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**An Assessment on Economic Rights of Labour in Construction Sector: A Comparative
Analysis of Donor-Funded and Government-Funded Building Projects**

by

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080/MSCoM/023

A THESIS

**SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER IN
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT**

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING

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
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled “**An Assessment on Economic Rights of Labour in Construction Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Donor-Funded and Government-Funded Building Projects**”, submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Science in Engineering in Construction Management, is a record of an original work done under the guidance of Asst. Prof. Mahendra Raj Dhital and Assoc. Prof. Nagendra Bahadur Amatya. This thesis contains only work completed by me except for the consulted material, which has been duly referenced and acknowledged.



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ABSTRACT

The construction industry in Nepal represents one of the leading sources of economic growth and job creation, though it largely comprises an informal sector facing persistent challenges in delayed wage payment, inadequate social protection, and poor enforcement of labour rights. This research examines the extent to which economic rights are fulfilled for construction workers through a comparative study of donor-funded and government-funded building construction projects in four purposively selected districts: Kathmandu, Rupandehi (Butwal), Rukum West, and Jajarkot. Guided by the Labour Act, 2074 (2017), the Social Security Act, 2075 (2018), and relevant ratified ILO Conventions.

Responses were recorded on-site and subsequently entered into KoboToolbox for data management, then analyzed using descriptive statistics, independent samples t-tests, and chi-square tests in SPSS. Significant differences between project types were observed in Social Security ($t = -2.929$, $p = 0.005$), Contractual Transparency ($t = 2.471$, $p = 0.016$), and Awareness ($t = -3.328$, $p = 0.001$). Chi-square analysis further revealed significant associations in access to medical insurance ($\chi^2 = 13.22$, $p = 0.004$), equal pay for equal work regardless of gender ($\chi^2 = 21.02$, $p < 0.001$), and general understanding of workers' rights ($\chi^2 = 18.40$, $p < 0.001$). To complement these findings, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with five senior construction-sector professionals identified five systemic enforcement failures: a near-total awareness vacuum (97% of workers received no rights training); institutional incapacity, with all five experts unanimously rating DOLS as “ineffective”; the absence of digital systems for registration, wage payment, and grievance reporting; and a fundamental legal design misfit between the Labour Act, 2074 and the informal, mobile construction workforce.

Despite observable differences between project types, overall compliance remained critically low across both groups, with systematic violations of the Labour Act, 2074 and the Social Security Act, 2075 documented in both. Critical gaps included low social security coverage, absence of labour audits, and poor rights awareness. Experts unanimously recommended the immediate digitalization in construction sector, a national rights-awareness campaign, and significant expansion of labour inspection capacity as priority reforms.

Keywords: Labour Economic Rights, Construction Sector, Compliance Assessment, Donor-Funded Projects, Government-Funded Projects,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Full Form
ADB	Asian Development Bank
BOCW	Building and Other Construction Workers (India)
CAAN	Construction Association of Nepal
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CITB	Construction Industry Training Board (United Kingdom)
CPF	Central Provident Fund (Singapore)
DoLER	Department of Labour and Employment Relations
DOLS	Department of Labour and Occupational Safety
EPF	Employees' Provident Fund
ETF	Employees' Trust Fund
EU	European Union
FCAN	Federation of Contractors' Association of Nepal
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ILC	International Labour Conference

ILO International Labour Organization

KII Key Informant Interview

MoLESS Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NHRC National Human Rights Commission

NPR Nepalese Rupee

NSO National Statistics Office

OHS Occupational Health and Safety

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

PF Provident Fund

PPMO Public Procurement Monitoring Office

SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

SSB Social Security Board

SSF Social Security Fund

CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

Labour rights are fundamental for ensuring fair treatment, economic security, and social protection in any workforce. In Nepal, the construction sector has become a significant driver of economic growth and urban development, employing a large portion of the labour force, including both skilled and unskilled workers. Despite its economic contribution, the sector remains largely informal and relies heavily on temporary and subcontract-based employment, exposing workers to wage delays, unsafe working conditions, and limited access to social security.

The Labour Act, 2074 (2017) and the Social Security Act, 2075 (2018) aim to safeguard workers' rights, including fair remuneration, safe working environments, and social protection. These national provisions align with Nepal's commitments to international labour standards. Under the Treaty Act, 2047, Nepal has ratified 11 ILO conventions, several of which relate directly to the economic rights of labour. However, enforcement remains inconsistent, particularly in construction, due to weak institutional monitoring, low awareness among workers, and the prevalence of informal employment practices.

Given these challenges, this study seeks to assess the economic rights of labourers in Nepal's construction sector, focusing on construction sites in Kathmandu. It aims to examine the level of compliance with national labour laws, identify gaps in enforcement, and provide recommendations to enhance protection and accountability. Through this research, the study aspires to contribute to a more equitable and sustainable construction labour market that upholds the dignity and rights of all workers.

1.1 Background

The construction industry of Nepal is arguably one of the most economically significant and rapidly growing sectors of the country's economy. This industry makes valuable contributions to job creation, infrastructure development, and urbanization. It employs skilled and unskilled workers through infrastructure development, residential construction, and construction of privately owned buildings. It acts as a vital pillar for development in Nepal and as an important vehicle for poverty alleviation among Nepalese workers ((CBS), 2020). According to National Statistics Office (National Statistics Office (NSO), 2025), the Nepal's labour force participation rate (LFPR) of Nepal is 65.5% for people who are ten years and older. There is considerable inequality in terms of gender when it comes to labour force participation; males are more active

than females in contributing their labour to the national economy (71.2% vs. 60.2%). The construction industry, being a major part of the secondary industry, contributes to approximately 12.7% of the total labour force in Nepal (National Statistics Office (NSO), 2025).

However, despite this significant economic presence, the industry is largely unregulated and informal, resulting in a high number of precarious workers within it. Such workers frequently face insecurity of employment, late or unpaid wages, unsafe working conditions, and lack of access to social protection (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2022). Additionally, according to the (National Statistics Office (NSO), 2025), approximately 69.9% of Nepal's workers are considered vulnerable employees, working on their own or as contributing family workers, without having access to any form of social security or any contract and legal protections. This problem especially exists in the construction industry, where the mode of employment of workers consists of temporary, subcontracted work, and/or daily-wage labour.

The Labour Act, 2074 (2017) and the Social Security Act, 2075 (2018) have been formulated with the primary objective of providing a legal framework ensuring that all workers enjoy equal entitlements to fair wages, proper workplace safety measures, and social security benefits (Government of Nepal, 2017) (Government of Nepal, 2018). Such acts of legislation are consistent with Nepal's international commitments under International Labour Organization ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98, which encompass freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2022). However, despite such legal provisions, issues pertaining to enforcement and compliance with labour laws in the construction sector have remained consistently inadequate owing to limited capacity for institutional oversight, worker ignorance regarding their legal rights, and the prevalence of informal hiring practices, which render it challenging to enforce any legal claims (Bhattarai, Dahal, & Neupane, 2024). Indeed, the subcontracting mechanism of the construction sector, which involves employers contracting out work to multiple subcontractors, is a major reason why such issues prevail.

It is against such a backdrop that there emerges an undeniable necessity to thoroughly examine how effectively the economic rights of the labour force have been fulfilled in Nepal's construction sector, especially within districts such as Kathmandu, Butwal, Rukum West, and Jajarkot, given the different levels of urbanisation, institutional capacities, and governance of projects in these regions. The present study aims to evaluate the degree of compliance of labour

-related economic rights in both donor-funded and government-funded construction projects, determine important areas where the current enforcement systems have fallen short in addressing issues related to labour laws, and come up with recommendations based on evidence gathered in order to further enhance the welfare of the labour workforce. Through this process, it is hoped that the study will help build a just and sustainable labour market in Nepal's construction industry by ensuring that all labourers' fundamental rights be met at all times.

1.2 Problem statement

The construction industry of Nepal is vital for its development in terms of providing jobs and infrastructural expansion. Nonetheless, even with the existence of relevant legislative frameworks under the Labour Act 2074 (2017) (Government of Nepal, 2017) and the Social Security Act 2075 (2018) (Government of Nepal, 2018), economic rights of construction workers are poorly safeguarded. The enforcement of legislation is not rigorous enough primarily because of the lack of adequate regulation on an institutional level and low awareness levels regarding economic rights among workers themselves (Bhattarai, Dahal, & Neupane, 2024)

Workers often experience issues like wage arrears that negatively affect them financially and make them dissatisfied with working conditions (Bista, Neupane, & Bhattarai, 2024). Workers are employed informally in many cases without contracts, insurance coverage or any social security whatsoever, making their situation even more unstable (Doranga, Subedi, & Katwal, 2023) Lastly, workers do not have appropriate tools to file complaints about wage disputes or abuse and violations of their economic rights (Sapkota, Subedi, & Ale, 2023).

Moreover, the majority of construction labourers are also less aware of the legal and economic rights of theirs regarding minimum wages, social security payments, and welfare allowances as per the existing law (Sapkota, Subedi, & Ale, 2023) (Bhattarai, Dahal, & Neupane, 2024). Even though the construction industry plays an important role in the country's economy, economic rights of its employees remain neglected and unprotected (Bajracharya, Rana, Karki, & Giri, 2024)

It may be preliminarily concluded from the experience of the developed countries that those donor funded projects (ADB, World Bank, USAID, and others) where labour compliance is mandatory, third party monitoring is employed, and there is a risk of damaging the reputation

meet greater success than government funded projects. Still, there is no study in existence that could quantify this difference in the case of Nepal.

Consequently, the objective of this research is to explore the realization of the economic rights of the workers in the construction industry of Kathmandu, Nepal, and find out the discrepancies between the provisions of law and the reality on the ground.

1.3 Research Questions

This study is guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the current level of compliance with economic rights of labour in Nepal's construction sector through a comparative analysis of donor-funded and government-funded projects?
2. What are the key challenges and gaps affecting the enforcement of economic rights for construction workers?
3. What are the possible solutions for overcoming the existing challenges and gaps ?

1.4 Research Objective

General Objective

1.To evaluate the economic rights of labour in Nepal's construction sector through a comparative analysis of donor-funded and government-funded projects, while identifying key challenges and recommending policy interventions for improved compliance.

Specific Objective

1. To assess the current level of compliance with economic rights of labour in Nepal's construction sector through a comparative analysis of donor-funded and government-funded projects.
2. To identify and analyze the key challenges and gaps affecting the enforcement of economic rights of labourers in the construction industry.
3. To suggest possible solutions for overcoming the existing challenges and gaps

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study addresses a critical gap in Nepal's academic and policy landscape by providing the first multi-dimensional assessment of economic rights compliance in the construction sector, comparing donor-funded and government-funded projects across four geographically diverse districts. Using a seven-subscale Labour Economic Right Compliance framework grounded in the Labour Act 2074, Social Security Act 2075, and key ILO conventions, it offers a comprehensive, simultaneous examination of wages, social security, working hours, legal compliance, economic fairness, contractual transparency, and worker awareness dimensions that prior research has only examined in isolation (Government of Nepal, 2017) (Government of Nepal, 2018).

The findings carry direct policy relevance for MoLESS, DOLS, and Nepal's broader labour governance architecture. By empirically documenting the distribution and nature of violations including near-zero SSF registration, the dominance of verbal contracts, the absence of labour audits, and critically low rights awareness the study provides actionable diagnostic evidence for regulatory reform. Its recommendations, anchored in both primary data and international best practice, offer a concrete roadmap for aligning Nepal's construction labour governance with constitutional commitments and ILO convention obligations.

For donor agencies including the World Bank, ADB, and bilateral partners, the comparative dimension of the study provides evidence to evaluate whether social safeguard conditionalities embedded in funding agreements translate into meaningful on-the-ground compliance and where monitoring and evaluation frameworks require strengthening. For civil society organisations and worker advocacy groups, the findings expose patterns of systemic neglect that are otherwise obscured by the informal and dispersed structure of the sector, providing an evidence base for awareness and empowerment campaigns.

At the broadest level, the research contributes to Nepal's obligations under SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth. The construction sector employs 12.7% of Nepal's total labour force, meaning that measurable improvements in rights compliance carry welfare consequences for a substantial share of the national workforce and their families. This study establishes the empirical baseline from which such improvements can be designed, monitored, and evaluated.

1.6 Scope of the Study and Limitation

This study examines the state of labour economic rights compliance in Nepal's building construction sector, with a specific focus on comparing compliance levels between donor-funded and government-funded projects. The research was conducted across four districts Kathmandu, Rupandehi (Butwal), Rukum West, and Jajarkot selected to represent a geographic and developmental cross-section of Nepal, spanning urban, semi-urban, and remote contexts. The study population comprised workers directly engaged at active construction sites within these districts during the data collection period, and a census approach was adopted covering all 68 accessible respondents. LECR was assessed across seven subscales: minimum wage compliance, timely wage payment, social security fund (SSF) registration, provident fund contribution, insurance provision, overtime compensation, and leave entitlements. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics and inferential tests chi-square and independent-samples t-test to identify significant differences in compliance across funding types.

The scope is deliberately confined to building construction projects and does not extend to infrastructure, road, hydropower, or other civil works sectors, which may exhibit different compliance dynamics. Similarly, the study addresses only the economic dimension of labour rights, excluding civil, social, or occupational safety rights, which fall outside the defined LECR framework. The findings are therefore not intended as a comprehensive assessment of overall labour rights conditions in Nepal's construction industry.

Several limitations must be acknowledged in interpreting the results. First, the sample size of 68 workers, while constituting a census of the accessible population, is relatively small, which may constrain the generalisability of findings to the broader construction workforce in Nepal. Second, data were collected primarily through structured worker questionnaires; the perspectives of employers, contractors (*thekedars*), and project management units were captured only through supplementary Key Informant Interviews, and their responses may be subject to social desirability bias. Third, the study relied on workers' self-reported awareness and perception of compliance rather than independent documentary verification of payroll records, SSF registration logs, or insurance certificates, which may introduce recall bias. Fourth, the selection of districts, though purposive and geographically representative, may not fully capture the diversity of project types and labour arrangements across all provinces of Nepal. Finally, the cross-sectional nature of the study captures a single point in time and does not account for seasonal variation in construction activity or temporal changes in compliance behaviour. Despite these limitations, the study provides empirically grounded, district-level

evidence that contributes meaningfully to the understanding of labour rights enforcement gaps in Nepal's construction sector and offers a basis for targeted policy recommendations.

CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Understanding the economic rights of workers in Nepal's construction sector requires looking at three important areas: how labour laws are written and applied, what international standards say about workers' rights, and how construction projects are actually managed on the ground. This chapter brings together existing research and reports on all three of these areas. It lays the foundation for comparing how donor-funded and government-funded construction projects in Nepal treat the workers they employ.

The construction sector is one of Nepal's largest employers. According to the National Statistics Office (National Statistics Office (NSO), 2023), approximately 1.5 million workers are employed in construction-related activities inside Nepal, with millions more working abroad in the construction industries of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and South Korea. Yet despite this large workforce, construction workers remain among the most economically vulnerable groups in the country. They typically work on short-term contracts, lack social security coverage, and rarely receive all the benefits guaranteed by law such as overtime pay, festival allowance, or accidental insurance (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MoLESS), 2021).

This vulnerability has two main causes. The first is a weak legal framework that, until recently, did not give construction workers adequate legal protection. The second is poor enforcement of even the laws that do exist. The Labour Act 2074 (2017) was a major step forward, but its effective implementation especially at construction sites remains incomplete (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2020).

Two guiding ideas shape how this chapter reviews the existing literature. The first is the International Labour Organization's Decent Work Agenda, which states that all workers regardless of sector, contract type, or skill level deserve fair wages, safe working conditions, social protection, and the freedom to organise (International Labour Organization (ILO), 1999). The second is the human rights-based approach to economic labour rights, which frames wages, social security, and fair treatment not as optional benefits given by employers, but as rights that every worker is entitled to by law (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights (OHCHR), 2012). Together, these two frameworks help us evaluate Nepal's construction sector honestly and critically.

This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 covers the legal framework for labour rights in Nepal, including a historical overview and a detailed look at the Labour Act 2074. Section 2.3 examines how well these rights are actually being respected in practice, using data from Nepali studies and national surveys. Section 2.4 looks at international labour standards and Nepal's obligations under them. Section 2.5 introduces international best practices, with a special focus on South Korea's construction wage protection law, and draws lessons for Nepal. Section 2.6 identifies the key research gaps that this thesis aims to fill.

2.2 Legal Framework for Labour Rights in Nepal

2.2.1 Historical Background of Labour Laws in Nepal

Nepal's labour legislation has gone through several stages of development. Before 1992, there was very limited formal regulation of employment. The first major law was the Labour Act 2048 (1992), which set basic rules on working hours, wages, leave, and employment conditions. However, this law was primarily written with factory workers and permanent employees in mind. Construction workers, who are mostly hired on short-term or daily wage arrangements, were not well covered by this law (Bhattarai K. , 2016).

The Labour Act 2048 had several weaknesses. It did not require written appointment letters for all workers. It did not clearly include casual or daily wage workers in social security provisions. It lacked strong enforcement mechanisms, and penalties for violations were too small to act as a real deterrent. As a result, employers especially in the construction sector could violate the law without serious consequences (Sharma D. , 2018).

Over the following two decades, Nepal ratified a number of International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, including those on forced labour, discrimination, child labour, and the right to organise. However, domestic implementation of these commitments remained weak. A 2016 ILO review found that Nepal's legal framework was not fully aligned with these international obligations and that enforcement was particularly poor in sectors like construction (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2016).

The turning point came in 2017, when Nepal passed the Labour Act 2074 and the Social Security Act 2074. These two laws together represent a significant modernisation of labour protection in Nepal. They apply to all workers including those in construction and include

provisions for minimum wages, social security, gratuity, festival allowance, overtime pay, and written contracts. The Social Security Fund (SSF) was established under the Social Security Act 2074 to manage worker contributions and provide benefits such as medical treatment, accidental insurance, maternity support, and pension (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MoLESS), 2019).

2.2.2 The Labour Act 2074: Key Provisions and Their Relevance to Construction

The Labour Act 2074 is the main law governing employment in Nepal today. It contains 14 chapters and 142 sections. The following discussion highlights the provisions most relevant to construction workers, and explains what each provision means in practical terms on a construction site.

Section 7 Written Appointment Letter: This section requires all employers to give workers a written appointment letter before they begin work. The letter must state the worker's wage, job description, working hours, and contract duration. On construction sites, workers are often hired verbally or through labour contractors (thekedar). Without a written letter, workers have no proof of their terms of employment, making it nearly impossible to claim unpaid wages or other benefits through legal channels. Despite this requirement, (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MoLESS), 2021) found that over 60 percent of construction workers in Nepal still do not receive a written appointment letter.

Sections 28–30 Working Hours and Overtime: The Act sets a standard working day of eight hours and a maximum of 48 hours per week. Any work beyond these limits must be paid as overtime at 1.5 times the normal hourly rate. On construction sites, especially those working under tight deadlines, workers often work 10 to 12 hours per day during peak construction seasons. However, overtime pay is rarely provided. (Khatri, 2021) found that only about one-third of construction workers in Kathmandu Valley received overtime payment as required by law.

Section 53 Gratuity: Workers who complete at least one year of continuous service with the same employer are entitled to gratuity, calculated as one month's wage for each year worked, paid out when the employment ends. In the construction sector, the short-term nature of most contracts is frequently used as a justification to avoid paying gratuity. However, the Labour Act 2074 applies to workers on fixed-term contracts as well. Enforcing this provision remains a major challenge (Department of Labour and Employment Relations (DoLER), 2022).

Section 57 Festival Allowance: Every worker must receive one month's basic salary per year as festival allowance. This is usually paid around major religious festivals such as Dashain or Tihar. This provision is better known and more widely observed than some others, particularly in donor-funded projects. However, in government-funded and private construction, it is often not paid or is paid at a reduced rate (Thapa, 2020).

Section 100–104 Labour Inspection and Compliance: The Act gives the Department of Labour and Employment Relations (DoLER) the authority to inspect workplaces, review employment records, and take legal action against employers who violate the law. However, the inspection system in Nepal is significantly understaffed. A 2022 DoLER report noted that there are approximately 160 labour inspectors for the entire country covering over 800,000 registered establishments. This means that in practice, most construction sites are never inspected, and violations continue unchecked.

Table 1 Comparison of Labour Act 2048 and Labour Act 2074 — Key Provisions for Construction Workers

Provision	Labour Act 2048 (Old)	Labour Act 2074 (New)
Minimum Wage	Set by government; not regularly reviewed; sector-specific gaps	Minimum wage updated regularly by Minimum Wage Fixation Committee; applies to all sectors including construction
Working Hours	8 hours/day; overtime rules vague; rarely enforced on construction sites	8 hours/day, max 48 hours/week; overtime at 1.5x rate (Section 28–30); must be compensated
Social Security	Provident fund for formal workers only; construction workers mostly excluded	Mandatory SSF enrollment for all workers (linked to Social Security Act 2074); employer + worker contributions required

Provision	Labour Act 2048 (Old)	Labour Act 2074 (New)
Festival Allowance	Mentioned in some contracts; not consistently paid in construction	One month's salary per year as festival allowance (Section 57); legally enforceable
Gratuity	Limited to formal/permanent workers; almost absent in construction	Gratuity for all workers after one year of service (Section 53); applies to project-based construction labour
Contract Terms	Often verbal in construction; no legal minimum written contract	Written appointment letter required (Section 7); specifies wages, duties, and duration
Penalties	Weak enforcement; fines minimal; inspection capacity limited	Fines and corrective action specified; labour audit provisions included (Section 100–104)

Source: Compiled by author from Labour Act 2048, Labour Act 2074, and MoLESS (2021).

2.2.3 The Social Security Act 2074 and the Social Security Fund (SSF)

Alongside the Labour Act 2074, the Social Security Act 2074 established the Social Security Fund (SSF), now managed by the Social Security Board (SSB). Under this system, workers contribute 11% of their basic salary, and employers contribute 20% to the SSF. In return, workers receive access to four main benefit packages: (1) medical and health insurance, (2) accident and disability insurance, (3) maternity and other dependent benefits, and (4) old age pension.

The SSF is particularly important for construction workers because their work is physically demanding and dangerous. Falls from scaffolding, exposure to dust and chemicals, and injuries from equipment are common risks. The SSF's accidental insurance package is meant to provide financial protection in these situations. However, as of 2023, the Social Security Board reported that only about 15 percent of construction workers inside Nepal are

enrolled in the SSF (Social Security Board (SSB), 2023). This means the vast majority remain without any formal social protection.

Barriers to SSF enrollment in the construction sector include: the informal nature of most construction employment; resistance from contractors who wish to avoid the 20 percent employer contribution; lack of awareness among workers about their rights; and the absence of effective monitoring by project owners (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MoLESS), 2021). Donor-funded projects, particularly those funded by the World Bank, ADB, and bilateral donors, are increasingly including SSF compliance as a condition in their contracts, which has led to somewhat higher enrollment rates in those projects compared to government-funded works.

2.3 Economic Rights in Practice: Evidence from Nepal

2.3.1 Wage Levels and Minimum Wage Compliance

Nepal's Minimum Wage Fixation Committee sets minimum wages for different categories of workers. As of fiscal year 2023/24, the minimum daily wage for unskilled construction workers is approximately NPR 747 per day (or NPR 19,422 per month), while semi-skilled and skilled workers receive higher rates (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MoLESS), 2023). However, surveys consistently show that many construction workers receive wages below these legally mandated minimums.

A detailed study by (Poudel, 2019) covering 250 construction workers in Lalitpur and Bhaktapur districts found that 44 percent of unskilled workers were being paid below the official minimum wage. The study also found that workers hired directly by a contractor (first-level hiring) received better wages than those hired through a sub-contractor or labour broker. Workers at the bottom of subcontracting chains who are typically the most unskilled and socially vulnerable suffered the highest levels of wage underpayment.

(Khatri, 2021) examined labour rights compliance in 30 road construction projects in the Bagmati Province. He found that wage compliance was significantly higher in projects funded by international donors (approximately 68 percent compliance with minimum wage rules) than in government-funded district road projects (approximately 41 percent compliance). He attributed this difference to better monitoring systems, third-party audits, and contractual conditions in donor-funded projects.

(Sharma & Adhikari, 2020) studied 18 building construction projects in Kathmandu and found that wage payment delays were common, with workers sometimes waiting three to four weeks for payment. These delays caused financial hardship for workers who depend on daily or weekly wages to pay rent and food costs. Delayed wages are a form of economic exploitation that, while not always illegal under older laws, is now explicitly prohibited under the Labour Act 2074 (Section 39), which requires wages to be paid on a monthly basis and within seven days of the wage period ending.

The NSO Labour Force Survey 2022/23 provides important national-level data. It found that approximately 78 percent of construction workers in Nepal fall into the category of 'informal employment,' meaning they lack written contracts, social security coverage, and legal job protection. This informality is the single biggest obstacle to enforcing economic rights on construction sites (National Statistics Office (NSO), 2023).

2.3.2 Social Security and Insurance Coverage

Enrollment in the Social Security Fund is legally mandatory for all workers under fixed-term or permanent contracts with a registered employer. However, the reality in Nepal's construction sector is far different. The Social Security Board's annual report for 2022/23 shows that out of an estimated 500,000 workers regularly employed in construction inside Nepal, only about 75,000 are formally enrolled in the SSF a coverage rate of approximately 15 percent (Social Security Board (SSB), 2023).

Tamang (Tamang, 2022) conducted a study of 15 infrastructure projects in Sindhupalchok and Kavrepalanchok districts and found that none of the government-funded projects had enrolled workers in the SSF, while approximately 40 percent of workers in donor-funded ADB road projects were enrolled. The study noted that donor contract documents explicitly required SSF enrollment as a condition, and project monitoring consultants checked compliance during regular site visits. No such requirement existed in the government-funded projects studied.

Chaudhary (Chaudhary, 2023) found similar results in a study of housing construction in the Terai region. He noted that employers frequently tell workers that SSF enrollment is optional or only for permanent employees. This misinformation, combined with workers' general lack of awareness about their legal rights, keeps enrollment rates low. Some employers also prefer to pay workers a slightly higher daily wage as a substitute for formal benefits a

strategy that costs them less overall and avoids administrative requirements, but leaves workers without the long-term protection that the SSF provides.

2.3.3 Other Economic Rights: Festival Allowance, Gratuity, and Overtime

Beyond wages and social security, construction workers in Nepal are legally entitled to a range of other economic benefits. Research consistently shows that these benefits are not being provided in the majority of cases.

Festival allowance one month's basic salary per year is the most widely known and most commonly paid benefit after wages. Thapa (Thapa, 2020) found that about 52 percent of workers in Pokhara construction projects received festival allowance, while only 28 percent of workers in rural district-level government projects received it. Donor-funded projects had a compliance rate of around 61 percent.

Gratuity is even less commonly paid. Since most construction workers are hired on short-term or project-based contracts, employers often argue that gratuity does not apply. This argument is incorrect under the Labour Act 2074, which applies gratuity provisions to fixed-term workers. However, DoLER found that gratuity compliance in the construction sector is below 15 percent nationally (Department of Labour and Employment Relations (DoLER), 2022).

Overtime pay compliance is also very low. Poudel found that although 80 percent of construction workers surveyed in his study had worked overtime hours, only 29 percent received any overtime compensation (Poudel, 2019). In many cases, workers were afraid to complain because they feared losing their employment.

Occupational health and safety (OHS) is a related area that directly affects workers' economic rights. Construction sites in Nepal have among the highest rates of workplace injury in any sector. NHRC documented that accidental injuries in construction frequently result in permanent disability, loss of income, and economic hardship for workers' families (National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), 2021). Without insurance and without proper OHS protections, workers bear these costs entirely on their own.

2.3.4 Factors Driving Non-Compliance

The academic literature identifies several interconnected reasons why labour rights are not consistently respected in Nepal's construction sector. Understanding these causes is important for designing effective policy solutions.

First, the multi-layer subcontracting system is a major structural problem. In a typical construction project in Nepal, the main contractor subcontracts work to a second-level contractor, who may further subcontract to a labour broker (thekedar), who then recruits individual workers. At each level, a portion of the payment is retained as profit, which means the actual wages paid to workers at the bottom of the chain can be significantly lower than what the project owner intended. The Labour Act 2074 holds the main contractor legally responsible for workers' wages, but in practice this chain of accountability is very difficult to enforce (Bhattarai K. , 2016).

Second, competitive bidding and low-price tenders put downward pressure on labour costs. In Nepal's public procurement system, contracts are typically awarded to the lowest bidder. This creates an incentive for contractors to cut costs wherever possible, and labour being the most flexible component of construction costs is often where cuts are made. Workers end up paying the price for a procurement system that does not adequately protect wage costs (Public Procurement Monitoring Office (PPMO), 2020).

Third, workers' lack of bargaining power makes it difficult to resist exploitation. Most construction workers in Nepal are migrants from rural areas, lack formal education, are not members of any trade union, and do not know their legal rights. This makes it easy for employers to underpay them or withhold benefits without consequence (Tamang, 2022).

Fourth, inspection and enforcement capacity is severely limited. As noted earlier, Nepal has approximately 160 labour inspectors for the entire country. Given the number of active construction sites at any given time, systematic inspection is not possible. Penalties for violations are also not large enough to deter non-compliance for well-resourced contractors (Department of Labour and Employment Relations (DoLER), 2022).

Comparative legal frameworks across the region demonstrate that sub-contracting accountability can be regulated without prohibiting sub-contracting altogether. India's Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act (Government of India, 1970) places joint and several liability on the principal contractor for wage and statutory benefit violations by any sub-contractor in the chain, ensuring that the party with financial capacity cannot disclaim responsibility by pointing to a lower-tier sub-contractor. The European Union's Directive 2019/1152 on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2019) further requires that workers be informed of their employer's identity regardless of the number of contractual tiers, addressing the jurisdictional

opacity that makes enforcement difficult in multi-tier chains. Hong Kong's Construction Industry Security of Payment Ordinance (Government of Hong Kong SAR, 1997) provides a direct payment mechanism that allows workers to claim wages directly from the project owner when a sub-contractor defaults, bypassing the chain entirely. These three models joint liability, transparency obligations, and direct payment rights are not mutually exclusive and together represent a layered accountability architecture that Nepal's Labour Act 2074 currently lacks in any meaningful operational form.

2.4 International Labour Standards and Nepal's Obligations

Nepal is a member state of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and has ratified a significant number of ILO conventions. These conventions are internationally binding commitments that Nepal is expected to translate into national law and policy. This section reviews the key international standards relevant to construction workers' economic rights and assesses how well Nepal is meeting its obligations.

Nepal has ratified ILO Convention No. 100 (Equal Remuneration), Convention No. 111 (Discrimination in Employment), Convention No. 29 (Forced Labour), Convention No. 138 (Minimum Age), and Convention No. 182 (Worst Forms of Child Labour). More recently, Nepal ratified Convention No. 144 (Tripartite Consultation) and has taken steps toward ratifying Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association) and Convention No. 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining), though full ratification and implementation of these two remain pending (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2020).

The ILO's Decent Work Agenda, launched in 1999, provides an overarching framework with four pillars: employment creation, rights at work, social protection, and social dialogue. All four pillars are relevant to Nepal's construction sector. Workers need consistent employment opportunities (pillar 1), respect for their legal rights including minimum wages (pillar 2), access to social security and insurance (pillar 3), and mechanisms for collective bargaining or grievance redress (pillar 4). Current research shows that Nepal's construction sector falls short on all four pillars, though pillar 3 (social protection) shows the largest gaps (International Labour Organization (ILO), 1999).

The ILO's Decent Work Country Programme for Nepal 2023–2027 identifies construction as a priority sector. The programme's key targets include: increasing SSF enrollment among informal workers, strengthening labour inspection systems, improving occupational safety standards in construction, and addressing wage theft and payment delays.

The programme also specifically highlights the need to address the exploitation caused by multi-layer subcontracting in public works projects (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2023).

Protection of workers from retaliation for asserting their rights is grounded in ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association (International Labour Organization (ILO), 1948) and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (International Labour Organization (ILO), 1949), both of which explicitly prohibit acts of anti-union victimisation and guarantee workers the right to make collective representations without fear of dismissal or penalty. In the construction sector context, where workers are typically hired on short-term contracts and have no trade union presence, these protections are particularly difficult to enforce through conventional collective bargaining mechanisms. International evidence indicates that dedicated whistleblower protection legislation providing reverse burden of proof, financial compensation for retaliatory dismissal, and anonymous reporting channels is among the most effective instruments for closing the enforcement gap created by workers' fear of reprisal (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2021). The near-total absence of formal complaint filing among construction workers in Nepal, documented consistently across multiple studies (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MoLESS), 2021) (Department of Labour and Employment Relations (DoLER), 2022), reflects not satisfaction but the rational suppression of grievances in the absence of any credible protection against retaliation.

Nepal's periodic reports to the ILO Committee of Experts show a mixed picture. On paper, the legal framework has improved significantly with the Labour Act 2074. In practice, however, the ILO has repeatedly expressed concern about the gap between law and enforcement, particularly in the informal sector and in construction (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2022). The Committee of Experts noted in its 2022 review that Nepal needs to substantially increase labour inspection capacity and improve data collection on wage and benefit compliance.

The ILO's Construction Sector Programme specifically calls on member states to ensure that contract documents for public construction projects explicitly include labour cost transparency requirements. This means that wage costs should be visible, itemised, and protected within construction contracts not bundled into general contractor profit margins where they can easily be cut. This recommendation is directly relevant to Nepal's public

procurement system and forms an important part of the international evidence base examined in the next section.

ILO Convention No. 81 on Labour Inspection (International Labour Organization (ILO), 1947) establishes the international standard for national labour inspection systems, requiring member states to maintain a system of labour inspectors with sufficient numbers, powers, and resources to ensure effective enforcement of labour law across all workplaces. Article 10 of C81 specifically requires that the number of inspectors be sufficient having regard to the number and size of establishments, the number and variety of workers employed, and the complexity of the laws to be enforced. Nepal has not ratified C81, but its principles constitute the benchmark against which Nepal's inspection capacity must be assessed. With approximately 160 labour inspectors covering over 800,000 registered establishments nationally (Department of Labour and Employment Relations (DoLER), 2022), and Labour Offices present in only 10 of Nepal's 77 districts, Nepal's inspection architecture falls fundamentally short of the C81 standard. The ILO's own guidelines on labour inspection in the construction sector (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2021) further emphasise that construction sites require specialised inspection protocols given their mobile, temporary, and multi-employer character requirements that Nepal's current generalised inspection system is structurally unable to meet.

2.5 International Best Practices and Lessons for Nepal

2.5.1 The Challenge of Protecting Construction Workers Globally

Nepal is not alone in facing challenges around construction workers' rights. Globally, the construction sector is characterised by informal employment, multi-layer subcontracting, and competitive bidding practices that tend to squeeze labour costs. Countries that have successfully improved construction workers' economic rights have typically done so through a combination of strong laws, transparent procurement systems, and dedicated wage protection mechanisms. This section examines international examples with the most direct relevance to Nepal's situation.

2.5.2 South Korea's Construction Wage Protection Law: A Model for Nepal

South Korea offers one of the most advanced and practical examples of protecting construction workers' wages through legal mechanisms embedded in the procurement and payment system. The key law is the Act on the Employment Improvement of Construction Workers (Ministry of Employment and Labour, Republic of Korea, 2021). This law, combined

with its Enforcement Decree, creates a system that effectively ring-fences wages within the construction payment chain ensuring that money allocated for workers actually reaches them, regardless of what happens at the contractor level.

The most important provision is Article 7-3 of the Act, read together with Article 4-2 of the Enforcement Decree. These provisions require that for any construction project with a contract value of 30 million Korean Won (KRW) or more which covers almost all formal construction projects the project owner must open a separate, dedicated bank account specifically for wage payments. The main contractor is required to deposit workers' wage costs into this account separately from the general project budget. Wages are then disbursed directly to workers from this account, either by the contractor under monitored conditions or directly by the project owner on behalf of the contractor.

This mechanism addresses a specific problem that is very similar to what Nepal faces: contractors winning bids by quoting very low prices, and then cutting labour costs to make a profit. In South Korea's construction industry, before this law was introduced, aggressive low bidding was common. Contractors would win contracts by underbidding, and then squeeze subcontractors, who in turn underpaid workers. Workers frequently experienced wage theft, delayed payments, and non-payment especially at the bottom of subcontracting chains (Kim & Park, 2019).

By requiring a separate wage account, South Korea's law achieves three important things. First, it makes the amount of money allocated to workers' wages visible and transparent from the start of the project. Second, it prevents contractors from using wage funds for other project expenses or to cover losses caused by bidding too low. Third, it creates a clear paper trail that makes it easy for labour inspectors, workers, and project owners to verify whether wages have actually been paid (Lee, Choi, & Jung, 2009).

The Enforcement Decree further specifies the types of projects covered, the procedure for opening and managing the dedicated wage account, reporting obligations for contractors, and penalties for non-compliance. Penalties include fines of up to 10 million KRW and potential cancellation of construction licences for repeat violations. These penalties are significant enough to act as a real deterrent.

The South Korean model has been evaluated positively by both government and academic researchers. Kim and Park (2019) found that the introduction of the separate wage account requirement led to measurable improvements in on-time wage payment rates and

significant reductions in wage theft complaints in the construction sector. Lee et al. (2020) found that the law was particularly effective in reducing exploitation at lower tiers of the subcontracting chain which is precisely where workers are most vulnerable.

South Korea's experience also shows that this type of mechanism can work within an existing legal framework without requiring a complete overhaul of the procurement system. It was introduced as an amendment to an existing law and was phased in gradually, starting with larger projects before extending to smaller ones. This phased approach allowed the construction industry to adapt without major disruption (Ministry of Employment and Labour, South Korea, 2021).

2.5.3 India's Building and Other Construction Workers Act, 1996: A Sector-Specific Legislative Model

India's Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (India, 1996) represents the most directly applicable sector-specific legislative model for Nepal, given the structural and demographic similarities between the two countries' construction workforces. Enacted explicitly because India's general labour laws like Nepal's Labour Act 2074 were architecturally unsuited to the mobile, project-based, multi-employer nature of construction work, the BOCW Act established three core mechanisms. First, it created mandatory Welfare Boards at the state level, funded by a welfare cess of one to two percent of total construction cost collected from project owners, which finance health, housing, education, and pension benefits for registered workers (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2020). Second, it imposed joint and several liability on the principal contractor for wage and benefit violations by sub-contractors directly targeting the accountability evasion that multi-tier subcontracting enables (Government of India, 1970). Third, it required mandatory registration of all construction workers and employers, creating the administrative foundation for compliance monitoring. Evidence from Indian states with active Welfare Boards notably Kerala and Tamil Nadu shows measurably higher social security coverage among construction workers compared to states where the Act is poorly implemented. However, the BOCW Act's limitations are also instructive: its effectiveness depends entirely on state-level implementation capacity, and in many states registration rates remain low due to worker unawareness and contractor resistance (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2020). For Nepal, the BOCW model suggests that sector-specific legislation is both legally feasible and practically necessary, but must be paired with a funded implementation

architecture and digital registration systems to avoid replicating India's uneven enforcement record.

2.5.4 Other International Examples

South Korea's ring-fenced wage account is the most directly applicable model for Nepal, but other countries offer useful lessons as well.

India has implemented a labour welfare cess in its construction sector, under the Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996. This law requires project owners to pay a cess (levy) of between one and two percent of the total construction cost into a state-level Welfare Fund, which is then used to provide health, housing, and educational benefits to registered construction workers. While the cess model is different from South Korea's payment ring-fencing approach, it demonstrates that it is legally and administratively feasible to create dedicated funds for construction workers within the procurement and payment system (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2020).

The United Kingdom has long operated a Construction Industry Training Board (CITB) levy, which similarly collects contributions from construction employers to fund training and welfare. The UK also has a 'Gangmasters Licensing Authority' system that regulates labour brokers a mechanism that could be adapted to control Nepal's thekedar (labour broker) system (Construction Industry Training Board (CITB), 2022).

Singapore has introduced mandatory direct wage payment for foreign construction workers, where employers must pay wages directly into workers' bank accounts. This prevents deductions and wage theft by middlemen and has been effective in a migrant-dominated construction workforce similar in some ways to Nepal's (Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, 2021).

Digital labour administration has emerged as one of the most effective tools for closing enforcement gaps in construction sectors with large informal workforces. Bangladesh's readymade garment sector provides the most directly transferable evidence: following the introduction of mandatory digital wage payment through mobile money platforms, wage theft complaints declined significantly and payment regularity improved, demonstrating that digital payment is administratively feasible even in low-infrastructure developing-country contexts (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2022). South Korea's construction sector has implemented an electronic wage management system under its Employment Improvement Act

(Ministry of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea, 2020), requiring that wage payments be processed through a verified digital channel linked to the worker's registered identity, creating an auditable payroll trail that inspectors can verify remotely. Lee et al (Lee, Choi, & Jung, 2009) found that the combination of digital registration and verified payment significantly reduced wage default rates at lower tiers of sub-contracting chains precisely where Nepal's compliance data show the greatest violations. These examples confirm that digital labour administration is not a futuristic aspiration but an operationally tested instrument, and that its core components worker digital identity, electronic payroll, and mobile-accessible grievance reporting can be phased in incrementally within Nepal's existing mobile money and e-government infrastructure.

Bangladesh, which also has a large informal construction sector, has adopted ILO-supported 'social compliance' requirements in its public procurement guidelines, requiring contractors bidding on government projects above a certain value to demonstrate that they have a system for paying workers in compliance with labour law. While enforcement remains weak, this shows that compliance requirements can be built into procurement without new legislation (ILO, 2022).

Thailand's Social Security Act (Social Security Office, Thailand, 2019) provides a voluntary contribution scheme under Section 40 specifically designed for self-employed and informal workers, allowing them to contribute small fixed monthly amounts and access accident insurance, invalidity benefits, and maternity support without requiring a stable employer-employee relationship. This model directly addresses the design flaw that makes Nepal's mandatory contribution scheme inaccessible to construction workers. Singapore's Central Provident Fund (Central Provident Fund Board, Singapore, 2023) offers a complementary model through its multi-account structure separating ordinary savings, healthcare, and retirement funds which allows workers to access accumulated balances for housing and medical emergencies without forfeiting long-term pension benefits. Both models demonstrate that social security portability and flexibility are achievable within a statutory framework, providing a comparative policy basis for reforming Nepal's SSF to serve its mobile construction workforce.

2.5.5 Lessons for Nepal's Public Procurement and Construction Labour Policy

Drawing on the international examples above, several practical lessons can be identified for Nepal. These lessons are particularly relevant to the comparison between donor-funded and government-funded projects that this thesis addresses.

The most important lesson from South Korea is that the best way to protect construction workers' wages is not to rely solely on inspection and penalties after the fact, but to design the payment system so that wages are protected from the moment a contract is signed. A ring-fenced or separately itemised wage payment mechanism within Nepal's public procurement system applicable to projects above a certain contract value could significantly reduce wage theft and non-payment without requiring a major increase in inspection capacity.

This approach would work particularly well in Nepal's context because the Public Procurement Act 2063 (2007) and Public Procurement Regulations 2064 (2007) already set out the rules for how government contracts are awarded and managed. Amending these instruments to require that wage costs be separately stated in contractor bids, and that wages be paid from a designated account or through a verified direct payment mechanism, would be a targeted intervention that directly addresses the problem of labour cost compression in low-bid contracts (Public Procurement Monitoring Office (PPMO), 2020).

The international legal foundation for embedding labour protections in public procurement is ILO Convention No. 94 on Labour Clauses in Public Contracts (International Labour Organization (ILO), 1949), which requires that public contracts above a defined threshold include clauses guaranteeing workers wages, working hours, and conditions no less favourable than those established by national law or collective agreement. Although Nepal has not ratified C94, its principles directly inform the procurement-level reforms that South Korea has implemented (Ministry of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea, 2020). The European Union's public procurement framework similarly requires that contract performance conditions may include labour-related requirements linked to the subject matter of the contract, as reflected in EU Directive 2019/1152 on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2019). Both frameworks confirm that requiring contractors to protect labour cost components as a condition of contract award rather than leaving them subject to competitive compression is legally established practice in advanced procurement systems and is directly transferable to Nepal's Public Procurement Act 2063 (Government of Nepal, 2007).

A second lesson is that donor-funded projects, which already require higher levels of transparency and compliance, provide an existing model and evidence base that Nepal can learn from. Studies such as (Khatri, 2021) and (Tamang, 2022) show that where donor contracts require SSF enrollment, wage payment records, and third-party monitoring, compliance rates improve substantially. The challenge is to transfer these practices from the donor-funded sphere to the broader government-funded public works sector.

A third lesson is that the multi-layer subcontracting chain which is the main vehicle for wage exploitation in Nepal can be regulated without banning subcontracting altogether. South Korea, India, and Singapore all allow subcontracting but place legal wage liability on the main contractor or project owner, making it impossible to escape responsibility by pointing to a lower-level subcontractor. Nepal's Labour Act 2074 already includes some provisions in this direction, but they need to be strengthened, made more specific, and backed by a practical payment mechanism.

Table 2 South Korea vs Nepal — Construction Wage Protection Mechanism Comparison

Feature	South Korea	Nepal (Current Status)
Wage Protection Law	Act on Employment Improvement of Construction Workers (Act No. 15652)	Labour Act 2074 — wage provisions exist but enforcement weak
Ring-fenced Wage Account	Mandatory separate wage account for contracts \geq 30 million KRW (Article 7-3 + ED Article 4-2)	No separate wage payment mechanism; lump-sum payments to contractors
Direct Payment to Workers	Verified direct or monitored wage disbursement required	Payment mostly through sub-contractors; workers vulnerable to deductions

Feature	South Korea	Nepal (Current Status)
Bid Price Transparency	Labour cost must be itemised and ring-fenced separately in bid	Labour cost often not itemised; absorbed in overall contractor margin
Subcontracting Control	Multiple layers regulated; wage liability extends upward	Multi-layer subcontracting common; wage liability unclear
Applicability	Applies to all public and private construction projects above threshold	No threshold-based mechanism; uniform rules rarely enforced

Source: Compiled from Act on Employment Improvement of Construction Workers (South Korea, 2021), Labour Act 2074 (Nepal), PPMO (2020), and MoLESS (2021).

2.6 Research Gap and Justification for This Study

The review of existing literature presented in this chapter reveals several important gaps that this thesis aims to address.

First, while there is a growing body of research on labour rights in Nepal generally, very few studies have specifically compared the situation in donor-funded versus government-funded construction projects in a systematic way. Studies such as (Khatri, 2021)) and (Tamang, 2022) point to differences in compliance rates between these two project types, but they do so on a small scale, covering a limited number of projects in specific districts. A broader, more structured comparative study is needed.

Second, most existing research focuses on either wages or social security in isolation. Very few studies have examined the full range of economic rights including festival allowance, gratuity, overtime, written contracts, and insurance simultaneously, within the same sample of projects and workers. This thesis examines all these rights together, providing a more complete picture of economic rights compliance in Nepal's construction sector.

Third, the existing literature on Nepal's construction sector does not adequately engage with international policy models that could be adapted to strengthen Nepal's framework. South Korea's ring-fenced wage payment mechanism, India's welfare cess, and Singapore's direct wage payment system are discussed in international labour policy literature but have not been

applied analytically to Nepal's specific legal and procurement context. This thesis fills this gap by drawing explicit connections between Nepal's challenges and these international models.

Fourth, the comparison between donor-funded and government-funded projects is not just an academic exercise it has direct policy implications. If donor-funded projects consistently achieve better compliance, it is important to understand why: whether it is because of the contractual conditions, the monitoring systems, the capacity of project staff, or the financial resources available. Understanding the causes of the difference is essential for designing policies that can replicate the better outcomes of donor-funded projects within the government-funded sector.

Fifth, the literature gap on site-level evidence is significant. Most reports and policy documents use aggregate national data or district-level surveys. There is a lack of primary, site-level data collected directly from workers and employers at specific construction projects, comparing compliance in real time. This thesis addresses this gap through its primary data collection methodology.

In summary, this thesis is justified by: (1) the lack of systematic comparative research on donor- vs. government-funded construction projects; (2) the need for comprehensive site-level economic rights data; (3) the absence of analytical connections between Nepal's labour rights challenges and international models that could provide policy solutions; and (4) the urgent policy relevance of improving economic rights compliance in a sector employing over 1.5 million Nepali workers (National Statistics Office (NSO), 2023).

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The methodology chapter offers a systematic process through which the current study was designed, conducted, and analysed. In particular, the methodology chapter presents an account of the various decisions that were made concerning the research approach, theoretical framework, methodology, target population, and sample, tools of data collection, and methods of analysis used. A sound methodology is crucial to ensure that the conclusions derived from this study are valid, reliable, and replicable.

This research employs a mixed-methods approach, which combines quantitative survey methods for Objective I, namely the comparison of labour economic rights compliance in the case of donor-subsidized projects versus government-sponsored projects and with qualitative methodology (Key Informant Interviews (KII)) for Objective II, which entails the identification of critical challenges and gaps within the process of compliance monitoring. The reason for choosing the mixed methodology in this context lies in the complementary nature of the two components. While the quantitative methodology can provide numerical data regarding compliance rates, it is the qualitative side of the research methodology that explains the reasons behind compliance issues.

3.1. Research Design and Methodology

3.1.1 General

The current study utilizes the use of mixed-methods research. This entails the integration of both quantitative and qualitative research techniques in a sequential manner. In this design, the quantitative survey (Phase I) is done first, whereby data regarding compliance are collected numerically and subjected to statistical analysis; the qualitative Key Informant Interviews (Phase II) are done later to help understand and validate the results obtained during Phase I through the insight from experts in the construction industry. This helps in making sure that the qualitative section answers questions arising from the quantitative section effectively (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).




Figure 1 General Research Design Workflow

Quantitative Component (Objective I)

In the quantitative section, the method used is the structured questionnaire, where respondents, comprising construction workers, are asked about their compliance levels on seven economic rights factors using a five-point Likert scale and Yes/No questions, generating ordinal and nominal data, respectively. It is suitable to use the quantitative research design in Objective I because the concept of compliance, which involves the degree of adherence to legal provisions, is measurable and can be quantified and statistically analysed (Creswell & Creswell, 2018) (Field, 2018).

Qualitative Component (Objective II)

The qualitative element will include semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) of five experts with a combined experience of 10 to 15 years of work in government, donor-financed, and private construction projects in Nepal. This research method was chosen due to

its effectiveness in gathering views of experts concerning institutional problems, issues related to law enforcement, and other challenges, which cannot be measured and assessed via workers' questionnaires. The semi-structured interview methodology provides researchers with an opportunity to explore certain topics such as wage rates, social protection schemes, working conditions, compliance, economic fairness, transparent contracts, and awareness while remaining flexible enough to explore any emerging themes. Thematic analysis will be employed in the process of analysing results obtained from KIIs.

3.1.2 Research Design

The study follows a seven-phase sequential research design that provides a systematic and transparent pathway from research conception to conclusion and recommendations. Each phase is described below.

Phase 1 — Research Initiation

The research starts with recognizing the problem and then formulating research objectives and questions, as well as defining the scope of the research. During this stage, it was determined that the comparison would be made between donor-funded projects and government-funded projects and after that KII with the industry experts was done to find the gap in the policies and implementation.

Phase 2 — Literature Review

In order to assess Nepal's legal system on labour rights, the level of implementation in the construction industry, international standards on labour issues and obligations of Nepal under the International Labour Organization, and global best practices in protecting the wages of construction workers, a review of the available national and international literature was done. The review of literature helped set up the rationale for conducting this thesis.

Phase 3 — Expert Validation of Instruments

Before conducting the survey, the structured survey form was reviewed by an expert of subject matter (expert in the areas of labour law, construction management, and social policy). The subject matter experts evaluated the relevancy, precision, and adequacy of the items as per the Labour Act 2074, Social Security Act 2075, and relevant ILO conventions. The comments of these experts were carefully considered in developing the final questionnaire form which ensures a high degree of content validity.

Phase 4 — Instrument Development and Pilot Testing

The instrument created was a validated questionnaire, which comprised Likert-type scale questions, yes/no questions, as well as semi-structured questions in the case of the KII part. The pilot study involved three to four construction workers to determine the level of understandability, comprehensibility, and the time taken to complete the instrument. Statistical analysis was not done at this point since the information gained would be utilized to modify the wording and make it more comprehensible.

Phase 5 — Data Collection

The primary data were sourced from two independent channels as follows: (a) through face-to-face structured interviews of 68 construction workers at chosen construction project locations within the four districts, and (b) through semi-structured KIIs with five construction sector experts. The data collection process for both methods was undertaken directly by the researcher. Interview responses from construction workers were noted down during the interviews and then coded in KoboToolbox, whereas responses from KII were documented during the interviews and analysed thematically.

Phase 6 — Data Analysis

IBM SPSS Statistics was used for the statistical analysis of quantitative data. Descriptive statistics, independent-samples t-test, and chi-square test were conducted to measure the level of compliance and determine if there were any statistically significant differences between projects. Thematic analysis was conducted on KII data.

Phase 7 — Conclusions and Recommendations

The last stage is where both the quantitative and qualitative results are brought together to present a holistic interpretation of the state of labour economic rights in the construction sector in Nepal. Policy recommendations are made based on the evidence collected from the field.




Figure 2 Research Design Workflow

3.1.3 Research Framework

3.1.3.1 Theoretical Framework

This study is grounded in a compliance-centred theoretical framework that views the realisation of labour rights as contingent upon three interdependent conditions: the existence of legally defined entitlements, an institutional infrastructure capable of enforcing those entitlements, and worker knowledge sufficient to claim them. This framework draws on Labour Rights Theory as elaborated in international labour law scholarship and aligns with the ILO Decent Work Agenda, which positions rights-based employment standards as prerequisites for equitable economic development. Within this framework, non-compliance is understood not as a purely behavioural phenomenon but as a structural outcome produced by gaps in law, enforcement, and awareness simultaneously.

3.1.3.2 Conceptual Framework

This study's conceptual foundation is derived from a comparative compliance assessment framework. The independent variable of the research is "Project Funding Source," classified into donor funding and government funding for the construction of buildings. The dependent variable of the research is Labour Economic Rights Compliance (LERC), which refers to how far the labourers employed in the chosen projects are able to enjoy economic rights accorded by Nepal's Labour Act 2074 (2017), Social Security Act 2075 (2018), and ILO Conventions.

Compliance is operationalised as a multi-dimensional construct measured across seven distinct subscales, each corresponding to a legally defined cluster of worker entitlements:

- Wage and Payment Practices — minimum wage compliance, timeliness of payment, alignment between promised and actual wages, and festival allowance provision.
- Social Security, Paid Leave, and Insurance — Social Security Fund (SSF) and Provident Fund (PF) registration, employer contributions, sick leave, home leave, annual leave, maternity/paternity leave, public holiday leave, leave encashment, medical insurance, and accidental insurance.
- Working Hours and Overtime — daily and weekly working hour limits and overtime compensation.

- Legal Compliance and Enforcement — written employment contracts, labour inspections, complaint mechanism awareness, protection from retaliation, and labour office training.
- Economic Fairness and Equality — gender-based pay equality, fair treatment, and awareness of non-discrimination rights.
- Contractual Transparency — disclosure of rights at hiring and information on termination procedures.
- Awareness and Capacity Building — worker knowledge of legal rights and exposure to training.

Each sub-scale is assessed individually, acknowledging the separate legal status of the rights covered by that sub-scale. The model is based on the national and international commitments made by Nepal, as shown in Figure 3.1 below.




Figure 3 Conceptual Framework — Seven Compliance Dimensions

3.2. Study Area

The study was conducted across four geographically and administratively diverse districts in Nepal, selected to provide a purposive cross-section of urban, semi-urban, and

remote construction environments. This geographic diversity was central to ensuring that findings reflect variation in both project type and enforcement context across Nepal's differing terrain and institutional capacity.

Kathmandu (Urban): As the national capital, Kathmandu hosts the highest concentration of government-funded building construction activity and has relatively greater access to labour administration infrastructure. Seventeen government-funded project workers were surveyed in this district.

Rupandehi/Butwal (Semi-Urban): Located in the Terai region, Rupandehi represents an economically active semi-urban district with significant construction activity. Nineteen government-funded project workers were surveyed here.

Rukum West (Remote): A mountainous district in Karnali Province, Rukum West is characterised by limited institutional infrastructure and restricted labour office access. Twelve donor-funded project workers were surveyed in this district.

Jajarkot (Remote): One of Nepal's most geographically isolated districts, also in Karnali Province, Jajarkot represents the most constrained enforcement environment in the study. Twenty-two donor-funded project workers were surveyed here.

This geographic design ensures that the findings are not limited to urban centres and reflect the range of institutional and enforcement conditions under which construction workers actually operate across Nepal.

3.3. Study Population, Sampling and Sample Size

Objective I's target population involves all the construction workers working in the selected sites where construction projects are being executed either through donor funding or government funding at the time of conducting the study. The accessible population was identified through actual enumeration of workers working in the selected sites which totalled 68 workers where 34 worked in donor-funded projects while 34 others in government-funded projects.

Minimum sample size was calculated by applying Cochran's (1977) formula for determining proportions in a very large or infinite population (Cochran, 1997):

$$n = (Z^2 \times p \times q) / e^2$$

For a 90% confidence level, $Z = 1.645$; assuming maximum variability ($p = q = 0.5$) and an acceptable margin of error of $e = 0.10$, the formula yields a minimum sample size of $n = (1.645^2 \times 0.5 \times 0.5) / (0.10^2) = 68$. As a result of this precise equivalence, census sampling techniques have been used in this instance, whereby all 68 workers have been included in this research. With census sampling, sampling error is minimized, and the entire accessible population is taken into consideration.

Purposive sampling was used for the purposes of selecting five respondents for the Key Informant Interviews under Objective II. The selection was based on expertise, experience, and knowledge gained from various construction projects carried out by the government, funded by donors, or private companies in Nepal. In total, the five experts have at least ten to fifteen years of experience. Their expertise is related to construction engineering, construction project management, and supervision of the construction sector.

Table 3 Sample Distribution Overview

District	Government-Funded (n)	Donor-Funded (n)	Total
Kathmandu	17	-	17
Rupandehi (Butwal)	19	-	19
Rukum West	-	12	12
Jajarkot	-	22	22
Total	34	34	68

Note. Equal allocation of 34 respondents per project type ensured comparability across all statistical analyses.

3.4. Method of Data Collection

3.4.1 Primary Data Collection

Primary data for this study were collected through two independent instruments corresponding to each research objective: a structured questionnaire survey for Objective I (quantitative) and semi-structured Key Informant Interviews for Objective II (qualitative). Both instruments were developed, validated, and administered directly by the researcher.

3.4.1.1 Survey Instrument — Expert Validation (Pre-Test)

Content validation of the structured questionnaire was conducted prior to its administration. Experts in labour laws, construction management, and social policies validated the survey in terms of the relevance, accuracy, and adequacy of all items concerning the Labour Act 2074, Social Security Act 2075, and the adopted conventions by ILO. They critically examined the correlation of all survey items with the seven compliance aspects and ensured linguistic clarity and relevance of each item. Their suggestions for improvements were carefully considered during the revision of the questionnaire. Content validation is the most suitable method for ensuring the validity of such a study as floor and ceiling effects can be expected because of varied enforcement of the regulations (Izah, Sylva, & Hait, 2024) (Rossi, 2024).

3.4.1.2 Survey Instrument — Pilot Testing (Instrument Comprehension Check)

The refined questionnaire then went through a pilot test, involving a small sample of three to four construction workers, to check their understanding, gauge how long it would take them to complete the survey, and identify any remaining unclear questions. No data analysis was done at the pilot stage. This feedback was used only to improve the wording of questions for workers with little educational background.

3.4.1.3 Main Survey Administration

Finally, the survey tool was administered through personal face-to-face interviews, which were held by the researcher at the identified project areas in the four different districts. Face-to-face interviews were done by the researcher through asking questions and noting down the answers due to the lack of literacy among construction workers. Personal interviewing is the best method of data gathering in people with little or no educational background (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Data was then coded and uploaded into KoboToolbox for processing. A total of 68 responses were collected where 34 were from construction workers who participated

in donor projects and another 34 from workers on government-sponsored projects, representing 100% of the available sample population.

3.4.1.4 Key Informant Interview — Instrument Design

As a tool for data collection through semi-structured interview, the Key Informant Interview (KII) tool was designed to consist of eight main themes and 31 items. They included all seven dimensions of compliance identified in the quantitative tool, namely Wages and Payment; Social Security; Working Hours and Overtime; Legal Compliance and Enforcement; Economic Fairness and Equality; Contractual Transparency; and Awareness and Capacity Building, in addition to another theme covering policy gaps and institutional changes. While some were structured question types involving options and others were more probing in nature, the tool allowed cross-comparison across respondents while at the same time allowing specific issues to emerge from each respondent's expertise and experience.

3.4.1.5 Selection of Key Informants

The five key informants selected for the purpose of qualitative data collection were selected using purposive sampling so that the data collected through qualitative research is reflective of various kinds of experience relevant to the construction industry in Nepal. The inclusion criteria included: at least ten years of experience in project management in the construction industry, labour administration in the construction industry, or policies relating to the construction industry; experience in working on both donor and government funded projects; and knowledge about labour law regulations in Nepal.

3.4.1.6 Interview Administration

The interview process was done one-on-one with all five of the Key Informants. Before each interview, participants were given information regarding the study's goals, their right to choose not to participate, and that their answers would be kept confidential. The interviews proceeded systematically, following the order of the eight-part interview questionnaire, with the researcher asking the questions and documenting the answers in real-time. If the answers given by the participants were particularly noteworthy, additional questions were used to explore deeper into the topic.

3.4.2 Secondary Data Collection

Secondary data collection involved a systematic review of national legislation, international conventions, and published academic literature relevant to labour rights compliance in the construction sector. The principal legal instruments reviewed include the Labour Act 2074 (2017), the Social Security Act 2075 (2018), and Nepal's ratified ILO Conventions (C98, C100, C111, C131, C144). Published empirical studies from Nepal and comparable South Asian construction sectors were reviewed to contextualise primary findings and benchmark compliance dimensions against established international standards.

3.5. Data Analysis

The data obtained from the quantitative survey were analysed with the aid of IBM SPSS Statistics. In the analysis, three types of statistical methods were used in accordance with the measurement level of data and the aim of analysis. An accepted alpha level of $\alpha = 0.05$ is set across the analyses with two-tailed p-values for all hypothesis testing (Field, 2018) (Pallant, 2020)

3.5.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

3.5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Mean and Standard Deviation

The descriptive statistics, namely the arithmetic mean (M) and standard deviation (SD), were calculated for each of the seven composite subscale scores among each project group. This marks the traditional first step in survey methodology, which allows the reader to gain insight into the central tendency and dispersion before any hypotheses are formally tested (Creswell & Creswell, 2018) (Pallant, 2020). For Likert-scale measures, a larger subscale mean implies more often reported compliance with the associated right; for dichotomous measures (where 1 denotes "Yes" and 0 denotes "No"), the subscale mean reflects the percentage of workers acknowledging the right. The standard deviation describes the extent of dispersion in one's experience: a high standard deviation suggests heterogeneous experiences, an observation valuable on its own merits in a labour rights setting, indicating unequal enforcement of rights within the same project category (Field, 2018).

5.1.2 Chi-Square Test of Independence

Pearson's chi-square (χ^2) test of independence was performed on each survey item, which is categorized or ordered data, to assess whether there is a significant difference in response distribution in terms of workers from government-funded projects versus workers from donor-funded projects. Categorized and ordered data violate interval-level measurement

assumptions needed for parametric mean-based tests, hence making the chi-square test the most methodologically suitable test for analyzing such data (Agresti, 2018). It checks whether the frequency of occurrence differs significantly from that expected in the case of statistical independence between the two variables.

The chi-square statistic can be calculated using the formula: $\chi^2 = \sum [(O - E)^2 / E]$, where O stands for observed frequencies, while E stands for expected frequencies. In cases where a p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning there is a statistically significant association between the distribution of responses to the particular item and the type of project funding (Field, 2018). If any expected cell frequency was less than five, Fisher's Exact Test was conducted due to violations of chi-square test assumptions.

3.5.1.3 Independent-Samples t-Test

The independent-samples t-test was used to evaluate mean composite subscale scores for differences between the government-funded projects group and the donor-funded projects group. The composite subscale scores, which are obtained from adding up the numeric responses for each individual item under each of the compliance dimensions, result in continuous or quasi-continuous variables that can be subjected to parametric tests (DeVellis, 2016) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2019). A t-test is used when one compares means of a continuous dependent variable between two independent groups (Field, 2018).

As each group consisted of $n = 34$ employees, surpassing the $n = 30$ per group benchmark that typically indicates compliance with the Central Limit Theorem, the sampling distribution of the mean of each group was considered normal, thus meeting the distribution assumption of the t-test (Pallant, 2020). The formula for the t-statistic used in this study was: $t = (M_1 - M_2) / SE(M_1 - M_2)$, wherein M_1 and M_2 were the group means and SE was the standard error of the difference. Before conducting each t-test, the Levene's Test for Equality of Variances was performed; when the result of Levene's test was significant ($p < 0.05$), the t-statistic corrected by the Welch's method was provided (Field, 2018).

3.5.1.4 Significance Level and Two-Sided Testing

A traditional alpha level of $\alpha = 0.05$ was selected as the standard throughout, and two-tailed p-values were reported in all inferential analyses. The decision to use two-tailed testing was based on the lack of theoretical justification for specifying that one project type would be better than the other on any specific dimension, and therefore the two-tailed test was considered more conservative and appropriate (Field, 2018) (Pallant, 2020). A p-value less than 0.05

indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected, suggesting statistical significance. A p-value equal to or greater than 0.05 suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on inadequate evidence, rather than positive proof of group equivalency (Nickerson, 2000).

3.5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis — Thematic Analysis

The thematic analysis of the KII data was carried out following the six-step methodology developed by Braun & Clarke (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which includes the process of data familiarization, generating initial codes, identifying the themes, reviewing the identified themes, defining and naming the themes, and writing the report. The analysis process involved two phases: first, the analysis was conducted on a sectional basis, with an analysis being performed on each of the 31 questions in isolation, noting expert views on each and any points of consensus and disagreement among experts. The second phase of the analysis involved cross-sectional analysis based on the eight sections of the KII, leading to the identification of five major themes recurring consistently in the KII data.

The qualitative analysis was made rigorous through the use of the following methods: (i) capturing the exact words of the experts during interview sessions and validating them; (ii) deriving thematic categorizations from the data, rather than imposing them a priori; and (iii) triangulating KII findings with the results of the quantitative survey to establish the consistency between both datasets.

3.6. Reliability of Data

3.6.1 Content Validity

The content validity of the study was achieved through the expert validation process outlined in Section 4.1.1. The expert reviews from the labour lawyers, experts on construction management, and social policy experts were conducted to ensure that each item in the scale was based on a clear provision in either the Labour Act 2074, Social Security Act 2075, or the ratified ILO convention. Each of the provisions of legislation mapped to the respective questions makes up a highly rigorous basis for content validity (Izah, Sylva, & Hait, 2024).

3.6.2 Face Validity

Face validity was established using the pilot testing procedure as discussed in Section 4.1.2. The construction workers acknowledged that the questions posed were clear, understandable, and pertinent to their work experiences. The use of the face-to-face interview

method in administering the survey also ensured that all the construction workers understood the questions before answering.

3.6.3 Note on Internal Consistency (Cronbach's Alpha)

Cronbach's alpha, the most frequently used internal consistency reliability index, was not calculated in the present study, and such non-calculation is an intentional approach to methodology and not an accidental omission. The calculation of Cronbach's alpha is contingent upon three major assumptions in statistics that are blatantly contradicted by the nature of the survey itself.

The first assumption is uni-dimensionality, which postulates that all the items in a given scale assess one underlying factor. It is noteworthy that the current survey consists of seven independent subscales (A–G) based on seven separate clusters of rights established by individual legislative acts. Thus, using all the questions as one scale would be statistically incorrect (Izah, Sylva, & Hait, 2024).

Secondly, the reliability value alpha has an assumption that the items should be tau equivalent, implying that all of them should have equal true score variances and factor loadings. In practice, however, the items used in this test tool are not tau equivalent but congeneric since they vary significantly in terms of endorsement and level of compliance. The items on minimum wage compliance exhibit high ceilings (55 out of 68 workers were getting paid at least NPR 19,550) while those on festival allowance, SSF registration, medical insurance, and labour audit exhibited floors (39, 66, 49, and 60 out of 68 workers did not comply, respectively).

Third, Cronbach's alpha needs adequate response variability for measuring inter-item correlation. The large floor and ceiling effects noted above lead to very low variability for some specific questions, thereby making any calculations based on alpha either artificially high or low, in either case giving an inaccurate picture of the quality of the questionnaire. As stated by (Izah, Sylva, & Hait, 2024), alpha is sensitive to variability in the data, especially when this variability is low due to floor or ceiling effects. It must be noted that this pronounced distributional skew is not a weakness of the research instrument but its most important finding, namely the lack of enforcement of statutory labour rights legislation in Nepal's construction industry. Alternative measures of internal consistency such as McDonald's Omega, composite reliability, and the KR-20 coefficient are built on the same assumption as Cronbach's Alpha and are thus no more applicable. Neither test-retest reliability nor inter-rater reliability could

have been used for assessing the internal consistency of the questionnaire in the context of this cross-sectional research (Izah, Sylva, & Hait, 2024) (Rossi, 2024).

3.6.4 Ethical Considerations

This study has been undertaken under the guidance of social scientific ethical standards. Before each interview, the participant was made aware of the purpose of the study and the voluntary nature of his/her participation; they were also allowed to exit the study whenever they wished to do so without suffering any penalty. The confidentiality of each response was ensured, and the identity of any individual worker cannot be identified through the results presented herein. With regard to the key informant interviews, consent was obtained for recording the response, and all five experts agreed to participate in the study. Since there is an element of fear of retribution by employers for construction workers, the interviews were undertaken in private and free from the gaze of any supervisor or site manager wherever possible.

3.6.5 Limitations of the Methodology

Several methodological limitations must also be recognized. The first limitation is that cross-sectional methodology does not allow the drawing of causal inferences. The study only describes the compliance situation as of a certain point in time without being able to examine trends or causality. The second limitation pertains to the sample size. The survey was conducted among a total of 68 construction workers who represent the total population in the available sampling frame. This number may be sufficient to conduct a census but does not allow generalisation to other construction projects beyond those within the scope of this study. All data that are quantified depend on worker self-reporting, and this is also a potential source of measurement error, including memory, social desirability, or fear of reprisal biases despite anonymity assurance. The purposive sampling of the KII respondents, consisting of only five individuals, is another constraint because they belong to the expert category, which means their views do not reflect workers' perceptions or those of the enforcement authorities. Finally, the difficulty in accessing some remote locations in Rukum West and Jajarkot posed challenges in sampling construction workers.

3.7. Research Matrix

The research matrix presented in Table 3.1 maps each research objective to its corresponding data sources, collection methods, analysis techniques, and expected outcomes.

This ensures coherence between the methodological choices and the analytical objectives of the study.

Table 4 Research Matrix

Objective	Data Source	Collection Method	Analysis Technique	Expected Output
1. To assess the current level of compliance with economic rights of labour through a comparative analysis of donor-funded and government-funded projects.	68 construction workers across 4 districts	Structured questionnaire (Likert & dichotomous items)	Descriptive stats, t-test, chi-square (SPSS)	Compliance rates, group comparisons, significant differences
2. To identify and analyze the key challenges and gaps affecting the enforcement of economic rights of labourers in the construction industry.	5 senior construction professionals (KII)	Semi-structured Key Informant Interviews	Thematic analysis	Cross-cutting themes, institutional gaps, policy recommendations
3. To suggest possible solutions for overcoming the existing challenges and gaps.	KII	Interview with experts and analysis of responses	Thematic analysis	Suggestion of Solutions to the existing problems

CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents a comprehensive, integrated analysis of findings derived from two complementary sources of evidence: (i) a structured quantitative survey administered to 68 construction workers across four districts of Nepal Kathmandu, Rupandehi (Butwal), Rukum West, and Jajarkot with an equal split of 34 respondents from government-funded projects and 34 from donor-funded projects; and (ii) five Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) conducted with senior construction-sector professionals collectively holding between 10 and 15 years of experience. The analysis addresses two primary objectives: (i) to assess the level of labour economic rights compliance, disaggregated by project funding type; and (ii) to identify the key challenges and structural gaps affecting enforcement of labourers' economic rights.

4.1 Assessment of the current level of compliance with economic rights of labour in construction sector through a comparative analysis of donor-funded and government funded Building Projects

The quantitative analysis is organised around the seven Labour Economic Rights Compliance (LERC) dimensions: (A) Wage and Payment Practices, (B) Social Security, Paid Leave, and Insurance, (C) Working Hours and Overtime, (D) Legal Compliance and Enforcement, (E) Economic Fairness and Equality, (F) Contractual Transparency, and (G) Awareness and Capacity Building. Statistical significance is assessed at $p < 0.05$. Findings are contextualised against the Labour Act, 2074, the Social Security Act, 2075, and relevant ILO Conventions ratified by Nepal.

4.1.1 Subscale A: Wage and Payment Practices

The Wage and Payment Practices subscale assesses the degree to which construction workers receive fair, timely, and legally mandated remuneration. It comprises four items: monthly income levels relative to the statutory minimum (NPR 754/day), timeliness of wage payment, alignment between promised and actual pay, and receipt of festival allowance (Dashain kharcha). These items operationalise the wage-related provisions of the Labour Act, 2074.

A.1 Average Monthly Income (Minimum Wage Compliance)

Across both groups, 55 of 68 workers (80.9%) reported receiving at or above the statutory minimum wage, while 13 (19.1%) reported income below the legal threshold. Disaggregated

by project type, 30 of 34 government-funded workers (88.2%) were compliant, compared to only 25 of 34 donor-funded workers (73.5%). The chi-square test yielded $\chi^2 = 2.378$, $p = .123$ not statistically significant. Despite this, approximately one in four donor-funded workers reported sub-minimum wages a direct violation of the Labour Act, 2074. The higher non-compliance in donor-funded projects likely reflects extensive sub-contracting chains that distance the funding source from enforcement obligations.




Figure 4 Minimum Wage Compliance by Project

A.2 Timeliness of Monthly Wage Payment

Only 4 workers (5.9%) reported 'always' receiving wages on time; 10 (14.7%) reported 'never.' Combined 'rarely' and 'never' categories accounted for 44.1% of all respondents. Donor-funded workers showed a more severe pattern: 21 of 34 (61.8%) fell in 'never' or 'rarely', compared to 9 of 34 (26.5%) in government-funded projects. The chi-square test yielded $\chi^2 = 8.8$, $p = .066$ approaching but not reaching significance, indicating a practically meaningful difference in payment regularity.




Figure 5 Wage Payment Timeliness

A.3 Alignment Between Promised and Actual Pay

Approximately 83.9% of workers experienced consistent alignment between promised and actual pay (combined 'always' and 'often'). The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 6.146, p = .189$ not significant. Outright wage misrepresentation at hiring is not the dominant mode of non-compliance; the primary violations lie in payment timing and completeness, not in misstatement of rates.

A.4 Receipt of Festival Allowance (Dashain Kharcha)

Festival allowance emerged as the most egregiously non-compliant entitlement: 39 workers (57.4%) reported 'never' receiving it, and combined 'never' and 'rarely' responses accounted for 66.2% of the entire sample. No significant difference was found between project types ($\chi^2 = 4.783, p = .443$). Both project types overwhelmingly and equivalently fail to provide this mandatory statutory benefit. All five KII experts unanimously identified the absence of any mandatory reporting mechanism for bonus disbursement as the primary enforcement gap.




Figure 6 Festival Allowance Receipt

Composite Score Analysis

The composite Wage and Payment Practices subscale yielded a mean of 10.41 (SD = 1.96) for government-funded workers and 11.38 (SD = 2.55) for donor-funded workers. The independent-samples t-test returned $t = -1.762$, $p = 0.083$ not statistically significant, though marginal. The larger SD in donor-funded projects indicates greater outcome variability, possibly reflecting different sub-contracting depths across donor project sites.




Figure 7 Subscale A Composite Score- Wage and Payment Practices

Subscale Conclusion

Systemic, moderate-level non-compliance characterises both project types. The most severe violations are concentrated in festival allowance non-provision (66%+ of workers) and irregular payment timing (44%+). The weak trend toward better composite scores in donor-funded projects ($p = .083$) does not translate into substantively different individual-item outcomes. The KII evidence locates the structural root cause in cascading payment delays from government or client to contractor to workers a fiscal architecture problem that transcends individual project governance.

4.1.2 Subscale B: Social Security, Paid Leave, and Insurance

This subscale the most comprehensive in the framework comprises eleven items covering SSF and Provident Fund (PF) registration, employer contribution compliance, six categories of paid

leave, and two categories of mandatory insurance. These provisions are governed by the Labour Act, 2074 and the Social Security Act, 2075.

Question-Level Analysis

B.1 SSF or Provident Fund Registration

SSF or PF registration revealed catastrophic non-compliance: only 2 of 68 workers (2.9%) were registered both from government-funded projects while 66 (97.1%) were not. The chi-square test yielded $\chi^2 = 2.06$, $p = .151$ not significant, as near-zero registration characterised both groups. KII experts identified the fundamental structural explanation: the SSF was designed for stable, formal employment relationships and is architecturally incompatible with the daily-wage, multi-employer nature of Nepal's construction workforce.




Figure 8 SSF / PF Registration Status

B.2 & B.3 Employer Contributions to Gratuity and Provident Fund / SSF

Both items returned near-identical results: 66 of 68 workers (97.1%) reported never receiving mandatory employer contributions the 8.33% gratuity and 10% PF, or the unified 21% SSF contribution. Chi-square tests yielded $\chi^2 = 2.061$, $p = .357$ not significant. The near-total absence reflects systemic informality enabled by cascading sub-contracting chains that strip away formal statutory obligations at every tier.

B.4 to B.9 All Categories of Paid Leave

All six leave categories returned near-identical findings: 95–100% of workers reported 'never' receiving any of the specified leave entitlements. The only statistically significant chi-square result was for paid home leave: $\chi^2 = 6.581$, $p = .037$ government-funded workers showed marginal variation (3 'sometimes', 3 'rarely') while all 34 donor-funded workers reported 'never.'

The practical difference is negligible. Compliance is effectively zero across all leave categories in both groups, reflecting the daily-wage nature of construction employment in which the administrative infrastructure for leave tracking and disbursement simply does not exist.




Figure 9 Leave Entitlement Non-Compliance across all categories

B.10 Annual Medical Insurance (at Least NPR 100,000)

Medical insurance produced one of the most statistically significant chi-square results in the dataset: $\chi^2 = 13.218$, $p = .004$. Government-funded workers reported marginally better access (1 'always', 5 'sometimes', 10 'rarely', 18 'never') versus donor-funded workers (0 'always', 0 'sometimes', 3 'rarely', 31 'never'). The government advantage likely reflects informal, ad hoc medical reimbursements rather than systematic insurance provision. Genuine coverage as mandated by the Labour Act remains effectively non-existent in both groups.




Figure 10 Annual Medical Insurance Access By Project type

B.11 Accidental Insurance (at Least NPR 700,000)

Accidental insurance showed marginally better but still deeply inadequate compliance: 24 workers (35.3%) reported 'never' and 14 (20.6%) 'rarely.' The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 7.860, p = .097$. Donor-funded workers reported slightly better coverage, possibly due to visible risk management obligations at their project sites.




Figure 11 Accidental vs Medical Insurance Compliance by Project Type

Composite Score Analysis

The composite Social Security subscale yielded a mean of 48.91 (SD = 4.41) for government-funded workers and 50.94 (SD = 1.61) for donor-funded workers. The t-test returned $t = -2.522, p = 0.014$ statistically significant, favouring donor-funded projects. The substantially lower SD

for donor-funded workers (1.61 vs 4.41) indicates uniformly low but consistent compliance in donor projects, while government-funded projects show greater variability.

Subscale Conclusion

The Social Security subscale reveals the most profound compliance failures in the entire study: SSF/PF registration near-zero; all leave types denied to virtually the entire workforce; insurance provision consistently inadequate. Despite near-universal failure, donor-funded projects demonstrate statistically significantly better composite scores ($p = .014$) attributable to donor safeguard requirements. However, the absolute compliance levels remain a systemic violation of both domestic legislation and ILO Convention C102 (Minimum Social Security Standards).

4.1.3 Subscale C: Working Hours and Overtime

This subscale assesses compliance with the Labour Act's standard eight-hour working day, 48-hour working week, and mandatory overtime compensation at 1.5x the basic wage rate (Dhara 28).

Question-Level Analysis

C.1 Normal Working Hours per Day

62 of 68 workers (91.2%) reported working more than eight hours per day. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 0.000$, $p = 1.000$ identical between groups. This near-universal exceedance of the statutory daily limit establishes that the overwhelming majority of workers are continuously entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked beyond eight per day.




Figure 12 Daily Working Hours Compliance

C.2 Working Days per Week

49 of 68 workers (72.1%) worked more than six days per week. Donor-funded workers showed a more severe pattern: 28 of 34 (82.4%) exceeded the six-day limit versus 21 of 34 (61.8%) in government-funded projects. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 3.578$, $p = .059$. The higher rate

in donor-funded projects may reflect intensive schedules driven by donor-imposed completion milestones.

C.3 Receipt of Overtime Payment

Only 44.1% of workers receive overtime consistently (combined 'always'/'often'), while 38.2% rarely or never receive it. Donor-funded projects show a polarised pattern: workers are equally likely to always receive or never receive overtime pay. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 5.929$, $p = .204$ not significant.



Figure 13 Overtime Payment Frequency by Project type

C.4 Working Overtime Without Payment

More than 67% of all workers regularly performed unpaid overtime at least 'sometimes.' Donor-funded workers showed the more severe problem: 22 of 34 (64.7%) reported 'often' or 'always' working without overtime pay, versus 14 of 34 (41.2%) in government-funded projects. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 8.573$, $p = .073$ approaching significance. All five KII experts unanimously identified worker unawareness of overtime rights as the primary enabler, alongside fear of dismissal as a structural deterrent.

Composite Score Analysis

The composite Working Hours and Overtime subscale yielded a mean of 8.91 (SD = 2.33) for government-funded and 10.24 (SD = 1.97) for donor-funded workers. The t-test returned $t = -2.531$, $p = 0.014$ statistically significant, favouring donor-funded projects. This apparent contradiction with the item-level finding of more unpaid overtime in donor projects is resolved

by examining the composite scoring structure: the overtime payment receipt item drives the composite upward due to more 'always' responses, while the reverse-coded unpaid overtime item only partially moderates this.

Subscale Conclusion

Extended working hours are near-universal, yet overtime compensation remains inconsistent and frequently absent. The statistically significant composite score difference ($p = .014$, favouring donor-funded) must be read alongside the item-level finding that donor-funded workers experience more frequent unpaid overtime. The Labour Act's overtime provisions are systematically violated. The KII analysis identifies mandatory electronic time-keeping unanimously endorsed by all five experts as the most critical reform capable of creating the evidentiary basis for overtime claims.

4.1.4 Subscale D: Legal Compliance and Enforcement

This subscale measures the institutional dimension of labour rights compliance through six items: written employment contracts, verbal employment rights awareness, labour office inspections, complaint knowledge, retaliation protection, and Labour Office training.

Question-Level Analysis

D.1 Written Employment Contract

Only 4 of 68 workers (5.9%) had a written employment contract 3 from government-funded and 1 from donor-funded projects. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 1.063$, $p = .303$ not significant. Written contracts are foundational to all other rights enforcement: they legally constitute the employment relationship, trigger notice period entitlements, and provide the documentation basis for wage and benefit claims. Their near-total absence (94.1%) represents the structural failure underlying many other compliance deficits. All five KII experts unanimously endorsed making written contracts a prerequisite for construction permit issuance as the single most impactful short-term reform.





Figure 14 Written Employment Contract Presence

D.2 Awareness of Verbal Employment Rights

Only 16 of 68 workers (23.5%) knew that employment is legally recognised even without a written contract. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 1.308, p = .253$ not significant. Workers lacking both written contracts and awareness of verbal employment rights are effectively without any perceived legal basis for asserting claims.

D.3 Labour Office Inspections

60 of 68 workers (88.2%) reported 'never' seeing a labour inspector visit their workplace. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 6.267, p = .099$. The KII evidence provides the structural explanation: Labour Offices exist in only 10 of Nepal's 77 districts, rendering enforcement effectively absent across the majority of the country. All five KII experts unanimously rated DOLS as 'Ineffective' in construction sector enforcement (Q16).



Note. 88.2% of workers (60/68) have NEVER seen a labour inspector: $\chi^2 = 6.267, p = .099$ (NS).

Figure 15 Labour Audit Frequency at Project

D.4 Knowledge of Complaint Mechanisms

Only 7 of 68 workers (10.3%) knew how and where to make a formal complaint 5 from government-funded and 2 from donor-funded projects. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 1.433, p = .231$. Four of five KII experts identified worker unawareness that the Labour Court even exists as the primary accessibility barrier, establishing that the formal judicial remedy is entirely invisible to those it is designed to protect.

D.5 Feeling Protected from Retaliation

53% of workers rarely or never feel protected from retaliation. Donor-funded workers showed a marginally more favourable distribution: 41.2% report 'always' or 'often' feeling protected versus 14.7% in government-funded projects. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 7.365, p = .118$ not significant. Fear of retaliation is identified by 4 of 5 KII experts as the most frequently cited barrier to grievance filing.




Figure 16 Worker Perception of Retaliation Protection by Project type

D.6 Training Provided by Labour Office

61 of 68 workers (89.7%) reported 'never' receiving any Labour Office training. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 2.216, p = .330$ not significant. All five KII experts unanimously identified the absence of any government agency with a budget or mandate for construction-sector rights training as the primary structural barrier.

Composite Score Analysis

The composite Legal Compliance and Enforcement subscale yielded a mean of 18.91 (SD = 1.60) for government-funded and 18.38 (SD = 2.03) for donor-funded workers. The t-test returned $t = 1.194, p = 0.237$ not statistically significant. Neither project type demonstrates meaningful advantage.

Subscale Conclusion

The Legal Compliance and Enforcement subscale exposes a comprehensive institutional vacuum: 94% lack written contracts; 88% have never been inspected; 90% are unaware of complaint mechanisms; and 100% have never filed a grievance. The absence of any significant difference between project types ($p = .237$) confirms that donor funding alone cannot bridge this governance architecture gap. The KII evidence establishes that DOLS's mandate, inspector-to-worker ratios, and enforcement geography are all structurally insufficient to produce compliance.


4.1.5 Subscale E: Economic Fairness and Equality

This subscale examines equity in remuneration and workplace treatment, particularly gender-based pay equality, operationalising Nepal's obligations under ILO Conventions C100 and C111. It comprises three items.

Question-Level Analysis

E.1 Equal Pay for Equal Work Regardless of Gender

This item yielded the most statistically significant chi-square result in the entire dataset: $\chi^2 = 21.023$, $p < .001$. Government-funded workers showed a relatively even distribution (5/9/11/7/2 for Always/Often/Sometimes/Rarely/Never). Donor-funded workers exhibited a strikingly bimodal pattern: 11 reported 'always' (32.4%) and 12 reported 'never' (35.3%). This polarisation indicates a segmented workforce in donor-funded projects a formally engaged minority experiencing equitable pay practices, and an informally engaged majority that does not. Three KII experts identified skill-level conflation as the primary operational mechanism of discriminatory pay.




Note. $\chi^2 = 21.023$, $p < .001^{***}$. Bimodal distribution in donor projects indicates workforce segmentation.

Figure 17 Gender Pay Equality Responses by Project Type (Bimodal Pattern in Donor – Funded Projects)

E.2 Personal Experience of Unfair Treatment

The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 8.151$, $p = .043$ statistically significant. Donor-funded workers report significantly higher frequencies of unfair treatment: 18 of 34 (52.9%) reported 'sometimes' or 'often', compared to 8 of 34 government-funded workers (23.5%). This challenges the assumption that donor-funded projects provide more equitable environments.



Note. $\chi^2 = 8.151, p = .043^*$. 52.9% of donor workers report "Often/Sometimes" unfair treatment vs 23.5% Govt.

Figure 18 Experience of Unfair Treatment By Project Type

E.3 Knowledge of Legal Rights to Equal Pay

Only 19 of 68 workers (27.9%) were aware of their legal right to equal pay. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 1.826, p = .177$ not significant. Even workers who experience discrimination lack the legal knowledge to frame it as a rights violation.

Composite Score Analysis

The composite Economic Fairness subscale yielded a mean of 6.47 (SD = 1.71) for government-funded and 6.94 (SD = 2.53) for donor-funded workers. The t-test returned $t = -0.898, p = 0.373$ not statistically significant. The larger SD for donor-funded projects confirms greater within-group variability consistent with the bimodal equal pay distribution.

Subscale Conclusion

Donor-funded projects show greater polarisation on gender pay equality (higher proportions of both maximum and minimum compliance) while government-funded projects show more uniform partial compliance. Donor-funded workers report significantly more frequent unfair treatment ($p = .043$). The non-significant composite difference ($p = .373$) conceals important within-group variability revealed only through item-level analysis.


4.1.6 Subscale F: Contractual Transparency and Terms of Employment

This subscale assesses the degree to which workers are clearly informed of their employment conditions at and after hire, grounded in the Labour Act, 2074's transparency and informed consent requirements. It comprises four items.

Question-Level Analysis

F.1 Clear Explanation of Pay and Working Days at Hire

54 of 68 workers (79.4%) received a clear explanation of pay and working days when hired. By project type: 31 of 34 donor-funded workers (91.2%) versus 23 of 34 government-funded workers (67.6%). The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 5.757$, $p = .016$ statistically significant, confirming that donor-funded projects more reliably provide basic wage transparency at the point of employment.



Note. $\chi^2 = 5.757$, $p = .016^*$. Despite higher pay clarity, only 14.7% were informed of full statutory entitlements.

Figure 19 pay clarity at Hiring by Project Type

F.2 Informed About Economic Rights at Hire

Only 10 of 68 workers (14.7%) were informed about their broader economic rights at hiring a perfectly equal split of 5 from each project type. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 0.000$, $p = 1.000$. The critical distinction: while most workers are told their wage rate, almost none are informed of the full scope of statutory entitlements overtime, leave, social security, or grievance mechanisms.

F.3 Knowledge of Termination and Notice Period Rules

Only 6 of 68 workers (8.8%) 3 from each project type knew the rules for ending employment. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 0.000$, $p = 1.000$. The vast majority operate in an employment relationship without understanding any of its formal legal parameters.

F.4 Dismissed Without Proper Notice

27 of 68 workers (39.7%) reported 'never' having been dismissed without notice. Donor-funded workers reported higher frequencies of irregular dismissals. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 3.344$, $p = .342$ not significant. The KII evidence attributes this to structural circularity: written contracts are the legal trigger for notice period rights, but contracts require the very employer compliance that is absent.

4.7.2 Comparative Item Performance

Table 5 Contractual Transparency: Comparative Item Performance

Item	Description	% Govt	% Donor	χ^2	P value	Sig.
F.1	Pay clarity at hire	67.6%	91.2%	5.757	.016	YES *
F.2	Rights informed at hire	14.7%	14.7%	0.000	1.000	NO
F.3	Knows termination rules	8.8%	8.8%	0.000	1.000	NO
F.4	Never dismissed w/o notice	50.0%	29.4%	3.344	.342	NO

Note. NS = Not Significant. * Significant at $p < .05$. Compliance percentages reflect affirmative or highest-compliance responses.

Subscale Conclusion

Donor-funded projects significantly outperform government-funded projects on pay clarity at hiring ($p = .016$), but this advantage does not extend to broader rights disclosure, termination knowledge, or irregular dismissal protection. Near-universal absence of rights (14.7%) and termination awareness (8.8%) across both project types reflects systemic failure to operationalise the informed consent and transparency principles of the Labour Act, 2074.

4.1.7 Subscale G: Awareness and Capacity Building

This subscale assesses whether workers have been equipped with rights knowledge through formal training, understand where to seek redress, and can articulate their legal entitlements. It captures the critical enabler of all other rights: workers who lack awareness cannot assert or protect their entitlements under any circumstance.

Question-Level Analysis

G.1 Receipt of Training on Labour Rights

Only 2 of 68 workers (2.9%) 1 from each project type reported receiving any training on labour rights. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 0.000$, $p = 1.000$ perfectly equivalent. This is among

the most consequential findings in the study: training is the primary mechanism by which workers gain knowledge to recognise violations and assert claims; in its near-total absence, all other compliance mechanisms are compromised.




Figure 20 Rights Training Receipt

G.2 Knowledge of Complaint Authority


Only 3 of 68 workers (4.4%) all from government-funded projects knew where to go if their employer violated labour law obligations. The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 3.138$, $p = .076$. All 34 donor-funded workers had zero knowledge of complaint authorities. This directly explains the 100% no-complaint-filing rate: workers cannot use mechanisms they do not know exist.

G.3 Desire for Further Training on Rights

The training demand item yielded a statistically significant result: $\chi^2 = 5.397$, $p = .020$. All 34 donor-funded workers (100%) expressed desire for more training, compared to 29 of 34 government-funded workers (85.3%). This near-universal demand signals a strong enabling condition for rights awareness programme scale-up.

G.4 Overall Understanding of Legal Rights — The Awareness Paradox

35 of 68 workers (51.5%) reported 'no idea', 28 (41.2%) 'understand some', and only 3 (4.4%) 'proper knowledge.' The chi-square test returned $\chi^2 = 18.40$, $p < .001$. By project type: government-funded workers reported 3/2/20/9 for proper knowledge/understand most/understand some/no idea. Donor-funded workers reported 0/0/8/26, 76.5% report 'no idea.' This counterintuitive result donor-funded workers achieve higher composite Awareness scores yet demonstrate dramatically lower actual rights knowledge constitutes the **Awareness Paradox**: higher formal orientation scores do not translate into genuine worker empowerment.



Note. $\chi^2 = 18.40$, $p < .001^{***}$. 76.5% of donor-funded workers report "No Idea" about their legal rights.

Figure 21 Self- Assessed Rights Understanding by Project Type (The Awareness Paradox)

Composite Score Analysis

The composite Awareness and Capacity Building subscale yielded a mean of 8.06 (SD = 1.13) for government-funded and 8.74 (SD = 0.45) for donor-funded workers. The t-test returned $t = -3.254$, $p = 0.002$ statistically significant, favouring donor-funded projects. The extremely small SD for donor-funded workers (0.45) reflects near-uniform responses driven by the universal training demand (G.3) rather than by demonstrated rights knowledge.

Subscale Conclusion

Virtually all construction workers lack meaningful labour rights awareness regardless of project type. Rights training has reached only 2 of 68 workers; complaint authority knowledge is near-zero; and the majority report no understanding of their fundamental entitlements. The statistically significant composite score difference ($p = .002$, favouring donor-funded) is driven by training demand rather than knowledge. The Awareness Paradox calls for a fundamental reorientation toward outcomes-based, practically oriented training models rather than checklist-driven orientation procedures.

4.1.8 Overall Summary and Cross-Subscale Discussion

The comprehensive subscale-level analysis reveals a consistent and deeply troubling pattern of labour rights non-compliance across Nepal's construction sector, affecting workers in both donor-funded and government-funded projects. Statistically significant differences between project types were identified in four of the seven subscales: Social Security ($p = .014$), Working Hours and Overtime ($p = .014$), Economic Fairness at item level ($p = .043$ for unfair treatment), and Awareness ($p = .002$).

Donor-funded projects demonstrated significantly better composite scores on Social Security, Working Hours, and Awareness subscales, plausibly attributable to mandatory social safeguard requirements and documentation protocols imposed by international funding agencies. However, the same projects showed paradoxical disadvantages on individual items: more frequent unpaid overtime, higher rates of unfair treatment, and the Awareness Paradox in which higher composite scores coexist with dramatically lower actual rights knowledge (76.5% report 'no idea'). The influence of donor requirements is real but systematically uneven improving administrative compliance while leaving power-relations and experiential dimensions largely unchanged.

The cross-cutting finding unifying all seven subscales is the near-complete absence of institutional enforcement infrastructure: written contracts absent for 94.1% of workers; SSF registration at 2.9%; labour audits never at 88.2% of sites; complaint awareness absent for 89.7%; rights training absent for 97.1%. These systemic deficits cannot be addressed by project-level improvements alone.

Table 6 Comprehensive Statistical Results Summary

#	Subscale	Key Finding	χ^2 Sig. Items	Govt Mean (SD)	Donor Mean (SD)	t-test (p)	Sig.
A	Wages	66% no festival bonus; 44% chronic delays	None	10.41 (1.96)	11.38 (2.55)	t=-1.762 (.083)	NS
B	Social Security	97% lack SSF/PF; all leave near-zero	Medical p=.004; Home leave p=.037	48.91 (4.41)	50.94 (1.61)	t=-2.522 (.014)	SIG
C	Working Hours	91% exceed 8hr; 67% unpaid OT	None	8.91 (2.33)	10.24 (1.97)	t=-2.531 (.014)	SIG
D	Legal Compliance	94% no contract; 88% never inspected	None	18.91 (1.60)	18.38 (2.03)	t=1.194 (.237)	NS
E	Fairness	Bimodal gender pay p<.001; unfair treat.	Gender p<.001; Unfair p=.043	6.47 (1.71)	6.94 (2.53)	t=-0.898 (.373)	NS
F	Transparency	8.8% know termination rules	Pay clarity p=.016	7.03 (1.34)	7.09 (1.19)	t=-0.192 (.849)	NS
G	Awareness	2/68 trained; Awareness Paradox	Rights p<.001; Training p=.020	8.06 (1.13)	8.74 (0.45)	t=-3.254 (.002)	SIG


Note. NS = Not Significant. SIG = significant at $p < .05$. OT = Overtime. Mean scores = composite subscale totals from independent-samples t-tests.

Table 7 Statistical significance summary across seven LECR subscales

Subscale	t-test p	Sig.	Better Performer	Key chi-sq. Finding(s)
A Wages & Payment	p=0.083	NS	Donor (marginal)	None significant
B Social Security & Leave	p=0.014	SIG	Donor (sig.)	Med.Ins. p=.004; Home leave p=.037

Subscale	t-test p	Sig.	Better Performer	Key chi-sq. Finding(s)
C Working Hours & OT	p=0.014	SIG	Donor (sig.)	None significant
D Legal Compliance	p=0.237	NS	Neither	None significant
E Economic Fairness	p=0.373	NS	Neither	Gender pay p<.001; Unfair treat. p=.043
F Contractual Transparency	p=0.849	NS	Donor (pay clarity)	Pay clarity p=.016
G Awareness & Capacity	p=0.002	SIG	Donor (sig.)	Rights under. p<.001; Training demand p=.020

Note. SIG = significant at p < .05. NS = Not Significant. OT = Overtime.



Note. * = statistically significant subscale (p < .05). Scores normalised to 0–10 scale for comparability.

Figure 22 Cross subscale Compliance profile by Project type (Normalised 0-10 Scale)




Figure 23 Systemic Institutional Compliance Infrastructure Deficit

4.2 Identification and analysis of the key challenges and gaps affecting the enforcement of economic rights of labourers in the construction industry by KII

The KII thematic analysis provides the causal architecture explaining the quantitative outcomes documented in Sections 4.2–4.8. The Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted for the identification and analysis of the key challenges and gaps affecting the enforcement of economic rights of labourers in the construction industry. Five cross-cutting themes were identified through systematic comparative analysis of expert responses across 31 questions in thematic sections.

4.2.1 Theme 1: The Information and Awareness Vacuum

The near-total absence of rights awareness among both workers and employers is the most pervasive cross-cutting theme, appearing across questions on wages, overtime, contracts, grievances, and institutional outreach. Three of five experts independently identified the information gap as the single most critical overall enforcement failure (Q27). This directly corroborates the quantitative finding that 51.5% of workers report no idea about their legal rights, 97% received no training, and 100% have never filed a grievance not because they were satisfied but because they did not know the system existed. The information vacuum operates at two levels: at the individual level, preventing workers from recognising violations; at the institutional level, ensuring that even well-designed laws produce no compliance because neither party understands their obligations.

4.2.2 Theme 2: Institutional Incapacity and DOLS Ineffectiveness

All five KII experts unanimously rated DOLS as 'Ineffective' in construction sector enforcement (Q16) the most unambiguous single finding in the entire KII dataset. The

structural explanation: Labour Offices exist in only 11 of Nepal's 77 districts; inspector presence at construction sites is near-zero; no government agency has a budget or mandate for construction-sector rights training (Q23, unanimous). Four of five experts rated Nepal's translation of ILO convention obligations into domestic enforcement as 'Poorly' (Q26). The institutional geography of enforcement Labour Offices in 11 of 77 districts is the direct structural cause of the 88% never-inspected rate.

4.2.3 Theme 3: Sub-Contracting Architecture as Structural Enabler

Sub-contracting generates the informality through which enforcement gaps are operationalised at worksite level. Govind Raj Bhatta identified the fundamental problem as the opacity of who is the legal employer within multi-tier arrangements. Sugandha Subedi identified four pathways through which sub-contracting undermines enforcement: fragmenting the employment chain, enabling principal contractors to disclaim liability, creating jurisdictional confusion, and deploying unregistered micro-enterprises incapable of compliance. Rajendra Poudel's recommendation for joint and several liability for principal contractors already operative in India's Contract Labour (R&A) Act directly addresses this structural gap.

4.2.4 Theme 4: The Digitalisation Imperative

Digital transformation of labour administration covering worker registration, wage payment, contract documentation, and grievance mechanisms emerged as a cross-sectional reform consensus. Electronic time-keeping at construction sites above a threshold size was the only question where all five experts converged on the same primary instrument (Q9). A multilingual toll-free construction worker helpline was recommended by four of five experts as the single most immediate effective intervention (Q24) and all four noted that no such helpline currently exists. Digitalisation simultaneously addresses multiple enforcement gaps: digital payment prevents wage manipulation; digital registration closes the SSF coverage gap; electronic time-keeping creates evidentiary records for overtime claims.

4.2.5 Theme 5: Legal Design Misfit and Sector-Specific Legislation

Nepal's Labour Act 2074 is designed for formal, permanent employment relationships and is structurally misaligned with the project-based, mobile, multi-employer, and informally contracted nature of construction work. Four of five experts endorsed a dedicated Construction Workers' Rights Act (Q28). This finding has a direct parallel in South Asian legislative experience: India's BOCW Act (1996) was specifically enacted to address the inadequacy of general labour legislation for the construction sector. Nepal may be approaching a comparable

legislative inflection point, and the evidence in this study provides a strong empirical foundation for that argument.



Figure 24 Labour Rights Enforcement Challenges in Construction (KII Word Cloud)

4.2.6 Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings

Table 4.3 below documents the direct correspondence between each major quantitative finding and the KII-identified structural mechanisms that explain it. The KII evidence does not merely corroborate the survey data; it provides the causal architecture that explains why the quantitative patterns obtain.

Table 8 Integration Matrix: Quantitative Findings and KII Structural Explanations

Subscale	Key Quantitative Finding	KII Structural Explanation
A. Wages	44% chronic delays; 57% never receive Dashain bonus; 19% below minimum	Cascading fiscal delays client→contractor→workers; no bonus reporting mechanism; weak DOLS monitoring
B. Social Security	97% unregistered SSF/PF; all leave zero; 97% no employer contributions	SSF design misfit for mobile workers; sub-contracting dissolves contributions; no permit-linked compliance

Subscale	Key Quantitative Finding	KII Structural Explanation
C. Working Hours	91% exceed 8hr/day; 60%+ unpaid OT regularly	No time-keeping creates evidentiary vacuum; unawareness of OT rights (5/5 experts); dismissal fear deters claims
D. Legal Compliance	94% no contract; 88% never inspected; 100% no complaint filed; DOLS rated Ineffective	Labour Offices in 10/77 districts; near-zero inspector presence; no helpline exists; corruption identified
E. Fairness	Bimodal gender pay in donor (p<.001); 69% report unfair treatment	Skill-level conflation for discriminatory pay (3/5 experts); no standardised job classification
F. Transparency	14.7% informed of rights; 8.8% know termination rules; 40% dismissed w/o notice	No mandatory rights disclosure at hire; circularity: contracts require compliance that is absent
G. Awareness	97% no training; 95.6% don't know where to turn; Awareness Paradox	No mandate/budget for training; helpline does not exist; formal orientation ≠ rights internalisation

Note. KII explanations derived from thematic analysis of 31 questions across five expert respondents. OT = Overtime.

4.2.6 Triangulation

Quantitative violations across seven subscales are not random. They triangulate with KII structural explanations to reveal three root causes: (1) fiscal cascades through sub-contracting, (2) geographic absence of labour inspection, and (3) missing mandates for rights information. These causes produce the paradox of high violations with zero complaints a finding that contradicts naive interpretations of complaint data as a satisfaction indicator.

Table 9 Triangulation

Root Cause	Quantitative Evidence	KII Evidence	Overlap	Contrast Resolved
Fiscal cascade	A (44% delays), B (97% unregistered)	Cascading delays; subcontracting dissolves contributions	Strong	N/A
Geographic absence	D (88% never inspected), C (60%+ unpaid OT)	10/77 districts; near-zero inspector	Strong	N/A
No mandate for info	F (14.7% informed), G (97% no training)	No mandatory disclosure; no budget	Strong	N/A

Root Cause	Quantitative Evidence	KII Evidence	Overlap	Contrast Resolved
Visible vs invisible	19% (wage) vs 97% (SSF)	Not directly stated, but implied by design	Partial	Contrast explained by visibility gradient
Zero complaints	100% no complaint + high violations	No helpline; corruption; fear	Strong	Complaint paradox resolved

4.3 Possible solutions for overcoming the existing challenges and gaps

Drawing exclusively on insights from five Key Informant Interviews (KII) with labour experts, government officials, contractor representatives, and trade union leaders, this section presents eleven targeted recommendations to address systemic gaps in labour economic rights within Nepal's construction sector. Unlike survey data, the KII inputs identify root structural causes – from cascading payment failures and sub-contracting fragmentation to institutional ineffectiveness and the absence of worker-centric mechanisms. Each recommendation is presented with its KII-grounded rationale, proposed interventions, and expected outcomes.

4.3.1 Suggestion 1 – Comprehensive Digitalisation of Worker Registration

- **KII rationale:** Experts noted that Labour and Employment Offices exist in only 11 of 77 districts, and the absence of a digital verification system enables widespread contractor non-compliance. The current paper-based registration cannot track mobile construction workers.
- **Interventions:** Mandate digital registration linked to National ID; auto-enrol in SSF; on-site verification with penalties.
- **Outcome:** Closes the coverage gap, creates a national workforce database, ends exploitation through worker anonymity.

4.3.2 Suggestion 2 – Mandatory Digital Payment Verification for Contractor Billing

- **KII rationale:** All experts unanimously identified cascading payment delays from government clients to contractors as the root structural cause. They called for a digitalised payment system to allow independent verification of wage payments.
- **Interventions:** Digital payroll sheets as billing precondition; bank/mobile money only; amend Public Procurement Act and e-GP integration.

- **Outcome:** Enforceable audit trails, timely salary payments, eliminates cash-based evasion.

4.3.3 Suggestion 3 – Enact a Dedicated Construction Sector Labour Law

- **KII rationale:** Four of five informants explicitly called for a sector-specific Construction Workers’ Rights Act. They stated that the general Labour Act 2074 is structurally incompatible with mobile, multi-employer, piece-rate workers, and pointed to India’s BOCW Act 1996 as a directly applicable model.
- **Interventions:** Nepal Construction Workers’ Act (or detailed sector-specific rules) with portable leave/SSF, digital overtime pay, joint liability, and a 1–2% welfare cess.
- **Outcome:** Resolves legal-structural mismatch, establishes clear employer liability in subcontracting chains, aligns with regional standards.

4.3.4 Suggestion 4 – Dedicated Human Resource Management Mechanism

- **KII rationale:** Experts confirmed that no government agency holds a mandate or budget for rights training in the construction sector. DOLS was unanimously assessed as ineffective for construction sector regulation.
- **Interventions:** Establish HR Compliance Unit (HRCU) under DOLS or as semi-autonomous body; site-based Labour Welfare Officers reporting to HRCU.
- **Outcome:** Accountable institutional body, systematic compliance data, reduced contractor costs via standardised templates.

4.3.5 Suggestion 5 – Mandatory Rights Awareness & Capacity Building

- **KII rationale:** All five informants confirmed no government agency holds a mandate or budget for rights training in the construction sector. Experts recommended IEC tools (posters, audio, community drama) over written formats. They noted that workers on foreign-donor-funded projects showed higher awareness.
- **Interventions:** Mandatory on-site orientation (first week); multi-media IEC materials in local languages; local governments to deliver training; integrate skills upgrading.
- **Outcome:** Workers equipped to identify violations and use grievance mechanisms; skills training reduces wage discrimination.

4.3.6 Suggestion 6 – Amend Public Procurement Act to Protect Labour Costs

- **KII rationale:** Four of five experts identified cascading payment failures originating at the procurement stage. They recommended wage compliance certificates as a precondition for contract awards, consistent with ILO Convention C94 and South Korea’s procurement legislation.

- **Interventions:** List all labour cost components as non-competitive protected elements; PPMO validates adequacy before contract award.
- **Outcome:** Removes root economic incentive for underpayment; upstream compliance rather than post-violation response.

4.3.7 Suggestion 7 – Comprehensive SSF Reform for Construction Workers

- **KII rationale:** Experts identified structural design flaws – not merely enforcement failures – as the core cause. The SSF was designed for stable formal employment, not for mobile, daily-wage, multi-employer construction workers. Workers perceive income loss and lack technological access as deterrents.
- **Interventions:** Voluntary fixed monthly contribution (Thailand model); partial withdrawals (Singapore CPF); mobile app; government matching subsidy for low earners.
- **Outcome:** Portable, flexible, mobile-enabled SSF – shifts from unattainable to desirable.

4.3.8 Suggestion 8 – Strengthen Labour Enforcement Institutions

- **KII rationale:** DOLS was unanimously assessed by all five informants as ineffective in the construction sector. Corruption was cited as a compounding barrier, and the Labour Court is unknown to most workers. Nepal fails to meet ILO Convention C81 obligations.
- **Interventions:** Construction Sector Enforcement Division within DOLS with surprise inspections; revive Labour Audit Office; expand Labour Court access; district conciliation panels (30-day binding deadlines).
- **Outcome:** Restored deterrence, credible remedies, layered compliance across project cycle.

4.3.9 Suggestion 9 – Legal Accountability Framework for Sub-Contracting

- **KII rationale:** Experts identified the sub-contracting structure as the key mechanism rendering labour rights enforcement dysfunctional: workers across multiple tiers lack a legal entity to sue. Sub-contracting enables principals to disclaim liability and deploys informal micro-businesses incapable of compliance.
- **Interventions:** Mandatory sub-contractor registry; joint liability of principal contractor (India's Contract Labour Act model); cap tiers at two; workers can claim directly from principal (Hong Kong model).
- **Outcome:** Closes accountability loophole, legally binding employer responsibility across all tiers.

4.3.10 Suggestion 10 – Whistleblower Protection & Reward Mechanism

- **KII rationale:** Four of five informants identified fear of immediate termination as the primary deterrent to filing complaints. Additional barriers include geographical inaccessibility, language, corruption perception, lack of legal assistance, and inability to complain anonymously. This violates ILO Conventions C087 and C098.
- **Interventions:** Legal ban on retaliation with reverse onus of proof; financial penalties partly to whistleblower; reward scheme (% of fines collected); anonymous hotline.
- **Outcome:** Workers become active enforcement agents, converting the currently ineffective complaints system into an active tool.

4.3.11 Suggestion 11 – Dedicated Construction Workers’ Labour Bank

- **KII rationale:** Experts noted that no formal labour recruitment mechanism currently exists for the domestic construction sector. The unregulated *naike* system – with no written contracts, wage records, or accountability – structurally enables all documented violations.
- **Interventions:** Labour Bank under DOLS (tripartite governance) as sole legal recruiter; unique digital ID; CTEVT skills testing; electronic engagement record; register *naikes* as licensed intermediaries.
- **Outcome:** Converts monitoring from post-damage to real-time; persistent worker records; ends skill misclassification and structural exploitation.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

According to the results presented in chapter four of the current study, which include surveys conducted among 68 construction workers from Kathmandu, Rupandehi, Rukum West, and Jajarkot regions, followed by validation through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with five construction sector experts, there is an almost total absence of compliance with Nepal's Labour Act, 2074 and Social Security Act, 2075. Specifically, in all the seven sub-scales related to Labour Economic Rights Compliance, we note systematic and structural violations, namely that 97.1% are not registered at the SSF; 94.1% lack a written work contract; 88.2% have never had a visit from a labour inspector; 97.1% have never had any training on their rights; and 100% have never made any official complaints about labour issues.

These recommendations have been drawn directly from the results found in the research. Every recommendation is based clearly on either quantitative or qualitative data generated through

the research and addresses the gaps found either through the Labour Economic Rights Compliance analysis or the KII themes synthesis. In addition, all recommendations are based on the legislative situation in Nepal, and in some cases, even international examples are considered.

The study proposes eleven interconnected reforms to address systemic labour enforcement failures in Nepal's construction sector. These include mandatory digital worker registration and payment verification, a dedicated Construction Workers' Rights Act (modelled on India's BOCW Act), a Human Resource Compliance Unit, mandatory rights orientation using IEC materials, public procurement reforms to protect labour costs, SSF portability for mobile workers, strengthened labour enforcement with a Construction Sector Enforcement Division, sub-contracting regulations with joint liability, a whistleblower protection mechanism, and a Construction Workers' Labour Bank to replace the exploitative *naike* system. Collectively, these interventions shift from reactive enforcement to upstream structural prevention—addressing fiscal cascades, geographic absence of the state, missing information mandates, and legal design misfit—making compliance automatic and violations visible.

5.2 Recommendation From Study

The findings of this study reveal a near-total collapse of labour economic rights compliance across Nepal's construction sector, driven not by isolated employer misconduct but by deeply entrenched structural failures in law, administration, and institutional capacity. Addressing these failures requires systemic, mutually reinforcing reforms rather than piecemeal interventions. The most urgent priority is the comprehensive digitalisation of worker registration and wage payment. Since 97.1% of workers are unregistered with the Social Security Fund and 94.1% lack written contracts, mandatory digital registration of all construction workers through DOLS linked automatically to the SSF must be made a precondition for any project commencement. Concurrently, digital wage payment through bank transfer or mobile money should be required before contractors can submit payment bills, eliminating the cash-based system that enables wage delays and the non-payment of statutory bonuses.

Beyond digitalisation, Nepal's Labour Act, 2074 is structurally incompatible with the mobile, multi-employer, and informally contracted nature of construction work. A dedicated Construction Workers' Rights Act modelled on India's BOCW Act, 1996 is needed to provide

portable SSF benefits, transferable leave entitlements, mandatory accident and health insurance as protected project budget items, and joint and several liability of principal contractors for the violations of their sub-contractors. The exploitative *naike* system of informal recruitment should be replaced by a formally governed Construction Workers' Labour Bank that creates traceable, documented employment relationships at the point of hire. Sub-contracting chains should be restricted to a maximum of two tiers, and all sub-contractors must be registered with DOLS before engagement on any project.

The competitive tendering architecture of Nepal's Public Procurement Act, 2063 must also be reformed to ring-fence statutory labour cost components minimum wages, overtime, Dashain bonus, SSF contributions, and mandatory insurance as non-competitive line items in all public construction tenders, consistent with South Korea's procurement model and ILO Convention C94. This prevents below-cost bidding from compressing workers' legal entitlements before a project even begins. Simultaneously, DOLS must be restructured with a dedicated Construction Sector Enforcement Division, Labour Offices expanded well beyond the current 11 of Nepal's 77 districts, and a free multilingual worker helpline established immediately. A whistleblower protection mechanism with reverse onus of proof for employer retaliation is essential given that 100% of surveyed workers had never filed a formal complaint despite documented violations across all seven subscales. Finally, a mandatory rights orientation programme using pictorial IEC materials suited to low-literacy workers and delivered in local languages must be legally required at all construction sites within the first week of employment.

5.3 Recommendation for Further Study

This study provides the first systematic multi-dimensional assessment of Labour Economic Rights Compliance in Nepal's building construction sector, but its cross-sectional design, bounded sample of 68 workers, and geographic focus necessarily limit the generalisability of its findings. Several important directions for future research emerge from both the results and the acknowledged limitations of this work.

The most immediate need is for a longitudinal study that tracks compliance levels at comparable worksites over successive construction cycles, particularly before and after the introduction of digital registration and payment reforms. Such a design would provide rigorous causal evidence on whether the proposed interventions actually improve compliance outcomes and would also capture the effects of seasonal variation in construction activity a limitation

explicitly acknowledged in this study. Alongside this, the LERC framework developed here should be extended to infrastructure, road, and hydropower construction, sectors explicitly excluded from the present scope but which involve even more remote, mobile, and informally contracted workforces and may exhibit substantially different compliance dynamics.

The statistically significant bimodal gender pay pattern found among donor-funded workers ($\chi^2 = 21.023$, $p < .001$) revealing a polarised workforce in which formally engaged workers experience equitable pay while an informal majority does not warrants a dedicated gender-disaggregated study. Research examining the intersection of gender, caste, ethnicity, and skill classification in construction wage determination would inform more targeted and equitable policy responses. Similarly, while this study documents that donor-funded projects perform significantly better in Social Security ($p = 0.005$), Contractual Transparency ($p = 0.016$), and Awareness ($p = 0.001$), a detailed process evaluation of which specific donor conditionalities drive these differences and why overall compliance remains critically low even in donor-funded projects would generate actionable evidence for both agencies and the Government of Nepal.

Future research should also incorporate the perspectives of contractors, sub-contractors, and project management units, whose views in this study were limited to supplementary KII evidence. A parallel employer-side survey would illuminate the structural and financial barriers to compliance from the supply side of the employment relationship, particularly for small firms operating under the competitive bidding pressures identified in this study. Finally, the finding that 100% of workers had never filed a formal labour complaint not because they were satisfied but because they did not know the system existed or feared retaliation calls for a qualitative, ethnographic study of worker agency, institutional trust, and the lived experience of rights violations in Nepal's construction sites. Such a study would complement the quantitative evidence presented here and provide the deeper understanding needed to design enforcement mechanisms that workers will actually use.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX -A

QUESTIONERS FOR LABOUR INTERVIEW

A. General Information

Q1. Name or ID of respondent/ नाम or परिचय नम्बर

Q2. Gender/ लिंग

Q3. Occupation / पेशा

Q4. Date of Birth /जन्म मिति (DD/MM/YYYY)

Q5. Place of Origin / स्थायी ठेगाना

Q6. Currently working in / काम गर्ने ठेगाना

Q7. In which type of project are you working currently?

1. Government Project 2. Doner Funded Project

तपाईं हाल कुन प्रकारको परियोजनामा काम गर्दै हुनुहुन्छ?

१. सरकारी परियोजना २. दातृ निकायबाट आर्थिक सहयोगमा गरिएको परियोजना (E.g ADB , World bank)

Q8. Education level

1. None 2. Primary (1-5) 3. Secondary (6-10) 4. Higher Secondary (11-12)
5. College or above

औपचारिक शिक्षा

१. औपचारिक शिक्षा नलिएको २. प्राथमिक (१-५) ३. माध्यमिक (६-१०)
४. उच्च माध्यमिक (११-१२) ५. कलेज वा सोभन्दा माथिको

Q9. Type of worker

1. Unskilled 2. skilled 4. Semiskilled

If Skilled ,Type _____

श्रमिकको प्रकार

१. अकुशल २. अर्धकुशल ३. दक्ष

दक्ष कामदारको प्रकार _____

Q10. Employment type

1. Daily wage 2. Monthly contract 3. Salary based 4. Work based

रोजगारीको प्रकार

१. दैनिक ज्याला २. मासिक करार ३. तलबमा आधारित ४. काममा आधारित

Q11. How long have you been working in the construction sector?

1. <1 2. 1-5 3. 5-10 4. 10-20 5. >20

तपाईं निर्माण क्षेत्रमा कति समयदेखि काम गर्दै हुनुहुन्छ?

१. <१ २. १-५ ३. ५-१० ४. १०-२० ५. >२०

Q12. Are you affiliated with any labour union/worker organization?

1. Yes 2. No

If yes Where _____

के तपाईं कुनै श्रमिक संघ/कामदार संगठनसँग आबद्ध हुनुहुन्छ?

१. हो २. होइन

यदि हो भने कहाँ _____

Q13. What is your role in supporting your household economically?

1. Sole earner 2. Shared responsibility

तपाईंको परिवारको आर्थिक निर्भरता तपाईंमा कति छ?

१. परिवार पूर्ण रूपमा मेरो आम्दानीमा निर्भर छ

B. Wage & Payment Practices (Subscale 1)

Q1. What is your average monthly income (Minimum Wage = NPR 19,550 ,754 daily)
(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 106, नेपाल राजपत्र (Nepal Gazette) “खण्ड 75, संख्या 20, भाग 5”
published on date 2082-04-05)

1. Below the Minimum Wage 2. Minimum Wage or Above Minimum Wage

तपाईंको औसत मासिक आमदानी कति छ (न्यूनतम ज्याला = NPR १९,५५०)

१. न्यूनतम ज्यालाभन्दा कम २. न्यूनतम ज्याला वा सोभन्दा बढी

[Below the Minimum Wage =0 Minimum Wage or Above Minimum Wage =1]

Q2. How often do you receive your monthly salary/wage in time ? (i.e., not later than one month) (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 35)

- 1.Never — I do not receive my salary within one month. 2.Rarely — I receive my salary within one month in very few months. 3. Sometimes — I receive my salary within one month in about half of the months 4. Often — I receive my salary within one month in most months. 5.Always — I receive my salary within one month every month

के तपाईंले आफ्नो मासिक तलब/ज्याला समयमै प्राप्त गर्नुहुन्छ? (अर्थात्, एक महिना भन्दा ढिलो नगरी)

- १.कहिल्यै पनि - म एक महिना भित्र मेरो तलब पाउँदैन।
२.विरलै - म धेरै कम महिनामा एक महिना भित्र मेरो तलब पाउँछु।
३. कहिलेकाहीं - म लगभग आधा महिनामा एक महिना भित्र मेरो तलब पाउँछु
४. प्रायः - म धेरैजसो महिनामा एक महिना भित्र मेरो तलब पाउँछु।
५.सधैं - म प्रत्येक महिना एक महिना भित्र मेरो तलब पाउँछु

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q3. Is the amount you are paid equal to what was promised when you were hired?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 35.1)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंलाई काममा लगाउँदा वाचा गरिएको रकम बराबर तलब दिइन्छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि दिइदैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q4. Do you receive festival expenses (Dashain kharcha) equal to one month's basic remuneration each year (or proportional if less than one year)?

(Labour Act, 2074

– Section 37)

1. Yes, full amount annually 2. Mostly full amount 3. Partial amount
4. Rarely receive 5. Never receive 6.N/A

के तपाईंले प्रत्येक वर्ष एक महिनाको आधारभूत पारिश्रमिक बराबर चाडपर्व खर्च (दशैं खर्च) प्राप्त गर्नुहुन्छ (वा एक वर्ष भन्दा कम भएमा समानुपातिक)?

१. हो, वार्षिक रूपमा पूर्ण रकम २. प्रायः पूर्ण रकम ३. आंशिक
४. विरलै प्राप्त गर्नुहुन्छ ५. कहिल्यै प्राप्त हुँदैन ६. लागू हुँदैन

[1=Yes, full amount annually 0.75=Mostly full amount 0.5=Partial amount
0.25=Rarely receive 0=Never receive]

Q5. Have you Been in reserve ?

- 1.Yes 2.No

If yes how long _____

के तपाईं कहिल्यै जगेडामा बस्नुभएको छ?

१. छ २. छैन

यदि हो भने कति समयको लागि _____

If you have been held in reserve (not working but available), do you receive any remuneration during that period? (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 39)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

तपाईंलाई जगेडामा राखिएको बेला पारिश्रमिक पाउनुहुन्छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएकोछैन

[According to act should get half the remuneration , Never=0 Rarely=0.25
Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q6. When determining your wages and benefits, which of the following procedures did your workplace follow? (Multiple choice question)

1. Forming a committee (Section 116) 2. Submitting claims (Section 116)
3. Holding negotiations on time and reaching an agreement (Section 117)
4. Involving both the trade union and the employers' association (Section 85.4)
5. None

तपाईंको ज्याला तथा सुविधाहरू निर्धारण गर्दा, तपाईंको कार्यस्थलले निम्नमध्ये कुन-कुन प्रक्रिया पालना गर्‍यो?

१. समिति गठन गर्नु (धारा ११६) २. दाबी पेश गर्नु (धारा ११६) ३. समयमै वार्ता गर्नु र
समझौता गर्नु (धारा ११७) ४. दुवै ट्रेड युनियन र रोजगारदाताको संघ समावेश गर्नु (धारा
८५.४) ५. कुनै पनि होइन

[If one option was chosen from 1,2,3,4 then 0.25, if 2 0.5, if 3 0.75, if 4 1 if None 0]

C. Social Security, Paid Leave & Insurance (Subscale 2)

Q7. Are you registered for Social Security Fund (SSF) or Provident Fund by your employer? (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 52)

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईं आफ्नो रोजगारदाताद्वारा सामाजिक सुरक्षा कोष (SSF) वा सञ्चय कोषमा दर्ता हुनुहुन्छ?

१. छ २. छैन

Q8. Does your employer deposit 8.33% of your basic salary in gratuity and 10% additional for Provident fund (or 21% of basic salary in case of SSF) by employer ? (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 52,53)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंको रोजगारदाताले तपाईंको आधारभूत तलबको ८.३३% उपदान र १०% सञ्चयकोष (वा सामाजिक सुरक्षा कोषको हकमा आधारभूत तलबको २१%) तपाईंको नाममा जम्मा गर्दछ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि जम्मा भएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q9. Does your employer deposit money in your provident fund / SSF? (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 52)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंको रोजगारदाताले तपाईंको सञ्चय कोषमा / SSF मा पैसा जम्मा गर्छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि जम्मा भएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q10. Does your employer provide paid sick leave when you are injured/ill?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 44)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंको रोजगारदाताले तपाईंलाई घाइते/बिरामी हुँदा तलबी बिरामी बिदा दिन्छन्?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q11. Do you receive the following paid leaves?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 9)

I. Paid home leave one day for every 20-working day

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

II. 12 days of paid sick leave per year

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

III. 60 days paid leave for maternity leave or 15 Days paternity leave

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never 6.N/A

IV. 13 days paid public leave

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंलाई कानून अनुसार निम्न तलबी बिदाहरू दिइन्छ?

I. प्रत्येक २० कार्य दिनको लागि एक दिन तलबी घर बिदा

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन

II. प्रति वर्ष १२ दिनको तलबी बिरामी बिदा

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन

III. प्रसूति बिदाको लागि ६० दिनको तलबी बिदा वा १५ दिनको पितृत्व बिदा

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन ६. लागू हुँदैन

IV. १३ दिनको तलबी सार्वजनिक बिदा

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q12. Do you get paid for your accumulated leave when you leave your job (i.e. you get paid for your accumulated paid leave when you leave your job in lump sum)?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 49)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंले जागिर छोड्दा तपाईंको संचित बिदाको भुक्तानी पाउनुहुन्छ (अर्थात्, जब तपाईं जागिर छोड्नुहुन्छ तब तपाईंको संचित तलब बिदाको एकमुष्ट भुक्तानी पाउनुहुन्छ)?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q13. Does your employer provide annual medical insurance coverage of at least NPR

100,000, (paid by employer and employee)? (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 54)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंको रोजगारदाताले वार्षिक कम्तिमा रु. १००,००० को चिकित्सा बीमा कभरेज प्रदान गर्दछ,
(रोजगारदाता र कर्मचारीले 50/50 भुक्तानी)?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q14. Does your employer provide accidental insurance coverage of at least 700,000 by
employer? (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 55)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंको रोजगारदाताले तपाईंलाई कामको क्रममा हुने जुनसुकै प्रकारको दुर्घटनालाई समेट्ने
गरी कम्तीमा रु. ७,००,००० (सात लाख) बराबरको दुर्घटना बीमा गरिदिने गरेको छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

D. Working Hours & Overtime (Subscale 3)

Q15. Normal working hours per day (Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 7)

1. 8 hours or less 2. More than 8 hours

प्रति दिन काम गर्ने समय

१. ८ घण्टा वा कम २. ८ घण्टा भन्दा बढी

[8 hours or less =1 More than 8 hours =0]

Q16. How many days per week do you work (Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 7)

1. 6 Days or less 2. More than 6 days

तपाईं हप्तामा कति दिन काम गर्नुहुन्छ

१. ६ दिन वा कम २. ६ दिन भन्दा बढी

[6 Days or less=1 More than 6 days =0]

Q 17. Does the employer provide transportation service for female for work before sunrise or after sunset ? (Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 7)

1. Yes 2. No

के रोजगारदाताले महिलाहरूलाई सूर्योदय अघि वा सूर्यास्त पछि काममा जान यातायात सेवा प्रदान गर्दछ?

१. छ २. छैन

Q18. Are you paid additionally when you work overtime?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 7)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंले ओभरटाइम काम गर्दा अतिरिक्त पारिश्रमिक पाउनुहुन्छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

If Yes how Much / यदि हो भने कति

Q19. How often did you work more than 8 hours a day but did not get overtime payment?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 7)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंले प्रायः ८ घण्टाभन्दा बढी समय काम गर्दा पनि ओभरटाइमको भुक्तानी पाउनुहुन्न?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि

[Never=1 Rarely=0.75 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.25 Always =0]

E. Legal Compliance & Enforcement (Subscale 4)

Q20. Do you have a written employment contract or agreement?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 11)

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंसँग लिखित रोजगार सम्झौता छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes =1 No =0]

Q21. Do you know that, your employment relationship is considered established even if the employer hires you verbally (without a written contract)?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 12)

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंलाई थाहा छ, रोजगारदाताले मौखिक रूपमा (लिखित सम्झौता बिना) तपाईंलाई काममा राखे पनि तपाईंको रोजगार सम्बन्ध स्थापित मानिन्छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes =1 No =0]

Q22. Does a labor inspector or official from the Labour Office (Labour and Employment Office) visit your workplace to check on minimum wages, allowances, or other benefits?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 94(a) and (b))

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

न्यूनतम ज्याला, भत्ता वा अन्य सुविधा सम्बन्धी जाँचका लागि श्रम निरीक्षक वा श्रम तथा रोजगार कार्यालयका अधिकारीहरू तपाईंको कार्यस्थलमा आउँछन्?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीँ ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि आएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q23. Has Labour Office (Labour and Employment Office) provided training on labor standards, codes of conduct?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 94(c) and (d))

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के श्रम तथा रोजगार कार्यालयले तपाईंलाई श्रम मापदण्ड, आचारसंहिता सम्बन्धी तालिम दिएको छ?

Q20. Do you have a written employment contract or agreement?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 11)

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंसँग लिखित रोजगार सम्झौता छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes =1 No =0]

Q21. Do you know that, your employment relationship is considered established even if the employer hires you verbally (without a written contract)?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 12)

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंलाई थाहा छ, रोजगारदाताले मौखिक रूपमा (लिखित सम्झौता बिना) तपाईंलाई काममा राखे पनि तपाईंको रोजगार सम्बन्ध स्थापित मानिन्छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes =1 No =0]

Q22. Does a labor inspector or official from the Labour Office (Labour and Employment Office) visit your workplace to check on minimum wages, allowances, or other benefits?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Section 94(a) and (b))

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

न्यूनतम ज्याला, भत्ता वा अन्य सुविधा सम्बन्धी जाँचका लागि श्रम निरीक्षक वा श्रम तथा रोजगार कार्यालयका अधिकारीहरू तपाईंको कार्यस्थलमा आउँछन्?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीँ ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि आएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q23. Has Labour Office (Labour and Employment Office) provided training on labor standards, codes of conduct? (Labour Act, 2074 – Section 94(c) and (d))

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के श्रम तथा रोजगार कार्यालयले तपाईंलाई श्रम मापदण्ड, आचारसंहिता सम्बन्धी तालिम दिएको छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि छैन
[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q24. Do you know how and where to make a formal complaint about wages, working conditions, or safety at your workplace? (Labour Act, 2074)

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंलाई थाहा छ आफ्नो कार्यस्थलमा ज्याला, काम गर्ने अवस्था वा सुरक्षा सम्बन्धी औपचारिक गुनासो कहाँ र कसरी गर्न सकिन्छ?

१. छ २. छैन
[Yes =1 No =0]

Q25. Have you ever filed a complaint (to employer, labour inspector, union) about pay or conditions?

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंले कहिल्यै आफ्नो ज्याला वा काम गर्ने अवस्था सम्बन्धी गुनासो (रोजगारदातालाई, श्रम निरीक्षकलाई वा संघ/युनियनमा) दर्ता गर्नुभएको छ?

१. छ २. छैन
[Yes =1 No =0]

If yes, where / यदि हो भने, कहाँ दर्ता गर्नुभयो?

Q26. Were the complains resolved?

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never 6. N/A

के दर्ता गरिएका गुनासाहरू समाधान भए ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि छैन ६. लागु हुँदैन (N/A)
[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q27. Do you always feel protected from retaliation (punishment, dismissal) for raising labour-related complaints?

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never 6. N/A

के तपाईंले श्रम सम्बन्धी गुनासो उठाउँदा दण्ड, बर्खास्त वा अन्य प्रतिशोधबाट सधैं सुरक्षित महसुस गर्नुहुन्छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि छैन ६. लागु हुँदैन (N/A)

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

F. Economic Fairness & Equality (Subscale 5)

Q28. Do men and women doing the same work get the same pay here?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 2,Section 7)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के यहाँ एउटै काम गर्ने पुरुष र महिलालाई समान ज्याला दिइन्छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि पाएको छैन

[Never=0 Rarely=0.25 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.75 Always =1]

Q29. Have you personally experienced unfair treatment about pay or work at your work place ? (Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 2, Section 6)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंले आफ्नो कार्यस्थलमा ज्याला वा कामको सम्बन्धमा अन्यायपूर्ण व्यवहार अनुभव गर्नुभएको छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीं ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि छैन

[Never=1 Rarely=0.75 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.25 Always =0]

Q30. Do you know about your legal rights to equal pay and non-discrimination ?

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंलाई आफ्नो कानुनी अधिकारहरू (समान ज्याला पाउने र भेदभाव नहुने अधिकार) को बारेमा जानकारी छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes= 1 No =0]

G. Contractual Transparency & Terms of Employment (Subscale 6)

Q31. When you were hired, did your employer clearly explain how much you will be paid and the working days per week? (Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 3)

1. Yes 2. No

तपाईंलाई नियुक्त गर्दा, के रोजगारदाताले तपाईंलाई स्पष्ट रूपमा बताएको थियो कि तपाईंलाई कति ज्याला दिइनेछ र हप्तामा कति दिन काम गर्नुपर्छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes= 1 No =0]

Q32. Were you informed about your Economic rights (fair pay, working hours, overtime, social security)?

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंलाई आफ्नो आर्थिक अधिकारहरू (न्यायपूर्ण ज्याला, काम गर्ने घण्टा, ओभरटाइम, सामाजिक सुरक्षा) बारे जानकारी दिइएको छ ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes= 1 No =0]

Q33. Do you know about rules for ending employment (notice period/ termination)?

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंलाई रोजगारी अन्त्य गर्ने नियमहरू (सूचना अवधि/बर्खास्तको प्रक्रिया) बारे जानकारी छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes= 1 No =0]

Q34. Have you been asked to leave without proper notice?

(Labour Act, 2074 – Chapter 21, Section 144)

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never

के तपाईंलाई उचित सूचना नदिई कामबाट निस्कन भनिएको छ?

१. सधैं २. प्रायः ३. कहिलेकाहीँ ४. विरलै ५. कहिल्यै पनि छैन

[Never=1 Rarely=0.75 Sometimes= 0.5 Often= 0.25 Always =0]

H. Awareness & Capacity Building (Subscale 7)

Q35. Have you received any training on labour rights (wages, social security, safety) ?

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईंले श्रम अधिकार (ज्याला, सामाजिक सुरक्षा, सुरक्षा) सम्बन्धी कुनै तालिम पाउनुभएको छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes= 1 No =0]

Q36. Do you know where to go if your employer does not pay wages or follow the law?

1. Yes 2. No

यदि रोजगारदाताले ज्याला नदिए वा कानून पालना नगरे, तपाईंलाई कहाँ जाने थाहा छ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes= 1 No =0]

Q37. Would you like more information or training about wages, benefits, and your rights?

1. Yes 2. No

के तपाईं ज्याला, सुविधाहरू र आफ्नो अधिकारबारे थप जानकारी वा तालिम पाउन इच्छा छ ?

१. छ २. छैन

[Yes= 1 No =0]

Q38. Do you understand your legal rights for wages, working hours, overtime, and social security at work?

1. I have proper knowledge 2. I understand most 3. I understand some 4. I have no idea

के तपाईंलाई काममा ज्याला, काम गर्ने घण्टा, ओभरटाइम र सामाजिक सुरक्षा सम्बन्धी कानुनी अधिकारहरू थाहा छ?

१. मलाई उचित ज्ञान छ २. म धेरैजसो बुझ्छु ३. म केही बुझ्छु ४. मलाई थाहा छैन

[1=I have proper knowledge 0.75=I understand most 0.5=I understand some 0=I have no idea]

APPENDIX – B
QUESTIONS FOR KII

**KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW (KII) QUESTIONNAIRE FOR
EXPERT CONSULTATION**

Thesis Objective II:

To Identify and Analyse the Key Challenges and Gaps Affecting the Enforcement of Economic Rights of Labourers in the Construction Industry

PREAMBLE AND INTERVIEW INSTRUCTIONS

This Key Informant Interview (KII) guide has been designed to supplement and deepen quantitative survey findings (n=68 construction workers) collected in the field. The survey revealed alarming patterns of non-compliance with Nepal's Labour Act 2074, including near-universal absence of social security registration, systematic denial of leave entitlements, unpaid overtime, lack of written contracts, and 100% non-reporting of grievances.

The purpose of this KII is to obtain expert perspectives on the root causes of these findings, the institutional and structural gaps that permit such violations, and to generate evidence-based recommendations for policy reform — consistent with Nepal's international obligations under ILO Conventions and comparative practices from South Asia and beyond.

ESTIMATED DURATION: 60–90 minutes

FORMAT: Semi-structured. The interviewer will use the closed-ended options as anchors but should encourage expert elaboration on each topic.

CONFIDENTIALITY: Responses will be anonymized and used solely for academic thesis research.

RECORDING: Interview will be audio-recorded only with informed written consent.

RESPONDENT PROFILE (To be completed before interview)

Name (Optional)	
Designation / Title	
Organization / Institution	
Experienced Sector	Government / Private / NGO / Trade Union / Academia /Doner/ Other: ____
Years of Experience in Labour/Construction Domain	
Date of Interview	
Interview Mode	In-person / Phone / Video Call

SECTION I WAGES & PAYMENT PRACTICES

Challenges in wage determination, timeliness, and minimum wage enforcement

Survey Finding: 19% of surveyed workers earn below Nepal's legal minimum wage (NPR 754/day). Only 5.9% always receive wages on time; 44% rarely or never do. 57% never receive the legally mandated Dashain bonus. 93% have no formal procedure for wage determination — wages are set unilaterally by employers.

Q1. In your assessment, why do a significant proportion of construction workers continue to be paid below the legal minimum wage despite clear statutory provisions?

- (a) Weak or absent monitoring by the Department of Labour and Occupational Safety
- (b) Informal and sub-contracting chains dilute employer accountability
- (c) Workers' lack of awareness of their legal minimum wage entitlement
- (d) Inadequate penalties/sanctions that do not deter employers
- (e) Political patronage and collusion protecting contractor interests
- (f) All of the above
- (g) Other (specify below)

From your expertise, what is the single most critical cause?

Q2. The survey found only 5.9% of construction workers always receive wages within the legally mandated one-month period. What are the systemic causes of delayed wage payment in Nepal's construction sector?

- (a) Cascading payment delays from government/client to contractor to workers
- (b) Absence of written contracts means no legal benchmark for payment schedules
- (c) No digital payment infrastructure — cash-based payments are easily delayed/manipulated
- (d) Labour inspectors do not audit payroll records
- (e) Workers have no legal recourse for delayed payment without significant cost/risk
- (f) Multiple layers of sub-contracting that fragment financial accountability
- (g) Other (specify below)

What institutional reform could most directly address wage payment delays?

Q3. Nepal's Labour Act mandates a Dashain festival bonus equivalent to one month's basic salary. The survey found 57% of workers never receive it. What is the primary enforcement gap?

- (a) No mandatory reporting mechanism for bonus disbursement
- (b) Sub-contracted and daily-wage workers are excluded in practice
- (c) Labour inspectors rarely visit construction sites near festival periods
- (d) Employers exploit workers' lack of legal knowledge
- (e) Legal penalties for non-payment are too low to be deterrent
- (f) Other (specify below)

What specific enforcement mechanism do you recommend to ensure compliance with festival bonus obligations?

Q4. The survey found 93% of workers have no formal wage determination procedure — wages are set unilaterally. How should collective bargaining or minimum wage-setting mechanisms be strengthened for the construction sector?

- (a) Establish a sector-specific Wage Board for construction under the Labour Act
- (b) Mandate trade union representation in any construction project above a threshold value
- (c) Require project-level wage agreements to be filed with the Labour Office before work begins
- (d) Link public procurement contracts to wage compliance certificates

- (e) Introduce wage payment apps/digital disbursement with Labour Office oversight
- (f) Other (specify below)

Are there international models (e.g., India's Construction Workers Welfare Boards, UK's Gangmasters Licensing) that Nepal could adapt?

SECTION II SOCIAL SECURITY, PROVIDENT FUND & INSURANCE

Gaps in registration, contribution compliance, and benefit delivery

Survey Finding: 97% of workers are not registered with Nepal's Social Security Fund (SSF) or Provident Fund. 97% of employers never deposit the legally required 8.33% gratuity + 10% PF contributions. 78% never receive paid sick leave. 91% never receive home leave. 98.5% never receive paid public holidays.

Q5. With 97% non-registration in the SSF, what do you consider the most critical structural barrier to extending social security coverage to construction workers in Nepal?

- (a) The SSF's design is suited to formal/permanent employees, not mobile daily-wage workers
- (b) No employer ID verification system is linked to construction permits or project approvals
- (c) Workers fear that SSF deductions reduce their take-home pay and resist registration
- (d) The SSF has insufficient outreach, digital infrastructure, and multilingual support
- (e) Sub-contractors deliberately keep workforce informal to avoid SSF obligations
- (f) Government lacks the political will to enforce SSF compliance against powerful contractor lobbies
- (g) Other (specify below)

What policy instrument could achieve mass registration within 3–5 years?

Q6. Nepal's Labour Act requires employers to deposit 8.33% gratuity and 10% Provident Fund contributions. Given near-universal non-compliance in construction, what enforcement reforms are most urgent?

- (a) Mandatory digital payroll and SSF deduction reports linked to construction project tracking
- (b) Require SSF compliance certificates for all contract renewals and project bids
- (c) Third-party auditing of payroll records for all construction projects above NPR 5 million
- (d) Real-time SSF portal access for workers to verify contributions
- (e) Criminal liability (not just fines) for employers who withhold provident fund contributions
- (f) International aid/IFI-funded pilot programs to subsidize small contractor compliance
- (g) Other (specify below)

Which country's model for provident fund enforcement in construction do you find most applicable to Nepal?

Q7. The survey found 91% of workers never receive home leave and 98.5% never receive paid public holidays — near-total non-compliance with the Labour Act's paid leave provisions. What explains this?

- (a) Construction is by nature project-based; employers claim leaves are impractical on active sites
- (b) Workers themselves prefer cash-in-lieu, not understanding the value of leave entitlements
- (c) There is no monitoring mechanism for leave provision in informal construction contracts
- (d) Labour inspectors do not request leave records during inspections
- (e) Lack of written contracts makes leave entitlements entirely dependent on employer goodwill
- (f) Other (specify below)

Should Nepal introduce a mandatory paid-leave encashment system for construction workers? What would implementation look like?

Q8. What lessons from comparable South Asian or international contexts (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Singapore, ILO C167) are most relevant for improving social protection for construction workers in Nepal?

- (a) India's Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Act — cess-funded welfare boards
- (b) Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF) portable accounts for migrant construction workers
- (c) ILO Convention 102 — minimum social security standards ratification pathway
- (d) Bangladesh's industry-specific employer health insurance mandate
- (e) Sri Lanka's EPF/ETF mandatory contribution model extended to informal workers
- (f) Other (specify below)

Which reform do you believe would have the highest impact in the Nepali context, and why?

SECTION III WORKING HOURS & OVERTIME VIOLATIONS

Enforcement gaps in rest, overtime pay, and gendered protections

Survey Finding: 91% of workers regularly work more than 8 hours/day (legal maximum). 72% work more than 6 days/week. Only 23.5% always receive overtime pay — 22% never do. 60% often or sometimes work extended hours without any compensation. 100% of female workers report no transportation is provided for night or early morning shifts.

Q9. The survey reveals systematic violation of Nepal's 8-hour daily/48-hour weekly work limit in construction. What is the most effective enforcement mechanism in your view?

- (a) Mandatory electronic time-keeping systems at construction sites above a threshold size
- (b) Random unannounced labour inspections with authority to issue on-the-spot fines
- (c) Worker-reported digital grievance tools (SMS/IVR) that trigger automatic inspections
- (d) Linking working-hour compliance to contractor registration renewal
- (e) Industry-level collective agreements setting maximum hours and overtime rates

(f) Other (specify below)

In your experience, has any enforcement mechanism successfully reduced overtime violations in informal construction settings? Please describe.

Q10. 60% of workers in the survey are not compensated for overtime hours. Nepal's Labour Act requires double pay for overtime. What is the root cause of this systematic wage theft?

- (a) Workers are unaware of their right to overtime pay
- (b) Verbal-only contracts allow employers to deny agreed terms
- (c) No time-record documentation means workers cannot prove hours worked
- (d) Labour inspectors rarely check overtime payment records
- (e) Workers fear dismissal if they raise overtime payment claims
- (f) Other (specify below)

Should Nepal require project-level overtime payment reports to be submitted to the Labour Office monthly?

Q11. Nepal's Labour Act requires employers to provide transportation for female workers during shifts before 6 AM and after 8 PM. The survey found 100% non-compliance. What specific measures could enforce this?

- (a) Mandatory transportation allowance included in construction project budgets
- (b) Female labour inspector deployment to verify compliance on sites with female workers
- (c) Criminal penalty for employers who force female workers to commute during restricted hours without transport
- (d) Requirement to include transport provisions in any construction employment contract
- (e) Industry federation-level self-regulation with annual compliance reporting
- (f) Other (specify below)

What is the broader gender dimension of economic rights violations you observe in Nepal's construction sector?

SECTION IV LEGAL COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

Institutional failures, inspection capacity, and grievance accessibility

Survey Finding: 94% of workers have no written employment contract. 88% of workplaces have NEVER been visited by a labour inspector. 90% of workers have never received any training from the Labour Office. 90% do not know how to file a formal complaint. 100% of workers have never filed a complaint. Over 53% rarely or never feel protected from retaliation.

Q12. The survey found that 88% of construction workplaces have never been visited by a labour inspector. What is the primary institutional cause of this enforcement vacuum?

- (a) Severe shortage of labour inspectors relative to the number of active construction sites
- (b) Labour inspectors lack authority to access informal or sub-contracted worksites
- (c) Corruption and collusion — inspectors are bribed to overlook violations
- (d) Inspection mandate is risk-based and does not prioritize small/informal sites
- (e) Inspectors lack training and tools for construction-specific violations
- (f) Budget and logistics constraints — especially in remote/hilly areas
- (g) Other (specify below)

What inspector-to-worksite ratio would be adequate for Nepal? What is the current ratio approximately?

Q13. Nepal's Labour Act 2074 mandates written contracts for all workers. The survey found 94% of construction workers have no written contract. What institutional reforms would ensure contract compliance?

- (a) Make written contracts a prerequisite for issuance of construction permits
- (b) Introduce a standardized model construction employment contract approved by DOLS
- (c) Require contractors to submit worker registration lists to Labour Offices at project commencement
- (d) Allow verbal contracts to be enforceable only up to a threshold project size
- (e) Digital contract registration through a Government portal linked to contractor licensing
- (f) Other (specify below)

What do you see as the biggest obstacle to implementing written contracts in informal construction settings?

Q14. 100% of survey respondents have never filed a formal labour complaint. The literature identifies fear of retaliation, lack of awareness, and inaccessible grievance channels as key barriers. In Nepal's construction context, which is most critical?

- (a) Fear of immediate dismissal — most workers are in casual/daily-wage arrangements
- (b) Geographic inaccessibility of Labour Offices for migrant and remote workers
- (c) Language and literacy barriers to filing formal complaints
- (d) Perception that the system is corrupt and complaints will not be acted upon
- (e) No legal aid or free representation for workers who wish to complain
- (f) Absence of anonymous/digital reporting mechanisms
- (g) Other (specify below)

What anonymous, accessible grievance channel design would you recommend for construction workers in Nepal?

Q15. Nepal's Labour Act provides for a Labour Court and Collective Bargaining mechanisms. To what extent are these accessible to construction workers in practice?

- (a) Effectively inaccessible — costs, time, and complexity deter use by daily-wage workers
- (b) Accessible in principle but no legal aid support; workers cannot afford representation
- (c) Accessible only in major urban centres — rural workers have no practical access
- (d) Labour Court backlog means cases take 2–5 years — workers simply move on
- (e) Workers are unaware that the Labour Court exists
- (f) Other (specify below)

What is the average time-to-resolution for a wage dispute case in Labour Court? Is there data available on this?

Q16. How do you assess the overall effectiveness of Nepal's Department of Labour and Occupational Safety (DOLS) in enforcing economic rights specifically in the construction sector?

- (a) Very effective — adequate enforcement occurs in most cases
- (b) Moderately effective — major violations are addressed but minor ones persist
- (c) Minimally effective — enforcement is largely performative or limited to large formal employers
- (d) Ineffective — enforcement is absent in informal/sub-contracted construction
- (e) Counter-productive — enforcement activity deters formalization

What is the single most important institutional reform DOLS needs to meaningfully enforce economic rights in construction?

SECTION V ECONOMIC FAIRNESS, EQUALITY & DISCRIMINATION

Gender pay gaps, caste-based discrimination, and structural inequality

Survey Finding: 30.9% of respondents say women are rarely or never paid equally to men for similar work. 69% of workers have experienced some form of unfair treatment. 72% are unaware of their legal rights to equal pay and non-discrimination. The survey had only 8 female respondents, suggesting under-representation of female workers in the sample.

Q17. Nepal's Constitution (Article 34) and Labour Act guarantee equal pay for equal work without discrimination. In the construction sector, what are the primary drivers of wage inequality?

- (a) Gender-based wage discrimination — women routinely paid less for the same task
- (b) Caste-based discrimination — Dalit and marginalized workers receive lower wages
- (c) Ethnic/origin-based discrimination — workers from hill regions paid less in Terai and vice versa
- (d) Skill-level conflation — employers classify women and minorities as 'unskilled' to justify lower pay
- (e) Lack of standardized job classifications enabling discriminatory wage-setting
- (f) All of the above are significant
- (g) Other (specify below)

*Is there documented evidence of wage differentials by gender/caste in Nepal's construction sector?
What does the data show?*

Q18. Given that 72% of workers are unaware of their equal pay and non-discrimination rights, what strategies have proven effective in similar contexts to close the rights literacy gap?

- (a) On-site rights awareness sessions by Labour Office mobile teams during project start
- (b) Visual/pictorial rights posters in local languages at construction sites (mandatory display)
- (c) IVR/SMS-based rights information in Nepali and regional languages
- (d) Trade union-led worker education programs tied to membership
- (e) Integration of workers' rights into contractor orientation requirements
- (f) NGO-delivered community-level legal literacy programs
- (g) Other (specify below)

Which approach has the best evidence of impact among construction workers in South Asia?

Q19. How are female workers specifically disadvantaged in the enforcement of their economic rights in Nepal's construction sector, beyond wage inequality?

- (a) Disproportionately employed through sub-contractors, removing employer accountability
- (b) Sexual harassment deters rights-claiming and formal complaint filing
- (c) Maternity leave non-provision leads to dismissal or forced resignation before or after childbirth
- (d) No separate welfare or rest facilities, making continued employment difficult
- (e) Lower unionization rates among female construction workers
- (f) Other (specify below)

What specific recommendations would you make for a gender-responsive enforcement framework in Nepal's construction sector?

SECTION VI CONTRACTUAL TRANSPARENCY & TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT

Information asymmetry, termination rights, and sub-contracting opacity

Survey Finding: 85% of workers were never informed of their economic rights (fair pay, overtime, social security) at hiring. 91% are unaware of job termination and notice period rules. 60% have been dismissed without proper notice at some point. 79% were told basic pay and working days — but comprehensive rights disclosure is near-absent.

Q20. The survey found that even when employers communicate basic pay and working days, 85% do not disclose full economic rights (overtime, SSF, leave). What regulatory instrument would best close this information asymmetry?

- (a) Mandatory worker rights information form to be signed at hiring for all construction workers
- (b) Digital onboarding platform where employers register workers and auto-generate rights disclosures

- (c) Labour Office posting requirements — physical rights notice at every active construction site
- (d) Penalties for employers who fail to disclose rights to workers at hiring
- (e) Standardized hiring kit developed by DOLS to be distributed through contractor associations (f) Other (specify below)

How can rights disclosure be made practical and meaningful in settings with high worker illiteracy?

Q21. 60% of workers have been dismissed without proper notice. Nepal's Labour Act prescribes specific notice periods. What is the key enforcement gap for notice period compliance?

- (a) Workers are unaware they are entitled to notice pay and cannot claim it
- (b) Informal employment status means no legally recognized employment relationship exists to trigger notice rights
- (c) No employer obligation to document the reason for or timing of dismissal
- (d) Labour Courts are inaccessible for challenging wrongful or sudden dismissal
- (e) No whistleblower protection prevents workers from reporting sudden dismissals
- (f) Other (specify below)

Should Nepal introduce a mandatory severance fund for construction workers, funded by employer contributions? Please elaborate.

Q22. Sub-contracting is pervasive in Nepal's construction sector. How does it create gaps in the enforcement of economic rights?

- (a) It fragments the employment chain, obscuring who is the 'real' employer responsible for rights
- (b) Sub-contractors are often unregistered micro-enterprises with no capacity for compliance
- (c) It enables project promoters/main contractors to disclaim liability for wage and SSF violations
- (d) It creates jurisdictional confusion between labour inspectors and project oversight bodies (e) Workers in multi-tier sub-contracting have no relationship with any entity they can hold legally accountable
- (f) Other (specify below)

Should Nepal introduce joint and several liability for principal contractors for labour law violations by their sub-contractors, as in several EU and ASEAN countries?

SECTION VII AWARENESS, CAPACITY BUILDING & INSTITUTIONAL OUTREACH

Worker education, employer capacity, and government outreach effectiveness

Survey Finding: 97% of workers have received no labour rights training. 95.6% do not know where to go if their employer fails to pay wages. 92.6% actively want more information/training

on their rights. 51.5% have no idea about their legal rights. Only 4.4% feel they understand most or all of their rights.

Q23. 97% of construction workers have received no labour rights training. Despite 92.6% actively wanting this training, it is not reaching them. What is the most critical barrier to delivery?

- (a) No government agency has a budget or mandate for construction-sector rights training
- (b) Workers are geographically dispersed across project sites — no single delivery point
- (c) Training materials are in Nepali only and inaccessible to minority language workers
- (d) Employers restrict workers' access to outside organizations including NGOs and unions
- (e) Training is available at Labour Offices but workers cannot leave sites to attend
- (f) Other (specify below)

What is the most cost-effective, scalable model for delivering rights awareness to construction workers in Nepal's context?

Q24. 95.6% of workers do not know where to go if their employer fails to pay wages. This makes the legal right to wage recovery meaningless in practice. What immediate intervention would be most effective?

- (a) A free, toll-free construction worker helpline operated by DOLS with multilingual support
- (b) Mobile Labour Office camps deployed to major construction sites monthly
- (c) Community-based paralegal networks trained to assist construction workers
- (d) Simple visual/audio rights posters at all Labour Offices and construction sites
- (e) Worker rights information via construction permit notifications sent to project sites
- (f) Integration with existing government social service platforms (e.g., local government offices) (g) Other (specify below)

Are there existing helplines or complaint mechanisms for construction workers in Nepal? How are they performing?

Q25. Employers — especially small contractors and sub-contractors — are often themselves unaware of their legal obligations. How should employer capacity building be addressed?

- (a) Mandatory labour law orientation for contractor registration and renewal
- (b) Simplified compliance checklists developed by DOLS for small contractors
- (c) Sector-level employer associations (FCAN, CAAN) required to conduct annual compliance workshops
- (d) A grace period combined with amnesty for employers who register workers retroactively
- (e) Tax incentives for SSF-compliant employers
- (f) Other (specify below)

Should employer compliance with labour law be made a condition of obtaining public construction contracts in Nepal?

Q26. Nepal has ratified several ILO conventions. How effectively are these international obligations translated into domestic enforcement practice in the construction sector?

- (a) Poorly — ratification is symbolic; domestic enforcement mechanisms are not aligned
- (b) Partially — some provisions are reflected in the Labour Act but implementation is weak
- (c) Moderately — compliance occurs in large formal projects with international funding
- (d) Well — Nepal has a functional compliance infrastructure, problems are implementation only
- (e) Not assessed — no systematic ILO Convention compliance review for the construction sector

Which ILO Conventions, if prioritized, would most strengthen economic rights enforcement in Nepal's construction sector? (e.g., C029, C087, C098, C100, C131, C167)

SECTION VIII POLICY GAPS, REFORMS & STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Expert-level recommendations for systemic change

This final section is open-ended and seeks expert synthesis. These questions will directly inform policy recommendations in the thesis.

Q27. From your expert perspective, which of the following represents the single most critical gap in the enforcement of economic rights of construction workers in Nepal?

- (a) Legal gap — inadequate or unenforced labour legislation specific to the construction sector
- (b) Institutional gap — insufficient capacity, independence, and resources of DOLS/Labour Offices
- (c) Information gap — workers and employers both lack knowledge of rights and obligations
- (d) Structural gap — informality, sub-contracting, and casualization fundamentally undermine enforcement
- (e) Political gap — lack of political will and powerful contractor lobbies block reform
- (f) Financial gap — workers cannot afford legal representation; no legal aid for labour cases
- (g) All gaps are equally significant and require simultaneous reform

Please explain your selection and what addressing this gap would require in practical terms.

Q28. Several countries have introduced sector-specific legislation for construction workers (India's BOCW Act, Singapore's Employment of Foreign Workers legislation, UK's Construction Industry Scheme). Would Nepal benefit from a dedicated Construction Workers' Rights Act?

- (a) Yes — the existing Labour Act is too generic; a sector-specific law is essential
- (b) Yes — but only if accompanied by a funded enforcement agency and welfare board
- (c) Partial — targeted regulations under the existing Labour Act would suffice without a new law
- (d) No — the Labour Act is adequate; implementation not legislation is the problem
- (e) No — a new law would take years and distract from enforcing existing provisions
- (f) Other (specify below)

If Nepal were to draft a sector-specific law, what three provisions would you prioritize?

Q29. What is your assessment of the role of trade unions in protecting the economic rights of construction workers in Nepal? What structural reforms are needed?

- (a) Unions are largely absent from construction worksites and have minimal impact
- (b) Unions focus on political affiliation rather than workplace rights enforcement
- (c) Union access to construction sites is restricted by employers and not protected by law
- (d) Unions lack technical capacity to negotiate sector-specific collective agreements
- (e) Fragmentation among multiple unions weakens collective bargaining
- (f) Unions have the potential but need legal reform to gain meaningful site access
- (g) Other (specify below)

What model of worker representation (trade unions, worker committees, worker cooperatives) would best serve the interests of informal construction workers in Nepal?

Q30. Given the findings from the survey (near-universal violations across wages, SSF, leave, contracts, and grievance mechanisms), what should be the government's three highest priority reforms in the next two years?

- (a) Mandatory SSF registration linked to construction permit issuance
- (b) Dramatically increase labour inspector numbers and deploy them to construction sites
- (c) Establish a free Labour Rights Helpline and mobile Labour Office camps for construction
- (d) Enforce written contracts as a pre-condition for contractor licensing
- (e) Create a Construction Workers' Welfare Fund (cess-based) for social protection
- (f) Launch a national awareness campaign on construction workers' economic rights
- (g) Introduce joint liability for principal contractors for sub-contractor violations

Please rank your top three and explain the sequencing rationale.

CLOSING QUESTION — Open-ended

Q31. Based on your experience and expertise, what is the one thing about the enforcement of economic rights of construction workers in Nepal that is most commonly misunderstood or overlooked — by policymakers, researchers, or the public — and what would you most want to see reflected in this thesis?

APPENDIX -C

DATA ANALYSIS TABLE FOR OBJECTIVE 1

t-test for Equality of Means						
		N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Two-Sided p	t
wage payment practices	Government Project	34.000	10.4118	1.95500	0.083	-1.762
	Doner Funded Project	34.000	11.3824	2.54670		

1. Wage & Payment Practices (Subscale 1)

SN	Questions	Options	In which type of project are you working currently?			Chi - Square	Pvalue (Sig.)
			Government Project	Doner Funded Project	Total		
1	What is your average monthly income ? (min Rs 754 daily)	Below the Minimum Wage	4	9	13	2.378	0.123
		Minimum Wage or Above Minimum Wage	30	25	55		
2	How Often do you receive your monthly salary / wage in time ? (i.e not later than one month)	Never — I do not receive my salary within one month.	3	7	10	8.8	.066 ^a
		Rarely — I receive my salary within one month	6	14	20		
		Sometimes — I receive my salary within one month	12	6	18		
		Often — I receive my salary within one month	10	6	16		
		Always — I receive my salary within one month	3	1	4		
3	Is the amount you are paid equal to what was promised when you were hired?	Always	14	18	32	6.146	.189 ^{a,b}
		Often	14	11	25		
		Sometimes	3	0	3		
		Rarely	2	5	7		
		Never	1	0	1		
4	Do you receive festival expenses (Dashain kharcha) equal to	Yes, full amount annually	2	0	2	4.783	.443 ^{a,b}
		Mostly full amount	1	0	1		
		Partial amount	3	6	9		

one month's basic remuneration each year (or proportional if less than one	Rarely receive	4	2	6		
	Never receive	19	20	39		
	N/A	5	6	11		

2.Social Security ,Paid Leave and Insurance (Subscale 2)

SN	Questions	Options	Government Project	Doner Funded Project	Total	Chi - Square	Pvalue (Sig.)
1	Are you registered for Social Security Fund (SSF) or Provident Fund by your employer?	Yes	2	0	2	2.06	.151 ^{a,b}
		No	32	34	66		
2	Does your employer deposit 8.33% of your basic salary in gratuity and 10% additional for Provident fund (or 21% of basic salary in case of SSF) by employer ?	Always	1	0	1	2.061	.357 ^{a,b}
		Often	1	0	1		
		Sometimes	0	0	0		
		Rarely	0	0	0		
		Never	32	34	66		
3	Does your employer deposit money in your provident fund / SSF ?	Always	1	0	1	2.061	.357 ^{a,b}
		Often	1	0	1		
		Sometimes	0	0	0		
		Rarely	0	0	0		
		Never	32	34	66		
4	Does your employer provide paid sick leave when you are injured/ill?	Always	32	34	1	7.328	.120 ^{a,b}
		Often	1	0	1		
		Sometimes	6	2	8		
		Rarely	4	1	5		
		Never	22	31	53		
5	Paid Home Leave for every 20 working days	Always	0	0	0	6.581	.037 ^{a,*}
		Often	0	0	0		
		Sometimes	3	0	0		
		Rarely	3	0	1		
		Never	28	34	67		

6	12 days of paid sick leave per year	Always	0	0	0	3.143	.208 ^{a,b}
		Often	0	0	0		
		Sometimes	3	0	0		
		Rarely	1	1	1		
		Never	30	33	67		
7	60 days paid leave for maternity leave or 15 Days paternity leave	Always	0	0	0	3.580	.167 ^{a,b}
		Often	0	1	0		
		Sometimes	0	0	0		
		Rarely	0	0	1		
		Never	10	16	67		
		N/A	24	17			
8	13 days paid public leave	Always	0	0	0	1.015	.314 ^{a,b}
		Often	0	0	0		
		Sometimes	1	0	0		
		Rarely	0	0	1		
		Never	33	34	67		
9	Do you get paid for your accumulated leave when you leave your job (i.e. you get paid for your accumulated paid leave when you leave your job in lump sum)?	Always	0	0	0	1.015	.314 ^{a,b}
		Often	0	0	0		
		Sometimes	0	0	0		
		Rarely	1	0	1		
		Never	33	34	67		
10	Does your employer provide annual medical insurance coverage of at least NPR 100,000, (paid by employer and employee)?	Always	1	0	1	13.218	.004 ^{a,b,*}
		Often	0	0	0		
		Sometimes	5	0	5		
		Rarely	10	3	13		
		Never	18	31	49		
11	Does your employer provide accidental insurance coverage of at	Always	1	1	2	7.860	.097 ^{a,b}
		Often	4	6	10		
		Sometimes	10	8	18		
		Rarely	11	3	14		
		Never	8	16	24		

least NPR 700,000, fully paid by the employer, as required by law?						
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Social Security Paid Leave and Insurance (Group Statistics)

t-test for Equality of Means						
		N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Two-Sided p	t
social security paid leave insurance	Government Project	34.000	48.9118	4.40638	0.014	-2.522
	Doner Funded Project	34.000	50.9412	1.61323		

3.Working Hours & Overtime (Subscale 3)

SN	Questions	Options	Government Project	Doner Funded Project	Total	Chi - Square	Pvalue (Sig.)
1	What is your normal working hours per day?	8 hours or less	3	3	6	0	1.00 ^a
		More than 8 hours	31	31	62		
2	How many days a week you work ?	6 Days or less	13	6	19	3.578	0.059
		More than 6 days	21	28	49		
3	Are you paid additionally when you work overtime?	Always	8	8	16	5.929	0.204
		Often	10	4	14		
		Sometimes	6	6	12		
		Rarely	6	5	11		
		Never	4	11	15		
4	How often did you work more than 8 hours a day but did not get overtime payment?	Never	10	2	12	8.573	.073 ^a
		Rarely	4	6	10		
		Sometimes	6	10	16		
		Often	13	12	25		
		Always	1	4	5		

Working hour and Overtime (Group Statistics)

t-test for Equality of Means						
		N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Two-Sided p	t
Working hour and Overtime	Government Project	34.000	8.9118	2.32728	0.014	-2.531
	Doner Funded Project	34.000	10.2353	1.97037		

4. Legal Compliance & Enforcement (Subscale 4)

SN	Questions	Options	Government Project	Doner Funded Project	Total	Chi - Square	Pvalue (Sig.)
1	Do you have a written employment contract or agreement?	Yes	3	1	4	1.063	.303 ^a
		No	31	33	64		
2	Do you know that, your employment relationship is considered established even if the employer hires you verbally (without a written contract)?	Yes	6	10	16	1.308	0.253
		No	28	24	52		
3	Does a labor inspector or official from the Labour Office (Labour and Employment Office) visit your workplace to check on minimum wages, allowances, or other benefits?	Always	0	0	0	6.267	0.99 ^{a,b}
		Often	0	1	1		
		Sometimes	1	1	2		
		Rarely	5	0	5		
		Never	28	32	60		
4	Do you know how and where to make a formal complaint about wages,	Yes	5	2	7	1.433	.231 ^a
		No	29	32	61		
5	Do you feel protected from retaliation (punishment,	Always	2	6	8	7.365	0.118 ^a
		Often	3	8	11		
		Sometimes	8	5	13		
		Rarely	14	7	21		

	dismissal) for raising labour-related complaints?	Never	7	8	15		
6	Has Labour Office (Labour and Employment Office) provided training on labor standards, codes of conduct?	Always	0	0	0	2.216	0.33 ^{a,b}
		Often	0	0	0		
		Sometimes	0	2	2		
		Rarely	3	2	5		
		Never	31	30	61		

Legal Compliance and Enforcement (Group Statistics)

t-test for Equality of Means						
		N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Two-Sided p	t
Legal compliance and Enforcement	Government Project	34.000	18.9118	1.60242	0.237	1.194
	Doner Funded Project	34.000	18.3824	2.03030		

5.Economic Fairness & Equality (Subscale 5)

SN	Questions	Options	Government Project	Doner Funded Project	Total	Chi - Square	Pvalue (Sig.)
1	Do men and women doing the same work get the same pay here?	Always	5	11	16	21.023	<.001 ^{*,b}
		Often	9	8	17		
		Sometimes	11	3	14		
		Rarely	7	0	7		
		Never	2	12	14		
2	Have you personally experienced unfair treatment about pay or work at your work place ?	Never	12	9	16	8.151	.043 ^{*,b}
		Rarely	14	7	17		
		Sometimes	7	11	14		
		Often	1	7	7		
		Always	0	0	14		
3	Do you know about your legal rights to equal pay and	Yes	7	12	19	1.826	0.177
		No	27	22	49		

	non-discrimination ?						
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Economic Fairness and Equality (Group Statistics)

t-test for Equality of Means						
		N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Two-Sided p	t
Economic fairness and Equality	Government Project	34.000	6.4706	1.70978	0.373	-0.898
	Doner Funded Project	34.000	6.9412	2.53391		

6.Contractual Transparency & Terms of Employment (Subscale 6)

SN	Questions	Options	Government Project	Doner Funded Project	Total	Chi - Square	Pvalue (Sig.)
1	When you were hired, did your employer clearly explain how much you will be paid and the working days	Yes	23	31	54	5.757	.016*
		No	11	3	14		
2	per week? Were you informed about your Economic rights (fair pay, working	Yes	5	5	10	0	1.00 ^b
		No	29	29	58		
3	Do you know about the rules for ending your job, including notice period	Yes	3	3	6	0	1.00 ^b
		No	31	31	62		
4	Have you ever been asked to leave without proper notice?	Never	17	10	27	3.344	.342 ^b
		Rarely	6	10	16		
		Sometimes	7	10	17		
		Often	4	4	8		
		Always	0	0	0		

Contractual Transparency and terms of employment (Group Statistics)

t-test for Equality of Means						
		N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Two- Sided p	t
Contractual transparency and term of employment	Government Project	34.000	7.0294	1.33678	0.849	- 0.192
	Doner Funded Project	34.000	7.0882	1.19005		

7.Awareness & Capacity Building (Subscale 7)

SN	Questions	Options	Government Project	Doner Funded Project	Total	Chi - Square	Pvalue (Sig.)
1	Have you received any training on labour rights (wages, social security, safety) ?	Yes	1	1	2	0	1.00 ^{a,b}
		No	33	33	66		
2	Do you know where to go if your employer does not pay wages or follow the law?	Yes	3	0	3	3.138	.076 ^a
		No	31	34	65		
3	Would you like more information or training about wages, benefits, and your rights?	Yes	29	34	63	5.397	.020 ^{*,b}
		No	5	0	5		
4	Do you understand your legal	I have proper knowledge	3	0	3	18.4	<.001 ^{*,b,c}
		I understand most	2	0	2		

rights for wages, working hours, overtime, and social security at work?	I understand some	20	8	28		
	I have no idea	9	26	35		

Awareness and Building Capacity (Group Statistics)

t-test for Equality of Means						
		N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Two-Sided p	t
Awareness and building Capacity	Government Project	34.000	8.0588	1.12657	0.002	-
	Doner Funded Project	34.000	8.7353	0.44781		

APPENDIX – D

OVERALL COMPLIANCE OF LABOUR RIGHT

Construction Worker Survey – Demographic Profile (n=68)

1. Gender of Respondent		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Male	60	88.2%
Female	8	11.8%
2. Occupation (Consolidated)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Labour / Mistri (combined)	57	83.8%
Farmer + Labour (combined)	5	7.4%
Welder	1	1.5%
Tailor + Labour	1	1.5%
Construction Lab Technician	1	1.5%
Excavator Operator	1	1.5%
Rigger	1	1.5%
Other/Mixed	1	1.5%
3. Age (Summary Statistics)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Mean Age	32	-
Median Age	30	-
Mode	32	-
Std. Deviation	10	-

4. Place of Origin (Major Regions)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Jajarkot (incl. Shivalaya sub-areas)	18	26.5%
Butwal / Rupandehi	11	16.2%
Bardiya	9	13.2%
Rukum West	6	8.8%
Makawanpur	4	5.9%
Dang	4	5.9%
Panchthar	3	4.4%
Lalitpur	3	4.4%
Other Districts(Nuwakot, Udaypur, Saptari-2 Ramechhap,Udaypur,Sunsari, Arghakhanchi -1)	10	14.7%
5. Current Working Location (Consolidated)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Butwal	19	27.9%
Jajarkot	22	32.4%
Kathmandu	15	22.1%
Rukum West	12	17.6%

6. Type of Project		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Government Project	34	50.0%
Donor Funded Project	34	50.0%
7. Education Level		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Secondary (Grade 6–10)	29	42.7%
Primary (Grade 1–5)	13	19.1%
Higher Secondary (Grade 11–12)	13	19.1%
No Formal Education	11	16.2%
College or Above	2	2.9%
8. Type of Worker		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Unskilled	29	42.7%
Skilled	22	32.4%
Semiskilled	17	25.0%
9. Years of Experience in Construction		

Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
5–10 years	24	35.3%
1–5 years	17	25.0%
10–20 years	14	20.6%
Less than 1 year	7	10.3%
More than 20 years	6	8.8%
10. Affiliation with Labour Union		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Not affiliated (No)	65	95.6%
Affiliated (Yes)	3	4.4%
11. Household Economic Role		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Shared responsibility	38	55.9%
Sole earner	30	44.1%

**Construction Worker Survey – Wages & Payment Practices
(n=68)**

1. Average Monthly Income		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Minimum Wage or Above (\geq NPR 754/day)	55	80.9%
Below Minimum Wage ($<$ NPR 754/day)	13	19.1%
2. Salary Paid Within One Month (Timeliness)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Rarely receive salary within one month	20	29.4%
Sometimes receive salary within one month	18	26.5%
Often receive salary within one month	16	23.5%
Never receive salary within one month	10	14.7%
Always receive salary within one month	4	5.9%
3. Wages Equal to Amount Promised at Hiring		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Always matches promised amount	32	47.1%
Often matches promised amount	25	36.8%
Rarely matches promised amount	7	10.3%
Sometimes matches promised amount	3	4.4%
Never matches promised amount	1	1.5%
4. Dashain Festival Bonus (One Month Basic Salary)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never receive Dashain bonus	39	57.4%

Not Applicable (N/A)	11	16.2%
Receive partial amount	9	13.2%
Rarely receive Dashain bonus	6	8.8%
Yes, full amount annually	2	2.9%
Mostly full amount	1	1.5%
5. Wage Determination Procedure		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
No formal procedure (None)	63	92.7%
Forming a Committee	0	0.0%
Submitting claims	4	5.9%
Negotiation and agreement	1	1.5%
Involvement of Trade union and employers association	0	0.0%

Construction Worker Survey – Social Security & Insurance (n=68)

1. Registered for SSF / Provident Fund		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Not registered (No)	66	97.1%
Registered (Yes)	2	2.9%
2. Employer Deposits Gratuity/PF Contributions		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never deposits (Never)	66	97.1%
Always deposits (Always)	1	1.5%
Often deposits (Often)	1	1.5%
3. Employer Deposits SSF/PF for Workers		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never deposits (Never)	66	97.1%
Always deposits (Always)	1	1.5%
Often deposits (Often)	1	1.5%
4. Paid Sick Leave When Injured/III		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never provided (Never)	53	77.9%
Sometimes provided	8	11.8%
Rarely provided	5	7.4%
Often provided (Often)	1	1.5%
Always provided (Always)	1	1.5%
5. Annual Medical Insurance (≥ NPR 100,000)		

Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never provided (Never)	49	72.1%
Rarely provided	13	19.1%
Sometimes provided	5	7.4%
Always provided (Always)	1	1.5%
6. Accidental Insurance (\geq NPR 700,000, legally required)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never provided (Never)	24	35.3%
Sometimes provided	18	26.5%
Rarely provided	14	20.6%
Often provided (Often)	10	14.7%
Always provided (Always)	2	2.9%
7. Paid Home Leave (1 day per 20 working days)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never provided (Never)	62	91.2%
Rarely provided	3	4.4%
Sometimes provided	3	4.4%
8. Paid Sick Leave (12 days per year)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never provided (Never)	63	92.7%
Sometimes provided	3	4.4%
Rarely provided	2	2.9%
9. Maternity/Paternity Leave		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Not Applicable (N/A)	41	60.3%
Never provided (Never)	26	38.2%
Often provided (Often)	1	1.5%
10. Paid Public Leave (13 days/year)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never provided (Never)	67	98.5%
Sometimes provided	1	1.5%
11. Payment for Accumulated Leave on Job Exit		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never paid out (Never)	67	98.5%
Rarely paid out	1	1.5%

Construction Worker Survey – Working Hours & Overtime (n=68)

1. Normal Working Hours Per Day		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
More than 8 hours	62	91.2%
8 hours or less	6	8.8%
2. Working Days Per Week		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
More than 6 days	49	72.1%
6 days or less	19	27.9%
3. Overtime Payment		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Always paid overtime	16	23.5%
Never paid overtime	15	22.1%
Often paid overtime	14	20.6%
Sometimes paid overtime	12	17.7%
Rarely paid overtime	11	16.2%
4. Worked 8+ Hours Without Overtime Payment (Frequency)		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Often worked unpaid overtime	25	36.8%
Sometimes worked unpaid overtime	16	23.5%
Never worked unpaid overtime	12	17.7%
Rarely worked unpaid overtime	10	14.7%
Always worked unpaid overtime	5	7.4%
5. Transportation for Female Workers (Night/Early Shift)		
Response Option	Count (n=8, Only Female)	Percentage
Not provided (No) — all 8 female respondents	8	100.0%

Construction Worker Survey – Legal Compliance and Enforcement (n=68)

1. Written Employment Contract		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
No written contract	64	94.1%
Has written contract (Yes)	4	5.9%
2. Awareness: Verbal Hire = Legal Employment		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Not aware (No)	52	76.5%

Aware (Yes)	16	23.5%
3. Labour Inspector Visits Workplace		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never visits (Never)	60	88.2%
Rarely visits	5	7.4%
Sometimes visits	2	2.9%
Often visits (Often)	1	1.5%
4. Labour Office Training on Rights/Standards		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never received training (Never)	61	89.7%
Rarely received training	5	7.4%
Sometimes received training	2	2.9%
5. Know How/Where to File a Formal Complaint		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Does not know (No)	61	89.7%
Knows (Yes)	7	10.3%
6. Ever Filed a Complaint About Pay or Conditions		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never filed a complaint (No)	68	100.0%
7. Feel Protected from Retaliation for Complaining		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Rarely feel protected	21	30.9%
Never feel protected	15	22.1%
Sometimes feel protected	13	19.1%
Often feel protected	11	16.2%
Always feel protected	8	11.8%

Construction Worker Survey – Economic Fairness & Equality(n=68)

1. Equal Pay for Men and Women		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Often equal pay (Often)	17	25.0%
Always equal pay (Always)	16	23.5%
Sometimes equal pay	14	20.6%
Never equal pay (Never)	14	20.6%
Rarely equal pay	7	10.3%

2. Personally Experienced Unfair Treatment at Work		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never experienced unfair treatment	21	30.9%
Rarely experienced unfair treatment	21	30.9%
Sometimes experienced unfair treatment	18	26.5%
Often experienced unfair treatment	8	11.8%
3. Know Legal Rights to Equal Pay & Non-Discrimination		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Not aware of rights (No)	49	72.1%
Aware of rights (Yes)	19	27.9%

Construction Worker Survey – Contractual Transparency & Terms of Employment (n=68)

1. Informed of Termination/Notice Period Rules		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Employer explained pay & working days at hiring (Yes)	54	79.4%
Not explained (No)	14	20.6%
2. Informed of Economic Rights at Hiring		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Not informed of economic rights (No)	58	85.3%
Informed of economic rights (Yes)	10	14.7%
3. Know Termination/Notice Period Rules		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Does not know termination rules (No)	62	91.2%
Knows termination rules (Yes)	6	8.8%
4. Ever Asked to Leave Without Proper Notice		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Never dismissed without notice	27	39.7%
Sometimes dismissed without notice	17	25.0%
Rarely dismissed without notice	16	23.5%
Often dismissed without notice	8	11.8%

Construction Worker Survey – Awareness & Capacity Building (n=68)

1. Received Labour Rights Training		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
No training received (No)	66	97.1%
Training received (Yes)	2	2.9%
2. Know Where to Go for Wage Non-Payment		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Does not know (No)	65	95.6%
Knows (Yes)	3	4.4%
3. Want More Information/Training on Rights		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
Yes, want more information/training	63	92.7%
No, do not want (No)	5	7.4%
4. Self-Assessed Understanding of Legal Rights		
Response Option	Count (n=68)	Percentage
No idea about legal rights	35	51.5%
Understand some rights	28	41.2%
Understand most rights	2	2.9%
Have proper knowledge of rights	3	4.4%

APPENDIX -E

PLAGRISM CHECK OF THE THESIS REPORT



Similarity Report ID: oid:3117:584570511

PAPER NAME

An Assessment on Economic Rights of Labour in Construction Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Donor-Funded and Government-Funded Building Projects

AUTHOR

Sushil Dhungana

WORD COUNT

33830 Words

CHARACTER COUNT

206998 Characters

PAGE COUNT

141 Pages

FILE SIZE

3.6MB

SUBMISSION DATE

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APPENDIX -F

18TH IOE GRADUATE CONFERENCE ACCEPTANCE MAIL

30/04/2026, 13:09

Pulchowk Campus, Institute of Engineering, Tribhuvan University Mail - [IOEGC18] Editor Decision



SUSHIL DHUNGANA <080mscom023.sushil@pcampus.edu.np>

[IOEGC18] Editor Decision

1 message

Dr. Pradeep Shrestha <ioegc17@gmail.com>

Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 8:38 AM

To: Sushil Dhungana <080mscom023.sushil@pcampus.edu.np>

Sushil Dhungana:

We have reached a decision regarding your submission to 18th IOE Graduate Conference, "An Assessment on Economic Rights of Labour in Construction Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Donor-Funded and Government Funded Buildings Projects".

Our decision is to: Accept Submission

With Warm Regards,
IOEGC-18 Editorial Team

