

There is doctrinal gap in peace enforcement during mobilization of force in collective security, POC and R2P. Principle of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, minimum use of force except in self-defense and protection of mandate is not equally applicable to peace enforcement mission: response in collective security, R2P and POC operations when host nation is perpetrator of POC issue. Reviewing the shortcomings and gaps in protection of civilian and R2P, the principle of peace enforcement needs to be refined as Primacy of POC, Impartiality, and Intervention with required force, proportionate use of force to threat factor. A separate peace enforcement doctrine/framework/guidelines is required with more clarity in implementation of it in UN charter. Collective Security needs effective international intervention which was well implemented during Korean War (1949-1953) and Gulf War (1991) when Kuwait was liberated from Iraq. Hence, separate principal of collective security actions by UN adhering to principle of international unity, intervention by effective multinational force, proportionate use of force, primacy of humanitarian factor is required. Actions adhering to these principles can only address the aggression against sovereign nations when mighty nations are involved.

Being one of the prominent troops contributing country in UNPKO (Number one as of 15 Feb 2025); Nepal can effectively contribute the international crisis with

upgraded and quality peacekeeping/peace enforcement force sophisticated with modern technologies and equipments.

6.10.2 Major Impacts of Reformation of UNSC Structure and its Tools for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

Reforming of UNSC in view of structural and procedural aspects is instrumental in promoting universal democratic norms of governance and decision making. It increases the people's positive perception about UN and also increases the credibility of UN in the mindset of the global forum. Though it is not possible to address each grievance of the different interest groups, a balanced solution is required. Elimination of veto power and decision making based on 2/3rd /3/4th majority, inclusion of states in permanent and non-permanent category promotes sovereign equality of all nations. Reforming fills the gap between doctrinal aspects mentioned in the UN Charter and implementation in practice. Ownership of rising powers and deprived defeated powers of WW II further strengthen UNSC with their more dedicated commitment in global peace and security affairs. Added responsibility of the prominent powers of the world promotes sense of responsibility and ownership in decision making procedures. It promotes the balance of power theory.

Amendment of Charter proposed by different panels, reports reflecting the power dynamics of the contemporary world and brings more clarity in controversial provisions of the Charter of UN prepared on post WW II scenario. Ensuring the role of UNGA in decision making in global peace and security affairs in addition to UNSC enhances effective functioning of UNSC with wider participation, ownership of all members of UNGA and extensive discussions in decision making. Extensive reframing of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security strategy, formulation of appropriate framework, clear cut provisions on contribution of the international armed forces and subsequently course of action in mobilisation for the maintenance of international peace and security promotes the effectiveness of different UN actions in breach of peace, threat to civilians and intervention against sovereign states.

Reforming of UNSC including prominent powers based on principal of sovereign equality and regional representation addresses the aspiration of countries which are significant players in international politics having prominent influence in UN funding avoids the possibility of dissolving UN and creation of parallel organization.

The rise of parallel organization or dissolving of UN creates more power struggle, confusion in decision making in global peace and security affairs. Reforming of UNSC strengthening the major tools of maintain global peace and security like non use of veto power in R2P, POC, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and safeguarding of sovereignty of the nations through collective security addresses the contemporary security threats of the world. This increases the credibility of UN and subsequently provides roadmap for the effective implementation of prominent reports for the reforming of UN: The report of the High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change, The Larger Freedom, Outcome of World Summit 2005 and Our Common Agenda. This enforces UNSC's effectiveness with new doctrine and paradigm for the implementation of its major tools in maintaining global peace and security affairs.

Clarity in peacekeeping and peace enforcement and effective implementation of peace enforcement with dedicated international force has huge impact on promotion of humanitarian intervention even when there is no consent of host government. Overall capability and credibility of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security increases which also mitigates the rising anti UN sentiments.

There is vast significance and opportunities for Nepal from reformed Security Council and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security. There is ample opportunity to safeguard nation from devastating effect of climate change by active participation in different forums and raising strong voice to ensure the package aid to mitigate threats induced by it. The reformation assist in uplifting different instruments of national power including economic security being least developed country and safeguard nation from terrorism and transnational threats. Nepal is key claimant as non-permanent member of UNSC as topmost contributor in UNPKO. Consequently, there are ample opportunities to modernize Nepali Army with state ownership to establish it as credible international force for the maintenance of international peace and security in need. Through effective collective security mechanism, security of Nepal from any external aggression is ensured. Reformed UNSC gives ample opportunity for the promotion of various national interests and effective implementation of its foreign policy as well as promotion of rights of landlocked, small and least developed countries.

The interpretation of primary and secondary data discussed in various chapters have achieved some unique finding on drawbacks of structural and procedural aspects

of UNSC, identifies major factors necessitating reforming of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of global peace and security, suggested effective models for reforming of UNSC and its tool to deal with UNSC's main responsibility maintaining secure world and explored the significant impacts of reforming UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7.2 Conclusion

The problem of institutional reform arises from time to time in the majority of the world's institutions. Despite several institutional, regional, and internal UN attempts, the UN has not rebuilt itself in structural and procedural areas and is departing from the Charter mandates. Any organization inevitably undergoes change in response to the demands of different contexts. After 77 years, the organization that was founded in the post WW II era's shifting global power dynamics is unable to adapt to the reality of the modern world. Since its establishment, UNSC's role for the establishment of peace and security using its tools Collective Defense and peace enforcement for R2P as well as POC have both successful and unsuccessful accounts. But some violation of UN core principles and humanitarian catastrophes like Rwandan genocide, renewed Israel-Palestine crisis, Russian invasion of Ukraine and unsuccessful UN peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions has demanded reforming in structural, procedural and greatly in implementation of UNSC's tools for stable global peace and security. When there was commitment UNSC authorized intervention to preserve sovereignty of South Korea against North Korean invasion (1950-1953) and Kuwait liberation from Iraqi invasion (1990-1991) was possible. This shows that to preserve its core principles UN through UNSC authorized multinational military organizations can carry out wide scale military operations. But same actions has not been taken when interest of P5 nations are contradicting. Ongoing Gaza catastrophe and Russian invasion of Ukraine and repeated unsuccessful UN missions has raised serious concerns about the effective existence and functioning of UN: an organization deviating from its principles when it comes to practice. The issue of Security Council Reform is of great importance to the developing small states which have threat to their sovereignty by mighty neighbors with superior military power and hegemonic attitude. Their voice in UNSC's forum is only guaranteed with their presence there even in non permanent category. UNSC actions must ensure that sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states can't be small or big.

All core problems in the structural set up, procedural aspects, prospects of enlargement of the council, implementation of collective security, R2P, Protection of civilian lies in the P5 veto power. Hence veto power authority and misuse of it in promotion of national interest not placing the global interest of humanity is a core problem in humanitarian catastrophes and inaction of UNSC raising global security. All dimensions of security perspectives: collective security, R2P, peace enforcement, effective UNPKO with view of POC directly and indirectly with veto power. There is need in charter amendment about strict adherence of party to the dispute not to take part in resolution, amendment in veto power abiding the democratic norms and value and mechanism for rapid enforcement in emergency. Global Consensus is required for R2P, Collective Security and POC. World should have one voice bonded by terms of reference in UN Charters revitalized and redefined as per the demand of the present world. Hence this dissertation concludes the various models for the revitalization of UNSC and its tools for the maintenance of international peace and security. It strongly urges that based on the UN core principle of 'Sovereign equality of all nations', there is requirement for the creation of inclusive UNSC by expansion in both permanent and non-permanent category by including rising powers of the world as well as ensuring balanced representation from prominent nations from the region. Regional representation and inclusion of different categories of the states having concerns on wider dimension of security makes UNSC effective addressing the demands of the changing world order and its insecurity by products. It also expands the scope of wider universal ownership in international peace and security affairs.

Veto power is against the norms of global democratic values. UN is the largest promoter of democracy and good governance. Reviewing the adverse implication and misuse of veto power in maintaining international peace and security, major reformation on it based on global democratic norms of decision making is required. The core theme is that a single use of veto by one P5 member of the UNSC can't challenge global aspiration and core spirit of UN charter. Adopting the universally accepted democratic norms in decision making makes UNSC more effective in dealing with global peace and security affairs. Similarly, there is need to strengthen the UNSC tools peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security for the maintenance of global peace and security from policy to ample clarity in execution level reviewing the gaps and lapses identified in existing mechanism. Peace enforcement modality is vague and reforming

UN peace enforcement modality with clear contribution model of armed blue helmet forces safeguards the POC, R2P and collective security responsibility of UNSC. The delayed deployment in need can't prevent the violators of POC, R2P and aggressors jeopardizing the sovereignty of the states. In addition, empowering the role of UNGA in ratification about the decision made by UNSC in international peace and security affairs adopting the appropriate universally accepted democratic decision making procedure makes UN response in global. Global peace and security affairs responsibility should be with UNGA and UNSC in balance of power concept. The Charter of UN which needs to be rewritten reviewing the power dynamics and emerging threats keeping in the mind that UNSC actions are not paralyzed in R2P, POC and protecting the sovereignty of UN member States through collective defense/collective security.

Strength of UN should not be undermined. It has worked tremendously. It is not like that it has only drawbacks, but it has overwhelming critical strength. Strength must be exploited with full spirit and weaknesses must be seen as grounds for improvement and further better performance. There is no contradiction that world needs a global watch dog and strong international organization as UN to prevent any kind of abuse of power politics, hegemony and dominance in international peace and security affairs. If the tendency of intervention to small states by mighty states continues, there will be big question mark on the existence and credibility of the UN. It should not be like that the sufferers asked for another alliance and go for the parallel organization. The conflicting interest of the P5 members has derailed all efforts in reforming of UNSC in multiple dimensions. This conflict of interest must be neutralized by realizing need of strong, effective, efficient, and democratic UNSC as global pioneer organization in maintenance of peace and security. Elimination of veto power with adaptation of global practice of governance and decision making is the way to establish UN as credible organization not only working for the interest of P5 nations but with full determination and commitment for the sake of global peace, security, stability and noble purpose of humanity. Reformation is extremely necessary since it addresses the rising anti UN sentiments and builds the positive image of UN by establishing it as trusted and credible organization. In addition, it enhances the universal ownership of the decision made by UNSC and stops the possible disintegration of UN and formation of parallel UN like international organization. Hence, UNSC should adhere to theories and principles of democratic decision making, supreme sovereignty, global interest, constructivism and neo liberalism

rather than realism

In conclusion, this dissertation has explored the necessity and potential pathways for reforming the UNSC to address its longstanding issues of inefficiency, inequity, and lack of representation. The present structure of the UNSC, particularly the veto power authority vested in P5 members, has led to barrier in addressing pertinent global security issues requiring armed intervention under UN, undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN as a whole. The disproportionate power of these members has often paralyzed decision making, while the exclusion of rising global powers and regional actors has further fueled dissatisfaction and calls for change. UNSC's veto power holders till now are propagating the theory of realism within UN system but in contrast it principally demands collective decision making, sovereign equality of all nations, constructivism and neo liberalism. Unilateral act of some mighty nations holding veto power in UNSC against established UN principles and its core duties of safeguarding sovereignty and genocide has created anarchic world. Reformation in veto power authority based on wider representation in UNSC and global democratic practice of decision making as well as revitalizing the role of UNGA in dealing with international peace and security affairs are the ways ahead for effective UNSC to deal with emerging security threats. Without reformation, UNSC has become eyewitness only in countering genocide and threat to sovereignty of its member states by mighty powers. Nepal has huge scope as internationally recognized prominent member state and integral part of UNSC to deal with international peace and security issues through effective, efficient and quality peacekeeping operations. This is also opportunity to have state's ownership to modernize Nepali Army in order to maintain it as credible asset to deal with emerging complex security threats under umbrella of UN. Nepal has to explore the opportunity to advocate the security of small states, right of landlocked states, and environmental security from adverse effects of climate change and economic security.

Appendix A

Key Informants Interview Questionnaires: Diplomats, Military Attaché, and Academicians of Political Science/ International Relation/ Strategic Studies/Conflict Studies

1. Give your short introduction, academic qualification, your significant exposure to diplomatic assignment and exposure as academician of international relation/ political science.
2. What is your view on the effectiveness of the present structure and procedural provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to address the world security issues?
 - (a) Effective
 - (b) Ineffective
 - (c) Partially effective
2. Your comments on your chosen option about effectiveness of UNSC stated above.
3. Do you think there is need to change present structure of the UNSC to function effectively in regards with security perspective of the global affairs?
 - (a) Yes, it should be changed.
 - (b) No, it will generate more disputes so present structure should be continued.
4. Comment if you foresee the change in present structure of UNSC is required. In your opinion, what type of structural change is required?
5. What additional role do you think it has to be given to UN Security Council to meet the present challenges?
 - (a) Food security.
 - (b) Social economic privilege to underdeveloped country.
 - (c) Transnational Crime and Human Trafficking.
 - (d) Environmental Security.
 - (e) Anti-Terrorist mandate and action for state sponsored terrorism.

- (f) Security of the land locked, small and least developed states.
 - (g) All of above.
 - (h) Others (Additional remarks if any).
6. Is amendment in UN charters related to UNSC is necessary?
- (a) No, all of them are still relevant
 - (b) Non-relevant provisions should be amended-like veto factor, Consent of all permanent members (P5) to enroll new member states and affirmative vote of all P5 members for any substantive decision, authorization of Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement mission are conflicting provisions which should be amended
 - (c) No idea
7. Additional comment if you foresee amendment in UN charters related to UNSC is required.
8. Efforts for the reforming of the United Nations Security Council is continued, but it has not come with any fruitful end, what might be the reason for that?
- (a) Conflict of interest amongst P5 Nations.
 - (b) Ineffectiveness of the leadership.
 - (c) Lack of global consensus.
 - (d) Ineffectiveness of the General Assembly.
 - (e) All of above
 - (f) No idea.
 - (g) Other (Mixed Options, Additional Remarks if any).
9. Why it is necessary to restructure the United Nations Security Council?
- (a) UNSC structural and procedural arrangements are according to the political situation of 1945 aftermath WW II so should be changed with time as per the changed global power dynamics and change in world order. Since there is no significant reforming since establishment of UN and there is drastic change in world order, so change is required.

- (a) Non- inclusiveness of all categories of member states like land locked, small states, least developed states.
 - (b) Veto power factor vested in P5 countries.
 - (c) Emergence of new economic and military power, Change in world order and global power dynamics.
 - (d) Reforming to address the security threats of 21st Century and changing dynamics of international threats breaching international peace and security.
 - (e) To address humanitarian, societal, and other security complexities.
 - (f) Balanced Regional representation
 - (g) All of above
 - (h) Other (Additional remarks if any)
10. What model you suggest on reforming of United Nations Security Council?
- (a) Council must be enlarged ensuring the equal regional representation in permanent member with renewable membership of non-permanent states of same proportion, Inclusion of all categories of states like land locked, least developed and small states is vital.
 - (b) Balanced power to each permanent and non-permanent category states.
 - (c) Balancing regional representation as well contribution of states economically and militarily to UN. Such nations can act in global security issues effectively.
 - (d) All of above
 - (e) Other (Additional remarks if any)
11. What is your view on veto power vested in Permanent five members(P5) in Security Council?
- (a) It is rational since P5 are significant powers in global affairs, it should be continued.
 - (b) It is a restriction on effectiveness of UNSC and has adverse implication on functioning as per the spirit of UN, so it should be modified or alternative of it should be there.

- (c) It is a tool to promote the vested interest of the P5 states and has jeopardized the functioning of UNSC.
 - (d) Option b and c
 - (e) Other (Additional Remarks if any)
12. Your comment how veto power has affected the functioning mechanism of UNSC.
13. What should be the basis of reforming of United Nations Security Council?
- (a) Regional representation.
 - (b) Contribution to UN economy.
 - (c) Military capability to deal with international conflict.
 - (d) Contribution to peace keeping missions.
 - (e) All of above
 - (f) Other (Additional remarks if any)
14. What challenges you see in reforming of the UNSC?
- (a) Dominance and interest of superpower.
 - (b) Veto power authority of P5 states.
 - (c) Tendency of maintaining status quo by P5 states.
 - (d) Many claimants and lack of global consensus.
 - (e) Opposition by the Regional Power and conflict of interest to enroll rival countries as permanent member of UNSC.
 - (f) All of above
 - (g) Other (Additional Remarks if any)
15. Which new regional power do you suggest enrolling in restructured UNSC if the reforming process is initiated?
- (a) Germany. (b) Brazil. (c) India. (d) Japan.
 - (e) South Africa. (f) Canada (g) Nigeria (h) South Korea (i) Egypt (j) Other (Mixed Recommendations or additional remarks if any)

16. If veto power is to be amended what could be the basis of passing various UNSC resolutions?

(a) Two-third majority of both permanent and non-permanent states of UNSC. Since 2/3rd majority is most practiced democratic decision-making process.

(b) Simple majority including majority in both permanent and non-permanent category.

(c) Continuation of current provision and furthermore any action by UNSC should be ratified by UNGA with 2/3rd majority.

(d) No idea

(e) Other (Additional comment if any).

17. Do you foresee the necessity of balancing role of General Assembly and Security Council in security related issues?

(a) Yes-there should be increased role of General Assembly

(b) No-Present provision is appropriate.

(c) Additional Remarks, if any:

18. Additional comment and remarks on various issues of reforming of UNSC.

Appendix B

Key Informants Interview Questionnaire- UN Civilian Staff/Branch Chiefs/Staff Officers/MILOBS/UNPOL/IPO at various UN Peace Keeping Missions

1. Give your short introduction, academic qualification (Civil/Military) and your exposure to UN environment.
2. How do you visualize the functioning mechanism of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Any issues to be addressed for better performance of it?
3. Since, you have significant experience on UN Peacekeeping operations at different missions, your comment on effectiveness of current peacekeeping operations with logic and analysis. What are your recommendations to enhance the capability of the peace keeping forces to achieve mission mandate especially protection of civilian and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) duties. Do you visualize any gap in structural set up of the peacekeeping forces and need up gradation in logistic aspect especially modern equipment and vehicles for operational purpose.
4. What all challenges contemporary UN missions are facing while carrying out the operational activities as per the mission mandate.
 - (a) Lack of cooperation from the host country.
 - (b) Lack of Intelligence.
 - (c) Lack of adequate maneuver troops and huge Area of Responsibility.
 - (d) Lack of modern equipment and terrain friendly operational and logistic vehicle.
 - (e) All of above.
 - (f) Other (Mixed Options).
5. Your recommendations to overcome the operational challenges you mentioned above.
6. What is your comment on operational mentality of the contingents deployed in UNPKO to achieve the mission mandate?
 - (a) All contingents participating in UNPKO have high level of operational mentality.

(b) Some contingents are highly operational and dedicated to carry out the assigned responsibility.

(c) Some contingents lack operational mentality and don't carry out operational activities effectively to achieve the mission mandate. They think UN mission as privilege and welfare.

(d) No idea.

(e) Other (Additional Comment if any)

7. Do you think that change in UNSC structure is required?

(a) Present structure is appropriate. There is no need of further reforming.

(b) There is need of the reforming as per the drastic change in world order since establishment of UN and as per change in power dynamics of the contemporary world.

(c) Other (Additional comment if any)

8. If you agree that reforming of UNSC is essential and being Branch Chief/Staff Officer/Military Observer at different desk of UN Missions, you are aware about the various issues of reforming of UNSC. What all are the core issues to be addressed while reforming UNSC. Kindly chose the appropriate option.

(a) Reforming is to be carried out to ensure wider representation of different categories of states like regional powers, land locked, small and landlocked states.

(b) Reforming of UNSC is to be carried out to enhance the effectiveness of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and carryout the responsibility of collective security to safeguard the sovereignty of the weaker nations against mighty states.

(c) Reforming of UNSC is to be carried out to make UN more effective to deal with security threats of contemporary world and effective implementation of Protection of Civilian (POC) and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) duties.

(d) All of above.

(e) No idea.

(f) Other (Additional Comment if any)

9. In your opinion, how the role of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) could be balanced with UNSC in terms of making decision for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(a) No, UNSC must be given sole authority to deal with security related issues. The present provisions and authority vested to UNSC should be preserved.

(b) Yes, being the global umbrella organization of all sovereign countries of the world and to ensure the sovereign equality of all nations as mentioned in UN charter, decision of UNSC should be ratified by 2/3rd majority of the UNGA to be functional.

(c) No idea.

10. Despite of efforts of reforming UNSC since its establishment, UNSC structural aspect and functioning mechanism is still in status quo. In your opinion, what is the main reason for that?

(a) Conflict of interest amongst P5 nations and lack of consensus.

(b) P5 nations want to preserve power.

(c) Ineffective role of UNGA.

(d) Lack of determination, initiative, and leadership amongst P5 members.

(e) All of above.

(f) Other (Mixed Option if any)

11. How do you visualize the threats of contemporary world? Is UNSC and contemporary UN missions successful in dealing with these threats?

12. How can UNSC handle the threats of contemporary world effectively? Do you foresee the necessity of any procedural and structural change in UNSC to deal with these threats? Give your analysis and recommendations.

13. Do you foresee the enlargement of UNSC membership in both permanent and non-permanent category of member states visualizing the change in world order and power dynamics since establishment of UN in 1945? Give your recommendation and

general model of reforming, if any.

- (a) Enlargement is required in both permanent and non-permanent category with veto power to additional members of permanent states. 2/3rd majority concept of decision making should be implemented even after enlargement of council in permanent category.
- (b) Enlargement is required only in non-permanent category.
- (c) Enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent category with no veto power to additional members.
- (d) No idea.
- (e) Other (Additional comment, if any)

14. Your opinion about veto power vested to P5 members of UNSC and its effectiveness, it should be abolished, changed or continued. What could be the alternative if it must be changed?

15. In case of any emergency situation demanding the prompt deployment of UN peacekeeping force to protect the civilians under deadliest threats, in your opinion, how far it is possible to deploy the UN peacekeeping force promptly after authorization from UNSC?

- (a) It is possible to deploy promptly under the current provision.
- (b) Prompt deployment of force is not possible since it must go through the process of force generation and willingness of the host country in this situation is vital aspect. Even there is standby force, the deployment of the force takes time and impact on conflict ridden country due to delayed deployment in terms of humanitarian crisis will be great.
- (c) No idea.
- (d) Other (Additional comment if any).

16. Is there any possibility to create standing UN/ Regional force for the prompt and swift mobilization in case of emergency situation of grave humanitarian crisis as a consequence of the conflict? What could be the correct alternative for this type of force?

17. How far UNSC being successful in maintaining the provision of Collective Security in terms of protecting sovereignty of small states?

- (a) Successful
- (b) Partially successful
- (c) Unsuccessful when there is involvement of mighty alliance like NATO and other powerful nations.
- (d) Other (Additional comment if any)

18. Any other comments/ Analysis/ view/recommendations on reforming of UNSC with regards to the security perspective?

Appendix C

Key Informants Interview Questionnaire: Peacekeeper Officers Corp of Contingents and Contingents Commanders

1. Give your short introduction, academic qualifications, and your exposure to different UN Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) as Contingent member/ Contingent Commander.
2. Share your mission experience, how your contingent contributed to fulfill the mission mandate including protection of civilian. Give details of your unit's roles and responsibilities.
3. What is your view about effectiveness of UNPKO relevant to your mission in terms of providing security to local population?
 - (a) Effective.
 - (b) Ineffective.
 - (c) Partially Effective.
4. Your comment if it is ineffective or partially effective.
5. What are the major operational and logistic challenges faced during your UN mission to fulfill the mission mandate related to protection of civilian?
 - (a) Restriction on freedom of action and freedom of movement by host country security forces.
 - (b) Limited Operational Outreach due to various threats.
 - (c) Lack of operational intelligence and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance devices.
 - (d) Lack of modern vehicles and Equipment's.
 - (e) Lack of Human Intelligence in area of operation.
 - (f) All of above.
 - (g) Other comment if any
6. What is your view about the performance of different units deployed in UN Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO)?

- (a) There is capability difference in different contingents in terms of Operational effectiveness.
 - (b) No, all contingents are equal in terms of operational effectiveness.
- 7. Your comment on way to enhance operational effectiveness if you feel there is capability gap and there is need to bring all contingents in uniform grid.
- 8. Have you visualized any performance gap between the contingents from different countries in terms of operational effectiveness, prompt and swift mobilization in case of any threat to civilians, effective operational activities as per the mission mandate and professionalism of the troops? Your comment on the professionalism of the peacekeeping units deployed in mission area. Their determination and willingness to conduct of operation for the protection of civilians.
 - (a) All are equally professional and there is strong determination to carry out peacekeeping operational duties to fulfill mission mandate of protection of civilians.
 - (b) There is need on improvement of professionalism and determination to carry out peacekeeping operational duties to fulfill mission mandate of protection of civilians.
- 9. Comment on way to enhance professionalism and determination to carry out assigned responsibilities if any.
- 10. Comment on affect created by capability gap of the contingents for the achievement of the mission mandate if any.
- 11. How do you visualize the security threats to local population prevailing in UN mission area you have deployed?
 - (a) Ethnic clashes.
 - (b) Threat from various Armed Groups.
 - (c) Meager presence of the government forces posing additional security threat.
 - (d) Threats from Terrorist Armed Groups.
 - (e) All above

(f) Others (Mixed threats among above options).

12. How far your UN mission was successful in dealing with those security threats and protect local population?

(a) Effective

(b) Partially effective

(c) Ineffective

(d) Other (Comment if any)

13. Your comment if your mission was ineffective or partially effective to deal with security threats and protect local population.

14. Give your recommendation about the enhancement of capability of Contingents participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to fulfill the mission mandate related with protection of civilian?

(a) Adequate maneuver troops with mission specific training. Majority of maneuver troops for operational duty of Protection of Civilians.

(b) A subunit of specialized troops to carry out special missions embedded in contingents.

(c) Adequate terrain friendly mechanized vehicle with mine protection capability.

(d) Adequate Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance- C4ISR equipment.

(e) Adequate Specialized intelligence manpower and detachments.

(f) All of above.

(g) Other (Mixed options from above).

15. Do you foresee the necessity of improvement in the structural set up of the contingents participating in UNPKO? If you foresee the necessity of structural change to achieve the mission mandate, how should be the overall structural set up of UN peace keeping mission to deal with the contemporary threats to civilian population?

(a) There is need of the structural change.

(b) Present structural set up is adequate to deal with prevailing security

threats.

(c) Other (Comment on the option you have chosen based on your experience).

16. What is your view about support of the host nation and security forces towards UN Peace keeping operations?

(a) Fully supportive

(b) Partially Supportive

(c) Non supportive

(d) Other (Comment on option chosen).

17. Do you foresee UN mission can sustain in typical peace enforcement mission under chapter VII when the situation demands to operate against the host nation for the protection of civilian mandate and while carrying out responsibility to protect (R2P) duty?

(a) Yes, it can sustain within framework of current set up of peacekeeping operations.

(b) No, it can't sustain within current set up of the Peace Keeping/ Peace enforcement Operations.

(c) Robust multinational and regional force is required to deal in such situation.

(d) Other (Mixed options from above)

18. Your recommendation to create robust multinational and regional force if you chose the mixed option including requirement of robust multinational force to deal with the situation expressed above.

(a) Creation of the integrated standing UN and regional power force to deal in extreme emergency.

(b) Earmarking the separate force from the regional and global power and seeking commitments from them. Maintenance of the standby force always to be deployed in short notice.

(c) Current Provision is Okay.

(d) Other (Your comment on the option chosen).

19. How is the host nation supporting UN mission in achieving Protection of Civilian mandate related to your mission?

(a) Integrated and joint Operations.

(b) Sharing of Intelligence.

(c) Non restriction on freedom of movement and freedom of action.

(d) All of Above

(e) None of above (non-supportive, partially supportive)

(f) Other (Mixed Options/Comment on the option chosen).

20. In case of any emergency demanding the prompt deployment of UN peacekeeping force to protect the civilians under deadliest threats, in your opinion, how far it is possible to deploy the UN peacekeeping force promptly after authorization from UNSC? Any suggested approach for the prompt mobilization and fasten the mobilization process.

21. Any additional comment about the contemporary peacekeeping environment and grounds of improvement since peacekeeping/ peace enforcement is primary tool of the UNSC to bring peace, security, and stability in the conflict-ridden states.

Appendix D

KII: Questionnaire for High Level UN Military Appointment in UN missions and other key appointments in the related UN environment

1. Give your short introduction, Academic Qualification, exposure to UN assignments or any significant Military / other Key UN related appointment.
2. How do you compare the geo-political reality, change in world power dynamics and world order since establishment of the UN in 1945 till now? In your view, what are the major changes?
3. Your opinion about the veto power vested to Permanent members (P5) of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? How has it affected the functioning mechanism of UNSC and its effect on UN response in protecting the vulnerable populations of the conflict affected areas? Should it be continued, or alternative arrangement should be there? Your suggestions for the alternative to the veto power if any?
4. Your comment on current role of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in comparison with UNSC to deal with global security affairs as UNGA represents the global forum while UNSC is limited to 15 members (5 permanent and elected 10 members).
5. Do you foresee the balance in role of UNGA, elected ten members (E 10) and permanent five (P5) members of UNSC in dealing with global security issues and other decision-making process?
6. If you foresee the reforming of UNSC in current structural set up, what could be your recommendation? Give your view in enlargement of the UNSC for the balanced representation globally. Highlight the details with recommended representation of nations in permanent and non-permanent category in reference to new power dynamics and the rising power of the world.
7. Despite of repeated effort for reforming of the UNSC, there is no significant development till now. In your opinion, what could be the main reason for that?
8. How do you visualize the various threats of the contemporary world? Are present structural and procedural aspects, provisions, and actions of UNSC sufficient to deal

with various threats of the contemporary world? If you visualize new structural and procedural reforms, give your recommendation to make UNSC more effective and efficient to handle with security threats of the contemporary world. Your visualization of future UNSC to deal with emerging Security Threats.

9. How do you analyze the change in conflict dynamics (Interstate to Intrastate and Asymmetric) since establishment of UN till now?

10. How do you foresee the role of UNSC in protecting sovereignty of the small countries of the world in reference to Collective Security? How far UN is successful in maintaining it?

11. What is your comment about reaction process and procedural aspects of UNSC to deal with international crisis? What could be the recommended way to deploy peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions promptly? Your analysis on delayed deployment of the force for emergency response and implications. Your comment on current provision and recommended approach.

12. Keeping in consideration of delayed deployment of the UN force in protection of civilians and prevent large scale conflict, do you think that UN need Standing Army/Regional force to deal with crisis of the world for the speedy and prompt deployment? Any alternative solution for it?

13. How do you foresee the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations? Any gaps you have identified pertinent to the mission you were involved with or monitored? How to enhance the capability of UN peacekeeping operations to deal with contemporary security threats?

14. Has peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII implemented properly? How far UN has been successful in carrying out peace enforcement mission in response to state sponsored terrorism, war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crime against humanity.

15. What all are the gaps you see in the charters of UN? Your recommendation to improve.

16. How successful are UN peacekeeping missions in fulfilling protection of civilian

mandate? Give your view referring with existing/ past UN peacekeeping/ peace enforcement missions.

17. Your comment about the support of the host nation to UN mission you have supervised or monitored?

18. Any other additional comment/suggestion/analysis pertinent to reformation of UNSC within scope of security perspective.

Appendix E

Key informants Interview Questionnaire- Interview of high-level UN officials and Official worked at United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) New York in different capacities

1. Give brief introduction of yourself and your assignment at UNHQ New York.
2. What is your view about the current functioning mechanism of UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security?
3. How you visualize the security threats of the contemporary world.
4. What is your view on response of the UNSC in dealing with the threats of the contemporary world? How effective it is and your recommendations to enhance effectiveness.
5. Do you foresee the necessity of reforming UNSC in procedural and structural aspects? Give rational for your statement.
6. Do you foresee the enlargement of UNSC membership in both permanent and non-permanent category of member states visualizing the change in world order and power dynamics since establishment of UN in 1945? Give your recommendation and general model of reforming, if any.
7. Give your opinion about the veto power. How it has been used by the permanent members (P5) of UNSC. Your analysis on implication of veto power.
8. Do you see the necessity of amending the current provision of maintaining veto power authority to P5 members or it is to be maintained as it is. Give rational for your statement.
9. What could be the alternative of veto power if you agree that it has to be changed?
10. Have you visualized any gaps/challenges in current peacekeeping mission? What is your recommendation to overcome the gaps identified? Based on your peacekeeping operations experience and key appointment at UNHQ New York, have you realized that UN missions are successful in fulfilling the mandate of Protection of Civilians and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) duties. What is your recommendation to enhance the effectiveness of UNPKO for the protection of civilian and Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) duties with operational and logistic perspective?

11. What is your view about collective security provision in UN Charter? Has it been effectively implemented?

12. Prompt and swift mobilization of the troops in case of emergency humanitarian crisis due to conflict is required to mitigate the threat to local population and prevent large scale damage. The deployment of the peacekeepers in conflict ridden area goes through long process, and it is said to be six months to one year. Do you foresee the need of standing UN and regional Army to mobilize promptly in such situation? Your view with probable options.

13. Any comment on UN charters which need to be amended and suggestion on additional provisions to be included in UN charters.

14. Despite of repeated effort in reforming of UNSC, it has not taken concrete shape and come to logical conclusion. Give your opinion about the way to resolve deadlock for reforming of UNSC.

15. Your comments on UNSC performance on Responsibility to Protect(R2P) and collective security with reference to invasion of Iraq by NATO, NATO involvement in Libya, Syrian Crisis, Russian Annexation of Crimea, and Russian Invasion to Ukraine.

16. What is your visualization about future UNSC, how it should be in terms of structure, procedural and functioning mechanism? Any other suggestions to establish UN as more effective body in maintaining peace, security, and stability in the world. What approach should UNSC take to neutralize contemporary security threats?

17. Any other comment/ observation/suggestion about the issues of reforming of UNSC with Security Perspective?

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