

**LORD KRISHNA AS A DECONSTRUCTIONIST TEACHER IN THE
BHAGAVADGITA**



A Dissertation

Submitted to

Nepal Sanskrit University

for the Fulfillment of the Requirement

for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Education

By

Hari Chandra Kamali

Reg. No. 23/2017

Nepal Sanskrit University

Nepal

August 2021

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RECOMMENDATION FOR FINAL EVALUATION

This is to recommend that this dissertation entitled "Lord Krishna as a Deconstructionist Teacher in the Bhagavadgita" undertaken by Hari Chandra Kamali, a PhD candidate at Nepal Sanskrit University, is complete. So I would like to recommend it for the Final Evaluation.

As the Supervisor for this project, I guided the researcher from the beginning and supervised the developments in the dissertation. As the researcher has ventured into the exploration of latest developments in philosophy of education and pedagogy, I appreciate his interest in innovation in education and his devotion to the work. I am sure that this dissertation will contribute significantly to developments in pedagogical practices and quality in education at both national and international levels. I express my special thanks to him for recontextualizing the message of the Bhagavadgita in the postmodern context.

.....

Prof. Dr. Govinda Raj Bhattarai

Supervisor

Nepal Sanskrit University

Kathmandu, Nepal

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.....

Prof. Dr. Krishna Chandra Sharma
Subject Expert

Nepal Sanskrit University

Kathmandu, Nepal

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.....
Prof. Dr. Amodavardhana Kaundinyayan
Subject Expert

Nepal Sanskrit University
Kathmandu, Nepal

DECLARATION

This is to declare that this dissertation entitled "Lord Krishna as a Deconstructionist Teacher in the Bhagavadgita" carried out under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Govinda Raj Bhattarai, and Subject Experts Prof. Dr. Krishna Chandra Sharma and Prof. Dr. Amodavardhana Kaundinyayan, is original; none of its parts was published previously. If this dissertation is proved to have violated any research ethics under the university, I shall be liable for the lawsuit.

.....

Hari Chandra Kamali

PhD Research Candidate

Reg. No. 23/2017

Nepal Sanskrit University

Nepal

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ABSTRACT

The Bhagavadgita, simply known as the Gita, is a widely-read text among the seekers of truth. When I first went through it, I realized its profoundness that no knowledge discovered until now can go beyond it. As a teacher educator, in my subsequent readings I paid attention to how Lord Krishna has taught Arjuna in the Gita. After some readings I had a hypothesis that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita. This laid a foundation for this project. As this study came to a conclusion, the report has been organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 consists of the fundamental concepts to set background to this study. So it introduces the Gita; presents Lord Krishna as a teacher; links deconstruction to pedagogy and then to religion and presents other fundamental concepts required to the research process. Chapter 2 contains commentaries on the Gita and reviews of the studies on the Gita; it has established the research gap that there is no study to establish the relation between deconstruction and the pedagogy in the Gita. Chapter 3 contains the theoretical review of the study, identification of theoretical data, process of deconstructive reading and its relation to religion and scriptures, and identification of the constructs of deconstruction—binary oppositions and difference—in the pedagogy of the Gita. Chapter 4 justifies Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita and relates it to postmethod pedagogy in terms of teacher roles and teacher identities from the perspective of deconstruction. Furthermore, chapter 5 presents the conclusion of the study that the pedagogy in the Gita contains the constructs of deconstruction, and that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher. The ending section of this chapter reviews the postmethod pedagogy on the ground of deconstruction and recommends ‘deconstructionist’ as the role of a teacher in postmethod pedagogy in order to develop it into deconstructive pedagogy and make it more effective in context.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- BA: Bhagavad Gita with the Annotation GudharthaDipika
- BC: Bhagavad Gita with the Complementary of Sankaracharya
- BCE: Before Common Era
- ca.: about
- cf.: compare
- ch.: chapter
- Deconstructing: Deconstructing ELT in the EFL Context: My Autoethnography
- Deconstruction: Deconstruction in Contemporary ELT Practices
- Deconstructive: The Deconstructive Angel
- Derridean: A Derridean Dictionary
- Dest: 'Deconstructionist' as the Role of a Teacher in Postmethod Pedagogy
- Educational: Educational Perspectives in the Bhagavadgita
- ed.: edition
- e. g.: for example
- EFL: English as a Foreign Language
- ELT: English Language Teaching
- et al.: and others
- Exploitation: Exploitation of Binary Oppositions in Sanjeev Uprety's *Ghanchakkar*.
- 5th: 5th Conference on Derrida
- Glossary: Glossary of Literary Terms
- How: How I Happened to Become a Nepanglish Teacher: Using Autoethnography
for Effective ELT in the EFL Context
- i.e.: that is

Metaphysics: Metaphysics in the Bhagavadgita Compared with the Western

Philosophies: A Hermeneutic Gaze

MLA: Handbook for Writers of Research Papers

NELTA: Nepal English Language Teachers' Association

no.: number

par.: paragraph

Pedagogy: Pedagogy as Deconstruction: A Pedagogic Approach to Sustainable Peace
in the World

PhD: Doctor of Philosophy

Postmodern: Postmodern Literary Theory: An Introduction

pp.: pages

qtd. in: quoted in

STEM: STEM Education and Cultural Diversity

Structure: Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences

Teaching: Teaching as Deconstruction: A Reflective Model of Teacher Development

TEFL: Teaching of English as a Foreign Language

trans.: translation

vol.: volume

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

As a teacher educator, after the study of the Bhagavadgita for my own interest, I have had a belief that there is some kind of relation between the pedagogy of the Gita and the theory of deconstruction. Upon exploring current pedagogical practices and their shortcomings, I wondered if these shortcomings could be resolved by following the pedagogy in the Gita! For some years I was lost in these conjectures and they remained afresh for long in my mind along with my professional career. Then I decided to work on these conjectures for this project.

This project, thus, is based on the reading of the text, the Gita, especially the pedagogy employed by Lord Krishna in teaching Arjuna. The purpose of this reading is to find out the strategy used by Lord Krishna to make his pedagogy more effective. As I had the conjecture that the pedagogy in the Gita contains the constructs of deconstruction, this study has analyzed the pedagogy guided by the theory of deconstruction. Thus it has identified the constructs of deconstruction in the pedagogy of the Gita and Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher. With this finding, this study has advanced further to review the postmethod pedagogy with referene to the pedagogy in the Gita and improvised it so that deconstructive pedagogy can have the potentials to solve many pedagogical challenges at hand.

After the completion of the study of the pedagogy in the Gita from the perspective of deconstruction, this report has been prepared and it has been designed into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces this study along with its basic concepts. Chapter 2 presents reviews and commentaries related to the study on the Gita and chapter 3 reviews the theory of deconstruction and explores the constructs of deconstruction in the pedagogy of the Gita. As the finding of this study, chapter 4

identifies Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita, and chapter 5 finally relates this finding to postmethod pedagogy and recommends that the role of a teacher as 'deconstructionist' can be more effective in present pedagogical practices.

This chapter introduces the fundamental concepts related to the study. First of all, it presents a preview of the Gita focusing on its date of origin, author and the main contents. Then it introduces Lord Krishna as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita, and then it relates the pedagogy in the Gita to deconstruction and then to religion. As this study is concerned with the role of Lord Krishna in the context of pedagogy in the Gita founded on the theory of deconstruction, introduction of these concepts in the beginning has guided the study to a proper direction. In addition, this chapter presents the basics of research like statement of the problems, research questions, rationale and objectives of the study, methodology of the study, conceptual framework and delimitations of the study.

A Preview of the Gita

The Gita is a scripture from Hinduism. As the scripture full of wisdom, it has been translated into over 75 languages. So it is widely accepted as a philosophical text. It is written in the form of a poetic dialogue between Arjuna and Lord Krishna taking place in the battle field before the war starts. As the context of the dialogue in the Gita captures everyday life situation, it contains the subject matter of wider significance. This can be observed in J. W. Hauer's view as he maintains that the Gita is “a work of imperishable significance as it gives us not only profound insights that are valid for all times but it also provides guiding principles for all religious life” (qtd. in Radhakrishnan 1). Hauer's understanding of the Gita suggests that its message is significant to anybody for any time. The value of the Gita will never decrease in time.

Regarding the terminological meaning of the Gita, Niranjan Saha states that the etymological derivation of ‘Bhagavadgītā’ is “‘bhagavat’ (divine or venerated) and ‘gītā’ (a name given to certain sacred compositions, often in a dialogical manner in versified form for the exposition of a particular philosophical or theosophical doctrine . . . [10]).” By this, the etymological meaning of the Bhagavadgita is the sacred song with its divine message by some divine power or personality, i. e. God. This implies that the Gita contains profound knowledge applicable to life in the service of divine power, so it has also been designated with various sacred names as discussed below. G. Prasad accentuates that it is called Gitopanishat as it deals with the realization of Brahman. He further states: “It is also called as Brahma-Vidya as it deals with methods to realize Brahman. It is also termed as yoga-shastra as it provides various approaches such as Karma, Jnana, Raja and Bhakti yoga to realize Brahman” (Prasad). The other common names assigned to it are: ‘Śrīmadbhagavadgītā,’ ‘Bhagvadgītā,’ or ‘Gita.’ Though it is read as an independent text, it can be found as a dialogue (saṃvāda) between Arjuna and Lord Krishna in the Bhīṣmaparva (i.e. Book 6) of the Mahābhārata covering eighteen chapters (i.e. twenty-three to forty) and running to seven hundred verses (Saha 142).

Regarding the author and the date of creation of the Gita, critics and commentators present various opinions. Nadkarni claims that “all available external evidence confirms the traditional view that the Gita first came out of the lips of Lord Krishna and was compiled later in verse form by Veda Vyasa as a part of the Mahabharata” (24). So Vyasa is commonly accepted as the composer of the Gita. When it comes to the date of creation of the Gita, we can find various claims as discussed below. Saha mentions that there are basically two sets of timeline, viz. pre-Vedic and Vedic age (ca. 1500 BCE – ca. 600 BCE) and post-Buddha era (ca. 400

BCE–ca. 1300 CE [144]). To this, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan argues that "the Bhagavadgita is later than the great movement represented by the early Upanishads and earlier than the period of the development of the philosophic systems . . ." (5). He concludes from the archaic construction and internal references of the Gita that "it is definitely a work of the pre-Christian era. Its date may be assigned to the fifth century B.C., though the text may have received many alterations in subsequent times" (5). Juan Mascaro, in the same vein, contends that the Gita is about 500 B.C., i.e. it is "pre-Buddhistic" as there are no references to Buddhism in the Gita (23). Highlighting the significant knowledge contained in the Gita, he further affirms, "Scholars differ as to the date of the Bhagavad Gita; but as the roots of this great poem are in Eternity the date of its revelation in time is of little spiritual importance" (23). But Swami Vivekananda offers a great possibility of justifying the Gita of antiquity. He asserts: "Long before that, there was current, according to many, the commentary on it by Bodhayana. If this could be proved, it would go a long way, no doubt, to establish the antiquity of the Gita and the authorship of Vyasa" (1-2). It is obvious that there is a lot of controversy on the Gita regarding its date, authorship, textual formation, philosophy, relation to the Mahābhārata, and the ultimate message it conveys (Saha 143). Phulgenda Sinha, in the same vein, mentions Khair and states: "Indian and Western scholars are still confused and divided among themselves on the questions of the authorship, the ultimate message and the date of the poem. The great divergence that exists in the views of the scholars who have deeply studied this book testifies at once to the popularity and the very controversial nature of the poem" (qtd. in Sinha 62-63). Such controversy and confusion regarding the date and authorship on the scriptures are common as they belong to the time of antiquity and anonymity.

Radhakrishnan perceives the Gita from much wider perspective and argues, "By its official designation, the Gita is called an Upanishad, since it derives its main inspiration from that remarkable group of Scriptures, the Upanishads (4)." He further stresses that besides giving a vision of truth, it also gives continuity to the tradition of the past generation (4). Swami Swarupananda maintains that the Gita is called an Upanishad because "it contains the essence of Self-knowledge, and because its teachings, like those of the Vedas, are divided into three sections, *Karma* (work), *Upasana* (devotion), and *Jnana* (knowledge [Foreword v]). Regarding the nature of teaching in the Gita, Radhakrishnan argues that it is not presented as a metaphysical system thought out by an individual thinker or a school of thinkers. It is rather set forth as a tradition which emerged from the religious life of mankind. It is articulated by a profound seer who sees truth in its many-sidedness and believes in its saving power. It represents not any sect of Hinduism but Hinduism as a whole; more than this it represents religion in its universality, without limit of time or space, embracing the synthesis of all types of spirituality pursued by humans (5).

Sri Aurobindo also agrees that the Gita is a unique Scripture in itself as it is not created by any Prophets like the Buddha, Christ, or Mohammad, nor is it the result of any spiritual *sadhana* (practice) like that of Vedas and Upanisads (17). This suggests that Aurobindo is suspicious of Vyasa as the author of the Gita. However, he regards it as a storehouse of knowledge. Similarly, A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada maintains that "Bhagavad-gita is also known as *Gitopanisad*. It is the essence of Vedic knowledge and one of the most important *Upanishads* in Vedic literature" (2). Sant Rampal Das Maharaj, in the similar fashion, comments that the Gita is a holy scripture which is a resource of spiritual wisdom. Although it is known as the scripture of the Hindus, it is, in fact, the scripture of the World. The origin of

the Gita is dated back to 5550 years ago during the years of the Mahabharata War. Then there was no any established religion, only Sanatana practice or service to mankind which got transferred to the pure souls. With this process of transference Veda Vyasa put it into the written form which came to us as the Gita (my trans.; [Preface iv]).

As the views on the origin of the Gita differ, there are also different interpretations of its theme. The commonly accepted theme of the Gita is that it guides the readers to the realization of the ultimate reality known as the Eternal One or the Supreme or the Brahman. To this, Radhakrishnan posits, "We can only speak of It as the non-dual, advaita that which is known when all dualities are resolved in the Supreme Identity" (14). As suggested by Radhakrishnan, there is an overarching relationship in these different explanations of the themes and this can be expressed as an organizing whole—the non-duality.

The other themes that the Gita overtly discusses are ‘*yoga*’, ‘*jnana*’, ‘*karma*’, ‘*dhyana*’, ‘*bhakti*’, ‘*sanyasa*’, and so so. In this regard, Prabhupada contends that the subject of the Bhagavad-gita entails the comprehension of the *five basic truths*: *isvara* (the science of God); *jiva* (the constitutional position of the living entities); *prakriti* (material nature); time (the duration of existence of the whole universe or the manifestation of material nature); and *karma* (activity [7]). Of all these, understanding the constitutive of living entities—the soul or self or *atma* and its immortality is a major concern of the Gita. All these themes, as the teachings of the Gita, are to guide the human beings to the way of salvation. For Ed Viswanathan there are four paths to it. They are: Jnana Yoga (path of knowledge); Karma Yoga (path of selfless action); Raja Yoga (path of breath control and pranayama); and Bhakti Yoga (path of devotion [298]). So it is also agreed that these are the major

themes of the Gita as taught by Lord Krishna to Arjuna. In a nutshell, Swami Gambhirananda, after Madhusudana Sarasvati, concludes that the purpose of the scripture, *Gita*, is concerned with absolute Liberation (21). The interpretation of the Gita from political perspective is that Lord Krishna is "the militarist" (Lal, Introduction), and from the psychological perspective he is "the father of psychology" (Osho 69).

In academia the Gita is interpreted from the perspectives of knowledge, Jnana Yoga which is also known as the Samkhya philosophy. This philosophy suggests that development of *jnana* (knowledge) is affected by two constitutives of being—*purusa* (self) and *prakriti* (not-self) which are subordinate to God. Prakriti is said to play an important role for the development of knowledge because as Radhakrishnan suggests, "All mental and material phenomena are explained as the outcome of the evolution of prakriti" (57). There are three modes of prakriti: *sattva* (lightness), *rajas* (movement), and *tamas* (heaviness). All these qualities are independent as well as interdependent, so they have dynamic relationship. Swami Dayananda explains that *sattva* represents knowledge which has the qualities like peacefulness, knowledge, inquiry, and clear thinking; *rajas* refers to the qualities that promote activity which develops the qualities like hyperactive, ambitious, active but thinking, wedded to an ideal and achievement; *tamas* refers to the quality of inactivity which makes a person selfish and greedy (138).

The other way to enhance knowledge as suggested by the Gita is to understand the relationship between *kshetra* and *kshetrajna*. Dayananda explains the meaning of *kshetra*: "All that you are aware of—all objects, your likes and dislikes, pleasures, misery, fortitude, your knowledge, and ignorance all this is *kshetra*" (127). So *kshetra* consists of the five elements (space, air, fire, water, earth), the ego, the

intellect, ignorance, the ten organs, the mind and the five sense objects. By *kshetrajna* (the knower of the field) he means to say the one "who is aware of *kshetra*, including this physical body and this phenomenal world" (127). This *kshetrajna* has multiple roles, so it appears to be the seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, doubter, knower, and so on (Dayananda 127). So with the attainment of wisdom in the Gita, certain qualities are fostered in the followers which are known as *daivi sampada* (divine qualities). Such divine qualities that the Gita teaches are fearlessness, purity of mind, commitment, the pursuit of knowledge and yoga, charitableness, self-restraint, doing worship, study of the scripture, performing austerities, straightforwardness, practice of non-injury, truthfulness, controlling anger, renunciation, tranquility, non speaking ill of others, compassion for all beings, lack of desire for objects, gentleness, modesty, not speaking or acting needlessly, and brilliance of mind (Dayananda 153).

The essence of the Gita has been interpreted from different perspectives, as observed above, by its precursors, let alone the later interpreters. They have, however, mostly common understanding of the Gita; they differ, to some respect, in explicating some issues. The reason behind this is rightly observed by M. V. Nadkarni as follows:

These perspectives or viewpoints neither were preconceived notions nor were derived from the study of the Gita alone, but also from their study of other texts, particularly the *Brahmashutras* and the *Upanishads*. What these acharyas did was to take a total view in developing their doctrines, derived from their comprehensive study and contemplation on them, and reapply them to individual scriptures in interpretation. (31-32)

As stated by Nadkarni, the interpretation of the Gita is not only based on the teachings of the Gita, it is also equally affected by the teachings of other scriptures like *Brahmashutras* and *Upanishads*, and understanding of the interpreters.

There are, as mostly accepted, three lines of perspectives to interpret the essence of the Gita; they are Dualist (dvaitta); Non-dualist (advaitta); and Qualified non-dualist (qualified non-dvaitta). Shankara, who is the first commentator of the Gita, argued for Advaita (nondualism or monism) as the essence of the Gita, i. e. there is only one ultimate existence that is *jiva* or *atma* or *Brahma*, and all else is unreal. Shankara has summarized it in half a verse: “*Brahmasatyam jagan mithya jivo Brahmeti na parah* (Brahman is the truth, the world unreal; the soul is Brahman, not anything else (Nadkarni 32). Nadkarni further explains, after Shankara, that the basic teaching of this school of thought is that “the ego, identified with body–mind–senses complex, is not the real self or the soul”; it is the expression of arrogance which diverts the spiritual pursuit. He concludes, “Ego perishes with the body, while the *Atman* is eternal. *Atman* is the Divine presence in all beings, not only human beings, but all beings. In this sense, all life is sacred as it is the explicit expression of the Divine” (32). As quoted above, the essence of the Gita is to let people realize their sacred reality, the *Atman*, which can help them enhance their divinity.

The second perspective to interpret the essence of the Gita is the view led by Madhavacharya which is called dualist (dvaitta). From this perspective, distinction is made between “the Independent (*swatantra*) Reality, which is the Supreme, and dependent (*a-swatantra*) reality, which is the world” (Nadkarni 45). The difference between the first school and this one is that it does not regard the world as illusory or unreal in any way. As Nadkarni explains after Madhva, in this perspective, “The world is absolutely–not just relatively–real, . . . it is entirely dependent on the Divine for creation, maintenance and dissolution. This dependence does not reduce its reality” (45). This suggests that this school of thought accepts two realities although they are interdependent. He again mentions, “Madhva speaks about five types of

differences or *pancha-bhedas*. They are as between God and the insentient world (*jada*), God and souls (*jivas*), the world and souls, the souls themselves, and insentient entities within the world” (Madhava qtd. in Nadkarni 46). It might be equally confusing that all these perspectives talk about the similar things and identify them interrelated and at the same time focus on some differences. It is true that they have more similarities, but the difference is only in terms of their focus which has been briefly stated by Nadkarni: “While the basic or ultimate reality for Shankara is unity, it is unity in diversity for Ramanuja, and diversity for Madhva” (46).

The third perspective that differs in interpreting the essence of the Gita which is known as ‘qualified monism’ (*Vishishtha-advaita*) is the commentary put forward by Ramanuja who argues that “though God, nature and the *jivas* are different with different characteristics, they form a unity in the ‘body’ of God Nature and *jivas* cannot exist without God and His support, and it is in this sense that they are a part of the body of God” ((Nadkarni 41). This school of thought is called qualified monism because “the unity of Brahman is qualified by the sentient and insentient things” (Yamunacharya qtd. in Nadkarni 41), i.e. the God is more qualified through his creation, both living beings and non-living things. Similarly, Nadkarni further justifies that it is also qualified because the “God is not a *nirguna Brahman* who is abstract, without attributes and indifferent to suffering humanity, but a God with attributes who responds to the love and prayers of his devotees” (41).

The Gita is a significant scripture for the people of any sect in order to enhance their wisdom in life. Nadkarni supports this in his book, *The Bhagavad-gita for the Modern Reader: History, Interpretations and Philosophy* and states that the essence and purpose of the Gita is “to offer a creative synthesis of different schools of thought and different paths of spiritual pursuit” in life (25). He further discusses the

authenticity and validity of the Gita in terms of its proven ability for over two millennia that it has provided answers to questions raised by people from different sectors until now and it has this potential even in the future too. So as Nadkarni has justified, the Gita can be considered as timeless like the Vedas. It is “an eternal intellectual and spiritual resource of humanity to draw upon, which is not exhausted but further enriched by using it” (26). This really presents the significance of the Gita in everyone’s life regardless their divergent contexts. Regarding the practical influence of the Gita in the present world, Nadkarni further writes:

The significance of the Gita’s inspiring and empowering teaching becomes apparent when we note why many people commit suicides when they give up facing problems. The Gita can give courage and cure demoralisation. One needs to face the struggle of life with wisdom and equanimity. The Gita teaches that it is also the duty of each individual to help all persons and the society in general to cope with this struggle. (5)

Nadkarni's statement justifies the significance of the study of the Gita in everyone's life to deal with their challenges. Thus anybody exposed to the Gita regardless the time they live by can realize its significance to a certain aspect of their living because it is so pervasive in its message that it has been valued by its readers over time.

Radhakrishnan has expressed the significance of the Gita in relation to humanity; in this regards, he asserts: "The chief problem facing us today is the reconciliation of mankind. The Gita is specially suited for the purpose as it attempts to reconcile varied and apparently antithetical forms of the religious consciousness and emphasizes the root conception of religion which are neither ancient nor modern but eternal and belong to the very flesh of humanity" (viii). Swami Ranganathananda, in the same vein, highlights the practical aspect of the Gita that it helps to resolve

many problems in the society like internal caste conflicts, feudal oppressions, mass poverty, etc and build “a new welfare society, based on human dignity, freedom and equality” (43). For Prabhupada the ultimate goal of the Gita is to enhance spiritual intelligence which he calls "Krishna Consciousness" and asserts that it conquers insatiable lust and develops spiritual strength in devotees (3.43; Prabhupada 190). Similarly, Richard Griffiths, a psychologist who explored different faith-based traditions, argues that spiritual intelligence enhances the "higher dimension of intelligence that activates the qualities and capabilities of the authentic self (or the soul), in the forms of wisdom, compassion, integrity, joy, love, creativity and peace" (Griffiths). Understanding the essence of the Gita, in this regard, helps one enhance spiritual intelligence which fosters all these human qualities to build a perfect personality. All these discussion above justify the significance of the Gita in expanding different dimensions of life. As education is a means to enhancing life, this project has explored the Gita from the perspective of pedagogy so that it can contribute to wellbeing of the humanity.

The contents of the Gita have been presented differently by translators and commentators. While it is not necessary to list them all in this project, the contents presented by Prabhupada in his book, *Bhagavad-gita As It Is*, has been presented here—firstly because this version of the Gita has been used as the text to derive data, and secondly because the content of every chapter is presented with its theme which helps to have a preview of the Gita. So the contents have been presented as follows:

Chapter One: Observing the Armies on the Battle of Kurukshetra

Chapter Two: Contents of the Gita Summarized

Chapter Three: Karma-yoga

Chapter Four: Transcendental Knowledge

Chapter Five: Karma Yoga—Action in Krishna Consciousness

Chapter Six: Dhyana-yoga

Chapter Seven: Knowledge of the Absolute

Chapter Eight: Attaining the Supreme

Chapter Nine: The Most Confidential Knowledge

Chapter Ten: The Opulence of the Absolute

Chapter Eleven: The Universal Form

Chapter Twelve: Devotional Service

Chapter Thirteen: Nature, the Enjoyer and Consciousness

Chapter Fourteen: The Three Modes of Material Nature

Chapter Fifteen: The Yoga of the Supreme Person

Chapter Sixteen: The Divine and Demonic Natures

Chapter Seventeen: The Divisions of Faith

Chapter Eighteen: Conclusion—The Perfection of Renunciation

(Prabhupada vii-xii)

Familiarizing Oneself with the Gita

As this project concerns the study of the pedagogy in the Gita, it is necessary that the teaching of the Gita be revisited. So I have reviewed the Gita chapter-wise in order to familiarize myself with the general understanding of the text (the Gita) and contextualize the study. For this I have used Bhuchandra Baidya's commentary on the Gita, *Essence of the Gita* as it is more comprehensive both in scope and meaning.

Baidya, a retired professor of Economics from Tribhuvan University, possesses a deep understanding on the Gita. In his book, *Essence of the Gita*, he has explored meanings and themes of the Gita into a greater detail. Before he presents the commentary and translation of the Gita, he briefly narrates the story of the

Mahabharata in order to show the context in which the Gita developed as the dialogue between Lord Krishna and the warrior, Arjuna. Then he presents the essence of the Gita under eighteen headings to focus on the themes as follows: (1) Despondency of Arjuna; (2) Knowledge of the Self; (3) Path of Action; (4) Path of Knowledge; (5) Renunciation of Action; (6) Meditation on the Self; (7) Knowledge of God; (8) Attaining God; (9) The Great Secret; (10) Divine Manifestation; (11) The Cosmic Form; (12) Path of Devotion; (13) The Field and Knower of the Field; (14) The Three *Gunas*; (15) The Supreme Spirit; (16) The Divine and the Demonic Nature; (17) The Threefold Faith; and (18) Renunciation and Liberation.

Analyzing the essence of the first chapter of the Gita, Baidya discovers three reasons for Arjuna's despondency. The first reason was "his attachment to his kinsmen—all the near and dear faces including grandsire Bhisma and guru Drona—who were standing in the opposing army" (29). The second reason was "his confusion regarding what was right and what was wrong" because Arjuna was "in dilemma: whether to fight or to give in" (30). And the third reason was that "Arjuna's ego was shattered as he observed the difference between what he had thought earlier and what he saw in front of his eyes" (31). He further analyzes the concern of war in the Gita: "The intent of the Gita is neither to sanction nor to condemn a war. The Gita just inspires us to perform our duty as appropriate to the moment we live in and in conformity with our inherent nature. The Gita trains us to make an intelligent use of the human life, so that we can evolve higher until we reach the ultimate goal" (Baidya 33).

Chapter 2 of the Gita deals with the theory of knowledge as its major theme. Baidya presents the essence of this chapter under the following sub-titles: Immortality of Soul, Transmigration of Soul, Class-duty, Yoga and Person of Stable Wisdom (38-

45). As Arjuna is in confusion, he goes to Lord Krishna to seek advice on what to do. Then, Lord Krishna starts giving knowledge of self to him by mentioning the difference between the soul and the body. To this, Baidya mentions: "The soul is *real* while the body is *unreal*, but neither of the two is worthy to be grieved for. There is no reason for grieving at the *real* because it never ceases to be, whereas everything *unreal* is bound to perish, no matter whether one wills it or not" (38). Moreover, Baidya also discusses the transmigration of soul and its immortality as taught by Lord Krishna to Arjun. He writes, "Death is the stage when the soul leaves the present body to assume a new form to resume its journey. The soul that exists within us is everlasting and unchanging" (39). Baidya focuses on Lord Krishna's advice to Arjun to carry on his class-duty as he belongs to a warrior's class for whom victory or death in the battle field is the ultimate destination. In Baidya's comment the next essence of Lord Krishna's advice to Arjun is to understand yoga. To this he paraphrases: "Yoga is practice—a practice of giving a right, expressing to a right idea—that helps one to realize the Self and attain the Supreme self" (42). He further explains the meaning of yoga that it is the practice of "non-attachment" and to remain free from the thought of result, positive or negative, gain or loss, success or failure" (42-43). So yoga, as Lord Krishna taught to Arjun which is summarized by Baidya, is "a state of stable mind and resolute understanding" (43). Baidya, similarly, presented qualities of a person with stable mind as characterized by Lord Krishna in the following extract:

To begin with, a person of stable wisdom is the one who has reached the state of *wantlessness*; he or she, becoming free of worldly desires and expectations, remains calm amidst all circumstances. Such a person accepts with cheer whatever befalls his lot as the will of Destiny, and is not upset even if nothing comes up. The person of stable wisdom restrains the body and senses and

remains engrossed in yoga. Such one is illuminated, peaceful and fulfilled.

(43-44)

Baidya concludes that a seeker with steadfast wisdom should "restrain senses and be free of undue attachments to and desires for sense-objects" (Baidya 44). The seeker who avoids such attachment to the likings can direct his/her attention fully to the action and get it done.

The essence of chapter 3 of the Gita, as presented by Baidya is discussion on the path of action, that is, *karma yoga*. He presents the essence in terms of the following sub-headings: Disinterested Action: Way of freedom from Bondage, Action in the Spirit of Sacrifice, Great One Sets Example for Others, Surrendering All Actions to God and Selfish Desire: The Enemy Within (52-57). In this chapter Lord Krishna explicates the similarity between the path of knowledge and the path of action, both of which lead to the same end, liberation. But for this the seeker needs to act being free from the bondage of action and its fruits (53). In other word, the action should be performed like worship. In this regard, Baidya maintains: "Every action that is free of willful motives becomes a sacrifice; it becomes a disinterested action that does not cause any binding effect" (54). To put it simply, Lord Krishna suggests Arjuna that he should act, as his duty, without keeping any fruits in his mind. As Baidya argues, performance of a great action requires a great personality because the great one should act "so as to maintain the social order and also to inspire other people to act" (55). To this he also asks an exhilarating question: "What happens, if God stops working?" (55). Thus, he concludes that everyone must act in order to keep this universe going—"The universe can't sustain without actions and interaction of all beings in Nature" (55). But in acting it is to be noted that all actions should be performed like an offering to God, all surrendering to God. It is also to be noted that

in acting the action should not have the feeling of "actor", he or she should not have the ego feeling of performing the action, what causes one to act is his or her *gunas* that are out of his or her control. So it is to be deluded by ego or the ignorant to think that one is the actor of this action oneself. If not, self desire will grow within the actor which will ultimately destroy himself or herself because as Baidya asserts: "Desire consumes and corrupts every being: it is the most dreadful block in the spiritual path" (57). Thus, he summarized Lord Krishna's teaching to Arjuna in the third chapter: "Therefore, desires must be conquered—however hard it is—by spiritual wit and will. Hence, Shree Krishna advised Arjuna to conquer desire, to discipline senses, mind, and intellect, to drop ego, and to contemplate on God" (Baidya 57).

In his analysis of chapter 4 of the Gita Baidya presents four sub- themes under the main essence of knowledge as follows: Descent of Divine, Action and Inaction, Scarified Action, and Action and Knowledge (62-66). As Baidya mentions, Lord Krishna himself started the yoga tradition and he had descended in a human form many times in the past for the moral and spiritual regeneration of the world. In Baidya's words Lord Krishna declared that "whenever righteousness decays and lawlessness prevails—God creates, through His divine power, an appropriate earthly form for Himself and descends to the mortal world" (63). The next theme explored in this chapter is difference between 'action' and 'inaction'. He distinguishes these two concepts as the former referring to "the actions that ought to be done" and the latter the action "to be shunned" (64). Whatever the type of action is, he emphasizes on the "detachment from the fruits of action" as it helps to remain equally calm and content both in success and failure, gain and loss, and pleasure and pain (64). Similarly, he regards "sacrifice action" as another theme of chapter 4 in which Lord Krishna accepts any way by which the devotees offer him their services like austerities, *Raj-*

yoga, pranayama, etc. So when the devotees are involved in disinterested action, Lord Krishna assumes that "he would appear in the form they like to see and grant them their wishes (65). The final sub-theme that is discussed in the fourth chapter of the Gita is interrelation between "Action and Knowledge" (65). With regard to the relation between action and knowledge Baidya states: "All actions should be backed by true knowledge" so that a yogi realizes the Supreme Truth and feels "no difference between friends and foes, followers and opponents, relations and strangers, saints and sinners" (Baidya 65). This suggests that "action" is definitely more significant than the "inaction", but action with the realizations of similarities in differences is still more significant. Thus, Lord Krishna advises Arjun to act having this feeling of inclusiveness or togetherness among different things.

Chapter 5 of the Gita deals with the theme of "Renunciation in Action" on which Baidya presents four sub-themes: Action Renunciation, Work is Worship, Vision of Equality and Way to Liberation (70-73). He presents the main theme of this chapter: "One should renounce action, and yet follow the path of action" (70). He justifies the interrelation between action and renunciation in the following words: "... the way of action is also the way of renunciation, and that one can enter into the way of renunciation only after one has purified one's mind by the practice of the way of action" (70). He further presents the broader meaning of renunciation when he writes: "Renunciation means to be fully absorbed in the contemplation of God, remaining free of desire, design and care" (70-71). Similarly, he also relates action with the practice of truth and knowledge. In the sub-theme, Work is Worship, Baidya explicates Lord Krishna's suggestion to look at the work and the methods to employ in doing it. He writes: "... one should always act looking at work as worship, as an offering to God" (71) and it can be achieved through two methods-- one, by forsaking

the claim of 'doership' in action and the other, by abandoning concern for the fruit of action (71). When action is performed guided by these methods, writes Baidya, "a yogi also attains the wisdom of renunciant" (71). That is to say, without renunciation of action and its fruits, one cannot be a yogi. So whatever a yogi does is a form of worship. The next sub-theme discussed under chapter 5 of the Gita, as explained by Baidya, is Vision of Equality by which he means to say that "all individual selves are similar intrinsically, though they look apparently different in respect of their shapes or bodily covers" (72). Thus, the vision of equality refers to the treatment of equality to everyone; it is to see equality in everything and being, e.g. wise or ignorant, animate or inanimate, human or inhuman; pleasure or pain, gain or loss, and likes or dislikes (72). When one does action with such vision, Lord Krishna suggests, he or she becomes a yogi and attains peace and freedom and ultimately liberation (72-73). Thus, it seems that vision of equality is foundation for realization of renunciation in action. The last sub-theme presented by Baidya, interpreting the fifth chapter of the Gita is Way to Liberation – the ultimate destination of every being. It is, however, not easier to achieve liberation as there are many challenges two of which are most difficult to overcome--desire and anger (73). These feelings are so strong and pervasive that they move side by side, increase conflict and even cause to commit crime (73). So it is essential to manage them properly for liberation; it is possible to overcome them through "single-minded devotion to God" (Baidya 73).

As Baidya interpreted, following Lord Krishna, chapter 6 of the Gita thematically explores the essence of "Meditation of Self" through the reconciliation of the path of knowledge and the path of action and it includes four sub-themes: Steps in Meditation, Vision of a Yogi, Control of Restless Mind and What Happens to Dropouts in Yoga? (77-81). Through the meditation on the self, the yogi can find ease

and peace in all circumstances like in heat and cold, joy and sorrow, honor and dishonor, prosperity and adversity, friends and foes, and saints and sinners (77). So such vision of harmony in diversity and equality is the result of meditation on the self, going into one's own self or soul or nature. Now, a question is raised—how is such meditation enacted? To this, Baidya mentions after Lord Krishna that it is not that difficult; the process is to just "hold yoga position and exercise to control over the body and mind ... cultivate full concentration of mind and meditate on the self unceasingly" (78). Besides, it is to be noted that in practicing yoga the whole pattern of life has to be "organized, balanced, regulated, and disciplined" (78). Similarly, the yogi should "give up all extremes and be moderate and disciplined in food, sleep, and recreation" (78). Through such practices the yogi reaches the state of tranquility or a state of silence or self-awareness in which one finds oneself being one with the supreme soul, Lord Krishna. The next sub-theme in the sixth chapter identified and discussed by Baidya is Vision of a Yogi by which he means to implicate that when yogis realize their self, they have a vision that there is presence of the Divine in all creatures and creation" (79). They find oneness in the universe and devote to that. As Baidya stated, the most challenging task in meditation on the self is to control the mind which is ever-wandering. With continuous effort it is possible that the mind can be controlled. As a result, meditation on the self can be made possible (79-80). In practicing meditation, some are unable to control their mind, so they simply dropout, To Arjuna's query to Lord Krishna regarding the result of dropouts in the practice of meditation, Baidya assures that "sincere efforts and right actions never go waste, and a good person never meets a sad end" (80). As Arjuna's mind was ever-wandering--whether to fight the battle or not--Lord Krishna advised him to control his mind through the practice of meditation so that he would be self-assured to perform his

duty. Summarizing the essence of chapter 6, Baidya reflects: "Meditation is a way of balancing and regulating the pattern of living ... constant practice of meditation takes one to the peak of spiritual evolution reaching where one sees all beings in oneself and oneself in all beings." (81) He further adds that there are three prerequisites for meditation: ". . . one-pointed concentration of mind, moderate way of living, and vision of equality" (Baidya 81).

The essence of chapter 7 of the Gita, as discussed by Baidya, is "Knowledge of God." However, he interprets this essence through identification of five sub-themes: Knowledge of God, Matter and Spirit, Types of Devotees, Methods of Worship, and How to Know God? (84-88). True knowledge of God, as he explains, is to know "this immanence and transcendence" (84), i.e. God-realization. So the best way to know God is "adore Him with faith and devotion" (84). Regarding the dualities of matter and spirit, following Lord Krishna, he mentions that they both belong to God. However, the former is the lower nature of God, while the latter is the higher one, and that the matter comprises of five gross elements, e .g. earth, water, air, fire and ether, and there psychic elements, e. g. mind, intellect, and ego. But the spirit is the consciousness or the embodied soul (85). Thus, he concludes that "God alone nourishes and sustains all the potentialities and possibilities that are in every creation. Though all creations emerge from the union of matter and spirit, every creation draws its distinct quality and merit from God" (Baidya 85).

The next sub-theme discussed in the seventh chapter of the Gita is classification of the types of devotees. As Baidya mentions, Lord Krishna identifies four types of devotees: people in sorrow, seekers of knowledge, seekers of wealth, and seekers of wisdom (86). Of these, Lord Krishna adores the fourth type of devotees as they have the spiritual power of discrimination. Similarly, regarding the

methods of worshipping Lord Krishna, as Baidya mentions, it is open; people may worship any God of their choices for the purpose they have and the rites and rituals they follow as all these different forms of God are the realizations of Lord Krishna. However, worshipping them with full devotion is the only way to reach the supreme (88). Regarding how God can be known Lord Krishna suggests that "only the wise can know him, only the virtuous can see him, and only the pure can meet him. The only way to discover God is to arrest the agitation of mind to transcend beyond the delusion of dualities and to attain the poise of illumination (Baidya 88).

Chapter 8 of the Gita contains the essence of "Attaining God" as Arjuna's question, 'how supreme God can be achieved,' is answered by Lord Krishna. Baidya identifies three sub-themes in this chapter: How to Remember God at the Time of Death, Rhythm of the Universe, and Ways of Leaving the World (91-95). As Baidya mentions after Lord Krishna, the best way to remember God is to have "unwavering faith in Him, loving devotion to Him and incessant chanting of His name" (92). Along with this when the devotees fix their mind on Him at the time of death, they ultimately attain Him (92-93). Accordingly, Lord Krishna prescribes some ways to practice at the last breath: "Controlling the senses stilling the life-death, uttering the syllable *Aum* and handling yogic concentration on God" (93). The next sub-theme Rhythm of the Universe suggests the cycle of the universe which is the cycle of creation and dissolution. The round of this cycle is complete in the course of Day and Night of Brahma, called '*Kalpa*.' In every *Kalpa* the universe is "dissolved back into the formless state of God. God alone continues to exist, and He sets in motion again the new cycle of creation" (94). As Baidya mentions, in Lord Krishna's words, there are two ways of leaving this world: the bright path and the dark path (Baidya 94). In these two paths leaving the world through the bright path leads one to liberation out

of the cycle of birth and death, whereas the dark path to the way of rebirth. However, a yogi whose mind is always fixed on God reaches his destination in spite of any path he leaves through.

The essence of chapter 9 has been summarized by Baidya as "The Great Secret" under which he identifies two sub-themes: The Great Secret and Worship and Devotion (99-101). He presents the great secret in the following words: ". . . the entire universe is the creation of God. The whole of existence evolves from Him and rests in Him, but God is independent and spontaneous. Though God dwells in all beings, He remains unattached and indifferent to the activities undertaken by them" (99). That is, God is both presence as well as absence. But for a devotee he is always present in every creation in Nature. Thus, the only way to realize God is to worship with devotion; Lord Krishna highly praises the devotees as Baidya states: "A devotee never falls, or fails but those who have no devotion fail to draw merit, no matter what they offer to God, and how they serve Him" (Baidya 101). This suggests that the secret of understanding Lord Krishna is to be his devotee, leaving out all other bondage in life.

The essence of chapter 10 as discussed by Baidya is "Divine Manifestation" which illustrates that Lord Krishna can be realized through various forms and symbols representing multiple glories. He describes this essence in terms of three sub-themes: Immanence and Transcendence of God, Divine Manifestations, and God, the Perfection of All (105-08). As God is the creator of this universe, he is present everywhere and holds the power to transcend every kind of restrictions and dualities like pleasure and pain, happiness and sorrow, honor and dishonor, courage and fear, and life and death (105). With such power Lord Krishna can manifest through any forms and symbols with infinite qualities, so his manifestations are called 'divine'. So

he manifests as Sun, Moon, Indra, Storm, Fire, Water and many more (106). Thus he is the God, the Supreme God, who prevails everywhere and holds divine qualities; he is the one "who creates every being and everything in the universe" (108). Praising the glory of Lord Krishna, Baidya reflects: "God glitters in everything that shows perfection in valor, vigor, talent, virtue, love and wisdom and in science and conscience" (Baidya 109).

Chapter 11 of the Gita contains the theme of "The Cosmic Form" in which Baidya explains how Lord Krishna appeared to have *cosmic* form. This chapter consists of three sub-themes: The Cosmic Form, Arjun's Prayer and Lord's Grace and Assurance (111-115). When Arjuna was curious to see Lord's cosmic form, he was granted with the divine sight. Otherwise, with the normal eyes of mortals he could not have seen him. In this cosmic form Arjuna saw him having innumerable faces, eyes, hands carrying weapons, etc. More surprisingly, the whole universe could be seen in his mouth! Then and there only Arjuna realized that Lord Krishna is the Supreme God (112). This manifestation terrified Arjuna and he could not resist it anymore. So he requested the Lord to transform again into the normal form and he did. With the realization of Lord's divine power he started praying to him and asked for pardon for mistakenly taking him as a friend (114). Then the Lord convinced Arjuna that he was really all-powerful and the supreme God of Gods and Goddesses. Being absorbed in the essence of this chapter Baidya reflects: ". . . boasting at transient worldly gain-- money, power, prestige, name or fame-- is sheer ignorance. All these are mutable sensation. So there is only one meaningful path . . . the will of Shree Krishna" (Baidya 117).

In chapter 12 Baidya presents "Path of Devotion" as the central theme which suggests two paths: "To adore God as manifest in the human face of Shree Krishna or

to meditate on him as the unmanifest, formless, and nameless force" (120). So he presents the main theme of this chapter into three sub-themes: Manifest and Unmanifest Aspects of God, Ways of Devotion, and True Devotee (118-20). As discussed earlier, devotion can be centered at two manifestations of the Lord--manifested forms or the unmanifested. A devotee can follow any of the forms. Similarly, there are also different ways of expressing devotion: one way is to be engrossed in the love of God, and the other is to seek him through selfless action performed in the name of God. As there are different ways of devotion, so are the types of devotees. Following Lord Krishna, Baidya mentions some of the characteristics of a true devotee as follows: no desire for personal gains, free of antipathy, jealousy, and hatred, fearless, impartial, pure, competent and so on (120). In his reflection from this chapter, Baidya states that the main characteristic of the devotee is "detachment from the world and devotion to the love of God" (Baidya 122).

The essence of chapter 13 is captured under the heading of "The Field and the Knower of the Field." In this chapter Baidya maintains that matter and spirit are discussed in detail. So it contains the following sub-themes: Field and the Knower of the Field, Sum and Substance of Knowledge, and Way to Self-realization and God realization. He states that "our body is called the field" and "the knower of the field is the self that dwells in different individual bodies" (123). The body consists of five gross elements, namely earth, water, fire, air, and space, and three other elements, e. g. ego, intellect and the unmanifest (123). But the spirit, the knower of the field, is functioning within the field, illuminating the field. The body is active but it is unaware of the spirit. So, as Baidya stresses: "A seeker should be able to discern the nature of the field and its knower in order to understand the world outside and the self

inside" (124). The seeker needs to develop certain ethical virtues that Lord Krishna has mentioned as such humility, integrity, harmlessness, forgiveness, uprightness, purity, steadfastness, self-restraint, indifferent to sense-objects, and absence of egotism (125). The next theme of this chapter is the sum and substance of knowledge. To this Baidya maintains that "the object to know, called the knowable, is God himself, who is beyond everything, beyond both *what is* and *what is not* ... God is the supreme consciousness by which everything is known intellectually, experientially, intuitively and realized spiritually" (125). This suggests that the sum and substance of knowledge is all about the God; once we know him, we know everything. Similarly, Baidya comments: "Nature and spirit are two aspects of God; all beings come into existence from the union of these two" (126). The last sub-theme discussed by Baidya in this chapter is Way to Self realization and God-realization. He writes: "The knower of the nature and functions of the field and the knower of the field lead up a seeker to the state of self-realization and God-realization" (126). That is, the field and the knower of the field are interrelated, the understanding of which leads the devotee to the path of full self-realization and ultimately to God-realization. Such devotees can even pass over even the influence of the *gunas*. Thus, Baidya reflects: "The Gita says that recognition of the individual soul and its relation with the supreme God is the sum and substance of all knowledge" (Baidya 128).

In chapter 14 of the Gita Baidya presents the essence entitled "The Three *Gunas*," that is, the soul is embodied with the three *gunas* of Nature: *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* which are all God's creation and his expression through Nature (130). Baidya discusses these three *gunas* in terms of two sub-themes: Three *Gunas* and Attributes of *Gunatita* (130-32). He states that "all the three *gunas* are present in

everybody, though their relative proportions vary from person to person, causing individual differences in temperament, conduct and character" (Baidya130).

According to the degree of dominance of a particular *guna* in a person his/her qualities differ from each other, and accordingly they tend to behave. Similarly, they will also deserve the result of their action performed due to their gunas. In Baidya's words the results of their different gunas and actions are described by Lord Krishna as: "All the three gunas create bondage by their respective fetters of attachment. So liberation is unattainable unless one transcends all the gunas" (131). Thus, the more one tries to transcend the gunas inherent in him/her, the nearer he/she reaches the God. This ultimately leads one to the state of *Gunatita*. When Arjuna asked Lord Krishna how one can be *gunatita*, the Lord answered, as Baidya writes, that there are some criteria which help to judge this transcendence. For example, clinging to nothing; not craving for acquiring anything new or more; regarding equally for joys and sorrows; remaining untouched by all dualities like praise and blame, honour and disgrace, good and evil etc., holding the same attitudes towards everything, being fulfilled in one's own inner self, and seeking the inward path of peace and bliss (Baidya 132).

"The Supreme Spirit" has been taken as the essence of chapter 15 of the Gita. This chapter gives details of qualities of supreme personality, known as *Purushotama*. So, as Baidya discusses, this chapter contains three sub-themes: "The World Tree," "God, the Source of Life," and "The Supreme Spirit" (135-37). In the beginning of the discussion, a mysterious tree known as *asvattham* has been described. This tree is opposite the other usual trees. Baidya argues that the symbolic meaning of this tree refers to "the deluding and binding nature of the world in which the embodied soul keeps moving through the cycle of birth and death" (135). The

next theme addressed by this chapter is to understand God as the source of life. Following Lord Krishna's lesson, Baidya stresses that the transformation of soul from one body to another goes on and on along with the birth and death of the bodies. So, the questions arise: who controls over this cycle? what is the source of this existence? To such queries Lord Krishna assures that he is the source of this all. To justify this Lord Krishna reveals his expression of power through different means. So, he is the Supreme Spirit as he is imperishable, whereas all other things in the universe are perishable (137). Reading the essence of this chapter, Baidya reflects: ". . . the ultimate goal of the human life cannot be met without a spiritual quest, and the singular goal that we have while leading a spiritual life is to free the embodied soul from the bondage of the body by making use of this very body, and thereby reach that state where the self meets the supreme self" (Baidya 139).

Chapter 16 consists of two contrary essences, namely "The Divine and the Demonic Nature." So in this chapter Lord Krishna gives in detail the characteristics of each. Baidya discusses them into four sub headings: Divine Nature, Demonic Nature, Fate of the Demonic, and Three Dangers (140-43). He cites Lord Krishna mentioning a list of twenty-six virtues of divine nature: fearfulness, clean heartedness, perseverance, generosity, self-control, sacrifice, knowledge of sacred texts, austerity, uprightness, harmlessness, truthfulness, freedom from avarice, gentleness, modesty, relinquishment, etc. (140). Similarly, he quotes Lord Krishna stating the following features of demonic nature: hypocrisy, arrogance, self-conceit, anger, harshness, ignorance, etc (141). He further presents the features of demonic nature that people with this nature will have no faith in spiritual life, no truth in scriptures; they follow senses and desires, lack intelligence, follow power, prestige, security, and stability, block the progress of humanity and ultimately ruin themselves

due to their evil spirited *karma*. In the process of transforming oneself from the demonic qualities to the divine one, as discussed by Baidya, Lord Krishna has made people be aware of three dangers: "lust, anger, and greed." If these dangers can be managed, people can possess divine qualities. If not, they will make their life a hell! (142). Reviewing the theme of this chapter, Baidya reflects:

The human mind tends to flow towards two opposite directions: one, rising towards virtue and the other, falling down to vice. To integrate the human personality by overcoming this conflict is the main aim of the spiritual life. The purpose of the classification of the human nature into two types—the divine and the demonic—is to help people eschew those tendencies that obstruct the realization of the supreme goal of life and cultivate the qualities that are supportive of attaining liberation. (143)

Presenting two oppositional natures together, for example, virtue and vice, divine and demonic natures, Baidya argues that one of the themes of the teachings in the Gita is to lead humans to the path of realization of virtues in life and develop divine qualities so that they can achieve supreme goal (liberation) in life.

In chapter 17 Lord Krishna's teaching has been summarized as "The Three-fold Faith" by Baidya. So, this chapter explores different human activities from three respective: *sattvic*, *rajasic* and *tamasic* (147). Accordingly, Lord Krishna explicates three types of 'food', 'sacrifice', 'austerity', etc. and their influences on personality; it is justified that there is positive correlation between the type of practice of faiths (*sattva*, *rajasa*, and *tamo*) and the types of personality (147-48). Similarly, Baidya also presents the significance of chanting *aum-tat-sat* as a theme of this chapter. To this he mentions, "The chanting of this *mantra* with faith in God enables one to make one's act of sacrifice meaningful and successful. *Aum* represents the Absolute, the supreme

Truth that exists in and by itself, while *Tat* stands for universality of that Truth and *Sat* for its perennial existence" (Baidya 148). Of all these types of faith, karma, things, etc. *sattvic* ones are prescribed for the best practices as they develop the best type of personality.

The last chapter has the essence of "Renunciation and Liberation" in Baidya's interpretation of the Gita. So this chapter elaborates how liberation and renunciation are interrelated, i.e. how renunciation helps the yogis to gain liberation. He elaborates this essence in terms of various sub-headings: Renunciation and Relinquishment, Five Causal Factors of Action, Knowledge, Action, Actor, Intellect, Will and Happiness, Verna System, Way to Spiritual Perfection, Final Word, Freedom from Distress and Sanjaya Concludes.

Following Lord Krishna, Baidya explains the interrelation and difference between 'renunciation' and 'relinquishment' that the first refers to "giving up of desire-driven action" and the next to the "abandonment of interest in the fruit of action." So relinquishment seems to be the means and the renunciation the end (152). This implies that what we need to renounce is not the action but the attachment to the outcome of our action. In analyzing the nature of action Lord Krishna identifies five causal factors: the body, the agent of action, the sense organs along with mind, the effort and the providence or the will of the God (153). Baidya adds: "These five-fold causal factors collectively determine the execution and outcome of every action: right or wrong, good or bad" (153-54). Similarly, the other aspects of actions have also been explored in this chapter of the Gita. As Baidya explains, Lord Krishna identifies "three impulses to action: knowledge, object of knowledge, and knower. He also identifies three composites of action: "instruments, action, and agent" (154). All these aspects of action (knowledge, actor, intellect, will and happiness) have been

classified and discussed in terms of three natural qualities--*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The next sub-theme includes the discussion on *varna system*. Baidya explains Lord Krishna's thoughts on this system that it was based on the "variable proportions of these very *gunas* that human kind was classified into four *varnas*--*Brahman*, *Kshetriya*, *Baishya* and *Shudra*--with appropriate duties assigned to each of them" (155-56). This justifies the interrelation between *guna* and *karma*, i.e. karma is the result of *gunas* one possesses and develops. Lord Krishna suggests the way to perfection which has been summarized by Baidya as: "The one who is detached from the worldly temptations, and is dedicated to his or her duty as the service of God eventually reaches the state of perfection" (156). So, how can we know whether a person is a perfected one or not? To this, Baidya again writes after Lord Krishna: "The perfected one neither grieves nor revels; he or she is always cheerful and treats alike all beings" (156). In the end of the discourse between Lord Krishna and Arjuna, even after giving him wisdom on the dimensions of life, thoughts, nature, *karma*, result, *mokshya*, and so on, Lord Krishna lets Arjuna make his own choice if he should fight the battle or not (157). But Arjuna could not go beyond Lord Krishna's advice and showed his devotion to him and his commitment to do his duty to lead the war of Kurukshetra (158). At the end of his interpretation of the Gita, Baidya reflects: "The beauty of the Gita lies in the freedom of choice given to every seeker. It is not a book of doctrines with a long list of do's and don'ts. The Gita lets open the window of opportunities and leaves the tasks of making appropriate choices to the seeker"(162 [Sic]). Thus Baidya emphasizes the openness of the Gita in its knowledge and message and the freedom it gives to its readers in understanding and interpreting it. This openness of the meaning in the Gita goes along with the nature of deconstruction and suggests the interrelation between them.

Lord Krishna as a Teacher in the Gita

Although the dialogue between Lord Krishna and Arjuna in the Gita has taken place in the battlefield, it has been interpreted from the educational perspective by many critics, researchers and commentators (Radhakrishnan 22-23; Dayananda 21; Ranganathananda 32; Baral, Preamble xxi; and Ghimire, "Educational" 238). This pedagogical perspective of the Gita concerns pedagogical roles played by Lord Krishna and Arjuna, pedagogical process and the lesson taught through the dialogue in the Gita. So this dialogue is an example of an informal pedagogical context in which Lord Krishna has played the role of a teacher directed toward the empowerment of his student, Arjuna and making him aware of his personal responsibility. Similarly, Arjuna, as a student, has been continuously questioning Lord Krishna and reflecting himself to conform whether he has been on the right track as suggested by his teacher or not. Thus, the role played by Lord Krishna in the Gita exactly goes along with the concept of pedagogy as defined by Wellington and Austin who state, "Pedagogy involves continual questioning, revision and internal validation, stressing empowerment and personal responsibility" (qtd. in Day 112-13).

Commentaries on the Gita discussed below present Lord Krishna as a teacher and Arjuna as a student. Radhakrishnan, an authority on Vedic study, regards the role of Lord Krishna mainly as a teacher in the Gita. He gives a sub-title, Krishna, the Teacher, in his book, *The Bhagavadgita*, and mentions, "So far the teaching of the Bhagavadgita is concerned, it is immaterial whether Krishna, the teacher, is a historical individual or not" (22-23). Similarly, Winthrop Sargeant, a Western scholar on classics, regards Lord Krishna as the Universal Guru and suggests that the teachings in the Gita are of universal significance (2). In the same vein, Swami Dayananda identifies Lord Krishna as a *guru* in the Gita because he argues that the

Lord has accepted Arjuna as his disciple and taught him the divine lessons to solve his problems, i. e. whether to fight the battle or not (21). In this context, he defines guru as "the one who dispels the darkness of ignorance by the light of knowledge" (21). Swami Ranganathananda, in the similar fashion, argues that Lord Krishna is an ideal teacher. He writes under the title "Sri Krishna: The Ideal Teacher" that first the Lord has identified his students' needs and made him psychologically ready, and then he started instructing him (32). Even during the process of teaching he has never imposed his ideas on him; he has rather given him freedom to decide on his own and go ahead. So he has identified Lord Krishna as the best teacher and contends: "The best teachers are those who help the disciples to solve their own problems, never imposing set solutions of their own on them. They never ask their disciples to surrender their independence of judgment" (Ranganathananda 41). Tika Dutta Baral, in the similar fashion, justifies that Lord Krishna is an ideal teacher full of mysterious knowledge and power, and Arjuna a student having discipline and responsibilities (my trans.; Preamble xxi). All these arguments on the role of Lord Krishna in the Gita in relation to Arjuna suggest that the Lord is a teacher and Arjuna a learner, and their dialogue is a pedagogical one.

Regarding the studies on the Gita in terms of pedagogical process, Janardan Ghimire studied it from educational perspective and explored it through different perspectives ("Metaphysics" 33-34). On the pedagogical process in the Gita, he argues that we can find "a type of chronology in the question-answer series which has been presented as: Question . . . Advice . . . Doubts . . . Clarification." He further explains:

The disciple raises the question at first. The *Guru* gives the instructions as per their expectation. The learner develops doubts and raises questions again. For

the elimination of these doubts, the *Guru* clarifies the concepts In the context of the teaching, *Krishna* is found to present the *Bhagavad Gita* in the form of dialogue between a *Guru* and a disciple (18.70). (“Educational” 238)

Ghimire has presented the process of teaching and learning in relation to the discourse between Lord Krishna and Arjuna. In this, Arjuna as a student raises many questions, e. g. 'why does he need to fight?' And Lord Krishna as a teacher teaches him the reasons to fight. So this usual question-answer series runs until Arjuna's doubts are eliminated.

In the study entitled “Need of Bhagavad Gita Concepts in the Present Scenario of Professional Education,” Bhavna Sharma and M. Ramachandran identify the aspects of pedagogical context in the Gita. Regarding the role of the teacher they argue that, like Lord Krishna’s role, it must be most balanced; the true teacher not only teaches truth but also demonstrates it. Similarly, observing Arjuna's nature and behavior as a learner, they have also mentioned the salient features of a good learner who has genuineness, humanity, obedience, faith in his teacher, humility, obedience, etc. (Sharma and Ramachandran). Besides the roles of a teacher, they have also explored the Gita in terms of the following educational objectives: development of virtual knowledge; development and modification of personality; adjustment in individual and social aims; development of internal consciousness; development of intellectual and reasoning ability, and establishment of importance of duties in life.

Regarding the roles of Lord Krishna as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita, Ghimire explored the pedagogy in the Gita and identified the roles as follows: authorized and honorable personality; dependable and ideal personality; facilitator of the situation; self-enlightened personality; personality attuned to speech-austerity; forgiving personality; imitative personality; ideal personality; and awakener of the

learner (“Educational” 308-14). Thus the Gita has been studied from educational perspective and explored its aspects. In all the studies the critics and researchers agree that Lord Krishna can be compared with a teacher/guru in the Gita, and they have also identified some of his roles as a teacher. But Lord Krishna’s role as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita has not been studied yet from any theoretical perspective. So this project has explored the role played by Lord Krishna as a teacher in the Gita from the theoretical perspective of deconstruction.

Deconstruction in Education

Derrida, an Algeria-born Jewish French philosopher is credited to have founded the theory of deconstruction. Despite his early-days' sufferings as an outsider, he undertook a study of several major philosophers at various prestigious institutions in Paris, and eventually became a teacher of philosophy. Then he taught at Harvard and Yale Universities. He proposed and practiced ‘deconstruction’ as a way of reading a text or interpreting any event with a view to identify contradiction inherent in it and its inability to produce consistent and final meaning. Derrida insists that deconstruction simply questions the themes expressed in a text in order not to subvert them for the sake of destroying them but to change the models and invent new ways of interpreting them (qtd. in Frederick 157). So Derrida himself did not define deconstruction but rather resisted any way of defining it. At present, it is, however, used as a theory of interpreting a text by the Derrideans. In this regard, M. A. R. Habib commends:

While Derrida himself has insisted that deconstruction is not theory unified by any set of consistent rules or procedures, it has been variously regarded as a way of reading, a mode of writing, and above all, a way of challenging

interpretations of texts based upon conventional notions of the stability of the human self, the external world, and of language and meaning. (649)

As explicated by Habib, there is a debate on what deconstruction is—a theory, a method, a strategy, or what! This confusion is natural as Derrida, the proponent of deconstruction, did not define it himself. So in practice deconstruction has different implications, and the most common practice of which is a way of reading texts in order to disclose different meanings inherent in it and challenge the notion of finding the established meaning in a text.

Initially, deconstruction was more concerned with Metaphysics as Derrida himself read the texts by Plato, Husserl, Heidegger, Strauss, Saussure, Hegel and others, deconstructing the ‘presence’ or ‘logos’ of their texts. Later on, it was, however, used as a theory of literary criticism by the Yale critics in the US. But at present, deconstruction has wider application as Frederick states: “Deconstruction has been applied to literature, art, architecture, science, mathematics, philosophy and psychology and any other disciplines that can be thought of as involving the act of marking” (119). Accordingly, deconstruction was introduced to education by some educational theorists like Gert Biesta, Philip Higgs and Mark Murphy. Explicating the influence of Derrida and deconstruction in education, Higgs notes:

In recent years educators, educational theorists, philosophers of education, and curriculum theorists around the world have shown a mounting interest in Derrida’s work and in his concept of deconstruction [see, for example, Biesta and Egea-Kuehne (2001), Cherryholmes (1988), Lather (1991), Stronach and MacLure (1997), Usher and Edwards (1994), Pinar *et al.* (1995) and Pinar and Reynolds (1992)]. The major influence of Derrida and deconstruction on the practice of education originally came from the adoption of deconstruction in

English departments. As ‘a theory of reading and writing’ deconstruction had found its way in the teaching of English, both in writing instruction and composition, and in the practice of teaching literature (174)

Although Derrida did not discuss educational issues directly, his conception and practice of deconstruction does have overarching significance in education. In this regard, Biesta and Egea-Kuhne commend that “deconstruction can engage a thoughtful reader in some powerful rethinking of education, analysing all the hidden assumptions which are implied in the philosophical, or the ethical, or the juridical, or the political issues related to education (qtd. in Higgs 175). Higgs proposes some questions from the Derridean or deconstructive perspective and exhorts the educationists towards the re-thinking of education considering the following questions:

how can we educate the other as other? in which space can education be realised? how can we let the other be as other in the educational encounter? what, and whose knowledge, should be transmitted in the educational encounter? how can we know in the educational encounter? what form of instruction should mark the educational encounter? what is the nature of an educational encounter? what of the place of language in the educational encounter? (Higgs 175)

Besides these educational issues raised by Higgs in relation to deconstruction in education, Mary Poovy has identified three strategic tools employed by Derrida in his deconstructive practices which can have direct implications to deal with these issues (107). Firstly, Poovy contends that deconstruction demystifies institutions and concepts that appear to be natural or neutral in being; this can transform the higher-level concepts and practices in the academy like that of institutional structure and

philosophy of education. Secondly, her argument is that deconstruction challenges and potentially dismantles 'hierarchical and oppositional logic' in the academic discourse; this has radical potentiality to transform the pedagogical process upside down, especially in terms of the role of the teacher and the students. Thirdly, she argues that deconstruction offers the notion of the middle voice or 'in-between' undecidable term, which can be used to rethink power structures created through binary thinking; this can also be employed to deal with educational issues more effectively. We can, for example, observe how the first strategic tool of deconstruction has been employed by Biesta to demystify the concept of Philosophy of Education, as defined by H. Siegel, as "a branch of education that addresses philosophical questions concerning the nature, aims and problems of education" (1):

The idea of 'philosophy of education' belongs to a very particular, Anglo-American construction of the field of educational studies, one in which this field is seen as that of the interdisciplinary study of educational phenomena Philosophy here takes the position of one of the 'foundational disciplines' for the study of education, together—at least traditionally—with history, psychology and sociology But if this is so, then one important question emerges: Who asks the educational questions? Unless we are to believe John Dewey who simply (and imperialistically) claimed that educational questions are by definition philosophical questions and vice versa—which, as a good deconstructionist would point out, already relies on the very distinction between philosophy and education that it wants to overcome, (Biesta 402)

This quote by a Derridean educationist, Biesta, briefly mentions the beginning of the philosophy of education, its development and the present stage it has reached. In the

beginning the philosophy of education incorporated different areas of study into the field of education and developed multiple perspectives on education by asking different philosophical questions on the educational contents. This rather created a gap between education and philosophy, i. e. philosophy in this perspective is regarded as higher level of thinking from which education borrows knowledge to deal with many educational issues. But later on, this hierarchical relation between philosophy and education has been deconstructed, i. e. the educational questions themselves are philosophical questions; philosophy is not different from education. This is also the view of education from the perspective of deconstruction. So deconstruction explores philosophical aspects of education as its integral process and develops it into a field of open inquiry.

Deconstruction in education, similarly, has been further developed by Mohsen Farmahini Farahani who wrote an article “Educational Implications of Philosophical Foundations of Derrida,” and introduced many Derridean terms like, deconstruction, presence, differance, trace, logos, play and many more to the field of education. Among such concepts introduced by Derrida in deconstruction, Farahani argues that the concepts like ‘différance’, ‘justice’, ‘the other’, and ‘responsibility’ can provide a powerful paradigm to develop a greater awareness of the issues at stake in education (Higgs qtd. in Farahani 2495). So he further commends that Derrida can be regarded as a great educational figure because of his radical and innovative methods that can be directly implemented in education and bring about radical changes.

Higgs relates Derrida’s deconstructive practices to the field of education and asserts that “throughout his critical analysis of writing and culture, Derrida constantly engages with questions about what it means to think, to learn, to teach, to know, and more specifically what it means to teach the other as other” (172). Farahani, in the

same vein, explores every aspect of education from the perspective of deconstruction and suggests how it can be linked to educational practices (2496-97). He argues that the aim of education based on deconstruction is to enhance critical analysis in the learners through having the critical perspectives from the side of the other as Derrida urges the readers to read texts critically, elevating their critical potentialities so that they can incur political and social changes. On curriculum he maintains that education founded on deconstruction is more likely to enact an interdisciplinary curriculum because for Derrida it is not natural to have diversification of various disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, politics, and history.

Regarding the roles of the pupil and the tutor in pedagogy founded on deconstruction, he argues, following Derrida, that the role of the tutor is to encourage the pupils to interact with texts and have a series of constant interpretations of the texts so that they can have their own interpretation of the texts. So the role of the pupils is to become a critical reader and pay attention to contradictions and gaps in the texts. Similarly, the role of the tutor is to provide the resources and freedom that the pupils require in order to learn independently. On the teaching method guided by deconstruction, he suggests that the students should be encouraged to have as many interpretations of a text as they opt for because the methodological procedure of deconstruction is anti-objectivist and introspective. It is directed to show an aporia in a text which is always open to every new interpretation. He further states: "The deconstruction method teaches us to abandon the long standing empathically tendencies which put partitions among and between various phenomena and subdivide them into acceptable and non-acceptable, right and wrong (truth and lie), central and subsidiary, wiseness and non-wiseness, and their reflection" (Farahari 2497). At the end of the paper, he makes a conclusion that education is: (i) without

global changeless bases; (ii) based on dialog; (iii) pluralistic and cares for individual differences; (iv) anti-authoritarian; and (v) critical thinking (Farahari 2497).

All these deconstructive developments and practices in education have established deconstruction/postmodernism in education. For such transformations deconstruction is at the center without any center as Glenn Rikowski and Peter McLaren argue: “For postmodernists all concepts are decentered (fragmented, splattered) and all dualisms (such as the Marxist notion of two major social classes) are deconstructed. The search for ‘meaning’ within texts as within discourse is infinitized, comprising endless academic work for postmodernists” (4). Similarly, Shreeram P. Lamichhane and Mana P. Wagley, the educationists from Nepal foresee the significance of deconstruction in education in the present context and vehemently state that we need to embrace “the post-modernist principle of deconstruction in the entire educational system” in order to overcome the challenges and meet the ambition of future education (11-12). This argument certainly goes with the aim of education in postmodern which is to "develop students' identities that enable them to struggle against inequalities and to expand basic human rights as well as emancipation from oppression" (Ozmon and Craves qtd. in Ghimire, “Educational” 429). In this regard, it is only through education founded on deconstruction that this aim of education in the postmodern context can be achieved because the deconstructive perspective of education raises the questions from the perspectives of the other, justice and responsibility as Higgs puts it, “What gives deconstruction its motive and drive is precisely its concern for, or to be more precise, its wish to do *justice* to what is excluded, to something other, to some alterity, to what is unpredictable (171).

The next important educational aspect concerned with deconstruction is the practice of reflection in the teaching leaning process. As Rikowski and McLaren

claim, in recent years, postmodernist educational practices have focused on the “postmodernized modes of ‘reflective’ teacher practice” and “postmodern educational research methods” so as to ensure “education as a resource for social equality and democracy” (3). In postmodernist or deconstructive pedagogical practices there is naturally enough space for reflection to take place because such process never expects the ultimate meaning; it rather regards the pedagogical process as an endless-meaning making play because in postmodernized mode of pedagogical practice the “search for ‘meaning’ within texts as within discourse is infinitized, comprising endless academic work for postmodernists” (4). Similarly, Higgs’ argumentation on the implementation of deconstruction in pedagogical process also justifies how reflection naturally takes place as he maintains: “Deconstruction rather provides a way to think again and afresh, more strictly and more radically about the concern that has been central to the project of education . . .” (176). As stated here, reflection is the process of thinking again and again of one’s actions and developing a fresh idea so as to improve on the earlier practices or to come up with different meaning or understanding of practices.

Exploring the use of deconstruction in education research, Mark Murphy is the leading researcher who has published the book entitled *Social Theory and Education Research*. In this book he discusses how deconstruction can be used to explore educational issues. In that he has proposed deconstruction as a social theory and finds its two major implications: "First, reading of published and/or produced teacher's narratives from a Derridean perspective with the aim of helping teachers read their own narratives; and second, detailing the possibility of presenting philosophical concepts developed by Derrida to practicing teachers" (13). This project, in this regard, is guided by the second implication of deconstruction as social

theory in education research. Thus the pedagogy employed by Lord Krishna as a teacher in the Gita has been studied founded on the theory of deconstruction.

Murphy further mentions that deconstruction as a social theory is concerned with the following research topics in education: (1) inequality, inclusion and education; (2) notions of educational selves and subjectivities; (3) curricular and pedagogical practice; and (4) governance and management (8). Of these, this project concerns the study of the third topic, *pedagogical practice*—how Lord Krishna as a teacher has been able to teach Arjuna even in the most challenging time.

There are a few examples of the application of deconstruction in pedagogical practices and research. In this regard, Hari Chandra Kamali implemented deconstruction in his ELT classes and presented its result in the 16th International Conference of Nepal English Language Teachers' Association. In this presentation he has argued that when deconstruction is used in teaching, it "can help teachers deconstruct their theoretical knowledge, reflect on their practices, and increase their 'teacher learning'. . ." (Kamali, "Teaching" 105). Regarding how deconstruction can be implemented in the language classroom, he has mentioned the following processes based on his autoethnography as an English teacher in the foreign language context:

I identified major 'binary oppositions' operating in the ELT discourse or classes, e.g. English versus local language; ELT theories versus local context; donor's interest versus local need; correct versus acceptable pronunciation/spelling; right versus acceptable answer; native versus local teacher; expert versus novice teacher; students versus teacher; pass versus fail; and so on. In all these oppositions, before the practice of deconstruction, there was a hierarchy that the first concept/practice is better than the second, which is reversed and replaced in deconstruction. That is, in deconstructing ELT all

the established practices are put into question; every effort made by the students in the process of learning is positively responded by the teacher; learning is perceived as a process of constructing multiple meanings!

("Deconstructing" Address)

Kamali's implementation of deconstructive pedagogical practices have opened up the possibilities of practices of deconstruction as a methodology in the pedagogical practices to explore and deal with contradictions in the pedagogical issues, and seek for multiple meanings to enhance creativity in the learners.

Pavel Boytchev, in the same vein, discusses the practice of deconstruction in education at three levels in his paper, "Deconstructionism in Education – A Personal Wandering Towards Constructionism: (1) Phases of constructing knowledge; (2) Manifestation of deconstruction; and (3) Constructionism and deconstructionism (6-8). In the first level the students get exposed to a text and develop their initial understanding of the text. But in the second level, the manifestation of deconstruction, the students deconstruct not only the meaning of the text intended by the author but the meaning of the text that they have constructed in the first level also gets deconstructed. The challenge with identification of this level is that it cannot be exactly explicated when, where and how the deconstruction takes place. In his regard, Boytchev maintains: "The main problem of deconstructionism is that it is hard to formalize the deconstruction phase. As a consequence, it is hard to provide methodological, pedagogical and technological tools that support it and the deconstruction phase is almost completely confided to be realized by the students themselves" (7). In the third level, he identifies constructionism and deconstructionism as interrelated processes despite the fact that constructionism focuses on "the personal construction of ideas and relations through the construction

of real-life artefacts” whereas, deconstructionism focuses on “the personal understanding of ideas and relations through the public deconstruction of real-life artefacts” (8). In Boytchev's 3 levels of deconstruction in practice the third level is rather vague as constructionism is an integral process of deconstructionism. So it is not necessary to discuss constructionism as a separate concept and process from deconstructionism; it can be simply called deconstructionism.

Deconstruction has also been linked to the study of university education. In a paper titled “Philosophy and Subversion: Jacques Derrida and Deconstruction from the Margins” Michael Roland F. Hernandez devotes a chapter discussing how a university education should be deconstructed or analyzed from the margin. He makes detail discussion regarding the issues of ‘responsibility’ and ‘justice’ that the university should handle properly in order to thrive towards an emancipatory education. Under the chapter ‘Towards an Emancipatory Education’ he expresses his grave concern that the university education is serving for “the purposes of transnational capitalism, religious fundamentalisms and decadent nationalism” (127). He argues that this is not the responsibility of the university. If a university does not remain “true to its nature as an *universitas*, a totality which, in its pursuit of knowledge, should be free from any influence—be it state power and its appendages in politico-economic power; or in the tele-technological superiority of the media, culture and religious ideology—that might distort its mandate to truth or it will eventually ‘fall prey into its own auto-immune destruction’” (128). Thus, Fernandez suggests that present university education needs to be subverted or deconstructed or read from the margin if we are to promote justice through emancipatory education. For this he gives two suggestions: first, we need to move away from the propagation of technical courses that treat students as objects ready to be sold or exported to the

abroad market; and second, the university must not treat education as a business which is meant to gain economic profit. On the contrary, it should rather focus on the enhancement of rhetoric and critical thinking skills as the most important tool for the pursuit of knowledge and success in life (129). This suggests that deconstruction in education is concerned with quality in higher education which is also the concern of this study.

Deconstruction and Religion

As the text, the Gita, under study is also concerned with religious thoughts, it is relevant to see if deconstruction is also concerned with religion. To this, we can find contradictory views. Barry Stocker in his book, *Derrida on Deconstruction*, discusses that although Derrida had a strong influence of 'Judaic' heritage, he simply saw it “as cultural, intellectual and aesthetic heritage,” and he was “not a religious Jew and did not belong to any synagogue” (Stocker 121). By this "Derrida" and "deconstruction" cannot be connected with religious and theological studies. The issue of Derrida and deconstruction, however, is so perplexing enterprise that nothing can be ascertained at the end! In the beginning it is, of course, apparent that “For Derrida, the metaphysical tradition has always included a moral view of Good and Evil, which belongs to a series of oppositions. These are the oppositions of truth and falsity, being and seeming, the inside and the outside, the natural and the social” (Stocker 124). On these oppositions Derrida finds a case of injustice resulting in violence as the oppositions create a kind of hierarchy in which one concept gets privileged over the other. So Stocker writes of Derrida’s understanding of ethics, “Derrida’s view on ethics is that it cannot be defined by what is other than violence” (Stocker 125). Now a crucial issue arises—is Derrida against ethics and religion, or has he simply had critical perspective on the ethics and religion? To this, Stocker is of

the opinion, after Derrida, that there can be no good or bad, good or evil in nature, but these are created by “the social community along with history, writing, politics and all the other impurities that destroy the natural” (Stocker 129). That is, ethics is not good or evil in itself; it is the practice of people that makes it good or evil. Thus, Stocker further explores Derrida’s conception of religion and contends: “Religion enters into Derrida’s philosophy in important ways, though he himself does not appear to have believed in God, or to have followed any religion. Nevertheless, for Derrida the question of god can never be avoided” (119). So there has been a great debate on whether Derrida is an atheist or a theist, and it has been a significant issue to explore further. In regard to this, Stocker observes:

There is no suggestion that God exists or that religion refers to objective truths. There is no discussion of the Devil or Demons elsewhere in Derrida . . . Derrida’s philosophy does not exclude the possibility that God, the Devil or religion might be real and it is a thoroughly agnostic philosophy. There is no attempt to discuss the validity of any claims of religion. (135-36)

In this citation Stocker presents Derrida's contradictory views on God and religion. As Stocker argues, Derrida does not define the concept of God or Devil. However, although he has not discussed them openly, he is not against the concepts like God, Devil and religion. So Stocker commends that Derrida's views on religion and God lies between religious and secular conception known as agnostic philosophy.

Besides this general understanding of Derrida in relation to religion and God, Stocker explores further on his conception of God and argues, “We can, however, find in Derrida like in Pascal, a kind of anxiety without the center or God that the ‘individual human is lost in an infinite universe where God is absent, and which is like an infinite sphere with no center’” (136). Thus, Stocker compares Derrida with

Pascal that they both realize the need of God who could be the center for every human pursuit. It can be logically concluded that there need not be center or God at the empirical level of human understanding; there is, however, necessity of center or God at the transcendental level because center at the empirical creates violence—through privileging one concept as the center while the other as the marginalized one. That is why, Derrida, according to Stocker, calls his position in relation to deconstruction as “radical empiricism,” and he further explains that for Derrida deconstruction is “the challenging of the transcendental by the empirical,” which implies that the center which needs to execute at the transcendental has been executing at the empirical (32). In other words, following Derrida, the center/God at the empirical should be deconstructed and the center/God at the transcendental should be sought for. Finally, Stocker comes to the understanding of God from the perspective of deconstruction: "God can be defined as that absolute, and that would be in line with the philosophical-theological discussion of God as absolute being" (138). All this justifies that deconstruction cannot distance itself away from religious studies and vice versa.

Observing Derrida’s academic career and deconstruction from the theological perspective, critics have come to a conclusion that Derrida in his later career was transformed into a theist from an atheist. Derridean critics call this transformation the “ethical turn” of deconstruction (Higgs, 171). In regard to this, Higgs maintains, "Over the past few years there has been a growing recognition of this horizon, which has led some commentators, such as, Baker (1995), and Critchley (1999a, 1999b), to speak about the 'ethical turn' of deconstruction" (171). For David Tacey it was not Derrida’s later transformation, he had previously signaled his interest, but indirectly, in religion through his work like “Faith and Knowledge” in which he had indicated

that “there is, or will be, a return of the religious in global civilization” (4). Tacey, following Derrida, further argues that both deconstruction and religion are concerned with each other, so he maintains: “Deconstruction, according to the late Derrida, is a way of doing truth, of keeping things authentic and open to the possibility of transcendence. He wanted to unravel and deconstruct, not to arrive at nothing, but to affirm a sacred reality that he sensed was undeconstructible” (3). Similarly, John D. Caputo also argues that Derrida had signaled the existence of something called the impossible in his work, “The Force of Law,” which cannot be deconstructed. So Caputo further commends: “I am identifying deconstruction as a kind of passion or prayer for the impossible, or as an affirmation of the ‘undeconstructible’. The first time I find mention of something ‘undeconstructible’ is in a 1989 essay titled ‘The Force of Law.’ This essay is the best place to start with the more overtly religion-friendly accenting of deconstruction in Derrida’s writings” (63). This statement by Caputo on Derrida’s conception of something undeconstructible suggests that deconstruction concerns the study of God and transcendental issues like ‘the sacred reality’, ‘the undeconstructible’, ‘the impossible’, and ‘the truth’. Thus the study of the Gita from the perspective of deconstruction has been possible and viable.

The most important work with regard to Derrida’s religiosity is the book, *Derrida and Religion: Other Testament*, which was the outcome of “The Capri Dialogue,” edited by Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart. The book contained the articles by some Derrideans who have explored Derrida’s works and events in relation to religion and God. As Tacey has mentioned, the theme of “The Capri Dialogues” was to discuss, among the philosophers, the condition of religion in society. In the beginning of the dialogue Derrida addressed the delegates: “We are not priests bound by a ministry, nor theologians, nor qualified, competent representatives

of religion, nor enemies of religion as such, in the sense that certain so-called Enlightenment philosophers are thought to have been” (Derrida qtd. in Tacey 5). This is the most obvious testimony to justify the link between deconstruction and religion. Nevertheless, Derrideans emphasise that the main concern of deconstruction is to have critical perspective on everything. So it receives the religious texts afresh, explores them into depths, exposes the aporias they contain, and looks for the impossible, the center at the transcendental, not at the empirical. To this, Habib summarises:

In conclusion, Derrida states that there are ‘two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play.’ The one dreams of arriving at a truth or origin which ‘escapes play and the order of the sign’ . . . The other which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism’, man being he who has ‘dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play.’ (660)

This quote by Habib, following Derrida's understanding of two types of reading, suggests two ways of reading a (religious) text—reading with a view to reach the definite meaning of a text and its origin or to reach the understanding that the text has no definite meaning and origin. Of these readings, Derridean reading favors the second one as it regards texts as the play of signs.

Statement of the Problems

The Gita is one of the highly studied texts in the world as it has been translated into over 75 languages including the world major languages. So it is widely read with different purposes, e. g. Hindus usually read it as their holy scripture and others read it as a philosophical text. As a result, there are also many commentaries and researches on the Gita worldwide. Besides theological and philosophical issues, it

has been mainly studied as a reference to education, environment, politics, management and psychology. Similarly, the discourse between Lord Krishna and Arjuna in the battle field has been studied from the educational perspective. In that Lord Krishna has been identified as a teacher or a Guru and Arjuna as his disciple or *sisya* (a learner). Lord Krishna has been regarded as an ideal teacher who is able to empower a desperate student with the knowledge and skills required to accomplish his duties. Here arises the most crucial question from the pedagogical perspective—how was Lord Krishna able to teach such profound lessons to a desperate student in that context? This is the most significant academic issue that has not been fully explored yet!

Although we can find the commentaries and studies in the Gita from various perspectives, it has not been explored yet from the theoretical point of view of deconstruction—there is no study to show the relation between deconstruction and the Gita. As deconstruction opens up new possibilities in any field of human inquiry, is it not necessary to study the Gita from the perspective of deconstruction? Is it not the high time to explore significance of the Gita in the academies? Such questions have not been answered through any study concerning the Gita yet. More importantly, it is necessary to explore the role of Lord Krishna as a teacher and its significance in pedagogy from the perspective of deconstruction. This philosophical dimension of the Gita has not been explored yet.

The main challenge of present-day-education system is that it has been unable to produce quality human resource. It is mainly because present education system is more of structural in nature which keeps certain values at the center, leaving others aside, limiting the scope of thinking. This needs to be deconstructed making the system of education more open, critical and creative. For all such transformations

teacher's role plays a crucial part which needs to be explored and identified well. In the present pedagogical context teacher's role has not received as much attention as it deserves. Thus, this study has explored all these issues with regard to the role of the teacher in relation to the pedagogy in the Gita and the theory of deconstruction in postmethod pedagogy and made some recommendations to improve on the challenges with present pedagogical practices.

Research Questions

As this study concerns the exploration of the pedagogy in the Gita from the perspective of deconstruction, especially the way Lord Krishna has been able to teach Arjuna even in the most adverse situation, it has been guided by the following fundamental questions: (i) What is the relation between the pedagogy in the Gita and deconstruction?; (ii) What is the role of Lord Krishna as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita?; (iii) What are the qualities of a deconstructionists"; and (iv) How can deconstruction contribute to the role of a postmethod teacher to make postmethod pedagogy more effective?

Rationale of the Study

The Gita is the world's widely read philosophical text as it is more popular among the scholars around the world. We can find the study of the Gita in relation to different pursuits of knowledge and it is always open to further exploration. So any study of the Gita, like this project, is significant in itself. Moreover, this study has linked the pedagogy of the Gita to deconstruction/postmodernism and the postmethod pedagogy and aimed to improve the quality in education through it. So this study has addressed the problem of the present education system which has further justified its significance.

More importantly, this study is a venture to explore the Gita from the theoretical viewpoint of deconstruction because there are scarcely any studies in education guided by the theory of deconstruction—let alone the study of the Gita. Since the Gita is perceived as the storehouse of wisdom and deconstruction as the practice of seeking for new meanings in a text, establishing the relation between the Gita and deconstruction has proved the most significant aspect of this study. Thus this study has justified the significance of the Gita in relation to the practice of deconstruction in the postmethod context at present.

As Lord Krishna has been successful to teach Arjuna, a desperate student, even during the chaotic period, this study has explored his role as a teacher and discovered this secret, i. e. Lord Krishna has been identified as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita. This discovery will have a great significance in pedagogical practices. So the role played by Lord Krishna in the pedagogy of the Gita has been recommended to the postmethod teacher as it will help them solve many of their pedagogical problems at hand and improve on their professional practices. Thus this study will have an overarching significance for the postmethod pedagogical practices and quality education.

Objectives of the Study

This study has been carried out with the following objectives: (i) to explore and identify the constructs of deconstruction (binary oppositions and difference) in the pedagogy of the Gita; (ii) to identify and justify Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita, and deduce the qualities of a deconstructionist as instructed by Lord Krishna in the Gita; and (iii) to recommend ‘deconstructionist’ as the role of a teacher in postmethod pedagogy.

Methodology of the Study

Methodology, in general, refers to the specific process of study of a subject or text. David Silverman and Amir Marvasti define methodology as "a general approach to studying research topics" (144). As a general approach, methodology includes theories, methods, strategies and every process that are used to carry out a study. So methodology manifests in the form of a research design which varies from one research to another. John W. Creswell presents that research design consists of three dimensions: the philosophical worldviews; the strategies of inquiry; and the specific methods (4). The worldviews refer to the theoretical understanding of the phenomena in the world. In this sense, any methodology in a research is guided by a certain theory, so theory and method are interrelated. Silverman and Marvasti also comment that "decisions about methodology are always theoretically loaded" (143). Following them, this study is grounded on 'deconstruction' as a theory conceptualized by Derrida and 'deconstructive reading' as a method of inquiry practiced by Derrideans. Although there are many theories being practiced in social research, Creswell presents four major theories as philosophical worldviews: postpositivism, constructivism, advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism (8). Following Creswell, this study is grounded on the philosophical worldview of advocacy/participatory as deconstructive reading is always concerned with the 'other' and 'justice'. This aspect of deconstruction can be observed in Higgs' view as he contends: "What gives deconstruction its motive and drive is precisely its concern for or, to be more precise, its wish to do *justice* to what is excluded, to something other, to some alterity, to what is unpredictable" (171).

Michael Crotty presents nine theoretical orientations in social research, e. g. postmodernism, feminism, critical inquiry, interpretivism, constructivism, positivism,

and others (qtd. in Creswell 20). Among these types of theoretical orientations, this study complies with postmodernism as Lucy argues, “Derrida's work is often thought to be interwoven with postmodernism” which is synonymously used with deconstruction (“Postmodern” 96). Similarly, Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba have presented five alternative inquiry paradigms as social theories: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, constructivism, and participatory (qtd. in Creswell 21). Of these types of inquiry paradigms, this study is close to critical theory because in deconstructive reading a text is analyzed from critical perspective. Deconstruction as a critical theory has been argued by Gert Biesta as he states: “Deconstruction is often depicted as a method of critical analysis aimed at exposing unquestioned metaphysical assumptions and internal contradictions in philosophical and literary language” (391). After all, deconstruction itself is a critical enterprise as it deconstructs any type of foundational meaning that creates a center and presence.

In what follows, the argument is concerned with how deconstruction is used as a critical theory or a method which deconstructs the centre or presence in a text and seeks something new, questioning the existing knowledge and practices (Durmus and Gur qtd. in Biesta 391). The existing knowledge and practices that are founded on certain metaphysical assumptions refer to logocentrism, a key feature of a philosophical, literary or any kind of text. In deconstruction this logocentric nature of a text is critically analyzed and deconstructed. In this regard, Barry Stocker writes, “Logocentrism in Derrida refers to the philosophical tendency to find truth in the presentation of Being, Spirit, Consciousness, History across a philosophical system or any idea, mode of experience, emphasized in a philosophical system” (52). In the same vein, Richard J. Lane maintains, “The main target of deconstructionist argument is the 'metaphysics of presence' that is to say, the notion that systems are grounded—

or structured—in a self-present entity, such as God, the liberal humanist concept of 'man', or the notion of universal truth" (73). Thus, deconstruction as a critical theory identifies the foundational concept in a text as logocentrism and deconstructs it so that the text cannot have any foundational meaning.

Now a question arises: how does deconstruction operate in a text? To this, the answer is not that straightforward as Derrida himself did not define it and explicate how it works; he left its working open like a play. He simply said that it works or happens in a text (Smith qtd. in Caputo, Introduction 16). It is, however, the Derrideans who specified deconstruction and applied it as a method. Lane describes it as a method of poststructuralism when he puts it: "While deconstruction and poststructuralism are closely related . . . , the former is a methodological approach to analyzing texts and arguments derived from the work of Jacques Derrida, while the latter describes a hybrid discourse that usually incorporates deconstructive ideas into a wider field of enquiry" (73). So deconstruction as a method implements the constructs of deconstruction in reading a text which is called deconstructive reading. So a deconstructive reading focuses on the neutral concepts so that they may not establish a central meaning. Poovy has used different terms in his analysis to refer to such neutral concepts, such as '*écriture*' the supplement, differance, hymen, etc. (107).

Application of the theory of deconstruction to study a text is called deconstructive reading which has been used as a method in deconstructive analysis. Guided by this method, texts are studied "in terms of their marks, traces, or indecidable features, in terms of their margins, limits, or frameworks, and in terms of their self-circumscriptions or self delimitations" (Silverman qtd. in Güney and Güney 23). So in a deconstructive reading such traces, aporias, margins and limits are identified in a text. In this, Silverman further explains, "It means that deconstruction

accounts for how a text's explicit formulations undermine its implicit or non-explicit aspects. It brings out what the text excludes by showing what it includes. It highlights what remains indecidable and what operates as an indecidable in the text itself" (Silverman qtd. in Güney and Güney 23). This suggests that in deconstructive reading of a text, oppositional concepts like decidable and undecidable, internal and external, explicit and implicit and so on. As a text contains such binary oppositions, their relation should be analyzed in detail. Mary Poovy, in the same line, suggests: "The project of deconstruction, then, is not to reverse binary oppositions but to problematize the very idea of opposition and the notion of identity upon which it depends. Deconstruction therefore undermines identity, truth, being as such: it substitutes endless deferral or play for these essences" (108). That is to say, deconstruction is not only concerned with identification of binary oppositions and the way they contribute to build up identity, truth and definite meaning in a text, but it is also concerned with how the relation between these binary oppositions can be problematized, undermined and opened up the possibilities of assigning multiple meanings in the text so that the ultimate meaning of the text can be endlessly deferred.

Deconstructive reading of a text, thus, thrives to justify that the text does not contain any foundational meaning as presence or truth. To justify it, this reading "begins by noting the hierarchy, proceeds to reverse it, and finally resists the assertion of a new hierarchy by displacing the second term from a position of superiority too" (Lodge and Wood 90). As they have stated, the first step in deconstructive reading is to identify the oppositions and the hierarchy they create and reverse their hierarchy so that the center of logos created by them can be subverted. Then the next step is to resist the center of logos created by the new hierarchy so that there can be other

possibilities of meanings out of these oppositions. This process finally justifies that the text lacks any determinate meaning; it only contains an activity of semantic free play. So it is suggested that “deconstructive criticism aims to show that any text inevitably undermines its own claim to have a determinate meaning, and licences the reader to produce his own meaning out of it by an activity of semantic 'free play'” (Lodge and Wood 107). Michael Roland F. Hernandez holds similar opinion on deconstruction and contends that it works as “a strategy that opens a text up into the possibility of the multiplicity of meanings” (12). Habib makes it more explicit, after Derrida, regarding how a deconstructive reading of a text can be applied in a text when he explains:

A deconstructive reading of a text, then, as practiced by Derrida, will be a multi-faceted project in general, it will attempt to display logocentric operations in the text, by focusing on a close reading of the text’s language, its use of presuppositions or transcendental signifieds, its reliance on binary oppositions, its self contradictions, its *aporiai* or points of conceptual impasse, and the ways in which it effects closure and resists free play. (654)

As explained by Habib, a deconstructive reading of a text analyses the text from multiple perspectives and explores how meaning is centralized as the transcendental signified, the referent which goes beyond the text as referred to it by the closure of the text itself. Similarly, it identifies some elements in the text which restrict the free play of the signs opening up the closure of the text and cases of *aporiai*, the contradictions and points of conceptual impasse the text has.

This study, however, is founded on 'deconstruction' as a social theory that can be employed to study educational issues. Murphy discusses how social theories like deconstruction can be applied to explore and analyze educational issues in his book

Social Theory and Education Research. In this book Murphy argues that deconstruction can be used as social theory in education research because "educational research embeds itself in a wide variety of theoretical discourses, using them to explore issues such as professional and cultural identities, forms of educational management, changing work practices and priorities" (3). That is to say, social theories can be used to explore the issues in educational practices and offer solutions to them. So the major issues that the social theories explore in educational research include the "notion of 'power' 'culture' and 'practice' " in terms of their influence in "teaching, learning, assessment and curriculum" (7). Thus this project has used deconstruction as a social theory to study the pedagogy in the Gita.

As teaching is a social behavior, social theories are useful to explain such behavior. However, application of such social theories in education is not always that easier as they come up with certain challenges. For example, some challenges might be related to "research design and implementation, including the development of tools such as data measurement and analytical criteria" (Murphy 6-7). So it is essential that appropriate methods be selected for the effective working of the theory because a method is actual implementation of a theory; it varies from theory to theory. So a question arises—is there any right or wrong theory? To this Murphy maintains that there is no 'right' or 'wrong' way to understand and apply these theories in research because research should not be overshadowed by theory (7). In the same vein, Silverman and Marvasti maintain, "There are no right or wrong methods. There are only methods that are appropriate to your research topic and the model with which you are working" (147). That is to say, selection of a particular theory and a method in a research is a relative concept; selection of one to another is only a matter of the degree of appropriateness. However, it is to be noted that most methods in social

sciences share a number of characteristics, as listed by John M. Swales and Christine B. Feak: They are explicit about details and procedures; they are slow paced since they do not presume much background knowledge; they contain justifications, explanations, and (sometimes) examples; and the terminology is often repeated (165).

Silverman and Marvasti define methods as "techniques that take on a specific meaning according to the methodology in which they are used" (145). They present four types of methods: observation, textual analysis, interview, and transcripts (145). But, for Creswell a method refers to a specific process of doing a study. So it "involves the form of data collection, analysis, and interpretation that researchers propose for their studies" (15). He has mentioned the types of methods to be used in qualitative study: emerging methods; open-ended questions; interview, observation, document, and audio-visual data; text and image analysis; themes, and patterns interpretation. In this regard, this study has made use of 'textual analysis' as a method to study the text, the Gita.

A method works either through qualitative strategies or through quantitative ones. As this project has made use of the 'textual analysis' as a method, it is a form of qualitative method (Creswell 15). A qualitative method can be guided by different theoretical orientations and models. Gubrium and Holstein present the four models of qualitative research: naturalism, emotionalism, ethno-methodology, and postmodernism (qtd. in Silverman and Marvasti 14-19). It means these four models are the theories that are more widely used in qualitative methods. Of these models this project has been guided by the model of postmodernism because deconstruction and postmodernism have been taken as synonymous with each other as deconstruction is the core of postmodernist thinking. This can be rightly observed in John Carlos Rowe's argument when he states that " by the middle of the 1980s, the

poststructuralist methods we identify with Derrida's deconstruction were referred to generally as "postmodern writing" (118). They also talk of different branches of postmodernisms: "While some postmodernists call for experimenting with alternative modes of representing social reality, others fundamentally question all form of representation to the point of nihilism by arguing that nothing can be known as 'true' or 'good' . . ." (18). So this project has limited itself to the use of deconstruction, i. e. Derridean version of deconstructive reading of a text.

As a textual study, this project has used 'text' for the source of data. A text can be understood in a much broader sense. Tilottama Rajan, after Habermas, writes of genre in relation to a text from deconstructive perspective and states: "Deconstruction does not make any genre distinction. It treats every genre into 'one comprehensive, all-embracing context of texts . . . a 'universal text'" (Habermas qtd. in Rajan 118). We can also observe similar sense in Silverman and Marvasti as they comment: "To introduce a separate section on texts can look a little artificial. After all, aren't people on the Internet constructing texts? Again, if we treat an interview as a narrative, this can mean looking for the same textual features as researchers working with printed material. Indeed, the mere act of transcription of an interview turns it into a written text" (74). Thus a text represents a wider range of sources of data.

Silverman and Marvasti suggest that text refers to any source of information that can be used for analysis. In other words, the data derived from an interview, the field notes taken by an observer, the transcription developed from an audio recording and the like are all texts similar to the printed form of a text. So a 'text' can be conceptualized as a "heuristic device to identify data consisting of words and images that have become recorded without the intervention of a researcher . . ." (Silverman

and Marvasti 74). In this regard, this project has not made any distinction between the sources of the data as primary and secondary; it regards any source of data as a text. Similarly, the use of the Gita, a classic as a text under study is like Derrida's concept of "a heuristic device" when he states: "I think we need to read them [Classics] again and again and I feel that, however old I am, I am on the threshold of reading Plato and Aristotle. I love them and I feel I have to start again and again and again. It is a task which is in front of me, before me" (Derrida qtd. in Gatson vii). The reason behind my selection of the Gita as the text for my dissertation is exactly as asserted by Derrida. So the Gita—*Bhagavad-gita As It Is*, written by A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada—has been selected as a heuristic device.

The data for the study are all textual and they have been selected from the verses of the Gita. In selection of the data, theoretical sampling has been used as this study is concerned with identification of the constructs of deconstruction and the role of Lord Krishna as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita from the perspective of deconstruction. So theoretical sampling has been to collect the data after Mason who explains that it

means selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical position . . . and most importantly the explanation or account which you are developing. Theoretical sampling is concerned with constructing a sample . . . which is meaningful theoretically, because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test your theory and explanation. (qtd. in Silverman and Marvasti 167)

Thus guided by theoretical sampling, the categories or constructs of deconstruction—binary oppositions and difference—have been identified in the pedagogy of the Gita as employed by Lord Krishna as a teacher through binary oppositions selected from

the pedagogical discourse between Lord Krishna and Arjuna. Then these constructs have been analyzed and interpreted qualitatively following both deductive and inductive logic of argumentation. Above all, reading of the text and interpretation of the data is mainly founded on the theory of deconstruction. With this interpretive procedure, Lord Krishna has been ultimately justified as a deconstructionist teacher in the Gita, and his role as a 'deconstructionist' teacher has been recommended to the context of postmethod pedagogy.


Regarding the process of selection and interpretation of the data, first, 'binary oppositions' have been selected from every chapter in the Gita. Then, to identify the occurrence of difference and to justify the role of Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita, these binary oppositions have been analyzed guided by the theory of deconstruction. For all this analysis and interpretation of the data the process of deductive logic, "which moves from the general to the specific" (MLA 44) and "the deductive model of thinking" (Creswell 55) have been used. Furthermore, the interpretation is guided by the theoretical data as derived from the sources documented in the work cited list (MLA Handbook 10). So this study has made use of the "inductive-deductive approach of reasoning" as argued by Cohen et al. (6). Through this process of qualitative methodology of data analysis and interpretation, the reliability of the analysis and the validity of the findings have been maintained after Mitchell: ". . . the validity of qualitative analysis depends more on the quality of the analysis than on the size of the sample" (qtd. in Silverman and Marvasti 76). That is, the data derived from the text have been analyzed and interpreted guided by the theoretical constructs of deconstruction.

In writing the methodology and the report of this dissertation caution has been given as suggested by Adrian Wallwork: "The secret of writing . . . is to be able to

describe the materials you used in your experiments and /or the methods you used to carry out your research, in a way that is sufficiently detailed to enable others in your field to easily follow your method and, if desired, even replicate your work" (217). In this regard, I am sure that any researcher studying the text, the Gita, will end up with the same finding if the text is analyzed founded on the theory of deconstruction as suggested by Derrida and the concepts of postmethod pedagogy. Similarly, this project has considered the points suggested by Silverman and Marvasti in applying the methodology: (1) Limit your data; (2) Have a clear analytic approach; and (3) Recognize that proper analysis goes beyond a list (77). Thus I have limited the data of this study to the binary oppositions and difference in the Gita; the analysis of the data is guided by deconstruction; and I have justified Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita through the analysis of the data guided by the theoretical constructs derived from the theory of deconstruction and its application to education. Similarly, I have gone beyond the list of the theoretical constructs to identify the qualities of a deconstructionist as instructed by Lord Krishna in the Gita.

Conceptual Framework of the Study

This report has been conceptualized as in the following diagram:



Delimitations of the Study

As both the text and the theory in this project are broad and complex, they have been delimited as required to make this study more specific. These delimitations

are as follows: (i) It has explored only two constructs of deconstruction, namely binary oppositions and difference; (ii) It has regarded Lord Krishna as a teacher, not as a God and Arjuna as a student in the Gita; (iii) Deconstruction has been used as synonymous with post-structuralism and postmodernism; (iv) *Bhagavad-gita As It Is* by A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada has been used as a text under analysis; (v) Any source of data is referred to as 'text' in general, not as primary and secondary sources; (vi) The subjective nature of language has been restricted only to some degree but not to the optimal; and (vii) Transliteration has been used to translate the terms of Sanskrit into English.

CHAPTER TWO

COMMENTARIES AND STUDIES IN THE GITA: A REVIEW

This chapter, first, presents the commentaries on the Gita from past to present and then reviews the studies in the Gita in relation to different fields of inquiry. Then it finds out the gap of knowledge between the studies in the Gita until now and this project. So it contains two main sections: Commentaries on the Gita and Studies in the Gita.

Commentaries on the Gita

This section includes the commentaries on the Gita by different scholars from past to present which are briefly discussed below.

Commentary by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan, who is an authority on Indian philosophy and tradition, has mentioned the truths that the classics contain and their significance for any time of human civilization. Regarding his commentary and translation of the Gita as a classic, he puts it: "The vitality of a classic consists in its power to produce from time to time men who confirm and correct from their own experienced truths enunciated in it. The commentators speak to us from experience and express in a new form, a form relevant to their age and responsive to its need, the ancient wisdom of the scripture" (viii). He argues that the classics are ever significant as the message they convey contains their lived experiences for years. In the same vein, regarding the significance of the Gita in the present age, he asserts, "The chief problem facing us today is the reconciliation of mankind. The Gita is specially suited for the purpose as it attempts to reconcile varied and apparently antithetical forms of the religious consciousness and emphasizes the root conception of religion which are neither ancient nor modern but eternal and belong to the very flesh of humanity" (viii). By this he has clearly

stated that the Gita has the potential to promote unity in diversity through its common message for humanity. This justifies the wider and ever-lasting significance of the Gita.

In his commentary on the Gita Radhakrishnan analyzes it under the following headings:

Importance of the Work

Radhakrishnan highlights the importance of the Gita as a Scripture of universal significance when he states, "It gives utterance to the aspirations of the pilgrims of all sects who seek to tread the inner way to the city of God" (1). He also quotes a German-Sanskrit scholar, J. W. Hauer's view on the Gita that it is "a work of imperishable significance" as it gives us the "profound insights that are valid for all times and for all religious life" (1). Thus he concludes that "it is a powerful shaping factor in the renewal of spiritual life and has secured an assured place among the world's great scripture" (2). His view on the Gita justifies that it is the most significant text in the world.

Date and Text

Regarding the period or date of its origin, Radhakrishnan argues that it is later than the early Upanisads and earlier than the development of the philosophic system. So it is "definitely a work of the pre-Christian era" (5). Although the exact author of the Gita is unknown, it is widely attributed to Vyasa who is also the compiler of the *Mahabharata* of which the Gita is a part.

Chief Commentators

Radhakrishnan has presented some commentaries on the Gita by some prominent Hindu scholars like Samkara, Ramanuja, Yamunacarya, Madhva, Nimbarka, Kesavakasmirin, and Vallabha. Shankara's commentary on the Gita is the

most ancient of the existing ones. In his commentary on the Gita Shankara states that "Reality or Brahma is one without a second. The entire world of manifestation and multiplicity is not real in itself and seems to be real only for those who live in ignorance" (qtd in Radhakrishnan 8). Ramanuja, however, refutes the doctrine of the unreality of the world as argued by Shankara, so he disagrees with the path of renunciation of action as suggested by Lord Krishna in the Gita. Instead, he highlights the path of knowledge, devotion and action in it.

Ultimate Reality

In Radhakrishnan's view the ultimate reality that the Gita talks about is the Eternal One or the Supreme or the Brahman as it cannot be talked of in terms of name. He maintains, "We can only speak of It as the non-dual, advaita that which is known when all dualities are resolved in the Supreme Identity" (14). The concept of ultimate reality in the Gita goes along with the Upanisads that "the Real is not this, not this" (14). However, such Supreme is attributed with some qualities like unmanifest, unthinkable and unchanging, neither existent nor non-existent (14). The Supreme as the ultimate reality has been identified with two-fold nature as 'being' and 'becoming' and that he is both *para* or transcendent and *apara* or immanent, both inside and outside the world (15). Radhakrishnan concludes the Real in the Gita as "the supra-cosmic, eternal, spaceless, timeless Brahman who supports this cosmic manifestation in space and time" (21). He also gives some other names to refer to this ultimate reality as the Universal Spirit, Paramatman, Paramesvara, Purusottama, and the Supreme Person.

Krishna, the Teacher

Besides different attributes and roles, Lord Krishna is also identified as a teacher or guru in the Gita as he is guiding Arjuna, his pupil towards the right action

because he was "fighting with the forces of darkness, falsehood, limitation, and mortality which bar the way to the higher world" (33). In this context he takes refuge to higher self, Lord Krishna who is also called "the world teacher" or *jagadguru*. Thus, Radhakrishnan identifies Lord Krishna as the world teacher—the one who has the potential to teach everyone in the world.

The Status of the World and the Concept of Maya

Radhakrishnan argues that the Gita regards the world only as "an appearance which cannot be logically related to the Absolute" or the Brahman because "the world is dependent on Brahman, the latter is not dependent on the world " (35). That is, the status of the world is simply an illusion. But it is the concept of *maya* that links the world to the Brahman. In his words, "This one-sided dependence and the logical inconceivability of the relation between the Ultimate Reality and the world are brought out by the word *maya*" (35).

The Individual Self

Radhakrishnan identifies the individual self as "a portion of the Lord, a real, not an imaginary form of the Supreme, a limited manifestation of God" (44). Such individual self exists in a man who "is a complex multi-dimensional being, including within him different elements of matter, life, consciousness, intelligence and the divine spark" (46). It is the individual self that constitutes the essence of the ego which is understood as "the distinguishing characteristic of human personality" (44).

Yoga- Sastra

Radhakrishnan in his commentary on the Gita argues that *yoga-sastra* teaches us "a practical way of reaching the supreme ideal" or Lord Krishna, and it is concerned with "spiritual dynamics", so it is "a discipline" to practice spiritual thoughts (50). He presents the etymological meaning of *yoga* that it was derived from

the root in Sanskrit, *yuj* which means 'to bind together' (51). So yoga means "binding one's psychic powers, balancing and enhancing them" (51). The Gita is also an important Scripture that deals with yoga-sastra as it "gives a comprehensive yoga-sastra, large flexible, and many-sided, which includes various phases of the soul's development and ascent into the Divine" (51). Moreover, the Gita explicates three important types of yoga: *jnana-yoga* (the way of knowledge), *bhakti-yoga* (the way of devotion) and *karma-yoga* (the way of action [51]).

Jnana or Saving Wisdom

Radhakrishnan describes *jnana* as vidya or wisdom which is "the means of liberation from the chain of *avidya-kama-karma*" (53). He relates *avidya* 'ignorance' to desire and states that it is the root cause of desire which causes bondage in life (53). So it is only through the wisdom that the bondage can be destroyed, the saving wisdom. To practice wisdom, "We must control the senses, possess the faith which no intellectual doubts and train the understanding (*buddhi*)" (53).

The Way of Knowledge: Jnana Marga

The term '*jnana*' refers to the "spiritual wisdom" which can be attained through "the intellectual pathway" (55). Radhakrishnan posits that the word *jnana* is "employed for both the goal of perfection and the way to it" (56). This *jnana* or wisdom which is "pure and transcendent" is different from scientific knowledge, though it is not discontinuous from it (56). *Jnana* is described as higher than the scientific knowledge as "The partial truths of science are different from the whole truth of spirit" (56). This *jnana* is fully discussed under Samkhya philosophy which is also a theme of the Gita. The development of *jnana* is affected by *purusa* (self) and *prakriti* (not-self) which are subordinate to God. *Prakriti* plays an important role for the development of knowledge because "all mental and material phenomena are

explained as the outcome of the evolution of *prakriti*" (57). There are three modes of *prakriti*: *sattva* (lightness), *rajas* (movement), and *tamas* (heaviness).

The Way of Devotion: Bhakti-Marga

Radhakrishnan defines *bhakti* or devotion as "a relationship of trust and love to a personal God" (61). The etymological meaning of the word is related to the meaning of the root, *bhaj* which means "to serve or service of the Lord" (63). In the practice of *bhakti*, devotees render their love or faith to their God without seeking any profit or result. In this process "the human soul draws nearer to the Divine by contemplation of God's power, wisdom and goodness, by constant remembering of Him with a devout heart, by conversing about His qualities with others, by singing His praises with fellow men and by doing all acts as His service" (63). *Bhakti* is one of the most important lessons taught by the Lord to Arjuna; it is regarded as the surest path to liberation.

The Way of Action: Karma Marga

The term *karma* refers to the involvement in action, doing one's assigned duties. For example, it was Arjuna's action to fight the war, not to withdraw from it. And this is what is taught by Lord Krishna to Arjuna. Radhakrishnan also argues: "The Gita is therefore a mandate for action. It explains what a man ought to do not merely as a social being but as an individual with a spiritual destiny" (71).

The Goal

Although the Gita discusses the paths to liberation or achieving the Supreme God, the ultimate goal of the Gita or Lord Krishna's teaching is to find the unity in these paths so that he can be realized. Radhakrishnan also agrees with this theme of the Gita when he concludes: "The Gita insists on the unity of the life of spirit which cannot be resolved into philosophic wisdom, devoted love or strenuous action. Work,

knowledge and devotion are complementary both when we seek the goal and after we attain it" (83). The ultimate goal of the Gita is to make one realize the unity in diversity and the essence which is undeconstructible, Brahman.

Commentary by Juan Mascaro

Mascaro, who taught at Cambridge and Oxford, translated the Gita into English as *The Bhagavad Gita* in which he praised its greatness: "The greatness of the Bhagavad Gita is the greatness of the universe; but even as the wonder of the stars in heaven only reveals itself in the silence of the night, the wonder of this poem only reveals itself in the silence of the soul" (33). He finds music everywhere in the Gita as he feels: "The vast symphony of the *Bhagavad Gita* goes on" (25). He identifies Krishna as "the God of Love" and contends that love for Krishna is the way to "have the universal harmonies of Brahman in the Universe" (25). In reviewing the Gita, he asserts that the symphony of the Gita contains many themes. However, he argues that the Gita has three central themes: *jnana* (light), *bhakti* (love), and *karma* (life [28]).

Mascaro explored the depth of the Gita and its significance in life which can be observed in his following words:

We may read the *Bhagavad Gita* in Sanskrit again and again, until we know the most important verses by heart, and chant them in Sanskrit, and the language of those verses becomes as familiar to us as our mother tongue. We may go to that poem in times of sorrow and joy and thus connect it with the deepest moments of our life; and write down the thoughts and emotions that the verses wake in us; and our reading may go on for years; and suddenly one day we may feel that we are reading the *Bhagavad Gita* for the first time. (34)

Commentary by A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada

Prabhupada, the world's foremost Vedic scholar and teacher, who represents an unbroken chain of fully self-realized spiritual masters beginning with Lord Krishna himself, who is also the Founder- Acharya of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), rendered the Gita with his brief commentary— *Bhagavad-gita As It Is*. He claims that all the other translations and commentaries on the Gita are not genuine and authentic because he argues that "almost all the English editions of Bhagavad-gita were introduced to fulfill someone's personal ambition" (xviii). So he asserts that his purpose of translating the Gita into English is "to present the will of Krishna, not that of any mundane speculator like the politicians, philosopher, or scientist, for they have very little knowledge of Krishna, despite all their other knowledge" (xviii). This claim may sound odd and vain but his logic is that "Krishna is absolute and there is no difference between Krishna's name, Krishna's form, Krishna's qualities, Krishna's pastimes, etc. This absolute position of Krishna is difficult to understand for any person who is not a devotee of Krishna in the system of *parampara* (disciple succession [xviii])." This proves that Prabhupada has explored the dimensions of Lord Krishna as instructed in the Gita and brought to us this authentic knowledge as it is.

Prabhupada states that the Gita is also known as *Gitopanisad* as it is the essence of Vedic knowledge. He identified Lord Krishna, the speaker of the Gita as "the Supreme Personality of Godhead, *Bhagvan*" (3). He finds Arjuna's relation to Krishna both as a devotee as well as a friend but their friendship is not common; it is of transcendental friendship (3). He identifies that "there are three types of transcendentalists, namely the *jnani*, the *yogi*, and the *bhakta* or the impersonalist, the meditator, and the devotee" (3-4). He further illustrates that the relation between

Krishna, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, and Arjuna is that of Lord and devotee respectively. Besides, we can also find the relationship between Lord Krishna and Arjuna as that of friendship. That is why, the Gita was instructed to Arjuna and he was capable to understand its message. However, Prabhupada mentions that a devotee can be in a relationship with the Supreme Personality of Godhead in one of the five ways: (1) in a passive state; (2) in an active state; (3) as a friend; (4) as a parent; and (5) as a conjugal lover (4).

Prabhupada contends that the subject of the Gita entails the comprehension of five basic truths: *isvara* (the science of God), *jiva* (the constitutional position of the living entities), *prakriti* (material nature), *time* (the duration of existence of the whole universe or the manifestation of material nature), and *karma* (activity [7]).

Prabhupada argues that out of these five items four of them (*isvara*, *jiva*, *prakriti*, and *time*) are eternal, whereas *karma* is not (10). But the Lord is above all these truths and controls all of them, so he is called the Supreme Personality of the Godhead, or he can be called by many other names: Krishna, Brahma, Paramatma, and many more. With this background Prabhupada further suggests, "From *Bhagavad-gita* we must learn what God is, what the living entities are, what *prakriti* is, what the cosmic manifestation is, how it is controlled by time, and what the activities of the living entities are" (7). This suggests that understanding the God is to understand the science of the functioning of different constituents in the universe.

Prabhupada further maintains that *isvara* is the supreme consciousness, whereas *jivas* are only parts and parcels of that consciousness, and that "both the conscious of the Lord and that of the living entity are transcendental" (10). But the difference is that the consciousness of the Lord is not contaminated or materially affected but that of the living entity can be. So it is necessary for one to be free from

materially contaminated consciousness in order to understand the transcendental world. It means our activities are to be purified which is possible only through *bhakti* (10). Similarly, he argues that living entity must be free from the bodily conception of life in order to be transcendentalist and succeed in *bhakti* (11).

Prabhupada in his interpretation of the Gita regards Krishna as "the cause of all causes. He is the primal cause, and He is the very form of eternity, knowledge and bliss" (13). Similarly, he regards the Gita "as the most perfect presentation of Vedic knowledge" (14). So he suggests that "we must accept Bhagvad-gita without interpretation, without deletion and without our own whimsical participation in the matter" (14). By this, Prabhupada insists that the Gita contains all the authentic knowledge which needs to be understood as it is revealed by Lord Krishna to us.

Commentary by Swami Dayananda

In his book entitled, *The Teaching of the Bhagavad Gita*, Dayananda explores the teaching or message of the Gita to its modern readers with detail explanation. He is popularly known for his classical *vedantic* interpretation of the Gita. He has discussed the themes of the Gita into twenty-one chapters which are briefly reviewed below.

In chapter 1, "The Human Problem," he identifies the mind as a 'battlefield' because the mind is always in conflict which arises because of the choices available (1). So he declares, "Everyone has conflicts; every mind is a *kuruksetra*, a battlefield" (1). As there are the choices, the mind is always changing, which he regards as "a fundamental human problem" that began from the time of ancestor's (2). And he further contends that there will always be conflict as long as the mind remains. So, to solve the human problems, the conflict in the mind should be resolved, and it is possible because "the human mind desires to be free from conflict" (3). To this,

Dayananda argues that the Gita has resolution—it teaches human beings how their fundamental problems can be better addressed. This is to "know the adequate self" because if we only remain with the inadequate self that always says 'I want', we can never be happy. This was the same problem with Arjuna in the beginning, but later on when he was made to realize his adequate self by Lord Krishna, he was able to eradicate his delusion (6).

In chapter 2, "The Sorrow of Arjuna," Dayananda presents the opening scene of the war of the Mahabharata to which the Gita is related. In the battlefield, on the eve of commencement of the battle, Arjuna suffers from the conflict whether it is good or bad to kill his kiths and kin in the battle. He describes Arjuna's conflict at the moments: "Arjuna is confused and overwhelmed by sorrow. He sees no solution to his problem. He cannot decide whether to retreat (*nivrtti*), or advance (*pravrtti*)" (13).

In chapter 3, "The Search for Solution," Dayananda presents Lord Krishna's advice to Arjuna that as a Kshatriya it is his duty to fight the battle. However, he was not willing to take action because there were his venerable gurus on the other side to whom he had to slay. Finally, Arjuna was ready to take his duty when Lord Krishna played the role of his guru to dispel his ignorance, giving him the knowledge of Sankhya philosophy. And Arjuna was ready to take action in the battle because he realized that *sreya* is much worthier than *dharma*.

In chapter 4, "The Three Limitations," Dayananda discusses limitations that the human beings have in gaining *sreya*. The first is that the human heart is subject to sorrow; the second is the mortality or time-bound nature of life; and the third is ignorance (23). He justifies that we want to overcome these limitations through seeking freedom: "freedom from sorrow, freedom from death, and freedom from ignorance" (24). And we read the Gita because it helps to get these freedoms in life.

In chapter 5 Dayananda explores the true nature of being or self under the title, "Who Am I?" He raises the following questions in order to understand the fundamental nature of 'I': are you the body? are the sense organs? are you the mind? are you the intellect? and are you ignorance? (30-32). He then concludes that we are awareness. So he suggests that we must say: "I am someone who is aware of my ignorance, my knowledge, my memories, my emotions, my hunger, my sense organs, and my body. All that I hear, see, smell, taste or touch are objects. I am the subject, the aware being, who is aware of all the objects, including the body and the mind" (32). In this statement he stresses that one needs to be aware of everything that he/she is exposed to as this helps him/her to understand who he/she is.

In chapter 6, "You Are Happiness," Dayananda discusses what happiness is. He maintains that limitation is not real because humans have the power to fight against it, but that human nature is simple awareness (*cit* [37]). And this awareness is the source of happiness because when we are aware of the self, we are also aware of our body, emotions, thoughts, and all other objects of the world (40). He further states that "happiness is manifest only in a satisfied mind, a mind that desires nothing" (40). So he concludes that happiness is the absence of desires, and a wise person does not depend upon anything for happiness; he lives in the world without fear or attachment, moving as freely as the air (43).

In chapter 7, "Karma Yoga," Dayananda explicates the significance of action in one's life. When Arjuna was in confusion whether to take action or not, he was advised by the Lord that action for him was of more significance than renunciation. Then he explains to Arjuna what *karma yoga* is. He simply defines *karma yoga* as "an attitude towards action" (52). By attitude he means to say the attitude which can defuse one's likes and dislikes while performing action or performing the action

without expectation of result. In other words, in performing our action, we should avoid the concept of success and failure; we should have the attitude of fruitlessness or neutrality to action.

In chapter 8, "Knowledge and Actionlessness," Dayananda compares the concepts of knowledge and actionlessness. By knowledge he contends that it is the knowledge of the self that "the Self is indestructible, immortal, unborn, full, and limitless" (58). As Arjuna lacked this knowledge in the beginning, Lord Krishna taught him. As a result, Lord Krishna became his guru and he was his disciple. Here he justifies the need of a teacher and suggests: "You must go to a teacher who will show you that all that you seek in life is yourself" (61). The notion of actionlessness, as he explains, is concerned with the conviction that we are not the actual actor or doer. We are actually the Awareness only, all the action is performed by the organs of the body or senses. Thus he writes, "One who appreciates oneself as actionless does not take oneself to be an actor, in spite of acting" (66).

In chapter 9 Dayananda defines renunciation as the notion that one is not the actor; the action is done by the actionless nature of the self. In the state of actionlessness or renunciation, the *yogi*, according to him, "sits happily in this nine-gate city (this physical body), neither acting nor causing anyone to act" (68). The meaning of renunciation is derived from the Sanskrit word *sannyasi* which means total renunciation or not having any desire for possession of things. Arjuna now is more confused about whether renunciation or action is better. To this, Lord Krishna suggests Arjuna that he cannot choose *sannyasi*, he should do his *karma*, i. e. *karma yoga*.

In chapter 10, "Meditation," Dayananda discusses the importance of contemplative mind or meditation for learning or knowledge. He delineates some

requirements for meditation that one needs to develop contemplative mind which is "a mind free from likes and dislikes, a mind that is naturally more abiding than reactive, a mind that is able to see things clearly, a mind that observes without judging, a mind that is naturally smiling, not subject to easy excitement" (76). With such contemplative mind one is ready for meditation during which he/she should appreciate himself/herself as formless, shapeless Awareness that is all silence. The practice of such meditation opens up new avenue which guides one to the moment in which "the seeker finally reaches the sought" where "the seeker and the sought are fused . . . the seeker does not see God as deity, nor himself as a devotee. God and the devotee resolve into each other; duality disappear" (78). This is the state of true knowledge which Dayananda describes in terms of three features: limitlessness, actionlessness, and self-effulgent Awareness (78).

In chapter 11, "Who Is God?" Dayananda explores what the Gita says about God. He argues that God or the Lord is "the entire creation" so all forms are His forms; therefore, one can invoke the Lord in any form" (91). In the Gita the Lord appeared as Lord Krishna and taught Arjuna that there is nothing beyond him as he is the author of creation and in him everything merges. Thus he concludes that God is "limitless Awareness" that includes each and every creation (92).

In chapter 12, "The Self as Brahman," Dayananda identifies the self as Brahman with references to different verses from the Gita. He argues that the root of Brahman, *brah*, signifies 'bigness'. How big does it mean? To this he mentions: "Nothing qualifies or limits that bigness; it is unconditionally big. It has no form, no limitation whatsoever" (98). So the term *Param Brahma* designates limitless *Brahma* which is not limited by any space or time. Similarly, he also presents that the root meaning of *atma* is "that which pervades everything". It suggests that whatever is

limitless can pervade everywhere, i. e. *Atma* (self) and *Brahma* are the same. He identifies some other themes of the Gita concerned with the understanding of the self and *Brahma* which are discussed under the topics: God is not different from me, Who is a devotee? What is *Brahma*? What is death and birth (*samsara chakra* [93-101]?).

Dayananda discusses, "King Among Secrets," as a theme of the Gita in chapter 13 of this book. By this he means to suggest the most secret knowledge of the Gita which he claims is "knowledge of the Self" (102). Focusing on its significance, he states: "It is a waste of human life, if one does not discover the truth about oneself" (103). He further explicates that the great secret is to identify the relation between the real and the apparent with the example of clay and pot. He writes, "Clay is real; the pot is apparent. The pot exists when clay exists, but when the pot is gone, clay still remains" (105). Thus the great secret is to identify the real that exists for ever. He discusses this theme with the sub-themes—King among Branches of Knowledge, Know the Lord, Know Thyself, Real and Apparent: The Great Secret, You Are Full, and The Cares of Humankind.

In chapter 14, Dayananda presents "The Glories of the Lord" as another theme of the Gita. This theme is mainly based on the lesson derived from chapter 10 of the Gita in which the Lord reveals the truth that "any glory which is found anywhere is His" because he asserts that he is "the material cause of the entire creation" (113). Equipped with such divine glories, Lord Krishna manifests himself into a cosmic form which cannot be observed by Arjuna through his sensual eyes. So he begs the Lord to provide him with the divine vision through which he could see his divine glories and form (115). As Lord Krishna bestows Arjuna with this divine vision, he is surprised to see the Lord's glories. Dayananda further states that one needs to have a peaceful mind in order to actualize the Lord's glories (110-111).

"Devotion" is the fifteenth theme as presented by Dayananda in this book while summarizing the essence of the Gita. By devotion he means to suggest the practice of being involved in action and offering its result in the name of Lord Krishna. He quotes the essence revealed by Lord Krishna to justify the meaning of devotion that it refers to the one who goes on with his work remembering the Lord (119). So devotion here is to be fully committed to Lord Krishna in whatever one performs; such a follower can only be his true devotee. In this regard Dayananda quotes what Lord Krishna has asserted on devotion and devotee, "Continue to do your work for achieving what you want; and when the result comes, remember me as the one who gives the fruit of action. One who cultivates this attitude is My devotee; his mind will abide in Me and My teaching will be clear to him" (118). So doing everything in the name of Lord Krishna is devotion; it is actually the attitude of the follower because when one remembers the Lord or offers him anything he likes without any ego and self interest, it is devotion (123). In this chapter Dayananda concludes, ". . . for *bhakti*, devotion, is the very attitude which makes you a *karma yogi*, performing action for the Lord's sake, gladly accepting all results as His blessing. *Karma yoga* is indeed *bhakti yoga*" (125).

Chapter 16 is entitled, "The Field and the Knower of the Field," which is mainly discussed in the thirteenth chapter of the Gita. Dayananda explains that *kshetra* refers to "anything that falls within one's field of experience", i. e. *kshetra* means 'the field' (126). In more specific sense *kshetra* refers to the physical body of an individual as an object of perception as well as the entire phenomenal world (126). So *kshetra* consists of the five elements (space, air, fire, water and earth), the ego, the intellect, ignorance, the ten organs, the mind and the five sense objects. He recapitulates the general meaning of *kshetra* after Lord Krishna in the following

words: "All that you are aware of—all objects, your likes and dislikes, pleasures, misery, fortitude, your knowledge, and ignorance all this is *kshetra*" (127). By *kshetrajna* (the knower of the field) he means to say the one "who is aware of *kshetra*, including this physical body and this phenomenal world" (127). This *kshetrajna* has multiple roles, so it appears to be the seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, doubter, knower, and so on. In other words, *kshetrajna* refers to *jnanam* and *purusha* because *jnanam* means to be that which is to be known which, in turn, refers to *purusha* which means *purna* (full [128]).

"The Three Qualities" is the theme of the Gita as discussed by Dayananda in the seventeenth chapter of this book. These qualities are the result of *prakriti*, and they have been discussed as *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. These are also called *gunas* which determine the psychological disposition of an individual (137). He explains that *sattva* represents knowledge which has the qualities like peacefulness, knowledge, inquiry, and clear thinking; *rajas* refers to the qualities that promote activity which develops the qualities like hyperactive, ambitious, active but thinking, wedded to an ideal and achievement; *tamas* refers to the quality of inactivity which makes a person selfish and greedy (138). Although these qualities are distinct in themselves, they are also intertwined with each other. As Dayananda puts it, "All the three qualities are found in every *antahkarana*, mind: everyone is at times contemplative, at times active and at times dull. The predominance of one of the three accounts for one's peculiar disposition (139)."

Chapter 18, "The Tree of *Samsara*," describes a tree called *asvatha* which has its root above and branches below which are called the Vedas as Lord Krishna describes it in the first verse of chapter 15 (Dayananda 141). In Sanskrit it is called *asvattha* which means *avyayam* (long-lived). However, it will come to an end when

knowledge dawns (141). Dayananda also describes the tree of *samsara* in a different way that the "branches of this tree are *kshetra*, the field of experience. The knowledge of karma contained in the Vedas forms its leaves, necessary for its survival" (142). The tree of *samsara* is described to be so mysterious that it cannot be perceived; it has no end and beginning, i. e. no existence. So this tree should be understood well—the well-rooted *asvattha* tree should be cut by the weapon of detachment (143). People who are free from pride, delusion and attachment can understand this tree properly and reach the limitless abode.

Chapter 19, "The Divine and the Demoniatic Nature," represents another important teaching that is well-discussed in the sixteenth chapter of the Gita. This presents the human qualities into two distinct poles—*daivi sampad* (the divine nature) and *asura-bhava* (the demoniac qualities). Citing the first, second and third *shlokas* from chapter 16 of the Gita, Dayananda mentions the following qualities of *daivi sampada*: fearlessness, purity of mind, commitment, the pursuit of knowledge and yoga, charitableness, self-restraint, doing worship, study of the scripture, performing austerities, straightforwardness, practice of noninjury, truthfulness, controlling anger, renunciation, tranquility, non speaking ill of others, compassion for all beings, lack of desire for objects, gentleness, modesty, not speaking or acting needlessly, brilliance of mind, etc. (153). Similarly, he also presents the qualities of *asura-bhava* 'demoniac qualities—pretentiousness, vanity, self-conceit, anger, harshness, and ignorance of right and wrong (154). As the qualities differ, so do the result, i. e. people who have divine attributes can have liberation, but those having the demoniac will have bondage (155).

"The Threefold *Sraddha*" is another lesson derived from the teaching of the Gita which is discussed in the twentieth chapter by Dayananda in this book; it is,

however, discussed in chapter 17 of the Gita. He analyzes the types of rituals, penance, charity, and *sraddha* (faith) taught by Lord Krishna in the Gita. Being guided by Lord Krishna's teaching in the Gita, he states that faith is of three types: *sattviki*, *rajasi* and *tamasi*. He illustrates that those who penance and worship to destroy others have *tamasi-sraddha*; those who penance and worship to become more powerful and greater than another have *rajasi-sraddha*; and those who penance and worship to purify his/her mind being guided by scriptures have *sattviki-sraddha* (156). Similarly, he states that *tapas* (the performance of austerities) are of three types: *manasa-tapas* (mental austerity), *vak-tapas* (austerity of speech), and *kayika-tapas* (physical austerity [157]). In the same vein, he presents *danam* (giving charity) of three types: *sattvika*, *rajasa*, and *tamasa*. He ends the discussion in this chapter with the quote from the Gita in which Lord Krishna instructs Arjuna: "The values that I have taught you are sattvika values. When assimilated they will make you naturally contemplative, and you will therefore know Me as yourself. I abide in all; in Me everything exists; you and I are not different at all" (157-158). This suggests that understanding Lord Krishna is to understand all types of shradhas and oneself as equal to him.

Chapter 21 in Dayananda's book is entitled "The Result of the Teaching" under which he presents Lord Krishna's teachings with the various themes. First, the Lord teaches Arjuna to distinguish between *tyaga* (renunciation of the fruit of action) and *sannyasa* (renunciation of action). By *tyaga* he means to say the renunciation of the fruit of action. On *tyaga* Dayananda puts it, "As a *karma-yogi*, you perform an action because it is your responsibility. You do not expect the result—nobody performs action without expecting some outcome—but it does not affect you whether the result is what you expected or not, because you receive any result as *prasada*, a blessing

from the lord" (159). On the other hand, he defines *sannyasa* as renunciation of action of any type. So there is a vast difference between them. To this he explains Lord Krishna's teaching to Arjuna:

mere renunciation of action does not qualify an unprepared person to become a *sannyasi*. One cannot become a *sannyasi* so long as one has a large stock of likes and dislikes. To rid oneself of likes and dislikes one must pursue *karma yoga* and one cannot perform action while one is a *sannyasi* Therefore, Lord Krishna advises Arjuna, 'Be a karma-yogi even though you are longing to renounce all your obligations and leave this war.' (161)

As explained by Dayananda, Lord Krishna is teaching Arjuna the way he can be a true *sanyasi*, i. e. to be immersed into the action (*karma yoga*) without having any attachment with its result. Thus, a *sanyasi* is also a *karma yogi* and vice versa.

Dayananda concludes that the world is not a trap. If somebody thinks that this world is a trap, he gives two counter suggestions to such people: (a) if you are uneasy in a situation and want to get out of it, it is better that you continue in that same field and master it; (b) if you feel that the world is a trap, you should examine yourself, because the same world does not seem to make everybody else unhappy (161). It means the world can be a trap for those who remain sad and have sorrows which are merely the result of mental projection. But happiness is natural part of life (162).

Similarly, he also stresses that the devotees should fix their mind to what Lord Krishna is teaching Arjuna in the Gita: "May you become one whose mind is ever in Me, who is devoted to Me, who worships Me, may you prostrate yourself before Me. You shall reach Me alone" (164). Why does Lord Krishna ask Arjuna to be only his devotee? This question is well-answered by Dayananda as he asserts that devotion to Lord Krishna is not only a matter of feeling, but a matter of discovery like a scientist

discovering a fact (165). So this suggests that understanding Lord Krishna is a process of discovering and a pursuit of scientific investigation, i. e. the teachings in the Gita are scientific.

Commentary by Winthrop Sargeant

Sargeant is an American writer and translator who had a long-standing interest in the Gita. So he produced a book, *The Bhagavad Gita*, which contains his brief commentary on the Gita. Before translation of the content of the Gita, he presents its detail setting, i. e. how the Gita is a part of the Mahabharata. In this introductory note he introduces the characters involved in the battle from both sides and the major events and settings which lead to the war. It is because the teachings of the Gita can be better understood when the contexts and roles of the characters are understood. He also compares the Hindu concept of creation with Hebrew and Christian and states that the Hindus regard the universe that stretches, in cycles of creation and destruction, into the endless past, and that will stretch, in similar cycles, into the endless future" (vii).

After presenting the setting of the Gita, he presents *Gita dhyanam* (meditation on the Gita) which highlights the significance of the Gita in human life. The third stanza of the invocation is translated as "The Upanisads are the cows; the milker is Krishna; Arjuna, the cowherd, is the calf; men and women of purified intellect are the drinkers; the milk is the sublime nectar of the Gita" (2). By citing this invocation in his book on the Gita, he is praising its glories and magnificence globally.

Commentary by Purushotam Pal

Upon reading the Gita, Pal comments that "many of the answers given by Krishna appear to be elusive and occasionally sophistic. When logic fails, Krishna apparently restores to divine magic (*maya*). The Gita is transformed from a reasoning

dialog in chapters 1-9 to a poetical and mystical vision in chapters 10-11. Similarly, he also raises some fundamental questions about the implication of the Gita in practical life: Can the ordinary human being ever give up the fruits of action? Is Hinduism again talking so big and positing goals so idealist that, with the exception of saints, all must despair of success? Is it reasonable? Is it practical to expect Arjuna, trained as a Kshatriya, expert in arts of war, to fight without desire to win? (Pal, Introduction).

Commentary by Devdutta Pattanaik

Pattanaik broadly reviewed studies on the Gita from ancient period until now and presented them in his book, *My Gita*. In this book he states that "the Gita readings took place in five waves spread over 1,200 years" which are briefly presented below (24-28). The first wave (from eighth to thirteenth century) included 'commentaries' in Sanskrit known as '*bhasya*' and the major commentators were Adi Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva Acharya. They were mainly concerned with the nature of God (Was God embodied, 'sa-guna' or formless, 'nir-guna'?) and the relationship of divinity and humanity. The second wave (from thirteenth to eighteenth century) included 'retellings' of the Gita in regional languages like in Marathi by Gyaneshwara, in Telegu by Peda Tirumalacharya, in Odiya by Balaram Das, in Assamese by Govinda Mishra, and many more. This period became more successful in taking the divine knowledge of the Gita to the masses, and the Gita started being personified as a goddess and hymns were created to meditate on her. The third wave (eighteenth century) was mainly the period of 'translation'. Some Europeans like Edwin Arnold, who are known as Orientalists, showed interest in the Gita and translated it into English. The fourth wave (early twentieth century) involved 're-translation' of the Gita by the Indian nationalists. Such nationalists were B. R. Ambedkar, Bal

Gangadhar Tilak, Mahatma Gandhi, and others; they were mainly interested in the Gita as a means to unite the people from divergent socio-cultural classes. The fifth wave (mid-twentieth century onwards) was concerned with 're-framing' as colonial empires were replaced with republics and democratic nation states. So, the European, American and South Asian scholars interpreted the Gita with multiple perspectives. For example, J. Robert Oppenheimer interpreted Krishna's cosmic form as the nuclear bomb; American academicians projected Hinduism as an outcome of an oppressive violent force, having hierarchical system that promoted patriarchy and untouchability (28).

In reviewing the studies on the Gita, Pattanaik argues that the period (twenty first century) we are living is unique; we have different contexts and issues (28). So he urges that "rather than seeking a singular authentic message" we must go for the "plurality of ideas that have emerged over the centuries and seek out what binds them and what separates them" (28). In this regard, this project is plausible as it has studied the Gita from the viewpoint of deconstruction, the present-day philosophy which allows for multiple interpretations of a text.

Commentary by Ed Viswanathana

Viswanathan wrote a book on the Gita entitled, *Amazing Secrets of the Bhagavad Gita*. In this book he has mentioned major teachings of the Gita under the central themes which are presented below (295-98).

Viswanathan presents 'duty' as a central theme of the Gita on which Lord Krishna teaches the following: (1) you have only the right to do your duty; you have no right to any rewards; (2) you should not act out of desire for the fruits of actions, and you should never be inactive at any time; (3) any action done with selfish motives will only make you unhappy, so always do selfless action (*Niskama Karma*); (4) those

who have renounced the fruits of actions are released from all karmic debt and will not be born again; (5) by abstaining from action, nobody can achieve freedom from action, nor by abandonment or renunciation of all actions can one attain perfection; and (6) God has nothing to gain by action, but still acts constantly.

The next theme that Viswanathan presents is 'the sin' on which he argues that Lord Krishna has given the following lessons: (1) even if you are the worst sinner in the world, you can cross over the ocean of sin with a bark of wisdom; and (2) as the blazing fire burns wood to ashes, so does the fire of knowledge (jnana) burn all "karmic debt" to ashes. Similarly, he presents 'the yogi' as the next theme of the Gita on which he writes after Lord Krishna that a yogi lives like raindrops on a lotus leaf; the raindrops fall but the leaf is not affected by them. So, a yogi lives in the world but he/she is unaffected by the world. Thus he teaches us to become a yogi.

The next theme that Viswanathan has identified in the Gita is 'the mind' on which Lord Krishna has taught that (1) to those who have control over the mind, the mind is a friend; but to those who have no control over the mind, it acts like an enemy; (2) to one who can control the mind and attain tranquility; heat and cold, pleasure and pain, honor and dishonor are the same; (3) whenever the mind goes unsteady and wanders, one must keep it under the control of the self; (4) the mind is restless and very difficult to control, but it can be controlled by constant practice and by detachment; (5) if you can become the master of your thoughts, you can become the master of your life as well the master of the world around you; and (6) when a person constantly thinks about objects, attachment for those objects arises in the mind; from attachment, desire is born, and from desire anger is born; from anger comes delusion; from delusion comes loss of memory, and from loss of memory

comes destruction of the intellect, and once the intellect is destroyed, a person perishes.

Another important theme that Viswanathan discusses is ‘birth and death’ on which Lord Krishna has taught the following in the Gita: (1) death is certain for anyone who is born, and birth is certain for anyone who dies; therefore, there is no reason to lament over the things that are inevitable; (2) all beings are not discernible before birth and after death, they manifest only between birth and death; therefore, there is no cause for grief; and (3) after many births and deaths, the person who has the full knowledge of the self (*Atman*) surrenders to God, knowing that God is everything. Similarly, the next theme he presents is ‘the immortal soul’ on which Lord Krishna has taught the following in the Gita: (1) the soul (*Atman*) within the body is unborn and eternal; *Atman* is not slain when the body is slain; (2) no one can destroy the imperishable *Atman*; and (3) just as a person puts on new garments after giving up old ones, *Atman* secures new bodies after giving up the old bodies.

The next theme of the Gita that Viswanathan discussed in his book on the Gita is ‘creation and annihilation of the universe.’ Lord Krishna teaches the following lessons on this theme: (1) by God's will, the whole universe is created and annihilated again and again; (2) a day of Lord Brahma, the God of Creation, lasts for a Kalpa, and his night lasts for another Kalpa; when Brahma's day arrives, all living entities come into being, and with the arrival of Brahma's night, they are helplessly annihilated; and (3) one Lord Brahma, God of Creation, lives for 311.04 trillion human years; after that another Brahma will appear.

‘Salvation’ has been identified as another theme of the Gita by Viswanathan, and he presents the following teachings by Lord Krishna on this theme: (1) salvation is for everyone; no one is denied salvation; (2) the best among us attain salvation after

one life; the worst will only attain salvation after many lives; (3) you do not have to be a Hindu to attain salvation; (4) Hindu salvation is the process by which a person realizes that he or she is not the perishable body but the Atman, the immortal soul within the body; that is the reason why Hindu salvation is known as self-realization; and (5) there are four paths to attain salvation; they are: *Jnana Yoga* (Path of knowledge); *Karma Yoga* (Path of selfless action); *Raja Yoga* (Path of breath control and pranayama; and *Bhakti Yoga* (Path of devotion).

Commentaries by Some Western Scholars

Western scholars working in different fields have praised the divine beauty and knowledge that the Gita contains. The following commentaries on the Gita are extracted from the book, *What is India? Know the Answer from the World Renowned Intellectual Giants*, compiled and edited by an Indian writer and cultural specialist, Salil Gewali. This book contains many brief commentaries on the Hindu scriptures as perceived by the Western scholars. I have, however, quoted some that are directly concerned with the significance of the Gita.

Julius Robert Oppenheimer, one of the world's greatest physicists, known as 'the father of the atom bomb' was also highly impressed by the wisdom of the Gita. So he contended: "The juxtaposition of Western civilization's most terrifying scientific achievement with the most dazzling description of the mystical experience given to us by the Bhagavadgita is all gruesome" (qtd. in Gewali 18). Similarly, Hermann Hesse, much acclaimed German poet and novelist, a Nobel Prize winner in literature, commented on the Gita: "The marvel of the Gita is its truly beautiful revelation of life's wisdom which enables philosophy to blossom into religion" (qtd. in Gewali 26). In the similar fashion, Henry David Thoreau, greatest American philosopher, writer, social critic and transcendentalist expresses the influence of the Gita in his life: "In

the morning I bathe my intellect in the stupendous and cosmogonical philosophy of the Bhagavad Gita, in comparison with which our modern world and its literature seems puny and trivial" (qtd. in Gewali 27). In the same line, Lord Warren Hastings, the first Governor General of British India was also heavily impressed by the knowledge in the Gita, so he commented: "I do not hesitate to pronounce the Gita a performance of great originality, of sublimity, of conception, reasoning and diction almost unequalled; and a single exception, amongst all the known religions of mankind" (qtd. in Gewali 49). Similarly, George Russell, an eminent poet, artist, and mystic in Irish literary Renaissance, praised the divine wisdom that the Gita and the Upanisads contain and remarked: "The Bhagavad Gita and the Upanisads contain such god-like fullness of wisdom on all things that I feel the authors must have looked with calm remembrance back through a thousand passionate lives, full of feverish strife for and with shadows, ere they could have written with such certainty of things which the soul feels to be sure" (qtd. in Gewali 51). In the same vein, Wilhelm von Humboldt, a German philosopher confessed his revelation on the Gita and stated: "The Gita, the most beautiful, [is] perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known tongue—perhaps the deepest and so loftiest thing the world has to show" (qtd. in Gewali 63). All these remarks made by the Western scholars on the Gita prove that the teachings of the Gita have wider significance. I have no references on whether Derrida studied the Gita or not. But I am of certain that had he studied the Gita, he would have praised profoundly and quoted many verses to relate his theory of deconstruction and deconstructive reading of texts.

Studies in the Gita

The Gita is a widely studied text proving its relevance to different human pursuits of knowledge related to the themes like education, management, psychology,

politics, philosophy and so on. So these studies have reviewed in the following discussion.

Educational Aspects in the Gita

In a paper, "Meaning of Education in the Bhagavad Gita" Janardan Ghimire discovered that the Gita has "occupied a significant space as a module of instruction." He identifies some key terms like "knowledge, wisdom, action and devotion" that give true meaning of education in the *Bhagavad Gita* (68). In reading the Gita from the educational perspective, he concludes:

Through the lens of education, all aspects of educational philosophy, i.e. meaning of education, aims of education, importance of education, learning materials, pedagogy, curriculum, motivational techniques, assessment practice, and roles of learner and teacher can be found and interpreted by and through a deeper reading of the *Bhagavad Gita*. Therefore, the *Bhagavad Gita* can be taken as an educational philosophy, because it has got all components of an educational philosophy ("Meaning" 73).

As suggested by Ghimire, the Gita is a reference to the study of many educational aspects like philosophy of education, curriculum, motivational and instructional techniques, pedagogy, teachers' and students' roles and evaluation. So it can be a good reference to educational studies.

Ghimire further carried out the study of the Gita for his PhD project and produced a dissertation on the Gita entitled "Educational Perspectives in the Bhagavadgita." In this project he has explored the Gita from different perspectives. So the objectives of this study were to: (i) acknowledge the historical assets of knowledge in the Gita from multiple perspectives; (ii) explore meanings and types of various human values interpreted in the Gita; (iii) infer the types of educative values

found in the Gita; (iv) search pedagogical perspectives of *Vidya* in the Gita; (v) identify philosophical principles contained in the Gita; and (vi) explore association/disassociation of the principles contained in the Gita with the stock of relevant knowledge (“Educational” 11-12).

In this dissertation Ghimire explored four major themes in the Gita: human values, educative values, philosophy and pedagogy (65). Following Murgold's argument he affirms that Lord Krishna's role in the Gita is like a real teacher and Arjuna's a student (qtd in Ghimire, “Educational” 57-58). He further argues that Lord Krishna has helped to develop Arjuna's personality through his teaching in the Gita and compares the knowledge of the Gita with the ambrosia of knowledge. Thus, he states: “Drinking this ambrosia of knowledge and wisdom, one can live successfully and holy life and can get salvation from the sorrow and sin in present life beside getting liberated from different types of bondages” (“Educational” 113).

Ghimire has found out that as a teacher, Lord Krishna has used some important teaching strategies to teach Arjuna in the Gita. These strategies are as follows: awakening of the inner heart; addressing the disciple with respectful names; artistic teaching; loving and warm behavior of the Guru; exploration of strength of the disciple; frequency in counseling; self-consciousness to duty; knowledge of result; encouragement; assurance of security; solution to doubts and curiosity; practical and divine knowledge; submission and devotion; accountability of the Guru; confession of weaknesses; use of Yoga-Energy; and presentation of challenges (“Educational” 271-287).

Ghimire's dissertation is so comprehensive that he has explored the values in the teachings of the Gita and presented them under two categories as desirous and non-desirous values. He has presented qualities of desirous values under five

categories as follows: (1) Action—uniformity in action and speech, no condemn, remaining aloof from inaction, non-violence, devotion, firmness, good company, mode of goodness in victuals, dutifulness, charity, self-virtue, fame . . . legal accumulation of wealth, skillfulness, study of Vedas, austerity, efficiency; (2) Mind—detachment, devoid of egotism, fearlessness, truth, honour, joy, stanchness, contentment, sacrifice, doubtless, greedless, devoid of anger and sorrow, peace; (3) Action and Mind—control of senses, non-jealousy, without anger, welfare, self-control, purity, tensionless, devoid of mourn, greedless service, unbiased, forgiveness, purity in soul, brightness; (4) Wisdom—equipoise, virtuous, spirituality, indiscriminate, thoughtfulness, differentiating between action and inaction, stanchness, knowledgeable, truthfulness; and (5) Behaviour—tolerance, contentment, simplicity, humility, patience, politeness, impunity, stable mind and wisdom, fearlessness, kindness, gentleness, shyness, indifferent (“Educational” 149).

Similarly, Ghimire has presented non-desirous values out of the teachings of the Gita under six categories as follows: (i) Non-action—attuned to gain for physical achievement, charity to inappropriate person, time and place; foul speech, giving up one's own action, illegal/unethical accumulation, insult others, involvement in destruction, lazybones, perform useless and horrifying action, quarrel, satisfaction of senses against the scriptural directives, slowness, tremendous effort, violence; (ii) Thoughtlessness—weakness in thought, absence of wisdom, indifference to one's own duty, loss of patience, attachment, inability to distinguish between action and non-action, virtue and vice and truthfulness and untruthfulness, uncontrolled desires, instability, wrong way, free flow of senses, abuse and condemnation, lack of peace; (iii) Sinful action—murder, avoiding duty, insult, foul speech, condemnation, greed, rudeness, victuals of pation and ignorance, condemnation of virtue, cruelty,

involvement in condemnable action and sinful action, thought only the matter of senses, infamy; (iv) Wrong thought—uncontrolled sexual desires, lustfulness, false prestige, impure commitment, jealousy, thought of ruining or destroying others, aggression, attachment to action fruit, tension, vanity, negativity, discrimination, fear, terror; (v) Ignorance—action with fruit, darkness, dogmatism, greed, attachment, obstinacy, slumber, lazybones, impatience, conflict, entanglement, delusion, weakness in heart, meanness; and (vi) Vice—egotism, pride, high-esteem, anger, cruelty, crookedness, negligence and suspicion to scriptures, dishonor, oblation, influenced by foolishness and egoism, disrespectful, materialistic thinking, paganism, free flow of senses, indiscipline, biases (“Educational” 152).

Another study of the Gita from the perspective of education is by Balbir Singh Jamwal, an Indian scholar on education, who carried out a research on the Gita entitled "Impact of the Bhagavadgita on the Present System of Education" and published its report as a book entitled, *Education and the Bhagavad Gita*. This is an important and elaborate work on the Gita to justify its relevance to education. The purpose of this study was to "highlight the philosophical ideas in the Gita and their impact on the subsequent changes that took place in the system of education" (Preface). In his study he reviewed major themes in Hindu philosophy: *karma* and *dharma*. He introduced four Vedas and Vedanta briefly (4-6) and also discussed key thoughts on Vedanta: *davaita*, *vivisthadavita*, *advaita*, *mimansa*, *sankhya*, *yoga*, and *nyaya* (6-8).

Jamwal introduces Srimad Bhgavad Gita as one of the three most important Scriptures, including Upanisads and Brahmasutras, and argues that it has "something supreme to teach the modern world" (10). He further states that the purpose of the Gita is "to remove delusion caused by ignorance and enable Arjuna to fight war . . . to

be victorious in the war of crimes against humanity . . . to show the path to the human beings to reach their destination in a disciplined way" (11). Thus, he highlights the value of the Gita in every individual's life and argues that it helps to evolve a perfect form out of a man's personality (11).

Jamwal interprets the themes of the Gita as follows (53-56): the Integral Yoga Discipline—yoga means binding one's psychic power, balancing and enhancing them; *Jnana* or the Saving Wisdom—*vidya* 'wisdom' is the only means of liberation from the chain of *avidya*, *kama*, and *karma*; the *Jnana Marga* or the Way of Knowledge—*jnana* is employed for both the goal of perfection and the way to it for the reorganization of reality as well as the scheme of spiritual knowledge; the *Bhakti Marga* or the Way of Devotion—*bhakti* is the relationship of trust and love to a personal God. In *bhakti* the devotee feels united intimately with the supreme which is experienced as the being in which all antitheses vanish, and he sees God in himself and himself in God; the *Karma Marga* or the Way of Action—the ideal way is to obtain release by knowledge and perform actions; there should be no objection to the performance of work until one reaches death.

The major findings that Jamwal has come up with his study of the Gita from educational perspective can be listed as follows (66-69): (i) the Gita provides a strong base for all the educational philosophies *viz.* Idealism, Naturalism, Pragmatism, Realism, etc; (ii) idealism accepts that ideas are the divine origin; the ultimate aim of man is to become a perfect human being and this fact has been emphasized throughout the Gita; the role of a teacher is to guide the students from the darkness to the light; (iii) pragmatism stresses on the 'actions' or 'work done'; it makes activity, engagement, commitment, and encounter as its central theme; (iv) realism says that reality can exist independent of mind; it ignores the higher mental activities and wider

experience which transcends sensory perception—as the Gita teaches us to rise ourselves higher and higher to the spheres of more and more subtle mastering over the influences of senses; (v) the Gita holds God realization to be the ultimate goal of the life; it is the sole end of all actions; (vi) the study of the Gita also plays a significant role in the development of the five basic human values and their sub-values: Truth, Righteous conduct, Peace, Love, and Non-violence; (vii) the study of the Gita strongly relates the five basic human values with the five domains of the personality (Physical, Intellectual, Emotional, Super-conscious, and Spiritual); (viii) a time often comes in the life of a man when he faces frustration, dismay, disappointment, mental tension, and unrest; the Gita can be a source of relief on such occasions; (ix) there is a necessity of religion in life to understand the meaning of life which the Gita can teach us; (x) the study of the Gita can emphasize to provide mental peace to man in the present condition of confusion and ambiguity; (xi) in this materialistic world, when people have become more superstitious practicing blind faiths, this becomes necessary to associate the teaching of the Gita with present day process of education for developing reasoning power; (xii) by associating the Gita with education, an individual will strive to develop his character in life and formulate his own ideals of life; (xiii) the Gita has infused a spirit of action in the minds of people since the time immemorial; and (ix) if associated with the present system of education, the Gita will certainly make the life of the students richer and more meaningful and they will become more active and energetic.

Priyanka Rani, similarly, carried out a study on the Gita entitled "The Effect of Bhagavadgita in the Present Scenario of Education." The major purpose of this study was to find out the relation between the Gita and the philosophy of education and to justify how the lessons from the Gita can help to uplift the status of education

running at present. Discussing the role of a teacher as guided by the Gita, she claims that the teacher must teach his subject with great competence but when the issue of judgment is involved, he should let the student feel as Arjuna was finally left to decide himself, i. e. whether to fight or not. She further maintains that the concept of the teacher in the Gita is that he must be most balanced; the true teacher not only teaches truth but also demonstrates it (Rani).

Nivedita Sahnil and Sumita Rao K., in the same vein, studied the Gita from the ethical perspective of teachers' professional conducts and produced an article entitled "Identifying Elements of the Code of Professional Ethics for Teachers in the Bhagavadgita: A Hermeneutic Study." They regarded the Gita as pedagogical context in which Lord Krishna was studied as a professional teacher and Arjuna as a student. Relating this to the context of education they state that "there has been an attempt made to trace out the educational implications from the perspective of Krishna as an ideal teacher and Arjuna as dutiful student" (716).

In this study they mainly explored the roles performed by Lord Krishna as an ideal professional teacher who is fully responsible for his disciple's learning. In this study they have identified twelve duties that Lord Krishna has performed as his professional conducts which are as follows: (i) Inculcate holistic approach to a problem; (ii) State rules and regulations; (iii) Be a knowledge provider; (iv) Solve doubts and confusions; (v) Probe questions; (vi) Repeat complex concepts; (vii) Describe students' duties; (viii) Motivate students to perform their duties; (ix) Be a guide; (x) Be open to individual differences; (xi) Instill qualities in students; and (xii) Give freedom of choice (718).

Bhavna Sharma and M. Ramachandran, on the other hand, studied the Gita from the perspective of professional education and published an article titled as

“Need of Bhagavad Gita Concepts in the Present Scenario of Professional Education.” In this study they came to the conclusion that the Gita contains all important philosophical thoughts and theories like Metaphysics, Epistemology, Axiology and Logic and they have direct influences on educational thoughts (Sharma and Ramachandran). Exploring such philosophical thoughts in the Gita, they came to a great realization that the Gita can be considered as the foundation for worldly and spiritual progress in education; therefore, it should be taken as an educational philosophy (Sharma and Ramachandran).

Psychology in the Gita

Like educational perspective on the Gita, it has also been explored from psychological perspective. In this regard, Michael C. Dillbeck studied the Gita as a case study in Vedic psychology, the concept and practice founded by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. This was a good effort to prove the significance of the Gita even in psychology, so the purpose of the study was to explore Vedic psychology "in terms of four themes: the nature of suffering, the experience of transcendental consciousness, the development of enlightenment, and the self-interacting dynamics of consciousness" (103). In this analysis he discovered that "the Bhagavad-Gita addresses the cause and elimination of suffering, the levels of the mind, the mechanics of experiencing transcendental consciousness, and the development of higher states of consciousness, or enlightenment, in which life is lived at the highest level of bliss, effectiveness, and universality" (103). This study has shed light on the significance of the Gita for reliving from sufferings and enhancing higher level of consciousness through understanding the individual psychology.

Binod Kumar Deo also studied the Gita from the perspective of psychology for his PhD project entitled “Impact of the Srimad Bhagavad Gita on the Mental State

of Cancer Patients.” His study was mainly concerned with identifying the status of cancer and cancer patients in Nepal, assessing the role of the Gita in therapy, and examining the impact of reading/reciting the Gita on the tranquility of post cancerous patients (13). He selected the sample of 300 cancer patients from B. P. Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital, Bharatpur and conducted the study under quasi-experimental design. He divided the sample into three groups: two experimental groups and one control group. The experimental groups were treated differently—one group with the treatment of the Gita recitation and the other with *bhajana/kirtana* (hymns). And the third group was simply dependent on the medicine prescribed by the doctors (152-53).

The result of the study showed that the Gita was more effective in reducing mental stress of the patients than the other means of treatment (229). By this Deo justifies the effectiveness of reciting the Gita to reducing pain in the cancer patients and links it to the psychology of Arjuna in the Gita. To this, he states: "Arjuna was highly disturbed on the battlefield. His mental condition was with conflicts. Lord Krishna encouraged him through dialogue" (229). This reference to the Gita implies that Lord Krishna understood Arjuna's psychology and counselled him effectively. As a result, his mental suffering was gone and he was fit to carry out his duty. Similarly, in this study the cancer patients got reliefs from their suffering after listening to the preaching of the Gita. This also further suggests that like Arjuna and the cancer patients, one can get relief from sufferings from life if he/she tries to follow the teachings of the Gita (229).

The Gita has also been studied from the perspective of personality development. Murgold studied the Gita from this perspective and produced an article titled "Personality Development in the Bhagavad Gita." In this article he states that

the Gita “embraces every aspect of human action, suits and elevates every stage of human development and conveys a message of wisdom in its entirety, and teaches the practical methods for the study and transformation of one's inner being" (qtd. in Ghimire, “Educational” 57-58). In fact, the Gita can be a good reference to the study of the factors related to personality development as Lord Krishna and Arjuna have different dimensions of personality. Furthermore, the teachings of the Gita are themselves targeted at enhancing the personality of Arjuna. However, this theme of the Gita needs further exploration.

N. Gayathri and K. Meenakshi, in the similar fashion, studied the Gita exploring emotional intelligence. In their study they found that the Gita focuses on the attachment as the root of all miseries because attachment leads to desire, and when the desire is not fulfilled, it leads to anger; and then anger to delusion; delusion to indiscriminate action which ultimately leads a man to his ruin (78). So it is essential for one to manage his/her emotion well. For this, the Gita is an effective resource as Lord Krishna has enabled Arjuna to control his desire. In this study they have found that the best way to manage one’s emotion is to maintain his/her emotional stability which is only possible remaining unattached to the fruits of action. They also argue that people who are of steady emotions, unperturbed by the dualisms of pleasure or pain, good or evil, loss or gain can remain unattached to the fruits of actions (78). They also have reached the conclusion that the lessons of Lord Krishna to Arjuna on the battlefield transcend religions, cultures, and beliefs, and are not bound by time or age. This suggests that once we develop emotional intelligence, we are able to go beyond any boundary for action (79).

Biswajit Satpathy and Balakrishnan Muniapan, on the other hand, analyzed the Gita from the perspective of human capital development and came up with a

paper entitled “The Knowledge of ‘Self’ from the Bhagavad-Gita and Its Significance for Human Capital Development.” Going through the verses of the Gita, they identified the verses that suggest how human capital can be enhanced as suggested by Lord Krishna to Arjuna in the Gita. They came up with the finding that ‘the lessons given by Lord Krishna in the Bhagavad-Gita are the way to achieve self realization and to realize the ultimate truth. These are very basic Universal principles (Spiritual Laws) that support and have proven that the average human does have the ability to create unlimited mind power” (146). This development of human ability and mind power is concerned with the spiritual development which, in turn, helps “to facilitate the development of transformational leaders” (146). For all this to happen, they argue that the self-knowledge is more important which can be achieved through “the control of the mind” as suggested by Lord Krishna to Arjuna in the Gita (149).

Nidhi Verma and Ajay Singh, in the same vein, carried out the study of the Gita with a view to explore stress management and published a paper, “Stress Management and Coping Embedded in the Bhagwad Gita” which really justifies the significance of the Gita in peaceful living. They regarded the Gita as “a doctrine of universal truth” and “one of the first revelations from God.” They further argue that the Gita “deals with the most sacred metaphysical science” (520). Their purpose of exploration was to provide basic understanding of the Gita in a simplified manner and inform the readers about how it can help them to manage stress in their personal life and “to recommend the therapy models embedded in the wisdom of the Gita which may add an additional content to western psychotherapies” (522). For this they presented basic understanding of all the chapters for an easy understanding of the Gita and concluded that the “application and understanding of these verses in day to day hassles can surely lead to happy, healthy and stress free life and can be helpful as

a coping mechanism for stressors of life” (522). This study has highlighted the significance of the Gita for wellbeing and peaceful living of a life.

Verma and Singh relate the teachings of the Gita to the release of stress in life. In this study the essence of the Gita alludes to the three dimensions of life: theory, practice and realization. When these dimensions are properly unified, life becomes peaceful. In this regard, they ask a question and explain: “*What does Gita teach? It teaches three things: Brahma –Vidyayam Yoga . . . It means Theory, Practice, and Realization.* The understanding of theory, practice and realization may lead an individual to cope with day to day stressors of life. There is a *theoretical physics, practical physics* and there is *technological implementation* of it” (520 [sic]). In this study they have linked the teachings of the Gita to conceptual and practical dimensions of life.

Linking the study of psychology to everyday life, S. Senthil Murugan and Nagarajan Jeyakumar explored the Gita with a view to find out its significance in everyday life and produced the report entitled “Insights of Bhagavadgita in Every Day Life.” As they have maintained in the report, the objective of the study was to explore self-realization, as discussed in the Gita, and find out how it can help to liberate people from their sufferings from everyday life (596). In this study they came to a conclusion that the main teaching of the Gita is that people can enhance their self-realization, and it helps them for the “development of virtual knowledge, modification of personality, internal consciousness, intellectual and reasoning ability, adjustment in individual and social aims, [and] establishment of importance of duties in life” (589). When people develop these qualities through self-realization in their life, this will certainly help them to manage every hardship in everyday life. This study also proves the significance of the Gita in life.

Politics in the Gita

'Politics' is another theme discussed in the study of the Gita. Amit Kumar Tiwari, Alok Kumar Pandey and Vivek Maheswari studied the Gita from the political perspective on how the Gita influenced the life of Mahatma Gandhi and his politics. They finally came up with an article entitled "Role of Shreemad Bhagwad Gita in Gandhi's Politics." So this study was based on two-fold purposes: one to explore Gandhi's life and the other to identify the influence of the Gita on his politics. They explored Gandhi's life and then argued that he became Mahatma because of his right understanding of the political, social and religious issues. They further found that his political philosophy was guided by broader concept of religion as explained by Lord Krishna in the Gita. So for Gandhi, as they maintained, religion was "not a particular religion but it was the gist of all religions"; his understanding of religion was based on "ethics and morality" and he was equally influenced by all the religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Islam and Christianity. So his "understanding about truth, non-violence, peace, and duty was guided by the gist of these religions" (5). However, it is not to deny that he was mainly influenced by the Gita that he had started it learning from his early political carrier and continued reading it all his life (5).

As Tiwari et al. remark, Gandhi's focus on the study of the Gita was to attain self-realization and *mokshya* which can only be achieved through one's control of impression and passion. They claim that Gandhi realized he was not fit for getting *moksha* as stated in the Gita because he could not control his passion. However, he claimed that his experiments were spiritual, moral and had essence of religious morality and that he was deeply influenced by the Gita; he wanted to live at peace with both, friends and foes (7).

As to the finding of this study, Tiwari et al. came to the conclusion that in Gandhi's view the Gita teaches about *karma* (duty), *bhakti* (devotion), *jnana* (knowledge), *satya* (truth), *brahmacharya* (celibacy), *aparigraha* (non-possession) and *asteya* (non-stealing [7-8]). Analyzing the teachings of the Gita as understood by Gandhi and its influence on his political career, they reached the conclusion that

Gandhi's life, work and politics were application of religion. But Gandhi's understanding about religion changed after passing the time and he himself accepted that his religious understandings were the subject of changes . . . , Gandhi did not accept Hindu system blindly and criticized many inhuman practices within the Hinduism such as Untouchability, blood sacrifices to deities . . . (8)

Gandhi, however, was of critical mind in reading the Gita as he had a different view on the teachings of the Gita from the other leaders of the Indian freedom struggle. For many leaders the Gita teaches to perform violence against violence but for Gandhi it does not teach violence against violence, it rather teaches the purification of soul within the body. The Gita, for Gandhi, teaches to remove all kinds of hatred and violent thinking within the body (10). Thus, in this study we can find a few clues that signal that Gandhi possesses deconstructive understanding of the Gita. First, he tries to remain at peace both with the friends as well as with the foes, i.e. to go beyond the hierarchy of the binary oppositions. Second, he does not have the blind faith on what the Gita teaches; he critically analyzes its teachings and points out its weakness. And lastly, he prefers to accept all the religious views on ethics and morality, i. e. interspirituality; he has an open mind, inclusive of all.

B. Mahadevan studied the Gita from the perspective of leadership development and published a paper, "Leadership Lessons from the Bhagavad Gita."

In this paper he explored the teachings of Lord Krishna regarding what a leader is and how he/she should behave. He came to the conclusion that the Gita focuses on the three basic ideas regarding the development of leadership: (i) Strong need to lead by example; (ii) Importance of developing a high degree of equanimity; and (iii) Understanding the principle of mutual dependence (14). Of them, Mahadevan focuses that the second idea of the leadership development is suggested by Lord Krishna. As the world is full of dualities which consist of both hot and cold, happiness and unhappiness, we need to face them because these are the realities of life and they will come and go naturally. So if we do not learn to endure them, we will never be able to exhibit leadership traits (14-15). This finding is the right perspective of leadership development in the Gita as it is full of such dualities and Lord Krishna's main instruction is to rise above such dualities, i.e. to show the presence of equanimity in one's thoughts and act accordingly. This kind of understanding is also very close to deconstruction which has opened up the possibility of deconstructive reading of the Gita.

After an overall understanding and analysis of the Gita from the perspective of leadership development, Mahadevan comes to a conclusion that an inspirational leadership can have several attributes which may not be available even in the contemporary leadership theories. Such attributes include: outgrow their own vision from the narrow perspective of 'what is in it for me?' to an opportunity to make a difference to the people and the place that they associate with; not afraid of anyone and not generating any sense of fear in others; an ability to dramatically transform people and entities that come to their contact in a sustained fashion; and leave behind an impact that guides a large number of people and organizations for a long time to come (16). More importantly, Mahadevan suggests that one needs to have a higher

level of spirituality in order to develop such leadership attributes and become a successful leader because he adds: “Spirituality will broaden the vision of an individual, melt their heart, embolden them to take great steps without fear of failures and significantly increase their leadership competence” (16).

Biswajit Satpathy, in the same line, carried out the study of the Gita with a view to explore spiritual intelligence and its relation with conflict resolution. He came out with an article entitled “Spiritual Intelligence from the Bhagavad-Gita for Conflict Resolution.” As he has mentioned, the objective of this study was to explore the causes of conflicts as discussed in the Bhagavad-Gita, to get the lessons to enhance spiritual intelligence that may help to resolve disagreements and to resolve conflicting situations in the management (452). In this study Satpathy employed hermeneutics as the methodology of study, identified the verses that are concerned with conflicts and conflict-resolutions and analyzed them. He made the findings that spiritual intelligence is concerned with the relationship between the person and his own mind, person with the society, person with the Nature and the person with the Supreme Power. With this when one can recognize the pervasiveness of generosity in one’s own life and the relative pettiness of being over-concerned with one’s own needs and feelings, there comes up conflict which is of the nature of 'either-or' kind of thinking. He further claims that as discussed in the Gita “conflict resolution is more than ‘zeroing out’ a transaction; it can be bringing about a web of spiritual relationship” (463). This can help in conflict resolution and management and enhance spiritual intelligence which is crucial in politics. However, this needs further exploration.

Jayant Lele reviewed the work by D. D. Kosambi on the Gita entitled "Social and Economic Aspects of the Bhagavad-gita" and produced an article “On Regaining

the Meaning of the Bhagavad Gita.” In this paper, he declares that the Gita is a fascinating document; it is an example of how a creative, imaginative, and erudite mind works at a complex historical puzzle (150). As Lele maintains, Kosambi, however, critically analyzed the Gita and identified its major problem that “it seems to ‘reconcile the irreconcilable’” (qtd. in Lele 17). He goes on to state that it is “a review-synthesis of many schools of thought which are mutually incompatible, but this incompatibility is never brought out” (qtd. in Lele 16). It shows that Kosambi’s finding in the study of the Gita contains some grains of deconstruction. When he mentions the phrases like ‘to reconcile the irreconcilable’ and ‘inequality that looks to equality,’ they show the need of the study of the Gita from the perspective of deconstruction as it works with the oppositional concepts that complement each other.

After reviewing Kosambi’s paper, Lele analyzes the meaning of the Gita from the perspective of a teacher. In the Gita Lord Krishna has played the role of a teacher who demonstrates “pure and authentic knowledge” and Arjuna as a student who is “an eager and competent seeker of truth” (161). The relationship between the teacher and the student is unequal. However, Lord Krishna has been successful to maintain the relationship of inequality into equality. It was only possible because Lord Krishna is a divine teacher who possesses “unlimited patience and kindness, love and generosity of a father to a son, a friend to a friend, a lover to a beloved” (161). This study has demonstrated that Lord Krishna has played different roles as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita. It also signals that Lord Krishna’s role as a teacher needs further exploration which has been a major concern of this study.

Environmental issues in the Gita

Environmental issues are also the major concern of the study of the Gita. In this regard, Jayita Pramanik and Bijan Sarkar carried out a study on the Gita relating

it to the environmental concern and published an article as titled “Environment and Environmental Awareness in the Bhagavad Gita.” The objectives of the study were to identify and analyze the verses (*shlokas*) in the Gita related to environment and related issues and to interpret the meaning of the shlokas with respect to environment and human-nature relationship (251). In this study they explored the Gita and identified the verses that contain environmental issues and explained them. Upon exploring the nature of discourse in the Gita, they also agree that it is like a dialogue between the teacher and the student. So they identify Lord Krishna as a mentor teacher reminding his student, Arjuna, of his duty, i. e. “to establish ‘*Dharma*,’ the rule with good governance” (251). This good governance is certainly eco-friendly.

Pramanik and Sarkar discuss many verses from the Gita that show the significance of the environment in human life. That is to say, reading these verses will arouse environmental awareness in its readers. For example, they analyze a verse from chapter 3 of the Gita and explain that it presents “the cycle of cloud, rain, food and human behavior to the nature” (252). They further explain:

This one beautifully represents the nature animal relation. ‘yagya’ is the work performed with the motive of selflessness and in the interest of others. If ‘yagya’ is thought as sacrifice and service to the environment, then this completes the cycle of nature and living beings mutual dependence. Animal lives on food (crops) which require rain to grow. Rain will only be sufficient if human performs good behavior to the environment.

Land, water, fire, air, space, mind, intelligence and arrogance these eight are ‘apara’, my non-living elements. Except these eight there is another element of mine, different from those- ‘Para’, the sense. It is the agent which

holds the whole universe. All animals are originated from these ‘Para’ and ‘Apara’. I am creating and enforcing the whole world. (253 [sic])

As the Gita has the context of pedagogical practices and environmental concern, it can play significant role to preserve the environment. So at the end of the study they make a recommendation: “Inclusion of the Gita in the syllabus will certainly enrich the learners to play environment friendly behavior and will help to grow environmental values within their mind” (255). Their exploration of environmental issues and emphasis on them in relation to the study of the Gita suggests that the Gita is a text of investigation from different perspectives—even the environmental one.

J. Hum wrote a paper, “An Ethno-ecological Introspection of the Bhagavad Gita: Scientific Implementation of the Work-culture for Sustenance of Biodiversity,” and explored in detail how people from primitive time have been living with nature in unity. For this he has identified the verses that show the relationship between nature and human beings and explained science of their relation. For example, he argues that God is nature; nature is the sacrifice of God and all the work-culture, action and ideology of action are *yajnya* (the sacrifice to God [75]). All this constitutes the biodiversity. Regarding the complexity of the biodiversity, he explains with reference to the verses from the Gita:

The whole theme of work-culture presented by Sri Krishna is meant for the whole biodiversity. All perceive the knowledge of work-culture through their systematic knowledge, while man is expected to implement his progressive knowledge to analyses it and accept accordingly. The world will perish, if the spirit of the Nature (God) ceases to work. There is nothing unattained, worth attaining or not been done, awaiting completion by the Nature. Still the spirit

of the Nature works (as duty) constantly to protect the work-culture (3/22-24).

(74)

Hum contends that Lord Krishna has given prime importance to the work-culture relation for the sustenance of bio-diversity of nature. So, as a member of this bio-diversity, we need to work to preserve this diversity so that we can combat with environmental problems that harm the bio-diversity like global warming, acid rain, greenhouse effect, Ozone depletion etc. and other natural hazards leading to spoilage of biodiversity (72-73).

Human Rights in the Gita

Sarina Aryal carried out a study of the Gita from the perspective of ethics with reference to human rights and produced a paper entitled "Comparative Reading of Bhagavad-Gita and Universal Declaration of Human Rights from the Branch of Philosophy Called Ethics". The purpose of the study was "to develop basic understanding of two diverse ethical traditions, namely, United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and Hindu Ethics from Bhagavad-Gita" (1). In her analysis of the Gita she found that it portrays ethics through "two opposing trends, one of abstinence, non-action and . . . action of moral obligations" (39). That is to say, ethics guides both types of actions—actions and non-actions as both action and non-action are complementary to each other. So, one has the right to both actions and non-actions. Thus, this study signals the occurrence of oppositional concepts (binary opposition) in the Gita which has been further explored in this project.

Management Studies in the Gita

In the article entitled "Towards a Conceptualization of *Karma Yoga*" Ashish Rastogi and Surya Prakash Pati explored the significance of Karma Yoga of the Gita in relation to the organizational management. In their review of the literature they

have mentioned different interpretations of Karma Yoga and concluded that Karma Yoga has been explored in terms of two opposing concepts—work with attachment to the outcomes and work without attachment. They state that "Karma Yoga is an energetic involvement by individuals where languor is denied and energy is channeled discretionally in selfless actions" (13). By this the Gita suggests that management in an organization needs to encourage the employees who focus on selfless actions (Karma Yogis) for the overall institutional development. The significance of this study in relation to the present study is that it has also analyzed the binary opposition—work with attachment to the outcomes and work without attachment and suggests the possibilities of exploration of binary oppositions in the Gita.

Interspirituality in the Gita

The value of the Gita can be observed in terms of its coverage of spiritual concerns which are discussed in relation to other scriptures. C. Kourie, in this regard, made a comparative study between the Gita, a holy text from the Hindu and the John of the Cross, a holy text from the Christianity. He published an article entitled "Discerning the Mystical Wisdom of the *Bhagavad Gita* and John of the Cross." The purpose of this study was to find out the similarities between these two holy texts and to contribute something to the emerging discipline 'interspirituality.' In this paper Kourie describes the Gita in Barnes' words as "undoubtedly the single most popular Hindu text, a semi-canonical scripture which nourishes the faith of millions" (qtd. in Kourie 248). He further presents the themes of the Gita as knowledge (*jnana*), action (*karma*), and loving devotion to God (*bhakti* [248]).

This paper reviews concepts of postmodern spirituality and the practices to promote 'interspirituality' in religious studies in order to justify the relevance of

spirituality in the postmodern context. With regard to this, he commends: “A major insight arising from the study of spirituality is the fact that we live in an *interspiritual/intermystical age*. *Postmodern spirituality* exhibits an openness to the deep treasures of the wisdom traditions of the world, bringing with it respect for the other, without abandoning concern for individual and communal diversity” (250; emphasis added). To show the importance of the study of interspirituality, he quotes Teasdale, a proponent *par excellence* of interspirituality, who strongly emphasises the fact that “the sharing of ultimate experiences across traditions is the *religion of the third millennium*” (qtd. in Kourie 251). Similarly, he cites Waaijman’s argument that there is “a necessity of a ‘global spirituality’; this is all the more important, given the fact that the structural matrix for any given spiritual way has the potential to become primary, and heuristic distinctions between traditions, . . .” (qtd. in Kourie 250).

Kourie’s major concern, therefore, is to raise “the global consciousness” through the interspirituality studies which he argues is “a feature of contemporary spirituality” which enables “a shift from divergence to convergence” (251). He further mentions that this global consciousness elicits a “remarkable richness of spiritual wisdom, of spiritual energies, and of religious cultural forms” (Cousins qtd. in Kourie 251), and also exhorts the believers to “respect diversity, recognize unity and celebrate the presence of the Spirit in all religions” (Chakkalakal qtd. in Kourie 250).

In regard to postmodern spirituality and interspirituality Kourie finds both the *Gita* and John of the Cross similar with their mission. For example, both the texts focus on the necessity of detachment and renunciation for spiritual development and perfection in life (262). Similarly, in both the texts, the *Gita* and John of the Cross, “discernment has led to a position whereby there is a willingness to let go of

preconceived notions, and follow a new path” (266). Thus, the study made by Kourie has justified the significance of the exploration of the Gita to promote global consciousness and the study of interspirituality to promote any pursuits of knowledge including pedagogical practices. This study has suggested the relevance of the study of the Gita founded on the theory of deconstruction which is the crux of postmodernity and has the potential for promoting interspirituality and postmodern spirituality.

Shivadurga and Anoop Gupta studied the Gita in a broader context regarding its influence in the life of great American philosopher, R. W. Emerson and secularism in America. They published the findings of their paper entitled “The Influence of R.W. Emerson, the Modern Philosopher and Saint on Secularism and His Influence on American Society: The Impact of the Bhagavad Gita on R.W. Emerson and Secularism.” R.W. Emerson is widely known as a great American philosopher, the originator of the ‘Transcendental Movement’ and also the prophet of the American religion. His search for truth and ideas to enhance life is fully guided by the thoughts from the Gita (Shivadurga and Gupta 184). They cite what Emerson said on his connection and impression on the Gita:

I would advice those of you who have not read that book (the Bhagvad Gita) to read it. If you only know how much it has influenced your own country even! If you want to know the source of Emerson’s inspiration, it is this book, the Gita. He (Emerson) went to see Carlyle, and Carlyle made him a present of the Gita (Bhagvad Gita); and that little book is responsible for the Concord Movement. All the broad movements in America in one way or the other are indebted to the Concord Party. (186)

Shivadurga and Gupta after Vivekananda further explain how Emerson influenced other great American thinkers. They argue that we can observe Emerson's vast influence on William James, Walt Whitman, Henry David Thoreau and others who are known as positive Emersonians. All of them were transcendentalists who, although they adapted to secularism, were much influenced by the transcendental ideas elaborated in the Gita. And this transcendentalism itself was known as the American Religion (186). All this justifies the magnificence of the teachings of the Gita and its influence on the Western thinkers. The study of the Gita in relation to interspirituality, however, needs further exploration in future as it seems to have unite all the spiritual practices under various religions.

Philosophy in the Gita

The Gita has been accepted widely as a philosophical text and there have been some studies on it from this perspective as well. In this regard, Ghimire explored the Gita and identified all the aspects of philosophies in it as follows: Metaphysics—reality is objective and subjective, spiritual as well as material, and the God or *Brahma* is supreme truth; Ontology—the God, *Brahma* and conscious soul ever exist, living entities are inferior and impermanent, existence of all living entities are parts of the God; Epistemology—knowledge is subjective and objective, it is connected with previous existence of life (*Sansakara*): knowing relates with meditation, company with wise person, devotion, scripture study, intuition and practice; and Axiology—values are absolute and relative as well (e. g. *Vedic* and spiritual values are absolute; they are concerned with *Gunas* of *Prakriti*, *Varnashrama Dharma* and divine and demonic quality ["Educational" 343]).

Ghimire explored different philosophical theories in the Gita and discussed them in chapter 15 of his dissertation under the title "Western Education Paradigm in

the Bhagavadgita." The theories that he has explored and identified are: Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, Existentialism, Naturalism, Perennialism, Essentialism, Progressivism, Reconstructionism, Behaviorism, Marxism, and Postmodernism. He has also identified the types of metaphysics in the Gita and listed them under the title of 'Metaphysics in the Bhagavad Gita' as follows: Idealistic metaphysics in the Bhagavad Gita; Realistic metaphysics in the Bhagavad Gita; Pragmatic metaphysics in the Bhagavad Gita; Existential metaphysics in the Bhagavad Gita; and Marxist metaphysics in the Bhagavad Gita ("Educational" 321). There is, however, no mention of deconstruction as a philosophy of education in this study. Nevertheless, it has opened up the avenue to exploration of the Gita from the philosophical perspective in education. Thus, this study has followed the deconstructive reading of the Gita to explore new philosophical dimensions in it.

Priya Kumari in her article entitled "Strands of Constructivism in the Bhagavad-Gita" explored the "glimpses of the process of knowledge construction, mutual learning and the facilitation of knowledge construction in the Gita" (530). As constructivism focuses on experiences by the learners in the process of knowledge construction, she cites Swami Rama mentioning the steps of knowledge construction in the Bhagavadgita as: "The first step is *Sravana*, the second *Manana*, . . . the third step, *Nididhyasana*, which means assimilating the knowledge one has gained and living according to it. The next step is *Sakshatkara*, in which the knowledge of the whole is revealed" (531). Similarly, it is equally important for the learners to be independent and critical in constructivist learning. Regarding the role of Lord Krishna as a teacher in the Gita, she identifies him as a facilitator. Thus, she states: "All the chapters of the Bhagavad-Gita, that is from the 'Way of Self Knowledge' through the 'Wisdom of Renunciation and Liberation' show different strategies adopted by Sri

Krisna as a facilitator to help Arjuna construct his knowledge" (533). She ends her article with a profound statement that "the Gita goes beyond constructivism, to know the ultimate truth and experience it after which there is nothing beyond..." (534). With respect to this project, it goes beyond constructivism focusing on the play of meanings in a text rather than search for the ultimate truth.

In the paper titled "The Doubting-Self as a Site of Agency? A Deconstructive Reading of the *Gita* and *Hamlet*" Sutanu Kumar Mahapatra has employed deconstruction to analyze a case in which both Arjuna and Hamlet suffer dilemma, so he has mentioned that the purpose of this study was "to trace and locate a doubting subject in two seminal texts—the Gita and Hemlet" (1). In this study he has taken the reference of Arjuna's unwilling to fight the battle in the beginning and his lead in the war at the end as the Derridean term "the logo-center or the 'metaphysics of presence'" (2) which is a theoretical flaw because in a deconstructive reading a text is justified to have lacking the center of meaning and the metaphysics of presence (Derrida qtd. in Lucy, "Postmodern" 26; Habib 654). Similarly, there is another theoretical flaw in this study when he presents that the Gita contains "a clear-cut affiliation to the dichotomy of the good and the evil of the social order that Lord Krishna constructs" (3). Such dichotomies, known as binary oppositions, do not have clear-cut affiliation leading to hierarchical relation to create a center and social order in a deconstructive reading; they are accepted as complementary to each other leading to multiple meanings as differance in a text (Derrida qtd. in Nuyen 135; Buchanan 59; Habib 653). In his analysis of Arjuna's doubting-self, we can find occurrence of deconstruction when he maintains that "this doubt [Arjuna's doubt to get victory over the battle] and rejection [unwilling to take part in the war despite Krishna's support] threatens Krishna's order." He further states, "It creates a fissure in the mind of Arjuna between his

socially assigned role and his own individual self" (4). Although this case supports the deconstructive reading, the finding of the paper justifies that the text does not have any fissure; it rather has a fixed meaning and role determined by the social, moral order. So he concludes that "Arjuna, shaking off his initial dilemma has agreed to go by the path that the moral order of that universe constructed on Krishna's discourse has scripted for him" (7). Thus, this paper is not a deconstructive reading; it is rather a structuralist reading as it justifies that the Gita has scripted meaning and role as directed by Lord Krishna.

The most relevant of all studies in the Gita to the present research project is the study of the Gita by Sabindra Raj Bhandari whose PhD project is entitled "The Transcendental in the Bhagavadgita." The objectives of this study were: to discuss the concept of the Vedic, Upanishadic, and Western transcendental philosophy, and to present the Gita as the authentic source of transcendental source of philosophy (6). Regarding the methodology of the study, Bhandari mentions that he used the philosophical tool of the Eastern/Vedic canon and the Western transcendental philosophers, and the theoretical references from various philosophers and thinkers from past to present (7). With respect to the theory applied for this study he has mentioned that the study was founded on transcendental philosophy (7). Similarly, as he has stated, his study is primarily based on the qualitative analysis of the data, "primarily a qualitative desk research" (8).

In this study Bhandari discusses some important findings in relation to the Gita from the transcendentalists' perspective. He argues that the Gita "deals with the issues of transcendence in a comprehensive way" as the process of transcendence is a "continual ascendance to a higher and higher plane" (302). He clarifies that the state of transcendence is achieved when all the dualities are merged into one. So he writes, "When all dualities are coincided, the personal mind merges with the transcendental

One, Brahma. This is the culmination of transcendence.” He further explains that in the transcendental state one and all merge into one another, and after the realization of this state, “the boundaries of *karma*, *jnana*, and *bhakti* collapse, and they all appear to be the same.” As he commends, the main teaching of the Gita by Lord Krishna is that it “shows a way out of the dualities of the mind to experience the perfect and unfettered liberation of the super-mind” (302). This finding has signaled the possibility of the deconstructive reading of the Gita as it presents that the Gita contains the dualities and that the teaching of the Gita is concerned with the transcendence of the dualities, going into the oneness. Similar to this study, the present study is also concerned with the study of the dualities in the Gita as they are called binary oppositions in the deconstructive reading. But the difference is that in the transcendental study the dualities ultimately collapse into the One and all whereas in the deconstructive study the dualities do not merge into One and all; they rather have the relation of supplementarity—one contributing to the meaning of the other without letting any transcendental center of meaning; they rather give ways to multiple meanings (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Derrida qtd. in Kakoliris 48; Derrida qtd. in Nuyen 135). This kind of relation between the dualities is called “quasi-transcendental logic” in deconstructive reading of the text (Fritsch 24-25; Biesta 394).

Another important finding of this study is that the human beings “can have access to supreme enlightenment simply by performing their prescribed duties in the right way.” It so happens, argues Bhandari, because “the realization of right action occurs when one frees oneself from *vikarma* or reaction,” and that “when one discards *vikarma*, one conceives a profound experience of inaction (*akarma*) that always opens the ground to conduct action (*karma*).” He further explains that it is the karma that always “frees the self from worldly contamination and uplifts the doer

from the mundane affairs of this life” (300). This finding justifies that access to the state of transcendence is very possible through the performance of one’s responsibilities (karma) in life. The next finding that justifies the significance of the Gita from the perspective of transcendentalism, as he maintains, is:

The Bhagavadgita transcends time and space as its message bears the quality of universal application. People are striving for the transformation of knowledge into wisdom. For that end, right philosophy about life and this world is needed. The Bhagavadgita centers on life and world, providing solutions to the bafflements of the age. (299)

As discussed earlier, the common point between this study and the present study is that both of them concern the dualities or binary oppositions that occur in the Gita. But the striking difference is that in a deconstructive reading the oppositions do not transcend into oneness as in the transcendentalism. In it the oppositions go beyond them not to form an organic whole as oneness but to show that the meaning they hold is unstable and keeps changing along with the play of their differences which produces different meanings. Thus it is understood that dualities in deconstruction work at the “ultra- or quasi-transcendental level of analysis—a level at which differences and identities are not viewed as (relatively) stable and settled” which is also known as “quasi-transcendental logic” (Fritsch 24-25; Biesta 394). Thus, transcendence in deconstruction is like “a mid-point and meeting ground between the transcendental and empirical.” That is, the dualities in deconstruction neither remain in the stable position nor do they reach the transcendental, the oneness; they remain somewhere in-between the empirical and the transcendental, which is called “quasi-transcendental, or the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical” leading to a case of differance (Chin-Yi 5).

The target differs in the transcendental and the deconstruction: the former ends with the oneness, whereas the latter with the differance. However, following the arguments of some Derrideans like David Tacey, it shows that these two theoretical perspectives on the dualities ultimately meet at a point: the oneness in transcendentalism is almost similar to “a sacred reality” which is “undeconstructible” for Tacey. As he puts it, “Deconstruction, according to the late Derrida, is a way of doing truth, of keeping things authentic and open to the possibility of transcendence. He [Derrida] wanted to unravel and deconstruct, not to arrive at nothing, but to affirm a sacred reality that he sensed was undeconstructible” (3). So if there is something undeconstructible, it is certainly the oneness! Nonetheless, the difference between these two theoretical perspectives mainly lies in the way they treat the dualities. Analysis of the dualities from the perspective of transcendentalism results in oneness as a center, whereas the analysis of the dualities from the perspective of deconstruction does not lead to a center as it deconstructs the center; it rather identifies possibilities of aporias and multiple meanings in a text which, as the Derrideans argue, will lead to the identification of 'a sacred reality' or 'the undeconstructible' not at the empirical level but at the transcendental one. Thus, guided by the theory of deconstruction, this study is concerned with identifying the constructs of deconstruction like binary oppositions (dualities) and differance in the Gita and justifying Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita.

CHAPTER THREE

EXPLORING DECONSTRUCTION IN THE PEDAGOGY OF THE GITA

This chapter mainly explores the constructs of deconstruction in the Gita. However, before this, it establishes a link between the Gita, deconstruction and religion. As this study concerns the deconstructive reading of the Gita, fundamentals of deconstruction have been discussed and the relation between deconstruction and religion has been explored to lay foundation for this study. Then studies founded on deconstructive reading have been reviewed. At the end, the constructs of deconstruction—binary oppositions and differance—have been identified with reference to the verses in the Gita. Thus this chapter contains the following sections: Deconstruction: An Introduction; Derrida, Deconstruction and Religion; Deconstruction and Religion: A Review; Deconstructive Reading of a Text: A Review; Exploring the Constructs of Deconstruction in the Gita—Binary Oppositions and Differance.

Derrida, Deconstruction and Religion

This section shows the interrelation between the three key concepts related to this study: Derrida, deconstruction, and religion because it is often argued that deconstruction does not concern religion and Derrida is an atheist. In this case, the study of the Gita from the Derridean perspective may sound irrelevant. So this section has explored these concepts further and established interrelation between these concepts in the following sub-sections: Derrida: A Radical Thinker; Derrida and Deconstruction; and Deconstruction and Religion.

Derrida: A Radical Thinker

Jacques Derrida, a radical postmodernist thinker, was born in 1930 into a Jewish family in El-Biar, Algeria; he suffered a lot in his childhood days as during the

Second World War, the Algerian Jews had their citizenship revoked, and they were treated as an outsider everywhere. This developed a feeling of uncertainty and lack of identity in him from the very beginning (Habib 649; Ahluwalia 81). Despite these difficulties and uncertainties, Derrida “undertook a study of several major philosophers, including Soren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger. He then studied at various prestigious institutions in Paris, eventually becoming a teacher of philosophy. He also worked at Harvard and, in 1975, began teaching at Yale University” (Habib 649).

Derrida’s academic journey from Algeria to France to America consists of many topsy-turvy experiences which have been compared with his development of deconstruction. To this, Ahluwalia mentions how deconstruction is influenced by colonial and postcolonial Africa in terms of his experience of exclusion, being sent home on his first day of school, radical instability of his own identity, a formative moment, colonial and diasporic experiences, and a double cultural displacement—Sephardic, and anti-Semitism (88-89). He further explains the relation between Derrida’s background and his themes in deconstruction: "Derrida's Algerian origin and his Jewish background are testimony to the importance of his identity, to his feelings of non-belonging and otherness. It is here that the personal becomes political and inevitably part of Derrida's overall project. The issues of the other, the excluded, the margin, boundaries are all personal in his case" (84). Despite all these hardships in life, Derrida developed a very influential personality that people in his contact were captivated by “his sparkling intelligence, his philosophical originality, and his generosity with students . . . his gentleness, compassion, seriousness, and wit” (Wood 38). David Wood further mentions that Derrida was really “a delightful interlocutor, a good listener and never self-important” (38).

On Derrida's contributions to philosophical development in the West, Raman Selden remarks, "'Derrida's paper 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', given at a symposium at John Hopkins University in 1966, virtually inaugurated a new critical movement in the United States. Its argument puts in question the basic metaphysical assumptions and Western philosophy since Plato" (87). After this presentation Derrida had more influence on literary studies in the universities of America, which resulted in the establishment of a school of 'deconstructive criticism'. This school of thought was founded on the inspiration from Derrida and became a major force in the 1970s and 80s in the literary criticism (Lodge and Wood 106). The practice of deconstruction began from the University of Yale where "the main practitioners of deconstruction were Jacques Derrida as a visiting professor, and Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman, Hillis Miller, and Harold Bloom," and some of them were "applying a new deconstructive logic to literary texts and genres, with emphasis upon Romanticism" which is known as American deconstruction (Lane 77).

Derrida's influence was so pervasive that it spread all over America and Europe without any comparison as Habib puts it, "Derrida's influence in America and Europe was unparalleled in the late twentieth century. His American disciples included the Yale critics Paul de Man, Hillis Miller, and Geoffrey Hartman, as well as Barbara Johnson and, arguably, Harold Bloom" (663). The deconstructive practices conceptualized and practiced by Derrida is known as deconstruction or more specifically Derridean deconstruction which "denies any stable point of origin" and "works in double movements: first, the questioning or dismantling of a binary opposition or hierarchical structure (argument, text, etc.). Second, showing how deconstructive devices are already at work in a system or text" (Ahluwalia 81). In the

same vein, A. T. Nuyen argues that the way Derridean deconstruction “accepts the concepts like meanings, truth, and values is different from the way they are commonly accepted” in the other critical practices. "What makes Derrida different from traditional philosophers is," continues Nuyen, “that he takes a deconstructive view of meanings, truth, and values, taking them to be the outcomes of difference” (135). Derrida’s biography, his thought and deconstruction all are so complex and confusing that Nuyen is right when he states, "Derrida is many things to many people" (134).

Derrida produces some important works in the field of philosophy and criticism as most of his works are the critical readings of the classical and contemporary works from Plato to Marx. The year 1967 became very historical for him as he produced his first three books: “*La Voix et le phénomène (Speech and Phenomena)* concerning Edmund Husserl’s theory of signs; *De la grammatologie (Of Grammatology)* whose subject is the ‘science’ of writing and *L’Écriture et la différence (Writing and Difference)* which contains important essays on Hegel, Freud, and Michel Foucault” (Habib 649). In the latter years he published some important books like *La Dissemination (Dissemination [1972])*, *Marges de la philosophie (Margins of Philosophy [1982])*, *Positions (1972)*, *Circumfessions (1991)*, and *Spectres de Marx (Specters of Marx [1994])* which looks at the various legacies of Marx (Habib 649-50).

On the nature of Derrida's writing styles, Ajda Güney and Kaan Güney, after Gutting, mention that his writings are very difficult to understand as they need “a constant and explicit probing of traditional philosophical concepts,” and that he “presents himself not as a practitioner of traditional philosophy but as its most assiduous reader” as he is “devoted himself to reading and commenting on the

writings of others more than any important philosophers since the middle Ages” (qtd. in Güney and Güney 220). Besides, the next cause of difficulty in understanding Derrida, as Caputo has discussed, is that he is “an avant-garde writer and so he uses a lot of neologisms—meaning to be of erring or straying destiny, or perhaps to be destined to stray or wander off course” (Caputo 48). This is certainly the obvious cause of difficulty in understanding him; he has alluded to many classical texts and given them a new sense often with coinage of the terms which require in-depth understanding of his ideas in different contexts. Realizing this as a great challenge, Niall Lucy published a dictionary, *A Derrida Dictionary*, describing the meanings of his neologisms so to make understanding of his works easier to everyone interested.

With regard to criticism on Derrida, Michael Roland F. Hernandez comments that Derrida has been caricatured as a prophet of doom by his opponents mainly because “Derrida was seen as the unfortunate heir to Nietzschean nihilism, Marxist economic reductionism, and Freud’s destructive libidinal tendencies.” All these philosophers were criticized for their radical thoughts, and Derrida, in the same vein, developed deconstruction as a radical philosophy, criticizing the “traditional philosophy, specifically of western metaphysics,” which developed him as “an enemy of philosophy” (107). Similarly, Philip Higgs also mentions that Ferry and Renaut, Fleming, Habermas, and Hoy are all against deconstruction as they argue that “deconstruction is a form of critical analysis which aims at tearing apart everything it finds on its way.” That is to say, they find the meaning of deconstruction synonymous with destruction and “characterise deconstruction as a form of textualisation with hyper-relativistic and nihilistic implications and go on to claim that it is ethically void, politically impotent, and utterly dangerous” (171). But John D. Caputo gives affirmative meaning to deconstruction and states that deconstruction brings out the

real nature of texts and their meaning rather than assigning meanings to them. He maintains that “the very meaning of, and mission of deconstruction, is to show that things — texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs and practices of whatever size and sort you need — do not have definable meanings . . . that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy” (Caputo qtd. in Higgs 170). Comparing deconstruction with the process of cracking a nutshell, Higgs explicates the meaning of deconstruction in an affirmative tone and states, “Deconstruction is an effort to crack open the nut, to go beyond the boundary, to disrupt the presence and allow the other as differance to come about” (170). So deconstruction is not annihilation of meanings of a text, it simply exposes its meaning and nature as it is. Caputo elaborates the meaning and essence of deconstruction in a more affirmative and life-enhancing light and states:

To ‘deconstruct’ is on the one hand to analyze and criticize but also, on the other hand, and more importantly, to feel about for what is living and stirring within a thing, that is, feeling for the event that stirs within the deconstructible structure in order to release it, to set it free, to give it a new life, a new being, a future That is why deconstruction is affirmation" (68)

Caputo is an ardent practitioner of deconstruction so he has realized its significance in life and stated that deconstruction is a process of living with the thing being deconstructed and giving it a new life, i. e. it is a life-enhancing process. Thus he further states highlighting the significance of deconstruction comparing itself with life, “Deconstruction is adventure, is risky business, as is life. So life and deconstruction go hand in hand (wherever they are going)” (53). For him deconstruction and life are inseparable; it is the process of deconstruction that makes life adventurous and meaningful.

Criticism on Derrida and deconstruction came to the fore time and again. For example, L. Kirk Hagen in his paper, “The Death of Philosophy,” mainly criticizes Derrida and Deconstruction/postmodernism on the ground of its rejection of ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ in any type of discourse including sciences. He puts it: “Postmodernism is notorious for its brash assertion that all accounts of the world—scientific, historical, folkloric, you name it—can never be objectively true because they are all just examples of discourse, or ‘competing vocabularies,’” . . . (Hagen). He also mentions that Derrida had been severely criticized by some other critics who called him with the various blemishing names. His sworn critics were Smith, Ballard, Quine, Sokal, Bricmont, Marcus, Berkeley, Chomsky, and Foucault. They called him and his works with different defaming titles: “childish”; “irresponsible and ideologically dangerous”; “anti-intellectual rot”; “gibberish”, and so on (Hagen).

Gregory Desilet, on the other hand, refutes the criticism against Derrida imposed by L. Kirk Hagen and his effort to demonize Derrida and deconstruction. Desilet, in this light, argues that Hagen is groundless in his claim when he “demonstrates a thorough and ironic misunderstanding of Deconstruction.” Desilet forthrightly denies Hagen’s claim that deconstruction is antithesis of scientific attitude or truth; he rather argues that “Derrida does not discredit ‘truth’ nor abandon ‘objectivity.’” He presents the reference to Einstein’s theory of relativity and asks a counter question: “He does not do so any more than does Einstein—the author of the theories of special and general relativity. Why is it so easy for scientists to accept a form of relativity in the realm of physics but remain stubbornly opposed to any analogous relevance of a form of relativity in the realm of semiotics?” (2). With this question Desilet has firmly supported Derrida and his proposition of deconstruction.

With regard to the criticism on Derrida, Habib mentions that criticism against Derrida and deconstruction is mainly concerned with the claim that it is very vague and complex. So he puts it: "Derrida has been criticized for his lack of clarity, his oblique and refractive style: his adherents have argued that his engagement with the history of western thought is not one of mere conformation but necessarily one of more inevitable complicity . . . as well as of critique" (654). It is obvious that Derrida is not that easier to understand: it is so mainly because he has resisted any efforts of defining deconstruction, and also because he has used many neologisms in his writing. He also states that the notion of *differance* that he conceptualized out of Saussurean differences is abstract as well (664). So he often remains uncertain and asks if Derrida has added anything more to our understanding of time of logic (665). Besides, there are some very harsh comments on Derrida as John Claude Evans claimed Derrida to be a "bad reader of philosophy" (qtd. in Stocker 36), and Searle accuses him of "intellectual terrorism" (qtd. in Stocker 49). Now it is apparent that Derrida faced many charges and challenges during his academic career; he, however, defended them all very honestly and politely.

Similar to the attacks on Derrida, there is also criticism on deconstruction as conceptualized by Derrida. Habib has mentioned some serious issues raised against deconstruction especially from the Marxists. So he notes: ". . . deconstruction has met with substantial criticism on a number of accounts. One of the sharpest objections, voiced by Marxist critics such as Terry Eagleton is that deconstruction exhibits a merely destructive or 'negative' capability, whereby it criticizes various systems and institutions without offering any alternatives. Hence, its critique is abstract, leaving everything as it was" (664). Similarly, M. H. Abrams argues that Derrida criticizes classical thoughts as being 'logocentric', i. e. they are founded on

certain kind of presence which takes the meaning of the text to its origin and definiteness. But observing Derrida's practice, Abrams claims that he is also "ascertaining another presence—'marks-on-blanks'—to which Abrams calls 'graphocentric model' because he destabilishes the 'priority of speech over writing'" (Abrams, "Deconstructive" 262-63). Thus the argument is that criticizing some kind of presence, deconstruction has established another presence. Samuel Frederick, in the same vein, mentions Spivak criticizing the weakness of deconstruction as she maintains:

in conceptualizing and sustaining an engagement with the politics of domination, since deconstruction involves the infinite displacement at hierarchical binary oppositions (rather than their tacit reversal), the post colonial critics aiming at substantive social transformation or revolution finds herself with inadequate power to revise dominant power structure." (qtd. in Frederick 115)

Spivak in this quote argues that deconstruction is unable to empower the voices against the dominant power as the efforts of the opposing power to reverse the power of the dominant is not reinforced; it does not weaken the power created through the hierarchical binary oppositions. Her criticism on deconstruction is only partially right because, although deconstruction does not replace the center created through violent hierarchy of the binary oppositions to create another center, it allows for a play of meanings, a middle voice, leading to justice which ultimately empowers the repressed one. Reviewing the critiques on deconstruction, Frederick summarizes them into three main types: first, deconstruction lacks seriousness and transparency in deconstructive writing as critics often equate it with nihilism or relativism; second, deconstructive reading has been criticized both academically and popularly as largely nonsensical

and unintelligible; and third, deconstruction tends to be comparatively opaque, eccentric, playful, imitative, and often crass (127-32).

Despite the critiques on Derrida's personality and his theory—deconstruction and deconstructive reading, there are also his adherents (though few in number) who promulgated him and deconstruction far and wide. As a result, Derrida was able to have wider and wider recognition and influence in the areas of intellectual pursuits. We can observe his popularity in the following quote made by one of his prominent critics, L. Kirk Hagen:

When Philosopher Jacques Derrida died in Paris at the age of 74 last year, French President Chirac said “France has given the world one of its greatest contemporary philosophers, one of the major figures of intellectual life of our time.” On this side of the Atlantic, *Time* magazine called Derrida “an intellectual demigod” whose influence on Western thought had been “immeasurable.” Similarly lofty eulogies appeared around the world, all paying homage to Derrida's best-known invention, a concept called “deconstruction” that became popular in the 1970s, part of the Holy Trinity of postmodern philosophy, alongside Marxism and psychoanalysis. . . . Derrida had even been rumored to be a candidate for the Nobel Prize in literature. (Hagen)

This eulogy on Derrida's death as quoted by his sworn critic, Hagen, suggests the influential personality of Derrida because his works are significant in the areas of quest of knowledge and represent a complex response to a number of theoretical and philosophical movements, especially phenomenology, structuralism, and psychoanalysis, which constitute the core of poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking. So besides its wider practice in literary theory and criticism (Gough 1), it

has also made its way through "comparative approaches and applications such as deconstruction and the following: feminism (Elam), architecture (Wigley), ethics (Critchley), and theology (Hart" [Lane 78]). Similarly, there are many researches, seminars and conferences on Derrida and his works which are committed to promote his thoughts and practices. For example, the fifth conference on Derrida that was held in Toronto had the following aims:

to form a community of scholars from around the world, bringing them together to share, develop and be supported in their work on Derrida . . . to continue the relevance of Derrida's work for today and therefore tomorrow . . . to see Derrida's work in its broadest possible context and to argue for its keen and enduring relevance to our present and future intellectual, cultural and ethical-political situations. (5th)

These aims of the conference justify that Derrida and deconstruction is crucial for advancing pursuit of knowledge at present and future as well from different perspectives—philosophical, cultural, ethical, political, and so on. Equally, it is also being discussed in education in terms of how it can be implemented in pedagogy, evaluation and researches. Similarly, this study is also an attempt to show the relevance of deconstruction to the study of educational issues in relation to pedagogy in the Gita.

Derrida and Deconstruction

Derrida is accepted as the proponent of deconstruction as his 1966 paper "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" has founded a new perspective in understanding and interpreting a text through declaration of *an event* that questioned the foundation or center accepted by all semiotic practices until then (Derrida, "Structure"1117). Deconstruction developed out of the crevasses that

structuralism has; it is mainly the restrictive nature of texts and interpretation that structuralism sought and it is this aspect of deconstruction that Derrida criticized, giving more open ways to the texts and interpretation. This practice of deconstruction gave way to the development of poststructuralism. That is why Derrida is also called a Poststructuralist and deconstruction as Poststructuralism as stated by Ajda Güney and Kaan Güney, “While structuralists sought a structure of the text, the Poststructuralist Derrida, for example, denies the possibility of such a structure. That is to say, Derrida’s deconstruction, which is always called together with Poststructuralism, gives us new ways of thinking” (21). Such new new ways of thinking refer to the multiple interpretations of a text giving it to plural meanings.

Higgs, in the similar fashion, argues, in connection with the conception and development of deconstruction, “The concept of ‘deconstruction’ was formulated by Jacques Derrida in the 1960s out of the philosophical writings of Heidegger, and reveals a way of knowing which typifies French poststructural and postmodern thinking” (170). Though some claim Derrida’s deconstruction being similar to Heidegger’s *Destraktion* and *Abbau*, Derrida himself justifies how his deconstruction differs from Heidegger’s: “As Derrida argues, (Derrida, 1980: 351) Heidegger inverts or negates metaphysics only to repeat it. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is thus a repetition of metaphysics in every sense of the word as a negative metaphysics remains a form of metaphysics as it borrows from its ontological structure and vocabulary” (qtd. in Chin-Yi 3). Besides, Noel Gough presents Derrida’s explanation on how he happened to conceptualize the term ‘deconstruction’ and how it is different from Heideggerian destruction:

In his letter to Isutsu, Derrida explains that in Heidegger’s work both *Destraktion* and *Abbau* signified 'an operation bearing on the structure or

traditional architecture of the fundamental concepts of ontology or of Western metaphysics' (p. 2). But the French word *destruction* too obviously implied 'an annihilation or a negative reduction much closer perhaps to Nietzschean 'demolition' than to the Heideggerian interpretation or to the type of reading that I proposed' (p. 2). Derrida recalls that the word *déconstruction* came to him somewhat spontaneously and that he checked to see if it was 'good French' by consulting 'the Littré' (the common name for the four-volume *Dictionnaire de la Langue Française* by Émile Littré first published in 1877). He was pleased to find that the grammatical, linguistic, and rhetorical associations of the term—for which there were several entries—were 'fortunately adapted to what I wanted at least to suggest' . . . (1)

This suggests that theory of deconstruction is distinctive and the development of Derrida's critical practices actually began out of the criticism of structuralism. As structuralism is concerned with the theory of metaphysics, accepting the presence of being as the center of a text, deconstruction attacked this presence and unraveled the structure. This opened up the boundless possibilities of interpretations of a text. As a result, deconstruction remained at the core of the theory of poststructuralism and postmodernism. Thus, they have only one common target, i. e. to emancipate the marginalized. To this, Jack Reynolds asserts: "Deconstruction, and postmodernism more generally, have both associated their various criticisms of the philosophical tradition with a desire to emancipate a conception of alterity that has been marginalised by basically all metaphysics" (31). Thus the target of the project of deconstruction is to set an entity free from domination letting open the multitude of possibilities.

‘What is deconstruction?’ has been a central issue since its conception and until now, or it may remain so even in the indefinite future! The reason behind it has been explicated by Habib: "Proponents of deconstruction often point out that it is not amenable to any static definition or systematization because the meaning of the terms it employs is always shifting and fluid, taking its color from the localized context and texts with which it engages" (650). So deconstruction simply happens without any specific theoretical basis! This is how deconstruction was conceived and practiced by its proponent, Jacques Derrida, as mentioned by his successors and contemporary deconstructionist, John D. Caputo: “Indeed, it was Derrida who emphasized that deconstruction isn't something that we *do* to things: deconstruction *happens*. And it happens in the middle voice” (16). Thus, it signals how deconstruction works or what it works for. To Reynolds, it works through the middle voice and it works for the alterity or justice, against repression (31). The discussion above suggests that deconstruction happens naturally and this happening works through the middle voice looking for alternative so that injustice and oppression imposed by the hierarchical relation by binary oppositions can be mitigated.

Habib discusses how deconstruction happens. He maintains that it happens as “a way of reading, a mode of writing, and above all, a way of challenging interpretations of the texts based upon conventional notions of stability of human self, the external world, and of language and meaning” (649). That is, deconstruction postulates a theory of reading which explores a text through different interpretations and exposes how the text eludes assigning a definite and stable meaning. Roomiya Manzoor and Sameer Ahmad Dar, in the same vein, maintain: “Deconstruction involves the close reading of texts in order to demonstrate that any given text has irreconcilably contradictory meanings, rather than being a unified whole” (28). This

implies that theory of deconstruction suggests a reading of a text which exposes how a text naturally consists of contradictory meanings. Traditionally, the purpose of reading a text was to expose its foundational meaning or logocentrism which is “sanctioned and structured in a multitude of ways, all of which are called into question by deconstruction” (Habib 653). In this way, a logocentric text is cracked open and justified to have no logos or center at all in the theory of deconstruction. This theory suggests that a reading strategy subverts the relation between the oppositions working in a text, for example, intellect and sense, soul and body, master and slave, male and female, inside and outside, center and margin, etc. which do not represent a state of equivalence in their meaning; such oppositions rather represent a kind of ‘violent hierarchy’ in which one term gets privileged in its meaning over the other term (653). This type of reading strategy guided by the theory of deconstruction which deconstructs such violent hierarchy in a logocentric text is called Derridean deconstruction (Güney and Güney 24).

Regarding the implementation of deconstruction Derrida himself denied any process of solidifying the concept and practice of deconstruction. However, the deconstructionists who followed Derrida’s line designated Derrida’s way of reading a text as ‘Derridean deconstruction’ which is described by a leading Derridean, Higgs:

it (deconstruction) is not simply a doctrine, not a system, not even a method, but something which is tied to an event. When I have to summarise very briefly what deconstruction is, and should not be, I often say: deconstruction is quite simply what happens. It is not simply the theoretical analyses of concepts, the speculative desedimentation of a conceptual tradition, of semantics. It is something which does something, which tries to do something, to intervene and to welcome what happens, to be attentive to the event, the

singularity of the event. That is why deconstruction happens as soon as something happens. It did not appear in the twentieth century, nor as a modern movement in the academy in the West. No, I think in every event, not only philosophical, in every cultural event there is some deconstruction at work, something which displaces and opens a structure, a set of actions, to singularity, to something other, to some alterity, to some unpredictable future.

(Derrida qtd. in Higgs 171)

Higgs, thus, presents some basic assumptions of deconstruction which suggest that language is ineradicably marked by instability and indeterminacy of meaning; given such instability and indeterminacy, no method of analysis can have any special claim to authority as regards textual interpretation; and interpretation is, therefore, a free-ranging activity more akin to game-playing than to analysis (171). Similarly, Manzoor and Dar contend that deconstruction, as a reading strategy, is “to take a text apart along the structural ‘fault lines’ created by ambiguities inherent in one or more of its key concepts or themes in order to reveal the equivocation or contradictions that make the text possible” (29). In addition, they have also identified certain essential concepts while elucidating the theoretical position of deconstruction as sanctioned by Derrida. The key themes of Derridean deconstruction/theory that they have identified are: there is nothing beyond the text; the ultimate meaning of a text is differance; every text deconstructs itself; any text contains the essential oppositional and conflictual nature of language; there is not one canonical signification to the text; there are simultaneous layers of meaning; the nature of language is such that it conceals meaning; there are infinite meanings in the text; and a text requires the necessity of an interminable analysis (Manzoor and Dar 29-30).

For Pietro Terzi the most important strategy to identify how deconstruction works is to see how the binary oppositions are treated in a text. Following Derrida, he argues that the “general strategy of deconstruction” is to question the binary oppositions of metaphysics like presence/absence, intelligible/ sensible, internal/external, etc. in a text (2). That is to say, deconstruction is mainly concerned with questioning the metaphysics of presence in a text as these oppositions constitute a center or presence through privileging the meaning of one concept over the other in their hierarchical relation. Gerasimos Kakoliris, in the same vein, maintains that Derrida’s initial reading of the philosophical texts during the 1960s and 1970s was to identify a set of hierarchical binary oppositions like identity/difference, speech/writing, inside/outside, man/woman, nature/civilization, good/evil, etc. and then to deconstruct the way they contribute to establish a foundational meaning or a center in a text (53). It is because in structuralism a text is thought to contain a foundational meaning which is called a center or the transcendental signified.

The study of binary oppositions took a different turn after 1960s, especially after the publication of Derrida’s paper entitled “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” because this article, as Hazard Adams stated, “really began the critique of structuralism” (1116). In structuralism the metaphysical concepts that represented oppositional ideas like ‘male’ and ‘female’ constituted a hierarchy or a structure in which a concept is privileged as a center and the other is suppressed as the other. In such a way, Derrida realized that the philosophy until then founded meaning through a structure that suppressed, excluded and marginalized the other (Osborne 179). So he deconstructed this system of structuralism. As a result, the way binary oppositions were treated in structuralism also took a new turn under deconstruction—they were not treated as constituting a hierarchical relation or a

structure; they were rather found to be complementary to each other. Thus, identification and deconstruction of binary oppositions has been the basics of Derridean deconstruction (Poovy 108) which guided to the interpretation of a text from the perspective of structuralism to poststructuralism, or in Seldon's words "structuralism gave birth to poststructuralism" (70). This guided the practice of deconstructive reading of a text which is to "display the operations of 'logocentrism' in any text," or the operation of binary oppositions to establish a foundational meaning (650) and then to deconstruct them to justify that there is no foundational meaning in a text. In other words, the practice of deconstructive reading of a text is intended to justify that "there is no 'truth' or 'reality' which somehow stands outside or behind language: truth is a relation of linguistic terms, and reality is a construct, ultimately religious, social, political and economics, but always of language, of various linguistic registers" (652). So the most important technique in deconstruction is "the unraveling and undermining of certain oppositions which have enjoyed a privileged place in Western metaphysics" under structuralism (Habib 653).

In a deconstructive reading, deconstructive critics read the texts critically and identify how the binary oppositions create violent hierarchy—keeping one concept of the opposition at the center while the other at the margin—so as to give the text a definite meaning and limiting the freeplay of meanings in the text. In this connection, Habib remarks:

Derrida points out that oppositions such as those between intellect and sense, soul and body, master and slave, male and female, inside and outside, center and margin, do not represent a state of equivalence between two terms.

Rather, each of these oppositions is a 'violent hierarchy' in which one term

has been conventionally subordinated, in gestures that embody a host of religious, social and political valencies. (653)

Like Habib, Barry Stocker maintains that Derrida in his deconstructive practices criticizes metaphysics and claims that “it is a reduction to opposition” (44). So the first thing that the deconstructive critics do is to reduce the text into a set of binary opposition, and then to deconstruct their hierarchical relation. For example, Helene Cixous in her essay “Stories” makes a list of binary oppositions that are concerned with female identity and asks ‘where is she?’ in the oppositions: activity/passivity; Sun/Moon; Culture/Nature; Day/Night; Father/Mother; Head/Heart; Intelligible/Sensitive; Logos/Pathos. Then she deconstructs these oppositions in terms of the the hierarchy of 'Masculine/Feminine opposition (Cixous 282).

Now here comes a question—what does deconstruction look for in reading a text? To this, Derrida invents a term ‘*differance*’ which is the central idea of deconstruction. But the problem is that what *differance* is is indefinite until now because this is how it was conceptualized by its proponent, Derrida. As Nuyen notes, Derrida conceived *differance* neither as a word nor as a concept; he described how the word was conceived and what it means etymologically (135). Selden explains the meaning of this term in the line of Derrida and maintains: "In French the verb '*differer*' means both 'to differ' and 'to defer'. 'To differ' is a spatial concept: the sign emerges from a system of differences which are spaced out within the system. 'To defer' is temporal: signifiers enforce an endless postponement of 'presence' . . ." (88). Nuyen further explains that *differance* contains both the meaning of differing and deferring in language, and it is “the differing and deferring of language that produce meanings, truths and values : *differance* 'could be said to designate the productive and

primordial constituting causality, the process of scission and division whose differing and deferring would be the constituted products or effects' ” (135). That is to say, the concept of difference in deconstruction does not produce a definite meaning like in the Saussurean difference in which meaning of a sign can be assigned because of its difference with the other sign (Habib 653). Unlike the Saussurean concept of definite meaning of a sign as a result of the differences between the linguistic sign, its definite meaning is deferred endlessly. In other words, a sign can never ever have a definite meaning; there is only play of signs in a text without a definite meaning. Thus, Nuyen further explains: “What is deferred, or excluded, can be called upon to undermine the unity of meaning, to blur the sharp line that divides the two terms of a binary opposition, thus leading to a multiplicity of meanings. For many literary critics, this constitutes deconstructive reading" (135). In this way, in a deconstructive reading of a text the play of meanings as 'differing' and 'deferring' deconstructs any established meaning, breaks its unity and opens the possibilities for multiple meanings as difference!

Deconstruction, thus, differs from structuralism the way it treats binary oppositions in a text in relation to meaning. So, in structuralism binary oppositions establish a foundational meaning as the center but it is not so in deconstruction as it looks for a “non-foundationalist ethics" (Nuyen 133). In deconstruction the meaning created through the relation between the binary oppositions is something like ‘the other’ or a ‘trace’ which goes on changing in relation with the other sign. As a result, the meaning created through the relation between the binary opposition is always undecidable or silent like the letter ‘a’ in *differance*. Thus Lane explicates: “More importantly, this ‘other’ leaves a ‘trace’ within the text, inhabiting in the in- between of words and concepts, and of the binary oppositions of words and concepts. It is an

absent remainder of, or an 'undecidable' within, language. It is as silent as the ending '-ance' in *differance*." (136 [sic]). In this way, deconstruction destabilizes the organic nature of a text and definite nature of meaning and opens up disclosure of a text and multiple possibilities of meanings in the text as differance.

Deconstruction and Religion: A Review

A very thorny issue regarding the discussion on Derrida and deconstruction is the relation between religion and God. Apparently, deconstruction and religion cannot go hand in hand because the former eschews the center and presence but the latter is founded on the center and presence, and Derrida himself declared that he *was* an atheist despite the fact that he had had religious background from his childhood. However, some Derrideans claim that Derrida in his later career *is* religious. In this regard, Higgs maintains, "Over the past few years there has been a growing recognition of this horizon, which has led some commentators, such as, Baker (1995), and Critchley (1999a.1999b), [Biesta (2001)] to speak about the "ethical turn" of deconstruction" (171). That is deconstruction has been applied to study religious texts and issues. Mawazo KavulaSikirivwa writes of its discussion in relation to religion in present time after Caputo and notes that deconstruction is considered as "a blessing for religion, its positive salvation, keeping it open to constant reinvention, encouraging religion to reread ancient texts in new ways, to reinvent ancient traditions in new contexts" (Caputo qtd. in Sikirivwa 68-69). This suggests that deconstruction studies religious texts from different perspectives; it critiques them and seeks for the new meanings inherent in the text which have the potentials for offering wellbeing to people. It does so from the relativist and postmodernist perspective and regards the religious texts as "a non-theological form" (Canale qtd. in Sikirivwa 45). Similarly, there came a book, *Derrida and Religion: Other Testament*,

edited by Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart which contains some articles by Derrideans who explored Derrida's works, events and discussed them in relation to religion and God. This all paved the viable way for deconstruction to discuss religion as its concern.

On deconstruction and religion Richard Kearney's work has an outstanding value. He published an article entitled "Deconstruction, God, and the Possible" included in the book, *Derrida and Religion: Other Testament*, in which he argues from the deconstructive ground that God can be defined not as the "absolute priority of actuality over possibility" which is practiced by onto-theologians but by "absolute priority of possibility over actuality" (305). Kearney further argues that Derrida's reading of the *possible* gestures towards "a new eschatological understanding of 'the possible God,'" and that we can see Derrida discussing the concept of "the impossible-possible" which is linked to the origin of faith." However, this faith in question is "a deconstructive belief in the undecidable and unpredictable character of incoming" (304). Kearney's discussion justifies that Derrida's faith is different from onto-theologians'; his is the deconstructive faith, the faith that is undecidable. Similarly, his understanding of God is the impossible-possible or the incoming, not that of any absolute actuality. In the same vein, John D. Caputo commends: "I am identifying deconstruction as a kind of passion or prayer for the impossible, or as an affirmation of the 'undeconstructible'. The first time I find mention of something 'undeconstructible' is in a 1989 essay titled "The Force of Law." This essay is the best place to start with the more overtly religion-friendly accenting of deconstruction in Derrida's writings (63). That is to say, God in deconstructive understanding is undeconstructible which is again like the impossible-possible because deconstruction is understood as the prayer for the impossible.

The discussion above in relation to Derrida, deconstruction and religion signal that these are interrelated concepts. To this, deconstructionists/postmodernists, however, are not directly concerned, and they cannot be away from such issues as well. Caputo, in this regard, relates these concepts to the sense of journey and vocation and remarks: “You can get a sense of the sort of path that postmodernists have in mind by giving a deconstructive analysis of the religious idea of having a "vocation," which means to follow the call that directs our spiritual journey” (49). He compares the spiritual journey made by St. Paul in religion with the deconstructive journey made by Derrida in philosophy as both of them had many adventures because St. Paul himself had to “run out of a lot of towns as a heretic” (Caputo 52). So in essence Derrida is not an atheist and deconstruction does not eschew religion, but they provide a different look on it. This look has been explained by Kearney that although Derrida did not directly talk of ‘God’ in his writings, we can, however, allude to his discussion on aporias of the impossible-possible. He cites Derrida mentioning that the *in* of the impossible is no doubt radical, implacable and undeniable; it is not simply negative or dialectical; it rather introduces to the possible which is likely to come true (302).

Derrida’s deconstructive concept of religion and God can be compared with Norman Kemp Smith's belief in God as he has summarized Hume’s concept of religion and argued that it consists mainly of belief in the existence of God (without proof) and the rational deconstruction of superstition:

Hume’s attitude to true religion can . . . be summed up in the threefold thesis:

(1) that it consists exclusively in *intellectual* assent to the 'somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined' proposition, 'God exists'; (2) that the 'God' here affirmed is not God as ordinarily understood; and (3) as a corollary from (1)

and (2), that religion ought not to have . . . any influence on human conduct—
beyond . . . its intellectual effects, as rendering the mind immune to
superstition and fanaticism. (Smith qtd. in Olson 75)

Smith in this quote, as mentioned by Olson, has succinctly maintained that God can be justified through logical argument; it is not that it exists in some forms as has been accepted by some people in their practices. He further argues that believing the existence of God in some forms has created some superstitious practices and fanaticism, so it needs to be logically understood and practiced in life.

The next issue relevant to discussion in relation to Derrida, deconstruction and religion is transcendence. On the surface deconstruction and transcendence cannot go together because the former is only concerned with the empirical, whereas the latter goes beyond it. But for Tacey they are concerned with each other as he asserts: “Deconstruction, according to the late Derrida, is a way of doing truth, of keeping things authentic and open to the possibility of transcendence. He wanted to unravel and deconstruct, not to arrive at nothing, but to affirm a sacred reality that he sensed was undeconstructible” (3). So this suggests that Derrida goes beyond the empirical, i. e. in practicing deconstruction one goes beyond the empirical and gets into the transcendence through which he/she can confirm the sacred reality, the undeconstructible or God! Thus there is transcendence in deconstruction which is not as commonly understood; it is as explained by Chung Chin-Yi which is like “a mid-point and meeting ground between the transcendental and empirical.” So transcendence in deconstruction is “quasi-transcendental, or the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical” the relation of which is difference (5). We can thus argue that Derridean perspective on God is similar to the concept of ‘difference’ which resists any type of definition as the ultimate; it regards things as only

possibilities. In this regard, Barry Hindess maintains after Tacey that Derrida assumes that “the God of classical theism has died in Western culture and there is no return to it.” So his main concern is “with the rebirth of God in the light of current knowledge and the rise of transcendence in contemporary times” rather than with the traditional understanding of transcendence and God (Tacey qtd. in Hindess 4). This suggests that deconstruction is concerned with the rebirth of God which can be understood through “ultra- or quasi-transcendental level of analysis—a level at which differences and identities are not viewed as (relatively) stable and settled” (Fritsch 25).

Tacey, on the same ground, explored Derrida regarding how he is concerned with religion and God. By this, he came to an understanding and published under the title of "Jacques Derrida: The Enchanted Theist" which became a ground-breaking work regarding the long-standing issues on Derrida, deconstruction and religion. He initiates this discussion with the question, “Can an atheist believe in God?” in relation to Derrida’s understanding of God and his so-called transformation from an atheist into a theist. To this, Tacey notes: “Intellectuals and theologians have been made nervous in recent times by the rumour that Derrida returned to God in his late career” (3). This created a huge debate among the critics both supporting and opposing Derrida. Those Derrideans who were strict atheists argued, “Some academics attempt to deny that Derrida, their Derrida, ever returned to religion, or, if this is acknowledged, it is put down to sentimentality in old age and the degeneration of a great mind” (Tacey 4). For Tacey it was true that he was transformed into a theist and his religiosity was quite puzzling, but his transformation was natural. However, many theologians “dismissed Derrida as a radical, nihilist and opponent of the holy.” They strongly denied Derrida’s transformation and doubted: “How can this emissary of evil turn around and dare to suggest that he has something to say about God?” (4).

Understanding Derrida's new conception of religion and God and welcoming his direct concern on such issues, Tacey affirms:

The answer to this conundrum is to say that Derrida is not interested in going back to classical theism. His agenda is quite different and more radical: he wants to move toward a new understanding of God and faith He is interested in God after the death of God, after theism, but also after classical atheism, sceptical thinking and the Enlightenment. What happens when we see beyond the death of God and the deconstruction of metaphysics? What do we see then? (4)

Now it is obvious that Derrida is concerned with religion and God and that he has been transformed into a theist from an atheist. However, it is also to be noted that Derrida's understanding of religion and God is different from that of other theologians. More importantly, Tacey alludes to Derrida's earlier work like "Faith and Knowledge" in which he has indicated that "there is, or will be, a return of the religious in global civilization" (4). So it was not that Derrida returned to religion in his later career but that he had had faith from the very beginning. This has been further supported by the proposal of the topic 'Religion' to discuss at the Capri dialogues in 1994 by Derrida himself. It was a philosophical summit at which Derrida talked straightforwardly on religion (4). To this Tacey brings forward Derrida's psyche before the Capri dialogue:

He had been asked to select the theme for the European Philosophical Yearbook and he replied: 'without whispering, almost without hesitating, machine-like: 'religion.' 'Why?' asks Derrida to himself. 'From where did this come to me, and yes, mechanically?' (1998 [1996]: 38). This is a clue to his involvement with religion; it comes to him from another part of himself. He is

not in control of this interest; it wells up and assails him like an alien will, an authority outside his own. He is compelled to attend to religion, which is not to his liking, since he would prefer to remain a classical atheist. Instead, he is driven out of this position into one that I should like to call enchanted atheism, that is, atheism with God. (4)

As Tacey has mentioned, the theme of “The Capri Dialogues” was to discuss, among the philosophers, the condition of religion in society. In the beginning of the dialogue Derrida addressed the delegates: “We are not priests bound by a ministry, nor theologians, nor qualified, competent representatives of religion, nor enemies of religion as such, in the sense that certain so-called Enlightenment philosophers are thought to have been” (Derrida qtd. in Tacey 5). This declaration by Derrida put himself in the position that he is not against religion; neither is he its blind follower.

The first issue discussed in the summit was what ‘religion’ could mean today and whether it is a remnant from the earlier period which needs to be criticized by the contemporary philosophers; to this issue, Derrida argues that it should “be approached anew, with different assumptions and expectations” (5). Derrida’s such affirmation on religion was really astonishing for many to which he responded that “he was not read into the depth and understood well, specially his intention on religion when he stated in his “Circumfession” that he had ‘been read less and less well over almost twenty years, like my religion about which nobody understands anything” (Derrida qtd. in Tacey7).

There can still be some more questions in relation to Derrida and religion. For example, what does Derrida think of God? what does he call it? To such questions, Tacey commends:

He does not call it Being; he prefers to call it the Impossible, the Messianic, the Beyond, and various other non-specific terms, because, as Derrida bears witness to the rebirth of God, he is not aware of an 'object' coming into view. Rather he sees an objectless reality coming toward him, a frightening, ghostly, numinous presence, that, in accordance with Jewish practice, he prefers not to name. This 'thing' is a no-thing, and he cannot give it a name. (8)

In this remark Tacey makes comparison of the concept of God between Derrida, Nietzsche and Levinas and finds that they are similar because they argue that we "have killed God with familiarity." They further maintain, "Our religion has made God too known and familiar, and as a result our culture is bereft of God. We have murdered ultimate reality by making it too human, too much like us" (9). So, Tacey continues, they exhort us to have a new look upon the ultimate reality, the God. By declaring 'the death of God', they mean to suggest: "When our metaphors of God are no longer seen as metaphors but as literal descriptions, then God is dead, because we have killed him with our words and concepts" (9). In this case, some questions arise: what is the way to understand God? and how can we approach it? To such issues, Tacey suggests:

We need to loosen the chains that bind us to our religious descriptions, and by the same act, allow the world of ultimate meanings to speak to us again. This is why deconstruction is an ultimately liberating enterprise for God, spirit or transcendence. At first it seems negative, and then we realize that its true motive is redemptive. In Nietzsche's terms, it is a joyful wisdom (9).

This is how Tacey justifies the deconstructive way of understanding religion and God—it can sound negative on the surface while it has positive affirmation in

essence. Following his argument, we can clearly observe the interrelation between Derrida, deconstruction and religion.

Now the atheist Derrida becomes a theist or religious Derrida which has been a matter of debate among philosophers and theologians. For many it is a radical transformation, but for a few it is a usual progression. To this, Tacey asserts: “It seemed that the religious Derrida emerged for all to see in the late 1980s, although Kevin Hart was one of the few to discern it at an earlier stage. Hart’s book *The Trespass of the Sign* detected the religious Derrida before Derrida himself had made this side of his thought explicit” (10).

Derrida’s understanding of religion and God gives way to postmodern spirituality which has been argued for by Tacey, when he states; “I would place Derrida and the mystical turn in postmodern thought in this category. These philosophers [the postmodernists] invite us to find the courage to go into the abyss, the moral and spiritual emptiness, and call forth the presence that might be hidden there” (9). As explicated by Tacey, deconstructive quest of God is to discover ‘the presence’ which is hidden into the abyss of the moral and spiritual emptiness. But this presence is different from the presence in the metaphysics. For Derrida this presence is “a new kind of fullness” with which we are unfamiliar, and we do not understand it (Tacey 9). So ultimately, as Tacey argues, “Derrida is reluctant to call this new presence ‘God’, because he feels his meaning would be mistaken, and everyone would assume he is going back to the past. He refuses God-language as much as possible, although in certain moments his defences fail and he admits that he is in search of God” (10).

Now Derrida, a so-called atheist, is in search of God! Here arises a question: How can an atheist search for God? Or what is the deconstructive way of searching

for God? Tacey contends that we can find techniques to explore God in Derridean literature, he states: “As a philosopher, Derrida developed a critique of transcendence inherited from Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. But as a quasi-theologian, he seemed to be engaged in mystical reflections similar to those of fellow North African St Augustine, as well as Meister Eckhart and the mystics of the Kabbalah” (10). This suggests that Derridean deconstruction approves of ‘transcendence’ and ‘mystical reflections’ in exploring God which is like a presence but different, or it can be called ‘a differance’! We can find this kind of identification of God in Derrida’s prayer as an atheist when Tacey mentions: “He is an atheist who prays all the time and reflects on God constantly– as often as the other great atheist, Nietzsche. In an unguarded moment, Derrida admits that “the constancy of God in my life is called by other names” (Derrida qtd. in Tacey 10). For Derrida the other names of the God are like “the impossible” or “the undeconstructible” (Caputo 63) or “*khora*” (Lucy, “Derridean” 68) or rather like “a spectre” or “a ghost” (Tacey 11). These other names of God can be compared with the realization of God as “Sa-Si” by Sa-Si Bhakta as discussed in his poem “Uttaradhunik Grantha” [Postmodern Scripture] included in his anthology, *Sa-Si: Uttar Adhunik Prometheus (Sa-Si: The Postmodern Prometheus* [Bhakta 70]).

In the Capri dialogue philosophers widely discussed the concept of religion and God and its significance in the present world. The major questions discussed were: What is religion? What is it doing and what is being done with it at present? What is happening and so badly? What is happening under this old name? Tacey has summarized Derrida’s concept of religion expressed in this dialogue as: “Religion is not something we do but something that is done to us. It is a response to a presence, and faith is generated once this presence has been felt. That, to me, is how we ought

to understand Derrida. It is not that he is religious; rather, something in him is religious, and he cannot shake it off" (11). Similarly, Caputo describes Derrida's concept of religion as "religion without religion" (qtd. in Tacey 11). Furthermore, Tacey finds Derrida as "a post-religious philosopher", "an enchanted atheist" and "a secular intellectual" (11). He comments on Derrida's analysis of religion at present:

Derrida speaks as a secular intellectual who is disenchanted with secularism, and also disenchanted with religions. He realizes that the majority of educated people in the West have become allergic to religions because they associate them with dreary church or synagogue services, hypocrisy, moralism, piety, fascistic styles of worship and warmongering fundamentalism. These problems have almost ruined the credibility of the religions in our time. (11)

As discussed above, Tacey's understanding of Derrida and his religious identity is that he is an enchanted atheist. To this, he explains, "Derrida insisted on his atheist persona as a defense against the mystical incursion that had assailed him from within. None of us likes to have our freedom stolen from us, and so Derrida remains the 'enchanted atheist', one who struggles with the spirit as if it were a spectre, a ghost" (11). This suggests that outwardly Derrida was an atheist but inwardly possessed some kind of spirit or faith which appeared to be a spectre or a ghost. So he has a split-personality, and accordingly, he has identity crisis. This has been explained by Tacey:

The man of knowledge is turning into a man of faith and this causes a crisis in his identity. Is he still the Nietzschean denier, who was more sure than Nietzsche that God was dead? Is he still the philosopher in the line of Feuerbach, Marx and Freud? It seems that the man of faith and the man of knowledge are separate selves in a person called Derrida. Faith and

knowledge, however, come together in his repeated question: ‘To whom am I praying?’ (13)

As Tacey has mentioned, Derrida addressed some prominent religious scholars and believers at a joint congress of the American Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature (2000). In this speech he spoke about his lifelong faith and different stages of development in faith, and justified the importance of atheism as a ‘stage’ in the development to theism:

If belief in God is not also a culture of atheism, if it does not go through a number of atheistic steps, one does not believe in God. There must be a critique of idolatry, of all sorts of images in prayer, especially prayer, there must be a critique of onto-theology True believers know they run the risk of being radical atheists. Negative theology, prophetic philosophical criticism, deconstruction: if you don’t go through these in the direction of atheism, the belief in God is naive, totally inauthentic. In order to be authentic, the belief in God must be exposed to absolute doubt. However paradoxical it may sound, believing implies some atheism, and I am sure that true believers know this better than others, that they experience atheism all the time. It is part of their belief. (Derrida qtd. in Tacey 13)

Derrida’s address on religion/faith has opened up an avenue to true understanding of religion and God and justified how atheism is a way to theism. So Derridean theology is often called a negative theology or transcendence and he is also called *an unbelieving believer* (my emphasis). As Tacey suggests, “Derrida’s is a path of negative transcendence, and he is interested in moving toward faith, but not without the intellect, its doubts and questions. Perhaps one could call him an unbelieving believer” (15). Tacey concludes Derrida’s transformation from an atheist

to a believer as an authentic spiritual journey which Derrida dared to express and accept. In this regard, Tacey commends that Derrida, as a deconstructionist, "had the courage to deconstruct himself" (15). Thus the answer to the question—can an atheist believe in God?—is 'yes' because, argues Tacey, "if God can be reassembled after being torn apart, interrogated and rebuked, and if something remains that survives the deconstructive process, it might legitimately claim to be regarded as holy" which can be called God as it is the presence that might be hidden in the spiritual/ moral emptiness (4).

Regarding the discussion on Derrida, deconstruction and religion, Hindess argued that Derrida had religious thought from the very beginning of his writing. He wrote a paper with reference to Tacey's discussion entitled "Response to David Tacey on Derrida's Religiosity." In this paper his main argument is that like some other critics Tacey's argument on Derrida's transformation in his later years is not right because his faith from the beginning was like that of "a milk-and-water variety of atheism" (5). That is to say, Hindess' argument is that Derrida's later straightforward discussion on religion and God is the result of the outgrowth of his earlier works (1). So Derrida's transformation into a believer is not surprising; it is rather natural progression (5). Hindess further contends that Derrida's transformation from his childhood faith to atheism in his youth is like "the other a-theism is already halfway to theism" (5). In this sense, Derrida's atheism was different from those of the other atheists' or it was a deconstructive atheism as a phase to theism. He makes a rather sharp comment on Derrida's religiosity and his transformation: "If the Christian God portrayed by Feuerbach is a human construct, so too is the presence that calls Derrida to his responsibilities. Far from Derrida's lapse into religious belief being a late return to the faith of his childhood, it marks his final capitulation to a demon of his own

design” (6). This suggests that 'presence' for Derrida is tantamount to God that he denied; however, he could not withhold this denial any longer as he had strong faith from his childhood.

Derrida's religiosity and faith continued to be an issue. So many studies have discussed them in different context. In the paper “Jacques Derrida and the Faith in Philosophy” C. E. Evink explores the relation between faith and philosophy as explained by Derrida. In general, Evink argues that faith and philosophy are thought to have oppositional relation—faith is concerned with belief and religion, whereas philosophy with science, knowledge and reason (313). Similarly, he further states that they are also different in terms of their quest: “Within this opposition, science and philosophy are supposed to be searching for real and rational truth and certainty, whereas faith and religion belong to the minor realm of opinion and uncertainty” (313). In such a way, faith and philosophy have been understood as separate pursuits for long, especially along with the beginning of the Enlightenment and onwards. They were, however, understood linked to each other in the medieval scholasticism (Evink 313-14).

When this issue comes to Derrida, Evink finds a kind of paradox in him, so he writes: “This is the paradox that Derrida gives us here: on the one hand he tries to deconstruct and to overcome the opposition between faith and reason, but on the other hand he seems to prefer rational critique and emancipation above any religious tradition, which seems to be the same as a preference for reason above faith” (315). Although in a point Evink has found Derrida prioritizing reason over faith, in further analysis he admits that Derrida is in the line of deconstructing this oppositional relation between faith and reason when he affirms that “faith and reason cannot simply be put in an opposition . . . faith is the source of reason and religion” (315). In

the modern times as reason was prioritized over faith, this hierarchy has been deconstructed by Derrida, as Evink writes, “The idea that rational projects like science and philosophy find their beginning in a certain faith, doesn’t have to be a surprise for those who know the work of Derrida” (316). Thus, Evink further states that the “pure undetermined faith” is much “older’ than any religion” (317). In this way, deconstruction reviews the binary oppositions and deconstructs their oppositional relation looking for the other or alterity because the aim of deconstruction is “to prepare a place for the other, an ‘invention of alterity’, by breaking through these horizons of expectation, by undermining and shaking established systems, by problematizing beaten tracks and breaking new ground” (317).

After exploring the Derridean concept of faith in deconstruction, Evink highlights the significance of employing deconstruction in religion and argues that it can help to minimize violence and enhance tolerance. He commends:

In deconstructing or dismantling a specific religion . . . in order to be able to criticize religion’s dogmas and rituals, in order to open it for other religious experiences, in order to make way for tolerance, and in order to reach, as closely as possible, a relation to alterity without violence, a ‘we’, a friendship of ‘we’ that precedes any community and doesn’t exclude anyone. (318-19)

Thus, Evink alludes to Derrida’s understanding of various religious practices and his conception of religion as bottomless abyss, and finds a balancing relation between them accepting all of them equally as ‘we’ not as the ‘other’ (319). To this, Evink first is suspicious of how one can keep going through the bottomless abyss or maintain tolerance with several religious traditions. However, the secret he discovered is ‘the faith’ which keeps one moving with renewed strength and speed. So he states that

deconstruction has such faith "that keeps him [Derrida] moving and that shows him the way, be it a way toward an aporia, not knowing where to go, at the risk of never arriving? I think it is indeed a specific faith that guides deconstruction" (320).

Derrida's exploration on religion has been brought forth by the Derrideans like John D. Caputo, Kevin Hart, and Yvonne Sherwood; they explored and exposed Derrida's faith and religiosity to public and employed deconstruction to theology. Their interview with Derrida on faith entitled "Epoché and Faith: An Interview with Jacques Derrida" was published in the book, *Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments*. In this book they discussed Derrida's opinions on different aspects of religion and interspirituality. In a question asked by Hart about the relation between Christianity and deconstruction (32), Derrida echoes questions in a wider context of religion: "What is Christianity? What is Judaism? What is Islam? Who knows? Who knows what they will be in the future?" . . . what criteria could we use to establish the new form as Christian or Jewish or Islamic?" (33). By these questions he means to suggest that deconstruction is concerned with all religious beliefs. Nevertheless, it was initially related with Christianity as the word 'deconstruction' is more closely related to Heidegger's *Destruktion* and Luther's *destruuntur* as both of them believed in Christianity (33). However, it does not mean that Christianity is more deconstructive than other religions, so Derrida presents the pervasive nature of deconstruction: "I can imagine Buddhist, Jewish, or Muslim theologians saying to me, 'Deconstruction'—we've known that for centuries!' People have come to me from far Eastern cultures telling me just that. And I'm sure that there are Jewish theologians and probably Muslim theologians who would say the same thing" (33). While mentioning many religions in relation to deconstruction, I wonder why and how Derrida missed to mention Hindus! I wonder what Derrida's response would

have been, had he studied the Gita? Thus, this study has filled up the gap and maintained relation between Hinduism and deconstruction with reference to the study of the Gita.

Caputo asked Derrida regarding how God can be named or affirmed or what there is in the name 'God' (36). To this, he claimed that "God could not be the omnipotent first cause, the prime mover, absolute being, or absolute presence. God is not some thing or some being to which I could refer by using the word 'God'" (37). By this he has denied any kind of definite identification with God; all these established conceptions of God have been questioned and denied because he firmly argues that "God is far beyond any given existence; he has transcended any given form of being. So I cannot use the word "God" for any finite being" (37). At the same time he also contends that we need to name or mention God. But the way he names God is different as he maintains "God has an essential link to being named, being called, being addressed. When I use the word 'God', I mention it. It is a word that I receive as a word with no visible experience or referent" (37).

Kevin Hart asked the next question regarding the relations between theology and deconstruction especially the difference between theological faith and religious faith (38). To this Derrida responded that theological faith is different from the religious faith in the sense that the former refers to the historical event, for example, "If someone has theological faith, one confesses to believe in Jesus as the Christ," which is "a way of relying on Revelation," whereas religious faith is "something more universal ..." (39). This is to suggest that deconstruction is close to religious faith. John D. Caputo asked Derrida the next question concerning the difference between an atheist and a theist, and whether he is a theist or an atheist (46). To this, Derrida responded that it is natural to "have some doubts about the distinction

between atheism and belief in God” because, argues he, “If belief in God is not also a culture of atheism, if it does not go through a number of atheistic steps, one does not believe in God” (46). He presents a deconstructive perspective on god and prayer and states: “There must be a critique of idolatry, of all sorts of images in prayer, especially prayer, there must be a critique of onto-theology—the reappropriation of God in metaphysics—which, as Heidegger says, doesn’t know anything about prayer or sacrifice” (46). So criticizing superstitious practices in religion and shaking off its hollow beliefs may sound atheistic practices to some religious orthodoxies, but in a true sense it is a positive mark for deconstructive faith in religion. So this might be common, as he asserts, to all the true believers; “True believers know they run the risk of being radical atheists” (46).

The next significant exploration on Derrida's religiosity is on the issues of aporias and transcendence. To this, Matthias Fritsch explored aporias and transcendence in Derrida’s works and published a paper “Deconstructive Aporias: Quasi-Transcendental and Normative.” As Fritsch argues, aporias became an important feature in Derrida as “his works turns more explicitly than before to moral and political questions” since the early 1980s (3). The answers to those questions could simply be like aporias. Similarly, he observes aporetic structure in Derrida’s discussion on the themes like law and justice, hospitality, forgiveness, cosmopolitanism, responsibility, gift-giving, friendship, and democracy and sovereignty with reference to his works (3-4). Reviewing Derrida’s works and themes discussed in them, Fritsch concludes:

In each of these cases, then, an unconditional and a conditional version of the concept—justice and the law, unconditional openness and conditional hospitality, the pure gift and economic exchange, democratic freedom and

openness and the limits needed for equality and sovereignty, etc.—are shown to be “irreconcilable but indissociable,” or “at the same time, but also by turns, inseparable and in contradiction with one another,” so that the task is to “think *together both* this heterogeneity *and* this inseparability. (4)

Fritsch identifies these themes in Derrida's works which consist of oppositional concepts like justice and the law, unconditional openness and conditional hospitality, the pure gift and economic exchange, democratic freedom and openness and the limits needed for equality and sovereignty and so on and analyzes their relation to each other. On this analysis he finds that they are in the relation of aporetic co-implication, i. e. existence of one depends upon the existence of the other; they are both inseparable and contradictory. That is why, Fritsch after Derrida argues for “the ineluctable impossibility of reaching a fully just, hospitable, forgiving or generously giving decision” (6). Thus, he further mentions that all decisions would have to pass through the “ordeal of the undecidable” or the “experience (and experiment) of the impossible” (Derrida qtd. in Fritsch 7). As these concepts cannot have fixed meaning and value, they do not have normative value. They have aporetic relation because they transcend their values and the value they designate is again not stable and settled. So their value is relational and quasi-transcendental or ultra-transcendental which goes beyond the transcendental/empirical relation (Fritsch 24-25).

With regard to the application of deconstruction in the study of the religious texts, Ian W. Mabbett made a comparative study between Derrida's deconstruction and Buddhism with reference to Nagarjuna, the second-century Mahayana Buddhist teacher, who founded Madhyamika that discusses the doctrine of void and produced an article entitled "Nagarjuna and Deconstruction." By this, Mabbett has justified how Eastward and Westward or the opposites meet at a common point like "the apostle of

the Middle Way" as discussed in Buddhism or "the prophet of infinite deferral" as discussed in deconstruction (203). This has brought Derrida and Nagarjuna at a common point where they "are seeking to give form—a self-referring and self-canceling form—to the same vision" (204) which is concerned with "a characterization of the various ways . . . dismantling of concept-reifying views . . . " (205).

Making a comparison between the theme of the Buddhism and deconstruction, Mabbett notes, "Deconstruction, which employs a special type of contemplative thought . . . gives us the eye of insight to see that this is what is happening. It is really like the Buddha eye, which sees all things, and the enlightenment it promises is really like *bodhi*" (208). He has explored Nagarjuna's doctrine of void and Derrida's concept of deconstruction and come up with some similarities between them. These similarities are discussed under the points as follows: both avoid any claim about a determinate reality; both identify their teaching with what is really the case; both criticize the logic of binary oppositions; both celebrate emptiness; both use the same four-cornered logic—a given concept can have no fixed or determinate referent in reality; both dismantle the concept of the self; and both recognize a conventional and higher truth.

The latest development in deconstruction is its relevance to the study of religion in the postmodern context. To this, Henk-Jan Prosman reviewed *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology*, edited by Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and analyzed how Vanhoozer has linked religious studies to postmodernity and vice versa. In this review Prosman argues, "The main contribution of the Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology is that it shows that postmodernism is 'everybody's business.' 'To be postmodern,' . . . 'is to signal one's dissatisfaction with at least

some aspect of modernity” (Review, par. 8). This suggests that postmodernism developed out of some restrictions in modernism and it is equally concerned with religion as religion is concerned with everybody. So in order to study everyone’s concern with religion, postmodern theology needs to be viable which can be both challenging as well as stimulating. Prosman writes in this concern: “To my mind postmodernism is most challenging and stimulating for theology. This should not make us lose sight of some of its problematic aspects. In emphasizing community and forms of life postmodern theology runs new risks, such as tribalization, pluralism and trivialization” (Review, par. 10). As Prosman predicts some challenges with postmodern theology, the solution is that they can be managed effectively only through the application of postmodern thoughts in theology.

Prosman defines postmodernity as “the démasqué of this universal aspiration” (Review, par. 3). It is the need of the time. It is, writes Prosman after Vanhoozer, “a move away from the authority of universal science, toward narratives of local knowledge.” So it rejects “unifying, totalizing, and universal schemes in favor of new emphasis on difference, plurality, fragmentation and complexity” (qtd. in Prosman, Review, par. 3). We can see that both religion and postmodernism are mainly concerned with doing welfare to the people from where they are—accepting their diversity. This is the major concern of postmodern theology which might contradict with traditional theology. However, for Vanhoozer postmodern is “not so much as a new condition for theology, but as a *theological* condition” because he argues that postmodernity is “inherently theological” (qtd. in Prosman, Review, par. 3).

The most striking significance of postmodernism in theology, argues Prosman, is that it “has made possible the return of the repressed, through its

appreciation of particularity and difference” (Review, par. 3). As religion should not marginalize anyone; as the purpose of religion is to redeem those who are in crisis, so is the goal of postmodernism—to fight against any form of repression, centralization, domination and presence! Both of them look for justice, equality and peace which can be achieved through the “messianic reading of the religious” (Vanhoozer qtd. in Prosman, Review, par. 3). Like Vanhoozer’s focus on messianic reading of the religious, deconstructive reading of a text also targets to raise the voice for the repressed and the marginalized through deconstructing the metaphysics of presence.

With regard to God from the postmodern perspective, Kamali's declaration on God at IDoS 2019 BarCamp Address in Berlin is comprehensive when he declared: "Everything good is God!" This declaration is similar to Derrida's conception of God as the 'possible-impossible.' This declaration deconstructs the transcendental nature of God as the center, and raises two deconstructive questions at the same time—if ‘good’ as God refers to ‘goodness’, is it possible to find goodness in everything? And is it impossible to find goodness in everything? In other words, can good exist without evil and vice versa? Or is it possible for everything to have only 'the good', excluding the other, 'the evil'? So the good in deconstructive sense refers to the ‘goodness’ that contains both ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ In this regard, Gert Biesta, a Derridean educationist, maintains that “as soon as we try to define ‘good’ without any recourse whatsoever to a notion of evil, it becomes clear that the presence of ‘good’ is only possible because of its relationship to what is not good, viz., ‘evil’ (393). So now the question is ‘how can this goodness be realized?’ The answer to this question is never fixed; there are possibilities of multiple responses—hence, the goodness is both possible and impossible; it is the possibility within the impossibility and vice versa. This conception of God goes in the line of Canale's understanding of God under

'deconstructionism' which he defines as "the constructive attempt to talk about God from within the context of our secular relativistic postmodern culture and in a non-theological form" (Canale qtd. in Sikirivwa 45). This concept of God can be compared with the case of differance in deconstruction and, thus, it can be concluded that God is differance and differance is God!

Deconstructive Reading of a Text: A Review

Deconstructive reading of a text is guided by the theory of deconstruction as developed and practiced by Derrida and Derrideans. The primary target of this reading is to identify the workings of the constructs of deconstruction in a text, so it aims at demonstrating that the meaning of a text is open without any definite meaning. In this regard, Habib explicates that a deconstructive reading

will be a multifaceted project: in general, it will attempt to display logocentric operations in the text, by focusing on a close reading of the text's language, its use of presuppositions or transcendental signifieds, its reliance on binary oppositions, its self-contradictions, its *aporiai* or points of conceptual impasse, and the ways in which it effects closure and resists free play. (654)

In this quote he mentions some specific activities that happen in a deconstructive reading which are: to display logocentric operation in a text; to closely read the text's language; to identify the presuppositions or transcendental signifieds and its reliance on binary oppositions; to explore the contradictions in the binary oppositions; and to find out the aporias or the free play of meanings. Similarly, Moya Corner briefly commends that a deconstructive reading is "not a search for a unified meaning or an attempt to discern what the author of a text might have wished to convey" (110). So the main point to note in a deconstructive reading is to go beyond the unified meaning or the authorial meaning of a text.

On deconstructive reading Noel Gough, in the same vein, discerns deconstruction “as a theory and method of reading and analytical inquiry, which aims to undermine the logic of opposition within texts.” So he comments, “It is a disposition towards reading for sub-texts, for textual contradictions, for textual blockages, for that which is textually suppressed or textually excluded” (2). Gough’s argument suggests that in a deconstructive reading of a text it is mainly to work out with the binary logic, to undermine this logic and to open up the contradictions and blockages that the texts have. In other sense, Corner asserts that “deconstruction is 'always and already' at work in texts; all texts are potentially self-deconstructing. The reader therefore brings nothing new to a deconstructive reading” (110). It is not only Corner who exposes the self-deconstructing nature of a text, Gough, after Raman Seldon, also argues that “deconstruction begins when we locate the point at which ‘a text transgresses the laws it appears to set up for itself. At this point texts go into pieces, so to speak’” (2). This is, of course, true to deconstruction that every text contains impasses or aporias which do not need to be exposed. So here comes a question—what is the significance of a deconstructive reading?

We cannot, however, deny the significance of deconstructive reading as deconstruction itself is the result of the deconstructive reading by Derrida who conducted deconstructive readings of numerous major thinkers, including Plato, Rousseau, Hegel, Freud, Husserl, Lévi-Strauss, and Saussure (Habib 655). With regard to this, Gough argues, "In deconstruction, iterative techniques and recursive looping are seen as ways to destabilize texts and make them yield unexpected conclusions. . . . Deconstruction continually defers positive meaning, savoring complexity and favoring the positive value of making no positive interpretations” (5). Gough’s view accentuates the significance of deconstructive reading in terms of its

capacity to produce new meaning out of the text and enhance the quest for positive meaning endlessly. He further mentions that “what might remain after deconstruction has led us to dismantle our preconceived frameworks of consciousness and perception, to demythologize our ideas of the transcendent and the everlasting, and to demystify our senses of truth, essence and reality” (5). This implies that deconstructive reading of a text can provide us with a new philosophical worldview to discern the truth. Bradbury, furthermore, writes of deconstruction that it “discloses to us a world of parody and pastiche, query and quotation; and having shown us all this, it teaches us how to enjoy it” (qtd. in Gough 5). Thus deconstructive reading of a text is like an adventure.

On the application and development of deconstructive reading, Pietro Terzi explored Fink’s concept of deconstruction as discussed by Derrida and came up with an article, “The Relevance of Fink’s Notion of Operative Concepts for Derrida’s Deconstruction.” He mentions after Fink that Derrida coined the term ‘deconstruction’ “to translate the Husserlian *Abbau* and the Heideggerian *Destruktion*” (1). It is obvious that Husserl and Heidegger have paved the way to the development of deconstruction. Derrida further practiced deconstruction but did not theorize it. He only commented that deconstruction is “‘everything and nothing’: it is neither a concept nor a well-defined methodology of reading or interpretation, let alone a discipline or a cultural trend in the guise of the American literary deconstructionism” (Derrida; Fink; qtd. in Terzi 1). This certainly created chaos in the practice of deconstruction and its practice. However, neither did he define its theory nor its methodology of practice systematically. Instead, he introduced many other concepts like *différance*, dissemination, spacing (*espacement*) or undecidable to heighten the unstable nature of meaning in a text (1).

The practice of deconstruction in reading texts, however, did not stop in itself; it continued with various views and practices. Later on, the followers of Derrida implemented it to deconstruct texts from various fields and it was called Derridean deconstruction. The most important strategy in reading a text in Derridean deconstruction is “the questioning of the binary oppositions of metaphysics (presence/absence, intelligible/sensible, internal/external, etc.) aimed at shedding light on implicit axiologies and envisaging new possibilities of thought at the limit of the philosophical tradition” (Terzi 2). Thus, it suggests that in a deconstructive reading metaphysics of presence is identified through the specification of binary oppositions in a text and then this presence is deconstructed justifying the possibilities of many other presences. After all, as Terzi states, deconstruction basically is “a style of reading” (2). But the reading is undefined with many possibilities! Silverman, however, defines deconstructive reading and specifies what happens with it. So he maintains that "deconstruction accounts for how a text's explicit formulations undermine its implicit or non-explicit aspect." He further states: "It brings out what the text excludes by showing what it includes. It highlights what remains indecidable and what operates as an indecidable in the text itself" (qtd. in Sikirivwa 47). Thus in deconstructive reading a text is explored to find out its implicit meaning as indecidable, i. e. it intends to prove that a text has no definite and ultimate meaning; it only contains a play of meanings.

Regarding Derrida's practice of deconstructive reading, Gerasimos Kakoliris presents a brief review of how Derrida carried out a deconstructive reading of texts in the beginning of his early career. He discussed his study in the article, “Jacques Derrida’s Deconstruction of Western Metaphysics: The Early Years” in a philosophical journal named *Dia-noesis: A Journal of Philosophy*. His major concern

of the reading was to deconstruct the “metaphysics of presence” which according to Derrida is a foundational existence which remains present with meaning (44). This foundational meaning as presence has had long tradition since Plato. Kakoliris notes that in Western thoughts this foundational meaning has been named differently over time. For example, “For Plato, this foundation are [is] the 'Ideas', for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, it is the 'passions', while for Edmund Husserl it is 'pure consciousness” (Kakoliris 44).

After analysis of such foundational meaning, known as ‘metaphysics of presence’ Derrida makes a claim that “presence, identity, speech, meaning, etc., include precisely those elements which they seek systematically to exclude, which, in turn, renders the priority of these phenomena, and the entire system of logocentrism or phonocentrism, impossible” (Kakoliris 46). By this what Derrida means to suggest is that when we privilege a particular meaning as center or foundational, as a presence, over the other in a text, this privilege or exclusion inevitably includes those meanings or elements which subvert the whole meaning of the text, opening up multiple interpretation of the text. This ultimately results in differance which, according to Kakoliris, “encapsulates what finally emerges from the metaphysical texts through their deconstruction, namely, that despite the desperate efforts of their metaphysical authors to found and maintain meaning in presence, meaning is always already conditioned by difference and non-presence” (46-47). So differance is the result of difference and non-presence of what is thought to be foundational in a metaphysical text, and it is also the result of deconstruction of such texts. In addition to this, Kakoliris puts it further regarding the nature of presence in a text in its linguistic analysis:

In a linguistic system, each “present” element signifies by referring differentially to another element and, consequently, it is never present in itself in a subsequent presence that would refer only to itself. In this sense, a sign is just a “trace” – a term that Derrida borrows from Emmanuel Levinas – a present, which has only ever existed as a trace of a present. The present is constituted by a differential network of traces, where the interval between the elements is described as “spacing”, (espacement) and the temporal difference between them as “temporization” (temporisation). (48)

By this what we understand is meaning in a text is “nowhere absolutely present in language, it is always subject to a kind of semantic drift (or deferment) that precludes the sign from ever coinciding with itself in a moment of absolute identification” (Kakoliris 49). Thus, Derrida in his deconstructive reading of the Western metaphysical texts simply exposed that the presence or the foundational meaning which is supposed to be at the center of a text as assigned with the ultimate meaning is simply an illusion, and there is no foundational presence. As explained by Derrida above, this is what happens in a deconstructive reading of a text.

With regard to the aim of deconstructive reading, Kakoliris mentions that it “is, initially, to render visible the latent metaphysical structure of a text’ . . . to show how certain concepts have been repressed” (51, 53). So a deconstructive reading of a text “shows that, within the ‘system of fundamental constraints’ and ‘conceptual oppositions’ of metaphysics, there is, as the non-transcendental or ‘quasi-transcendental’ condition of its possibility (and its impossibility), a heterogeneous nexus of non-oppositional differences and deferments, a *différance*, an “archi-writing”, that metaphysics has tried to repress” (51). This suggests that the ultimate goal of deconstruction or deconstructive reading shows what is repressed and justifies

that the text contains difference. To see the workings of difference in a text, deconstructive reading, as Anil Singhal states, aims to operate and demonstrate "the closure of inherent instability, ambiguities and multiplicities of meaning and dichotomies within texts" (9). Thus deconstructive reading exposes the workings of difference in a text.

The process of deconstructive reading, as Derrida practiced during the 1960s and 70s, was first to identify that "the particular philosophical text is constituted by a set of hierarchical binary oppositions (e.g. identity/difference, speech/writing, inside/outside, man/woman, nature/civilization, good/evil, etc)" and then to concentrate on "those elements of a text which not only cannot be incorporated into the 'metaphysics of presence', but also disorganize it, making apparent another logic that is not of that of traditional metaphysics" (Kakoliris 53). So in deconstructive reading, after the identification of binary oppositions, their relations are further analyzed in terms of how presence of particular meaning is centralized while decentralizing the other, and at the same time it is to observe how the process of centralizing the presence of 'a meaning' gets failure. Thus a deconstructive reading of a text ends up with the disclosure of a text in its meaning.

As Kakoliris has mentioned, Derrida, in his book, *Of Grammatology*, discusses a deconstructive reading in the chapter entitled "The Exorbitant Question of Method" and states that it "situates itself in the gap between what the author 'commands' within her text and what she does not 'command', that is, what takes place in her text without her will. This distance, fissure or opening, is something that deconstructive reading must 'produce'" (54). So in deconstructive reading the critic should be able to find out the gap between what the author intends to say and what he/she has unknowingly said. This is called a fissure—the gap between these two

meanings which open up possibilities for multiple meanings to appear, leading to disclosure of the text. In this way, a deconstructive reading destabilizes the meaning of a text which distinguishes itself from the traditional reading which is mainly concerned with the reproduction of the authorial or textual intention. Thus, in deconstructive reading

the meanings produced during the first reading of deconstructive reading become “disseminated” during the second reading. In other words, during the second reading, the text loses its initial appearance of semantic determinacy, organized around the axis of its authorial intention, and is eventually pushed into producing a number of incompatible meanings which are “undecidable” in the sense that the reader lacks any secure ground for choosing between them. (Kakoliris 55)

The discussion above suggests that deconstructive reading works out of paradoxes as the meaning of the text gets deconstructed in every reading; the authorial meaning is critically analyzed in order to justify that the meaning of a text is undecidable in its nature. Thus, it ultimately leads to the case of indeterminacy of meaning in the text.

To this, Kakoliris illustrates,

Deconstruction is installed between a text’s intended meaning (its declarative layer) and the text itself (its descriptive layer). Derrida’s deconstructive reading repeatedly uncovers opposed meanings between what the metaphysical author (for example, Rousseau) 'wishes to say' and what 'he says without wishing to say it,' or between what the author 'declares' and what the text 'describes without Rousseau's wishing to say it.' (57)

The difference between the structuralist reading and the deconstructive reading, according to Kakoliris, is that the former is based on the binary logic that

“takes place between the limits of a disjunctive ‘either... or’, but the latter on the ‘undecidable’ logic of supplementarity [that] constitutes the conjunctive logic of ‘both... and’, which, not only denies, but also disorganises classical binary thought” (59). To illustrate it, he presents the example of Plato’s *pharmakon* after Derrida:

The *pharmakon*, for example, is “remedy and poison, both... good and bad.”

Pharmakon “plays” between the poles of remedy and poison and, therefore, its rendering as either remedy or poison, as metaphysical binary thought ordains, prevents the revelation of the essential ambiguity of the word. Derrida refuses to determine a categorical, unambiguous meaning for *pharmakon*, or for the other undecidables. On the contrary, he stresses their characteristics of intensity and oscillation. (59)

Next important point to note in deconstructive reading is to be guided by what Derrida asserted on a text and its interpretation—“There is nothing outside of the text” (qtd. in Kakoliris 60). Kakoliris tries to explain its meaning in the line of Derrida that by this he means to suggest that “any exhaustive interpretative determination of a text is impossible, because language does not draw its ‘meaning’ from some deeper conceptual layer, a ‘transcendental signified’, which would exist outside of any system of the sign and, which, at some point, ‘would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign’” (Derrida qtd. in Kakoliris 59-60). Besides, with reference to Derrida’s deconstructive reading of philosophers such as Plato, Rousseau, Hegel, Husserl or Levi- Strauss, Kakoliris explicates the meaning of the expression—“There is nothing outside of the text”—as follows:

According to Derrida, this phrase ‘does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, as people have claimed, or have been naïve enough to believe and to have accused me of believing. But it does

mean that every referent, all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this 'real' except in an interpretive experience. The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of differential referring'. (60)

Guided by Derrida's argument on deconstruction, Alex Thomson states that deconstruction "strips concepts of their customary authority, not to dismiss them, but to do something different with them" (304). So it suggests that deconstructive reading is always intended to discover a new meaning in a text. Similarly, Niall Lucy mentions Barbara Johnson's view in her book, *Postmodern Literary Theory: An Introduction*, that in deconstructive reading of a text binary oppositions are not annihilated with all values or differences, but in it an attempt is made to "follow the subtle, powerful effects of differences already at work within the illusion of a binary opposition" ("Postmodern" 130). Similarly, M. H. Abrams holds the opinion that deconstruction is "a theory and practice of reading which claims to 'subvert' or 'undermine' the assumption that the system of language provides grounds that are adequate to establish the boundaries, the coherence or unity, and the determinate meaning of a text ("Glossary" 225). But it does not mean that deconstruction means destroying the values of the text, rather it means to refresh the relation between the binary oppositions and prove that their relation is of more complex and that they could signal to "an indefinite array of multiplex, incompatible, and undecidable possibilities" of meanings (225). Thus, in a deconstructive reading of a text the critic makes an effort to destabilize the boundaries, the coherence or unity and the determinate meaning of a text; it rather focuses on exploring multiple, incompatible and undecidable possibilities in the text.

The following are a few examples of how deconstruction has been applied in reading texts. In this regard, Martin Scherzinger carried out a deconstructive reading of *Seventh Symphony* and produced an article entitled “The Finale of Mahler's *Seventh Symphony*: A Deconstructive Reading.” The objective of the reading, as he has mentioned, was “to show how any 'internally coherent' moment contains within itself a 'space' which inevitably contains its opposite ('incoherence')—a space which reveals the inadequacy of that moment while at the same time, paradoxically, making its very coherence possible” (70). It is the deconstructive reading applied in the study of music which suggests that deconstruction or deconstructive reading can be applied in different human pursuits.

Applying deconstructive reading in the field of nursing practices, Moya Corner produced a research report entitled "Deconstructing Reflective Practice as a Model of Professional Knowledge in Nursing Education" which was submitted to the Institute of Education, University of London. She was more concerned with reviewing her nursing practices afresh which was assisted by her practice of deconstruction in her profession as she commends: “Those who take a deconstructivist approach to text analysis focus upon ‘the instability of linguistic meaning and the contradictions of conceptual thought’” (McPherson; Peters and Biesta qtd. in Corner 31). Similarly, in the deconstructive reading of her own nursing practices, she followed the processes as suggested by Johnson, which actually assisted her in recognizing “contradictions, repressions, uncertainties, and ambiguities” in her practices and deconstructing them (Johnson qtd. in Corner 31). So, in her experience “deconstruction is first of all a practice—it is what it does—not a body of theories, and secondly a parasitic practice—what it does is to inhabit the discourse of those who have something to say” (110). She further comments that

Derrida's ideas and writings along with their translations “have opened up new, exciting, and productive avenues of inquiry” which have helped the critical readers to do with new ideas, and she also opines that such deconstructive reflective practices are the “most liberating, democratic, and consistent with what is best in any educational endeavour” (246). In this way, she concludes that deconstructive reflective practices are the most effective practices in the field of academic professionalism.

Deconstructive reading has also been applied by Javed Akhter who studied the text, *Waiting for Godot*, and published an article “Waiting for Godot: A Deconstructive Study.” The purpose of the reading was “to scrutinize the text from Derrida’s deconstructive hermeneutics for dismantling the fixity, singularity and unified meaning of the text of the thought razing play under discussion” (44). The study was carried out as a narrative research, the data were taken from the text with reference to the key concepts of deconstruction like metaphysics of presence and messianic, aporia, logos, binary oppositions and delogocentrism which were discussed analytically (44). Through the analysis of metaphysics of presence, the study was intended to identify aporia in the text, i. e. to justify a case of “a logical impassable, contradiction, doubt and a moment of undecidability” (54).

In reading the text deconstructively, Akhter first identified the binary oppositions that occurred in the text like white and black, light and darkness, smart and dull, virtue and evil, ideal and physical, and man and woman, beauty and ugliness and so on and analyzed them founded on the theory of deconstruction (57). The findings of the reading showed ‘how the metaphysics of presence and messianic logocentrism imprint preventive effects on mental structure of human beings, and fall

them in the aporetic trap of omnipresent and omnipotent logi (61). He declares the other findings of the reading as follows:

The study tries to prove that the techniques of meta-theatre used in Samuel Beckett's play reject the conventional dramatic realism, make the text of the play delogocentric text, and bring it very close to Derridean deconstruction, which rejects and deconstructs the semantic singularity and fixity of meaning or hidden transcendental meaning of the text The study also concludes that man cannot perceive and interpret the text until and unless he dismantles the messianic logocentrism of the prevailing tradition of the metaphysics of presence (61)

The findings made in Akhter's study are compared with the features of Derridean deconstruction which attacks the definite and centric nature of meaning in a text as a transcendental signified. Thus, this study justifies the significance of deconstructive reading of a text in that the metaphysics of presence is identified and dismantled, opening up possibilities of indefinite meanings inherent in the text. In such a way, Akhtar ascertains that deconstructive reading of a text goes against the logocentrism, the philosophical principle which suggests that any text contains foundational meaning like 'truth', 'peace', 'justice', 'human', 'speech', God, etc.

Relating deconstruction to the field of religious study, Alexander Christopher Karolis carried out a PhD dissertation with the title "On the Deconstruction of Christianity: Technē and Touching—Abandoned Bodies in the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy." This dissertation was submitted to Australian National University, Australia. As the title itself implies, this study employed deconstruction to the study of religious text. In this regard, Karolis briefly comments on the essence of the text, *The Deconstruction of Christianity*, that it should be understood "as a posture of

thought in which there is an openness to what is beyond thought, a recognition of the limit to every enclosure, and, a recognition that an inside can only be in relation to an outside” (55). With this reference to the disclosure of a meaning in a scripture, she goes on analyzing Nancy’s reading of the text and comes up with the following findings:

In my account of Nancy’s deconstruction of Christianity I consider two Leitmotifs of presence, these come together in such a way as to characterize the Self-deconstructing process of Christianity First, that presence is never fulfilled; rather presence, as representation, is indicative of an absence that gives meaning in *absentia*. . . . Second, that presence is continually withdrawing from the world; (260)

Similar to the discussion on the relation between deconstruction and Christianity, in the book, *What Would Jesus Deconstruct? The Good News of Postmodernity for the Church*, Caputo, a prominent Derridean who employed Derridean concepts to theology has explored what Jesus has deconstructed in the Bible and how theological texts can also be concerned with deconstruction or postmodernism. The content of the book is introduced by James K. A. Smith, who is also a general editor of the book. In the introduction he discusses some Derridean concepts and the way they can be significant in theological studies. He comments in the line of Derrida that “deconstruction isn't something that we *do* to things: deconstruction *happens*. And it happens in the middle voice” (Introduction 16). He regards Jesus as Derrida and the practices in the church as deconstruction and asserts: “The church doesn't need Jacques Derrida in order to be deconstructed, because it's got Jesus! The deconstruction of the church happens from the inside Jesus's vision of the kingdom deconstructs all our domestications—not to leave the

institution razed to the ground, but merely flattened” (Introduction 16). Thus, Caputo is mainly concerned with how deconstruction works with texts or scriptures. On his observation of the texts he finds that deconstruction naturally occurs in a text, i. e. every text deconstructs itself. To this, he comments:

When a deconstruction is done well, the truth or—what seems like the same thing—all hell will break out. What the truth does, what this Christ-like figure in Sheldon's novel does, or their contemporary counterparts in *The Wire* do, what Jesus does, is deconstruct. Sheldon's famous novel, this classic of popular Christian piety, the one with the smarmy picture of Jesus on the cover, turns on a—hold your ears—*deconstruction*. Jesus Christ, Deconstructor! (30)

The discussion above shows that both Smith and Caputo are of the opinion that every text and character deconstructs themselves, so deconstruction is a natural phenomenon in a text. Although it is more common in general texts, it also equally applies to the religious text. As the authorial meaning in a text is deconstructed, so is the case in scriptural text; the god himself becomes the deconstructor like Jesus! This project, in the same vein, has justified that like Jesus Christ, Lord Krishna is a deconstructor or a deconstructionist!

On the application of deconstruction in reading texts, Caputo finds it so pervasive that it occurs itself in every text. He argues that deconstruction can be compared with an inner force of things which makes them tremble on their own. So this force, as he adds, will give them no rest, keep forcing itself to the surface, forcing itself out, making the thing restless. Similarly, he also finds deconstruction like a kind of uncontainable truth which is organized around the idea that things contain that they contain what they cannot contain. So he further notes that nobody has to come along

and "deconstruct" things. Things are auto-deconstructed by the tendencies of their own inner truth. Furthermore, he compares deconstruction with 'the other' which is the one who tells the truth on the 'same'; the other is the truth of the same, the truth that has been repressed and suppressed, omitted and marginalized, or sometimes just plain murdered, like Jesus himself, which is why Johannes Baptist Metz speaks of the 'dangerous memory' of the suffering of Jesus and why I describe deconstruction as a hermeneutics of the kingdom of God. (29)

In the end, Caputo along with Metz finds deconstruction as a hermeneutics of the kingdom of God, i. e. it is a process of exploring the ultimate truth or the transcendental signified as discussed in the scriptures and theology. In regard to the relation between deconstruction and truth, Caputo further notes:

On my reading, which will sound a little too pious to impious deconstructors and downright impious to good and pious Christians, deconstruction is a theory of *truth*, in which truth spells *trouble*. As does Jesus. That is what they have in common . . . it is also necessary to point out that deconstruction is at the same time a hermeneutics of truth, of the truth of the event, which is not deconstructible. (30)

In the quote above Caputo declares Jesus as a deconstructor, and then asks himself what Jesus would do as a deconstructor. To this issue he claims that he "would deconstruct a very great deal of what people do in the name of Jesus, starting with the people who wield this question like a hammer to beat their enemies." He further hypothesizes that "the first thing that Jesus would deconstruct is WWJD itself, the whole 'industry', the whole commercial operation of spiritual and very real money-making Christian capitalists" (31). By this Caputo, as a Derridean, tries to capitulate that deconstruction is very essential in theological practices in order to purify itself

and enhance its spiritual spirit. So he recommends deconstructive reading of scriptural text: “I advocate a certain deconstructive reading of the scriptural text, which always means to be attuned to love while staying tuned to present circumstances” (111). In the same line, this project is concerned with deconstructive reading of the scriptural text, the Gita, and it has found out that as a teacher Lord Krishna has deconstructed the teacher-centered and methods-led practices in teaching.

Similar to these deconstructive readings of Christianity, Anindya Sekhar Purakayastha and Subhendra Bhowmick also employed deconstructive reading in the Hindu scripture, The Mahabharata, and published an article “Tympanising Philosophy: Luxating the Disciplinary Margins through a Derridean Reading of the Mahabharata.” This is also a strong case which presents an example of how deconstructive reading can be employed to explore meanings in a text like scripture. They studied the text, the Mahabharata, guided by the practice of deconstructive reading. The purpose of which was to "argue for an alignment of embattled adversaries," namely philosophy and literature with reference to Derrida`s seminal work, *Margins of Philosophy* and the great Indian philosophico-literary epic, the Mahabharata (1). And the next purpose was to “demonstrate how in explicating the notion of *thick time* or 'contretemps,' the Mahabharata exemplified Derridean idea of deconstruction about 2,500 years ago” (3).

As their prime concern was to deconstruct the boundary between philosophy and literature, Purakayastha and Bhowmick selected the text, the Mahabharata and justified how the text “blurs the border zones between philosophy and its alterity or non-philosophical places [literature], enabling cross-borderal supplementation through the ‘logos of the Other’” (4). With regard to this, they contend: “Perhaps the *Mahabharata* may constitute some wild and unforeseen frontier at the tympanising

juncture of philosophy; and hence it can be located in a sort of ‘non-site’, as in spite of being a literary epic in its form and content, it is generally considered as a book of philosophy as well” (2).

To justify that the Mahabharata contains deconstruction in itself, Purakayastha and Bhowmick analyzed a story from it which was about Chirakari and his dilemma—to kill or not to kill his mother because, on the one hand, it is a serious sin according to ancient religious injunctions not to carry out one’s father’s order, and on the other hand, it is no less an offence to commit the sin of matricide (11). Thus, Chirakari’s dilemma is the undecidable in deconstruction or aporia which does not produce any ultimate meaning; this episode deconstructs the meaning of the text itself, opening up multiple interpretations of the text. Besides, they argue that many verses in the Mahabharata will lead to “the paradigmatic depth of the hermeneutic and the unending nature of the circles of their meaning, the polysemic and the polyvocal *Slokas* (verses) of the *Mahabharata* would always engender opportunity for deconstruction” (11).

Besides the application of deconstructive reading of the scriptures in Hinduism and Christianity, it has also been employed to study the text in Buddhism. In this regard, Victor Forte briefly explored deconstruction in Buddhism under the title “Buddhisms and Deconstructions.” Regarding the connection between deconstruction and Buddhist studies, Forte mentions that it was Robert Magliola’s work, *Derrida on the Mend*, which first made this comparative study and “initiated the emergence of contemporary Buddhology’s fascination with Derrida’s deconstructive project” (222). Forte’s review finds that “there are striking similarities between Derrida’s deconstruction and Eastern enlightenment-based wisdom (222). This suggests that deconstruction as a reading strategy can be applied to read the Gita

as it contains enlightenment-based wisdom which is popular not only in the Eastern culture but also in the West.

In the editorial of the book Park presents the most striking similar concept between deconstruction and Buddhism that in “Naming the Unnameable” both the terms, *différance* and *pratītyasamutpāda*, refer to “the Middle Way/Middle voice,” which has been further discussed in his essay, “Mabbett” which “enumerates eight points of comparison between Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way and Derrida’s deconstruction” (qtd. in Forte 222). Similarly, there are many verses in the Gita which suggest the significance of the Middle Way. This is what this project has justified through the deconstructive reading of the Gita.

Besides the application of deconstructive reading in scriptures, Sian Ellis Adams used deconstruction along with reconstruction as a process in reflective pedagogical practice for his dissertation which was submitted to the School of Education, University of Leicester. The title of this study is "An Investigation of the Deconstruction and Reconstruction Processes within the Context of Reflective Pedagogical Practice and within the Content of Play." This study aimed to “investigate the deconstruction and reconstruction processes within the context of reflective pedagogical practice and within the content of play” (12).

Deconstruction, in this study, was used as reflective practices which the practitioners employ in recalling their practices, articulating deeply embedded understanding and questioning their beliefs and the ways in which practice was informed (17). He argues, after Dahlberg, that the essential elements of reflective practice are “the ability, the disposition, the enthusiasm and the willingness to question, or ‘deconstruct’ the ways in which practitioners view their practice” (qtd. in Adams 42). He claims that “reflective practice occurs at many levels, from an initial

pragmatic level focusing on practical realities, anecdotal recalling of events, through to deeper critical enquiries in which values, beliefs and understandings are questioned, interrogated and deconstructed” (44). His argument justifies that reflection and deconstruction naturally go together enhancing the practitioners’ knowledge and skills. Adams presents the importance of reflective practices which aim to: enable practitioners to discuss, analyse, evaluate and change practice; promote an awareness of social and political contexts of education; appraise the moral and ethical issues implicit in their practice; encourage greater responsibility; develop practitioners' pedagogical theories; empower and enhance autonomy (Calderhead and Gates qtd. in Adams 28-29). Adams finds that the study of the reflective practices resulted in a process of deconstruction and reconstruction of practitioners’ values, beliefs and understandings, and that “the practitioners were committed and enthusiastic about exploring how children learn through play; displayed insecure pedagogical knowledge, practice rooted in affective domain; and were resistant to change and use of pedagogical language” (259). Adams’ study has demonstrated that deconstruction and reflection should go together for effective pedagogical practices.

Metin Boşnak and Asena Boşnak, on the other hand, discuss the basic concepts of deconstruction and present an example of a deconstructive reading of a literary text under the title of “Writing as Reading Itself: A Derridean Reading of *Lost in the Funhouse*.” The very thing they present in the beginning of their article is the deconstruction of hierarchical relation between the binary opposition between ‘speech and writing’. Traditionally, ‘speech’ was privileged over ‘writing,’ but “Derrida rejects this hierarchy, noting that saying and hearing do not always correspond to each other, and that the speech is derivative” (Derrida qtd. in Bosnak and Bosnak 20). To justify it, Derrida gives the example of the words: *differance*, meaning “to defer”

and its homophone *différance*, meaning “to differ”, both of which cannot be distinguished in speech; they can be seen as distinct words only in writing. Therefore, he argues that “Saussure’s attempt to restrict the language to audible word is completely rejected” (Derrida qtd. in Bosnak and Bosnak 20). To show the case of inadequacy in speech over writing and to deconstruct all types of binary oppositions, Derrida coined a term “différance” to suggest that “the signified always traces to different ‘signifieds’ while meaning is postponed each time through the constant deferral, which results in an endless chain of signifiers” (Derrida qtd. in Bosnak and Bosnak 20). In this way, Derrida never accepts the central or ultimate meaning of a text; what he argues is that the meaning is always in a play, in unstable condition. So Bosnak and Bosnak, in the same vein, argue that “there is no linear development and semantic center that totalizes and harmonizes the meaning; instead, there is ‘interplay and infinitum’ and ‘systematic play of differences’” in a text (20). Thus through deconstructing the binary opposition, deconstructive reading of a text ends up with *différance*—a case of multiple meanings and the undecidable.

Bosnak and Bosnak apply the deconstructive reading on John Barth’s book, *Lost in the Funhouse*, which is commonly accepted as “a post-structuralist short story collection, consisting of a maze of stories, in which the author forces the reader to get lost with him” (20). So this text can be regarded as an “illustration of Derridean philosophy.” As they found in their analysis of the book, “the language’s documentary function is completely disregarded. There only remains a Funhouse consisting in a series of the floating signifiers” (20). Reading the text, *Lost in the Funhouse*, Bosnak and Bosnak argue that the text does not end up with any final meaning; they conclude:

With the use of metafiction, it is shown in *Lost in the Funhouse* that language does not function to represent the world; it functions to prove that it has nothing to do with reality. . . . The text is only a playground; it does not necessarily take the reader, author or narrator to anywhere. It wants to get readers lost in this playground, and indeed enjoy getting lost in this process by undermining the desire to reach a final point. (20)

Besides, Bosnak and Bosnak also found that the narrator, Ambrose, in the title story, is in a funhouse and encounters many images of himself reflected on the mirror and finds himself in confusion with which image exactly represents him. So he comes to realize that “there is no center, there is no ‘ultimate’ image of himself that he can rely on” (22). In the story the narrator gets frustration that he is unable to find a way out of the plight because the signifieds that he believes to reflect him are lost, giving endless possibilities (22). They argue that all the stories included in *Lost in the Funhouse* are like “textbook illustration of Derrida’s views on language and writing.” So the anthology is “both a guide for ‘how not to write’ and ‘how not to define’ writing, thus defying an ultimate center” (26). That is to say, the book, *Lost in the Funhouse*, is the best example of Derridean reading of a text.

Like the deconstructive reading of the literary text, Yadav Bahadur Kadal studied the *Mahabharata* for his dissertation from gender perspective. In this study he has analyzed the roles of some dominant female characters like Shakuntala, Savitri, and Damayanti and discussed them under the sub-chapter entitled—Home and Away: A Deconstruction of the Binary Values:

Some astute characteristics of the woman characters like Shakuntala, Savitri, Damayanti and of course some other characters related to them in one way or the other come under the scrutiny in terms of their

gender dynamics. In their whole spirit of adventures, those females show their responsibility towards their womanly duty, and at the same time cross their gender boundary. They challenge the prevalent patriarchal gender rules/roles to establish their own identity by flouting the same. (299)

Although this study is not fully guided by deconstructive reading, Kadal has discussed it in a sub-chapter to show how the female characters deconstructed the traditional boundary of gender roles. This crossing of the patriarchal gender roles by the dominant female characters in the text, the *Mahabharata* suggests that it contains the constructs of deconstruction. The Gita, as the text under study, is a part of the *Mahabharata*, it has also justified that the Gita contains the constructs of deconstruction.

Besides the application of deconstructive reading in religious and literary texts, it has also been used in education to analyze pedagogical practices. In this regard, David W. Stinson and Ginny C. Powel applied deconstruction to explore teacher reflection and analyzed teacher/student binary—the most important binary opposition in pedagogical practices, and produced a paper entitled “Teacher Reflecting Differently: Deconstructing the Discursive Teacher/Student Binary.” In this paper they discuss how postmodern/poststructural or deconstructive theory can be used to reform pedagogical practices with reference to teaching mathematics. They argue that the postmodern theory “provides a *different* theoretical framework for teachers to trouble both traditional and reform-oriented mathematics teaching as they explore their own pedagogical philosophies and practices” (320). By this, this paper justifies the significance of deconstructionist/postmodernist perspective in pedagogical practices.

Taking the reference from other postmodernist pedagogues, Stinson and Powel justify the value of postmodern theory or deconstruction in pedagogical practices. In this regard, Seidman argues: “The value of postmodern theory is found in its awareness of and tolerance toward social differences, ambiguity, and conflict; it requires developing new languages, conventions, and skills to address the moral and political implications of knowledge” (qtd. in Stinson and Powel 320). Seidman suggests that we need to develop new perspectives in the pedagogical issues like language, conventions, skills, etc. which can be provided by the postmodern theory. Similarly, Walshaw finds the significance of postmodern theory in “shifting the focus from foundations and familiar struggles of establishing authority toward exploring tentativeness and developing scepticism of those principles and methods that put a positive gloss on fundamentals and certainties” (qtd. in Stinson and Powel 320-21). In other words, we need to encourage the practices of ‘tentativeness and skepticism’ rather than ‘fundamentals and certainties’ in pedagogy which can be ascertained through the application of postmodern theory/deconstruction because there is nothing fundamental and certain as “there is no origin . . . , no center to discourse” (Derrida qtd. in Stinson and Powel (321).

Guided by the theory of deconstruction, Stinson and Powel have used ‘deconstruction’ as a method in this study despite the fact that Derrida himself did not give it any definite concept/procedure or principles. However, the Derrideans have used it “as the methodology of exposing discursive binary oppositions defined interdependently by mutual exclusion, such as good/evil or true/false” (Dillon qtd. in Stinson and Powel 321). Now it has been almost common practice to explore binary oppositions in a text to deconstruct its presence of metaphysics because Derrida himself deconstructed Western metaphysical texts through exploring binary

oppositions. In this regard, Usher and Edwards contend, after Derrida, that the “binary oppositions shape the very structure of thought by constructing an essential center and authorizing presence” which can be deconstructed or collapsed “if the binary opposition is undermined” (qtd. in Stinson and Powel 321).

Being more specific to the application of deconstruction, Stinson and Powel explored the pedagogical practices of mathematics and identified the following binary oppositions: mathematical *Truths*/mathematical *truths*, teacher/student, effective teacher/non-effective teacher, reform teaching/traditional teaching, mathematically able student/non-mathematically able student, high-level course/low-level course, and so forth (321). They employed deconstruction as a method and tried to deconstruct the center or presence created by those binary oppositions and their interpretation focused on “unsettling and displacing (or troubling) binary hierarchies, uncovering their historically contingent origin and politically charged roles, not to provide a better foundation for knowledge and society but to dislodge their dominance, creating a social space that is tolerant of difference, ambiguity, and playful innovations that favors autonomy and democracy” (Seidman qtd. in Stinson and Powel 321-22). In this process they found that it was not that easier to deconstruct the capital-T truth of mathematics. They share their experience; “It appears that although mathematics has been argued to be the roots of postmodern thought (see, e.g., Tasić, 2001), to deconstruct the capital-T truths of mathematics might prove to be the most difficult deconstruction to undertake; it may be, nonetheless, the most important” (325).

The study of binary oppositions in deconstructive reading of a text can also be found in Kamali's Master's thesis entitled "Exploitation of Binary Oppositions in Sanjeev Uprety's *Ghanchakkar*." In this thesis he has identified major binary oppositions in the novel and analyzed them from the perspective of deconstruction.

The major binary oppositions he has identified in the novel are: sensible and crazy, fact and fantasy, dynamic and static, free and responsible, materialist and spiritual, re-totaling and rechecking, rich and poor, pre-modern and modern, and center and periphery (42-43). After the analysis of the binary oppositions in the novel he has concluded that the binary oppositions have been exploited guided by the theory of deconstruction and that this exploitation of the binary oppositions "results in the case of *differance*, proving that the novel, *Ghanchakkar* is an example of differance" (Kamali, "Exploitation" 58).

Comparing deconstruction with the theory of phenomenology, Jack Reynolds studied the concept of 'the other' between Derrida and Levinas and published an article "The Other of Derridean Deconstruction: Levinas, Phenomenology and the Question of Responsibility." In this paper Reynolds has used postmodernism and deconstruction synonymously as both of them have common goal. Regarding this, he mentions, "Deconstruction, and postmodernism more generally, have both associated their various criticisms of the philosophical tradition with a desire to emancipate a conception of alterity that has been marginalised by basically all metaphysics" (31). This suggests the common target of deconstruction and postmodernism which is to identify the marginalized in metaphysics and make efforts to emancipate it as an alterity or the other with its own value. Reynolds further claims that "Derrida owes Levinas quite a considerable philosophical debt" on the conceptualization of the alterity as Derrida also agrees that "alterity is similarly absolute and irrecoverable." So they agree on the concept of the other that it "by definition must elude any attempt to grasp it" and that it "precedes philosophy and 'necessarily invokes and provokes the subject before any genuine questioning can begin'" (33). This justifies that

Derrida has “avowed affinities with Levinas’ way of thinking” with regard to conceptualization and the process of emancipating the alterity (34).

Despite the fact that both Derrida and Levinas are concerned with the other or the alterity in dealing with binary oppositions, they have also some differences. For example, Reynolds maintains that Derrida has criticized Levinas on humanism, on the tradition of Western metaphysics, on feminine, on the religious and the ethical issues, and on understanding Heidegger and Husserl (34). On alterity, Reynolds argues, in the line of Caputo, that “Derrida’s conception of alterity in his later work nevertheless inclines towards the position that is best exemplified by Levinas, and John Caputo” as he is moving towards the messianic which is the common concern for all of them (36). As Reynolds has mentioned, for Derrida the messianic

refers predominantly to the religions of the Messiahs—i.e. the Muslim, Judaic and Christian religions. These religions proffer a Messiah of known characteristics, and often one who is expected to arrive at a particular time or place. The Messiah is inscribed in their respective religious texts, and in an oral tradition that dictates that only if the other conforms to such and such a description is that person actually the Messiah. (50)

In the discussion above Reynolds explains Derridean understanding of the messianic that “Derrida is not referring to a future that will one day become present, but to an openness towards an unknown futurity that is always already involved in what we take to be ‘presence’ and hence also renders it ‘impossible’” (51). For Reynolds the messianic “refers predominantly to a structure of our existence that involves waiting—waiting even in activity—and a ceaseless openness towards a future that can never be circumscribed by the various horizons of significance that we might attempt to bring to bear upon that possible future” (51). Thus, from the Derridean

perspective the messianic can be compared with the ‘center’, the ‘presence’, the ‘transcendental’, or the ‘God’ which we might wish to encounter, which is always impossible!

The other area of exploration guided by deconstruction is the value system. In a paper entitled “Values and Deconstructions: Derrida, Saussure, Marx” Gregory S. Jay discusses values in deconstruction in relation to Derrida, Saussure and Marx. The central issue between deconstruction and values is "How does deconstruction regard values?" To understand this issue better, it is necessary to explore it in relation to other critiques as well. To this, Jay ascribes,

The value of Marx, Nietzsche, and Saussure for Derrida, then, lies in the way each offers a critique of how system and history operate in various discourses . . . in soliciting the play of their terms. Deconstructive discourse thus takes place within the margins of the tradition it delimits, and persists in that transvaluation of values offered by each of its precursors. (188)

This suggests that deconstruction is concerned with the transvaluation of values, i. e. deconstruction of a value in relation to other values which can create a new value which is not value in itself. Jay further makes it clear: “Deconstruction is portrayed as a negative theology or absurdist aesthetic that paralyzes any meaningful action or statement and so threatens to cast both Marxism and traditional Judaeo-Christian humanism into an abyss of sophisticated speculations” (153-54). As values traditionally accepted are deconstructed, deconstruction is often understood as ‘a negative theology’ or ‘absurdist aesthetic’. So it seems that deconstruction disregards values, or it is not a value-based theory, or it is not a theory at all. Derrida, however, has nothing to say to such objections as he simply asserts that deconstruction happens and every text and value is self-deconstructed.

Now the next question arises—is deconstruction value-free? The response to it is 'of course, not'. As Jay puts it, “From Marx to Nietzsche, from Saussure to Heidegger to Derrida, the question of values is consistently at the forefront of deconstructive discourse, which discloses it in the language, history, politics, and technology of Western culture” (156). If deconstruction has values, how can they be explored? This is a crucial issue to explore in deconstruction. To this, Jay asserts that we need “to begin with a genealogy of the deconstruction of values” which goes along with the “rereading of the tradition . . . since the texts of Marx, Nietzsche, Saussure, and Heidegger . . . with just such rereadings of historical values” (157). Regarding the nature of value in deconstruction, Jay maintains, “The force of deconstruction is inseparable from its value, which lies in dis-closing the forms of technical, empirical, and ideological thought. The work of this disclosure often occurs stylistically in the disturbing resonances Derrida activates by mingling the vocabularies of Marx, Nietzsche, Saussure, and Heidegger” (167). This suggests that the value in deconstruction is the value which is the mixture of many other values deconstructed—a differance!

Jay also hints that the value in deconstruction is close to the value in Marxist as he notes: “The various appropriations of Marx now found among feminists, film theorists, philosophers, literary critics, and a myriad of postmodern or poststructuralist thinkers suggest that efforts towards a viable use of Marxist perspectives may be well underway, though they will leave the terms of Marxist analysis transformed (perhaps unrecognizably) in the process” (192). As deconstruction is the postmodernist or poststructuralist thinking which raises the voices for the other, the marginalized, and the oppressed; its value cannot remain detached from the Marxist ones.

The only value that deconstruction focuses, according to Caputo, is 'justice' as he contends, after Derrida, "The law is always deconstructible but 'justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible'" (Derrida qtd. in Caputo 63). So Caputo adds that "the voice of deconstruction is not far from the voice of the prophets, which calls for justice to flow like water over the land" (66). This justifies that Derrida/deconstruction is solemnly concerned with justice which is also a major concern with the Mahabharata as the war was fought for justice. So Lord Krishna took the side of the Pandavas as they were fighting for justice, and the Gita is the result of the discourse in the pursuit of justice which can be better understood through the lens of deconstruction.

Exploring the Constructs of Deconstruction in the Gita

As deconstruction is the result of Derrida's reading of the philosophical texts during the 1960s and 70s, it is essential to explore and identify how he practiced deconstructive reading. With this regard, Kakoliris maintains that this reading was to identify a set of hierarchical binary oppositions like identity/difference, speech/writing, inside/outside, man/woman, nature/civilization, good/evil, etc. (53). Terzi, in the same vein, suggests that the general strategy of deconstruction used by Derrida in his practice of deconstructive reading of a text was to question the binary oppositions of metaphysics like presence/absence, intelligible/sensible, internal/external, etc. in a text (2). These studies justify that 'binary opposition' is one major construct of deconstruction which is actually the starting point of deconstructive reading.

In the practice of deconstruction the next important concept that Derrida invented is the concept of 'différance' which is the thrust of his theory, deconstruction. In this regard, Habib contends that Derrida coined the term

'differance' which is regarded as central to his thought. He relates its context and meaning to "Saussure's concept of 'difference' as the constituting principle of language: a term is defined by what it is not, by its differences from other terms" and presents the way it differs. He further maintains, "Derrida incorporates into his term an ambivalence in the French word *differer* which can mean both 'to differ' and 'to defer' in time" (653). The point is that Saussure's difference produces a definite meaning out of the signs, but Derridean differance the deferral or postpone of a definite meaning. So the fact is that defferance refers to the case of a text lacking any fixed meaning. To designate this state of a text, Derrida argued that the term 'differance' itself has no definite meaning; it is "neither as a word nor as a concept" (Derrida qtd. in Nuyen 135). So Nuyen further explains that the term 'differance' contains both the meaning of differing and deferring in a text, and that it is "the differing and deferring of language that produce meanings, truths and values" (135). Thus, differance is another significant construct of deconstruction which is the result of deconstructive reading of a text. As 'binary oppositions' and 'differance' are key constructs of deconstructions this project has identified as employed by Lord Krishna as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita.

Identification of Binary Oppositions in the Gita

Theory of deconstruction is founded on the concept and practice of binary oppositions because it mainly operates through them. Binary oppositions, therefore, are the heart of the theory of deconstruction. So deconstruction can be understood only through exploring binary oppositions. In reviewing the historical practice of binary oppositions Hans Bertens maintains that it was first used in Jakobson's distinctive feature theory in *phonetics* (e.g. vowel/consonant; voiced/ consonant, etc.), and later on, it was applied by Levi-Strauss in his cultural study, known as "structural

anthropology” (62-63). Bertens further discusses Levi- Strauss’s concept of the origin of the system of binary opposition and states that “our ancestors deployed this simple model, or structure, to get a grip on a world that slowly began to appear to them as something separate and alien” (62). This suggests that binary oppositions became the foundation of logic from very early of human civilization. With this background, Ian Buchanan defines binary oppositions as “a pair of terms that although opposed to one another are necessarily bound together as each other’s condition of possibility” (59). He also presented some examples of binary oppositions like male/female, nature/culture, hot/cold, gay/straight, signifier/signified, and so on (59). This concept of binary oppositions laid foundation for the development of structuralism. With this regard, Lois Tyson states: “According to structuralism, the human mind perceives differences most readily in terms of opposites, which the structuralists call binary oppositions: two ideas, directly opposed, each of which we understand by means of its opposition to the other ” (213). Thus binary oppositions have been used to centralize a particular concept over another through their comparative qualities so that the focus of meaning can be grasped easily.

This use of binary oppositions gave rise to the development of structuralism, giving hierarchy of concepts and centralizing a particular meaning but it was criticized by Derrida. This gave birth to deconstruction. So deconstruction is founded on the critical analysis of binary oppositions in a text and binary oppositions are the basic construct of deconstruction. Thus, in a deconstructive reading of a text, the first thing is to identify what binary oppositions exist in it. Accordingly, as the first purpose of this project was to identify the occurrence of the binary oppositions, a construct of deconstruction, in the pedagogy of the Gita, they have been identified

with reference to the the text, *Bhagavad-gita As It Is*, written by A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada and listed them chapter-wise as follows (ch. 1-18):

Chapter One: Observing the Armies on the Battlefield of Kurukshetre

- i. *dharma kshetre* (in the place of pilgrimage) and *kuru kshetre* (in the place of Kurukshetra, desiring to fight; 1.1)
- ii. *svajanam* (kinsmen; 1.36) and *varna-shankaraha* (unwanted progeny; 1.40)
- iii. *kula-dharma* (the family tradition) and *kula-kshaye* (in destroying the family; 1.39)

Chapter Two: Cotents of the Gita Summarized

- i. *dukha* (distress) and *sukha* (happiness; 2.15)
- ii. *janma* (birth) and *mrityu* (death; 2.27)
- iii. *siddhi* (success) and *asiddhi* (failure; 2.48)
- iv. *subha* (good) and *ashubha* (evil; 2.57)
- v. *abhinanditi* (praising) and *dwesti* (enemy; 2.57)
- vi. *shanti* (peacefulness) and *ashanti* (unpeacefulness; 2.66)
- vii. *sata* (truth) and *asata* (untruth; 2.16)
- viii. *gata* (living) and *agata* (dead; 2.11)
- ix. *vyakta* (manifest) and *avyakta* (unmanifest; 2.28)
- x. *jaya* (victory) and *ajaya* (defeat; 2.38)
- xi. *labha* (profit) and *alabha* (loss; 2.38)
- xii. *sukrita* (good results) and *duskriti* (bad results; 2.50)

Chapter Three: Karma-yoga

- i. *karma* (work) and *akarma* (no work; 3.8)
- ii. *shrestha* (a great man) and *janaha* (a common man; 3.21)
- iii. *sva-dharma* (one's own duty) and *paradharmā* (another men's duties; 3.35)

Chapter Four: Transcendental Knowledge

- i. *siddha* (success) and *asiddha* (failure; 4.22)
- ii. *sadhu* (the pious) and *duskrita* (the miscreants; 4.8)

Chapter Five: Karma-yoga—Action in Krishna Consciousness

- i. *yuktah* (one who is engaged in devotional service) and *ayuktaha* (one who is not in Krishna Consciousness; 5.12)
- ii. *sannyasam* (to renounce work) and *karmanam* (to work with devotion; 5.1)
- iii. *karma-phalam tyaktva* (offering the result of all activities to Lord Krishna) and *kama-karena* (greedy for the fruits; 5.12)
- iv. *ajnana* (ignorance) and *janan* (knowledge; 5.15)
- v. *papa* (sin) and *sukrita* (pious activities; 5.18)
- vi. *svapake* (outcast) and *pandita* (those who are wise; 5.18)
- vii. *priyam* (the pleasant) and *apriyam* (the unpleasant; 5.20)
- viii. *prahrishyet* (rejoices) and *udvijet* (becomes agitated; 5.20)

Chapter Six: Dhyana-yoga

- i. *bandhu* (friend) and *ripuha* (enemy; 6.5)

- ii. *mana* (honour) and *apamana* (dishonor; 6.7)
- iii. *sita* (cold) and *usna* (heat; 6.7)
- iv. *sadhu*(the pious person) and *papi* (the sinner; 6.9)

Chapter Seven: Knowledge of the Absolute

- i. *apara* (inferior/material nature) and *para* (superior/living entities; 7.5)
- ii. *prabhavah* (the source of manifestation/origin) and *pralayah* (annihilation/dissolution; 7.6)
- iii. *avyaktam* (non-manifested/imperishable) and *vyaktam* (manifest/perishable; 7.24)
- iv. *anyadevatah* (other demigods) and *mamdridhavratah*(Krishna devotee; 7.28)
- v. *dvandvamohena* (having the illusion of/bewildered by dualities; 7.27) and *dvandvamohanirmuktaha* (free from the delusion of dualities; 7.28)

Chapter Eight: Attaining the Supreme

- i. *anavritim* (no return) and *avritim* (return; 8.23)
- ii. *punahajanmanavidhyate* (never takes birth again) and *punahajanmavidhyate* (takes birth again; 8.16)
- iii. *sukla-gati* (path of light) and *Krishna-gati* (path of darkness; 8.26)

Chapter Nine: The Most Confidential Knowledge

- i. *rakshasim* and *asurim prakritim* (demonic and atheistic nature; 9.12) and *daivim prakritim* (divine nature; 9.13)

- ii. *ekatvena* (in oneness) and *prithaktvena* (in duality/diversity; 9.15)
- iii. *pita* (father) and *mata* (mother; 9.18)
- iv. *prabhava* (creation) and *pralaya* (dissolution; 9.18)
- v. *sat* (spirit) and *asat* (matter; 9.19)
- vi. *svarga-lokam* (heaven) and *martya-lokam* (the earth; 9.21)
- vii. *shubhphala* (auspicious results) and *ashubhphala* (inauspicious results; 9.28)
- viii. *dveshyah* (hateful) and *priyah* (dear; 9.29)

Chapter Ten: The Opulence of the Absolute

- i. *bhavah* (birth) and *abhavah* (death; 10.4)
- ii. *yashah* (fame) and *ayashah* (infamy; 10.5)
- iii. *bhayam* (fear) and *abhayam* (fearlessness; 10.4)
- iv. *devah* (the demigods) and *danavah* (the demon; 10.14)

Chapter Eleven: The Universal Form

- i. *sva-cakshu* (natural eyes) and *divyam cakshyu* (divine eyes; 11.8)
- ii. *sakhe* (friend) and *deva* (Lord; 11.44)
- iii. *satasahasrasahakritini* (hundreds of thousands of varied divine and multicolored forms; 11.5) and *manusamrupam* (human form; 11.51)

Chapter Twelve: Devotional Service

- i. *naudvijate* (never agitating others) and *udvijate* (disturbing others; 12.15)
- ii. *harsha* (happiness) and *amarsha* (distress; 12.15)

iii. *ninda* (defamation) and *stutiha* (praise; 12.19)

Chapter Thirteen: Nature, the Enjoyer and Consciousness

i. *prakritim* (nature) and *purusam* (the enjoyer; 13.1)

ii. *kshetram* (the field) and *kshetrajnam* (the knower of the field; 13.1)

iii. *adambhitwam* (pridelessness) and *dambhitwam* (having pride; 13.8)

iv. *ahimsa* (non-violence) and *himsa* (violence; 13.8)

v. *sthairyam* (steadfastness) and *cancalam* (wandering; 13.8)

vi. *vairagyam* (renunciation) and *moham* (attachment; 13.8)

vii. *jnanam* (knowledge) and *ajnanam* (ignorance; 13.12)

viii. *sat* (cause) and *asat* (effect; 13.13)

ix. *nirgunam* (without material qualities) and *gunayuktah* (with material qualities; 13.15)

x. *avibhaktam* (without division) and *vibhaktam* (with division; 13.17)

xi. *grasisnu* (devouring) and *prabhavisnu* (developing; 13.17)

xii. *bharta* (master) and *bhokta* (supreme enjoyer; 13.23)

xiii. *vinasyatsu* (in the destruction) and *avinasyantam* (not destroyed; 13.28)

Chapter Fourteen: The Three Modes of Material Nature

i. *sattvam* (goodness) and *rajah* (passion; 14.5)

ii. *sattvam* (goodness) and *tamah* (ignorance; 14.5)

iii. *rajah* (passion) and *tamah* (ignorance; 14.5)

iv. *urdhvam* (upward) and *adhaha* (down; 14.18)

v. *pravritim* (attachment) and *sanga-tyaktva* (without attachment; 14. 22)

- vi. *vicalyate* (agitated) and *sthir* (non-agitated; 14.23)
- vii. *losta* (a lump of earth and stone) and *kancanah* (gold; 14.24)
- viii. *priya* (to the dear) and *apriyah* (undesirable; 14.24)
- ix. *mana* (honor) and *apamana* (dishonor; 14.25)
- x. *mitra* (friend) and *ari* (enemy; 14.25)

Chapter Fifteen: The Yoga of the Supreme Person

- i. *urdhva-mulam* (with roots above) and *adhah-mulam* (with roots downwards; 15.1)
- ii. *vinivrittakamah* (disassociation from lust) and *kama-yuktah* (lustful; 15.5)
- iii. *dvandvai-vimuktah* (liberated from dualities) and *dvandvatit* (oriented to dualities; 15.5)
- iv. *amudha* (unbewildered) and *mudha* (bewildered; 15.5)
- v. *vimudha* (foolish person) and *jnana-cakshusa* (those who have the eyes of knowledge; 15.5)
- vi. *ksharah* (fallible) and *aksharah* (infallible; 15.16)

Chapter Sixteen: The Divine and Demoniatic Natures

- i. *daivim sampadam* (the divine nature; 16.1-3) and *asurim sampadam* (the demoniac nature; 16.4)
- ii. *abhayam* (fearlessness) and *bhayam* (fearful; 16.1)
- iii. *danam* (charity) and *lovam* (greedy; 16.1)
- iv. *adrohah* (freedom from envy) and *drohaha* (having envy; 16.3)
- v. *pravritim* (acting properly) and *nivritim* (not acting properly; 16.7)

Chapter Seventeen: The Divisions of Faith

- i. *yajante-shastra-vidham* (worshipping as guided by Scriptures) and *yajante-shraddha-yanvitah* (worshipping being obsessed with faith; 17.1)
- ii. *sattvikah* (those who are in the mode of goodness) and *tamasa* (those who are in the mode of ignorance; 17.4)
- iii. *sattvikamaharah* (food dear to those in the mode of goodness; 17.8) and *taamasahbhojanam* (food dear to those in the mode of darkness; 17.10)
- iv. *sattvikamyajnah* (sacrifices by those who desire no reward is of the nature of goodness; 17.11) and *tamasamyajnah* (any sacrifice performed without regard for the direction of scripture and faith is considered to be in the mode of ignorance; 17.13)
- v. *sattvikamtapah* (the penance/austerity performed with transcendental faith for the sake of the Supreme; 17.17) and *tamasamtapah* (penance performed out of foolishness in the mode of ignorance; 17.19)
- vi. *sattvikamdanam* (charity given out of duty without expectation of return in the mode of goodness; 17.20) and *tamasamdanam* (charity performed without proper attention and respect in the mode of ignorance; 17.22)
- vii. *sat* (the Absolute Truth in the objective of devotional sacrifice; 17.27) and *asat* (anything done as sacrifice, charity, or penance without faith in the Supreme; 17.28)

Chapter Eighteen: Conclusion—The Perfection of Renunciation

- i. *tyagam* (must be given up) and *na-tyagam* (must not be given up; 18.3)
- ii. *sattviktyagah* (renunciation in the mode of goodness; 18.7) and *tamasatyagam* (renunciation in the mode of ignorance; 18.8)
- iii. *pravrittim* (doing) and *nivrittim* (not doing; 18.30)
- iv. *karya* (what ought to be doing) and *akarye* (what ought not to be done; 18.30)
- v. *bhaya* (fear) and *abhaya* (fearlessness; 18.30)
- vi. *dharma* (the principles of religion) and *adharma* (irreligion; 18.31)
- vii. *brahmana* (doer of the *brahma karma*; 18.42) and *sudras* (server of the brahmanas; 18.44)
- viii. *sva-dharma* (one's own occupation) and *para-dharma* (another's occupation; 18.47)
- ix. *tamevasharanamgaccha* (surrender unto Krishna, following His directions; 18.62, 65, 66) and *yathaicchasitathakuru* (perform as one likes, following one's own decisions; 18.63)

Identification of Differance in the Gita

In the practice of deconstruction differance is the most crucial construct that needs to be understood and employed. Deconstruction became a distinct critical practice because of Derrida's conception of differance. Jonathan D. Culler in his book, *On Deconstruction*, explains how the term originated and what it is meant to say. He puts it, "The verb *differer* means to differ and to defer. *Differance* sounds exactly the same as *difference*, but the ending '*ance*' which is used to produce verbal

nouns, makes it a new form which means ‘difference-differing-deferring.’ *Differance*, thus, designates both a ‘passive’ difference already in place as the condition of signification and an act of differing which produces differences” (97). Although the term ‘*differance*’ is Derrida’s coinage, it is closer to ‘*difference*’ which is the derivation of the French verb ‘*differer*’ which has two meanings—to differ and to defer. However, as ‘*differance*’ is different from ‘*difference*’ due to the alphabet ‘a’ in place of ‘e’, its meaning also differs from the meaning of ‘*difference*’ which designates a definite meaning in the Saussurean or structuralist sense because the difference in the sign results in the definite meaning. But the term ‘*differance*’ does not refer to any definite meaning because ‘*difference*’ in *differance* is both ‘differing’ and ‘deferring’. In other words, the meaning that *difference* designates contains both active and passive spacing—the sign designates a meaning through its difference but it is only for a moment; the definite meaning is postponed endlessly due to the indefinite deferral of the meaning. So there is only play of meanings of the signs. To this, Culler quotes Derrida’s concept of *differance* which refers to

a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/absence. *Differance* is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing [*espacement*] by which elements relate to one another. This spacing is the production, simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *differance* indicates this indecision as regards activity and passivity, that which cannot yet be governed and organized by that opposition), of interval without which the “full” terms could not signify, could not function. (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97)

As Derrida has explained, *differance* is the result of the relation between the oppositional signs which constitute a structure for a moment and keeps on changing

as a movement. So this relation between the oppositional signs constitutes a kind of play founded on differences and systematic relation between them which does not remain static and organized as a whole with closure. The signs create a space between the meanings created by the signs at their active relation as well as in the passive one, so the signs cannot assign a definite meaning, i. e. the meaning always remain as a movement and a play of the signs constituting a text.

Kakoliris further explains that differance is the result of deconstruction of the metaphysical texts or deconstruction of the meaning in presence founded and maintained by the metaphysical authors. Meaning in deconstruction is “always already conditioned by difference and non presence” (46-47), and differance as meaning is “the playing movement that ‘produces’ [...] these differences. It is ‘the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences” (Derrida qtd. in Kakoliris 48). Kakoliris, in this regard, makes clear distinction when he writes, “While binary logic takes place between the limits of a disjunctive ‘either... or,’ the ‘undecidable’ logic of supplementarity constitutes the conjunctive logic of ‘both... and,’ which, not only denies, but also disorganizes classical binary thought” (59). This suggests the inclusive nature of deconstruction rather than privileging one and excluding the other.

As deconstruction operates on the binary oppositions in a text, it works in two ways: one is to deconstruct the hierarchy of the oppositions by proving that they are complementary to each other, and the next is to discover the relation of the oppositions from different perspectives that could produce multiple relations between them opening up the possibilities of indefinite meanings (qtd. in Buchanan 115). That is, it goes beyond the binary or oppositional logic and works at the “ultra- or quasi-transcendental level of analysis—a level at which differences and identities are not

viewed as (relatively) stable and settled” which is also known as “quasi-transcendental logic” (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). In this working, Mary Poovy suggests that deconstruction uses three strategies: “first, it demystifies institutions and concepts that appear to be natural or neutral in being; second, it challenges and potentially dismantles 'hierarchical and oppositional logic'; and third, it offers the notion of the middle voice or 'in-between' undecidable term, which can be used to rethink power structures created through binary thinking" (Poovy 107). The result of this working, as suggested by Poovy, is the middle voice or in-between or the undecidables which are the features of differance because differance itself is understood “neither as a word nor as a concept” (Derrida qtd. in Nuyen 135). Similarly, some Derrideans argue that differance is also concerned with other issues like ‘justice’, ‘the other’, and ‘responsibility’ (Higgs qtd, in Farahani 2002; Stocker 143; Higgs 170). In other words they are also the indicators of identifying occurrences of differance in a text in its deconstructive reading.

Besides, some Derrideans have argued that Derrida in his later career has been concerned with religious issues like faith, transcendence, God and so on. In this regard, Higgs maintains, “Over the past few years there has been a growing recognition of this horizon, which has led some commentators, such as, Baker (1995), and Critchley (1999a.1999b), [Biesta (2001)] to speak about the “ethical turn” of deconstruction (171). They call this Derrida’s ethical turn which has also influenced the understanding of differance. David Tacey, in this regard, comments: “Deconstruction, according to the late Derrida, is a way of doing truth, of keeping things authentic and open to the possibility of transcendence. He wanted to unravel and deconstruct, not to arrive at nothing, but to affirm a sacred reality that he sensed was undeconstructible” (Tacey 3). Thus, a new kind of faith can be observed in

deconstruction which is “a *deconstructive belief* in the undecidable and unpredictable character of incoming” (Kearney 304, my emphasis). Similarly, for Lane this undecidable nature of deconstruction is the workings of *differance* as he writes, “‘Undecidables’ also *reveal* the workings of ‘*differance*’” (74). Regarding the deconstructive belief in the undecidable, Kearney further clarifies that Derrida’s faith or faith in deconstruction is different from the faith in onto-theology or onto-theologians’ because the former is the deconstructive faith, the faith that is undecidable, but the latter is the faith based on foundationalism. Similarly, on transcendence Chung Chin-Yi contends that it is like “a mid-point and meeting ground between the transcendental and empirical.” So transcendence in deconstruction is “quasi-transcendental, or the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical” the relation of which is *differance* (5). It seems that Derrida was very positive and optimistic towards the positive side of religion as he stated, that “there is, or will be, a return of the religious in global civilization” (Tacey 4). However, he was not bound by any kind of restrictions as he firmly stated: “We are not priests bound by a ministry, nor theologians, nor qualified, competent representatives of religion, nor enemies of religion as such . . . (Derrida qtd. in Tacey 5). This suggests that in applying deconstruction in a text, a deconstructionist is free to work with his/her logic and belief.

As Derrida opines, deconstruction naturally happens in a text. So when this happening is realized in a text, it is simply called deconstructive reading of a text; the result of which is the case of *differance*. In its happening the seemingly organic text is torn apart into pieces. This exposes the text’s self-contradictions, *aporiai*, and conceptual impasses opening up the free play of meanings in the text. Habib encapsulates this operation of deconstruction in a text and remarks:

A deconstructive reading of a text, then, as practiced by Derrida, will be a multi-faceted project in general, it will attempt to display logocentric operations in the text, by focusing on a close reading of the text's language, its use of presuppositions or transcendental signifieds, its reliance on binary oppositions, its self contradictions, its *aporiai* or points of conceptual impasse, and the ways in which it effects closure and resists free play. (654)

As explained by Habib in the quote above, to identify difference in a text is to identify the workings of deconstruction through contradictions, *aporiai*, impasses and free play of meanings in a text and to see the difference in the same as Stocker puts it. "Différance refers to the difference that the same contains" (178). Niall Lucy, in the similar fashion, writes of difference after Derrida that it "refers to 'the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other'" (Derrida qtd. in Lucy, "Postmodern" 26). So how the deconstructive logic works in reading a text is to see the rupture or *aporia* in the organized whole of the text or to see the difference in the same. This is exactly what happens when deconstruction happens in a text and the result of this happening is, thus, the case of difference.

Guided by the afore-mentioned theoretical discussion on the constructs of difference, we can extract the main constructs of difference as follows: "to differ and to defer" (Culler 97); "a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/absence", "the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by which elements relate to one another" (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97); "always already conditioned by difference and non presence" (Kakoliries 47); "the 'undecidable' logic of supplementarity [that] constitutes the conjunctive logic of 'both... and,'" (Kakoliries 59); "quasi-transcendental logic"

(Fritsch 25; Biesta 394); “the middle voice or 'in-between' undecidable term” (Poovy 107); concerned with the issues like ‘justice’, ‘the other’, and ‘responsibility’ (Farahani 2495; Stocker 143; Higgs 170); “a sacred reality”, “undeconstructible” (Tacey 3); “a deconstructive belief in the undecidable and unpredictable character of incoming” (Kearney 304); "differance as the 'undecidables'" (Lane 74); “quasi-transcendental, or the repetition of the transcendental in the empirical”, “a return of the religious in global civilization” (Tacey 4); "the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical" (Chin-Yi 5); “its [text’s] self contradictions, its *aporiai* or points of conceptual impasse” (Habib 654); “the difference that the same contains” (Stocker 178); and "opening up the possibilities of indefinite meanings" (Buchanan 115). All these constructs signal to what Derrida commented on the meaning of differance: “It is ‘neither a word nor a concept’” (Derrida qtd. in Nuyen). So Derrida did not define it and resisted any effort to define it because the true nature of differance is beyond any kind of system; it is the result of deconstruction which is undefined and will remain so. Anyway, for the convenience of this study, I have used these constructs to justify that the pedagogy used by Lord Krishna in the Gita contains these constructs of differance in different chapters. In what follows, the textual data have been taken from the text, *Bhagavad-gita As It Is*, by Prabhupada and analyzed guided by these constructs of differance to identify and justify that the pedagogy employed by Lord Krishna in the Gita contains differance.

In chapter 1 of the Gita the term *varna-sankara* (“unwanted population”; 1.40; Prabhupada 60) can be compared with the case of "the other" which goes against the center or presence the study of which is the main concern of deconstruction as it leads to the case of differance (Farahani 2495; Stocker 143; Higgs 170).

In chapter 2 of the Gita I have found some binary oppositions that lead to the case of the undecidable logic of supplementarity as they do not present any center of meaning (Kakoliries 59). Such oppositions are: *sukha-dukha dah* (“not disturbed by happiness and distress”; 2.14); *samaduhkha-sukham* (“steady in both happiness and distress, steady in both”; 2.15); *asatah* (“of the non-existence”) and *satah* (“of the eternal”; 2.16); *sukha-duhkha samekritva laabhalaabhaujayaajayau* (“equanimity in happiness and distress, profit and loss, and victory and defeat”; 2.38); *naabhinandati na dvesti* (“neither praising nor despising”; 2.57). The meanings of *sata* (truth) and *atma* (soul) as the never-changing existence (2.16, 20) are close to Tacey’s conception of differance as a sacred reality and the undeconstructible (3). Similarly, the term *nirdvandvah* (“without dualities”; 2.45) is exactly the same as the quasi-transcendental logic of differance (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). In the verse (2.48) *yoga* is defined as the state of equiposed (*samah bhutva*) and equanimity (*sangam tyaktva*) of success and failure, i. e. the ability to see the same in the difference (Stocker 178) which also refer to the meaning of differance. The term *prajna pratishtha* (“fixed in perfect knowledge or consciousness”; 2.57) designates the similar meaning with the deconstructive belief (Kearney 304). Thus chapter 2 of the Gita contains some verses which justify the occurrence of differance.

In the beginning of chapter 3 of the Gita, Arjuna’s question (3.2) states that Lord Krishna’s earlier teaching (chapter 2) was equivocal or confusing (*vyamisrenea vakyena*), so he has requested Lord Krishna to make it clear. This implies that the teaching of Lord Krishna differs and defers, creating a free play of meaning (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97), or this is the case of the self-contradiction, aporiai and conceptual impasse in the discourse. This is the most obvious occurrence of differance in the Gita.

In chapter 4 of the Gita Lord Krishna affirms that the Lord will manifest whenever and wherever there is increase in irreligious practice (4.7), and establish the religion (4.8). This declaration actually goes along with the presumption made by Tacey regarding the return of the religious in the global civilization (4) and the possibility of the incoming (Kearney 304). Furthermore, it is also concerned with the issue of establishing justice for the other (Farahani 2495; Higgs 170; Stocker 143). Similarly, the expressions *dvandvatito* (“surpassing duality”) and *samah siddhavasiddhau* (“steady in both success and failure”; 4.42) refer to the case of the quasi-transcendental logic and the conjunctive logic of ‘both . . . and’ (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394; Kakoliries 59). Similarly, the transcendental position that helps one to see “inaction (*akarma*) in action (*karma*)” and “action in inaction” (4.18; Prabhupada 217) can also be achieved through the practice of the deconstructive belief (Kearney 304) as it discovers the same in the difference and vice versa (Stocker 178).

The qualities of a *sanyasi* (“a renouncer”) as described in chapter 5: *yo na dvestina kankshati* (“one who neither hates nor desires the fruits of his activities”) and *nirdvandvah* (“free from all dualities”; 5.3) refer to the meaning of non-presence due to the play of differences in their meanings and the use of the quasi-transcendental logic (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). Similarly, the humble sage’s equal vision that finds equality among a *Brahmana*, a cow, an elephant, a dog and an outcaste (5.18) goes along with the concept of a middle voice and justice to the other (Derrida, "Differance" 124; Poovy 107; Higgs 170). Furthermore, the qualities that describe a *brahmavid* as a person who neither rejoices upon achieving something pleasant nor laments upon obtaining something unpleasant, who is self-intelligent, who is unbewildered, and who knows the science of God, who is already situated in

transcendence” (5.20) go with the concept of a deconstructive belief and the quasi-transcendental logic (Kearney 304; Fritsch 25; Biesta 394).

The state of *yogarudhasya* (“the state one has attained through the practice of yoga”; 6.3), as discussed in chapter 6 of the Gita, represents Chin-Yi’s concept of difference as the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical (5). Similarly, the state of tranquility of the mind that sees no difference in happiness and distress, heat and cold, honor and dishonor (6.7) also allude to the quasi-transcendental logic (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). The expressions *sama-lostrama-kanchanah* (“being equipoised to pebbles, stone, and gold” [6.8]) and *sama-buddhir visisyate* which means to suggest that “a person is considered still further advanced when he regards honest well-wishers, affectionate benefactors, the neutral, mediators, the envious, friends and enemies, the pious and the sinners all with an equal mind” (6.9) imply to the meaning of a deconstructive belief as difference (Kearney 304). The *yoga-yuktatma* (“the self-realized person”) who possesses *sarvatra samam* (“the quality to see equality everywhere even between the Supreme Lord and all beings”; [6.29, 32]) are similar with the argument of a middle voice and the difference that the same contains (Derrida, "Difference" 124; Poovy 107; Stocker 178).

Lord Krishna actually represents the case of the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical (Chin-Yi 5) as he teaches Arjuna in chapter 7 that all the created beings—material and spiritual—are originated from him and dissolve into him at the end (7.6). In this case the material nature is Lord Krishna’s empirical manifestation, whereas the spiritual nature is his transcendental manifestation. Thus, Lord Krishna represents the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical, i. e. we can find both material and spiritual natures in the Lord, so he can be called a *spiritual-materialist* or *spiritual scientist* who possesses the highest degree

of 'spiritual intelligence.' In the verse (7.12) when Lord Krishna explains that all states of beings—goodness, passion or ignorance—are his manifestations, in that all belong to him and he belongs to them all; however, he reiterates that he is independent. This nature of the Lord justifies the undecidable logic of supplementarity as a feature of differance (Kakoliries 59).

In chapter 7 we find the crux of deconstruction/differance which is to identify how a text is deconstructing itself. When a text contains contradiction, its meaning differs and the definite meaning is deferred/delayed. So there occurs a free play of the traces of meaning which creates the undecidable nature of meaning. This, for example, can be observed when we compare Lord Krishna's teaching in the verses 6.46 and 7.17. Earlier the Lord taught Arjuna to be a *yogi* as the *yogi* is "greater than the ascetic, greater than the empiricist and greater than the fruitive worker" (6.46), but now he is teaching Arjuna to be a *jnani*, "the one who is in full knowledge and who is always engaged in pure devotional service" (7.17). Such is the case of aporiai, a conceptual impasse in a text which opens up the possibilities of text's indefinite meanings (Habib 654; Buchanan 115). Similarly, the indefinite nature of meaning can be observed in the verse 7.21 when the Lord accepts different gods and the ways of worshipping them. This is all natural for the Lord because he is *dvandva-mohanirmukta*, "freed from the dualities of delusion" (7.28) which is the case of the quasi-transcendental logic (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394).

In chapter 8 of the Gita I have found *Brahma* as a sacred reality, the undeconstructible as argued by Tacey (3) because Lord Krishna describes *Brahma* as the indestructible transcendental living entity (8.3). Similarly, he describes the nature of *Brahma* as *Adhyatma* which is similar to a deconstructive faith conceived by Kearney (304). Like the conception of brahma, Tacey's conception of differance as a

sacred reality, the undeconstructible (3), goes along with the Lord's description of *Sanatana* which is "the unmanifest nature, which is eternal and is transcendental to this manifested and unmanifested matter" (8.20). In Chin-Yi's conception of *Sanatanah* as the transcendental to the manifested and the unmanifested matter is similar to the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical in deconstruction (5). Thus chapter 8 of the Gita contains strong evidence of the occurrence of differance.

By the expression *na nibadhnanti* in chapter 9 of the Gita Lord Krishna affirms that he is "detached from all these material activities," unbound by them; he also states that he is *udasina-vat* ("neutral") to any such things (9.9). These expressions made by Lord Krishna suggest that he is speaking a middle voice or these expressions are like the in-between undecidable terms (Poovy 107) because as Prabhupada explains, the Lord is "not situated in the dualities of this material world." He adds that the Lord is "transcendental to these dualities" (Prabhupada 411). Similarly, in the second line of the verse (9.15) Lord Krishna describes himself as *eketvena prithaktvena bahudha visvoto mukham* which means to say that he is "the one without a second, as diverse in many, and in the universal form" (9.15; Prabhupada 420). This verse contains the self-contradictory meaning as the Lord is both the unity and the diversity; however, the unity in the diversity is like a sacred reality, the undeconstructible (Tacey 3). Similarly, his universal form with diversity which cannot be conceived refers to the case of indefiniteness of meaning as a feature of differance (Buchanan 115). Furthermore, Lord Krishna's divergent forms with various manifestations as mentioned in the verses (9.16-19) suggest that the Lord's manifestations are indefinite like the meaning of differance (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Stocker 178; Buchanan 115). These manifestations are as follows: the ritual, the

sacrifice, the offering, the healing herb, the transcendental chant, the butter, the fire (9.16); the father of this universe, the mother, the support and the grandsire, the object of the knowledge, the purifier, the syllable ohm, the Rig, the Sama and the Yajur Vedas (9.17); the goal, the sustainer, the master, the witness, the abode, the refuge, the most dear friend, the creation, the annihilation, the basis of everything, the resting place and the eternal seed (9.18); immortality, death, spirit and matter (9.19).

Furthermore, the Lord declares in the verse 9.29 that he does not envy anyone; he is equal to all creations. This implies the case of justice and responsibility which are also the major concerns of deconstruction (Farahani 2495; Stocker 143; Higgs 170).

Acceptance of deconstruction and religion as interrelated and difference as a sacred reality refers to the possibilities of the incoming (Tacey 3; Kearney 304) which can be identified with the qualities that Lord Krishna has mentioned in the verses (10.4-5), or these are also the qualities of the one who holds deconstructive belief (Kearney 304) because these qualities are the result of the traces of differences that can be understood and acquired only through the undecidable logic of supplementarity and the workings of deconstruction as the undecidables (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Kakoliries 59; Lane 74). These qualities are: intelligence, knowledge, freedom from doubt and delusion, forgiveness, truthfulness, control of the senses, control of the mind, happiness and distress, birth, death, fear, fearlessness, non-violence, equanimity, satisfaction, austerity, charity, fame and infamy, and so forth. Similarly, the multiple forms that Lord Krishna represents as mentioned in the verses (10.21-40) of the Gita can be implied to the case of differing and deferring nature of or the play of differences which again result in the case of indefinite meanings as difference (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Buchanan 115).

The multiple forms that Lord Krishna represents also refer to the case of indefinite nature of meaning in a text. Some of the various forms as mentioned in chapter 10 of the Gita are: Vishnu, the radiant sun, Marici, the moon (10.21); the Sama Veda, Indra, the king of heaven, the mind, the living force or consciousness (10.22); Lord Shiva, the Lord of wealth, fire/ Agni, Meru (10.23); Brihaspati, Kshitreyas, the ocean (10.24); Bhrigu, Om, the holy names or japa, the Himalayas (10.25); asvatthah, Narada, Citraratha, the sage Kapila (10.26); Uccaihsrava, Airavata, the monarch (10. 27); thunderbolt, the suravi, Kandarpa (the god of love), Vasuki (10.28); Ananta, Varuna, Aryama, Yama (the lord of death) (10.29); Prahlada, time, the lion, Garuda (10.30); the wind, Rama, the shark, the Ganges (10.31); the beginning, the end, and the middle, the spiritual sciences of the self [spiritual intelligence], the conclusive truth (10.32); the letter 'A', the dual compound word, inexhaustible time, Brahma (10.33); all-devouring death, the generating principles of all that is yet to be, women having the qualities like fame, fortune, fine speech, memory, intelligence, steadfastness and patience (10.34); the Sama Veda, the Brihatsama, the Gyatri hymn, the month Margashirsa, flower-bearing spring (10.35); the gambling of cheats, the splendor, adventure, the strength of the strong (10.36); Washudeva, Arjuna, Vyasa, Ushana (10.37); punishment, morality, silence, the wisdom (10.38); the generating seed of all existences and preserver of every creation (10.39) and so forth (10.40; Prabhupada 485).

Lord Krishna's Universal Form, the opulences, as described in the verses (11.5-7, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20) justify that the Lord's forms and qualities have no limitations as they differ and defer on different occasions, constituting both a structure and a movement. So the Lord's Universal Form truly represents the case of differance in deconstruction (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97). Similarly, the *divyam*

cakshuh (“the divine eyes”; 11.8) bestowed to Arjuna by the Lord can be compared with the concepts of the quasi-transcendental logic and the deconstructive belief in the undecidable in deconstruction (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394; Kearney 304) because it is this logic that can help one see aporia/differance which lies deep into a text. Actually we can see the way differance has “opened up new, exciting, and productive avenues of inquiry” beyond any limitation in a text (Corner 246). This can be observed in Lord Krishna’s Universal Form as described in the verses (11.10-31; Prabhupada 496-509). Similar to Derrida’s conception of the meaning of the term, differance, as “neither a word nor a concept” (Derrida qtd. in Nuyen 135), and Lane’s discerning of differance as the undecidables (Prabhupada 74), the Universal Form of Lord Krishna is beyond conception and description. Observing this inconceivable and indescribable form and qualities of the Lord, Arjuna gets bewildered and baffled and pleads the Lord to tell him who he is: *akhyahi me ko bhavan ugra-rupo* (“please tell me who You are”; 11.31; Prabhupada 509). In the same way, the overt meaning in a text gets deferred and becomes undecidables in deconstruction which justifies the case of differance.

In chapter 12 of the Gita the expressions *sarvatra sama-buddhayah* (“being equally disposed to everyone”) and *sarva-bhuta-hite ratah* (“engaged in the welfare of all”; 12.4) refer to the case of justice to the other which is also concerned with differance (Farahani 2495; Stocker 143; Higgs). Similarly, the qualities that Lord Krishna has mentioned of his dearest devotees in the verses (12.13-20) allude to the qualities of differance, and they can be, in turn, defined as the qualities of a deconstructionist as well because both of them are undecidables in their nature and are founded on deconstructive belief (Lane 74; Kearney 304). So these qualities are as follows:

not envious but kind to all living entities; does not think of oneself as proprietor; free from false ego; equal in both happiness and distress; tolerant (12.13); always satisfied; self-control; engaged in devotional services with determination; mind and intelligence focused on Lord Krishna (12.14); does not disturb others and not feel disturbed by them as well; equipoised in happiness and distress, fear and anxiety (12.15); not dependent on the ordinary course of activities; pure; expert; without cares, free from all pains; not striving for some result (12.16); neither rejoices nor grieves; neither laments nor desires; renounces both auspicious and inauspicious things (12.17); equal to friends and enemies; equipoised in honor and dishonor, heat and cold, happiness and distress, fame and infamy; always free from contaminating association (12.18); always silent and satisfied with anything; does not care for any residence; fixed in knowledge and engaged in devotional service (12.19); follows the imperishable path of faith and devotional service to Lord Krishna (12.20). (Prabhupada 560)

When difference is discerned as a deconstructive belief, a sacred reality and the workings of the undecidables (Kearney 304; Tacey 3; Lane 74), the qualities of knowledge mentioned in the verses of chapter 13 (13.8-12) are also the qualities of difference. In other words, these are also the qualities of a deconstructionist who sees difference in everything. These qualities are mentioned as follows:

humility; pridelessness; nonviolence; tolerance; simplicity; approaching bona fide spiritual master; cleanliness; steadiness; self-control; renunciation of the objects of sense gratification; absence of false ego; the perception of the evil of birth, death, old age and disease; detachment; freedom from entanglement with children, wife, home and the rest; even-mindedness amid pleasant and unpleasant

events; constant and unalloyed devotion to Lord Krishna; aspiring to live in a solitary place; detachment from the general mass of people; accepting the importance of self-realization; and philosophical search for the Absolute Truth. (Prabhupada573)

In the verse (13.13) the description of “the knowable” as the eternal, Brahman, the spirit and beginningless alludes to the description of difference as a sacred reality and a deconstructive belief or the undecidables (Tacey 3; Kearney 304; Lane 74). Similarly, the knowable has been described as the Supersoul having many qualities like the original source of all senses, maintainer of all living beings and the master of all the modes of material nature (13.15); the Supreme Truth living outside and inside of all living beings, the moving and the unmoving (13.16); the one who appears to be divided among all beings but remains never divided and situates as one; the maintainer, devourer and developer of all (13.17); the source of light, unmanifested, the knowledge, the object of the knowledge and the goal of knowledge, situated in everyone’s heart (13.18); one who accompanies the individual soul in all bodies and understands that the soul is undeconstructible (13.28); sees the Supersoul equally present everywhere, in every living being, approaches the transcendental destination (13.29); does not mix with the body though situated in it (13.33). All these qualities of the knowable designate the qualities of difference as they refer to the possibilities of indefinite meaning (Buchanan 115).

Like the undecidable nature of difference, the three modes of qualities—goodness, passion and ignorance—conditioned in the material nature by the seed-giving father, Lord Krishna (14.4, 5) are always in competition for the supremacy of one over the other (14.10). Thus, the interplay between the three modes of qualities refers to the nature of difference in general. However, the mode of goodness which is

more illuminating and purer than the other (14.6) is associated with the sacred reality as discussed under difference (Tacey 3). Similarly, like the quasi-transcendental logic which helps to understand the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental (Fritsch 25; Chin Yi 5), Lord Krishna also suggests that one who transcends the three qualities of material nature can attain his spiritual nature (14.20). The Lord further explains the qualities of the one (the transcendentalist) who can transcend the three modes of nature (14.22-25) which is more likely to produce indefinite qualities, i. e. a case of difference.

The qualities of a transcendentalist, thus, can be compared with the nature of difference as possessed by a deconstructionist who believes in a deconstructive belief and quasi-transcendental logic and accepts the transcendental nature of the signifieds (Kearney 304; Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). So difference as the quality of a deconstructionist can be found in a transcendentalist who: does not hate illumination, avoids attachment and delusion; is unwavering and undisturbed through all these reactions of the material qualities, remains neutral and transcendental, knows that the modes alone are active; is situated in the self and regards alike happiness and distress; looks upon a lump of earth, a stone and a piece of gold with an equal eye; is equal toward the desirable and the undesirable; is steady, situated equally well in praise and blame, honor and dishonor; treats alike both friend and enemy; has renounced all material activities (14.22-25; Prabhupada 623). Besides, it is important to note that the impersonal *Brahman* as described by Lord Krishna in the verse (14.27)—immortal, imperishable and eternal—can be alluded to the description of difference—the workings of deconstruction—as a sacred reality and the undeconstructible (Tacey 3). That is, the impersonal Brahman can be compared with difference as they have similar qualities. With this respect, as the Lord reveals that he is the basis of this

impersonal Brahman (Prabhupada 626), he is also the basis of this sacred reality and the undeconstructible. This exactly represents a case of difference in the pedagogy of the Gita.

In chapter 15 the symbol of *asvattham* (“a banyan tree”; 15.3) represents the case of difference. To this Prabhupada affirms, “The real form of this tree cannot be perceived in this world” (633). This nature of *asvattha* exactly captures the meaning of difference as discerned by Derrida when he declares that it is “neither a word nor a concept” (qtd.in Nuyen 135) because *asvattha* cannot be perceived exactly. To this, Prabhupada states: “No one can understand where it ends, where it begins, or where its foundation is.” This is exactly what happens in the workings of deconstruction which results in difference—difference ultimately ends with the undecidables. In this regard, Lane commends, “Undecidables’ also *reveal* the workings of difference” (74). Thus, both *asvattha* and difference are undecidables in their nature. That is, difference exists in the Gita in the form of *asvattham*.

In the first verse of this chapter Lord Krishna asserts that the one who understands this mysterious tree—a symbol of Vedas—is known as *veda-vit* (“the knower of the Vedas”; 15.1). Here since difference can be designated as *asvattham*, *veda-vit* who understands *asvattha* can also be called a deconstructionist who understands difference well. Now the question is ‘who can be such a *veda-vit*?’ The answer to this is definitely Lord Krishna. That is, Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist who is able to explain any sort of mysteries. It is possible, however, for a person to become a *veda-vit* who should: be free from false prestige, illusion and false association, understand the eternal, be detached from the material lust, be free from the dualities of happiness and distress and know how to surrender unto the Supreme Person (Lord Krishna [Prabhupada 635]). As a *veda-vit* is a deconstructionist, a

person needs to have all these qualities in order to be a deconstructionist, a *veda-vit* who can reach the kingdom of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the supreme abode which is ever self-illuminated, not by the sun or moon or any light of material source (15.6) but by the power of the Lord. In this way, as the Gita alludes to the existence of a deconstructionist, there naturally comes difference because a deconstructionist works through difference.

Since difference has been regarded as the pursuit of a sacred reality and a deconstructive belief in the undecidables (Tacey 3; Kearney 304); a deconstructionist can be compared with a *veda-vit* or a godly man who has the transcendental qualities as described in the chapter 16 of the Gita (16.1-3). Lord Krishna declares these divine qualities as follows:

fearlessness; purification of one's existence; cultivation of spiritual knowledge; charity; self-control; performance of sacrifice; study of the Vedas; austerity; simplicity; nonviolence; truthfulness; freedom from anger; renunciation; tranquility; aversion to faultfinding; compassion for all living entities; freedom from covetousness; gentleness; modesty; steady determination; vigor; forgiveness; fortitude; cleanliness; and freedom from envy and from the passion for honour. (Prabhupada 656)

These transcendental qualities allude to the qualities of difference as they have a common destination, i. e. to enable one to develop the deconstructive faith and know the sacred reality (Kearney 304; Tacey 3).

In chapter 17 Lord Krishna explains three types of faith (*sraddha*), *tapah* (austerities), *yajnah* (sacrifice) and *danam* (charity), and so forth as *sattviki* (in the mode of goodness), *rajasi* (in the mode of passion) and *tamasi* (in the mode of ignorance). Of these, the faith in the mode of goodness ("*sattviki sraddha*"; 17.3)

alludes to the deconstructive belief as it is concerned with justice for the other (Kearney 304; Farahani 2495; Stocker 143; Higgs 170). Similarly, the most sacred expression, *Om Tat Sat* ("evoking that eternal Supreme"; 17.23) indicates the sacred reality or the undeconstructible with relation to differance (Tacey 3). My argument is that this *mantra*, '*Om Tat Sat*' (the sacred hymn) represents the way Derrida discerned the meaning of differance—"neither a word nor a concept" (qtd. in Nuyen 115) which, however, refers to the sacred reality or the undeconstructible inherent in everything. Thus, like this *mantra*, differance is all-pervasive and all-inclusive; it accepts whatever is the outcome of deconstructive analysis as true.

The discussion on the meaning of renunciation in chapter 18 of the Gita (18.2-6) can be linked to the concern of differance with the issues of justice, the other and responsibility (Kearney 304; Farahani 2495; Stocker 143; Higgs 170). Lord Krishna suggests that the duties like sacrifice, charity and penance should not be abandoned as they purify even the great souls. He further suggests that in doing these duties one should remain detached without any expectation of result (18.5, 6). Such duties are responsibility that can maintain justice for the other. Performance of one's duties/action in the Gita has not been designated as right or wrong; it is accepted as the result of the five factors of action (18.14, 15). These perspectives on responsibility and action discussed in the Gita are similar to the quasi-transcendental logic of deconstruction (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394), i. e. the Gita contains differance.

The *sattvikam jnanam*, ("knowledge in the mode of goodness"), the knowledge by which one undivided spiritual nature is seen in all living entities though they are divided into innumerable forms (18.20; Prabhupada 717) can be compared with deconstructive belief in differance as it looks for a sacred reality which is undeconstructible (Kearney 304; Tacey 3). The description of a *sattvik karta*

("a worker in the mode of goodness"; 18.26) as having the qualities like doing duties without association with the modes of material nature, without false, with good determination and enthusiasm, and without wavering in success or failure (18.26; Prabhupada 720) refers to a deconstructionist who works being guided by the quasi-transcendental logic accepting any result as difference (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394, Nuyen 135). In this regard, both Lord Krishna and Arjuna are *sattvik karta* as they are performing their duties in the mode of material nature. A deconstructionist, in the same vein, analyzes a text just to expose how a text is self-deconstructed—the mode of material nature of a text, and he/she does not impose his/her understanding of the text (Miller qtd. in Abrams, "Deconstructive" 267). As the mode of working nature between Lord Krishna, Arjuna and a deconstructionist is the same, it is justified that both the Lord and Arjuna are deconstructionist.

The qualities that describe the Brahmanas also go with the deconstructionist who possesses the qualities like peacefulness, self-control, austerity, purity, tolerance, honesty, knowledge, wisdom and religiousness (18.43; Prabhupada 730). That is, the qualities of a deconstructionist are the characteristic features of difference because a deconstructionist works through difference. Besides, as suggested by Lord Krishna, realization of self (*brahma-bhuyaya*) is the stage of highest knowledge (18. 51-53) which can be compared with the sacred reality as conceived in difference (Tacey 3). Thus, the qualities of a self-realized person, i. e. a deconstructionist, allude to the qualities of difference which are as follows:

Being purified by his intelligence and controlling the mind with determination, giving up the objects of sense gratification, being freed from attachment and hatred, one who lives in a secluded place, who eats little, who controls his body, mind and power of speech, who is always in

trance and who is detached, free from false ego, false strength, false pride, lust, anger and acceptance of material things, free from false proprietorship, and peaceful. (18.51-53; Prabhupada 737)

The other striking feature of difference is that there is no definite meaning in a text as it opens up the free play of meanings (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Nuyen 135). This can be observed in the pedagogy of the Gita when Lord Krishna allows freedom to Arjuna to decide on his duty himself—*yathecchasi tatha kuru* ("do what you wish to do"; 18.63) and in the next verse he suggests Arjuna to always think of him, become his devotee, worship him and offer his homage unto him because he is his very dear friend (18.65; Prabhupada 747, 749). Thus this change of lesson as suggested by Lord Krishna to Arjuna opens up the free play of meaning in the Gita (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97).

Now, in conclusion, all these extracts from chapter 1 to 18 in the Gita cited in relation to difference as a construct of deconstruction exactly justify the occurrence of difference in the pedagogy of the Gita. This has set background for discussion and justification of Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita.

CHAPTER FOUR

LORD KRISHNA AS A DECONSTRUCTIONIST TEACHER IN THE GITA

This chapter explores pedagogical aspect of the Gita founded on the theory of deconstruction and finally justifies Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita. So it first explores the pedagogical context in the Gita and then links the pedagogy in the Gita to the postmethod pedagogy. Then it explores the theoretical concepts of the roles of a teacher and teacher identities both in general and in the context of the postmethod pedagogy, and then analyzes Lord Krishna's role as a teacher from the deconstructive perspective, and finally justifies Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher. Thus, this chapter contains the following sections: Pedagogical Context in the Gita; Postmethod Pedagogy; Roles of a Teacher; Teacher Identities; and Lord Krishna as a Deconstructionist Teacher in the Pedagogy of the Gita.

Pedagogical Context in the Gita

Pedagogy concerns the process of teaching and learning with its multifaceted understanding, i. e. it differs from the way it was practiced under a method which focused primarily on the delivery of information from the source (teachers) to the target (students [Richards and Renandya 5]). So pedagogy is the conception of the post-methods practices which focus on "the dynamic interplay between teachers, learners, and institutional materials during the process of teaching and learning" (Brown qtd. in Richards and Renandya 6). That means, teaching, in pedagogy, is "a courageous occupation" and "a journey of hope based upon a set of ideals" (Day 8, 20). It is an integral part of learning as stated by Lieberman and Miller: "Teaching and learning are interdependent, not separate functions" (qtd. in Day 105). In the process of teaching and learning teachers are "problem posers and problem solver;

they are researchers; and they are intellectuals engaged in unraveling the learning process both for themselves and for the young people in their charge”; that is to say, teachers are learning themselves through the process of teaching because in pedagogy learning is “not consumption”; it is “knowledge production, and similarly, teaching is “not performance”; it is “facilitative leadership" (Lieberman and Miller qtd. in Day 105). Similarly, B. Kumaravadivelu has conceptualized pedagogy in a much broader sense which includes not only the educational aspects of teaching and learning but also the sociocultural aspect. He puts it: “I use the term *pedagogy* in a broad sense to include not only issues pertaining to classroom strategies, instructional materials, curricular objectives, and evaluation measures, but also a wide range of historical, political, and sociocultural experiences that directly or indirectly influence L2 education” (538). Although Kumaravadivelu relates the concept of pedagogy to the context of L2 teaching, this equally applies to pedagogy in general.

When it comes to the pedagogy in the Gita, the factors associated with pedagogy can be observed there. The pedagogical process in the Gita is not that easier to understand as it is multifaceted. As discussed earlier (Day 105), Lord Krishna as a teacher has both roles as a problem poser and a problem solver (18.63; 18.72) and Arjuna as a learner has been involved in knowledge production (18.73) rather than in consumption of knowledge. Similarly, Lord Krishna as a teacher is not simply performing his role; he is rather taking the role of a facilitative leadership (18.72). As the dialogue between Lord Krishna and Arjuna took place in the battlefield before the commencement of the war, he took the leadership in guiding Arjuna in the war. All these constitute the institutional materials for pedagogy in the Gita. Thus, as pedagogy constitutes the dynamic interplay between teachers, learners, and

institutional materials, we can observe the dynamic interplay between these dimensions in the pedagogy of the Gita.

Regarding Lord Krishna's role in the war, Radhakrishnan identifies him with a teacher or guru because he guided Arjuna to the right path as he who was "fighting with the forces of darkness, falsehood, limitation, and immortality which bar the way to the higher world" (33). As Arjuna was unwilling to take his responsibility in the battle (1.46), he takes refuge to higher self, Lord Krishna who is able to make him realize his duty (18.72). In this context, as teaching by Lord Krishna contains universal knowledge, Radhakrishnan calls him "the world teacher" or *jagadguru* (33). Similarly, Sargeant, in reviewing the role of Lord Krishna in the Gita, came to a conclusion that he is the Universal Guru who is teaching the lessons of universal significance (2). In the similar fashion, Dayananda in his book, *The Teaching of the Bhagavadgita*, identifies Lord Krishna as a *guru* because, accepting Arjuna as his disciple, he has been able to teach him the practical lessons which have become most effective in solving his problems(21). With this background Prabhupada also defines guru as "the one who dispels the darkness of ignorance by the light of knowledge" (21). Thus, the dynamic role of a teacher conceived in pedagogy can be observed in the Gita which can also be further justified in terms of the role of the learner (Arjuna) and institutional materials (the contents of the Gita).

Sharma and Ramachandran in their paper "Need of Bhagavad Gita Concepts in the Present Scenario of Professional Education" identify the aspects of pedagogical context in the Gita. Observing the role of Lord Krishna as a teacher, they argue that the role of a teacher must be most balanced; the true teacher not only teaches truth but also demonstrates it. Observing the role of Arjuna in the Gita as a learner, they identify some salient features of a good learner that he/she should be genuine and

have humanity, obedience and faith in his/her teacher (Sharma and Ramachandran). As teaching and learning is goal-driven, they identify the following educational objectives in the Gita: development of virtual knowledge, development and modification of personality, adjustment in individual and social aims, development of internal consciousness, development of intellectual and reasoning ability and establishment of importance of duties in life (Sharma and Ramachandran).

Concerning the next dimension of pedagogy, the institutional materials, i. e. curriculum, the contents to discuss among teachers and students, Prabhupada contends that the Gita contains "the most perfect presentation of Vedic knowledge" (14). Similarly, Dayananda argues that the Gita consists of the most secret knowledge which is "the knowledge of the Self" (Prabhupada102). They suggest that the Gita contains the knowledge of the whole universe that includes all living beings, living things and non-living things as well. For Sharma and Ramachandran the contents of the Gita consist of two types of knowledge: physical that includes art, science, engineering etc. and spiritual (Sharma and Ramachandran). They further argue that "the Bhagavad Gita is a comprehensive philosophical thought for all humankind; we can get comprehensive philosophical thoughts and theories from its detail study, for example, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Axiology and Logic System which have direct influence on educational thoughts" (Sharma and Ramachandran). C. Kourie, in the same vein, explores new dimension of the pedagogical content in the Gita in his paper "Discerning the Mystical Wisdom of the Bhagavad Gita and John of the Cross" which concerns "the global consciousness" through the "interspirituality studies" which he argues is "a feature of contemporary spirituality" that enables "a shift from divergence to convergence" (251).

Contents of the Gita cannot be specified in detail as it includes the knowledge of understanding from one particle to the imperishable Brahma. To be more specific, we can take *kshetra* as important pedagogical content which consists of the five elements (space, air, fire, water and earth), the ego, the intellect, ignorance, the ten organs, the mind and the five sense objects (13.6-7). Dayananda recapitulates the general meaning of *kshetra* in the following words: "All that you are aware of—all objects, your likes and dislikes, pleasures, misery, fortitude, your knowledge, and ignorance all this is *kshetra*" (27). Similarly, the next important content in the pedagogy of the Gita is *prakriti* and its qualities. *Prakriti* is said to manifest through three qualities: *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. These are also called *gunas* which determine the psychological disposition of an individual (Dayananda 137). He explains that *sattva* represents knowledge which has the qualities like peacefulness, knowledge, inquiry, and clear thinking; *rajas* refers to the qualities that promote activity which develops the qualities like hyperactive, ambitious, active but thinking, wedded to an ideal and achievement; *tamas* refers to the quality of inactivity which makes a person selfish and greedy (138). All these qualities constitute the contents of the pedagogy in the Gita. Besides, as reviewed in chapter 2, the studies in the Gita justify that its contents have been expanded to many other disciplines like philosophy, literature, psychology, education, politics, health, etc. As a result, the Gita is supposed to be a multidisciplinary text; it is an example of intertextuality and interspirituality. Thus, the Gita actually represents as a text of postmodern spirituality.

The next important dimension of pedagogical context is teaching and learning process which involves dynamic interaction between teachers and learners on the materials. So this is a dialogic process in which teachers and learners play their roles. In the Gita we can see Lord Krishna being involved in the dialogic process as a

teacher and Arjuna as a learner. To this, Ghimire maintains that it is like a type of sequence of actions in the question-answer form. He presents their pedagogical dialogue as “Question . . . Advice . . . Doubts . . . Clarification” (“Educational” 138). On the nature of the pedagogy in the Gita Ghimire explains that the disciple first raises the question and the *Guru* gives instructions as per his expectation. In this process whenever the learner develops doubts and raises questions again, the *Guru* clarifies the concepts and makes him able to learn. Thus the pedagogy in the Gita takes the form of a dialogue between a Guru and a disciple (“Educational” 238). In the pedagogical sense this dialogue can be regarded as a case of classroom instruction.

Sharma and Ramachandran, on the other hand, explore the pedagogical dialogue between Lord Krishna and Arjuna and identify the following methods and techniques: conversational method; question-answer method, demonstration method, contemporary method (rational analysis with proper analysis) and learning by doing (Sharma and Ramachandran). Dayananda, on the other hand, discusses the importance of meditation and devotion in learning which can be regarded as the techniques in the pedagogical process. He discusses the qualities of a meditative mind which is “free from likes and dislikes . . . naturally more abiding than reactive . . . able to see things clearly, a mind that observes without judging, a mind that is naturally smiling, not subject to easy excitement” (76).

Along with the exploration of the methods and techniques used in the pedagogy of the Gita, there are also some findings on the roles played by Lord Krishna as a teacher. Ghimire, in this regard, identified the following roles played by Lord Krishna in the pedagogical process in the Gita: authorized and honorable personality, dependable and ideal personality, facilitator of the situation, self-

enlightened personality, personality attuned to speech-austerity, forgiving personality, imitative personality, ideal personality and awakener of the learner (“Educational” 308-14). Sahnil and Rao K. in their paper, “Identifying Elements of the Code of Professional Ethics for Teachers in the Bhagavadgita: A Hermeneutic Study,” have identified twelve duties or roles that Lord Krishna has performed as his professional conducts which are as follows: inculcate holistic approach to a problem, state rules and regulations, be a knowledge provider, solve doubts and confusions, probe questions, repeat complex concepts, describe students’ duties, motivate students to perform their duties, be a guide, be open to individual differences, instill qualities in students and give freedom of choice (718). In the same line, Ghimire in his dissertation identifies different roles of a teacher in the Gita and presents them as follows: great authorized, honourable, dependable, ideal, self-enlightened, attuned to speech-austerity, forgiving, imitative, awakener of learner and welfare of discipline (“Educational” 537-38). With regard to evaluation in the pedagogical process in the Gita, Lord Krishna has employed 'self-evaluation' rather than 'teacher's evaluation' as he has let Arjuna make his own judgment and decision on his role in the war (18.63). Similarly the goal of pedagogical process has been achieved as Arjuna is empowered by his divine Guru, Lord Krishna to take his responsibility; he admits at the end of the dialogue that his delusion has gone as he has gained memories, i. e. his potentialities have been fully realized (18.73). All these discussions above strongly justify that the dialogue between Lord Krishna and Arjuna in the Gita alludes to the pedagogical context.

Postmethod Pedagogy

The pedagogy of the Gita can be compared with the postmethod pedagogy as advocated by B. Kumaravadivelu in his article entitled “Toward a Postmethod

Pedagogy” because the methodology employed by Lord Krishna in teaching Arjuna contains many of Kumaravadivelu’s concepts. So Lord Krishna’s pedagogy in the Gita can be compared with Derrida’s deconstruction/post-structuralism and Kumaravadivelu’s postmethod pedagogy as they go in the same line: Derrida deconstructed the metaphysics of presence grounded on structuralism and gave way to deconstruction and poststructuralism/postmodernism (Lucy, “Postmodern” 96; Stocker 15; Gnanasekaran 212; Higgs 170), and Kumaravadivelu deconstructed the centralized practice of ‘method’ and opened up possibilities in pedagogy (537). Both of these developments can be observed in the pedagogy of the Gita. As regards the transformation in pedagogy, Kumaravadivelu commends with reference to the context of L2 teaching: “As a consequence of repeatedly articulated dissatisfaction with the limitations of the concept of *method* and the transmission model of teacher education, the L2 profession is faced with an imperative need to construct a postmethod pedagogy” (537). Although he introduced this concept in the context of L2 teaching profession, it is equally significant in general education as well. Kumaravadivelu’s critique of “*method*” and preference to postmethod pedagogy is similar with Gert Biesta’s critique of “sender-receiver model” of communication in education and preference to interpretive model of communication in education founded on deconstruction. In both of them we can find that they are more optimistic towards the incoming of something new (Kumaravadivelu 537; Biesta 400). In other words, it is obvious that postmethod pedagogy is founded on deconstruction all the way poststructuralism and postmodernism are founded. Furthermore, deconstruction is the inevitable for postmethod pedagogy: firstly because both opt for “an open-ended inquiry,” and secondly because deconstruction is a supplementary to postmethod

pedagogy so as to make it complete as it is “a work in progress” (Kumaravadivelu 537).

Like the replacement of structuralism with poststructuralism and the replacement of modernism with postmodernism; the modernist concept of method has been replaced by the concept of postmethod. In the transformation of structuralism and modernism deconstruction played the role of a driving force, and it is the same case with pedagogy in the transformation of method into postmethod because teaching and learning in the post-methods era is influenced by the concept and practice of deconstruction and pedagogy as both look for the possibilities of something new in education (Kumaravadivelu 537; Biesta 394, 400; Kamali, “Pedagogy” 47). Thus, method of teaching has been transformed into pedagogy as a post-method practice which is defined as a movement away from a preoccupation with generic teaching methods towards a more complex view of teaching which encompasses a multifaceted understanding of the teaching and learning process (Richards and Renandya 5). In this regard, Richard and Renandya further argue that in the post-methods era attention has been shifted to teaching and learning process and the contribution of the individual teacher to pedagogy rather than the output of the process (5). In the same vein, Brown defines pedagogy as a "dynamic interplay between teachers, learners, and institutional materials during the process of teaching and learning (qtd. in Richard and Renandya 6). By this he has deconstructed the dominant role of teachers in pedagogy and considered the roles of multiple factors contributing to effective pedagogy; it is the same case with deconstruction as it never ends with fixity; the outcome of the deconstructive analysis is always the possibility of multiplicity— difference (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97)! Thus, deconstruction makes pedagogy more process-oriented and inclusive of all factors conducive to post-

method pedagogy which has been developed into "deconstructive pedagogy" (Kamali, "Dest" 73).

The epistemic rupture in philosophy and literature due to the introduction of deconstruction and the transformation in methods due to the introduction of pedagogy and postmethods came into practices in the same time in 1990s. To this Jack C. Richards and Theodore S. Rodgers have discussed the transformation in methods in their book, *Approaches and Methods in Language Teaching*. They maintain that "the notion of methods came under criticism in the 1990s By the end of the twentieth century, mainstream language teaching no longer regarded method as the key factor in accounting for success or failure in language teaching. Some spoke of the death of methods and approaches and the term 'post-methods era' was sometimes used" (247). Similarly, regarding the end of the era of methods Kumaravadivelu presents the background on how the 1990s witnessed radical changes in language teaching in his article "Toward a Postmethod Pedagogy." He remarks:

The 1990s witnessed a rare congruence of refreshingly new ideas that can fundamentally restructure second/foreign language teaching and teacher education. Among them are two mutually informing currents of thought: One emphasizes the need to go beyond the limitations of the concept of method with a call to find an alternative way of designing effective teaching strategies (Clarke, 1994; Kumaravadivelu, 1994; Prabhu, 1990), and another emphasizes the need to go beyond the limitations of the transmission model of teacher education with a call to find an alternative way of creating efficient teaching professionals (Freeman & Johnson, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Woods, 1996). (537)

Observing such radical transformations on methods and making some new developments in pedagogy, Kumaravadivelu called the teaching practices in this era a *postmethod pedagogy* (538). As foregrounded by Brown (qtd. in Richard and Renandya 6) and Richards and Rodgers, and fortified by Kumaravadivelu, the latest development in the field of teaching methodology is called the postmethod pedagogy. Besides, my argument is that this postmethod pedagogy can be better enhanced when it is founded on deconstruction as argued by some Derridean educationists like Culler (97), Nuyen (135), Biesta (394), Higgs (170), Tacey (3), Lane (174) and Kamali, "Dest" 73). Furthermore, upon my reading of the Gita with the deconstructive mind I have found that pedagogy employed by Lord Krishna in the Gita is a perfect example of the practice of postmethod pedagogy founded on deconstruction. Implication of deconstruction in pedagogy has made the pedagogy in the Gita more successful even in the most adverse circumstances. This strongly suggests the interrelation between deconstruction and postmethod pedagogy leading to the development of "deconstructive pedagogy" (Kamali, "Dest" 73). So we can observe the working of the deconstructive pedagogy in the practices by some Derridean deconstructionists like Trifonas who argues: "Deconstruction, in principle, is concerned with teaching in general which mainly aims to interrogate, exhibit and criticize the decidable ethics of 'right' and 'wrong' practiced in the educational institutions" (307). Trifonas plainly goes for the transformation in the pedagogy and calls for the 'Other' pedagogy or the 'new' pedagogy which should target for "an Archimedian point" although it is always already unreachable because the 'Other' pedagogy should aim to extend teaching and learning beyond the tendency of imitating a brief scholastic contents (333). Thus, for both Kumaravadivelu and Derridean educationists the postmethod pedagogy aims at the Other or an Archimedian point as a possibility (Kumaravadivelu

537; Derrida qtd. in Higgs 170; Trifonas 333). Kamali, in the same line, argues for “pedagogy as deconstruction,” i. e. the pedagogy guided by deconstruction on which he writes:

pedagogic approach focuses on divergent practices in the process of teaching and learning, it is further effected by the use of deconstruction as it also always looks for multiple thoughts and practices. It rather deconstructs all the established hierarchical norms and looks them afresh. So this approach is not teacher-centered, it is participatory-based. It looks for multiple ways of learning; it does not regard one concept and practice as more dominant than the other, it rather sees them as inter-dependent and equally meaningful. Because of such liberal and inclusive nature of deconstruction, pedagogy as deconstruction seems to be more effective in promoting balancing thoughts and practices in the students (“Pedagogy” 46)

Deconstruction and pedagogy, that is why, are crucial parts of postmethod pedagogy. Kumaravadivelu, however, has conceptualized the postmethod pedagogy as of “three-dimensional system consisting of the parameters of particularity, practicality, and possibility” (537). He explains these parameters and suggests that teaching guided by postmethod pedagogy must focus on: (a) particularity to “facilitate the advancement of a context-sensitive language education based on a true understanding of local linguistic, sociocultural, and political particularities”; (b) practicality to “rupture the reified role relationship between theorists and practitioners by enabling teachers to construct their own theory of practice”; and (c) possibility to “tap the sociopolitical consciousness that participants bring with them in order to aid their quest for identity formation and social transformation” (537). Besides these three dimensions of postmethod pedagogy, he mentions that there are some other

points to consider while implementing it. For example, the very thing it demands is to focus on “context sensitivity” so that “various participants actualize it variously to suit various necessities”; it demands “a re-visioning of their roles as postmethod practitioners”; and regards learner as “an autonomous learner” (545).

Now a question arises—what is the role of the postmethod teacher to actualize these parameters? To this, Kumaravadivelu commends that the postmethod teachers are like the postmethod learners in terms of their individual autonomy. He further argues that the postmethod teachers have “a reasonable degree of competence and confidence on the part of teachers . . . to build and implement their own theory of practice that is responsive to the particularities of their educational contexts and receptive to the possibilities of their sociopolitical conditions” (548). This suggests that postmethod teachers are free to experiment their ideas and develop theoretical concepts in order to address their pedagogical problems in the particular sociopolitical context. That is, they are the teacher researchers who empower themselves and develop professionally. Besides, as postmethod teachers are practitioners of pedagogy, they also reflect critically so that they can enhance their pedagogical practices. In this regard, Richards maintains that “teachers can improve their understanding of teaching and quality of their own teaching by reflecting critically on their teaching experiences” (23). So reflection by nature is concerned with both pedagogy and deconstruction which can be observed in Kamali’s “deconstructive-reflective practices in teaching” (“Teaching” 107).

Relating reflection to pedagogy, Rikowski and McLaren in their paper, “Postmodernism in Educational Theory,” focus on the inevitability of reflection in educational practices founded on postmodernism. They firmly argue for the “postmodernized modes of ‘reflective’ teacher practice” and “postmodern educational

research methods” and claim that such practices can ensure “education as a resource for social equality and democracy” (3). So we can observe that in postmodernist or deconstructive pedagogy reflection is inevitable because such pedagogical practices never end up with the ultimate meaning; they are rather reinforced by reflection (Kamali, "Teaching" 107). As a result, “the search for ‘meaning’ within texts as within discourse is infinitized, comprising endless academic work for postmodernists” (4). Furthermore, Corner, in the same line, carried out her PhD dissertation entitled "Deconstructing Reflective Practice as a Model of Professional Knowledge in Nursing Education" and concluded that “Derrida's ideas and writings, and the writings of those who have rendered his original texts accessible to the average reader . . . have opened up new, exciting, and productive avenues of inquiry The sense of possibilities created—other ways of seeing and doing – is . . . most liberating, democratic, and consistent with what is best in any educational endeavour” (246). This study also justifies the value of reflection in deconstructive practices. All these discussions above are related to the postmethod pedagogy, i. e. deconstructive pedagogy which can be observed in the roles played by Lord Krishna as a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita.

The Roles of a Teacher

Teachers can play different roles in their pedagogical practices; what role they play in teaching is determined by what approach or method their teaching is founded on. For example, Richards and Rodgers state: "Some methods are totally dependent on teachers as a source of knowledge and direction; others see the teacher's role as catalyst, consultant, guide, and model for learning; still others try to 'teacher-proof' the instructional system by limiting teacher initiative and building instructional content and direction into texts or lesson plans" (28). These views on the teacher's

roles suggest divergent roles of the teacher from an independent resource person to an instrumental. However, the transformations on the teacher's roles are towards more independence, resourcefulness and inclusiveness. In the similar fashion, Jeremy Harmer argues, "We should be able to adopt a variety of roles within the classroom which facilitate learning" (108). He further states that the roles of a teacher might vary from democratic one to autocratic or from fostering learner autonomy to transmitting knowledge to the learners. He presents some major roles of a teacher, for example, a controller, prompter, participant, resource and tutor (108-110). What roles the teachers play in their pedagogy is determined by the following issues in a broad sense as presented by Richards and Rodgers: the type of functions the teachers are expected to fulfill such as a practice director, counselor, or model; the degree of control the teachers have over how learning takes place; the degree to which the teachers are responsible for determining the content of what is taught; and the interactional patterns that develop between the teachers and learners (28).

The role of a teacher is also determined by the philosophy that the teacher holds because philosophy and education are interrelated—'philosophy of education'. That is to say, every philosophical thought is studied and applied in pedagogical practices and the teacher roles differ as the philosophy differs. Thus, in relation to philosophy and education Punam Basu defines philosophy of education as "the philosophical study of education and its problems" (95) and argues that the central subject matter of philosophy of education is education from the philosophical perspectives which determine goals, contents, methodology of teaching including teacher's roles and evaluation (95).

J C Aggarwal further opines that education is the dynamic side of philosophy; it is a "practical activity of philosophical thought" (58). He also quotes Fichte who

argues that "the art of education will never attain complete clearness without philosophy" (qtd. in Aggarwal 58). In the same vein, Dewey suggests that philosophy is the theory of education in its most common sense (qtd.in Aggrawal 58). Besides providing with the theoretical foundations for selection of contents in education, philosophy of education also guides to the selection of appropriate methodology of teaching which directs the roles of a teacher. In this regard, Aggarwal presents different philosophies of education and the respective roles the teachers play according to the philosophy they employ in their pedagogy. These roles are presented as follows: (1) Naturalism—an observer and the stage setter; (2) Idealism—a spiritual guide, an ideal person, a priest/guru, a friend, a philosopher and a guide; (3) Pragmatism—a helper, a guide, an arranger of experiences; (4) Existentialism—a facilitator, a problem-solver; (5) Realism: teachers as a realist, a fact-finder; (6) Humanism—a humanist, as assistant/helper, a path-finder; (7) Marxism—a social reformer, a progressive social agent; and (8) Behaviourism—a behavior modifier, an instructor, a director, a performer (67-95). Although Aggrawal has mentioned different philosophies practiced in education and teacher's roles as guided by these philosophical thoughts, it is not complete as it has missed the discussion of latest philosophical development, i. e. deconstruction/postmodernism and its influence in education.

On the role of the teacher, Ghimire in his PhD dissertation entitled "Educational Perspectives in the Bhagavadgita" identifies the roles of a teacher with respect to different philosophical theories. He presents these theories and the respective roles of a teacher as follows: (1) Idealism—latent knowledge explorer, knower of the stage and purpose of learning, provider, environment creator, spiritual symbol of right conduct, friend, guide, philosopher; (2) Realism—helps the students

know about the world, systemic organizer, judge, moral and disciplined, knower of scientific and psychological method, research work and experimentation; (3)

Pragmatism—learning situation constructor, resource person, motivator, guide, creator of proper learning environment, helper, evaluator, planner, democratic; (4)

Existentialism—encourages thinking, knower of teaching subjects, human condition and activities; offers, philosopher, have strong beliefs and commitments; (5)

Naturalism—problem putter, laissez-faire, critical and scientific, observer of learner, friend, philosopher, guide, environment setter, resource provider, recedes in the background; (6) Perennialism—trained in the liberal arts, authority figure, disseminator of truth, director of mental conditions, and scholar; (7) Essentialism—authorized, trained in the liberal arts, science, or humanities; intellectual, skilled communicator, superior in pedagogical skills; (8) Progressivism—facilitator, director of learning, guide, supervisor of learning and collaborative partner; (9)

Reconstructionism—shaper of society, transformational leader, change agent, tolerance for ambiguity, comfortable with change, trained in conflict management, organizational development, program, program evaluation, strategic planning; (10)

Behaviourism—disposure of reward and punishment, scientific attitudes, behavior shaper, knower of theory and the techniques of the conditioning process; (11)

Marxism—a soldier in the battle for communism, equipped with Marxist ideology, and methodology, politically and socially conscious, sound health, emancipation; (12)

Postmodernism—thinker, culture worker, critical ideology, helper, knower of critical pedagogy, empowered, advocator (537-38). Although Ghimire has mentioned the comprehensive list of philosophical practices employed in education in relation to the teacher's roles, he has not talked of deconstruction as a philosophy of education and its influence in education.

On the role of a teacher Christopher Day in his book, *The Passion of Teaching*, argues that teachers need to direct their attention towards their more dynamic role so that they can satisfy students' needs more effectively. So he maintains that "for teachers to be effective; they need to break out of predominantly transmission mode of teaching to those that are more dynamic and take students' learning needs seriously" (141). He is of the opinion that teachers with strong foundation of intellectual and emotional identities can be better committed to perform their roles better towards their students. He further explains, "The best teachers at all levels are those who have strong intellectual and emotional identities and commitments both to their subject and to their students" (Day 9). For Day the role of a teacher is dependent and determined by the role that the learners expect to comply with. So he presents the roles of a teacher in relation with learners as follows: learner, worker, teacher, citizen, parent, expert, peer, leader and problem solver (Bentley qtd. in Day 93-94). In this book Day argues for the passionate teachers who take the roles as listed by Zehm and Kottler. So the passionate teachers are those who (1) take care of themselves; (2) are interested and interesting; (3) find a mentor/critical friend (4) make learning meaningful; (5) balance care and control; (6) cultivate their cultural sensitivity; and (7) become active in professional organizations (qtd. in Day 33-34).

Among these roles of a teacher, 'mentor' has been widely applauded as it is claimed to be effective in making learners learn what they are expected to. There have also been more studies in this field. Gisbert van Ginkela, Jannet van Drieb and Nico Verloop maintain in their paper "Mentor Teachers' Views of their Mentees, Mentoring and Tutoring: Partnership in Learning" that mentor teachers' knowledge of mentoring and learning to teach is above all practical knowledge (123). Similarly, Shosh Leshema maintains that teachers having the role of a mentor should be able to

provide the mentees with “emotional support and professional socialization” along with the pedagogical guidance (Hawkey; Schwille; qtd. in. Leshema 2). Day suggests the role of a teacher as a “teacher researcher” who can explore his/her problems in course of teaching and solve them in order to make his/her pedagogy more effective.

Kumaravadivelu in his paper “Toward a Postmethod Pedagogy” points out the teacher's role as “the postmethod teachers” who are competent, confident and autonomous to put their theory into practice. He further explains that the postmethod teachers “build and implement their own theory of practice that is responsive to the particularities of their educational contexts and receptive to the possibilities of their sociopolitical conditions” (548). From the viewpoint of deconstruction the postmethod teachers themselves can be called the deconstructionist teachers because both deconstruction as pedagogy and postmethod pedagogy aim at the Other as a possibility (Kumaravadivelu 537; Derrida qtd. in Higgs 170). In the similar fashion, Kamali, in his presentation "Teaching as Deconstruction: A Deconstructive-Reflective Model of Teacher Development" applies deconstruction to his teaching and asserts that it "can help teachers deconstruct their theoretical learning, reflect on their practices, and increase their 'teacher learning' so that they can perform better and develop professionally" (“Teaching” 105).

All these developments in the field of pedagogy with respect to the teacher's role in the postmethod pedagogy as guided by the theory of deconstruction suggest the possibility of 'deconstructionist' as the role of a teacher. As a deconstructionist teacher, the teacher's role can be compared with the roles of a deconstructionist as discussed by R. Gnanasekaran in relation to a deconstructionist reading of a text as follows: “now and again as a reader of the text, a decipherer, an investigator, and at some different times, a correct critic” (213). That is to say, a deconstructionist teacher

should review and reflect on his/her pedagogical practices; he/she should get the contextual meaning of the instructional materials; he/she should carry out researches to solve his/her practical problems; and he/she should take any pedagogical issues critically. It is, however, to be noted that, as deconstruction itself is undefined, roles of a deconstructionist teacher cannot be restricted; a deconstructionist teacher's role can be rather compared with "a free play of meanings" in a text, i. e. difference (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97) and "a pedagogical dance" (Pryer qtd. in Day 106), i. e. a deconstructionist teacher is free to play any role as required in the postmethod context.

As a deconstructionist teacher, Kamali practiced deconstruction in his pedagogy, reviewed the literature in deconstructive and postmethod pedagogical practices and produced an article entitled "'Deconstructionist' as the Teacher of a Teacher in Postmethod Pedagogy." In this paper he has explored deconstruction in relation to postmethod pedagogy and improvised it into "deconstructive pedagogy" and suggested the following as the roles of a deconstructionist teacher: (i) A deconstructionist teacher practices pedagogy as deconstructive pedagogy founded on deconstruction; (ii) A deconstructionist teacher can fully act as an autonomous practitioner; (iii) A deconstructionist teacher can develop a reasonable degree of competence and confidence in performing pedagogy; (iv) A deconstructionist teacher not only critically implements theories into practice but he/she also builds theories out of practices; and (v) A deconstructionist teacher focuses on the interplay between theoretical and practical dimensions of pedagogy and lets it open to any possibilities to make the pedagogy more effective in context ("Dest" 73-74).

Teacher Identities

As teaching profession involves a lot of interactions and dealings with the learners from divergent backgrounds, teacher identity is affected by the way the teachers identify themselves and the way the learners and the other stakeholders of the institution hold views on them. So it is a common phenomenon that teachers are identified the way they practice pedagogy which is affected by these factors. To this, Day in his book, *A Passion for Teaching*, mentions after Epstein: "Teacher identity is the result of 'a sense of personal and professional, intellectual, social and emotional identity' and it is also the result of 'the process by which person who seeks to integrate his (her) various statuses and roles, as well as his (her) diverse experiences, into a coherent image of self'" (Epstein qtd. in Day 54). This suggests that teacher identity is determined in terms of certain factors that are connected to pedagogy, e. g. personal, professional, intellectual, social and emotional. Besides, it is also affected by teachers' status and roles and their experiences. So teacher identity is a complex concept to deal with but very crucial for effective pedagogy and teachers' professional development.

As identity is the result of many factors like personal, professional, social, emotional cultural etc., it is very complex to identify a teacher in his/her pedagogical practices. This complex nature of identity has been explicated by Habib when he puts it: "Identity, whether of the human self or of objects in the world, is no longer viewed as having a fixed, or pregiven essence, but is seen as fluid and dependent, like linguistic terms, on a variety of contexts" (652). Following Habib, it is still more complex because it is never fixed, it is always fluid in nature, and there is no pregiven essence in it. This also exactly applies to teacher identities. In this regard, Peter Kelley commends:

Teachers' identities are neither located entirely with the individual nor entirely a product of others and the social setting. They can be regarded as the ways in which practitioners see themselves in response to the actions of others towards them; that is they are the constantly changing outcomes of the iteration between how practitioners are constructed by others, and how they construct themselves, in and away from social situations. (513)

As suggested by Kelly, teacher identities are mainly constructed by others who are situated in a particular socio-cultural setting; however, teachers themselves can also construct their identity against that socio-cultural setting. Thus teacher identities should be studied from a much broader perspective. In this regard, Shosh Leshema maintains that there are some efforts to define professional identity in terms of the concepts drawn from other disciplines like sociolinguistics and psychology (Erikson and Gee qtd. in Leshema 4). So Gee mainly focuses on 'recognition' from the perspective of sociolinguistics and maintains, "Being recognized as a certain 'kind of person' in a given context is what I mean by 'identity'" (Gee qtd. in Leshema 4). Following Gee's social recognition as identity Leshema further stresses; "When a human being acts and interacts in a given context, others recognise that person as acting and interacting as a certain 'kind of person'" which results in his/her identification (4). In the same line, following Lave and Wenger, Kelly argues that identity is more affected by socio-cultural factors. So he stresses: "Socio-cultural theorists suggest that in becoming expert, engaging in particular social practices and moving from peripheral towards full participation in tasks of increasing accountability, people build identities" (qtd. in Kelly 513). As argued above, teacher identity is mainly affected by socio-cultural factors because it is situated in a context. Identity, however, for Day, consists more of personal factors rather than social, so he

asserts; "Identity is made up of mind, heart and body" (56). In other words, identity is constructed through a person's thinking, feeling and action concerned with his/her professional practices.

Besides these social, cultural, and psychological or personal factors as discussed above, identity is also affected by some other factors which have been mentioned by Castells:

Identities are sources of meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through the process of individualization. The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations. (qtd. in Day 58)

As stated above, Castells' conceptualization of identity contains some more factors from geography to religious. As a result, identity becomes a complex concept to define theoretically. Thus, Day and Hadfield maintain that identities are "not stable but discontinuous, fragmented and subject to change (qtd. in Day 57). This exactly applies to teacher identity as it consists of all the factors discussed above from personal to social, cultural, geographical, psychological and religious. All these factors make the concept of teacher identity complex and unstable, so it is always a subject to change, i. e. teachers can have an identity at a time which can change over time. Thus, theoretical foundation of teacher identity is naturally challenging to establish.

In what follows are some studies and arguments on teacher identity or teachers' professional identity which can be understood through the ways as mentioned by Leshema:

The concept of teachers' professional identity appears in the literature in different ways. Some studies emphasise its connection to teacher's image of self (Beijaard, Meijer, & Verloop, 2004; Knowles, 1992), while others emphasise more on its connection to teachers role (Goodson & Cole, 1994; Volkmann & Anderson, 1998). It seems that studies lack a clear definition of a teacher's professional identity (Beijaard et al., 2004). However, in the last decade the topic of professional identity of teachers has been acknowledged by researchers as a distinct area of research in the field of teacher education (Beijaard et al., 2004; Bullough, 1997; Connelly & Clandinin, 1999). (3-4)

This quote mentions some achievements, challenges and prospects in the development of teacher identity. The achievement is that we can find two perspectives on teacher identity: teacher identity through their image of self and through their roles. The challenge is that teacher identity lacks a clear definition, i.e. theoretical foundation. However, the prospect concerned with teacher identity is that it has been recognized and acknowledged as a distinct area of research in the field of teacher education which will open up further developments in this field. With regard to this, Kamali reviewed the roles of a teacher in postmethod pedagogy from the perspective of deconstruction and proposed "deconstructionist" as the the role of a teacher in postmethod pedagogy and proposed "deconstructive pedagogy" (Kamali, "Dest" 73).

As regards the teachers' roles and identities in pedagogy, the important factor to determine their identity depends upon how they "interpret their role, the meanings and understandings which they bring to their role, their beliefs and intentions, and so on" (Kelly 513). This implies that teacher identity is only personal matter as it depends upon how teachers perceive their roles and how they link it to their

theoretical understanding of their roles. Kelly further explains their roles with example that it depends upon how “the stances teachers take towards particular issues and situations, and explicitly in, for example, what they say to their colleagues during meetings” (513). Similarly, Wenger suggests that “the construction of identity takes place through participation in social situations . . . and through reflecting on and reifying that participation (qtd. in Kelly 513). So teacher identity as such is determined by the role the teachers play through participation in different social situations and through the way they reflect and reify their experiences in their professional interactions. In other words, teacher identity is the product of their professional practices.

Kelly further discusses some causes and types in general with relation to teacher identity. One cause or type of identity is assigned by social circumstances or the social factor, and the other is the identity that naturally exists due to the teachers’ personal nature or the personal factor (513-14). She also argues that there are often conflicts between these two types because teachers can accept and remain satisfied with their existential identity, but they might reject and remain dissatisfied with the assigned identity. So it is natural that there might often be conflict between these two types. Referring to this conflicting aspect of teacher identity, she notes, “When such assigned identities conflict with people’s existing identities as teachers and their identities in other areas of their lives, teachers experience considerable dissatisfaction which can lead them to deliberately reject assigned identities but which may also result in some teachers leaving the profession” (513-14). There are, however, some other teachers with reflective and discursive identities who are more likely to manage such identity conflicts as they can engage themselves on “ongoing ‘conversation’ with their practice, adopt stances which respond to their students’ difficulties, seek to

collaborate with students and colleagues in resolving these, look for ways forward in professional guidance and research, but only as starting points for their own enquiry, and adopt complex measures of success” (516). From the discussion above, we can simply come to a conclusion that there are three categories of teacher identities; assigned, existential and reflective or discursive. In this project, Lord Krishna’s identity as ‘a deconstructionist teacher’ is the assigned one; I have assigned him this identity through the deconstructive reading of his pedagogy in the Gita.

As any professional development moves forward from novice to expert, it is quite natural to have the developmental features in different phases of development which, in turn, result in the changes in identity. Along with the developmental factors related to profession, the expansion of social horizon and the increasing responsibilities in the roles will also add to the changes in identity. This has been explained by Kelly:

In their movement from novice to expert people adopt different stances towards the tasks in which they engage, and so they change identity. Thus identities are in a state of constant evolution (Lave, 1993), through a process which ‘consists of negotiating the meanings of our experience of membership in social communities’. (Lave; Wenger; qtd. in Kelly 513).

Teacher identity, with respect to such changes, can be of no exception; or rather it is more natural for teachers to have constant changes in their professional identity as they go on learning more and more in different contexts. As Gordon Wells puts it, “Learning is ‘the transformation that continuously takes place in an individual’s identity and ways of participating through his/her engagement in particular instances of social activities with others’” (qtd. in Kelly 513). Similarly, Day argues that “the teacher and those who are taught well themselves change over time as a result of life

changes and changes in societies, teachers need to revisit their own identities in order to continue to connect" (58). This suggests that along with the professional learning and development, there will be naturally changes in identity for any professional practitioners let alone the teachers, and that the teachers are more likely to have such constant changes in their identity as they are in continual process of learning.

Exploring the studies and nature of teacher identity, teachers have identified them as potential areas for exploration in order to develop their pedagogical practices. Regarding the quality of teaching and learning and teachers' professional development, it really matters how the teachers identify themselves in their professional community. That is, the way the teachers are identified in their community may encourage or resist their participation and learning in/from the community which will have direct influence in their professional practices. So there is a dire need of further research in relation to teacher identities and their advancement in pedagogical practices or professional development. With this respect Kelly remarks:

It follows that important areas for future research include how teachers' identities in other areas of their lives contribute and relate to their identities as teachers, the nature of identities which sustain participation in nonaligned communities or which actively reject or resist such communities, and the extent to which such identities can be encouraged and such participation and resistance supported. (514)

So it is inevitable that teachers be a researcher in order to explore who they are as a teacher. Or as suggested by John Elliott, they need to be a "teacher researcher" who can realize "the need to and rewards of looking beneath the surface of a problem by collecting evidence from a number of sources" and finally come to realize who they

are and how they need to conduct professionally (qtd. in Day 91). In other words, teachers can enhance their pedagogical practices and develop professionally through exploring their own practices in relation to who they are in different contexts.

With respect to this aspect of teacher identity and teacher learning through teacher as researcher, as a teacher educator and a teacher-researcher I would like to present my experiences on how I happened to construct different identities myself over time during my teaching of English at the university level and how I was identified by others. After some years of my pedagogical practices, I found myself as a "Nepanglish teacher" rather than an English teacher (Kamali "How" 34). Then after a few years of teaching I realized that I was "Sa-Si"—an existential identity. That is, it is a neologism and an acronymy, a short form which could produce multiple full forms without any fixed meaning like Derrida's "differance" (Sa-Si Bhakta 54-55, 67). Ideally, I conceptualized "Sa" referring to "Satya" (Truth) and "Si" to "Sirjana" (Creation). Thus, literally "Sa-Si" means the essence of "Satya" and "Sirjana." I tried my best to execute this identity in my professional practices through "*Sa-Si Sadhana*" (Sa-Si Bhakta 55). After some years of my *sadhana*, I found "Sa-Si" in the form of my personal God and myself as (?H/his,/H/her,/I/its,/a) devotee, i. e. "*Sa-Si Bhakta*" which became my identity (Sa-Si Bhakta 55)! For the last few years I have been exploring and practicing 'deconstruction' in education. Accordingly, I presented a paper "Deconstructing ELT in the EFL Context: My Autoethnography" at the Asia TEFL conference, Macau (Kamali, "Deconstructing"), and later on I published a paper identifying myself as a Nepanglish teacher in the European-American Journals (Kamali, "How" 34); I also published a paper entitled "Deconstruction in the Contemporary ELT Practices" in the journal of Nepal Academy. Lately, my 'deconstructive pedagogical practices' has been recognized by International Education

Summit and Award 2020. In an email addressed to me, they have recognized and awarded me as "Outstanding Teacher for Innovation in Teaching" (IESA_Virtual 2020), and my paper entitled "'Deconstructionist' as the Role of a Teacher in Postmethod Pedagogy" has been published in the international journal, Technium Social Sciences Journal/Education. More importantly, the present study also concerns the study of the pedagogy in the Gita in relation to deconstruction and teacher identity. In this study I have identified Lord Krishna as 'a deconstructionist teacher.' So as a devotee of Lord Krishna and a practitioner of deconstructive pedagogy, now I think I am a "deconstructionist teacher"!

When it comes to Lord Krishna's identity in the Gita, many commentators on the Gita argue that he is playing the role of a teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita, i. e. he is a teacher. But the question is—what kind of teacher is he? To this, Radhakrishnan describes him as a teacher with the divine power of "the Supreme Lord" (25); for Osho he is "the Father of Psychology"—a teacher who knows his students' psychology well (69). Sargeant describes him as "the Universal Guru" (2); Swami Ranganathananda and Tika Dutta Baral describe him as "an Ideal Teacher" (32; xxi) and so on. More importantly, as the pedagogy employed by Lord Krishna in the Gita is founded on deconstruction, I have identified and justified him as *a deconstructionist teacher*.

Lord Krishna as a Deconstructionist Teacher in the Pedagogy of the Gita

Deconstruction is the result of Jacques Derrida's 1966 paper entitled "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" which, as Adams stated, "really began the critique of structuralism" (1116) because in structuralism the human mind is believed to perceive differences most readily in terms of opposites which are called binary oppositions, i. e. two ideas, directly opposed, each of which

we understand by means of its opposition to the other (Tyson 213). In structuralism a text is supposed to have a central meaning which is expressed through the hierarchical relation between the binary oppositions found in the text, for example, identity/difference, speech/writing, inside/outside, man/woman, nature/civilization, good/evil, etc. and then to deconstruct the way they contribute to establish a foundational meaning or a center in a text (Kakoliris 53). In this context, David Lodge and Nigel Wood maintain that structuralism is ““based on some secured ground, a 'center' or 'transcendental signified' that is outside the system under investigation and guarantees its intelligibility’” (Derrida qtd. in Lodge and Wood 106). So this occurrence of presence as a center in a text is called metaphysics of presence or metaphysical which refers to “anything that is universal, abstract, conceptual or general . . . since it assumes something beyond the immediacy of material force” (Stocker 44). In other words, it is also called logocentrism as it keeps definite meaning ‘logos’ at the center of the text. This logocentric nature of text is the main feature of structuralism because it “requires a center that constitutes the system from the point of view of its origin and goal” (Stocker 114). Lane, explains after Derrida, how these concepts work under structuralism: "To clarify, Derrida argues that all of Western philosophy (metaphysics) relies on notion of origin, center, presence, transcendence, and so on, to explain how structures are formed, maintained, and how they develop or progress to a higher state" (94). Similarly, Nuyen further explains, after Derrida, how the concepts of logocentrism, metaphysics of presence and center works to create a definite meaning in a text:

Derrida claims that philosophy is structuralist in nature, in that it always presupposes a structure that requires to be present in its center something— God, rationality, substance, ideology, etc. that guarantees meaning, truth and

value. Derrida refers to this idea as the 'metaphysics of presence'. From the philosophical point of view it is rationality that is typically present in the center of a philosophical structure, a view that Derrida calls 'logocentrism'. (134-35)

Derrida, after his 1966 presentation, carried out deconstructive reading of the metaphysical texts from Plato to Rousseau and deconstructed the metaphysics of presence that the texts contain. In his reading of the Western metaphysical texts, he closely observed the relation between the binary oppositions in the text and developed an understanding of them. In other words, he started deconstructing the center or the metaphysics of presence through the analysis of binary oppositions which he called deconstruction.

Deconstruction, thus, turned to be a major turning point regarding how binary oppositions are treated in reading a text because in deconstruction they are perceived not to be oppositional but to be complementary to each other. In this regard, Tyson defines the relation between the binary oppositions, "One must examine the ways in which the two members of the oppositions are not completely opposite," but they need to be understood "the ways in which they overlap or share some things in common" (254). The way the binary oppositions are treated in deconstruction can be observed through the example presented by Kakoliris after Derrida's reading of Plato's "pharmakon":

The pharmakon, for example, is "remedy and poison, both... good and bad." Pharmakon "plays" between the poles of remedy and poison and, therefore, its rendering as either remedy or poison, as metaphysical binary thought ordains, prevents the revelation of the essential ambiguity of the word. Derrida refuses to determine a categorical, unambiguous meaning for pharmakon, or for the

other undecidables. On the contrary, he stresses their characteristics of intensity and oscillation. (59)

In deconstruction the binary oppositions, as discussed above, are understood not as opposite to each other but as complementary. On the ground of this transformation the way binary oppositions were treated in structuralism took a new turn under deconstruction because "deconstruction," in Derridean concept, "refers to the same that contains difference" (Stocker 178). That is to say, deconstruction cannot work out of differences, but there the difference works in a different way. Similarly, Buchanan also mentions that Derrida's concept of deconstruction treats the binary oppositions differently from the way they were treated in the structuralism because deconstruction holds the meaning of "a double gesture" which means to say that first it refers to "reversing the hierarchy of a particular philosophical opposition," and second to "a displacement of the very system in which the hierarchy operates" (115). In other words, in Derrida's view deconstruction operates on binary oppositions in two ways: one is to deconstruct the hierarchy of the oppositions by proving that they are complementary to each other, and the next is to discover the relation of the oppositions from different perspectives that could produce multiple relations between them opening up the possibilities of indefinite meanings so that the text cannot have any secured meaning. This kind of analysis about the relation between the binary oppositions in a text ultimately leads to the possibilities of having indefinite meanings of a text which is the case of "differance." As differance refers to the case of indefiniteness of meaning in a text, for Derrida, it is a concept of "a non-definition" (qtd. in Green and Lebihan 217).

The concept and invention of 'difference' is the result of Derrida's critical reading of the Western metaphysical texts as the practice of deconstruction to shatter

the established meaning. This invention became the foundation without any foundation for the poststructuralist or the postmodernist thoughts. To this, Reynolds remarks: “Deconstruction and postmodernism more generally, have both associated their various criticisms of the philosophical tradition with a desire to emancipate a conception of alterity that has been marginalised by basically all metaphysics” (31). Thus deconstruction and postmodernism both end with differance that allows the multiplicity of meaning accepting any alterity, the marginalized and the other of the metaphysics. With respect to how differance was conceptualized by Derrida, Jonathan D. Culler in his book, *On Deconstruction*, maintains: “The verb *differer* means to differ and to defer. *Differance* sounds exactly the same as *difference*, but ending *ance*, which is used to produce verbal nouns, makes it a new form meaning ‘difference-differing-deferring.’ *Differance* thus designates both a ‘passive’ difference already in place as the condition of signification and an act of differing which produces differences” (97). As Culler has argued, differance, unlike the difference that designates meaning to the signifiers, is not static; its meaning is rather differing in contexts. As a result, the difference in differance cannot designate a definite meaning; it is always postponed. Thus all the possible meanings as the resultants of differences between the signs refer to the state of differance! To this, Culler quotes Derrida’s concept of *differance* that it

is a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/absence. *Differance* is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing [*espacement*] by which elements relate to one another. This spacing is the production, simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *differance* indicates this indecision as regards activity and passivity, that which cannot yet be governed and organized by that

opposition), of interval without which the “full” terms could not signify, could not function. (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97)

As suggested by Derrida, differance goes beyond the metaphysics and destabilizes a center through the play of difference between the oppositions, the meaning of the opposition does not remain fixed; it rather keeps on moving, delaying the fixity in meaning. This makes differance a movement without being governed by any metaphysical rules. In the similar line, Raman Selden explains the meaning of the term ‘differance’ after Derrida: "In French the verb '*differer*' means both 'to differ' and 'to defer'. 'To differ' is a spatial concept: the sign emerges from a system of differences which are spaced out within the system. 'To defer' is temporal: signifiers enforce an endless postponement of 'presence' . . ." (88). This implies that the meaning of signs that is established through differences gets deferred which causes instability in the meaning of the signs resulting in the case of differance. Kakoliris further explains that differance is the result of deconstruction of the metaphysical texts or deconstruction of the meaning in presence founded and maintained by the metaphysical authors. Meaning in deconstruction is “always already conditioned by difference and non presence” (46-47), and differance as meaning is “the playing movement that ‘produces’ [...] these differences. It is ‘the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences’” (Derrida qtd. in Kakoliris 48). Thus in deconstruction there is no definite and fixed meaning of the signs or texts; the search for meaning is an endless tracing as there is no origin of presence.

Both structuralism and deconstruction are concerned with the analysis of the binary oppositions and their differences. But they differ from each other the way they perceive these differences. In structuralism meaning is definite as presence as it is the result of binary logic. So Tyson writes of this: “According to structuralism, the

human mind perceives differences most readily in terms of opposites, which the structuralists call binary oppositions: two ideas, directly opposed, each of which we understand by means of its opposition to the other" (213). But difference in deconstruction is the result of ultra- or quasi- transcendental logic used in the analysis of the binary oppositions. The quasi-transcendental logic finds the meaning in the oppositions not as definite and presence but as undecidable and indefinite— difference. Kakoliris, in this regard, makes clear distinction between the binary logic as used in structuralism and the undecidable logic in deconstruction when he writes, “While binary logic takes place between the limits of a disjunctive ‘either... or,’ the ‘undecidable’ logic of supplementarity constitutes the conjunctive logic of ‘both... and,’ which, not only denies, but also disorganizes classical binary thought” (59). Through this discussion we can argue that deconstructionists are those whose thoughts and practices are grounded on deconstruction or the quasi-transcendental logic or the undecidable logic. They do not believe in the transcendental signified that founds the definite meaning; they rather believe in difference or the undecidable nature of meaning in relation to the signs or texts. So for the deconstructionists exploring meanings in a text is like taking part in a play. This can be observed when deconstructionists apply deconstruction in a text or event. When it is applied to a text, it is called a deconstructive reading which attempts to display logocentric operations in the text by analyzing the text’s language and the transcendental signifieds; it operates on the binary oppositions and self contradictions in the text which contain *aporiai* or points of conceptual impasse; by this, it tears down the closure in the text and allows free play of meanings (Habib 654). In this way, a deconstructive reading of a text comes to a conclusion without any fixed conclusion. i. e. the reader finds no

definite meaning in the text; he/she rather finds contradictions or aporiai and multiple meanings in the free play of meanings in a text.

A deconstructionist who practices Derridean deconstruction, as discussed above, “works in double movements: first, the questioning or dismantling of a binary opposition or hierarchical structure (argument, text, etc.), and second, showing how deconstructive devices are already at work in a system or text (Ahluwalia 81). Similarly, a deconstructionist, following Gnanasekaran, is the one who “considers the text to be the subject and object of investigation” and “has the firm conviction that no single and right significance can be agreed to the content of the text (212). He further argues that a deconstructionist, when he /she deconstructs a text or any event, accepts the following four parts involved in the process of deconstruction or plays these four roles as: a reader of the text, a decipherer, an investigator, and at some different times a correct critic (213). However, it is to be noted that as deconstruction is not founded on any definite theory, nothing can be said of the role of a deconstructionist for certain because everything gets deconstructed over time. So a deconstructionist should be able to deconstruct himself/herself and have different identities and roles like that of Derrida himself. The most radical event of deconstruction in Derrida’s life was his transformation from an atheist to a believer. Thus, Tacey rightly stated that, as a deconstructionist, Derrida “had the courage to deconstruct himself” (15).

‘Deconstructionist’ is a role that anybody can take up as deconstruction can be applied to any texts or communicative events in any fields, for example, “literature, art, architecture, science, mathematics, philosophy and psychology and any other disciplines that can be thought of as involving the act of marking” (Frederick 119). Similarly, deconstruction has also influenced the field of education. Biesta and Egea-Kuhne commend that “deconstruction can engage a thoughtful reader in some

powerful rethinking of education, analysing all the hidden assumptions which are implied in the philosophical, or the ethical, or the juridical, or the political issues related to education (qtd. in Higgs 175). As deconstruction has wider application, professionals applying deconstruction in their respective fields are called deconstructionists. So there are deconstructionist critics, deconstructionist artists, deconstructionist philosophers, deconstructionist politicians, deconstructionist theologians, deconstructionist psychologists, deconstructionist educationists or deconstructionist teachers and so on.

As discussed earlier, teacher roles and identities are interrelated, and a teacher is often identified by the theory he/she employs and the role he/she plays in the pedagogy. In analyzing the pedagogy of the Gita, I have found that it contains many binary oppositions which have been exploited as suggested by the theory of deconstruction leading to the case of differance (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Fritsch 25; Biesta 394; Kakoliries 59). Besides, I have also found some other features of deconstruction in the pedagogy of Lord Krishna as suggested by these Derridean educationists. For example, a deconstructionist teacher plays the role to: “interrogate, exhibit and criticize the decidable ethics of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ practiced in the educational institutions” (Trifonas 307); think and behave like “a cosmopolitan individualist, . . . not exclude anything; it is the theory of inclusiveness; it is the theory of “justice” (Stocker 143); deal with the educational issues from the perspectives like “‘justice’, ‘the other’, and ‘responsibility’” (Higgs 170); “do justice to the ‘other’ of presence” (Biesta 394-95); “be recognized differently by different people in the same institution . . . from moment to moment and from context to context . . . be ambiguous or unstable” (Leshema 4); and the like.

Guided by these constructs of deconstruction discussed above, pedagogy in the Gita as employed by Lord Krishna has been analyzed to justify that he is a deconstructionist teacher. These constructs of deconstruction have been summarized into the following questions on the basis of which the pedagogy in the Gita has been analyzed and Lord Krishna's role as a deconstructionist teacher has been justified: (1) Are there binary oppositions employed in the pedagogy of the Gita? (2) On what theoretical ground are these oppositions analyzed? (3) Does the teacher interrogate, exhibit and criticize the decidable ethics of right or wrong? (4) Do the pedagogical issues concern responsibility and justice to the other? (5) Does the teacher have fixed identity or unstable and ambiguous identities? (6) Does the pedagogy end up with a definite lesson? (7) What are the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher which can be derived from the pedagogy of the Gita?

To the first question, I have found that pedagogy in the Gita contains many binary oppositions. As identified in the previous chapter of this report, the binary oppositions employed by Lord Krishna in the pedagogy of the Gita are: *dharma kshetre* (in the place of pilgrimage) and *kuru kshetre* (in the place of Kurukshetra, desiring to fight; 1.1); *svajanam* (kinsmen; 1.36) and *varna-shankaraha* (unwanted progeny; 1.40); *kula-dharma* (the family tradition) and *kula-kshaye* (in destroying the family; 1.39); *dukha* (distress) and *sukha* (happiness; 2.15); *janma* (birth) and *mrityu* (death; 2.27); *siddhi* (success) and *asiddhi* (failure; 2.48); *subha* (good) and *ashubha* (evil; 2.57); *abhinanditi* (praising) and *dwesti* (enemy; 2.57); *shanti* (peacefulness) and *ashanti* (unpeacefulness; 2.66); *sata* (truth) and *asata* (untruth; 2.16); *gata* (living) and *agata* (dead; 2.11); *vyakta* (manifest) and *avyakta* (unmanifest; 2.28); *jaya* (victory) and *ajaya* (defeat; 2.38); *labha* (profit) and *alabha* (loss; 2.38); *sukrita* (good results) and *duskriti* (bad results; 2.50); *karma* (work) and *akarma* (no work;

3.8); *shrestha* (a great man) and *janaha* (a common man; 3.21); *sva-dharma* (one's own duty) and *paradharm* (another men's duties; 3.35); *siddha* (success) and *asiddha* (failure; 4.22); *sadhu* (the pious) and *duskrita* (the miscreants; 4.8); *yuktah* (one who is engaged in devotional service' and *ayuktaha*' one who is not in Krishna Consciousness; 5.12); *sannyasam* (to renounce work) and *karmanam* (to work with devotion; 5.1); *karma-phalam tyaktva* (offering the result of all activities to Lord Krishna) and *kama-karena* (greedy for the fruits; 5.12); *ajnana* (ignorance) and *janan* (knowledge; 5.15); *papa* (sin) and *sukrita* (pious activities; 5.18); *svapake* (outcast) and *pandita* (those who are wise; 5.18); *priyam* (the pleasant) and *apriyam* (the unpleasant; 5.20); *prahrishyet* (rejoices) and *udvijet* (becomes agitated; 5.20); *bandhu* (friend) and *ripuha* (enemy; 6.5); *mana* (honour) and *apamana* (dishonor; 6.7); *sita* (cold) and *usna* (heat; 6.7); *sadhu* (the pious person) and *paapi* (the sinner; 6.9); *apara* (inferior/material nature) and *para* (superior/living entities; 7.5); *prabhavah* (the source of manifestation/origin) and *pralayah* (annihilation/dissolution; 7.6); *avyaktam* (non-manifested/imperishable) and *vyaktam* (manifest/perishable; 7.24); *anyadevatah* (other demigods) and *mamdridhavratah* (Krishna devotee; 7.28); *dvandvamohena* (having the illusion of/bewildered by dualities; 7.27) and *dvandvamohanirmuktaha* (free from the delusion of dualities; 7.28); *anavritim* (no return) and *avritim* (return; 8.23); *punahajanmanavidhyate* (never takes birth again) and *punahajanmavidhyate* (takes birth again; 8.16); *sukla-gati* (path of light) and *Krishna-gati* (path of darkness; 8.26); *rakshasim* and *asurim* *prakritim* (demonic and atheistic nature; 9.12) and *daivim prakritim* (divine nature; 9.13); *ekatvena* (in oneness) and *prithaktvena* (in duality/diversity; 9.15); *pita* (father) and *mata* (mother; 9.18); *prabhava* (creation) and *pralaya* (dissolution; 9.18); *sat* (spirit) and *asat* (matter; 9.19); *svarga-lokam* (heaven) and *martya-lokam* (the earth;

9.21); *shubhphala* (auspicious results) and *ashubhphala* (inauspicious results; 9.28); *dveshyah* (hateful) and *priyah* (dear; 9.29); *bhavah* (birth) and *abhavah* (death; 10.4); *yashah* (fame) and *ayashah* (infamy; 10.5); *bhayam* (fear) and *abhayam* (fearlessness; 10.4); *devah* (the demigods) and *danavah* (the demon; 10.14); *sva-cakshu* (natural eyes) and *divyam cakshyu* (divine eyes; 11.8); *sakhe* (friend) and *deva* (Lord; 11.44); *satasahasrasahakritini* (hundreds of thousands of varied divine and multicolored forms; 11.5) and *manusamrupam* (human form; 11.51); *naudvijate* (never agitating others) and *udvijate* (disturbing others; 12.15); *harsha* (happiness) and *amarsha* (distress; 12.15); *ninda* (defamation) and *stutiha* (praise; 12.19); *prakritim* (nature) and *purusam* (the enjoyer; 13.1); *kshetram* (the field) and *kshetrajanam* (the knower of the field; 13.1); *adambhitwam* (pridelessness) and *dambhitwam* (having pride; 13.8); *ahimsa* (non-violence) and *himsa* (violence; 13.8); *thairyam* (steadfastness) and *cancalam* (wandering; 13.8); *vairagyam* (renunciation) and *moham* (attachment; 13.8); *jnanam* (knowledge) and *ajnanam* (ignorance; 13.12); *sat* (cause) and *asat* (effect; 13.13); *nirgunam* (without material qualities) and *gunayuktah* (with material qualities; 13.15); *avibhaktam* (without division) and *vibhaktam* (with division; 13.17); *grasisnu* (devouring) and *prabhavisnu* (developing; 13.17); *bharta* (master) and *bhokta* (supreme enjoyer; 13.23); *vinasyatsu* (in the destruction) and *avinasyantam* (not destroyed; 13.28); *sattvam* (goodness) and *rajah* (passion; 14.5); *sattvam* (goodness) and *tamah* (ignorance; 14.5); *rajah* (passion) and *tamah* (ignorance; 14.5); *urdhvam* (upward) and *adhaha* (down; 14.18); *pravritim* (attachment) and *sanga-tyaktva* (without attachment; 14.22); *vicalyate* (agitated) and *sthir* (non-agitated; 14.23); *losta* (a lump of earth and stone) and *kancanah* (gold; 14.24); *priya* (to the dear) and *apriyah* (undesirable; 14.24); *mana* (honor) and *apamana* (dishonor; 14.25); *mitra* (friend) and *ari* (enemy; 14.25); *urdhva-mulam* (with roots above) and

adhah-mulam (with roots downwards; 15.1); *vinivrittakamah* (disassociation from lust) and *kama-yuktah* (lustful; 15.5); *dvandvai-vimuktah* (liberated from dualities) and *dvandvatit* (oriented to dualities; 15.5); *amudha* (unbewildered) and *mudha* (bewildered; 15.5); *vimudha* (foolish person) and *jnana-cakshusa* (those who have the eyes of knowledge; 15.5); *ksharah* (fallible) and *aksharah* (infallible; 15.16); *daivim sampadam* (the divine nature; 16.1-3) and *asurim sampadam* (the demoniac nature; 16.4); *abhayam* (fearlessness) and *bhayam* (fearful; 16.1); *danam* (charity) and *lovam* (greedy; 16.1); *adrohah* (freedom from envy) and *drohaha* (having envy; 16.3); *pravritim* (acting properly) and *nivritim* (not acting properly; 16.7); *yajante-shastra-vidham* (worshipping as guided by Scriptures) and *yajante-shraddha-yanvitah* (worshipping being obsessed with faith; 17.1); *sattvikah* (those who are in the mode of goodness) and *tamasa* (those who are in the mode of ignorance; 17.4); *sattvikamaharah* (food dear to those in the mode of goodness; 17.8) and *taamasahbhojanam* (food dear to those in the mode of darkness; 17.10); *sattvikamyajnah* (sacrifices by those who desire no reward is of the nature of goodness; 17.11) and *tamasamyajnah* (any sacrifice performed without regard for the direction of scripture and faith is considered to be in the mode of ignorance; 17.13); *sattvikamtapah* (the penance/austerity performed with transcendental faith for the sake of the Supreme; 17.17) and *tamasamtapah* (penance performed out of foolishness in the mode of ignorance; 17.19); *sattvikamdanam* (charity given out of duty without expectation of return in the mode of goodness; 17.20) and *tamasamdanam* (charity performed without proper attention and respect in the mode of ignorance; 17.22); *sat* (the Absolute Truth in the objective of devotional sacrifice; 17.27) and *asat* (anything done as sacrifice, charity, or penance without faith in the Supreme; 17.28); *tyagam* (must be given up) and *na-tyagam* (must not be given up;

18.3); *sattviktyagah* (renunciation in the mode of goodness; 18.7) and *tamasatyagam* (renunciation in the mode of ignorance; 18.8); *pravrittim* (doing) and *nivrittim* (not doing; 18.30); *karya* (what ought to be doing) and *akarye* (what ought not to be done; 18.30); *bhaya* (fear) and *abhaya* (fearlessness; 18.30); *dharma* (the principles of religion) and *adharma* (irreligion; 18.31); *brahmana* (doer of the *brahma karma*; 18.42) and *sudras* (server of the brahmanas; 18.44); *sva-dharma* (one's own occupation) and *para-dharma* (another's occupation; 18.47); *tamevasharanamgaccha* (surrender unto Krishna, following His directions; 18.62;65;66) and *yathaicchastathakuru* (perform as one likes, following one's own decisions; 18.63). As Lord Krishna has used such binary oppositions in his pedagogy in the Gita, he is a deconstructionist teacher.

Regarding the second question, ‘on what theoretical ground are the binary oppositions treated?’ I have found that Lord Krishna has mostly treated the binary oppositions in his pedagogy guided by the theory of deconstruction; whenever the Lord is to teach Arjuna some important lessons, he has used the binary oppositions the meanings of which can be understood deconstructively, i. e. he has used the quasi-transcendental logic and the conjunctive logic of ‘both . . . and.’ In deconstruction the oppositional concepts do not create hierarchy—keeping the meaning of one concept at the center and the other at the periphery; rather both the meanings are related to one another to constitute a new meaning which is again differing and deferring from the previous meanings. For example, in the binary “*priyam* 'the pleasant' and *apriyam* 'the unpleasant' (5.20)” Lord Krishna does not suggest Arjuna that he should only go for the *priyam* avoiding the *apriyam*; he rather suggests that he should accept both *priyam* and *apriyam* and advance forward. Thus there is no definite answer to what is

priyam and what is *apriyam*. As a result, the meaning constructed through deconstructive analysis of binary oppositions is like difference.

The pedagogy in the Gita itself begins with the binary oppositions, e. g. Arjuna is confused about whether it is better to conquer the Kaurab brothers or to be conquered by them, or to do his duty or not (2.6, 7). There is no immediate and fixed answer to it, so the long pedagogical discourse took place out of such dilemma. Similarly, in all these binary oppositions meanings got differed and deferred; many traces of meanings emerged between them; as a result, there were free plays of meanings in the discourse between Lord Krishna and Arjuna. When we analyze the opposition—whether to fight or not, Lord Krishna seems to have focused more on Arjuna’s side/duty; this is, however, not definite as the Lord has also considered the other side of the duty—the Lord has said, “All are with Me, but I am not in them” (9.4; Prabhupada 405), and the Lord has also said, “They [The Kauravas] are already put to death by My arrangement, and you, O Savyasachi, can be but an instrument in the fight” (11.33; Prabhupada 511). Now the question is: if the Kauravas are already killed by the Lord, does it really mean that it is Arjuna’s duty? Furthermore, the Lord guides him to do his duty, but later on he lets him decide on his own (18.63)! In this way, in deconstruction the binary oppositions do not lead to the straightforward meaning; they do not create any center of meaning; there is always a structure and a movement of the differences of meaning. Thus, the binary oppositions in the pedagogy of the Gita can be analyzed through deconstructive analysis: the quasi-transcendental logic; the undecidable logic of supplementarity; the conjunctive logic of ‘both . . . and’ and the relational meaning of both the concepts. As Lord Krishna has used such deconstructive logic in the pedagogy of the Gita, he is a deconstructionist teacher.

One needs to have the conjunctive logic of ‘both . . . and’ in order to understand how deconstructive analysis works with the binary oppositions. That is why, after Arjuna was ready to learn (2.7), Lord Krishna teaches him to have acceptance of the oppositions like *sukha-dukhā* (“not disturbed by happiness and distress”; 2.14); *samadukhā-sukham* (“steady in both happiness and distress”; 2.15); *asatah* (“of the non-existence”) and *satah* (“of the eternal”; 2.16); *sukha-dukhāsamekritvalābhālabhaujayājayau* (“equanimity in happiness and distress, profit and loss, and victory and defeat”; 2.38); *naabhinandati na dvesti* (“neither praising nor despising”; 2.57) and the like. As Lord Krishna has trained his student, Arjuna, to have deconstructive understanding of the binary oppositions in the pedagogy of the Gita, he is a deconstructionist teacher.

In the verse (2.48) *yoga* has been defined as the state of equipoised (*samaḥ bhūtvā*) and equanimity (*sangam tyaktvā*) of any oppositions like success and failure, i. e. the ability to see the same in the difference (Stocker 178). Lord Krishna suggests Arjuna: “Perform your duty equipoised, O Arjuna, abandoning all attachment to success or failure. Such equanimity is called *yoga*” (Prabhupada 122). The understanding of binary oppositions both in *yoga* and deconstruction is the same. Similarly, he has used *yoga* as a structure and a movement in his pedagogy in the Gita, so he is a deconstructionist teacher. Furthermore, his description of a humble sage who has equal vision and finds equality among a *brahmana*, a cow, an elephant, a dog and an outcaste (5.18) suggests that there are similarities between a humble sage and a deconstructionist teacher as they make no hierarchy between the concepts; they treat every beings equally. Similarly, his description of a *sanyasi*, “a renouncer” with the qualities like *yo na dvestina kankshati* (“one who neither hates nor desires the fruits of his activities”) and *nirdvandvaḥ* (“free from all dualities”; 5.3) also refers

to the use of the quasi-transcendental logic in the pedagogy of the Gita (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). What's more, the qualities that describe a *brahmavid*, as a person who neither rejoices upon achieving something pleasant nor laments upon obtaining something unpleasant, who is self-intelligent, who is unbewildered, and who knows the science of God, who is already situated in transcendence" (5.20) go with the concept of a deconstructive belief and the quasi-transcendental logic (Kearney 304; Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). All these descriptions above justify that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher who is like a *yogi*, a humble sage, a *sanyasi*, and a *brahmavid*.

There are some other expressions in the pedagogy of the Gita that contain the deconstructive logic of the binary oppositions. For example, the expressions *dvandvatito* ("surpassing duality") and *samah siddhav asiddhau* ("steady in both success and failure"; 4.22) refer to the case of the quasi-transcendental logic and the conjunctive logic of 'both . . . and' (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394; Kakoliries 59); *yogarudhasya* ("the state one has attained through the practice of yoga"; 6.3); the state of tranquility of the mind that sees no difference in happiness and distress, heat and cold, honor and dishonor (6.7); *sama-lostrasma-kanchanah* ("being equipoised to pebbles, stone, and gold"; 6.8)); *sama-buddhir visisyate* ("a person is considered still further advanced when he regards honest well-wishers, affectionate benefactors, the neutral, mediators, the envious, friends and enemies, the pious and the sinners all with an equal mind"; 6.9); *yoga-yuktatma* ("the self-realized person who possesses, *sarvatra samam*, the quality to see equality everywhere even between the Supreme Lord and all beings"; 6.29, 32); *dvandva-moha-nirmukta* ("freed from the dualities of delusion"; 7.28); *na nibadhnanti* ("detached from all these material activities, unbound by them") and *udasina-vat* ("neutral to any such things"; 9.9); *sarvatra*

sama-buddhayah (“being equally disposed to everyone”) and *sarva-bhuta-hite ratah*, (“engaged in the welfare of all”; 12.4), the Supreme Truth living outside and inside of all living beings, the moving and the unmoving (13.16); the one who appears to be divided among all beings but remains never divided and situates as one; the maintainer, devourer and developer of all (13.17); and so on. All these expressions contain the meanings of the oppositions that differ and defer, leading to the case of differance (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97); they also refer to the difference that the same contains (Stocker 178), the conjunctive logic of ‘both . . . and’; (Kakoliries) and the quasi-transcendental logic of the oppositions (Fritsch 25; Biesta 394). Thus this also justifies that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher.

The third question in this analytical process is concerned with the main activities that a deconstructionist teacher performs in his/her pedagogy: to interrogate, exhibit and criticize the right and wrong of the ethical aspects of pedagogy (Trifonas 307). From this perspective I went through the pedagogy in the Gita and found that it consists of abundant interaction between the teacher and his disciple—the learner has raised questions whenever he is in confusion and the teacher has explained, demonstrated, criticized and suggested in order to make him realize the truth of every phenomenon. As Arjuna shows his inability to make a decision on whether to fight or not (2.7), his teacher, Lord Krishna, criticizes him, “While speaking learned words, you are mourning for what is not worthy of grief. Those who are wise lament neither for the living nor for the dead” (2.11; Prabhupada 80). He explains to him further about his duty and instructs him to carry out it (to fight)—*tasmad yudhyasva bharata* (“therefore, fight, o descendant of Bharata”; 2.18; Prabhupada 90).

When Lord Krishna suggests Arjuna to remain *sthita-prajnyasya* (“having transcendental consciousness”), Arjuna asks him some questions: “What are the

symptoms of one whose consciousness is thus merged in transcendence? How does he speak, and what is his language? How does he sit, and how does he walk?" (2.54; Prabhupada 128). All these questions have been dealt well by using deconstructive logic like a teacher explaining the most challenging issues to his students. By this, Lord Krishna suggests him further and instructs him to do his duty (3.30). Arjuna is really a critical learner; he not only listens to and follows his teacher's advice but he also asks critical questions, e. g., "The sun-god Vivasvan is senior by birth to You. How am I to understand that in the beginning you instructed this science to him?" (4.4; Prabhupada 195). Such questions are natural because Lord Krishna's pedagogy is too complex for Arjuna to understand as they contain aporiai; the meaning of the instruction is ambiguous and undecidable. This can be observed more clearly in this question by Arjuna: "O Krishna, first of all You ask me to renounce work, and then again you recommend work with devotion. Now will You kindly tell me definitely which of the two is more beneficial?" (5.1; Prabhupada 243). As the pedagogy advances further, Arjuna becomes more curious as well as dubious. So he asks, "O my Lord, O Supreme Person, what is Brahma? What is self? What are fruitive activities? What is this material manifestation? And what are the demigods?" (8.1; Prabhupada 365). Lord Krishna has also done his best to make Arjuna get his points. Along with the answers to his questions Lord Krishna was explaining his opulence to him. When Lord Krishna said that he transformed himself into the cosmic manifestation, Arjuna doubted and showed interest to see his cosmic form (11.3). Then Lord Krishna bestowed him the divine sight which helped him see his cosmic manifestation (11.5). Thus there are many such cases of questioning, answering, criticizing, doubting, accepting and suggesting in the pedagogy of the Gita. This implies that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher.

The major contribution of deconstruction to education has been realized through the focus on the issues of justice, the other and responsibility. When I analyzed the pedagogy in the Gita from this perspective, I found that Lord Krishna has equally focused on these issues. Lord Krishna's support and guidance to Arjuna himself is a case of justice because the Pandavas were compelled to go for the war because of many cases of injustice inflicted onto them by the Kauravas. Moreover, the Lord's concern with justice can be observed when he declares that he will take birth on this earth whenever there is increase in irreligious activities, and he will protect the pious (4.8). Similarly, the expressions like *sarvatra sama-darsanah* (6.29), *sarvatra sama-buddhayah* (12.4), *samam sarvesu bhutesu* (13.28), *samam pasyam hi sarvatra* (13.29) have proved that the pedagogy in the Gita is to promote justice. Furthermore, justice and the other are interrelated as it is 'the other' that needs justice because it was always repressed by the center before the practice of deconstruction. So the other is what has been excluded from the center; it is the unthought, unspoken and unrepresentable as a result of the hierarchy created through binary oppositions which is called the epistemic violence (Hernandez 112). Thus, in deconstruction the hierarchy is deconstructed; as a result, there is no center and periphery or the other as deconstruction is concerned with "its wish to do *justice* to what is excluded, to something other, to some alterity, to what is unpredictable" (Higgs 171). As it is the responsibility of a deconstructionist to do justice to the other, Lord Krishna has used this justice via the deconstructive analysis of the binary oppositions employed in his pedagogy and his dealing with Arjuna. He has suggested Arjuna to fight, i. e. to fight for justice. The responsibility in relation to deconstruction and pedagogy is the action that Lord Krishna has taught to Arjuna. So the Lord instructs him to fight for justice

without considering its results (4.19-23). All this justifies that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher.

Next dimension to explore, identify and justify in the pedagogy employed by Lord Krishna in the Gita concerns his identity as a deconstructionist teacher. Identity simply refers to the way a teacher is recognized in his/her professional practices. From the perspective of deconstruction in pedagogy, the identity of a teacher is unstable because a teacher who is identified “as ‘being’ [someone/something] can change from moment to moment and from context to context and can be ambiguous or unstable” (Leshema 4). So when it comes to the identity of Lord Krishna as a teacher, I have found in his pedagogy that his identity has been changing from context to context. Accordingly, Arjuna has called him with different names, for example, Krishna (2.8); Govinda (1.32); Madhusudhana (1.34); Janardana (1.35); Madhava (1.36); Varsneya (1.40); Arisudana (2.4); Hrikesha (2.9); Kamalaatra-aksa (11.2); Parama-isvara (11.3); Purusa-uttama (11.3); Yogesvara (11.4); Prabho (11.4); Vishnu (11.30); Deva-vara (11.31); Yadava (11.41); Keshava (13.1); Mahabaho (18.1); and Nisudana (18.1). It is not only that Lord Krishna as a teacher is having changing identities, but Arjuna, the learner, is also having changing identities in this pedagogy. For example, the Lord calls him: Parantapa (2.3); Sisya (2.7); Gudakesh (2.9); Bharata (2.10); Kaunteya (2.14); Purusa-rsabha (2.5); Partha (2.21); Mahabaho (2.26); Kurunandana (2.41); Dhananjaya (2.49); and Anagha (3.3). As the definite meaning is always postponed in deconstruction, this unstable nature of teacher identity found in the pedagogy suggests that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher.

Besides, as identity is perceived to be “a coherent image of self” (Epstein qtd. in Day 54), Lord Krishna has expressed his coherent image of self through various

opulences as mentioned in the verses (9.16-19). These manifestations are as follows: the ritual, the sacrifice, the offering, the healing herb, the transcendental chant, the butter, the fire (9.16); the father of this universe, the mother, the support and the grandsire, the object of the knowledge, the purifier, the syllable ohm, the Rig, the Sama and the Yajur Vedas (9.17); the goal, the sustainer, the master, the witness, the abode, the refuge, the most dear friend, the creation, the annihilation, the basis of everything, the resting place and the eternal seed (9.18); immortality, death, spirit and matter (9.19) and so on. Similarly, Lord Krishna has also mentioned his different forms and manifestations in the verses (10.21-40) which also justify his changing nature of identity. These multiple identities are: Vishnu, the radiant sun, Marici, the moon (10.21); the Sama Veda, Indra, the king of heaven, the mind, the living force or consciousness (10.22); Lord Shiva, the Lord of wealth, fire/ Agni, Meru (10.23); Brihaspati, Kshitreyas, the ocean (10.24); Bhrigu, Om, the holy names or japa, the Himalayas (10.25); asvatthah, Narada, Citraratha, the sage Kapila (10.26); Uccaihsrava, Airavata, the monarch (10. 27); thunderbolt, the suravi, Kandarpa (the god of love), Vasuki (10.28); Ananta, Varuna, Aryama, Yama (the lord of death) (10.29); Prahlada, time, the lion, Garuda (10.30); the wind, Rama, the shark, the Ganges (10.31); the beginning, the end, and the middle, the spiritual sciences of the self, the conclusive truth (10.32); the letter 'A', the dual compound word, inexhaustible time, Brahma (10.33); all-devouring death, the generating principles of all that is yet to be, women having the qualities like fame, fortune, fine speech, memory, intelligence, steadfastness and patience (10.34); the Sama Veda, the Brihat-sama, the Gayatri hymn, the month Margashirsa, flower-bearing spring (10.35); the gambling of cheats, the splendor, adventure, the strength of the strong (10.36); Washudeva, Arjuna, Vyasa, Ushana (10.37); punishment, morality, silence, the

wisdom (10.38); the generating seed of all existences and preserver of every creation (10.39) and so forth (10.40). Lord Krishna's identity is so inconceivable that it is never possible to identify exactly who he is. This has been signaled by his multiple opulences discussed above and his Universal Form as described in the verses (11.5-7, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20). All these divergent qualities and forms that Lord Krishna possesses are unlimited and unstable as expressed in the pedagogy of the Gita. So his identity is like that of 'differance' having the possibilities of indefinite meaning. Thus, Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher.

'Does the pedagogy end up with a definite lesson?' is another crucial dimension to explore in the pedagogy of the Gita and decide whether Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher or not because deconstruction never expects definite meaning and closure in a text (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97). Meaning in a text is the result of a free play of signifiers in their differing and deferring relation with one another, so it is never fixed; it is always differing and deferring. To represent this nature of meaning of signifiers or text, Derrida coined the term 'differance' which resists any definite meaning and definition of a text (Derrida qtd. in Nuyen 135). As I have justified the occurrence of differance in the pedagogy of the Gita in chapter 3 of this report, the pedagogy in the Gita does not end up with any definite meaning. Thus, Lord Krishna who has used differance in his pedagogy is a deconstructionist teacher.

The discussion above, on the whole, has justified that the pedagogy in the Gita contains the constructs of deconstruction and that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher. Accordingly, Arjuna is a deconstructionist learner as he has been guided by the deconstructionist teacher, Lord Krishna (7.28) and is successful in learning what his teacher has taught (18.73). Thus the role of the teacher has been justified to be fruitful and effective. Guided by these findings, I have deduced some possible

qualities of a deconstructionist teacher which also equally applies to Arjuna as a deconstructionist learner. These qualities have been explored across the chapters from the Gita considering the deconstructive pedagogy employed by Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher. In what follows is the discussion of these qualities.

Exploring chapter 2 with a view to identify qualities of a deconstructionist teacher, I came to a conclusion that a deconstructionist teacher: neither laments for the living nor for the dead (2.11); is not disturbed by happiness and distress, and is steady in both happiness and distress (11.15); believes in the soul as undeconstructible and a sacred reality (2.20-26); does his/her duty without considering happiness or distress, loss or gain, victory or defeat (2.38); becomes transcendental to the three modes of material nature (*tamasa, rajasa and sattvik*), is free from all dualities (the hierarchical meaning relations created through the binary oppositions) and is established in the self (2.45); strives for *yoga*, gets rid of both good and bad reactions (2.50); is indifferent to all that has been heard and to be heard (2.52); gives up all varieties of desires for sense gratification (2.55); is not disturbed in mind due to miseries, not elated with happiness and free from attachment, fear and anger (2.56); is fixed in perfect knowledge devoted to action (2.57); is detached from all kinds of attachments and aversions (2.64); lives free from desires, gives up all sense of proprietorship, is devoid of false ego, and is peace-loving (2.71); is situated in the state of the spiritual (*brahmi-sthitih*; 2.72).

I have also found some more qualities that can be attributed to a deconstructionist teacher as described by Lord Krishna in different chapters of the Gita as they allude to the constructs of deconstruction. For example, a deconstructionist teacher: sees inaction in action and action in inaction while remaining engaged in his/her own actions (4.18); performs his/her actions without

expectation of the results, remains satisfied and independent (4.20); is free from duality (concepts of binary logic) and is steady both in success and failure (4.22); works in devotion, controls his/her mind and senses, and is dear to everyone (5.7); treats all equally and has equal vision (*sama-darsana*; 5.18); neither rejoices upon achieving something pleasant nor laments on the unpleasant; is self-intelligent (*sthir-buddhih*), knows the science of God and is already situated in transcendence (5.20); is beyond the dualities that arise from doubts (5.25); is the benefactor and well-wisher of all living entities (*suhridam sarva-bhutanam*; 5.29), is in the state of yoga (6.3); regulated in his/her habits of eating, sleeping, recreation and work (6.17); is self-realized and sees everything equally (*sarvatra sama-darsanah*; 6.29); is like a *yogi* devoted to a sacred reality or the undeconstructible (Krishna Consciousness; 6.46).

In chapter 10 of the Gita Lord Krishna has mentioned some qualities that he has designated to the living beings created by him. As Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher, the qualities that he has discussed in his pedagogy can also be regarded as the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher. In this sense, a deconstructionist teacher possesses: intelligence, knowledge, freedom from doubt and delusion, forgiveness, truthfulness, control of the senses, control of the mind, happiness and distress, birth, death, fear, fearlessness, non-violence, equanimity, satisfaction, austerity, charity, fame and infamy, and so forth (10. 4-5). Like Lord Krishna demonstrating his cosmic manifestation and giving divine eyes to Arjuna (11.5;), we can deduce that a deconstructionist teacher should be able to justify the facts and provide his/her learners with the concrete ideas (11.8), perform any roles as required in the context (11.31), and have friendly relation with them (11.41).

In chapter 12 of the Gita Lord Krishna has mentioned some qualities of his devotees. As he is a deconstructionist teacher, the qualities that he has assigned to his

devotees can be designated as the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher because Lord Krishna is a model teacher and all teachers are his devotees/followers. Thus, a deconstructionist teacher: is not envious but kind to all living entities; does not think of himself/herself as a proprietor; is free from false ego; equal in both happiness and distress; tolerant (12.13); is always satisfied; self-control; engaged in devotional services with determination; and has mind and intelligence focused on him (12.14); does not disturb others and not feel disturbed by them as well; is equipoised in happiness and distress, fear and anxiety (12.15); is not dependent on the ordinary course of activities; is pure; expert; without cares, free from all pains; not striving for some result (12.16); neither rejoices nor grieves; neither laments nor desires; renounces both auspicious and inauspicious things (12.17); is equal to friends and enemies; equipoised in honor and dishonor, heat and cold, happiness and distress, fame and infamy; always free from contaminating association (12.18); is always silent and satisfied with anything; does not care for any residence; is fixed in knowledge and engaged in devotional service (12.19); follows the imperishable path of faith and devotional service to Lord Krishna (12.20; Prabhupada 555-60).

In chapter 13 of the Gita Lord Krishna has described the qualities of a *ksetrajna* (the knower of the field) and the knowledge to be considered for *adhyatma jnana* (knowledge of self-realization) and the philosophical process of realizing the Absolute Truth. As a deconstructionist teacher has a deconstructive belief (Kearney 304), a belief in a sacred reality and the undeconstructible (Tacey 3), and as he/she employs the quasi-transcendental logic (Biesta 394), he/she can be compared with a *kshetrajna* who possesses the following qualities as *adhyatma jnana*:

humility; pridelessness; nonviolence; tolerance; simplicity; approaching bona fide spiritual master; cleanliness; steadiness; self-control; renunciation of the

objects of sense gratification; absence of false ego; the perception of the evil of birth, death, old age and disease; detachment; freedom from entanglement with children, wife, home and the rest; even-mindedness amid pleasant and unpleasant events; constant and unalloyed devotion to Lord Krishna; aspiring to live in a solitary place; detachment from the general mass of people; accepting the importance of self-realization; and philosophical search for the Absolute Truth. (13.8-12; Prabhupada 573)

In chapter 14 of the Gita Lord Krishna has described the qualities of a *gunatit* (a transcendentalist who has gone beyond the modes of nature; 14.22-25). As these qualities go along with the concept of the relation between the transcendental and the empirical (Chin-Yi 5) and the quasi-transcendental logic of deconstruction (Fritsch 25, Biesta 394), the qualities mentioned below can be ascribed to the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher because he/she has the ability to transcend the center as presence. Thus, a deconstructionist teacher is like a *gunatit* who: does not hate illumination; eschews attachment and delusion; is unwavering and undisturbed through all these reactions of the material qualities; remains neutral and transcendental; knows that the modes alone are active; is situated in the self and regards alike happiness and distress; looks upon a lump of earth, a stone and a piece of gold with an equal eye; is equal toward the desirable and the undesirable; is steady, situated equally well in praise and blame, honor and dishonor; treats alike both friend and enemy; has renounced all material activities (14.22-25; Prabhupada 623).

Like the *asvattham* (a mysterious tree; 15.3-4) which exactly represents the nature of differance (Derrida qtd. in Nuyen 135; Culler 97; Habib 654), a deconstructionist teacher is also difficult to understand. Prabhupada describes the *asvattham* as, “The real form of this tree cannot be perceived in this world. No one

can understand where it ends, where it begins, or where its foundation is" (15.3-4; Prabhupada 633). Thus, like the *asvattham*, the personality of Lord Krishna as a teacher and Derrida as a deconstructionist are similar as they seem to be mysterious and self-contradictory. That is, the mystery and uniqueness, complexity and contradiction are also the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher.

The qualities of a deconstructionist teacher can be compared with a *vedavit* (a godly man who has the transcendental qualities) as described in chapter 16 of the Gita (16.1-3). These are the divine qualities which help to actualize the deconstructive qualities like a sacred reality, the undeconstructible (Tacey 3) and a deconstructive belief in the undecidable (Kearney 304). As the qualities of a *vedavit* can be designated to a deconstructionist teacher, he/she has the following qualities as described by Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher:

fearlessness; purification of one's existence; cultivation of spiritual knowledge; charity; self-control; performance of sacrifice; study of the Vedas; austerity; simplicity; nonviolence; truthfulness; freedom from anger; renunciation; tranquility; aversion to faultfinding; compassion for all living entities; freedom from covetousness; gentleness; modesty; steady determination; vigor; forgiveness; fortitude; cleanliness; and freedom from envy and from the passion for honour. (16.1-3; Prabhupada 656)

The qualities of a deconstructionist teacher can also be compared with the description of a *sattvik karta*, (a worker in the mode of goodness) as described in chapter 18 of the Gita. Like a *sattvik karta*, a deconstructionist teacher should do his/her duties without association with the modes of material nature, without false ego, with good determination and enthusiasm, and without wavering in success or failure (18.26; Prabhupada 720). Similarly, a *sattvik karta* can be compared with the

Brahmana who possesses the qualities like peacefulness, self-control, austerity, purity, tolerance, honesty, knowledge, wisdom and religiousness (18.42; Prabhupada 730). That is, these qualities of a *brahmana* can be designated as the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher. Furthermore, both *sattvik karta* and *Brahmana* possess *sattvik jnana* (knowledge in the mode of goodness) because it is that knowledge by which one undivided spiritual nature is seen in all living entities, though they are divided into innumerable forms (Prabhupada 717). As this *sattvik jnana* helps to actualize the sacred reality and the undeconstructible (Tacey 3) through promoting the deconstructive belief in the undecidable (Kearney 304) in deconstruction, a teacher applying this knowledge in pedagogy is a deconstructionist teacher and the qualities that describe *sattvik jnana* are the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher.

As suggested by Lord Krishna, realization of self (*brahma-bhuyaya*) is the stage of highest knowledge and the one who reaches this state of realization of self is called a self-realized person. As a self-realized person, a deconstructionist teacher strives for actualizing the sacred reality and the undeconstructible through the application of deconstruction in his/her pedagogical practices. Thus, the qualities of a self-realized person mentioned below are also the qualities of a deconstructionist teacher:

Being purified by his intelligence and controlling the mind with determination, giving up the objects of sense gratification, being freed from attachment and hatred, one who lives in a secluded place, who eats little, who controls his body, mind and power of speech, who is always in trance and who is detached, free from false ego, false strength, false pride, lust, anger and acceptance of material things, free from false proprietorship, and peaceful. (18.51-53; Prabhupada 737)

Lord Krishna, in addition, suggests that after the stage of *brahma-bhuyaya* one becomes *brahma-bhutam* (one who is transcendently-situated) who becomes fully joyful once he realizes the Supreme Brahman; he never laments or desires to have anything, is equally disposed toward every living entity, and is purely devoted to Lord Krishna (18.54; Prabhupada 738). That is, a deconstructionist teacher should strive for the state of *brahma-bhutam* from the state of *brahma-bhuyaya*. As a result, he/she possesses these qualities as a deconstructionist teacher.

Guided by the pedagogy in the Gita, a deconstructionist teacher needs to possess the quality of spiritual intelligence as it helps to manage the causes of lust like material senses, mind and intelligence. Thus, Lord Krishna suggests Arjuna that “knowing oneself to be transcendental to the material senses, mind and intelligence . . . one should steady the mind by deliberate spiritual intelligence [Krishna Consciousness] and thus—by spiritual strength—conquer this insatiable enemy known as the lust” (3.43; Prabhupada 190; *sic*). The spiritual intelligence, as suggested by Lord Krishna, includes a deconstructive belief (Kearney 304) and a sacred reality (Tacey 3) as discussed by Derrideans. Thus spiritual intelligence is a significant quality of a deconstructionist teacher. For Prabhupada this spiritual intelligence is Krishna Consciousness. So he suggests that one needs to develop Krishna Consciousness in order to understand Lord Krishna and be his follower, i.e. for a deconstructionist teacher Lord Krishna is a model teacher.

Last but not least, my argument is that a deconstructionist teacher is like a *spiritual-materialist* as I found that the pedagogy in the Gita consists of the knowledge of material and spiritual aspects of the universe. For example, in the seventh chapter Lord Krishna teaches Arjuna that all the created beings—material and spiritual—are originated from him and dissolve into him at the end (7.6).

Similarly, in chapter 18 he describes *sattvik jnana* (knowledge in the mode of goodness) as *avibhaktam* (the knowledge by which one undivided spiritual nature [spiritual]) is seen in *vibhaktesu* (all living entities as divided into innumerable forms [material]), i. e. spiritual-material (18.20). This kind of transcendental relation between the material and the spiritual is found both in deconstruction and pedagogy in the Gita. Thus, a deconstructionist teacher is also *a spiritual-materialist* or *a spiritual scientist* who, like Derrida, is an unbelieving believer.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This chapter first makes a conclusion of the study and then recommends 'deconstructionist' as the role of a teacher in postmethod pedagogy. So in the beginning it summarizes the main findings of the study to bring out the conclusion which links to the context of postmethod pedagogy. The postmethod pedagogy as proposed by Kumaravadivelu in his paper "Toward a Postmethod Pedagogy" has been reviewed from the perspective of deconstruction and the findings of this study. Then 'deconstructionist' as the role of a teacher is recommended to the postmethod teacher so that the postmethod pedagogy can be made more appropriate and effective to the present context. Thus, this chapter contains the following sections: Conclusion of the Study and 'Deconstructionist' as the Role of a Postmethod Teacher: A Recommendation.

Conclusion of the Study

In deconstructive reading of the pedagogy in the Gita it was found that the dialogue between Lord Krishna and Arjuna began with identification of the problem—Arjuna's unwilling to perform his duty (1.45) and ended with his commitment to the duty (18.73). In-between these two points there was intense discourse between Lord Krishna as a teacher and Arjuna as a learner. So this discourse has been studied as a pedagogy. This pedagogy consists of a series of questions and answers between the teacher and the learner concerning various issues. Thus, in this study I have explored the pedagogy in the Gita from the perspective of deconstruction and identified some occurrences of the constructs of deconstruction (binary oppositions and differance) on the basis of which I have justified Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher. The major findings of this study can be listed

as follows: (i) The pedagogy in the Gita contains many binary oppositions across the chapters; (ii) It also contains many instances of difference; (iii) Lord Krishna has played the role of a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita; and (iv) A deconstructionist can be identified with some distinctive qualities. Guided by these findings, this study has made a recommendation that 'deconstructionist' can be a more appropriate role for a postmethod teacher in the practice of postmethod pedagogy.

The first finding of this study concerns the occurrences of binary oppositions in the pedagogy of the Gita. With this regard, it was found that Lord Krishna has used the binary oppositions across different chapters in the Gita. The major binary oppositions identified in the pedagogy of the Gita are: *dharma kshetre* (in the place of pilgrimage) and *kuru kshetre* (in the place of Kurukshetra, desiring to fight; 1.1); *svajanam* (kinsmen; 1.36) and *varna-shankara* (unwanted progeny; 1.40); *kula-dharma* (the family tradition) and *kula-kshaye* (in destroying the family; 1.39); *dukha* (distress) and *sukha* (happiness; 2.15); *janma* (birth) and *mrityu* (death; 2.27); *siddhi* (success) and *asiddhi* (failure; 2.48); *subha* (good) and *ashubha* (evil; 2.57); *abhinanditi* (praising) and *dwesti* (enemy; 2.57); *shanti* (peacefulness) and *ashanti* (unpeacefulness; 2.66); *sata* (truth) and *asata* (untruth; 2.16); *gata* (living) and *agata* (dead; 2.11); *vyakta* (manifest) and *avyakta* (unmanifest; 2.28); *jaya* (victory) and *ajaya* (defeat; 2.38); *labha* (profit) and *alabha* (loss; 2.38); *sukrita* (good results) and *duskriti* (bad results; 2.50); *karma* (work) and *akarma* (no work; 3.8); *shrestha* (a great man) and *jana* (a common man; 3.21); *sva-dharma* (one's own duty) and *paradharma* (another men's duties; 3.35); *siddha* (success) and *asiddha* (failure; 4.22); *sadhu* (the pious) and *duskrita* (the miscreants; 4.8); *yukta* (one who is engaged in devotional service) and *ayuktaha*' (one who is not in Krishna

Consciousness; 5.12); *sannyasam* (to renounce work) and *karmanam* (to work with devotion; 5.1); *karma-phalam tyaktva* (offering the result of all activities to Lord Krishna) and *kama-karena* (greedy for the fruits; 5.12); *ajnana* (ignorance) and *jnana* (knowledge; 5.15); *papa* (sin) and *sukrita* (pious activities; 5.18); *svapake* (outcast) and *pandita* (those who are wise; 5.18); *priyam* (the pleasant) and *apriyam* (the unpleasant; 5.20); *prahrishyet* (rejoices) and *udvijet* (becomes agitated; 5.20); *bandhu* (friend) and *ripu* (enemy; 6.5); *mana* (honour) and *apamana* (dishonor; 6.7); *sita* (cold) and *ushna* (heat; 6.7); *sadhu* (the pious person) and *paapi* (the sinner; 6.9); *apara* (inferior/material nature) and *para* (superior/living entities; 7.5); *prabhava* (the source of manifestation/origin) and *pralaya* (annihilation/dissolution; 7.6); *avyakta* (non-manifested/imperishable) and *vyakta* (manifest/perishable; 7.24); *anyadevata* (other demigods) and *mamdridhavrata* (Krishna devotee; 7.28); *dvandvamohena* (having the illusion of/bewildered by dualities; 7.27) and *dvandvamohanirmuktaha* (free from the delusion of dualities; 7.28); *anavritim* (no return) and *avritim* (return; 8.23); *punahajanmanavidhyate* (never takes birth again) and *punahajanmavidhyate* (takes birth again; 8.16); *sukla-gati* (path of light) and *Krishna-gati* (path of darkness; 8.26); *rakshasim* and *asurim prakritim* (demonic and atheistic nature; 9.12) and *daivim prakritim* (divine nature; 9.13); *ekatvena* (in oneness) and *prithaktvena* (in duality/diversity; 9.15); *pita* (father) and *mata* (mother; 9.18); *prabhava* (creation) and *pralaya* (dissolution; 9.18); *sat* (spirit) and *asat* (matter; 9.19); *svarga-loka* (heaven) and *martya-loka* (the earth; 9.21); *shubhphala* (auspicious results) and *ashubhphala* (inauspicious results; 9.28); *dveshya* (hateful) and *priya* (dear; 9.29); *bhava* (birth) and *abhava* (death; 10.4); *yasha* (fame) and *ayasha* (infamy; 10.5); *bhaya* (fear) and *abhaya* (fearlessness; 10.4); *deva* (the demigods) and *danava* (the demon; 10.14); *sva-cakshu* (natural eyes) and *divyam cakshyu* (divine eyes; 11.8); *sakhe* (friend) and

deva (Lord; 11.44); *satasahasrahakritini* (hundreds of thousands of varied divine and multicolored forms; 11.5) and *manusamrupam* (human form; 11.51); *naudvijate* (never agitating others) and *udvijate* (disturbing others; 12.15); *harsha* (happiness) and *amarsha* (distress; 12.15); *ninda* (defamation) and *stutiha* (praise; 12.19); *prakriti* (nature) and *purusha* (the enjoyer; 13.1); *kshetra* (the field) and *kshetrajna* (the knower of the field; 13.1); *adambhitwa* (pridelessness) and *dambhitwa* (having pride; 13.8); *ahimsa* (non-violence) and *himsa* (violence; 13.8); *thairya* (steadfastness) and *cancala* (wandering; 13.8); *vairagya* (renunciation) and *moha* (attachment; 13.8); *jnana* (knowledge) and *ajnana* (ignorance; 13.12); *sat* (cause) and *asat* (effect; 13.13); *nirguna* (without material qualities) and *gunayukta* (with material qualities; 13.15); *avibhakta* (without division) and *vibhakta* (with division; 13.17); *grasisnu* (devouring) and *prabhavisnu* (developing; 13.17); *bharta* (master) and *bhokta* (supreme enjoyer; 13.23); *vinasyatsu* (in the destruction) and *avinasyantam* (not destroyed; 13.28); *sattva* (goodness) and *rajah* (passion; 14.5); *sattva* (goodness) and *tama* (ignorance; 14.5); *raja* (passion) and *tama* (ignorance; 14.5); *urdhva* (upward) and *adhaha* (down; 14.18); *pravriti* (attachment) and *sanga-tyaktva* (without attachment; 14. 22); *vicalyate* (agitated) and *sthir* (non-agitated; 14.23); *losta* (a lump of earth and stone) and *kancana* (gold; 14.24); *priya* (to the dear) and *apriya* (undesirable; 14.24); *mana* (honor) and *apamana* (dishonor; 14.25); *mitra* (friend) and *ari* (enemy; 14.25); *urdhva-mulam* (with roots above) and *adhah-mulam* (with roots downwards; 15.1); *vinivrittakama* (disassociation from lust) and *kama-yukta* (lustful; 15.5); *dvandvai-vimukta* (liberated from dualities) and *dvandvatit* (oriented to dualities; 15.5); *amudha* (unbewildered) and *mudha* (bewildered; 15.5); *vimudha* (foolish person) and *jnana-cakshusa* (those who have the eyes of knowledge; 15.5); *kshara* (fallible) and *akshara* (infallible; 15.16); *daivim sampada* (the divine nature;

16.1-3) and *asurim sampada* (the demoniac nature; 16.4); *abhaya* (fearlessness) and *bhaya* (fearful; 16.1); *dana* (charity) and *lova* (greedy; 16.1); *adroha* (freedom from envy) and *droha* (having envy; 16.3); *pravriti* (acting properly) and *nivriti* (not acting properly; 16.7); *yajante-shastra-vidham* (worshipping as guided by Scriptures) and *yajante-shraddha-yanvitah* (worshipping being obsessed with faith; 17.1); *sattvika* (those who are in the mode of goodness) and *tamasa* (those who are in the mode of ignorance; 17.4); *sattvikamahara* (food dear to those in the mode of goodness; 17.8) and *taamasahbhोजना* (food dear to those in the mode of darkness; 17.10); *sattvikamyajna* (sacrifices by those who desire no reward is of the nature of goodness; 17.11) and *tamasamyajna* (any sacrifice performed without regard for the direction of scripture and faith is considered to be in the mode of ignorance; 17.13); *sattvikamtapa* (the penance/austerity performed with transcendental faith for the sake of the Supreme; 17.17) and *tamasamtapa* (penance performed out of foolishness in the mode of ignorance; 17.19); *sattvikamdana* (charity given out of duty without expectation of return in the mode of goodness; 17.20) and *tamasamdanam* (charity performed without proper attention and respect in the mode of ignorance; 17.22); *sat* (the Absolute Truth in the objective of devotional sacrifice; 17.27) and *asat* (anything done as sacrifice, charity, or penance without faith in the Supreme; 17.28); *tyaga* (must be given up) and *na-tyaga* (must not be given up; 18.3); *sattviktyagah* (renunciation in the mode of goodness; 18.7) and *tamasatyagam* (renunciation in the mode of ignorance; 18.8); *pravritti* (doing) and *nivritti* (not doing; 18.30); *karya* (what ought to be doing) and *akarye* (what ought not to be done; 18.30); *bhaya* (fear) and *abhaya* (fearlessness; 18.30); *dharma* (the principles of religion) and *adharmā* (irreligion; 18.31); *brahmana* (doer of the *brahma karma*; 18.42) and *sudras* (server of the brahmanas; 18.44); *sva-dharma* (one's own occupation) and *para-dharma*

(another's occupation; 18.47); *tamevasharanamgaccha* (surrender unto Krishna, following His directions; 18.62;65;66) and *yathaicchasi tathakuru* (perform as one likes, following one's own decisions; 18.63).

The next important finding this study has made is the identification of the occurrences of difference across different chapters in the pedagogy of the Gita. In chapter 1 of the Gita I have found only one occurrence of difference, i. e. the term *varna-sankara* (unwanted population) which refers to the births as the result of “the degradation of the womanhood”; it refers to the case of the other (1.40; Prabhupada 60). In chapter 2 of the Gita I have found some binary oppositions and expressions that justify the occurrences of difference in the pedagogy of the Gita. For example, *sukha-dukha-dah* (“not disturbed by happiness and distress”; 2.14); *samaduhkha-sukha* (“steady in both happiness and distress, steady in both”; 2.15); *asata* (“of the non-existence”) and *sata* (“of the eternal”; 2.16); *sukha-duhkhasamekritva laabhalaabhaujayaajayau* (“equanimity in happiness and distress, profit and loss, and victory and defeat”; 2.38); *naabhinandati na dvesti* (“neither praising nor despising”; 2.57); *Sata* and *Atma* as the never-changing existence (2.16; 2.20); *nirdvandvah* (“without dualities”; 2.45); *Yoga* ‘the state of equipoised’ (*samah bhutva*) and equanimity (*sangam tyaktva*) of success and failure (2.48); *prajna pratisthita* (“fixed in perfect knowledge or consciousness”; 2.57); *vyamisreneva vakyena* (“equivocal or confusing”; 3.2); increase in irreligious practice (4.7) and establish the religion (4.8); *dvandvatito* (“surpassing duality”) and *samah siddhav asiddhau* (“steady in both success and failure”; 4.22); to see inaction (*akarma*) in action (*karma*); a *sanyasi* (“a renouncer”); *yo na dvestina kankshati* (“one who neither hates nor desires the fruits of his activities”); *nirdvandvah* (“free from all dualities”; 5.3); the humble sage’s equal vision that finds equality among a *brahmana*, a cow, an elephant, a dog and an

outcaste (5.18); the qualities that describe a *brahmavid* as a person who neither rejoices upon achieving something pleasant nor laments upon obtaining something unpleasant, who is self-intelligent, who is unbewildered, and who knows the science of God, who is already situated in transcendence” (5.20); the state of *yogarudhasya*, the state one has attained through the practice of yoga (6.3); the state of tranquility of the mind that sees no difference in happiness and distress, heat and cold, honor and dishonor (6.7); *sama-lostasma-kanchanah* (“being equipoised to pebbles, stone, and gold”; 6.8)); *sama-buddhir visisyate*, which means to suggest that “a person is considered still further advanced when he regards honest well-wishers, affectionate benefactors, the neutral, mediators, the envious, friends and enemies, the pious and the sinners all with an equal mind” (6.9); *yoga-yuktatma* (“the self-realized person”) who possesses, *sarvatra samam*, the quality to see equality every where even between the Supreme Lord and all beings (6.29, 32).

Differance can be observed through the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical which has been described in the seventh chapter when Lord Krishna says that all the created beings—material and spiritual—are originated from him and dissolve into him at the end (7.6). Similarly, differance can be observed in the verse 7.12 when Lord Krishna explains that all states of beings—goodness, passion or ignorance—are his manifestations, in that all belong to him and he belongs to them all; however, he is independent. Undecidable in meaning as a feature of differance can be found between the verses (6.46 and 7.17) as earlier the Lord taught Arjuna to be a *yogi* (6.46) but later on to be a *jnani* (“the one who is in full knowledge and who is always engaged in pure devotional service”; 7.17). Such is the case of *aporiai*, a conceptual impasse in a text which opens up the possibilities of a text’s indefinite meanings, i.e. differance. Similarly, the indefinite nature of

meaning expressed in the verse (7.21) and the expression, *dvandva-moha-nirmukta* (“freed from the dualities of delusion”; 7.28) also justify the case of difference in the pedagogy of the Gita.

In chapter 8 of the Gita description of *Brahma* as a sacred reality, the undeconstructible, the indestructible transcendental living entity (8.3), *Brahma* as *adhyatma*, and the description of *Sanatana* as “the unmanifest nature, eternal and transcendental to this manifested and unmanifested matter” (8.20) all justify the occurrence of difference in the pedagogy of the Gita. Similarly, in chapter 9 the expressions like *na nibadhnanti* (“detached from all these material activities”), unbound by them; *udasina-vat* (“neutral”; 9.9) and Lord Krishna’s description of himself as *ekatvena prithaktvena bahudha visvoto mukham*, “the one without a second, as diverse in many, and in the universal form” (9.15) allude to the occurrence of difference in the pedagogy of the Gita. Furthermore, Lord Krishna’s divergent forms with various manifestations as mentioned in the verses (9.16-19) explicate his indefinite manifestations which justify the occurrence of difference in the Gita. For example: the ritual, the sacrifice, the offering, the healing herb, the transcendental chant, the butter, the fire (9.16); the father of this universe, the mother, the support and the grandsire, the object of the knowledge, the purifier, the syllable ohm, the Rig, the Sama and the Yajur Vedas (9.17); the goal, the sustainer, the master, the witness, the abode, the refuge, the most dear friend, the creation, the annihilation, the basis of everything, the resting place and the eternal seed (9.18); immortality, death, spirit and matter (9.19); and his declaration that he does not envy anyone; he is equal to all creations (9.29).

Similarly, the multiple forms that Lord Krishna represents as mentioned in the verses (10.21-40) of the Gita refer to the case of differing and deferring nature or the

play of differences which justify the occurrence of difference. These multiple forms are: Vishnu, the radiant Sun, Marici, the moon (10.21); the Sama Veda, Indra, the king of heaven, the mind, the living force or consciousness (10.22); Lord Shiva, the Lord of wealth, fire/ Agni, Meru (10.23); Brihaspati, Kshitreyas, the ocean (10.24); Bhrigu, Om, the holy names or japa, the Himalayas (10.25); asvatthah, Narada, Citraratha, the sage Kapila (10.26); Uccaihsrava, Airavata, the monarch (10.27); thunderbolt, the suravi, Kandarpa (the god of love), Vasuki (10.28); Ananta, Varuna, Aryama, Yama (the lord of death) (10.29); Prahlada, time, the lion, Garuda (10.30); the wind, Rama, the shark, the Ganges (10.31); the beginning, the end, and the middle, the spiritual sciences of the self, the conclusive truth (10.32); the letter 'A', the dual compound word, inexhaustible time, Brahma (10.33); all-devouring death, the generating principles of all that is yet to be, women having the qualities like fame, fortune, fine speech, memory, intelligence, steadfastness and patience (10.34); the Sama Veda, the Brihat-sama, the Gyatri hymn, the month Margashirsa, flower-bearing spring (10.35); the gambling of cheats, the splendor, adventure, the strength of the strong (10.36); Vashudeva, Arjuna, Vyasa, Ushana (10.37); punishment, morality, silence, the wisdom (10.38); the generating seeds of all existences and preserver of every creation (10.39-40).

Lord Krishna's Universal Form, the opulences as described in the verses (11.5-7, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20) justify that the Lord's forms and qualities have no limitations as they differ and defer on different occasions, constituting both a structure and a movement. So the Lord's Universal Form truly represents the case of difference. Similarly, the other expressions like *divyam cakshu* ("the divine eyes") bestowed to Arjuna by the Lord and Arjuna's request *akhyahi me ko bhavan ugra-rupo* ("please tell me who You are"; 11.31); *sarvatra sama-buddhaya* ("being

equally disposed to everyone”) and *sarva-bhuta-hite rata* (“engaged in the welfare of all”; 12.4) also refer to the occurrence of difference.

The qualities of his dearest devotee as mentioned in the verses (12.13-20) also suggest the nature of difference as the meanings of these verses differ and defer in context and they represent aporas in the Gita. Thus, in difference one is not envious but kind to all living entities; does not think of himself/herself as proprietor; is free from false ego; equal in both happiness and distress; tolerant (12.13); is always satisfied; self-control; engaged in devotional services with determination; mind and intelligence focused on Lord Krishna (12.14); does not disturb others and not feel disturbed by them as well; is equipoised in happiness and distress, fear and anxiety (12.15); is not dependent on the ordinary course of activities; pure; expert; without cares, free from all pains; not striving for some result (12.16); neither rejoices nor grieves; neither laments nor desires; renounces both auspicious and inauspicious things (12.17); is equal to friends and enemies; equipoised in honor and dishonor, heat and cold, happiness and distress, fame and infamy; always free from contaminating association(12.18); is always silent and satisfied with anything; does not care for any residence; fixed in knowledge and engaged in devotional service (12.19); follows the imperishable path of faith and devotional service to Lord Krishna (12.20).

Some other expressions in chapter 13 also represent a case of difference because these meanings represent a case of undecidables, the impasse in the Gita. For example, the description of “the knowable” as the eternal, Brahman, the spirit and beginningless (13.13); the knowable as the Supersoul having many qualities like the original source of all senses, maintainer of all living beings and the master of all the modes of material nature (13.15); the Supreme Truth living outside and inside of all

living beings, the moving and the unmoving (13.16); the one who appears to be divided among all beings but remains never divided and situates as one; the maintainer, devourer and developer of all (13.17); the source of light, unmanifested, the knowledge, the object of the knowledge and the goal of knowledge, situated in everyone's heart (13.18); the one who accompanies the individual soul in all bodies and understands that the soul is undeconstructible (13.28), who sees the Supersoul equally present everywhere, in every living being, who approaches the transcendental destination (13.29), who does not mix with the body though situated in it (13.33).

The three modes of qualities—goodness, passion and ignorance—conditioned in the material nature by the seed-giving father, Lord Krishna (14.4, 5) are always in competition for the supremacy of one over the other (14.10). This interplay between the three modes of qualities refers to the nature of difference in general. The ability to transcend these qualities as suggested by Lord Krishna (14.20) and the qualities of the transcendentalist who transcends these three modes of nature (14.22-25) refer to the nature of difference. In chapter 15 the symbol of *asvattha* (“a banyan tree”) as has been described in the verses (15.3, 4) represents the case of difference as the real form of such tree cannot be perceived in this world. This nature of *asvattha* exactly captures the nature of difference as discerned by Derrida when he declares that difference is literally neither a word nor a concept. The mystery of this tree is that no one can understand where it ends, where it begins, or where its foundation is. This is exactly what happens in the workings of difference as it ultimately ends with the undecidables. Such nature of undecidables reveals the workings of difference which is represented by this tree. In chapter 17 the most sacred expression, *Om Tat Sat* (“evoking that eternal Supreme”; 17.23) indicates the sacred reality or the undeconstructible with relation to difference. This *mantra*, *Om Tat Sat*, (the sacred

hymn) truly represents the meaning of difference as neither a word nor a concept because this *mantra* is all-pervasive and all-inclusive; it accepts everything as true like the outcome of deconstructive analysis of a text—difference.

There are also many examples of occurrence of difference in chapter 18 of the Gita. The major concern of the verses (18.2-6) can be linked to the concern of difference with the issues of justice, the other and responsibility. Lord Krishna suggests that the duties like sacrifice, charity and penance should not be abandoned as they purify even the great souls. He further suggests that in doing these duties one should remain detached without any expectation of result (18.5, 6). Such duties are responsibility that can maintain justice for the other. The other expressions like *sattvikam jnana* ("knowledge in the mode of goodness"), the knowledge by which one undivided spiritual nature is seen in all living entities though they are divided into innumerable forms (18.20); a *sattvik karta* ("a worker in the mode of goodness"), the one who has the qualities like doing duties without association with the modes of material nature, without false, with good determination and enthusiasm, and without wavering in success or failure (18.26); and the qualities that describe the Brahmanas: peacefulness, self-control, austerity, purity, tolerance, honesty, knowledge, wisdom and religiousness (18.43) refer to the nature of difference.

As there is no definite meaning of difference, it opens up the free play of meanings in a text. This can be observed in the verse of the Gita when Lord Krishna allows freedom to Arjuna to decide himself on his duty—*yathecchasi tatha kuru* ("do what you wish to do"; 18.63). However, Lord Krishna in the next verse suggests that we should always think of him, become his devotee, worship him and offer our homage unto him because we are his very dear friend (18.65). The Lord's teaching in this verse suggests that Lord Krishna is at the center, but it is not true because the

meaning is only differing and deferring between the verses 18.63 and 18.65, allowing a free play of meanings. This exactly justifies the occurrence of difference in the pedagogy of the Gita.

The third finding of this study concerns the identification of Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher and the fourth finding—qualities of a deconstructionist. So in the discussion that follows, first Lord Krishna has been justified as a deconstructionist teacher and then the qualities of a deconstructionist have been deduced from the instructions by the deconstructionist teacher in the Gita, because identification of Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher and qualities of a deconstructionist are intertwined in the teachings of the Gita.

The discussion in chapter 4 of this report and summary of the two findings above justify that Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita because he has used two important constructs of deconstruction—binary oppositions and difference—in his instruction. So the first finding of this study concerns the identification of the occurrence of binary oppositions in the pedagogy of the Gita and the second the difference. The second finding of the study has justified that Lord Krishna has used deconstruction to exploit these binary oppositions in his pedagogy; as a result, the pedagogy contains many cases of difference. So the meanings of the binary oppositions in the pedagogy of the Gita lead to the case of differing and deferring, i. e. difference. Similarly, Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher has expected his student, Arjuna, to be a deconstructionist as he declares, "te dvandva-moha-nirmukta bhajente mam dhridha vratam" (Those are my devotees who are free from the attraction of qualities, follow my instruction, and remain engaged in my services; my trans.; 7.28). This suggests that Arjuna is also a deconstructionist learner. Thus, as Lord Krishna is a deconstructionist, it can be implied on the grounds

of the teachings of the Gita that a deconstructionist is a multidimensional personality—a teacher, a tapasvi, a jnana yogi, a karma yogi, a bhakti yogi, a sanyasi, a devotee, a learner and the other. Guided by the teachings in the Gita by the deconstructionist teacher, qualities of a deconstructionist have been deduced in the following discussion. So a deconstructionist: neither laments for the living nor for the dead (2.11); is not disturbed by happiness and distress and is steady in both happiness and distress (2.56); believes in the soul as undeconstructible and a sacred reality (2.20-26); does his/her duty without considering happiness or distress, loss or gain, victory or defeat; becomes transcendental to the three modes of material nature (*tamasa, rajasa and sattvik*), is free from all dualities (the hierarchical meaning relations created through the binary oppositions) and is established in the self (2.45); strives for *yoga*, gets rid of both good and bad reactions (2.50); is indifferent to all that has been heard and to be heard (2.52); gives up all varieties of desires for sense gratification; is not disturbed in mind due to miseries (2.56), is not elated with happiness and is free from attachment, fear and anger; is fixed in perfect knowledge (2.57); is detached from all kinds of attachments and aversions (2.64); lives free from desires, gives up all sense of proprietorship; is devoid of false ego, and peace-loving (2.71); and is situated in the state of the spiritual (*brahmi-sthitih*; 2.72).

Similarly, a deconstructionist sees inaction in action and action in inaction while remaining engaged in his/her own actions (4.18); performs his/her actions without expectation of the results, remains satisfied and independent (4.20); is free from duality (concepts of binary logic) and is steady both in success and failure (4.22); works in devotion, controls his/her mind and senses and is dear to everyone (5.7); treats all equally and has equal vision (*sama-darsana*; 5.18); neither rejoices upon achieving something pleasant nor laments on the unpleasant; is self-intelligent

(*sthir-buddhi*), knows the science of God and is already situated in transcendence (5.20); is beyond the dualities that arise from doubts (5.25); is the benefactor and well-wisher of all living entities (*suhridam sarva-bhutanam*; 5.29), is in the state of yoga (6.3); is regulated in his/her habits of eating, sleeping, recreation and work (6.17); is self-realized and sees everything equally (*sarvatra sama-darsana*; 6.29); is like a *yogi* devoted to a sacred reality or the undeconstructible (Krishna Consciousness [6.46]). Besides, a deconstructionist has the qualities like intelligence, knowledge, freedom from doubt and delusion, forgiveness, truthfulness, control of the senses, control of the mind, happiness and distress, birth, death, fear, fearlessness, non-violence, equanimity, satisfaction, austerity, charity, fame and infamy, and so forth (10.4-5). Like Lord Krishna demonstrating his cosmic manifestation to Arjuna (11.5), a deconstructionist is able to provide his/her learners with concrete ideas through demonstration, give them the divine eyes (11.8), perform any roles as required in the context (11.31), and have friendly relation with the learners (11.41).

Like the qualities of Lord Krishna's devotees a deconstructionist is not envious but kind to all living entities; does not think of himself/herself as a proprietor; is free from false ego; is equal in both happiness and distress; tolerant (12.13); is always satisfied; self-control; engaged in devotional services with determination, mind and intelligence focused on Lord Krishna (12.14); does not disturb others and not feel disturbed by them as well; is equipoised in happiness and distress, and fear and anxiety (12.15); is not dependent on the ordinary course of activities; is pure; expert; is without care, free from all pains; is not striving for some result (12.16); neither rejoices nor grieves; neither laments nor desires; renounces both auspicious and inauspicious things (12.17); is equal to friends and enemies; equipoised in honor and dishonor, heat and cold, happiness and distress, fame and infamy; always free

from contaminating association (12.18); is always silent and satisfied with anything; does not care for any residence; is fixed in knowledge and engaged in devotional service (12.19); and follows the imperishable path of faith and devotional service to Lord Krishna (12.20; Prabhupada 555-60). Similarly, a deconstructionist also has the knowledge of *kshetra-jna* ("the knower of the field") and the knowledge to be considered for *adhyatma jnana* ("knowledge of self-realization") and the philosophical process of realizing the Absolute Truth. Thus, a deconstructionist has the following qualities:

humility; pridelessness; nonviolence; tolerance; simplicity; approaching bona fide spiritual master; cleanliness; steadiness; self-control; renunciation of the objects of sense gratification; absence of false ego; the perception of the evil of birth, death, old age and disease; detachment; freedom from entanglement with children, wife, home and the rest; even-mindedness amid pleasant and unpleasant events; constant and unalloyed devotion to Lord Krishna; aspiring to live in a solitary place; detachment from the general mass of people; accepting the importance of self-realization; and philosophical search for the Absolute Truth. (13.8-12; Prabhupada 573)

Furthermore, like a *gunatita* ("a transcendentalist who has gone beyond the modes of nature") a deconstructionist does not hate illumination, eschews attachment and delusion; is unwavering and undisturbed through all these reactions of the material qualities, remains neutral and transcendental, knows that the modes alone are active; is situated in the self and regards alike happiness and distress; looks upon a lump of earth, a stone and a piece of gold with an equal eye; is equal toward the desirable and the undesirable; is steady, situated equally well in praise and blame, honor and dishonor; treats alike both friend and enemy; has renounced all material

activities (6.22-25). Similarly, like the *asvatta* (a mysterious tree) which exactly represents the nature of difference, a deconstructionist is difficult personality to understand because he/she seems to be mysterious, self-contradictory, irrational, illogical, unstable and rebellious like the *asvatta* (15.1-4)!

The qualities of a deconstructionist can also be compared with a *veda-vit* ("a godly man who has the transcendental qualities") as described in chapter 16 of the Gita (16.1-3). Thus the qualities mentioned below allude to the qualities of a deconstructionist:

fearlessness; purification of one's existence; cultivation of spiritual knowledge; charity; self-control; performance of sacrifice; study of the Vedas; austerity; simplicity; nonviolence; truthfulness; freedom from anger; renunciation; tranquility; aversion to faultfinding; compassion for all living entities; freedom from covetousness; gentleness; modesty; steady determination; vigor; forgiveness; fortitude; cleanliness; and freedom from envy and from the passion for honour. (Prabhupada 656)

In addition, the qualities of a deconstructionist can be compared with the description of a *sattvik karta* ("a worker in the mode of goodness") who does his/her duties without association with the modes of material nature, without false ego, with good determination and enthusiasm, and without wavering in success or failure (18.26; Prabhupada 720). Similarly, a deconstructionist can also be compared with a *Brahmana* who possesses the qualities like peacefulness, self-control, austerity, purity, tolerance, honesty, knowledge, wisdom and religiousness (18.42).

A deconstructionist, furthermore, has *sattvik jnana* that helps him/her to actualize the sacred reality and the undeconstructible through promoting the deconstructive belief in the undecidable in pedagogy as in deconstruction. Lord

Krishna suggests that realization of self (*brahma-bhuyaya*) is the stage of highest knowledge and the one who reaches this state of realization is called a self-realized person. As a self-realized person, a deconstructionist strives for actualizing the sacred reality and the undeconstructible through the application of deconstruction in the pedagogy. Thus, a deconstructionist has the following qualities:

Being purified by his intelligence and controlling the mind with determination, giving up the objects of sense gratification, being freed from attachment and hatred, one who lives in a secluded place, who eats little, who controls his body, mind and power of speech, who is always in trance and who is detached, free from false ego, false strength, false pride, lust, anger and acceptance of material things, free from false proprietorship, and peaceful. (*Sic*;18.51-53; Prabhupada 737)

Furthermore, Lord Krishna suggests that after the stage of *brahma-bhuyaya* one becomes a *brahmabhuta* ("one who is transcendently-situated") who becomes fully joyful once he/she realizes the Supreme Brahman. So a deconstructionist, like a *brahmabhuta*, never laments or desires to have anything, is equally disposed toward every living entity, and is purely devoted to Lord Krishna (18.54).

Last but not least, *spiritual intelligence* is also a significant quality of a deconstructionist teacher (my emphasis). In this regard, Prabhupada explicates that Lord Krishna suggests Arjuna to possess the quality of spiritual intelligence as it helps to manage the causes of lust like material senses, mind and intelligence (3.43). For Prabhupada this spiritual intelligence refers to Krishna Consciousness. Both these qualities—spiritual intelligence and Krishna Consciousness—include the deconstructive concepts like a deconstructive belief and a sacred reality as discussed by Derrideans. Thus, a deconstructionist needs to possess the quality of spiritual

intelligence or Krishna Consciousness. However, in this study I have discovered one significant quality of a deconstructionist, i. e. *spiritual-materialist*. This quality has been derived from the analysis of the seventh and eighteenth chapters in the Gita. In the seventh chapter Lord Krishna teaches Arjuna that all the created beings—material and spiritual—are originated from him and dissolve into him at the end (7.6). Similarly, in chapter 18 Lord Krishna describes *sattvik jnana* (knowledge in the mode of goodness) as *avibhaktam* ("the knowledge by which one undivided spiritual nature [spiritual]) is seen in *vibhaktesu* (all living entities as divided into innumerable forms" [material]; 18.20), i. e. spiritual-material. This spiritual-material dimension is similar with the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical (quasi-transcendental) as discussed in deconstruction. Thus a deconstructionist as suggested in the pedagogy of the Gita is a *spiritual-materialist* or a quasi-transcendentalist who, like Derrida, is an unbelieving believer. However, some Derrideans argue, and even Derrida has accepted in his later years, that he has transformed from an unbelieving believer to a believer. Similarly, this spiritual-material is an inferior dimension of Lord Krishna; his superior dimension is transcendental and spiritual which can be realized only through spiritual intelligence, i. e. 'spiritual intelligence' is the highest quality of a deconstructionist.

As deconstruction is a process of inquiry into difference, it cannot be specified with any limited criteria and qualities. Similarly, the teachings of the Gita are so vast and deep that they cannot be limited to any interpretations, i. e. the findings in this study are limited. So it is necessary that there be more studies on the interpretations of the Gita, its relation to deconstruction, role of Lord Krishna in the Gita from different theoretical perspectives, teachings of the Gita, relevance of the Gita to the aspects of education, qualities of a deconstructionist teacher and students and the like.

Deconstructionist Teacher: The Role of a Postmethod Teacher

'Postmethod pedagogy' as proposed by B. Kumaravadivelu through the publication of his article "Toward a Postmethod Pedagogy," became a landmark work in pedagogy. It was actually the product of his critique on methods as they were highly centralized until the end of the twentieth century because there were "repeatedly articulated dissatisfaction with the limitations of the concept of *method* and the transmission model of teacher education" (Kumaravadivelu 537). The 1990s became the most productive period in the field of methodological practices and then there came two innovative ideas: "One emphasizes the need to go beyond the limitations of the concept of method with a call to find an alternative way of designing effective teaching strategies (Clarke, 1994; Kumaravadivelu, 1994; Prabhu, 1990), and another emphasizes the need to go beyond the limitations of the transmission model of teacher education with a call to find an alternative way of creating efficient teaching professionals (Freeman & Johnson, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Woods, 1996)" (qtd. in Kumaravadivelu 537). With this background Kumaravadivelu came up with the conception of postmethod pedagogy and put it: "I use the term *pedagogy* in a broad sense to include not only issues pertaining to classroom strategies, instructional materials, curricular objectives, and evaluation measures, but also a wide range of historical, political, and sociocultural experiences that directly or indirectly influence L2 education" (538). Although he defined pedagogy in relation to L2 education, it can be applied to general education as well because this conception of pedagogy is so broad that it includes all the aspects of pedagogy in general—classroom strategies, instructional materials, curricular objectives, evaluation measures along with historical, political, and sociocultural experiences.

With this conception of pedagogy against methods, Kumaravadivelu realized an imperative to construct a pedagogical method which could address the spirit of postmethods aspirations. So he materialized a postmethod pedagogy and proposed its parameters: particularity, practicality, and possibility (537). He explicated these three theoretical dimensions of postmethod pedagogy and suggested how they must be executed: (a) facilitate the advancement of a context-sensitive language education based on a true understanding of local linguistic, sociocultural, and political particularities; (b) rupture the reified role relationship between theorists and practitioners by enabling teachers to construct their own theory of practice; and (c) tap the sociopolitical consciousness that participants bring with them in order to aid their quest for identity formation and social transformation (537).

Kumaravadivelu made a claim that these three parameters could provide a base for *an alternative organizing principle* for postmethod pedagogy which could “have the potential to offer the necessary conceptualization and contextualization based on the educational, cultural, social, and political imperatives of language learning, teaching, and teacher education” (557; emphasis added). Like Kumaravadivelu’s alternative organizing principle for postmethod pedagogy, Biesta and Egea-Kuhne have also conceptualized deconstruction having potential for education and commend that “deconstruction can engage a thoughtful reader in *some powerful rethinking of education*, analysing all the hidden assumptions which are implied in the philosophical, or the ethical, or the juridical, or the political issues related to education (qtd. in Higgs 175; emphasis added). These perspectives focus on the rethinking of education from open and contextual grounds, avoiding the static, centralized and formalized form of educational system. These are also the issues discussed by Derridean educationists (Biesta 400; Higgs 175; Trifonas 307). So it is

obvious that postmethod pedagogy and deconstruction are interrelated in terms of their mission in education.

Like the replacement of structuralism with poststructuralism and the replacement of modernism with postmodernism; the modernist concept of method has been replaced by postmethod. In the transformation of structuralism and modernism deconstruction played the role of a driving force, and so is the role of pedagogy in the transformation of method into postmethod because teaching and learning in the post-methods era is influenced by the concept and practice of deconstruction and pedagogy as both look for the possibilities of something new in education (Kumaravadivelu 537, 558; Biesta 394, 400; Kamali, "Pedagogy" 47). Thus, teaching at present is founded on the concept of pedagogy which is perceived as a movement away from a preoccupation with generic teaching methods towards a more complex view of teaching which encompasses a multifaceted understanding of the teaching and learning process (Richards and Renandya 5). They further argue that in post-methods era attention has been shifted to teaching and learning process and the contribution of the individual teacher to pedagogy rather than the output of the process (5). In the same vein, Brown defines pedagogy as a "dynamic interplay between teachers, learners, and institutional materials during the process of teaching and learning (qtd. in Richard and Renandya 6). Here the dynamic interplay that occurs in pedagogy is like a deconstructive opening in education which has been argued by Derridean educationist, Gert Biesta, because this opening is like "a deconstructive entrance, an entrance for the incoming of something new, something unforeseen" which would be like the result of the dynamic interplay between the teacher, learners and the institutional materials in the pedagogical process (400). Both of these concepts—the dynamic interplay and a deconstructive opening—suggest that pedagogy is basically a

process, so there are chances of multiple responses and outcomes while this process keeps happening. In other words, pedagogy happens like deconstruction without any definite goal. This suggests that both pedagogy and deconstruction are process-oriented and regard teaching as a play. As postmethod pedagogy and deconstruction are interrelated, they give a new development in pedagogy which is called a deconstructive pedagogy (Weise, Uba; Mansoor and Malika 493; Kamali 70). Aliya Weisa contends that deconstructive pedagogy "seeks to reveal, explore, or at least gesture towards discontinuities and contradictions that are already at work, no matter how naturalized they have become" (Weise). This suggests that deconstructive pedagogy employs deconstruction as a process of exploration of the subject to reveal ruptures and discover the potentials inherent in them in order to lead it to further developments.

As a teacher educator and researcher, I find the efforts and appeal made by Kumaravadivelu on the conceptualization of the postmethod pedagogy similar with the efforts and appeal made by Derridean educationists like Gert Biesta, Philip Higgs, Michael Roland F. Hernandez, Glenn Rikowski and Peter McLaren as they have a common concern. This concern is to meet the emerging needs of the post-methods era in education. As Derrida deconstructed the center created through the metaphysics of presence grounded on structuralism and gave way to the development of poststructuralism and postmodernism (Lucy, "Postmodern" 96; Stocker 15; Gnanasekaran 212; Higgs 170), Kumaravadivelu, in the similar fashion, deconstructed the centralized practice of 'method' in language teaching and opened up the possibilities of pedagogy—the postmethod pedagogy (537). Similarly, like Kumaravadivelu's critique of "*method*" as the transmission model of teacher education and the proposal of postmethod pedagogy (537), Gert Biesta critiqued the

“sender-receiver model” of communication in education and argued for interpretive model of communication in education founded on deconstruction (400). So, in both of these developments, we can find more similarities, and the most striking point is that they are more optimistic towards the incoming of something new in education (Kumaravadivelu 537; Biesta 394). Besides, there are also two important similarities between Kumaravadivelu’s postmethod pedagogy and Derrida’s deconstruction. As proposed by Kumaravadivelu, postmethod pedagogy has two important features—“an open-ended inquiry” and “a work in progress” (537) which also go along with deconstruction because Derrida did not define deconstruction at all and resisted any efforts to define it, i. e. he wanted it to work as an open-ended inquiry and a work in progress. In this regard, following the line of Derrida, Habib puts it:

While Derrida himself has insisted that deconstruction is not theory unified by any set of consistent rules or procedures, it has been variously regarded as a way of reading, a mode of writing, and above all, a way challenging interpretations of texts based upon conventional notions of the stability of the human self, the external world, and of language and meaning. (649)

The reason why Derrida did not define deconstruction is that he discovered that deconstruction happens itself in a text. So when deconstruction happens, it happens like an open inquiry as in the postmethod pedagogy and it happens like a work in progress because it eschews stability and fixity of meaning in a text. This justifies that postmethod pedagogy and deconstruction share common features and need to be unified as a single methodology to make pedagogy effective. Similarly, Caputo maintains, “Indeed, it was Derrida who emphasized that deconstruction isn't something that we *do* to things: deconstruction *happens*. And it happens in the middle voice” (16). So as deconstruction happens, it materializes the first two parameters of

the postmethod pedagogy—particularity and practicality, and its happening in the middle voice helps to actualize the third parameter—possibility, i.e. to assist the teachers for their quest for identity formation and social transformation as a possibility. So it is apparent that postmethod pedagogy and deconstruction are interrelated and they need to be studied and implemented as a unified approach so as to discover an appropriate methodology to suit the social context as suggested by Holliday (218).

Observing the interrelationship between deconstruction and postmethod pedagogy, I came to witness deconstruction in postmethod pedagogy and vice versa like Gert Biesta witnessing deconstruction in education. Although Derrida did not talk of education directly, Biesta, a Derridean educationist, elaborated this in his paper “Witnessing Deconstruction in Education: Why Quasi-Transcendentalism Matters.” Similarly, another Derridean educationist, Higgs, in re-thinking education, came to the realization of the significance of deconstruction in education and discussed this in his article “Deconstruction and Re-thinking Education.” In the similar fashion, Farahani discussed the significance of Derridean philosophy, i. e. deconstruction in education in his paper “Educational Implications of Philosophical Foundations of Derrida.” Trifonas, similarly, observed the pedagogical practices before the emergence of deconstruction and found them dead and advocated the practice of deconstruction in education in his paper “The End of Pedagogy: from the Dialectic of Memory to the Deconstruction of the Institution.” All these Derridean/deconstructionist educationists have witnessed the occurrence and significance of deconstruction in pedagogy and contributed something new to the development of postmethod pedagogy—deconstructive pedagogy, which has been further discussed by Kumaravadivelu in his paper “Toward a Postmethod Pedagogy.”

Although Kumaravadivelu does not mention deconstruction in his proposal of the postmethod pedagogy, we can find more similarities between them in many pedagogical issues. In this regard, as Kumaravadivelu contends, postmethod pedagogy is “a work in progress” (557); I recommend that the postmethod pedagogy be supplemented by deconstruction so as to make it grow further and remain more appropriate to the postmethod context. For this it is imperative that the postmethod teacher play the role of a deconstructionist teacher in the postmethod pedagogy like the role of a deconstructionist teacher played by Lord Krishna in the pedagogy of the Gita.

Now more significant issues emerge regarding the roles of a postmethod teacher as a deconstructionist. To this, I have discussed them with reference to the discourses on pedagogy in general and postmethod pedagogy vis-à-vis deconstruction in particular so that the role of a deconstructionist teacher in the postmethod pedagogy can be specified. To begin with, Pryer conceives of pedagogy as “a special kind of erotic encounter” between the teacher and students (Pryer qtd. in Day 106), it is naturally challenging for teachers because it is their duty to manage it well. For this, it requires that the teachers have “sustained amounts of intellectual, social and emotional energy” (Day 107). This has been well predicted even by the practitioners of the postmethod pedagogy. In this regard, Kumaravadivelu states: “The greatest challenge the emerging postmethod pedagogy imposes on the professional community today is to rethink and recast its choice of the organizing principle for language learning, teaching, and teacher education” (557). That is to say, it is not only in the case of language learning, teaching and teacher education that the organizing principles of the postmethod pedagogy require rethinking and recasting; it is after all a common case in pedagogy as well. Similarly, as postmethod pedagogy has been

proposed as a “work in progress,” it is open to discussion on how it can be developed to meet the challenges in the postmodern context (557). He further asks: “How do postmethod teachers pursue professional development involving the triple pedagogic parameters of particularity, practicality, and possibility? How do they theorize from practice and practice what they theorize?” (550). These issues can be effectively dealt with only when postmethod pedagogy is grounded on deconstruction—deconstructive pedagogy. This suggests that postmethod pedagogy needs to be further developed to make it more effective in the present context.

As the concept and practice of teaching and learning have been transformed into the postmethod pedagogy in the twenty-first century, this has created “new understandings of the social realities”; as a result, the postmethod pedagogy has gone through some “transitions” as presented by Lieberman and Miller (qtd. in Day 143-44): (1) From individualism to professional community; (2) From teaching at the center to learning at the center; (3) From technical work to inquiry; (4) From control to accountability; (5) From managed work to leadership; (6) From classroom concern to whole-school concern and beyond; and (7) From a weak knowledge base to a broad knowledge base. These transitions can be more challenging for the postmethod teachers to deal with as postmethod pedagogy itself is a work in progress. So it is necessary that the postmethod pedagogy develop fully so that it could address these transitions more successfully; i. e. it is essential that postmethod pedagogy be developed into deconstructive pedagogy. Furthermore, when postmethod pedagogy is developed into a deconstructive pedagogy, it can deal with the emerging binaries under “pedagogical orientations” as discussed by Canagarajah: learning as a detached cognitive activity vs. learning as personal; learning as transcendental vs. learning as situated; learning process as universal vs. learning as cultural; knowledge as value-

free vs. knowledge as ideological; knowledge as preconstructed vs. knowledge as negotiated; learning as instrumental vs. learning as political (15-17).

Relating Derridean deconstruction to education in general and pedagogy in particular, Higgs has raised some fundamental issues which need to be considered in re-thinking education in the postmethod context or in deconstructive pedagogy. These issues are:

how can we educate the other as other? in which space can education be realised? how can we let the other be as other in the educational encounter? what, and whose knowledge should be transmitted in the educational encounter? how can we know in the educational encounter? what form of instruction should mark the educational encounter? what is the nature of an educational encounter? what is the place of language in the educational encounter? (175)

These are very important issues which need more serious concentration and developments in the pedagogical knowledge and practices. Such issues are definitely challenging but the postmethod pedagogy guided by deconstruction (deconstructive pedagogy) has the potential to solve them and make pedagogy more effective.

Similarly, things to consider under the postmethod pedagogy are the points proposed by Kumaravadivelu as the third parameter of the postmethod pedagogy: “a pedagogy of possibility” and “individual identity” (543). In this regard, two questions arise—what possibilities does the postmethod pedagogy expect to occur? and what type of teacher identity does it suggest for? (545) To these issues, deconstructive pedagogy has the answer; i. e. the concept of 'differance' in deconstruction bears the potential to deal with any possibilities in postmethod pedagogy, and the role of a postmethod teacher as a deconstructionist can have the potential to improvise his/her

roles because in deconstructive pedagogy teacher's role/identity is unstable. Thus the workings of deconstruction in postmethod pedagogy can make it more effective in practice.

The other issues concerned with implication of the postmethod pedagogy are practices in the universities which are treating “education as a business meant to gain economic profit” rather than focusing on “the centrality of critical thinking skills as the most important tool for the pursuit of knowledge and of a life-project” (Hernandez 129). In this regard, the question is ‘how can the postmethod pedagogy address this issue effectively?’ Here again this issue can be addressed when postmethod pedagogy is grounded on deconstruction because deconstruction destabilizes the center (e.g. profit) and works for justice and responsibility.

To meet all these challenges, it is necessary that teachers develop professionally. Teacher's professional development is like *diferance* because it always differs and defers; it is both a structure and a movement. In this regard, Hargreaves argues that teachers at present "are at a crossroad for teachers' professionalism and professional learning." So he presents two possible roads: “One possible future road is that of teachers' diminished professionalism through regulations, another is to maintain and pursue professionalism based on teachers' own participation” (qtd. in Helleve1). Of these possibilities, it is obvious that teachers going through the second road will develop more professionally. So it is also necessary that the postmethod teachers go through the second road, i.e. they maintain and pursue professionalism based on their own participation. As the postmethod pedagogy is the need of the present time, it can be improved much better so as to address the emerging issues in pedagogy and help teachers develop professionally through their participation. For all this it is necessary that the postmethod pedagogy be supplemented with

deconstruction, i. e. deconstructive pedagogy. So a postmethod teacher needs to play the role of a deconstructionist teacher like Lord Krishna in the pedagogy of the Gita. So, in what follows, I have discussed how a deconstructionist teacher can improvise the postmethod pedagogy.

When a deconstructionist teacher employs deconstruction in the postmethod pedagogy, the postmethod pedagogy as a work in progress can manage most of its shortcomings because deconstruction is the driving force of all sorts of developments after structuralism/modernism: "The power of the *deconstructive movement* can be gauged by the fact that many other major intellectual traditions have been forced into radical reassessments" (Selden 90; emphasis added). Accordingly, when the postmethod pedagogy is guided by "the teachings of Jacques Derrida" which are used to refine "a host of stale methodologies" in education (Trifonas 303, 306), it can be developed into a more appropriate work from "the work in progress" (Kumaravadivelu 537). With this respect, in applying the postmethod pedagogy a deconstructionist teacher is more concerned with "the Other" and "a more equitable new world picture" (Trifonas 306). Similarly, he/she is also more concerned with the "*justice* to what is excluded, to something other, to some alterity, to what is unpredictable" (Higgs 171). Furthermore, the role of the postmethod teacher as a deconstructionist can make pedagogical practices more effective so as to achieve Trifonas' "Archimedian point" (333) and Kumaravadivelu's "parameter of possibility" (537) because like Lord Krishna playing the role of a deconstructionist teacher who was able to teach Arjuna the most complex lessons even in the period of turmoil, a deconstructionist teacher can manage any such challenges in the postmethod pedagogy.

The role of a deconstructionist teacher in the postmethod pedagogy is to thrive for the impossibility because “deconstruction can be regarded as an activity which attempts to bring into view the impossibility to totalize, the impossibility to articulate a self-sufficient, self-present centre from which everything can be mastered and controlled (Higgs 171). It is because deconstruction works in the very space between the possibility and the impossibility. As Tacey states, it is “the very experience of the possibility of the impossible” (8). In that it “does not exclude anything; it is the theory of inclusiveness; it is the theory of justice” (Stocker 143). Thus a deconstructionist teacher makes the postmethod pedagogy all-pervasive and all-inclusive; he/she “aims to interrogate, exhibit and criticize the decidable ethics of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ practiced in the educational institutions” (Trifonas 307). That is, in deconstructive pedagogy any sort of foundational concept is deconstructed and, as a deconstructionist, the teacher focuses on the issues like difference, justice, the other, and responsibility in his/her pedagogy (Higgs 170). Above all, a deconstructionist teacher is more concerned with teaching the other who has been marginalized (Scherzinger 73; Ahluwalia 84). In teaching the other he/she involves the learners in the practice of critical thinking and critical analysis through the “questions about what it means to think, to learn, to teach, to know, and more specifically what it means to teach the other as other” (Higgs 172). Thus, teaching, for a deconstructionist teacher, is like “a special kind of erotic encounter, a meeting of teacher and student . . . is a wild and chaotic process, a struggle that is sometimes joyful, sometimes painful” (Pryer qtd. in Day 106). Pryer’s conception of pedagogy exactly represents Derrida’s conception of meaning as difference in a text because both go for the free play and the endless deferral of the definite meaning like truth, being, identity, etc in deconstruction (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97; Poovy 108). Furthermore, teaching, for a

deconstructionist teacher, is like a “pedagogical dance”, “a wild and a chaotic process” (Pryer qtd. in Day 106) because it always looks for “a way to think again and afresh, more strictly and more radically about the concern that has been central to the project of education” (Higgs 176). In this way, a deconstructionist teacher is able to work out with any sort of challenges and make best out of them to make his/her pedagogy more effective and productive in context.

The most important role that a deconstructionist teacher can play in pedagogical reform is to look for something new because deconstruction does not accept the things as static. This can be observed in what Cornor writes, “Derrida's ideas and writings, and the writings of those who have rendered his original texts accessible to the average reader . . . have opened up new, exciting, and productive avenues of inquiry. . . .The sense of possibilities created—other ways of seeing and doing—is . . . most liberating, democratic, and consistent with what is best in any educational endeavour” (246). Thus in this postmethod context the only effective way to work for equality is to empower the marginalized which can be achieved through the roles played by a deconstructionist teacher in the postmodern context as Reynolds commends: “Deconstruction, and postmodernism more generally, have both associated their various criticisms of the philosophical tradition with a desire to emancipate a conception of alterity that has been marginalised by basically all metaphysics” (31). So the main concern of pedagogy in the postmodern context is to emancipate the other, end social inequalities and enhance social justice (Rikowski and McLaren 4).

Now the question arises—how does a deconstructionist teacher emancipate the other and do social justice? To this, my argument is that it is the prime responsibility of the deconstructionist teacher to do so because he/she works like a

cosmopolitan individualist as the theory of deconstruction does not exclude anything; “it is the theory of inclusiveness; it is the theory of justice” (Stocker 143). With this attitude of inclusiveness a deconstructionist teacher deconstructs the established binary oppositions in the pedagogy like acceptable and non-acceptable, right and wrong (truth and lie), central and subsidiary, wisdom and non-wisdom etc. (Farahani 2497). Similarly, in Kamali’s experience it is necessary for a teacher in the postmethod pedagogy to identify the binary oppositions active in the operation of the pedagogy and address them effectively. He gives the example of how the binary oppositions were used to centralize certain thoughts and practices and marginalize the other:


The method-led practices encouraged students to think and behave in terms of binary oppositions and hierarchy they created, e.g. 'teacher versus students', 'texts versus students' interests', 'exam versus learning', 'pass versus fail', and so on. So students always put one thought and practice as more dominant than the other which resulted in exclusion of certain thoughts and practices.

(Kamali, "Deconstruction" 52)

In these binaries the first concept and practice would deserve more attention than the second one. But for a deconstructionist teacher both of them are interrelated and supplementary to each other; both of them are equally significant for the process of learning and have the potential for multiple meanings because deconstruction works as “a strategy that opens a text up into the possibility of the multiplicity of meanings” (Hernandez 12).

The next important aspect of a deconstructionist teacher is his/her focus on reflective practices because pedagogy for him/her is an ongoing play where meanings are never static; they are always the result of a meaning-making process because

deconstruction, the theoretical foundation of a deconstructionist teacher, works out of the differing and deferring of a meaning which constitutes both a structure and a movement (Derrida qtd. in Culler 97). It is in the state of a structure (a trace) when the deconstructionist teacher reflects upon his/her practices and puts the practices forward that constitutes a movement. As this continues, it constitutes a cyclic process which Kamali calls “deconstructive-reflective cycle.” He has illustrated it as follows (Kamali “Teaching” 107):



The role of reflective practices in teachers’ professional development has been much discussed in relation to English language teaching and teacher learning (Ur 6; Richards and Rodgers 217; Johnson 23; Wallace 8). It is also equally significant in postmethod pedagogy. So, as a deconstructionist teacher, Kamali has illustrated how deconstruction includes reflection as deconstructive-reflective cycle and helps for better learning and professional development. He has further explained how the deconstructive-reflective cycle occurs in deconstructive pedagogy: the teacher

“identifies binary oppositions operating in the plan and the teach stages, deconstructs them, uses them, and reflects from them, which results in teacher learning and professional development" (Kamali “Teaching”107). Thus a deconstructionist teacher who is involved in the deconstructive-reflective practices, i. e. deconstructive pedagogy, can enhance his/her critical thinking and develop professionally, and is able to tackle any problem in pedagogy at hand.

In the development of deconstructive pedagogy the Derridean educationists have explored more on the critical, reflective and creative dimension of education from the perspective of deconstruction so as to make pedagogy more effective. In this regard, Biesta states: “Deconstruction is often depicted as a method of critical analysis aimed at exposing unquestioned metaphysical assumptions and internal contradictions in philosophical and literary language” (391). Thus a deconstructionist teacher always works with critical perspective and exposes out any sort of contradictions and narrow-minded thoughts and practices established in pedagogical practices so that he/she finds out “a way to think again and afresh, more strictly and more radically about the concern that has been central to the project of education” (Higgs 176). In this way, a deconstructionist teacher in his/her deconstructive-reflective practices in pedagogy “aims to interrogate, exhibit and criticize the decidable ethics of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ practiced in the educational institutions” (Trifonas 307). This shows that deconstructive-reflective practices have wider significance in the implementation of deconstructive pedagogy. This can be observed in Higgs’ remarks,

Derrida’s reflections on deconstruction and related concepts such as *différance*, justice, the other, and responsibility, can provide a powerful paradigm to develop a greater awareness of the issues at stake in education;

for his texts suggest new ways of thinking about education and of assuming responsibility in education in relation to the other, and in the name of justice.

(175)

Similar appeal has been made by the postmodern educationist, Rikowski and McLaren in their paper “Postmodernism in Educational Theory.” They argue that reflection is inevitable in the educational practices founded on postmodernism [deconstruction]. They firmly go for the “postmodernized modes of ‘reflective’ teacher practice” and “postmodern educational research methods” and claim that such practices can ensure “education as a resource for social equality and democracy” (3). As all these reformative thoughts and practices are rooted to the conceptualization of deconstruction, it is more liable for a deconstructionist teacher to effectively implement all of them in order to improvise the postmethod pedagogy and implement the deconstructive pedagogy.

All the transformations that occurred in the post-methods era after 1990s resulted in the development of postmethod pedagogy which is perceived as a movement away from a preoccupation with generic teaching methods towards a more complex view of teaching that encompasses a multifaceted understanding of the teaching and learning process (Richards and Renandya 5). In the same vein, Brown defines pedagogy as a "dynamic interplay between teachers, learners, and institutional materials during the process of teaching and learning (qtd. in Richards and Renandya 6). It can be observed that the main transformation on the methods-led teaching practices is on the process rather than on the product. So the teaching process in pedagogy is a dynamic interplay among the agents involved in the pedagogy that bears the potential for a deconstructive opening in education as argued by a Derridean educationist, Biesta. He contends that “a deconstructive entrance,” is like, “an

entrance for the incoming of something new, something unforeseen” which would be like the result of the “dynamic interplay between the teacher, learners and the institutional materials in the pedagogical process” (Biesta 400; Brown qtd. in Richards and Renandya 6). This is where I have found the confluence of pedagogy and deconstruction which started to flow through postmethod pedagogy as proposed by Kumaravadivelu developing into deconstructive pedagogy (Kumaravadivelu 537, 558; Biesta 394, 400).

In his proposal of the postmethod pedagogy Kumaravadivelu states that it is “an open-ended inquiry” and “a work in progress” (537). Since Lord Krishna as a deconstructionist teacher in the pedagogy of the Gita was successful to teach Arjuna the secret of wisdom even in the chaotic context, a deconstructionist teacher, I claim, can implement and improvise the postmethod pedagogy as deconstructive pedagogy in any context because he/she is equipped with various qualities as identified in chapter 4 of this report. So I recommend that in practicing the parameters of the postmethod pedagogy: particularity, practicality, and possibility (537), a deconstructionist teacher improvise and implement them so as to make them more effective in any context. For example, to implement the first parameter—facilitate the advancement of a context-sensitive language education based on a true understanding of local linguistic, sociocultural, and political particularities, the deconstructionist teacher can consider the immediate context and take action like Lord Krishna advising Arjuna to do his duty rather than avoiding it (2.37). Similarly, in implementing the second parameter—rupture the reified role relationship between theorists and practitioners by enabling teachers to construct their own theory of practice, the deconstructionist teacher can encourage the learners to reflect themselves and take action on their own like Lord Krishna letting Arjuna reflect

himself and make decision on whether to fight or not (18.63). In the similar fashion, in implementing the third parameter—tap the sociopolitical consciousness that participants bring with them in order to aid their quest for identity formation and social transformation, the deconstructionist teacher can give them freedom to work out their plans on their own and accept their actions and result as difference.

Regarding the role of the postmethod teacher in postmethod pedagogy, Kumaravadivelu maintains that he/she should be autonomous, like a postmethod learner, in his/her pedagogical practices (548). However, he/she needs to possess "a reasonable degree of competence and confidence" so that he/she can build and implement their [his/her] own theory of practice" in the educational and sociopolitical contexts (548). When it comes to the implementation of the postmethod teacher's roles, guided by the findings of this study, my recommendation is that these roles become more effective when they are underpinned by deconstruction. For example, the postmethod teacher becomes more autonomous when he/she practices pedagogy like a deconstructionist teacher because in deconstructive pedagogy the teacher is free to implement the pedagogy as it is not guided by any foundational theory, and he/she is also free to theorize the practices through reflection and implement in contexts leading to the cyclic process of deconstructive-reflective practices as difference.

In what follows, I have discussed further how a postmethod teacher can perform better as a deconstructionist teacher making his/her role more effective in deconstructive pedagogy. Regarding the teacher's autonomy, a deconstructionist teacher can fully act as an autonomous practitioner because he/she is not guided by any foundational theory; for him/her any result of practice is acceptable as there is no concept of good or bad, right or wrong, and so on. A deconstructionist teacher accepts pedagogy as a wild and chaotic process because texts (pedagogy) have no ultimate

and definite meaning; they only contain free play of meanings. So a deconstructionist teacher simply acts without being worried about the outcome of the action; this truly gives freedom and autonomy to the actor. As a deconstructionist teacher, Lord Krishna enjoyed the pedagogy in the Gita as it happened like a wild and chaotic process and a free play of thoughts and gave this freedom to Arjuna as well (3.30). So a deconstructionist teacher believes that pedagogy gets much better when teachers and learners, as autonomous individuals, are involved in pedagogy that goes like a wild dance.

As suggested in the postmethod pedagogy, a deconstructionist teacher can develop a reasonable degree of competence and confidence in performing pedagogy because in deconstructive pedagogy he/she acts like a critical reader and analyzes a text critically looking for something new. This enhances competence in the teacher which, in turn, helps to boost up his/her confidence as well. Thus, being involved in such critical practices, a postmethod teacher can enhance his/her level of competence and confidence to make pedagogical practices more process-oriented with free play of meanings like in deconstruction. As a deconstructionist teacher, Lord Krishna has also focused on this aspect and enabled Arjuna to become more and more competent and confident in his thoughts and actions in the pedagogical process. As a result, he was able to understand the teachings by Lord Krishna and realize his duty, and was ready to act more confidently.

The next role of the postmethod teacher concerns how he/she builds theory out of practice and implements it in context and addresses the emerging issues. This is, in fact, a very crucial role of the postmethod teacher which can be ascertained by playing the role of a deconstructionist teacher because in practicing deconstructive pedagogy he/she deconstructs the traditional hierarchy created by the binary—theory

versus practice, and he/she actually works out of the rupture in-between them while accepting them as complementary to each other, and reflecting on them. As a result, he/she can theorize the reflections out of practice which, however, goes on changing in practice in the process of addressing emerging challenges as a movement, creating different traces. Thus, a deconstructionist teacher focuses on the interplay between theoretical and practical dimensions of pedagogy making it open to any possibilities.

A deconstructionist teacher, thus, possesses the potential required to make the theoretical and practical dimensions of postmethod pedagogy work more effectively. So a deconstructionist teacher, like Lord Krishna in the pedagogy of the Gita, can develop the work of postmethod pedagogy into a deconstructive pedagogy and implement it to address any pedagogical issues at hand and make pedagogy more effective. However, I feel the necessity of further researches on the role of a deconstructionist teacher in postmethod pedagogy, its development into deconstructive pedagogy, and the significance of the Gita in different aspects of pedagogy.

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Appendix i

References to the Constructs of Binary Oppositions and Differance in the Gita

Chapter 1:	Verses 1, 36, 39, 40
Chapter 2:	Verses 11, 14-16, 20, 27, 28, 38, 45, 48, 50, 57, 66
Chapter 3:	Verses 2, 3, 21, 35
Chapter 4:	Verses 7, 8, 18, 22
Chapter 5:	Verses 1, 3, 12, 15, 18, 20
Chapter 6:	Verses 3, 5, 7-9, 29, 32, 46
Chapter 7:	Verses 5, 6, 12, 17, 24, 27, 28
Chapter 8:	Verses 3, 16, 20, 23, 26
Chapter 9:	Verses 3, 12, 13, 15-19, 21, 28, 29
Chapter 10:	Verses 4, 5, 14, 21-40
Chapter 11:	Verses 5, 7, 8, 10-31, 44, 51
Chapter 12:	Verses 4, 13-20
Chapter 13:	Verses 1, 8-12, 13, 15-18, 23, 28, 29, 33
Chapter 14:	Verses 5, 6, 10, 18, 22-25, 27
Chapter 15:	Verses 1, 3-6, 16
Chapter 16:	Verses 1-3, 4, 7
Chapter 17:	Verses 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28
Chapter 18:	Verses 2-8, 14, 15, 20, 26, 30, 31, 44, 47, 51-53, 62, 63, 65, 73

Appendix ii

Sample Shlokas to Refer to the Occurrence of Deconstruction in the Gita

1. सुखदुःखेसमेकृत्वालाभालाभौजयाजयौ ।
ततोयुद्धाययुज्यस्वनैवंपापमवाप्स्यसि ॥२-३८ ॥
2. त्रैगुण्यविषयावेदानिस्त्रैगुण्योभवार्जुन ।
निर्द्वन्द्वोनित्यसत्त्वस्थोनिर्योगक्षेमआत्मवान् ॥२-४५ ॥
3. यदृच्छालाभसन्तुष्टोद्वन्द्वातीतोविमत्सरः ।
समःसिद्धावसिद्धौचकृत्वापिननिबध्यते ॥४-२२ ॥
4. ज्ञेयःसनित्यसंन्यासीयोनद्वेष्टिनकाङ्क्षति ।
निर्द्वन्द्वोहिमहाबाहोसुखंबन्धात्प्रमुच्यते ॥५-३ ॥
5. विद्याविनयसम्पन्नेब्राह्मणेगविहस्तिनि ।
शुनिचैवश्वपाकेचपण्डिताःसमदर्शिनः ॥५-१८ ॥
6. ज्ञानविज्ञानतृप्तात्माकूटस्थोविजितेन्द्रियः ।
युक्तइत्युच्यतेयोगीसमलोष्टाश्मकाञ्चनः ॥६-८ ॥
7. सुहृन्मित्रार्युदासीनमध्यस्थद्वेष्यबन्धुषु ।
साधुष्वपिचपापेषुसमबुद्धिर्विशिष्यते ॥६-९ ॥
8. सर्वभूतस्थमात्मानंसर्वभूतानिचात्मनि ।
ईक्षतेयोगयुक्तात्मासर्वत्रसमदर्शनः ॥६-२९ ॥
9. आत्मौपम्येनसर्वत्रसमंपश्यतियोऽर्जुन ।
सुखंवायदिवादुःखंसयोगीपरमोमतः ॥६-३२ ॥
10. योयोयांयांतनुंभक्तःश्रद्धयार्चितुमिच्छति ।
तस्यतस्याचलांश्रद्धांतामेवविदधाम्यहम् ॥७-२१ ॥
11. येषांत्वन्तगतंपापंजनानांपुण्यकर्मणाम् ।
तेद्वन्द्वमोहनिर्मुक्ताभजन्तेमांदृढव्रताः ॥७-२८ ॥
12. समोऽहंसर्वभूतेषुनमेद्वेष्योऽस्तिनप्रियः ।
येभजन्तितुमांभक्त्यामयितेतेषुचाप्यहम् ॥९-२९ ॥
13. सन्नियम्येन्द्रियग्रामंसर्वत्रसमबुद्धयः ।

तेप्राप्नुवन्तिमामेवसर्वभूतहितेरताः ॥१२-४ ॥

14. अद्वेष्टासर्वभूतानांमैत्रःकरुणएवच।
निर्ममोनिरहङ्कारःसमदुःखसुखःक्षमी ॥१२-१३ ॥
15. समःशत्रौचमित्रेचतथामानापमानयोः।
शीतोष्णसुखदुःखेषुसमःसङ्गविवर्जितः ॥१२-१८ ॥
16. अविभक्तंचभूतेषुविभक्तमिवचस्थितम्।
भूतभर्तृचतज्ज्ञेयंग्रसिष्णुप्रभविष्णुच ॥१३-१७ ॥
17. समंसर्वेषुभूतेषुतिष्ठन्तंपरमेश्वरम्।
विनश्यत्स्वविनश्यन्तयःपश्यतिसपश्यति ॥१३-२८ ॥
18. समंपश्यन्हिसर्वत्रसमवस्थितमीश्वरम्।
नहिनस्यात्मनात्मानंततोयातिपरांगतिम् ॥१३-२९ ॥
19. नरूपमस्येहतथोपलभ्यते
नान्तोनचादिर्नचसम्प्रतिष्ठा।
अश्वत्थमेनंसुविरूढमूलं
असङ्गशस्त्रेणदृढेनछित्त्वा ॥१५-३ ॥
20. ॐतत्सदितिनिर्देशोब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधःस्मृतः।
ब्राह्मणास्तेनवेदाश्चयज्ञाश्चविहिताःपुरा ॥१७-२३ ॥
21. सर्वभूतेषुयेनैकंभावमव्ययमीक्षते।
अविभक्तंविभक्तेषुतज्ज्ञानंविद्धिसात्त्विकम् ॥१८-२० ॥
22. इतितेज्ञानमाख्यातंगुह्याद्गुह्यतरंमया।
विमृश्यैतदशेषेणयथेच्छसितथाकुरु ॥१८-६३ ॥

Om Tat Sat! Om Tat Sat!! Om Tat Sat!!!