

I. Parameters of Justice, Forgiveness and Punishment

Facets of justice are both punishment and forgiveness. However, there is no clear cut demarcation between forgiveness and punishment for the idea is often loaded with political ideologies that are in the mindset up of the legislators. Hence, the present research will seek to understand the demarcation on how punishment and forgiveness are overlapping each other, and if it is justified that Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) will approach to both concepts of forgiveness and punishment. For the same, the research will take in consideration the writings on the philosophy of truth and reconciliation and of Jacques Derrida and John Stuart Mill and other writers.

Justice is either forgiveness or punishment. For forgiveness and justice cannot go hand by hand. Many problems arising in discussions of forgiveness emerge from unclear usage of the term. Hence, to say that justice is forgiveness or punishment is a dubious aspect. However, in the provisions of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) formed in nations in the aftermath of conflict, these terms are tend to be applied and used for similar purpose.

Usually, forgiveness is associated with mercy and amnesty but justice is often providing punishment or sanction to the offender. In typical case of Nepal and South Africa, the (TRC), as is a very special and useful example, depicts justice as forgiveness in an interpersonal and institutionalized feature. Actually, one could say that establishing the TRCs was an attempt to institutionalize forgiveness without any loss of its interpersonal features.

It is clearly stated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the South African TRC that it functions on the basis of the forgiveness principle: "It is based on the principle that reconciliation depends on forgiveness and that forgiveness can only take place if gross

violations of human rights are fully disclosed. What is, therefore, envisaged is reconciliation through a process of national healing” (6).

Such commissions in Nepal and South Africa depend on the principles of interpersonal forgiveness or punishment. At least, these principles are the reasons for or which this kind of reconciliation was chosen by the political elites. Forgiveness is a process that leads to reestablishing and regaining dignity as a human being with a certain objective value. It is not the exclusive way to regain dignity and self-respect after suffering or committing an acknowledged wrong, but if a given process does not lead to reestablishing the dignity of a victim and a perpetrator, we cannot talk about genuine forgiveness. It is interesting to note that resentment, as in words of famous philosopher J. S. Mill who in *Utilitarianism* writes:

And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato’s dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist. which we bear towards the wrongdoer, already includes the most important aspect of justice; however, this alone cannot make a person pay to the heinous act performed by him/her. (1)

Unless, a person has to pay for his/her act in physical or economic sense, the idea of justice is incomplete. In these concerns, the present research will analyze the effect of events on the aftermath of post conflict in the fictions based on the notion of truth and reconciliation in J. M. Coetzee’s *Disgrace*.

Coetzee's *Disgrace* is based on post-apartheid South Africa where the need for truth and reconciliation among the previously warring parties is emphasized. In absence of a commission that emphasize people to sit together and act for lasting peace, a society can essentially move no forward. However, the lead character Professor David Lurie is still living within the shadows of racial supremacy and, hence his treatment towards the fellow Blacks are biased and from the rulers perspective. In this background, the plot of the novel takes two rape cases to expose the mentality of the Whites and Blacks in a recently freed African society to expose the need of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

However, with the presence of the people like Prof. Lurie who were unwilling to change their mind set up things were tough for the officials working with the truth seeking and reconciliation mechanism. In a study by Jay Jonathan and Erika Vora in "Dilemma – Redefined in Truth Seeking" they opine:

The effectiveness of the TRC was measured on a variety of levels, namely its usefulness in terms of bringing out the truth of what had happened during the apartheid regime, the feelings of reconciliation that could be linked to the Commission, and the positive effects both domestically and internationally that the Commission brought about in a variety of ways from the political environment of South Africa to the economic one. The opinions of three ethnic groups were measured in this study: the English, the Afrikaners, and the Xhosa. (6)

The usefulness of the commission was aimed to be able to reconstruct the lost faith among the once warring groups. However, this is still not prevalent among the people who were determined to continue with the way it was going. Despite the different ways

implemented and lodged by the body among the victims and perpetrator of the once rival groups.

The stance taken by Prof. Lurie is in line with the White people's mentality who seeks excuse on the atrocities performed during the apartheid in the form of the then system and practice. Thus, the bitter enmity continues to exist in the society even after the end of racist era, hence a TRC mechanism is set up to break through this stern mentality. The idea of the commission was to establish mutual faith and understanding among the once rival groups through the process of lasting peace and harmony in the society.

The TRC was viewed as much less effective in bringing about reconciliation by several groups involved during the conflict era. Some of the victims complained that the proceedings only helped to remind them of the horrors that had taken place in the past when they had been working to forget such things. Thus, the TRC's effectiveness in terms of achieving those very things within its title is still debatable. The process of its functioning suspected by the victims and the former warring groups, as well. However, the process and different bodies were engaged in the process to record the grievances, as Joseph McElroy in "Reading of Apolitical Documents" narrates the places set for the hearings of the woes:

Public hearings of the Human Rights Violations Committee and the Amnesty Committee were held at many venues around South Africa, including Cape Town (at the University of the Western Cape), Johannesburg (at the Central Methodist Mission), and Randburg (at the Rhema Bible Church). (36)

The commission empowered to grant amnesty to those who committed abuses during the apartheid era, as long as the crimes were politically motivated, proportionate, and there was full disclosure by the person seeking amnesty.

Similarly, Joseph McElroy is of the opinion that justice and forgiveness are apolitical aspects. He in “Reading of Apolitical Documents” writes:

To avoid victor’s justice, no side was exempt from appearing before the commission. The commission heard reports of human rights violations, perpetrators and considered amnesty applications from all sides, from the apartheid state to the liberation forces, including the African National Congress. (37)

This project analyzes the fact that forgiveness and punishment cannot go hand to hand. It is either forgiveness or punishment that can go with justice. As such, in the aftermath of formation of TRC, the accused of heinous crime are provided with forgiveness instead of punishment. How can justice be mere forgiveness? Can heinous crime be left to go unattended in the name of reconciliation? Is forgiveness concurrent to punishment? Is it fair for TRC to approach to both principles of forgiveness and punishment?

For the lasting peace and mutual understanding to be restored in the war-torn society, it was essential to bring and punish the perpetrators for their past crime. If not, it was essential to make the offenders realize their mistakes, to the least. The purpose of the Commission in bringing out truth can be viewed in the following statement from an article by Jonathan and Vora in “Dilemma – Redefined in Truth Seeking”:

All participants perceived the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be effective in bringing out the truth, however, in varying degrees ranging from person to person. The Afrikaners perceived the TRC to be

less effective in bringing out the truth than the English participants and much less effective than did the Xhosa. (5)

The differences in opinions about the effectiveness can be attributed to how each group viewed the proceedings. Some viewed them as not entirely accurate as many people would lie in order to keep themselves out of trouble while receiving amnesty for their crimes, given that the Commission would grant amnesty to some with consideration given to the weight of the crimes committed.

Through the depiction of conflict of forgiveness and punishment in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, researcher implies to the fact that justice cannot be both punishment and forgiveness. Similarly, the researcher will also take into consideration that justice cannot be both punishment and forgiveness.

Disgrace is the tale of professor of communications, David Lurie at a University in Cape Town. White, fifty-two years old and twice divorced, he has a rash affair with one of his students, Melanie, renamed by Lurie as 'the dark one' (18), in which, at least once, the pressure of his sex upon her is arguably an act of rape. The news gets out and he is summoned under an article which deals with 'victimization or harassment on grounds of race, ethnic group, religion, gender, sexual preference, or physical disability' (39). He is called to a hearing, chaired by the Prof. of Religious Studies (47), where a committee attempts to drag from him not a legal plea of guilt, but rather a public confession or statement of his wrongdoing. One member, Desmond Swarts, is particularly pressing on this point (51-54).

The idea of truth and justice is true in the case that similar confusion and uncertainty, and in some cases similar discordance, exist respecting the first principles of all the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the most certain of them,

mathematics; without much impairing, generally indeed without impairing at all, the trustworthiness of the conclusions of those sciences, as Mill opines:

An apparent anomaly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon, what are called its first principles. Were it not so, there would be no science more precarious, or whose conclusions were more insufficiently made out, than algebra; which derives none of its certainty from what are commonly taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. (3)

The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light.

However, in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it.

Lurie's answers do not please the committee and he is asked to resign from his profession. Lurie leaves Cape Town and stays with his daughter, Lucy, in the countryside, where he agrees to help out on the land and in an animal welfare clinic. Before too long, Lurie and Lucy are attacked by a gang of black men. Lurie is set alight and locked in the bathroom while his daughter is raped and her dogs shot. Lucy refuses to tell the police of the sexual assault, despite her father's protests. She is left pregnant. As Lucy's black neighbours gain more power, her father feels stripped of his social standing. He becomes tied to the animal welfare clinic, helping to put down stray dogs and dispose of their corpses. He becomes the dog-man.

Disgrace closes as Lurie puts down a dog which he has grown, perhaps, to love. Immediately, one can find many allusions to the TRC, not least in Lurie's hearing where the chairman as Professor of Religious Studies can be seen as a parallel to Archbishop Desmond Tutu. One member of the committee, Desmond Swartz, shares the Archbishop's Christian name and, spoken aloud, his surname means 'black', reminding readers of a black/white dichotomy of which Lurie finds himself a part. The article under which Lurie is summoned deals with victimising others of a different sex or race, and although Lurie's deed falls more heavily under a victimisation due to sex, the fact that Melanie is darker skinned does not go unnoticed by the committee, who remind Lurie of the case's 'overtones' in such a time (50), and 'the long history of exploitation' which precedes him (53). Excepting these specific details, a larger issue ties Lurie's case to the TRC, concerning the question of how he should be judged.

Similarly, McElroy in "Reading of Apolitical Documents" frames the idea that compromise amongst many parties' give rise to more extreme post-apartheid wishes. The rising African National Congress would probably have preferred a harsher punishment

whilst the ruling National Party would have preferred total amnesty for fear of retribution after their 46 year reign of racist oppression. Archbishop Tutu's approach seemed to combine the two, offering amnesty for those who wished to humble themselves for forgiveness, their public confessions a contentious fusion of the sacred and the secular. In a situation where every slave-owner was in the wrong, pleading guilty or not guilty was not the problem: the question was of remorse. Ultimately, the aim was to move forward in a spirit of forgiveness, both from the victims of apartheid and from God. Hypothetically, forgiveness could unite the secular and the sacred.

Coetzee in *Disgrace* shows how these concerns cannot easily unite; rather than the secular and sacred working together, Lurie's hearing seems to pull in two opposing directions. The committee at once advises Lurie to seek the help of a lawyer and a priest. They do not accept his plea of guilt, but rather want an admission of wrongdoing which Lurie refuses to give because it would be 'beyond the scope of the law. At the same time, they only accept his challenge to the makeup of the committee in a legal sense, and wish not to concern themselves with what Lurie calls his 'philosophical reservations.

Most strikingly, they want him to make a statement of contrition (where 'contrition' has decidedly Catholic connotations) by which they hope, from the words he uses, to 'divine whether it comes from (his) heart' (54). The use of 'divine' is, of course, ironic. It is impossible for a human to 'divine' such a thing. This critique of the TRC, argues that its Christian and judicial elements were contradictory. The essence of confession lies in the confession booth, or in the prayer. As such, supposing that one can identify the spirit of repentance is almost hubristic. As Lurie reasons:

I appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, before a branch of the law. Before that secular tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea

should suffice. Repentance is neither here nor there. If a public confession is called for, there can be no guarantee that the statement is from the heart.

Repentance belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse. (58)

There can be little doubt that Lurie has done something wrong by sleeping with his student, but although he acknowledges his guilt in a legal sense, he cannot confess a personal sense of guilt. Indeed, if it is personal, it cannot be publically confessed.

One of the haunting queries at the end of the novel is, if Prof. Lurie and his daughter have undergone enough suffocation and trouble. The idea of justice is not only to punish the perpetrator but make him/her feel the agony of the injustice being injected by him to respective victims. So, by the end of *Disgrace* whether Lurie has paid for his sins: the idea of professor to dog-man title has achieved a spiritual elevation, even grace. For example, the scene at Melanie's family home would suggest not, but there cannot be any right or wrong answer: this is not something for any Justice or an individual to judge it. This is indeed an action of human dignity that has to do with the sentiments of life and living of an individual.

In the very fact that *Disgrace* is a novel, and moreover a novel about South Africa, it becomes a public act, albeit an act of literature. As such, by the privacy that defines contrition, it cannot be considered a confession. In order to elucidate this further, I shall turn to Coetzee's other work; indeed his interest in the confession is not limited to *Disgrace*. It can be found across his oeuvre, most evidently in his study on confession in Rousseau, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky. David Attwell analyses this essay and writes that:

Truth in confession discussed in the text and cannot be arrived at by introspection alone, no matter how rigorous, that the endless story of the self will be brought to finality

only at the point where it is most unaware; release comes with an affirmation or imposition of truth - alternatively, from grace.

Without the idea that justice and forgiveness are intermingled and conjoined concepts, one cannot arrive at an answer as to whether or not Lurie has achieved grace because, to reiterate, the sufferings are not merely physical but also mental. Here, the suffering of Lurie may be considered as the memories we construct in and around the sufferings and woes of life. The idea of a Professor suffering from haunting memoirs is not only the idea of his individual self, but the entire society. For this gives a mirror of the society and ideals we live in. Hence, the idea of forgiveness is determined by the society at large. There cannot be a society that is sans values and these values, in turn, are created by the politico of the respective states.

This is not an easy lesson for a secular and critical observation. With this concept comes an endless sense of self-doubt as the textuality of a novel is brought to the fore. With a continual questioning of the self comes very little opportunity for selflessness. Speaking from a position of secular postmodernism, Coetzee writes:

The standard is the body. Whatever else, the body is not "that which is not" and the proof that it is the pain that it feels ... Not grace, then, but at least the body.... It is not that one grants authority to the suffering body: the suffering body takes this authority: that is its power. (75)

'Not grace then, but at least the body'. What significance could this hold for post-apartheid South Africa? Coetzee insists: 'Let me put it baldly: in South Africa it is not possible to deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the body.' As Derek Attridge observes, Coetzee's words are 'chosen with extraordinary care', so it is no coincidence that his profession is embedded within 'authority'.

The suffering body takes authority and, as such, it destroys language. Taken from a testimony given at the TRC, a woman speaks out about the loss of a loved one: 'This inside me... fights my tongue. It destroys... words. Before he was blown up, they cut off his hands so he could not be fingerprinted... So how do I say this? - this trouble... I want his hands back'. Marked by ellipses, her speech is helpless in the face of such a physical loss. She cannot put into words what these hands, marked with suffering, could testify.

Whereas Lurie's supplication before Melanie's parents was not an act of grace, one may ask whether, by the novel's close, Lurie has atoned for his *Disgrace*. The novel ends with Lurie handing over a dog to be euthanized, a dog which he may have grown to love, as:

Animals are the embodiment of the secular and of the body, having no souls in the Christian belief (indeed, Lurie comments earlier in the novel, 'The Church Fathers had a long debate about (animals), and decided they don't have proper souls... Their souls are tied to their bodies and die with them. Lurie bears the crippled dog in his arms 'like a lamb,' into a room which smells of 'expiration, the soft, short smell of the released soul.' (219-20)

It is surely this scene in which Lurie is most likely to have atoned for his *Disgrace*; this ending which best fits the description of 'the endless story of the self brought to finality at the point where it is most unaware'. Lurie gives himself over to the dog, and then gives up the dog. It is his most selfless act in the novel.

For the idea of justice to David Lurie is not limited to self realization but whether his self is satisfied or not?. However, for a society to flourish under larger subjective welfare has to be willing to give and take for the larger welfare of the common interest.

However, the idea of justice; when in one hand is about welfare of the larger population; punishment, on the other hand is an attempt to ensure that all people are not to be treated with same level of influence and facilities. In between lies, forgiveness, for it is not justice or punishment for they contradict each other.

II. Exposition of Forgiveness and Punishment

Nature of crime differ from being of individual nature to social, as a whole. To take for, crimes of labor camps are different from other war crimes, such as crime against humanity including terror bombing and mass evacuation. The latter of the crime is methodical and selective in nature, thereby creating impact at larger scale. This process from the knowingness of the criminal acts which are directed at the humanness of human beings ranges to those done at reckless scientific findings. The whole idea of these crimes is, the perpetrator should be made liable to his/her wrong doings. Moreover, no-one ever asked to be pardoned, so they should not be. And when there is the case of pardon, it could only be justified by the distress and dereliction of the guilty but that finds them complacent and unconcerned.

The notion that God seems able to forgive because such a being would be beyond the particular entanglements of guilt and harm. Jacques Derrida implies that forgiveness points in this way beyond the human or is divine, as in the cliché about erring and forgiveness. Derrida questions the idea that forgiveness cannot be a response to radical or extreme evil or the inexpiable in the name of a hyperbolic ethics, an ethics which is exaggerated, which goes beyond an exchange of demands, and expectations. The unforgivable is radical evil for Derrida or perhaps even something worse (if that was possible). He says that such evil involves “an absolute hatred” and “destructive hostility” (49). This ethics “therefore, [that] carries itself beyond laws, norms, or any obligation. Ethics beyond ethics, there perhaps is the undiscoverable place of forgiveness” (36).

The notion of forgiveness here is one of reaching out to the other, extending our forgiveness, without being asked to do so or expecting anything in return. Derrida says it is hard to follow Vladimir Jankélévitch’s logic in “Should we Pardon them?” has changed

his mind from an earlier work, *Le Pardon* (1967) where he was more sympathetic to the idea of unconditional forgiveness. The gaps Derrida seen in Jankélévitch's logic are between the unforgivable and between findings of crime that are concluding that we cannot forgive it. For Derrida:

This conclusion cannot follow because the unforgivable calls for our forgiveness and "because this logic continues to imply that forgiveness remains the correlate of a judgment and the counterpart to a possible punishment, to a possible expiation," to the expiable. To say the unforgivable calls for forgiveness may not be justice unless the victim too, desires for the same. (36)

Derrida questions such a correlation since he sees punishment and forgiveness as quite separate and distinct, and sees forgiveness as not tied to judgment. He finds the idea of the imprescriptibly points beyond the law to the concept of the unforgivable, and therefore, true forgiveness (53).

Jankélévitch is only alleging that pardon has not been asked for. (35). What Derrida finds most problematic in Jankélévitch's account is the idea that "forgiveness must have a meaning" (36). He finds no reason to assume that forgiveness depends on a human possibility. Derrida challenges both Arendt's and Jankélévitch's view that forgiveness is "a human thing" or on a human scale, (30-31) suggesting that pure forgiveness somehow goes beyond the human.

According to Derrida, Jankélévitch's view concerning the unforgivability of the Shoah falls into the economic logic of exchange. In contrast, hyperbolic ethics concerns itself with the impossible, therefore the unforgivable. Surprisingly, Derrida "privatizes" forgiveness even more than Arendt, because Arendt connects forgiveness with judgment

and punishment (1998, 241), whereas Derrida argues that pure forgiveness has nothing to do with judgment. For him, forgiveness is between two people only, the victim and the perpetrator (42).

Derrida accepts that some people cannot bring themselves to forgive and that such a decision is a private matter, citing the example of a woman who said at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa that only she, the victim, could forgive and she was not ready to forgive. Derrida's idea is that a democracy to come would allow for the secret and the inaccessible, and experiences such as those of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission demonstrate the importance of allowing for such secrets (55). It is important that there is a space for private decisions concerning whether or not and when to forgive. However, there is a strain in Derrida's thought on forgiveness which goes against his acceptance of non-forgiveness.

While Derrida's account of true forgiveness may be of a forgiveness that does not, cannot exist, he claims it is essential to provide us with a means to think about the nature of forgiveness, to understand acts which fall short of true forgiveness. The impossibility of pure forgiveness should guide our thinking about forgiveness based on repentance, mourning, and exchange. Ultimately, we will negotiate between pure forgiveness and its impure forms. Derrida's characterization of forgiveness addresses the logic of forgiveness, rather than the ethics or psychology of forgiveness. He does not make a claim as to when we should forgive and when not.

The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For- besides that the existence of such- a moral instinct is itself one of the matters in dispute- those believers in it who have any pretensions to philosophy, have been obliged to abandon the idea that it

discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete. The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics, insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case. They recognise also, to a great extent, the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their authority. According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. But both hold equally that morality must be deduced from principles; and the intuitive school affirm as strongly as the inductive, that there is a science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the a priori principles which are to serve as the premises of the science; still more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various principles to one first principle, or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims, some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be someone fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of

precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident.

To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism, of past and present ethical doctrine. It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs have, attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognized.

Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further, and say that to all those a priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable.

The purpose is not to criticize these thinkers; but for reference and illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the most illustrious of them, the *Metaphysics of Ethics*, by Kant. This remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the treatise in question, lay down a universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this:

“So act, that the rule on which thou act would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings” (43). But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.

The idea of justice in the present occasion, utilitarian or happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Mill opines:

Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. (4)

This is not however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of

determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.

Similarly, the idea of forgiveness as implicitly arguing for the madness of pure forgiveness, for two reasons. Derrida's criticisms of Jankélévitch and Arendt suggest not only that their account of forgiveness is conditional but also that their particular views about whom and when we should forgive are objects of his disapproval. Derrida quotes a passage from Jankélévitch's essay, and then warns what follows are remarks of such polemical violence and such anger against the Germans that I do not even want to read them or cite them" (28)

Forgiveness is not limited to normative, normalizing of ideas of pardoning the offender. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality. Derrida also says that a hyperbolic ethics "would command precisely ... that forgiveness be granted where it is neither asked for nor deserved, and even for the worst radical evil" (29). Conversely, Derrida's association of impure forgiveness with calculation and corruption implies that we should avoid this impurity by not considering the conditions for forgiveness, such as repentance and atonement, (46) although he notes that once we have to make a decision in a particular case, forgiveness must "engage in a series of conditions of all kinds (psycho-sociological, political, etc.)" (45).

Conditional forgiveness concerns the feelings of the victim and the possible implications of forgiveness, for example. In the sense of holding out impossible ideals, Derrida is a stern moralist. When exactly Derrida believes we should give way to the madness of pure forgiveness is another question. His remarks concerning the South

African Truth and Reconciliation commission accord with Jankélévitch's point that others cannot forgive on behalf of the dead:

The survivor is not ready to substitute herself, abusively, for the dead.”

(2001, 44; Jankélévitch, 1996, 569) Here the impossibility of forgiveness is a pragmatic one, in that the survivor is not in a position to forgive. Derrida also says that “I always risk perjuring myself by forgiving, of betraying someone else by forgiving, for one is always doomed to forgive (thus abusively) in the name of another. (49)

However, it appears that he is willing to accept that risk in the name of forgiveness.

Derrida says “It is between these two poles, irreconcilable but indissociable, that decisions and responsibilities are to be taken” (2001, 45).

Marxists feminists argue that in class society rights can benefit only a few middle class women; like most men, will remain oppressed until the capitalist economic system is replaced by communism. Women's liberation is their entry into the paid labor market and their participation in the class struggle; it is only in communist society that the economic dependency that is the basis of women's oppression will disappear, and communal child care and housekeeping free them from domestic drudgery and allows them to participate fully in productive life. Such change cannot be achieved simply by demanding justice, for they are the product of a particular stage of economic development; sexual equality cannot therefore be achieved at will, but only in specific historical circumstances.

According to Marxists, feminist share ideas with radical feminists, desire for revolutionary change; they seek the establishment of communist society. A society where the means of production will be commonly owned, they believe gender inequality will disappear. There is no clear cut division between Marxist and socialist feminists; they share

much in common. Marxist feminists tend to give more credence to the possibility of capitalist societies gradually moving towards female equality.

Marxist feminists argue that women position in society primarily benefits capitalism and capitalist rather than female. In regards, Margaret Benton argues:

Capitalism benefits from a large reserve of labor force of women to keep wages down and profits up. In their roles in secondary breadwinners, married women provide a source of cheap easily exploitable labor because women have been socialized to comply and submit, they form a docile labor force that can be readily manipulated and easily fired when not required. (7)

Compared to male workers, women are less likely to join unions to go on strike or take other forms of militant actions against employers. Even when women join unions, they often find themselves in male dominated organization where according to Barron and Norris, men often do not share the interest or outlook of their fellow female unionists. Some Marxists also believe that women benefit capitalists and the capitalist system in their capacities as mothers and housewives by reproducing labor power at no cost to employers.

Capitalist social system is main cause of women's oppression in society and its way out is to dismantle this capitalistic social system. Capitalism gives rise to economic inequality and dependence. Marxism can be used to help us understand, how patriarchal law and custom have manipulated economic forces. In the context, Engles says "If wives are to be treated be emancipated from their husband, women must first become economically independent of men" (qtd. in Tong 49). For that dismantle of capitalistic economic system is needed where the exploitation of labor is working very strongly. By this reason women are suffering from the adjective like weak, passive, emotional in patriarchal society. As such, Tyson writes, "Women are economically, politically and socially oppressed as an

underclass” (93). As such, Marxism is used to understand the feminist concerns like, economic, political and social rights and liabilities of women.

Thus, one of the primary tasks of Marxist feminism is to create the kind of world in which women experience themselves as an integrated person rather than fragmented or sophisticated beings. Gender inequality is production of capitalism and determined by capitalistic mode of production. For the elimination of the oppression of women capitalistic economy should be dismantled which also breaks the patriarchal social system because it is based on capitalistic system as workers are alienated from sex, self, children and their surroundings. Women do not get their proper place because working class men have succeeded in protecting their own interest at women’s expense. They have been able to do this because dominant attitude label any work done by women as inherently inferior to that done by men.

Women are paid less because of the interest and self-protection of male superiority that evaluates women as if they are commodity because of they possess different sex. When Women take domestic responsibilities and outward work is generally supposed to be carried out by their male counterparts. In turn, it is generally supposed that the outward work is hard and tough. As such, women are treated as weak creatures capable of carrying out domestic responsibilities, which are less troublesome. Therefore, women’s interest, capacity, vigor, etc. are neglected as male term women as commodity and suitable of inferior activities, and then thereby the whole idea of justice has been unfair and male centered.

Yet for the common folks, forgiveness is merely an apology which has nothing to do with the sentiments of the victims. The press is rather interested in news writing, common people discussing and state in judging good and bad. Hence, having caught up the word utilitarian, Mill explains the scenario as:

While knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment; as though it implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning. (10)

Hence for those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing the victim from further degradation is merely an attempt to further take the victim to turmoil and insecurity.

But there is no list of the dangers of pure forgiveness, of the harms which might arise from its untrammelled progress. Derrida makes one point concerning the possible arrogance and assertion of sovereignty in presuming to forgive. Not everyone wishes to be forgiven. Nevertheless, he adds that forgiveness that is unconditional but without sovereignty is possible. In case of 'there is no right to forgiveness,' I believe that is appropriate, but perhaps lurking there is a tension in that Derrida is taking supererogatory concepts and pushing their logic, so there is a kind of implicit expectation that if unconditional forgiveness is an ideal, then it is a good that we should expect of ourselves and that others may expect of us.

A possible implication of Derrida's account is that we should be less forgiving of the unforgiving, for they do not aspire to true forgiveness, a paradoxical outcome.

Derrida's view seems to imply that the perpetrators must be forgiven no matter what they

did. Furthermore, his account of forgiveness puts the onus on the victims to forgive rather than the oppressors to atone. This point could be a little unjust, as Derrida says that his concern is what he calls the comedy of forgiveness and what he has in mind are those who presume to forgive on behalf of others, such as heads of state (50).

Ultimately, he claims, he remains torn between the purity of forgiveness and the pragmatism of reconciliation. However, the weight of his argument lies on the potential forgivers. This presumption adds a further burden to the victims of radical evil, and cannot constitute an ethical injunction in every case. Nevertheless, Derrida's idea that there is a call for forgiveness even of the unforgivable is an appealing one. He does not define forgiveness psychologically, but it is generally understood as the giving up of thoughts of revenge and resentment, or our 'sense of grievance'.

Such forgiveness does not necessarily mean that the perpetrator and the victim will trust again or reconcile in the sense of restoring a relationship with among each other. Forgiveness takes into consideration that these insights are for resolving or minimizing any future risk, thereby ensuring that the society is sans such repetition. This tends to create environment to forgive the unforgivable, if we ever should, for this leads a society to preach further. Otherwise, society and humane values cease to exist. So, the idea is whether expectation and demand for forgiveness is right or not? Precisely, can there be any conditions for it? Respect for others brings the beginning of the possibility of forgiveness; however, this does not mean that there is a sufficient ground for forgiveness to the perpetrator.

If forgiveness is related to the acknowledgement of responsibility for one's acts and genuine regret and remorse, then forgiveness may be possible. If there is a direct request from forgiveness from the perpetrator, which is rare, it is unjust to expect

forgiveness or criticize victims for withholding it. Forgiveness may be worthwhile for the victim because it shows they are coming to terms with the past. However, no-one can dictate the terms under which someone should reach the point of forgiveness. Being forgiving may be a human good but not one that can be forced on people. Nor should we judge others for not being forgiving enough in these extreme cases.

We might say they are impractical beings or those who make things worse for themselves by not forgiving, but we should not condemn them by holding them to impossible ideals. That said, forgiveness is a valuable ethical action, as long as it does not entail condoning wrongdoing. Lack of forgiving as a consistent trait and in relation to trivial transgressions is problematic, but not particular instances of in relation to extreme ill treatment. In the end, forgiveness is a leap even when it is related to repentance and apology. The attitude of the perpetrator and their relation to the victim makes a basic difference to whether forgiveness is possible. We may be able to forgive, but we cannot ethically demand that victims forgive. The victim may have their own reasons for forgiveness as part of the process of recovery. But only they can decide whether to forgive the unforgiveable.

III. Treatment of Truth and Reconciliation in *Disgrace*

The plot of the novel *Disgrace* is set in post-apartheid South Africa where J. M. Coetzee narrates the tale of David Lurie, twice divorcee, a fifty plus professor of Communications and Romantic Poetry at Cape Technical University. Professor Lurie believes in self made hypocrisy and assumes self as superior to others; even in regards to state made laws and regulations, as well. He lives within his financial and emotional means. Though his position at the university has been reduced, he teaches his classes dutifully; and while age has diminished his attractiveness, weekly visits to prostitute satisfy his sexual needs.

Forgiveness comes with political, cultural and social awareness but the male ideology and discourse is still there in the culture and society to distort amnesty making the women culturally silent and enduring, thus making their thinking culturally erroneous. Thus, the novel ends with David putting down his favorite dog at the animal refuge. It indicates the phases of difficulties through which David is going through, and however, which are just because he took female mere as an instrument, until the tragedy fell on him, in person.

Coetzee's *Disgrace* revolves around the proceedings on the formation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in post-apartheid South Africa. Coetzee centers his fiction on the mentality of a university Prof. Lurie who is obsessed with sexual desires, a colonial mindset up. The formation of TRC was to open legitimate means for hearing and accusation for serious offence against humanity occurred during the civil war, including murder, rape and extortion – crime of serious violation basic of human rights. Professor Lurie's relationship with his female student, Melanie during the time

of proceedings of (TRC) and the incident of rape committed on his daughter, Lucy introduce the idea of amnesty in the novel.

The central character, Prof. Lurie is a White living in living and teaching in a University in South Africa. He is a good example of a White person who loses power, in several ways: he was once a real ladies' man, but soon loses his attractiveness. In his job, too, the power shift after the free elections of 1994 has had a great impact: he is forced to teach communications than his preferred genre of literature and poetry. After his seduction of a non-white student, he has to resign or apologise publicly. However, his mean mentality does not allow him to ask for forgiveness. He prefers quitting the job over the scandal.

For Prof. Lurie to dismantle the capitalistic system is quite difficult. It is shape by the age-old sexual and egoist exploitation that has made the present day Prof. Lurie. By this reason women are suffering from the adjective like weak, passive emotional in patriarchal society. As such, Tyson writes, "Women economically, politically and socially oppressed as an underclass" (93). Marxism which is used to understand the feminist issues, economic political and social, is called Marxist feminism.

Besides, the shameless attitude of Prof. David is witnessed when he has sex on his daughter's bed. However, David is soon to have tough times because of his reckless attitude. A young man - Melanie's boyfriend - visits Lurie unexpectedly in his office that afternoon. He threatens Lurie with disclosure of the relationship. That night Lurie's car is vandalized and Melanie does not come to his house. Monday, Melanie reappears in class with her boyfriend but by then she is determined to have David pay for his doings.

Even though *Disgrace* is written in third person, David Lurie's language, thoughts and perceptions dominate the text. Every character the reader experiences is filtered through the intricate understanding of David. Yet access to Lurie's interior does not produce intimacy so much as it reveals his isolation. This is most apparent in his relationships with women. Within the first few chapters of the novel, the reader is introduced in detail to two of Lurie's lovers: Soraya and Melanie. These women vary in age, ethnicity, and education. The only thing they have in common, really, is David's inability to connect with them.

Lurie's relationship with Soraya, the prostitute, is founded on money. The novel opens, "For a man of his age, fifty-two, divorced, he has, to his mind, solved the problem of sex rather well" (1). His solution to his problem appears to be clear-cut, without any complications. However, as Lurie describes his relationship, we realize that the reason his relationships are so uncomplicated is that Lurie does not allow them to be. He keeps them strictly superficial. Soraya, for instance, is a complicated Muslim woman. Lurie, however, knows nothing at all about her. He does not know where she lives, whether or not she has children, how old she is, or even what her real name is. When Soraya claims to hate nude beaches and beggars, Lurie does not probe the inherent contradiction between her opinion and her occupation. Moreover, Lurie fails to act on his recognition of the injustice of Soraya's employment at Discreet Escorts. Lurie considers paying Soraya directly, cutting out the Escort service, but he dislikes the possibility of having to see her in the morning.

Prof. Lurie has reason to believe that his advances are inappropriate. He and Melanie do not even share interests. As they watch the Norman McLaren movie, Lurie wants Melanie to be captivated, yet Melanie watches. She is passive, too, during sex.

Lurie ignores every indication that Melanie is repulsed by him, instead choosing to interpret her behaviors through his own desires. For instance, when Lurie forces himself on her at her cousin's house, Lurie notices, "She does not resist. All she does is avert herself: avert her lips, avert her eyes. Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core" (25). However, the thing a man of professor status should understand is, avert does not mean 'yes' of the girl. Instead it is a clear indication that she is not willing with the relationship. But, for David, females are mere pleasure and, there is 'no' from them.

David thus equivocally justifies his action with slippery language. Melanie does not resist but rather averts; the act is not rape but undesired to the core. He defines his act with his own language, never calling it what it is: rape. Lurie (and the reader along with him) is locked in his own utterly selfish hermeneutic of desire.

Hence the idea of forgiveness is a male created discourse to dominate the females. When the conditions are restrained, the process is communication regarding discourse. In the context M. H. Abrams narrates:

. . . the discourse of an era, instead of reflecting pre-existing entities and orders, bring into being the concepts, oppositions, and hierarchies of which it speaks; that these elements are both products and propagators of power or social forces, and that as a result, the particular discursive formations of an era determine what is at the time accounted knowledge and the truth as well as what is considered to be humanly normal as against what is considered to be criminal, or insane, or sexually deviant. (107)

There is no ideology on forgiveness for that cannot meet the universal standard, in any forms, either in verbal as myths or in written texts, which may seem to present or

reflect an eternal reality in fact consists of what are called representations that means, verbal formations which are the 'ideological products' or 'cultural constructs' or the historical conditions of a specific era. All these concepts are mere instruments created by the male to impose their supremacy over the females. Such representations are conditioned to be true to those who are under the system of ruling power who has the privilege to create the discourse as truth that is created to impose impositions to females.

These scene engages a number of urgent ethical problems opened up by the TRC, at the core of which lie a series of significant tensions between the 'visceral' and 'reason'. Both *Disgrace* and the TRC question, that is, whether the visceral (conceived as the emotional, instinctive and deeply embodied) can be reasonable, or is in necessary opposition to reason; or whether reason, and the justice and truth that derive from it, are by nature eviscerated, whether they inevitably translate the visceral into abstract value, disembodied meaning or immaterial recovery. Indeed, there are several nuances of these terms that are particularly meaningful in the context of the TRC and Coetzee's interrogation of it.

Prof. Lurie is a twice divorcee, but has a daughter from his first marriage. Because Lurie is a specialist in literature, he does not like his job any longer now he has to teach communications. When David's weekly dates with the prostitute Soraya end abruptly, he starts an affair with one of his students. Melanie Isaacs is more than thirty year younger and not interested in this affair with Lurie. Although Lurie does not see it similarly, Melanie is unwilling to have sex with him and accuses him of rape. Lurie has to speak to a committee of inquiry who want him to repent publicly. He is quite stubborn, because he is willing to admit his guilt, but does not want to read

Melanie's statement or apologise. Prof. Lurie then resigns and leaves to the countryside to see his daughter Lucy.

The decision of the professor to quit his job rather than apologize has to do with deeply rooted knowledge which according to Pieter Vermeulen in "Dogged Silences" is called 'visceral' which "refers literally to the internal organs (the viscera) and figurally to the deep or profound" (187). The feeling of rigidness, hence comes to be associated not only with the body, but with emotions and instinct and, because of these figural meanings which is associated to an individual through the bloodline, culture and way of living s/he is groomed. This mentality that does not regard other people in regards to self has to be changed to bring around a reasonable and visible change in the society. The idea of former perpetrator settling down with the victim and understanding his/her pain is the idea expressed in the TRC.

The notion of justice being delivered to the victims is not merely physical but, also psychological and mental. However, with people like Prof. Lurie, the essence of repentance can only also signify the inverse of reason: the irrational. It means there is no meaning and purpose is asking for forgiveness by heart over the spilled milk. Reason, on the other hand, before it comes to mean the premise of an argument, signifies a reckoning or accounting; it is invested, that is, in the calculable and the proportionate, inadequate and the entire history of truth and justice dependent upon it.

Capacity to adapt thought or actions to ends of justice is forgiveness; however, they are state owned and devised. The very test of humanity itself – and thus to be synonymous with sanity. These meanings, their strange harmonies and disturbing dissonance, resonate throughout the TRC's difficult mandate to be at once a quasi-judicial body charged with measuring the accountability of perpetrators and a forum

for witnessing the seemingly emotional, embodied and profoundly interior testimony of victims to the process of granting amnesty.

The process of amnesty cannot be started unless, truth in regards to what, how and who are responsible for an offence is established as can be seen in the case of Coetzee's eighth novel, *Disgrace*. It is Coetzee's first novel about his native South Africa after its transition to black-majority rule, constitutes a direct and rather ominous meditation on that fear. *Disgrace* won the Booker Prize in 1999, making Coetzee the only author to win twice, the first time having been for *Life and Times of Michael K.* in 1983.

The protagonist David Lurie is a fifty-two-year-old University teacher, or, as he puts it, "earns his living," at Cape Technical University, formerly Cape Town University College (3). The change of name itself is meant to suggest how dismally the life of the mind is faring in South Africa of late. Both the classics and modern-language departments having been shut down in a process called rationalization, Lurie now teaches communications, a field he finds inherently preposterous, plus one literature course each year that fails to excite his post-Christian, post-historical, post-literate students.

When we first encounter him, Lurie is twice divorced and content with a weekly visit to a prostitute, a habit made untenable when he accidentally runs into her with her young children in tow. He then begins an affair on uncertain terms with Melanie Isaacs, one of his students. (8). Their names notwithstanding, these characters are not explicitly identified as Jewish, though the unspoken fact of their Jewishness clearly has something to do with Coetzee's larger symbolic purposes. She is not unwilling, but neither does she fully consent; as for him, although he feels a hope that "there might, despite all, be a future" for the two of them, he mishandles things; (14).

Melanie becomes confused and rattled, and a sexual-harassment complaint is soon filed. In the midst of Rape Awareness Week, Lurie must undergo the procedure his university has set out for such cases. The panel assigned to hear his case, which seems quite pointedly not to include any white males, insists not only on an admission of guilt—this Lurie readily gives—but on “confession, repentance, abasement” (28).

But Lurie cannot bring himself to renounce an affair that has engaged his passion and affections, and in any event he will not concede to his inquisitors the right to think his private thought, “I appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, before a branch of the law. Before that secular tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. . . . Repentance belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse” (39).

It appears, then, that we are finally being given something to admire in this dour, self-centered figure. But the next part of the novel thoroughly undermines any such expectation, just as it erases the crucial distinction Lurie has himself drawn between the spheres of public and private accountability. Instead, the two gradually blur into the background of South Africa’s changed political and social landscape, in which the rights of man have apparently lost any semblance of validity.

Dismissed from his teaching position for his stubborn stand, Lurie goes to his daughter’s place in the country to puzzle out his life. Lucy is an ex-hippie lesbian, living at the moment in contented celibacy and making ends meet by caring for dogs and raising flowers—a scaled-down, close-to-the-earth, nonintellectual existence that contrasts with what has been her father’s appetite for sensual satisfaction and worldly accomplishment. Lurie now busies himself helping out at a local animal clinic run by one of Lucy’s married friends. There he slowly overcomes his cynical detachment, develops an affection for the many unwanted dogs that must be put down, and conducts a brief affair

with the unattractive owner of the clinic in an episode that constitutes a sort of penance for his previous sexual arrogance.

But just as Lurie is adjusting to his reduced circumstances, and living through his disgrace, much greater humiliations are in store. The ever-present dread of crime in the new South Africa becomes a horrible reality when three black intruders gain entry to the Lurie property, ransack the house, shoot the dogs, set David afire, and rape Lucy, who later learns that she has become pregnant as a result.

It studies the domination of women in many fields from different perspectives thereof. In this regard, Rosemarie Tong states, “Feminism is not one, but many theories or perspectives and that each feminist theory or perspective attempts to describe women’s oppression to explain its causes and consequences and to describe strategies for women’s liberation” (16).

Feminism is a school of thought which tries to dismantle the patriarchal social norms and values to liberate women against the natural law of equality. As a movement, it assumes that women are also human beings like men. It raises the voices against the inadequacy, as well as ideologies of the males. Therefore feminism is complaint against patriarchal monopoly and is a commitment to eradicate the ideology of domination to establish a healthy and equal society for both male and female. As such, feminism is a movement for the creation of new society in which there are no any forms of discrimination and individuals are not separated and demarked on the basis of theirs’ making of gender, race and sexuality.

The major focus of feminism is on political, economical, physical, psychological and religious equality. It opposes gender stereotypes and discrimination against women based on the assumption that women are passive, weak and physically inferior. British author and critic Rebecca West has following opinion on feminism:

I myself have never been able to find out precisely what feminism is . . . I only know that other people call me a feminist, whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a door mate or prostitute to that of a woman of voice and status. To be called feminist is okay, but what actually it stands for, is a challenge that has been a query to me. (219)

Feminism has often focused on what is absent rather than what is present, reflecting concern with the silencing and marginalization of women in patriarchal culture, a culture organized in the favors of men unlike the other approaches for their false assumptions about women.

The tale of Melanie, renamed by Lurie as 'the dark one' (18) has feminism reaction to it. The unfair treatment imposed upon women. It raises voices against the commodification of women. Louis Tyson, one of the leading scholars on the necessity of feminist movement comments on the necessity of the feminist movement, as:

Women are not the objects used for the conveniences of men. It's a question made by women to break all oppression and restriction. It's a struggle against patriarchy and its ill treatment of the female race. Patriarchy continually exerts forces that undermine women's self- confidence and assertive, then points to the absence of these qualities as proof that women are naturally, self effacing and submissive. (85)

Feminism wages wars against all kinds of myth making tendency of men. It challenges the foundation of male norms and assumption and questions heliocentric ideologies which mean the patriarchal attitudes and male interpretation of literature, economics, politics, religions, etc.

According to Marxist theory, an individual is heartily influenced by the structure of society which in all modern societies mean class structure. Marxist feminist see contemporary gender inequality as determined ultimately by the capitalist mode of

production. Gender oppression and women's subordination is seen as a form of class oppression, which is minted (like racism) because it serves the interest of capital and ruling class. Marxist feminism is the belief that women's situation cannot be understood in isolation from its socio-economic context, and that any meaningful improvement in the lives of women requires that this context be changed. In regards, Althusser opines, "We live in a class society that is also structured by gender, which means that men and women experience class in different ways" (258).

One of the aspect of justice is; gender oppression is class oppression and women's subordination is seen as a form of class oppression. To analyze women's situation in society understanding of socio-economic context is the prime requisite. Marxist feminism connects the oppression of women to Marxist ideas about exploitation, oppression and labor. Marxist feminists see women as being held down as result of their unequal standing in both the workplace and the domestic sphere. Prostitution, domestic work, childcare and marriage are all seen by Marxist feminist as ways in which women are exploited by a patriarchal system which devalues women and the substantial work they do. Marxist feminists focus their energies on broad change that affects society as a whole rather than on an individual basis. They see the need to work alongside not just men, but all other groups as they see the oppression of women as a part of larger pattern that affects everyone involved in the capitalist system. Feminism tries to find out the root cause of women's oppression in society and way-out from that oppression. Marxist feminism is a sub type of feminism, which sees the oppression of women and seeks its resolution from Marxist point of view.

Mary Wollstonecraft in *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* depicts how the industrialized Europe of the eighteen century worked against the married bourgeoisie women of the time. She was an advocate of educational and social equalities for women. Wollstonecraft compares the women to that of the caged birds, who can sing but cannot,

claim to do so in the natural habitat. Women, can claim their supremacy in traditional works like giving birth and looking after the children, added by the house-hold chores. Thus, Wollstonecraft attacks the sentimental novels of her time for their harmful influence on women's intellectual development. In the context, she writes, "Feminine weakness of character often produced by confined education is a romantic twist of the mind, which has been very properly termed sentimental" (385). As such, the sale of emotions of women was the subject matter of sentimental novels.

Marxists critics search their root of feminism in the writings of various writers, including Virginia Woolf. The sentimental novels have always remained at the centre of love affairs and feelings. "*A Room of One's Own*" is a book by Virginia Woolf where she discusses the privacy and economic independence to develop and write text as male writers. Due to the lack of right to freedom and property, women are being prevented from realizing their creative possibilities by patriarchal society. She hopes to achieve a balance between a male self realization and female self annihilation. The tradition of women's writing is affected by male's tradition. She also makes a survey of the women writers from the seventeenth century to nineteenth century. However, Woolf was a feminist who disliked the word 'feminist,' as this word represented feminine attitude of weak mentality and submission. She wanted boldness and decency in the society, so as to deal with the problems on her own. By being what male wanted them to do, there was no escape from the traditional sense of male domination on the females imposed on them, since ages. This is the outcome of the male mentality, which is guided and motivated by the sexist nature of male.

Facing different cross currents like the Suffrage Movements, Civil Rights Movements and Liberation Movements of twentieth century feminism took shape as an organized movement only after 1960s. It was launched as one of the effective literary movements after this. This ferment of the 1960s provided feminism with its ideological core,

vitality and impetus. The early feminists during the first half of the twentieth century were ultimately successful in gaining the suffrage in 1919 and were instrumental in the enactment of protective legislation for women workers in the 1920s. These women, who were concerned with reforms to improve the status of women within the separate sphere, have been termed 'social feminists.' At the same time, they were challenged by a group of more outspoken feminists who rejected protective legislative as inherently discriminatory and worked for equal rights legislation. These are often described, as the 'radical feminists.' They questioned patriarchal authority in such a radical manner that the social feminists accused them of being anti-family.

During the 1960s and 70s, new wave feminism came with an attempt to break down the barriers between the male and female spheres. In a social context, where patriarchy disseminated the idea that to be women in this society is to be "feminine" and to be a feminist is to be "neurotic," this movement of feminism flourished much with the writings of twentieth-century feminist writers Virginia Woolf and Simone de Beauvoir who made a great contribution in the field of feminist theories with their world famous works *A Room of One's Own* and *The Second Sex* respectively.

Except housework women have to perform their natural works. One of them is childbearing which women's unquestionable task is. But in patriarchal society childcare is also women's essential work. They give birth and bring up the baby but male members do not take it as a vital work and if any woman does only child caring in the house is called workless. But the father or may be so called father takes away the child when he wants. This Injustice is in patriarchal society. As Friedrich Engles's says, "women give birth, the mother of any child is always known. However, the identity of the father is never certain because a woman could have been impregnated by a man other than her husband" (qtd. Tong 49). Later this child, if male, tries to control mother.

It is soon established that Lucy's former assistant, a black man by the name of Petrus who is now, post-apartheid, her co-proprietor, probably knew the attack was coming and managed to absent himself on the day it occurred. Lurie, confronting him, is met with impassivity, insensibility, stonewalling. "In the old days one could have had it out with Petrus," Lurie thinks:

But now, "It is a new world they live in, he and Lucy and Petrus. Petrus knows it, and he knows it, and Petrus knows that he knows it. Unlike her father, however, Lucy has been coming to terms with the new situation; she is prepared to accept the child growing within her, and she also recognizes that Petrus cannot and will not be brought to account. Invoking a phrase indelibly associated with an earlier regime of white supremacy, she spits out: "He is not some hired laborer whom I can sack because in my opinion he is mixed up with the wrong people. That's all gone, gone with the wind."
(65)

Perhaps, Lucy tells her father, the rapists have even marked her out as their own property, and will return to claim her—and she wonders, shockingly, "if *that* is the price one has to pay for staying on. . . . They see me as owing something. They see themselves as debt collectors, tax collectors" (67).

When Petrus offers to protect her and the child if she will become part of his extended household, in effect giving over her land and agreeing in name to being his third wife, Lucy accepts, again shockingly, insisting only on the privacy of her own home. Lurie protests all the way, calling on every principle of justice and ethics and individual integrity. His fatherly love and protectiveness aroused, he begs her to leave, to prosecute, to renounce, to repudiate, to refuse. But to Lucy these are all abstractions, without

meaning in the circumstances she feels she must somehow manage herself. And so, gradually, he, too, comes to accept the new arrangements, which begin to look like a disturbingly desolating allegory of the white man's fate in the new South Africa.

Disgrace is a gripping read, paced, shaped, and developed in a way that locks us into the narrative, and threaded with recurring images, like that of fire, which slowly build to an unbearable climax. In fact, the airless, ungenerous voice that pervades these pages is clearly the result of a conscious authorial decision. As Lurie himself remarks, "English is an unfit medium for the truth of today's South Africa. . . . Like a dinosaur expiring and settling in the mud, the language has stiffened" (123).

Coetzee's subtext seems to be nothing less than the extinction of Western man and the Western sense of self as every pole of meaning that once constituted Lurie's being is slowly, inexorably, deconstructed in the reality of the new South Africa. As such, *Disgrace* is vaguely reminiscent of the traces of human civilization relating to the formation of punishment and self realization. Lurie is re-inscribed, as the academic term has it nowadays, into a new postcolonial arrangement, becoming a figure on the margins of history.

In accepting this new position, moreover, Lurie undergoes every bit of the reeducation that he once stoutly opposed when standing before the sexual-harassment tribunal. His edges wear off, his hardness melts along with his certainties. His sexuality flickers out as he begins to question the terms on which he used to see male/female relatedness; even the rape, which will at least give him a grandchild, comes to seem morally preferable to his own previous barren use of women. Renting a stuffy room with a lumpy mattress, he devotes himself to the humane elimination of dogs whom he has come to see as fellow beings with souls.

As Lurie surrenders the claims of his manhood and his masculine prerogatives, bound up as they are with such outmoded concepts as principle, judgment, and law, Lucy asserts the superior and countervailing “female” virtues of specificity, immediacy, acceptance, tolerance, and adaptability. Her proposed new position in Petrus’s establishment:

However “humiliating,” is nevertheless welcomed by her as “a good point to start from again. . . . With nothing. . . . No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.

“Like a dog,” her father comments. “Yes, like a dog,” she assents. (189)

Coetzee mean to endorse these horrifying new arrangements, or to accept them as inevitable? Is he projecting a chastening parable of love and forgiveness.

At the end, all we are left with at the end is the picture of Lucy, contented, close to the land, un-modern, and Lurie in a deepening state of resignation, almost beyond thought or speech, cradling a doomed dog like a lamb a wounded Christ figure in a scaled-down narrative of renunciation and redemption. The even more terrible response given by Coetzee is that when that fateful moment arrives, any independent sense of reality will have been so completely extinguished that there will be no one to tell the difference between love and hate, justice and mercy, right and wrong. In this, surely, he is mistaken; but he comes searingly close to making us believe that the idea of forgiveness is vague and blurred.

The same can drawn of the interrogatory plot of *Disgrace* which begins with David Lurie’s sexual harassment hearing over his affair with Melanie Issacs, a student in his Romantic poetry class. This scene of interrogation, in which the faculty committee indignantly objects to Lurie’s ‘acceptance of charges’ without remorse,

initiates the novel's reframing of, and reflection on, the ethical and juridical quandaries confronted by the TRC. However, the professor assumes the idea of forgiveness is abstract and

The obscene nature of Lurie is framed by colonial concept of justice. For him, the entire process of investigation and delivery of justice by the University Disciplinary Committee is meaningless and futile. He is of the idea that 'to apologize' would in no regards is likely to change the matter for good. Prof. Lurie's stance on the notion of 'repentance' is depicted, as:

I am sure the members of this committee have better things to do with their time than rehash a story over which there will be no dispute', responds Lurie to his colleagues. 'I plead guilty to both charges. Pass sentence, and let us get on with our lives. (23)

This response does not, from the committee's perspective, meet the demands of ethical responsibility, ostensibly both because it is not sufficiently visceral and because it does not provide the spectacle of deliberation that warrants the production of reasonable truth.

Dr. Rassool, committee member of the disciplinary body objects to Lurie's demeanor protests to the way things are taken by Lurie. When the essence of repentance is at the psychological level, Prof. Lurie takes it in mechanical sense. Prof. Lurie accepts the charges, as:

Prof Lurie says he accepts the charges. Yet when we try to pin him down on what it is that he actually accepts, all we get is subtle mockery. To me that suggest that he accepts the charges only in name. Professor Lurie pleads guilty, but I ask myself, does he accept his guilt or is he simply

going through the motions in the hope that the case will be buried under paper and forgotten? (24)

The way of accepting guilt cannot be merely in words but has to be in mental and psychological level. This is something that comes with the change in mentality of an individual resulting in a marked change in his/her behavior. However, this is not reflected in the way Lurie accepts the guilt.

To Prof. Lurie things are abstract and mechanical. He does not understand the pain of victimized people, instead tries to justify his act. The Disciplinary Committee does not accept the way he justifies his act. The reconciliation between the perpetrator and the victim is not merely abstract, but should be meaningful and in a rational manner accepted by both the parties. The Committee finds apologize forwarded by Prof. Lurie as unacceptable, to which Dr. Rassool has following opinion:

Does, then, the acceptance of charges, as Lurie's response suggests, signify merely a willingness to pay the price, as in 'accepting the charges' for a collect phone call? Or does it require a performance of deliberative reason and sincerity? Or, as Dr Rassool's remonstrance demands, a visceral transformation of attitude, emotion and the instincts of the body itself?

Lurie's position insists that justice is a matter of calculable adequation, of indemnity and exchange – that it operates in the economic manner elaborated in exchange for goods or kind for the damage.

This argument for a strictly economic conception of justice appears at a number of other provocatively troubling moments throughout the novel. After the attack at the farm, for example, Petrus proposes to Lurie a series of indemnifications that, while

extra judiciary, largely conform to the exchange structure of justice: that the insurance will give Lurie a new car, that his (Petrus's) promise of future protection will compensate for Lucy's lost sense of security, and that his offer of marriage will function as reparation for her rape. Lucy herself comes up with a reasonable explanation of her rape, in which the rape is, rather than an injury to be compensated, the indemnification for a history of dispossession and harm. Perhaps "they see me as owing something", she muses. "They see themselves as debt collectors, tax collectors. Why should I be allowed to live here without paying? Perhaps that is what they tell themselves" (55).

David first notices that the power in South Africa is shifting when he hears about Petrus's development. Lucy tells him that Petrus is her "new assistant, in fact, since March co-proprietor" (62). Deirdre Coleman in "Anthropology of Forgiveness" mentions that Petrus is Lucy's "newly empowered neighbour" (210). Lucy explains to David that "Petrus is busy establishing his own lands" and that "he has played his cards right [so] he could get a second grant to put up a house" (76-7). David would not believe it if Lucy had not told him, but Petrus "is a man of substance" (77). Somehow it seems David sees him more as a farm hand. Lucy adds that she "can't order Petrus about. He is his own master" (114). According to Lopez,

In the first years of South African democracy, the existing system of property in land, together with the power relations associated with it, was being superseded and reformed, and as we see in *Disgrace*, particularly in Petrus's development throughout the novel from labour tenant to farm manager, the effects of these measures were especially felt in the rural

areas, where everything revolves around the property and distribution of the land. (925)

Petrus is the prime example of a black man who gains more power after the abolition of apartheid. The depiction of powerful Petrus is the sign of the positive changes being enjoyed by the Blacks.

David thinks that Lucy's rape was instigated by Petrus because he wants her piece of land. David knows that "Petrus will not be content to plough forever his hectare and a half [...] Petrus would like to take over Lucy's land" (117). David's view of Petrus is even bleaker because he thinks "Petrus has a vision of the future in which people like Lucy have no place" (118). David also thinks it is suspicious that Petrus is mysteriously away when the attack takes place. His suspicion towards Petrus is not surprising because he has hardly known to believe people.

According to Coleman, Lurie thinks Petrus is "complicit in some way in her gang rape" (597). The rape is to show Lucy and David how powerless they are and how powerful Petrus is. According to Coleman, "Lurie's concept of a conflict between different sides is racially inflected: symbolically, the rape signals for him a transference of supremacy from one side to another" (603). Coleman adds that the three rapists have shown:

. . . Lurie that in competitive, evolutionary terms, black seed prevails over white, youth over age. Lopez explains that "Acts of intrusion in *Disgrace* point to the conflicts and uncertainties reigning in post-apartheid South Africa, given the new conditions for sharing rural and urban space by all racial and social groups. (926)

The attack could be a revenge of the black South Africans for the past in which only whites had power. According to Lopez, “the attack on Lucy and Lurie on the farm is the event that most explicitly highlights the end of white privilege over the land and its people” (927).

In the case of the TRC, the uncertain meaning of accepting charges – of the implicit demand for visceral transformation to accompany the calculations of justice – presented itself most glaringly in the guise of perpetrators. This, even insouciantly, recounted acts of unfathomable barbarity, counting on this truth to pay their debt, purchase amnesty and settle the demands of responsibility. Indeed it was this spectacle of perpetrators eviscerated of remorse and shame, if not humanity itself, that led some South Africans to regard the TRC’s ‘truth for amnesty’ deal as essentially exchanging justice for truth, or as merely canceling debts rather than exacting payment for them.

The difficulty of justice or happiness is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory or natural instinct but it is a sense informing us of right and wrong. Besides that the existence of such a moral instinct is itself one of the matters in dispute those believers in it who have any pretensions to philosophy to which philosopher Mill narrates:

Victims have been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete. (9)

The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics, insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case.

While the TRC articulated its justice, under Desmond Tutu's influence, as 'restorative' rather than retributive, its amnesty branch nonetheless operated on the principle of reasonable exchange and measured its judgments in terms of adequation and proportionality – whether the truth had been adequately confessed, and whether the act, omission or offense was proportional to the political objective pursued.

Thus, while the TRC is a forum that allows for greater visceral expression than does an ordinary courtroom, it maintains purchase on the reasonable by measuring ends and means and by bartering amnesty for truth. Now while Lurie, in his sexual harassment hearing, clutches doggedly onto a literal conception of justice, Dr. Rassool demands a performance that demonstrates viscerality. This demand is twofold: it asks both for a suitable performance and for a visceral transformation and it shoulders the hope that the former will function as assurance of the latter.

The scene, thus, resumes the novel's meditation on performance as a constituent of responsibility that begins with Lurie's attempts to mop up the bureaucratic traces of his relationship with Melanie. Urging her to take the exam she has missed, even if she has not read the material, he implores:

Melanie, I have responsibilities. At least go through the motions'. Lurie implies in this appeal to Melanie that responsibility can, in some sense, be satisfied by 'going through the motions', that if performance is not entirely coextensive with responsibility, that the two at least significantly

overlap, that a certain enactment or display is a necessary constituent of responsibility. (203)

Yet this performance is precisely what Lurie himself refuses to give at his sexual harassment hearing and for this reason his admission does not, from the committee's perspective, meet the demands of responsibility: it neither provides the spectacle of deliberation and debate that passes for the production of truth nor does it perform a sense of subjective guilt – of iniquity and *Disgrace* – to accompany its acknowledgment of objective guilt. In short, the committee isn't convinced that Lurie's admission is a reflection of his sincere feelings: "I have said the words for you, now you want more, you want me to demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous. That is beyond the scope of the law" (204).

Lurie's point is not without merit: sincerity is indeed beyond the scope of the law. The law has no reliable means for measuring it, no matter how crucial a constituent of truth it may be considered to be. Indeed, the irony is that the main form of measuring sincerity, as these scenes attest, is performance itself, a measurement implicitly endorsed by the TRC which relied largely on public performances as the quality control mechanism in the production of truth and made transformative. If the TRC was not so naive as to assume that this transformative equation was guaranteed, it nevertheless wagered heavily on it, unambiguously seeking a visceral transformation, not only of individuals, but of society.

This demand for transformation is precisely what Lurie mocks following his sexual harassment hearing. 'Reformation of character', he scoffs to Lucy, 'It reminds me too much of Mao's China. Recantation, self-criticism, public apology. I'm old-fashioned, I would prefer simply to be put against a wall and shot. His scorn is based

not only on his preference for a crudely economic version of justice, but on his skepticism over whether the visceral is, through confession, contrition or punishment, transformable.

In order to learn more about the potential consequences of the power shift, I will look at the reaction of the characters in the novel. Most of the white characters have difficulties with becoming used to the shift in power and some of them would rather deny the shift, but they all have to come to terms with it, because it is the abolition of a system that treated people unequally and in a discriminatory fashion.

According to Maria Lopez, “[i]n *Disgrace*, continuous topographical or spatial conflict highlights the problem of how to learn to share space, how to live together, in the new South Africa” (929). Lopez’s statement summarises some of the main issues in J.M. Coetzee’s novel *Disgrace*. Another very significant issue in the novel is power and the reversal of power. In the novel, Coetzee writes about relationships in the post apartheid situation in South Africa. The relationships in the novel are affected by the shift of power that takes place and are therefore being redrawn. Although he does not discuss the political situation explicitly, race, gender, and power are recurrent themes in his novels. In *Disgrace*, Coetzee is sometimes explicit about skin colour, but most of the times he only gives the reader hints so that we can never be certain about race. For example, names in the novel often refer to skin colour.

The reversal of power relations seems to be more intense in the country. Instead of rest, David experiences tensions in the countryside. While he came to rest, he and Lucy are attacked at the farm. Lucy is raped by three black men and David is almost set on fire. They also shoot the dogs, beat David and steal his car. It seems that life is different in the country, because possession and power are still very significant.

However, life in the country is actually quite similar to life in the city, because power is also very significant in Cape Town. David's personal change, as a reaction to the power shift, is very conspicuous in the novel, because he changes from a selfish man to a caring man with compassion for animals. He no longer cares about appearances only, and it seems that power has become less important for him. According to Joseph McElroy:

The politics [in this novel] are post apartheid, a new order of political correctness and at first a somewhat predictably sketched wasteland popular culture. But from the city the story moves to the situation in the countryside, anarchy largely unpolished, land and power changing hands, the racial majority finding itself. (30)

McElroy summarises the novel in two sentences which capture the most conspicuous developments. The most important issue in the novel seems to be the abolition of apartheid and most importantly how black and white people should live together as a result. Because most of the people deal with the consequences of the post apartheid period, this is the novel's main theme. The change takes place in the city as well, but not as conspicuously as in the country where black people gain much more power after the change in the system for it is the system that determines the way societies are made and justice is imparted. There is a shift in power from white to black and it is best that white people accept this and try to adapt.

David thinks that he has "solved the problem of sex rather well," because he hires Soraya every Thursday afternoon, which shows that the power in their relationship is not evenly distributed (1). In other words, their relationship is not one of equals. On the other hand, David is unaware that he is powerless because she only

gives him the illusion of power. When Soraya wants to pull out, she is able to and David cannot change this. Although David treats Soraya rather well, his reasons for this behaviour are quite selfish. Soraya, with her “honey-brown body, unmarked by the sun” is “tall and slim, with long dark hair and dark liquid eyes” (1).

It seems that Soraya is coloured and David also explains that she is “a Muslim” (3). David likes her not only for her beauty, but also because she is “quiet, quiet and docile” (1). He seems to describe her as a child, because he calls her docile, but also “compliant, pliant” (5). David mentions that Soraya is “surprisingly moralistic” in her “general opinions” (3).

Disgrace is the story of a fifty two years old divorcee, Prof. David Lurie, once a renowned and loved lecturer of Romantic Poetry at Cape Town University. But this gentleman could not maintain his ethics in regards to treatment towards female student and fell to disgrace. This is the story of fall of human mentality that with the change of the times and administration, he is now Adjunct Professor of Communication. He is also limited in the courses he offers. Other than the mandatory Communication 101 and 201, he is allowed to offer only one elective or special-field course. This year he offers a course on Romantic poets. Lurie is apathetic toward the material he teaches and rarely engages his students. He no longer teaches out of passion or conviction but only to make a living.

Over the past twenty-five years the professor has published three scholarly books from opera, to William Wordsworth’s influence on history, and revelations of erotic nature of Richard of St. Victor, and on. Yet, his true desire is to write a chamber opera entitled *Byron in Italy* is yet to materialize. Every Thursday Lurie travels to a prominent gated community, enters a well-furnished apartment, and sleeps with Soraya, a prostitute that he chose from a catalogue at Discrete Escorts under the category of exotic.

Prof David Lurie teaches Romantic poetry at the University of Cape Town. At the start of the novel he is visiting a prostitute for a weekly session. However he starts an affair with one of his students, 30 years his junior. He is intoxicated with her. She however turns sour and her boyfriend threatens David. She then makes an official complaint about David. There is a Committee of Inquiry at which David admits his guilt but refuses to apologize. This is the crux of male mentality that takes female for granted and her desires are mere abstract to the passion of male.

Thus, David is publicly condemned and loses his job. He then goes to stay with his lesbian daughter Lucy on her small holding in the Eastern Cape. There he hopes to continue with the writing of his long cherished dream – an opera on Lord Byron. For a while everything is peaceful and David volunteers at an animal welfare camp. However one day they are visited by three men who rape Lucy and set fire to David and rob them of their car and valuables. This horrific attack changes their relationship. Lucy withdraws from social life and David fails to understand why she does not bring rape charges against the men. The pathos of Lucy and the victims of sexual assault of Prof. David have to be understood from the perspective of feminism.

Feminism is one of the most widely used terminologies in recent days. It refers to wide varieties of concerns in regards to empowering female, and also in exposition of male mentality that dominates females and undermines their sufferings. However, the use of ‘feminism’ has a long history and goes as far as latter years of nineteenth century. According to Simon Blackburn in *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*:

The term feminism was first used by the French dramatist Alexander Dumas in 1872 in pamphlet “I” to designate the emerging movement for women rights. The term ‘I’ gradually emerged to be world-wide cultural movement to secure a complete equality of women within the enjoyment of all human

rights in moral, social, religious, political, educational, legal, economic, and many others equalities. (123)

From then onwards the term has been widely used in various fields in regards to empowerment of women, around the world. In the recent days, it stands almost near to the sense that feminism is a movement that is an attempt to safeguard female rights and voices.

This statement sounds belittling, because he suggests that she cannot be this moralistic because she is a prostitute. Although he seems to like Soraya very much, he probably likes her most because she obeys easily. This illustrates that David enjoys it that she follows up his commands and that he enjoys being in power. He pays her and she has to obey him for ninety minutes. David would like to have more power over Soraya, though. He admits that “he has toyed with the idea of asking to see him in her own time” (2). He never actually asked Soraya. According to Deirdre Coleman, “ownership is a key issue in Lurie’s relationship with women in the novel” (610).

After Soraya’s disappearance, David starts a sexual affair with Melanie Isaacs. This relationship consists of people who are more unequal than David and Soraya were. Melanie is one of David’s students at his Romantics course, which means he is her superior. When David tries to talk Melanie into sleeping with him, she can hardly refuse because he has the power to let her fail the course. Although David never forces Melanie by threats of this nature, their affair is unwanted by Melanie. It seems that in this affair David is able to find the power he lost with Soraya. According to Coleman, “ownership is also an issue in his seduction of the student Melanie” (610). David tells Melanie that she “ought to” spend the night with him, “because a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone” and “she has a duty to share it” (16).

While David first defends himself by comparing himself to a dog that follows his instincts, he later understands the damage rape does to a woman. Lucy asks him if “males must be allowed to follow their instincts unchecked” (90). David thinks men cannot repress their desires, but when he compares himself to the three rapists, he becomes more concerned about women. He thinks he can identify himself with the three powerful men, but questions whether he can put himself in the position of a powerless woman. Short after Lucy’s rape by the three black men, David thinks about the relationship between men and women. On the other hand, for Lucy, the attack does not have racial implication, but gender implications. For Lurie this is difficult to believe, because they have also tried to set him on fire while he is a man. This could be explained by the fact that because he is a man, he is more powerful and has to be made harmless before they can show their strength to Lucy and to David as well.

David slowly understands that men are much more powerful than women. He first thinks Lucy would report the rape if the three men had been white (159). According to Lopez, “for Lucy, then, unlike for Lurie, the essential fact is not that the rapists were black and she is white, but rather that they are men and she is a woman. The male-female conflict is emphasised over the inter-racial one” (928).

Thus, the idea of moral conscience in an individual is of the moral awakening within him/her. This is to say the notion of justice is more concerned to conscious awakening of an individual that has to do with moral and ethical values, set by the society. To say that there is consciousness within an individual is a march towards realizing pain and suffering that is often universal in nature. For the same, when Lurie's daughter is a victim to sexual harassment, the soul of the father awakens. Then, Lurie goes to the places and meets people who have been subjugated by his behaviour.

Justice and morality are confined to the notion that they complement each other. However, to say that morality is the parameter of justice is partially true for it is not only morality that is taken in consideration by law and state authority, The avenue of justice is combination of conscious awakening towards the sufferings and pain of an individual in relation to his/her fellow beings.

IV. Blurring of Forgiveness and Punishment in *Disgrace*

The idea of forgiveness is often associated with punishment. However, to take that forgiveness is punishment is something that has nothing to do with the latter idea because both these notions are state sponsored and directed through higher authority. There cannot be either punishment or forgiveness without the consent of the State power and its authority. To say that forgiveness is divine may not be appropriate for, it is not God gifted but should come from the heart of the victim.

Then, no victims are likely to pardon the offender right from the heart for, the pain and humiliation associated with being victimized is hardly to go from one's memory. Then, is there any demarcation between forgiveness and punishment. In terms of physical terms, there certainly is. For the prior is painless and violence free, and the latter is imposing physical harassment and inflicting torture.

The politics of state ensembles the idea that forgiveness is superior to penalty. But, there are no mechanisms to make people abide to principles of forgiveness. This is the case with David Lurie, the English Poetry professor who sought to resign from his post rather than be 'sorry' for his indecent act of sexual harassment. The state has set up human mind in such a manner that finds easier to take sanctions like economic or physical rather than be 'sorry' to his/her deeds. This state's notion is reflected in the large number of prisons and confinement center made by the state rather than focusing on places where people can seek for forgiveness or at least search the soul for their deeds. The modern state is more dictatorial in punishment than it was during the ancient ages.

The whole idea of justice is blurred for there are two aspects to it. The first is from the victim's perspective that wants the perpetrator to be punished for his/her unfair action. However, when it comes to the perpetrator, she/he is also having a

stance. There might be some physical demands or necessity or his/her nature might be different, as in the case, where some individual are able and others are disable. As such, the flow and the chart of the good doer and the bad doer goes on, and both the parties seek justice for their deeds. In light is the narration of Professor Lurie, who goes on to define and defend his act of sexual advancement with one of his students.

Coetzee's *Disgrace* is the narration of White peoples' mentality in post-apartheid South Africa. Professor Lurie, the lead character depicts the White peoples' mentality that does not shy away from putting mental and physical pressure on his fellow people. Due to his sexist mentality towards his Black counterpart and women, he could not maintain his dignity and falls trap to self created mentality. Through the way of thinking and taking person in his way David represents the way White people are accustomed to take punishment and forgiveness in South Africa.

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