

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Nepal-India relations: political changes and India's influence in Nepal (1990-2020) examines how India has influenced political changes in Nepal, two South Asian countries that have shared both pleasures and pains from the beginning of time. Nepal and India are two close neighbors sharing commonalities in various respects. In this connection, Yadav (2011) has asserted that "Nepal and India are two neighbors having unique relations dating back to antiquities perhaps even before the dawn of human civilization" (pp.221-227).

Nepal-India relations are unique due to the sharing common socio-cultural, religious and other civilizational features since the emergence of human settlement in the Indian subcontinent region regarding the geographical location, However, Josse (2020) has described, "Nepal's unfortunate location between India and China has led to the phase: Nepal's strategy for survival" (p.1).

As a landlocked nation that relies too heavily on India, Nepal is also understandably preoccupied with New Delhi's influence over its political and economic affairs. Pakistan's conflict with India serves as the foundation for its security strategy. In a similar vein, Bangladesh is making efforts to lessen India's influence by involving western nations in national development. In order to resist India's influence, Sri Lanka continued to rely on aid from the West (Dharmadasani, 2001, p. 5). South Asia's minor countries are geographically in a favourable location, but their dependence on India and its influence is not just. In addition, Josse (2020) has emphasized, "Nepal's physical distance from central China and the succession of weak governments there for centuries before 1949, inclined Nepal in the past to think that India's interference and intervention in Nepal's affairs was a greater probability than China's" (p.3).

While the communist and ultra-nationalist elements in Nepal consider Indian influences on Nepali political changes as interference with Nepal's

sovereignty and independence, the democratic block sees India as having a beneficial influence on Nepal.

According to numerous studies and personal experiences, there are two main currents affecting Nepal-India relations i.e. obvious and very basic, while the other is less obvious but has a greater impact on Nepal. The invisible current is driven by historical connections, geographic ties, cultural differences, and interpersonal connections, whereas the visible current occasionally has ripples that flow up and down. However, since the 2006 political shift, the India factor has been particularly important in determining Nepal's domestic and foreign policies (Pandey & Adhikari, 2009, pp. 42-43).

There are various factors that have contributed to the shaping of Nepal-India relations. The significant factor in defining a state's foreign relations is its geography and geolocation. In the context of Nepal-India relations, too, unmanaged and open border, socio-cultural linkages, lingual intimacy, trade and commerce, people-to-people relations (p.149) as advocated by Dahal (2011) in constructivist theory of IR (p.149), and the role of India in each and every political change have been clearly appreciated and criticized. This is because physical proximity frequently helps to create positive bonds between countries (Saran, 2017, p.149). Moreover, Saran (2017) claims that due to geographical attachment it is creating conflict as well as strong tie that has enriched by constructivist theory of IR but practically India's dominant role is contradictory. With no other neighbor is India so well bonded on these, political, economic and cultural connections, fronts as it is with Nepal.(p.149)

In response to the geosensitivity, King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the father of modern Nepal, said that his country is like a "yam between two stones (Acharya, 2021, p.70). The Emperor of the South, whose residence was abroad but which had cleverly subjugated Hindustan, should likewise be kept in close friendship, as should the Emperor of the North (2001, Dharamdasani, p. 17).

Later, the early British India policy towards Nepal was a projection of the commercially driven eighteenth-century English company's agenda. However, the British quickly developed an interest in the surrounding areas to the north after

seizing control of Bengal in 1764. At the same time, Nepal served as a transit country for trade between the East-India Company and Tibet-China (Rose, 1971, pp. 24-35).

British attempted to enter Nepal under this pretext, dragging the British East-India Company into the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1816. By the favor of the British East-India Company Government, it succeeded in advancing British interests in Nepal leading to the creation of the Ranas, which ruled for 104 years. They adhere to their appeasement policy (Josse, 2020, p. 5) and isolate Nepal from the rest of the world (Singh, 2009, p-92). In fact this strategy was taken helpful to shield Nepal against an invasion.

However, the friendship with the British government was not without its share of dissatisfaction. Shree tin Maharaj and Prime Minister Jung Bahadur Rana was unable to obtain from London the guarantee of the Treaty of Sugauli's amendment. He demanded the *Elaka of Khyreegarch* and viewed the restoration of *Oudh Terai*, areas of Terai that Nepal had lost in Anglo- Nepal War, as a meager compensation for Nepal's assistance in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 (Singh, 1996). (p. 31)

This situation shows that Jung Bahadur Rana was dissatisfied with British India's involvement in Nepal as well, but he was without a choice. During the Rana era in Nepal, British India had a significant effect in Nepali politics and administration. Although Jung Bahaur Rana was able to withstand British pressure, succession disputes following his passing provided the British leverage, which they were not afraid to utilize (Rose & Fisher, 1970; Park. (p. 147)

For instance, the British Government acknowledged Bir Shumsher as the new prime minister on November 22, 1885, when Ranodeep Singh was killed and Bir Shumsher (1885–1901) usurped his power. This sparked intense animosity and sadness in Nepal at the time (Singh, 1996, p.32). Singh (1996) has added the following assertions that, "But Junga Bahadur and his successors were fully convinced that only by keeping friendship with the British their position in Nepal, in addition the independence of their country, could be preserved" (p.76).

Here the mindset of necessary grace of British India to gain and retain in power in Nepal established. From this perspective, it is obvious that Rana's anxiety helped to maintain Nepal's independence. The Treaty between Nepal and British India in December 1923 confirmed Nepal's sovereignty (Rose & Scholz, 1980, p. 39). 1951s political change in Nepal was significantly influenced by India. However, the communist win in China pulled Nepal and India closer together because it was followed by threats against Tibet and declarations of determination to re-establish China's "traditional frontiers." The old treaties between Nepal and Great Britain were immediately replaced (1950) by new ones that included secret sections requiring dialogue between the two governments in the event of being challenged by an external force (Rose & Fisher, 1970; Park, pp. 150–151)

The 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty between Nepal and India was acclaimed as a success by the pro-Indian camp. Its critics saw it as a long-term plan to influence Nepali politics and the government, inflame anti-Indian sentiment, and use it as election propaganda, all of which have strained bilateral ties between Nepal and India.

The Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 was made between Nepal and India which remained a turning point in Nepal-India relations. The provisions of the treaty are often compared with the Versailles treaty held to end the world war first (Timalsina, 2019, June). This treaty also further stressed that Nepal as a sovereign and independent country which came into force one year before the armed revolution held for democracy which was against the Rana regime (Dharmadasani, 2001, p. 24).

The pact of 1950 has consistently been a contentious subject of discussion and controversy in Nepal. The 1950 treaty, in the opinion of Nepal's political elite, was an unfair one (Saran, 2017, p.153). In fact, the treaty sparked a major argument immediately after the Communist Party Nepal (Maoist) emerged as the dominant force in Constituent Assembly I (CA, 2008). The leader of CPN (Maoist) Puspa Kamal Dahal, 'Prachanda' believed that the treaty of 1950 ought to be annulled in light of the altered circumstances. However, the treaty's provision

for abrogation after one year's notice has not been used by the government of Nepal (Saran, 2017, p. 153).

Whereas Communist Party Nepal, United Marxist- Leninist (CPN-UML)'s president Man Mohan Adhikari as a seating Prime Minister (1994/95) had strongly raised the issue of revision of 1950's Nepal-India treaty during his visit to India. Adhikari is the first Prime Minister of Nepal to propose a review of the 1950 unequal treaty to PV Narasimha Rao his Indian counterpart, during his visit to India (Nepal Press, 2021, April 26).

This treaty between Nepal and India (1950) seems only vote politics. This is further proved by the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) done by Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai on 4th April, 2012 which is no longer endorsed and not enforced but left space to India to influence in Nepal (Bista, 2011, January 4). In the same vein, Vinod, (2016, July-September) wrote that, "Through the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 31 July 1950, both sides mutually agreed to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other"

The treaty however was criticized in Nepal, as India's unwanted influence was seen as an encroachment on its sovereignty. Since Nepal was directly subjugated by the pro-British India Rana regime prior to 1950s, Nepal-India relations started to take shape on the basis of political identity after 1950-1951. At the time this deal was struck, Nepal actually feared a Chinese threat, particularly in the wake of China's invasion of Tibet (Saran, 2017, p. 153). This dynamics was compromised, nevertheless, when the King's position altered in 1960, from leading political reform and modernization to defending the bastions of established authority and interests.

The state India was unable to adapt their nature in order to keep up with the backward change in Nepal. If it had occurred, relations between India and Nepal would have continued in perfect harmony and peace (Muni, 1992, p.8). Left-leaning Congress Socialists from India demanded steadfast support for the democratic forces during the political movement of 1951, carrying the momentum of change started in Nepal at the time all the way to the point where the Kingdom

was transformed into a republic. However, one from the right of the center wanted to avoid upsetting the Ranas and formed a pragmatic alliance with them to protect their perceived security interests.

Early in the 1970s, BP Koirala made a lot of statements calling for an armed uprising in Nepal, but in 1976, the emergency imposed in India and the rift between Indira Gandhi and Jaya Prakash Narayan, BP Koirala's close associate, forced Bisheswor Prasad Koirala to return to Nepal from exile under the guise of "national reconciliation" (Muni, 1992, p.81). BP Koirala pushed the king to accept the cooperation of the democratic forces and acknowledged the king as a cause of political stability and nationalism in response. Later, the king decided to liberalize the system through a referendum, but the multi-party system was reportedly defeated by extensive conspiracies. On the other side, king Birendra's proposal for the Zone of Peace (ZoP) was formally announced on February 25, 1975, in a speech to the foreign dignitaries gathered in Kathmandu for his coronation. According to Josse (2020), "The geopolitical sensitivity created with the merger of Sikkim (1975) in India King Birendra proposed Nepal be declared as a Zone of Peace" (p. 407).

Many claimed that while the majority of nations (130 by 2020) supported the concept, India viewed the proposal for zone of peace unfavorably. The 1950 Treaty, according to Indian officials, "already assured Nepal's security" (Josse, 2020, p. 343). With this, they asserted that the king of Nepal's relationship with the leaders of India had deteriorated. In turn, king Birendra rejected the Buffer state idea and viewed that Nepal was not a part of the sub-continent and retorted, it is really that part of Asia which touches both China and India (Muni, 1992, p. 66).

The explanation above makes it apparent that Nepal and India signed separate trade and transit treaties in 1978. Nevertheless, India launched a blockade against Nepal in 1989. As a result, it assisted in the restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1990. Few Indian leaders' support for the anti-Panchayat movement in Nepal, which Nepal's political parties accepted normally, also helped to increase India's influence in Nepal.

After the political change of 1990, Nepal-India relations *prima facie* reforms grew, which further strengthened ties between the two countries. However the left parties in Nepal in general, and CPN (UML) dragged the issue of Nepal-India relations into the election campaigns. The opposition, particularly the Communist parties, also used the security treaty (1965 and 1991), trade and transit difficulties, the above mentioned issue of Tanakpur Pancheshwor Project and other matters in order to condemn the Nepali Congress for its pro-Indian position that "betrayed" Nepal's national interests (Pandey, 2005).

Tanakpur Treaty, which was signed in 1991 between Nepal and India, also drew controversy but was later handled by mutual accord between the two nations. The CPN (UML) government, which was formed in 1994, advocated for the updating of the 1950s treaty and the adoption of the equal friendship between China and India (Dharmadasani, 2001, pp. 28–30). However, Nepal's political leadership was never aware of its country's geopolitical situation.

The most challenging aspect of any bilateral interactions is how frequently they become involved in internal politics. While studying Nepal-India relations, the Mahakali Treaty, a contentious agreement between Nepal and India signed in 1996, was a controversial issue in Nepali politics. This treaty has been perceived as India's disproportionate influence in Nepal. However, in the meantime, India's foreign policy changed under Prime Minister Indra Kumar Gujral, who launched the "liberal neighborhood" policy. As a result of this bilateral relationship, Nepal now has access to Bangladesh's Phoolbari port for trade (Upreti, 2009, pp. 25–26). However, India's restriction through a quota system to limit the import and export via this port makes it exceedingly unproductive as it had been expected.

New Delhi was extremely displeased with the takeover of king Gyanendra of Nepal in February, 2005. Gyanendra proclaimed that he would take full control of the country for three years and assumed total power. India interpreted the takeover as a rejection of a diplomatic resolution to the Maoist uprising. In addition, India had a fairly strong reaction and made the decision to skip the SAARC conference. The decision to stop providing weapons to Nepal was made by India on February 25, 2005 (Upreti, 2009, p.32). Natwar Singh, India's

former foreign minister, stated the following before the parliament on March 4, 2005:

It is serious setback to democracy and bring the monarchy and main stream political parties in direct confrontation. This can only benefit the forces that not only wish to undermine democracy in Nepal but the institution of democracy as well. (Upreti, 2009, p.32)

King Gyanendra and Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh met in Jakarta in April 2005 during the Asian-African summit. The King pledged to improve the situation after the Indian Prime Minister argued for the restoration of democracy in Nepal. India did not accept King Gyanendra's attempts to use China as a pawn in order to solicit her support in providing weaponry. Midway through 2005, India persuaded the King once more to take steps toward restoring democracy, and only after King Gyanendra had done so, had India resumed providing Nepal with arms aid (Upreti, 2009, p.32). However, the US pledged to support Nepal by providing security aid in order to counter the (Maoist) insurgency (2020, Josse, p. 417). The US recognized India's demand for Nepal to have exclusive authority in this situation. Till the date India and US both have followed twin pillar policy (Josse, 2020, p.418). But it was not the royal takeover of 2005 that annoyed India rather it provided an opportunity to weaken King's move who resorted to bring China in South Asian politics via SAARC.

In that scenario, the twelve-point agreement reached between the rebel Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) in November 2005 in New Delhi was later endorsed by other nations, most notably the US (Josse, 2020, p. 416). Based on the agreement holding true in time and place and being successful, that agitating force for the restoration of democratic rights contributed to make Mass Movement II success. India's support, according to Muni (2012), was crucial to the success of the April Movement in Nepal (pp. 92–94). Even known India baiters like S.D. Muni, a South Asian expert for India, shows how eagerly the Indian bureaucracy tried to legitimize its participation in the affairs of Nepal.

The Maoist rebellion and political developments in May and October 2002 posed a security threat to India's security, which has long been seen as a risk

to the country (Saran, 2017, p. 165). Evaluating the long term security threat, the peace process surrounding the Maoist war and its resolution over the past ten years (1996-2005) has made India's influence on Nepal's political changes quite evident. Saran (2017) asserted that the possibility of a "red corridor" running from the North all the way down to Andhra Pradesh was feared if Maoist could not be restrained and vanquished (p.155).

According to P. Dhakal (Interview, September 8, 2021), "People residing over Eastern Terai of Nepal are discriminated by Hilly -Brahmin's rule in Kathmandu." Independent India still bears the burden of British domination. The claim is further supported by India's support for Terai-Madhesh ever since Terai-based political parties were established. According to Dhakal, India's involvement in the Madhesh dispute might be understood as a manifestation of constructivist IR theory, but there are frequent disagreements in this line of thoughts.

When a new administration takes office in Nepal, India feels entitled to the first state visit of the new prime minister, as a result Prime Minister Prachanda's state visit to China was seen suspiciously by India. As a result, and it caused a major problem for Nepal's relations with its neighbors (Lima, 2014 March 7). In order to force Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, to retire, the army general Rookmangud Katawal's dismissal was brought up. Additionally, the attempt to alter the centuries-old custom of putting Bhatta Pujaris of Indian descent in the Pashupatinath temple brought Puspa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' into confrontation with India. Similarly, key informants have opined that:

The CPN (UML) leader Madav Kumar Nepal created the administration following P.M. Puspa Kamal Dahal's resignation as Prachanda. The UCPN (Maoist) strongly denounced this administration as Kathaputali Sarkar, an Indian supporter (hand puppet government) (Interview with Bijukchhe, November 3, 2018).

On November 3, 2018, he added that India had not extended an official invitation to the administration established Prime Minister Jhalnath Khanal. This symbolizes the autonomous establishment of the Khanal government and it also implied Nepal's vain attempt to counteract Indian influence in this region. In

order to offer India the security control contract for Tribhuvan International Airport, the controversial Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) was signed by the government led by Baburam Bhattarai (TIA) which was criticized as Bhattarai's appeasing policy to India. Saran (2017) detailed, "However, the political leaders of Nepal nearly schizophrenic in their dealings with India, seeking favors and political intervention on their behalf in private but criticizing India for meddling in their affairs in public" (p.157).

But because there was no agreement among the political parties to establish an electoral administration, Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi of the Supreme Court rose to power and successfully conducted a second CA poll (2013AD). The entire predicament is also attributed to India, and the circumstance that emerged following the announcement of the constitution in 2015 forced people to recognize this responsibility (Pandey, 2072 B.S., pp.504-505). Further Nepali Times (2015, September 27) has stated that India's assistance for Madhesi protesting parties and the unofficial economic blockade on Nepal both served to confirm Nepalis' suspicions that India is meddling in domestic politics and government (Para 9).

This perspective makes it evident that Indian Prime Minister Modi did the best to avoid being accused of obstruction by Nepal by using numerous diplomatic channels and international lobbying. As a result, the relationship between Nepal and India has endured numerous vicissitudes. With the release of India's new political and administrative map on November 2, 2019, by Oli government along with the counterpublication of Nepal's map based on the Sugauli Treaty of 1816, the two bordering countries' cartographic disagreement resulted in a tense relationship (Gurung & Ranjan, 2020, December 28). When the beaked map of Nepal got parliamentary approval, things got complicated. Additional remarks made by Indian authorities and P. M. Oli's non-diplomatic but more political address to parliament fuelled the deterioration of bilateral relations. Oli mentioned:

There are a number of factors that have made Nepal's relations with India highly complicated. In addition, things have been rather complicated for tense relationships. As a result, it is challenging to depict Nepal-India

relations in a straight line. As a result, the histories of Nepal-India relations have been rather rocky. Relations between India and Nepal have both formal and informal aspects. Therefore, a far more thorough study of their relationships is required. (Mandal, 2014, p.1)

While mapping the Nepal –India relations since Mass Uprising I (1990) stressing to India's influences in Nepali politics and political changes, the researcher tried to reach on particular generalization through available resources based on empirical literatures. An assessment was done with Nepal's relations of the recent past with India and India's policy towards Nepal. In order to find out India's influences in Nepal's political changes (1990-2020) through the help of international theories i.e., Geopolitical, Spheres of Influence, Realist, Constructivist and Dependency and empirical literatures, the researcher has used descriptive and analytical perspectives.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The role and interests of India in Nepal's political changes have been a subject of debate that India played a constructive role in various political changes in Nepal but in return it desired favourable government in Nepal. After the April revolution (2006), the relationship between Nepal-India has entered into the new era because Nepal dealing with India from 1950 to 1990, was highly guided by the Monarchical system. However India proudly claims its instrumental roles in bringing the political change in Nepal.

India from 1950 onward had used to see two pillar policy, constitutional Monarchy and multi-party system. However, since 2006 onward, it seemed like to shift from two pillars policy to *Republican* set up in Nepal. It seems only lip service of India because there is clear contradictions in theory and practice of India's foreign policy. Similarly, India claims that it merely expects commitment of Nepal towards no use of its territory against its vital security concern on the other hand, it wants to have favorable government in Nepal. Puspa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' explicitly said to the TV anchor that “Now it is the time that Prime Minister Oli be replaced with a “new coalition” comprising of his NCP faction together with the Nepali Congress and the Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP) that is

“comfortable” for the India's regime (Telegraph Nepal, 2021, March 2). This study explores the multiple dimensions of Nepal-India relations as viewed by academia, analysts, politicians and civil society

1.3 Research Questions

In order to examine Nepal's relations with India from 1990 to 2020 on the basis of the following research questions with a particular focus on India's influences in Nepal's political changes.

1. What was the state of Nepal-India relations before 1990?
2. How has India influenced political changes in Nepal, especially from 1990 to 2020AD?
3. Why is India's influence on political change in Nepal always controversial?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

As said, Nepal-India relations have been historic as well as unique. Geo-strategic location of Nepal is playing significant role for such uniqueness and proximity. This led to India's engagements in Nepal's most political changes during 1990 and 2006. This also causes undue political influences in Nepal. In this controversy, why should Nepal not re-evaluate its relation with its immediate giant neighbor i.e. India that would provide new direction and momentum in the changed political context in Nepal?

The main objective of this study is to analyze Nepal-India relations from 1990-2020. The specific objectives of this study are as follows:

- a) To identify the state of Nepal-India relations before 1990,
- b) To examine the influences of India in Nepal's political changes (1990-2020), and
- c) To find out India's influences in political changes of Nepal and the political controversies associated with this.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Nepal-India relations are unique as well as very close because of the socio-cultural and historical attachments between the people of the both countries for long. Likewise, the geo-political situation of Nepal is also making closer relations with India for centuries. One should not overlook India's facilitative role in every political change that occurred in Nepal when studying Nepal-India relations, including the 1950s Nepal-India Peace and Friendship Treaty, the 1951 democratic movement, the 1960s Royal takeover of King Mahendra, the 1990s political change, the twelve point agreement held on November 22, 2005 between the SPA and rebelling Maoist, and the mass uprising II in 2006, as well as further political developments until 2020. Through this research, the influences of India on the aforementioned political events are examined. This study is important to understand the role of India in Nepali politics because some scholars contend that India has an excessive impact, while others view India as promoting democracy in Nepal. The finding will be significant for political leaders and policy makers as they are the key formulators of foreign policy and security strategy. As the study of political relation especially India's influence in Nepal's political changes will be a new contribution, it will provide avenues for further researchers to deal more with this subject.

1.6 Delimitation of the Study

However, an overview of significant events in Nepal-India relations prior to 1990 have been explained sequentially to draw India's influences in Nepal's politics since the year 1947 the beginning of post colonial era, it is limited to the period between 1990-2020 only. Under the recent political developments between Nepal and India, the constitution making process and India's role in Madhesh politics and political parties are also highlighted. This research has focused on India's influences in political changes in Nepal.

1.7 Chapter Organization

This dissertation has been divided into nine chapters. Chapter one is the preliminaries of the dissertation such as the statement of problem, research questions, study objectives, detailed significance of the scope. Chapter two is the

review of previous literature related to Nepal-India relations and theoretical and empirical works. Information or views or opinions and presentation are discussed and presented in chapter three. Chapter four has examined Nepal-India relations and political changes in Nepal (1816–1990). Chapter five emphasizes India's role in mass uprising I (1990) and political and other phenomenon. Similarly, chapter six covers the government changes in Nepal and India's influence. Chapter seven posited India's influence in the political transformation of 1990s, India's influence over the armed revolution of CPN (Maoist) and India's position in the Madhesh movements, and peace process and peoples' movement II (2006). Chapter eight has covered water resource sharing agreements and treaties, trade and transit relations and Nepal-India people-to-people contacts and public diplomacy, India's interest in Madhesh politics, open borders, migration and India, the problem of Bhutanese refugees, political parties in Nepal and India, and other areas. Chapter nine has furnished a summary of the dissertation and responses to research questions based on the important results and conclusions. Finally, it has made new areas of research possible.

CHAPTER-II

LITEATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theories of International Relations

International relations are the interactions between states in the international arena from conflict to cooperation. All states have some relationships with each other. No modern state can avoid involvement in international affairs, and this involvement must be systematic and based on certain principles. The relations between Nepal and India must be based on the mutual cooperation, panchaseela and the non-aligned movement. That's what the researcher found through this study.

The word "international" according to the Oxford English Dictionary was first used by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1780, speaking about the international jurisprudence. Bentham said the word "international", must be acknowledged, and is a new one, though it is hoped sufficiently analogous and intangible (Melkote & Rao, 1993).

International relations should necessarily involve principles of justice, obedience to legitimate law or rules, there laws and rules are derived from universal moral principles and respect for fellow humans, both domestically and internationally. There should be a complete abandonment of forces that encourages learning and the co-existence of societies and nations peacefully under the leadership of adequately enlightened rules (Melkote & Rao, 1993). However, the author's lens of study has not shown clear path for the bilateral relations between the large and small states such as Nepal-India, India-Bhutan etc.

According to Goldstein (1996), the world is too complex. The international relations are incredibly fascinating topics. They have an impact on a certain subset of people and cultures worldwide. They share connections with other actors, such as the UN, international and multi-national companies, worldly people, and others. In addition, they have social ties to economies, cultures, domestic politics, and other factors influenced by geography and history.

The idea of international relations has been crucial to the development of nation-states and the global political system. Yet, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 AD marked the beginning of contemporary government structures and international relations. While international relations had previously been governed by religion, Westphalia subsequently codified the idea of sovereignty.

2.1.1 Realist Theory

Realist approach to international relations believes that politics is a power struggle. The problem, however, is the psychological relationship in which one actor can control the behavior of another actor. Palmer and Parkkins (1979) have opined that the world community is a historical reality. People who live in "sovereign" states that must "co-exist" on the same planet. Through sheer necessity these states have relation to promote their well-being and security (pp.1-29).

Palmer and Parkkins (1979) explored national interests, state politics, and means of power. A number of examples and their patterns and their importance in the international system have been used to demonstrate the balance of power principles. This literary treatment is an original and authoritative contribution to our understanding of the principles, tools, institutions, and techniques of IR. This also serves to integrate various theories of international relations for consideration of research objectives.

Moreover, state's main goal is survival consequently states seek only sufficient power, not maximum power. According to Palmer and Parkkins (1979) the main goal of any independent nation is the protection and promotion of its national interest and small state like Nepal, It is also keen on securing its independent international personality in international political arena.

However, the relationship between Nepal and India is not guided by the ideas as stated, but by loyalty and over-reliance on Nepali politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats. They only raise issues of national interests as propaganda to gain popularity around elections.

The personalization of policy-makers, covertly or overtly, affects bilateral and multilateral relations. For example, personality clashes between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and King Birendra from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, and between Nepal's King Birendra and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, are the key to the relationship between Nepal and India (Muni 1992, p. 63-85).

Realism is a straight forward approach to IR, where all nations are working to increase their own power, and those that have been able to hold their power most efficiently will thrive, while weaker nations will find it easier. The theory states that the state's primary interest should be self-preservation, and that the continued rise to power should always be a social, economic, and political essential.

Melkote and Rao (1993) argued that "political relations are governed by objective rules deeply rooted in human nature". The relations between Nepal and India have also gone through various ups and downs under different rulers. For example, the Gujral Doctrine had a liberal influence on relations between Nepal and India, whereas the Nehru Doctrine followed a strict foreign policy towards Nepal and other neighboring countries. In such reality of International politics, Nepal's international relations are highly guided by realism theory of IR because the primary need of any sovereign state is its existence. The geo-location of Nepal is quite sensitive; taking into consideration of this reality at the centre of national interest Nepal should maintain its balanced relations with India and China.

The nature of realism refers that it is good for governments to seek high moral grounds that they have not always achieved, as it implies, trickery and violence can be powerful tools to foster national interests. If made a priority, reluctance to implement a foreign policy that would improve a country's global structure could morally attract the attention of international institutions. Karpowicz (2010, July 26) pointed out that people are selfish and the lack of international government. These factors contribute to a conflict-based IR paradigm in which the state is the dominant actor whereas power and security are the main issues, and there is little room for morality.

Karpowicz (2010, July 26) further argued that political realism is usually contrasted by international relations scholars with theoretical perspectives that emphasize idealism, liberalism, interdependence among nations, and international cooperation. Machiavellianism is a Vedic brand of political realism that applies to both domestic and international affairs. It is a doctrine that denies the relevance of morality in politics and argues that all means are justified to achieve a particular political end. Regarding the relationship between Nepal and India, the Karpowicz theory may be appropriate for analyzing India's influence on political change in Nepal, but given Nepal's geopolitical sensitivities, the author's thoughts are not enough.

2.1.2 Spheres of Influence Theory

In the field of international relations, a sphere of influence (SoI) is a spatial or conceptual division over which a state has some degree of cultural, economic, military, or political monopoly. It is the loose or illegitimate meaning of the date at the beginning of recorded history. As a tool of great power or imperial dominance, sphere of influence claims can bring order to surrounding regions, while rival powers seek exclusive influence in the same region, or secondary or vassal states resist subordination or contribute to the conflict (Jackson, 2019, 24 October).

Deudney (n.d) explained that the conflict between ancient Rome and Carthage over exclusive influence in the marginal regions of the western Mediterranean led to the Punic Wars beginning in the 3rd century BC. More recently, the Monroe Doctrine (1823) effectively asserted America's sphere of influence in the "New World", precluding further European colonization of the Americas, and the subsequent smaller American neighbors to intervene in the domestic affairs of after World War II, the Soviet Union created spheres of influence as a political fact on the territory of Eastern European countries. (Para. 5)

Hast (2016) argued that sphere of influence in international politics is a state's claim to exclusive or dominant control over a foreign territory or territory or in international politics. The term refers to a political assertion of exclusive

control, which other states may or may not recognize as fact, or a promise to refrain from interfering in the sphere of influence of other states. It can also refer to a legal agreement.

Deudney (n.d.) opined that the term in the latter legal sense first acquired meaning in the 1880s, when the colonial expansion of the European powers in Africa and Asia was nearing completion. This final phase of expansion was marked by efforts by all major colonial powers to peacefully continue their mutual competition for colonies through agreed procedures. For this purpose, the sphere of influence agreement was used. (para. 2)

An agreement between Great Britain and Germany of May 1885 first used the term and provided for "separation and definition of their respective spheres of influence in the area of the Gulf of Guinea." This agreement was followed by many agreements of a similar kind, represented by Article 7 of the Agreement between Great Britain and Germany of 1 July, 1890 concerning East Africa. Hast (2016) argued that the sphere of influence theory of IR has taken an important place in various post-Cold War discussions and discourses. Discuss power relationships and describe power relationships, including influencing and affected forces, and the areas they occupy.

Similarly, Hast (2016) analyzed that the metaphorical source of spheres of influence is the orbit, and the term "orbit" refers to the influence of the US, Russia and even the EU. Similarly, India also has covert policies to exert influence in areas of the subcontinent. Violating a border means violating sovereignty and therefore violating sphere of influence. This is thus a pejorative term that reveals a violation or disregard for the sovereignty of an independent country, whereas Indian disrespect is shown here. The sphere of influence as an emotionally and historically charged concept embodied by contemplating injustice has the power to mobilize resistance and stir up resentment.

In the context of South Asia, SAARC's failure due to India's indifferent role suggests that while regionalism embraces all regional powers equally, sphere of influence theories are intended to be hegemonic

or imperialist or interventionists in the name of humanitarian intervention, development assistance, resolution of peripheral problems, or even political change. It justifies the influence of those in power and believes in, or believes in, unipolar power. It focuses on India's sphere of influence, particularly the Madhesi population and their impact on Nepal's politics and government.

2.1.3 Dependency Theory

A school of thought in modern social science called dependency theory aims to comprehend underdevelopment, analyze its origins, and, to a lesser extent, suggest ways to overcome it. It first appeared in South America in the 1960s, gained traction in scholarly communities and at regional organizations, quickly spread to North America, Europe, and Africa, and is still relevant in today's discourse (Sonntag, 2001).

According to the dependency theory, the peripheral status of affected nations in the global economy is the fundamental reason for underdevelopment. On the global market, impoverished nations typically provide cheap labor and raw supplies. These resources are sold to developed nations with the infrastructure to turn them into completed items. Developing nations wind up paying high costs for the final goods, using up resources that could be used to increase their own production capabilities. The end effect is a vicious cycle that keeps the world economy divided into a rich core and a destitute periphery. But the opinion has neglected the dependency of landlocked and geopolitically sensitive countries like Nepal.

Nepal has geopolitical advantages as it borders two emerging economic and technological powerhouses with huge populations, markets and industries (Dahal, 2011). He also pointed out that Nepal has historically been able to maintain closer ties with its two neighbors than they could with each other (pp. 21-33). Historically, Nepal is a constitutionally Hindu-majority country and the ruling class has always been the elite of Hindu society. The India's states of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar, which border Nepal, are also made up of people who share the same religious and cultural ties with Nepal. For this reason, most of the policies and patterns introduced by the Nepal government are primarily designed to appease the indigenous population. It says it

achieves democratic victory by giving people equal privileges (Dahal, 2011, pp. 21-33). Nepal has suffered the bitter experience of being defeated and forced to sign treaties and agreements that limited it of its territory, trade rights and, most importantly, its national integrity. As a result, it has relatively less power and resources than those two states of hers.

According to Muni, when the Sino-Indian War broke out in 1950, Nepal also had to maintain relations with China. King Mahendra sought to diversify relations, adopting a policy of non-alignment and expanding diplomatic ties with the United States, China, the Soviet Union and Japan (Muni, 1973). A key reason Nepal pursued this strategy of diversifying and pursuing India's special ties was to balance interdependence between neighbors and free itself to pursue national interests in the international system. With this strategy, Nepal aimed to reduce its overall dependence on India and its security challenges. Nepal's development, whether it is economic prosperity, political development or national security, depends on how it manages the relationship between its two neighbors. In this way, it represents itself and contributes to the international arena (Dahal, 2011, pp. 21-33). Pierson and Theda (2002) have opined, "In historical institutionalism in contemporary political science stated "Outcomes at a "critical juncture" trigger feedback mechanism that reinforces the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future" (p.6).

Since 2006 the monarchy was abolished and the new government declared Nepal a secular state. During this period Nepali suffered from an identity crisis that caused more and more differences in terms of ethnicity, class, religion, etc. (Dahal, 2011, pp. 21-33). These differences were the main reasons why Nepal struggled to achieve a single national interest and achieve political stability with regional and religious identities gradually becoming national identities. These differences have destabilized the country's political system. Political parties causing these differences have led to the creation of exploitative political and economic institutions, aggravated by Nepal's unfavorable political situation.

2.1.4 Constructivist Theory

The advent of constructivism in IR is often associated with the end of the Cold War. It could not be explained by traditional theories such as realism and liberalism. This failure is linked to several core principles, such as the belief that states are selfish actors competing for power, and the unequal distribution of power between states that determines the balance of power between them.

Because traditional theory focuses on the state, there is not much room to observe individual agency. It was ultimately the actions of ordinary people, not the actions of states and international institutions that ensured the end of the Cold War. Constructivism responds to this concern by asserting that we created the social reality. The activities and interactions of actors, who are typically powerful individuals like leaders and prominent citizens, continually influence and occasionally transform the nature of international relations (Sarina, 2018, February 23).

Sarina opined that agency and structure are mutually constructive, implying that structure influences agency and vice-versa. Agency can be understood as the ability of individuals to act, and structure refers to the international system of material and ideal elements. Another central theme of constructivism is identity and profit (2018, February 23).

Constructivists further explained that states can have multiple identities that are socially constructed through interactions with other actors. Identity is an expression of an actor's understanding of who they are, which indicates their interest. They are important to constructivists who argue that identities represent interests and behaviors. For example, a small national identity implies a different set of interests than those implied by a large national identity. Smaller states are probably more focused on their survival (Josse, 2020a, p. 1). On the other hand, the great powers are interested in controlling the world's political, economic and military affairs.

Therefore, the relationship between Nepal and India can be studied in light of with this theory. This is because open borders and the shared socio-cultural

identity of those who have marital relationships in neighboring regions have made bilateral relations close and unique.

2.1.5 Geo-political Theory

Norman (1905) stated that "although Nepal is an independent country, geographically; it is almost part of India (p.269)". However, the author did not take the view of Nepal-India relations and India's influence on Nepal's political change, which is discovered under this degree in the course of detailed research. In a country like Nepal, many factors limit its foreign policy flexibility and its role in international politics. The most limiting are location, level of economic development and size of territory. The strategic position Nepal occupies limits freedom of movement. Barston (1971) stated, "The freedom of choice and type of external relation of Botswana (Estonia and Swaziland) is very limited because of economic dependence resulting largely from their landlocked geographical locations vis-à-vis south Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabe)" (p.44).

Dahal (1997) suggested that globalization and the establishment of global fora such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund have reduced the value of geography and other physical features. The declining value of distance today has reduced geography's relevance and greatly, if not completely, reduced the ability of nations to gain positions of power through geography (p.1-26). However, India does not use this term when dealing with its neighbors, it only uses lip service. Author has further detailed that, "Nepal occupies pivotal position in the Himalayas between the central and south Asian regions, a part of Euroasian Landmass, to use Mackinder's terminology" (p.27).

In that regard, Dahal (1997) opined that it lies north of the monarchical kingdom of Tibet, an autonomous region of communist China. East, West and South are Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttar Kanda in the Federal Republic of India. Dahal further argued that such a position constitutes a geopolitical framework essential to the security of India and the stability of its

heartland, the Ganges belt, where most of its human and resource base is concentrated. Largely because of that, India seeks greater influence in Nepal for regional and political defense in areas bordering China, which Indian strategists see as India's real competitive country.

Bhattarai (2005) explained that both geographic and physical features influence relations between nations. Bhattarai's geographic focus was on mountains and seas and their impact on international politics and inter-governmental relations (p. 9). It is illustrated by the fact that Nepal is located between two geopolitically large and powerful states. Historically, Nepal's foreign policy has focused on maintaining balance with its neighbors. The founder of modern Nepal, the late King Prithvi Narayan Shah, once said that Nepal is "a yam between two rocks" (Josse, 2020, p. 3). Small countries are often characterized by restrictions on foreign policy actions. Nepal is not only a large country, but also a landlocked country and economically, trade and transit, dependent on India (Gaurab, 2020, July 25) as a result of this geographical compulsion.

Josse (2020) has referred that PM Nehru's addressed to CA of 17 March 1950 that, "We can not tolerate any foreign invasion in any part of the subcontinent. Any possible invasion of Nepal would be inevitably involving the safety of India". Further Josse (2020) opined, Notably, on 5 October, 1962, Marshal Chen Yi, then Vice Premier and Foreign Mnister of China, stated that, "in case any foreign army makes a foolhardy attempt to attack Nepal...China will side the Nepali people" (p.337).

In this critical geopolitical sensibility, this theory of IR is better suited to examine the relationship between Nepal and India by making connections with various theorists. The researcher has analyzed various facts and events for rationality.

Figure 2.1

Mackinder's Heartland Theory and Spykman's Rimland Theory

MACKINDER'S HEARTLAND THEORY AND SPYKMAN'S RIMLAND THEORY



Source: <https://slideplayer.com/amp/9982596/>

Mackinder and Spykman (1904) proposed the Heartland- Rimland theory of geopolitics. Although an outdated theory, India may still have a legacy of this theory in its diplomatic relations with South Asian countries. Spykman (1938) in "Geography and Foreign Policy" has claimed "Geography does not argue, it simply is". Spykman as described by Nicholas Spykman, geography is the "most fundamental conditioning factor in the foreign policy states because it is the most permanent" (p.7). Likewise, Bhattarai, (2005) has claimed that "anything that dictated Nepal's foreign policy is its geographical position described by various Nepal's and India's scholars. India's Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh said that geography dictates Nepal-India relation" (p. 2).

Josse (2020a) argued that geography is indeed the foundation of strategy and policy. Strategy, as defined by Napoleon, is the art of using time and space in military and diplomatic ways.... Geopolitics is the influence of geography on the division of man. As Napoleon said, the geography of a country to know a country is to know its foreign policy (p.9). It has alleged that, "Geopolitically Nepal's stand is strategically important because its land could be used by external forces to launch anti-Tibet movement which may create unexpected loss to Nepal" (p.2). We should keep two neighboring countries equidistant or equiproximity and not rely on them to solve all our difficulties.

Baral (2018) has written that Nepal's strategic relations with India are nothing more than the manifestation of mutual location of the country to the high altitudes, difficult topography and adverse terrain which have played

obstructionist role with India in developing connectivity with China. But the relation with India is easier and wider due to its easy geographical border (pp.43-63).

Dahal (2019) has opined that state survival and takeover in neighborhood and global politics to be central to Nepal's national interests. Nepal's rank as a small country is relative to its huge neighbors India and China. Country's new geopolitics must support an inter-subjective framework, not just geopolitical decisions and winner-take-all markets, for the purpose of nation-states sufficient to meet the lives of their citizens (p.219). Dahal (2019) has further opined that, "the neighborhood priority of India and China hooked Nepal from the periphery to geopolitical focus. The strategic geography of Nepal makes it vital for neighbors' security" (pp.219-222). Similarly, Acharya (2021) has attributed that:

Geopolitics was almost forgotten from the global political vocabulary during the era of globalization. It was considered outmoded, old-fashioned but for Nepal, the return of geopolitics has become a distinct reality due to the rise of India and China in its immediate neighborhood. (P.41)

Many argued that Nepal must ensure its foreign policy serves national interests in a complex geopolitical environment. India and China recognize the importance of Nepal's stability to national security. Nepal's path to economic prosperity can best be achieved by maintaining cooperative relations with its two neighbors.

Nepal's historic and unwavering belief in the principle of non-alignment guides her desire to seek friendship with all and antagonize none. Documents in the field of IR, i.e. geopolitics, realism, spheres of influence, dependency and constructivist described above have described consistent perceptions of the relationship between Nepal and India. The studies to justify India's influence on Nepali politics and political change these notions are found ambiguous. It has been explored throughout this study to fill research gaps.

2.2 Literatures

A number of relevant books and scholarly articles are reviewed to gain a broader understanding of the historical basis and to gather current data on the research. Government policies, official reports and speeches including statements of Nepal and India are available from open sources and other official websites. They provide relevant sources of important literature for research. In addition, the published literature on strategic issues in the conflict between South Asia and Indo-China and its impact on Nepal-India relations also contribute to the research field. The most commonly followed materials are books, magazines, government policies, joint speeches and statements related to Nepal-India relations, current literature, web-based sources, news articles etc.

2.2.1 Empirical Literatures

Bhattacharjee (1970) argued that if India did not steer the change (the 1951 armed revolution in Nepal) toward democracy, China would certainly turn Nepali anti-Rana sentiments to its own advantage. He claims that it would have been used for the time was ripe for the end of Rana's rule. However, the system to replace it was still uncertain. To forestall the influence of Chinese ideology in Nepal, India had to intervene in Nepali politics in favor of democratic forces. India's intervention in Nepali politics benefits democratic forces in addition to being morally correct and politically wise. The close ties between India and Nepal in the past were well known, but modern times bring the two countries even closer.

Bhattacharjee (1970) has accepted the contribution that young Nepali students made to the battle for Indian freedom. Acharya Kripalini, Vijarakshmi Pandit Acharya, Narendradeva, and Jay Prakash Narayan founded the Nepal Rastriya Conference on October 31, 1946, with the intention of supporting the Indian national movement and launching a peace movement in Nepal for democracy. The meeting was organized by Nepali youth, mostly the students studying in Banaras.

Rose (1971) suggested that a holistic approach would be useful for a comprehensive study of foreign policy. He used the

term "reflection" to describe the determinants of foreign policy. Such as geographical conditions, historical developments, worldviews, people's interests, and the development of common principles of international action. This is also the basis of Nepal's foreign policy. He argued that the Kathmandu Valley served as a storehouse for external influences, mostly of Indian origin. Rose (1971) has further claimed that Nepali political refugees, basically leftist, in India occasionally threatened to go China for support if India did not provide the necessary backing, particularly after the 1962 border war held between India and China. (p.251)

This did not make interesting at that time in giving any Nepali opposition group, including the pro-China faction of the Nepal communist party, the magnitude of support in both materials and men that would have been required to overthrow the royal regime (p.251). Since the Rana regime, India has had a good reason to worry about the role of interventionists in Nepal's politics. Rana's British East India Company (BEICG) government's appeasement policy and Nepal's isolation from the world served the British as guardians of Nepal's politics and administration. The India-centric tendencies and mindsets of the Rana rulers have always aimed to serve corporate government.

For instance, Rana ruler Padma Shumsher called upon Sri Prakash Gupta and two of his other helpers, who were Indian constitutional specialists, to draft a constitution for Nepal so that New Delhi could have an easier time infiltrating or micro-managing Nepal. During the crisis in Hyderabad and Kashmir in mid-1948, Mohan Shumsher proposed to aid India by sending 10 battalions of the Nepalese Army to New Delhi. In 1950 he decided to use the Indian Army whenever the need arose. Nepal publicly promised to come to India's assistance (Rose, 1971, p. 181).

During the Rana rule Nepali leaders displayed an unwarranted allegiance to Indian authority. Although India has not asked for it, Nepal has always provided help to resolve India's crisis when the arms revolution was nearing its peak. Nehru said he told Mohan Shumsher not for political change in Nepal. He advised the introduction of light political reforms towards democracy so that the influence of India would be evident.

Ramakant and Upreti (1972) have found that the 1960 royal takeover viewed India's government as a substantial regent and neither encouraged nor discouraged exiles in the Nepali parliament from preparing to confront King Mahendra externally. In the 1960s India adopted a "wait and see" policy regarding Nepal's political ups and downs. In fact, India was dissatisfied with Prime Minister B. P Koirala because India was hoping yes-man to Nepal's political authority. Prime Minister Neheru's reaction to King Mahendra's takeover was, "this is the retreat of democracy" (Rose, 1971, p. 233). But in contrast to India, the People's Government of China maintained a discreet silence on the royal takeover, merely reporting the event without editorial comment (p.235). India also continued its regular relations with Panchayat government in Nepal.

Shaha (1992) has written that it should not be forgotten that the sudden mass movement for the restoration of democracy witnessed in Nepal had been largely fueled by the international changes. Nonetheless the roles of small countries in the present phase of democratization of international relation, and India's relation with its regional neighbors would have to be taken into consideration for a more thorough understanding of the whole situation (pp.34-50).

Further, Shaha (1992) has contended that the broad contours of Nepal-India relations have been fixed by geography which goes on showing over time its dynamics by establishing its own political and economic nexuses. Two of its facets, relatively permanent, are geo-politics and geo-economics, while geo-strategic dimension is transient and can not become a perennial feature of Nepal-India relations.

Historically, India is credited to have mid-wife for the birth of democracy in Nepal in 1951 through the "Delhi compromise." But India's unsophisticated diplomacy became one of the catalysts for the December 1960's Royal Coup scaled the fate of democracy in Nepal. The author (1972) also mentioned India's role in the political changes of the 1990s. However, more systematic information about it has been found through this research.

Muni (1992) emphasized that great power domination, not Indian intervention, clearly defends India's role in the Indian subcontinent. Dealing with power relations between big and small is mostly influenced by moral and ethical assumptions that the big is evil and the small is innocent. But Muni ignored national sovereign equality. However, in a statement dated 20 October 1970, King Mahendra agreed to exchange "military intelligence" with India on developments to the detriment of both countries (pp. 9-10).

Since the time of the Rana regime, India has had good reason to worry about the role of interventionists in Nepal's politics. Rana's British East India Company (BEICG) government's appeasement policy and Nepal's isolation from the world served the British as guardians of Nepal's politics and administration. The India-centric tendencies and mindsets of the Rana rulers have always aimed to serve corporate government.

Muni (1992) further argued that within the Panchayat system, political support for the Zone of Peace (ZoP) proposal submitted by Nepal was timely pledged by India, but only lip service by both Morarji Desai (1977) and Rajiv Gandhi. Bajracharya et al. (1993) alleged that:

Indian support was provided during King Mahendra's coup in the 1960s. General Kodandera Subhaya Timaya, DSO, 1906–1965, the supreme commander of India, was present. Timaya's visit to Kathmandu from December 8 -14, Deputy Prime Minister Subarna Shumsher's departure for personal travel and the Royal Declaration of Ministers' detention on December 12 are some of the facts that lend credence to the accusations made above (pp. 82–95).

Bajracharya et al. (1993) further argued that the monarchy, which is seen as the last major barrier to harmful influences from the outside world, especially India, is fundamentally different from the rest. The reasons, though, were essentially "anti-Indian and pro-Chinese" oriented. This category included the outraged community, some students, and young intellectuals who were outraged by what they interpreted as India's interference in Nepal's internal affairs. (p.91)

Thakur (1994) have claimed that during the 30-year Panchayat rule relations between Nepal and India were not healthy due to the ZoP proposal, trade and transit agreements, and the arms purchase incident from China in 1988. The researcher hoped to shed light on this fact through this study by making it original and contributing to its meaning.

Khalim and Lama (1995) have described the political institutions and elite behaviors relevant to Nepal-India relations that provide insight into communist attitudes towards India and India's role before and after the 1990 revolution. India has an influence over the democratic process in Nepal that was expressed by the Joint Statement of 10 June 1990 which can be explained in light of spheres of influences theory of IR (Hast, 2016) in neighborhood relations between powerful and weak states.

Upadhyaya (1995) has written that Nepal-India relation was established with the good hope but the establishment of democracy was disturbed by the end of parliamentary democracy in 1960. Moreover, after the restoration of democracy in 1990, Nepal-India relation was hoped to go on easy track of prosperity but politico- economic issue (trade treaty renew) disturbed it. But the various chapters included in this book do not disclose the India's influences in Nepali politics.

Baral (1996) has claimed that Indo- Nepal relation is complex and difficult because of its depth areas. In 1995 following the reinstatement of the House of Representatives, CPN (UML) government was dethorned, it was taken easily by India. Taking such smooth transfer of power into consideration, Prime Minister P. V Narsimha Rao said that Nepal –India enjoy the closest fraternal relationship and the bond that bind the people together can not be weakened by the vicissitudes of politics. India shares the joy of the people of Nepal over another triumph of democracy and the smooth transfer of power that has taken place of the government (pp.6-8).

However, Nepal-India relations have suffered from being over-discussed, but with less urgency for examining them from a new perspective. The Nepali power elites including party leaders are inclined to domesticcate Indo-Nepal

relation by pursuing a two track policy. They politicize for immediate political gains at home by stigmatizing other parties or groups as pro-India" or taking an eighty-degree turn while thinking that India is always crucial for power. This assumption especially in the post-1990 period appears to be exaggerated, though significant. However, given the nature of the relationship, which touches all aspects of Nepali society, the emphasis on the inclusive relationship between Nepal and India is understandable.

Dahal (1997) argued that the country's geostrategic aspects are essentially related to neighboring China and India. Nepal's geopolitics was greatly influenced by the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, which included security, economic and demographic elements. In this treaty, the two countries agreed to put pressure on common strategic policies. India also offered to support Nepal's defense, modernization and economic development, and to enhance cultural and technological cooperation with the intention of Indian politicians is to keep Nepal out of China's sphere of influence.

Jaiswal (2000) emphasized border issues and ethnic relations between Nepal and India after India's independence. He assured Nepal's democratic process had India's support. Author further argued that Nepal's foreign policy has one basic objective: to reduce India's influence. This is because India always intends to influence Nepali politics in exchange for India's support for Nepal's pro-democracy movement (pp. 67-72).

Lohani (2000) has written that today Nepal and China are bound by a treaty of peace and friendship based on the five principles of 'peaceful coexistence'. Proponents of equiproximity theory hope that the new treaty between Nepal and India will be revised according to the same principles. In fact, for the past 50 years, the 1950 treaty has not hindered good neighborly relations, except for a very unfortunate brief period when India invoked her treaty in 1989. Indeed, India accused Nepal of violating its regulations and imposed a trade ban, causing immense suffering to the country's public (p.4-5).

Nayak (2000) argued that although Nepal is an independent country, it is geographically almost part of India. It was clear that Nepal and India had equal interests when it came to specific developments in Asia. For example, no

India's government can tolerate an invasion of Nepal from anywhere, despite the lack of a military alliance between the two countries. Any invasion of Nepal would inevitably endanger India's security (p.16).

Thapa and Jalhin (2000) have made great efforts to provide an overview of Nepal's foreign policy and strategic options in the context of international relations. In addition, they traced Nepal's foreign policy practices in the changing environment of the international community to achieve the basic and sustainable well-being of the people and the national interests i.e., independence and national unity.

Furthermore, they (2000) have examined the historical development of Nepal as aintegrated state in 1768, a critical period when Britain was consolidating its hegemony on the Indian subcontinent, and the relationship between Nepal and India from unification until the 1990s, which talks politically about the upheavals taking place between Nepal and India. India's influence on such political changes was not reflected by them. It can be considered as a unique contribution in this field.

Dharamdasani (2001) argued that Nepal is landlocked and highly dependent on India in its political and economic affairs. To avoid India's domination Bangladesh has taken steps to reduce India's influence by inviting Western countries into its national development. Similarly, Sri Lanka also relied on Western support to end Indian influence (p.5). However, Nepal's success in implementing foreign policy depends on India and China's ability to make a practical assessment of what they see as the least interest at all times, and to obtain concessions and benefits from all parties based on that assessment. But if Nepal wants to overestimate its strength and lose sight of the practical limits of its mobility, it could be in jeopardy.

Dahal (2009) believed that India's influence, overtly or covertly, is reflected in the actions of the government and even the ruling party. Whether or not this is openly acknowledged, India's influence is showing in regime change. He professed that Nepal could not circumvent its powerful neighbors and asked the United Nations and other third parties to mediate. Either democracy or preferential government, India wants to see in Nepal.

Upreti (2009) pointed out that it was India that brought about political change in Nepal and played a key role in its subsequent efforts towards democracy, modernization and development. India's approach to political development is unclear. He tried to pursue a dualistic policy of stability and democracy. India believed that political stability was an essential factor in asserting its security interests in Nepal. However, India has always maintained a closer understanding with Nepal's democratic political leaders who supported the democratization efforts of the Nepali people.

Pandey (2072 BS) said India was showing deep interest in resolving the Maoist rebellion and restoring peace and democracy in Nepal. She has played a key role in bringing Maoists and democrats together on one platform. India's approach to the issue of political development in Nepal in recent years seems clear.

Thapa (2010, December 10) suggested that Indian diplomacy in Nepal is tainted with Jekyll and Hyde characteristics. There is always diplomats here, showing a double face, both public and private. In public, they describe the relationship between Nepal and India. Their conduct in private, however, has failed to conform what they say in the public. For instance, the provocative remarks made by a Birjung based Indian consular about Terai-Madhes as a separate province. Indian mindset towards Nepal is intolerable, annoying and dominating. But he is silent about Indian involvement in Nepal's political changes.

Devi (2011) noted that the relationship between Nepal and India is very close due to the geographic proximity, economic dependency and abandoned issues inherent in between them. Furthermore, Nepal experienced a struggle for democratization in her twentieth century, she does not explicitly state what role India played in Nepal's politics and political changes. Here, Nepal's economic dependence or India's locked position in Nepal-India imposes its policies on Nepal's internal affairs under the spheres of influences and dependency theories of IR.

Observing the proactiveness of India in internal affairs, author Devi (2011) stated that Shital Niwas' Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) could easily

be renamed the Indian Ministry of Internal Affairs (p. 66). She refutes India's direct role in Mass Movement II (2006) and argued that massive international pressure and establishment of status undoubtedly contributed to the fall of the royal government that autocratic rule was not oppressive.

She (2011) also gave her view that the Communist Party of India had interfered in Nepal's democratic affairs through Maoist rebellion. Nepal, on the other hand, is home to a grand India-U.S. plan to contain China and has no option to become a nominal satellite state. After a five-year hiatus, Nepal and India have established defense ties and will soon embark on various defense and military equipment procurement projects. MCC may be the best tool, but she did not specify it in this writing.

Depending on India's current influence and prospects for security-related cooperation from absolute monarchs, first King Mahendra, then his son King Birendra, India will seek friendly democratic powers, particularly the Nepali parliament. India therefore strongly supported the democratic movement. It expressed its full support for peaceful political and democratic change in Nepal.

Jain (2011) said that South Asia's importance in the global age is obvious in terms of its democratic influence in the global arena, particularly with regard to strategic, military, and economic concerns in the age of nuclear diplomacy in New South Asia, Nepal more so than India. Claims have increased that India's relations with South Asian countries have fundamentally changed following unprecedented political developments in the neighboring region that have profound implications for India's myriad national interests. For example, Nepal underwent a political transformation in May 2008 when her 240-year-old monarchy was abolished. Here India needs to totally reassess its relationship with Nepal.

Bhatt (2012) argued that Man Mohan Adhikari officially opposed the 1950 treaty. His government failed to stay in power for more than nine months. Sher Bahadur Deuba came into power with the support of the RPP. It was criticized by one section of Nepali political circle as pro-Indian alliance (p.102-103). He (2012) acknowledged India's influence on Nepali

politics, but did not reveal India's involvement with Nepal in political change in the 21st century. In the context, as claimed by different scholars (Muni, 2012) "India has played a significant role in mass-uprising II and to bring the Maoist in peace process" (pp.312-332).

Jha (2012) has written that if there is one point on which most local politicians agree, it is India's centrality in Nepal's development. Some of the rhetoric needs to be sampled to understand how India is being blamed for everything that happens in Nepali politics. Some other scholars claim that India contributed to the end of the war by providing a safe haven for the Maoists and bringing them to Kathmandu, destroying the monarchy and bringing about regime change (pp. 332-361).

Baral (2012) argued that the Nepali democratic movement from 1990 has focused on internal and external factors with visible and invisible roles in Nepal's democratic process. Changing geopolitics and shifting priorities are urging rulers to maintain traditional ties between Nepal and its two neighbors, viz. China and India. However, when the opportunity presented itself, Nepali rulers and politicians seemed jealous of using foreign policy tactics to assess domestic political challenges. Such strategies have backfired in most of the cases (pp. 108-109).

Both Nepal and India blamed the tense relations that arose after King Mahendra's 1960 action. King Mahendra was accused him of employing China as a counter-force to India in his post-takeover period. India did not welcome the shift despite the fact that it appeared to have occurred. Mahendra and his lieutenants are paranoid due to the use of force by Nepali congress and other parliamentarians from their Indian base.

After India's proposal for Afghanistan at the Dhaka Summit in November 2005, King Gyanendra's proposal for China to join SAARC did not sit well with Indian politics. He deliberately took his anger out on the king, who had already done so on February 1, 2005. India was reportedly unhappy with attempts to get China to join the SAARC. It boasted of being one of the most important nations it has not changed India's attitude towards the royal

system. For this reason, the royalists could not attribute it to the end of the Nepali monarchy. The US, EU and India stopped supplying arms and ammunition to the besieged king who was fighting insurgents.

According to Muni (2012), Nehru and his successors, particularly Indira Gandhi, have undoubtedly undermined democracy, both in India's quest for dynamism and in the domestic political context with the establishment of a state of emergency in 1975. It was unquestionable under normal circumstances—much more dependable and potent than Nepal's democratic government (pp. 9–10).

The role of neighboring countries has become important in the face of political turmoil in the letter and spirit of this turmoil of the former, and vice-versa. The question of democracy is bound up with political turmoil. The leaders and cadres of political movements in neighboring countries have sought and obtained various kinds of support from India's neighboring states, and this has led to differences between centers and states within the general dynamics of India's federal politics.

While looking at Indian involvement in South Asia, there is a type of opinion that has been consistently critical of Indian interventions in neighboring countries that are experiencing "political turmoil," primarily for stability and security, leading to the strengthening of these countries' democratic power and institutions. During the first decades of Indian independence, democracy was seen as a foreign policy objective, albeit a secondary one aimed at the stability and security of the neighborhood. In fact, democracy has always been a prerequisite and ancillary to India's stability and security (pp. 13–28). It is not obvious why India has remained silent during royal takeovers of Nepal in 1960 and 2005?

After democracy was established in 1951, Nepal adopted an open and non-aligned foreign policy. Nepal's diplomatic relations were directed and controlled by India during the reign of King Tribhuvan from February 1951 to March 1955. The rulers of both countries acknowledged the existence of a "special relationship" between the two countries despite strong opposition from Nepali leftist parties in Nepal and Indian nationalist leaders.

Indian leadership in Nepal's domestic and foreign affairs was embraced during this period. The successes provided significant Indian support, overthrowing the Rana regime, restoring the hegemony of King Tribhuvan, and invading Nepal.

India's political objective in Nepal was to promote and encourage Western liberal democracy. This had to be India's strategic and political interests in Nepal. As one of the world's largest democracies, India feels a responsibility to protect democracy at home and promote it in neighboring countries such as Nepal. The adoption and functioning of the same political institutions with common political ideals, values and norms in both countries was assumed to constitute unity of interests in neighboring countries. Such political harmony and ideological affinity will help maintain the "special relationship" between neighboring countries. Moreover, Indian leaders believed that democracy would be an effective tool against the spread of communism.

Shakya (2013) has opined that political instability is a curse not only on social peace, territorial integration, economic development and prosperity, but also on international acceptance, recognition, credibility and respect. It is a serious threat to any nation. Nepal's politics are unstable because of its unstable political model, and that was the case with Rana regime due to its imbalanced and dysfunctional foreign policy toward India and China. Nepal does not yet have a correct and balanced India policy. Due to the lack of national unity in Nepal's foreign policy, the self-interest of neighboring countries in Nepal's politics has always remained precarious (pp. 365-410). Here, she has not said anything about India's role in April 2006 movement.

Shrestha and Shakya (2013) confirmed that India imposed a blockade on Nepal on her March 23, 1989. After several days of border restrictions, India continues to open two transit points, Jogbani-Biratnagar and Laksaur-Birgunj. On the first day, all 22 transit points were shut. India's Foreign Minister at the time, P.V. Narsimha Rao, said two transit points were enough for Nepal. Trade treaties and trade treaty renewals were the obvious cause of the blockade, but what is hidden is Nepal's affinity with China, and India's

desire to oust the king from power rocks India. They did not point the invisible reasons in the course of further research.

Kharel (2014) found that while most of Nepal's youth and some leaders do business with India, primarily on the basis of a mutually beneficial approach, they adhere to a minimum set of diplomatic norms and values. It claims that India is directly responsible for its non-compliance. Kharel (2014) further noted that, especially since 2006, during Nepal's long and important transition period, Indian diplomatic missions and intelligence agencies have been influencing all areas of political activity and government mechanisms in policy, management and implementation at the micro- level.

Mukharji (2014) has extensively argued that India played a role in some of the defining movements of contemporary Nepali history. There was political support for movement against the Ranas and the tale of the King's flight to India needs no retelling. There was support for democracy in the 1960s and 70s and the people's movement of 1990 leading to constitution writing for Nepal and a democratically elected government. The conclusion of the 12 point agreement 2005 held in Delhi with India's mediation, between the Maoist and the mainstream political parties was the charter for all the changes that followed. However, in such engagement of India in Nepal's internal affairs, we should not forget our national interest.

Mukharji (2014) has further expressed that geo-politics is a combination of geography and politics. Since Nepal's geographical location and socio-cultural conditions remain an inescapable reality, its multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-cultural characteristics have to be taken into account while crafting its foreign policy.

According to Mandal (2014), the geopolitical landscape is undergoing dynamic changes and turbulent patterns. The changing scenario following the conclusion of the cold war was described by (2014) Mandal such as Fukuyama as the end of history, Huntington as the clash of civilizations, Keplan as the Coming Anarchy, Ohmae as the Borderless World, and Krauthammer as the unipolar movement. The new emphasis on Asia in US foreign policy is seen as an assertion

and rebalancing of US dominance in the crucial Asia and Pacific area (BRI vs. IPS) (p.35).

Mandal (2014) has opined that this recognized the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region and put it at the center of the geopolitical game. Former US President Barack Obama has stressed that the India-US partnership is "essential" in addressing global challenges. Washington believes India should increasingly become the focus of US foreign policy (p.35). This scenario directly determines India's role in Nepal.

Democracy has always been the most admired political system throughout recorded history. It begins with a superior goal in human governance with the undeniable break that freedom from injustice and social exclusion provides. Nepal does not have a long history of pro-democracy movements aimed at introducing a Western-style democracy that permeated the country in 1951 and continued into the 1960s.

Unfortunately, although Nepal's democracy came to an end in 1960 with a royal coup, it was revived in 1990. In 2005, King Gyanendra put it in risk once more. In Mass Uprising II, the monarchy was overthrown by an alliance of rebel Maoists and seven political parties (SPA), viz. Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (UML), Nepali Congress (Democratic), Janamorcha Nepal, Workers Peasant Nepali Party, United Left Forum, and Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandi Devi).

It has also noted that the goal of promoting democracy plays a very subordinate role in India's foreign policy, which since independence has been determined solely by geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Although non-interference remains a major pillar of India's foreign policy, Nepal's geopolitical position occupies an important place in her foreign policy. In addition, a long border with China has enhanced strategic proximity have made Nepal a key factor in India's security.

India has supported the Nepali monarchy, but for decades it has harbored the Nepali parliamentary party, nurtured Maoist leaders and supported the democratic movement. This dual policy often created tension

and friction between Kathmandu and New Delhi. Even in the recent democratization movement, India has played a central role in supporting Nepal's democratization and shaping the country's political development.

In November 2005, India has also helped in creating understanding between the SPA and the Maoist for 12 point understanding in New Delhi moreover, India gave support to Mass Movement II, (2006) and after the political change held in Nepal in 2006, the role of India was alarmingly increased which is defined as undue advantage of India with the fragile political situation in Nepal. But the writer has not explained the casewise role played by India in Nepal since 2006 onwards.

Dev (2016) stated that India has always been an actor, factor and mediator of political changes held in Nepal. India's role was clearly seen during her anti-Rana democratic revolution from 1950 to 1951, in the form of political and military support for the revolution or in completing the 'Delhi Accords'. Likewise, India's government and major political parties played a key role during the 1990 democratic revolution.

India's role was remarkable and widely recognized during the 2006 mass movement II and the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. India has shown keen interest in the process of drafting a new constitution by Nepal's Constituent Assembly and even after the promulgation of the new constitution in breaking the long political stalemate and strife between the main political parties and the protesting Madhesh based party.

History proved that in all past political/democratic transitions, Nepal has always received full political and moral support from India. NC, which has always viewed India as a reliable and trustworthy friendly force, has garnered support for Nepal's democracy and development. The NC's occasional criticism of India is largely unremarkable. He further said that throughout India's history, the Communist Party of Nepal has always faced skepticism and cynicism. Since India imposed a blockade, Gautam (2016) continued to study how India's foreign policy has caused a lot of

debate once more. Nepal's own internal issues resulted from its efforts to devolve power to diverse ethnic groups and underrepresented communities (pp.65-74).

Similarly, Kavitha (2016) noted that Nepal has proven to be a buffer state between India and China and its impact have seen clearly after 2006 AD. Nepal occupies a unique position in the South Asian region, both geographically and politically Nepal and India have had a close relationship since time immemorial. It is maintained through state visits by heads of state and government, including dignitaries and leaders. This Nepal-India relationship has been 'special' in many ways since the 1950 treaty. The Zone of Peace (ZoP) proposal submitted by Nepal was not recognized by India as violating the provisions of the 1950 Convention. Similarly, New Delhi viewed the arms purchases as a sign of Kathmandu's intention to develop military ties with Beijing in violation of the 1950 treaty.

Kavitha (2016) previously claimed that relations between Nepal and India were strained in 2005 after King Gyanendra took over power. But her 12-point agreement between the SPA and the Maoists who had rebelled inside India brought the party closer to India. Similarly, it wiped out centuries long Monarchy.

In this context, Yadav and Dhakal (Interview, 2021, September 8) have stressed that, " as a Hindu King India is always favored Monarch of Nepal but the over tilt of King Gyanendra towards China and playing China Card against India helped SPA to go against absolute Monarchy even it tried to retain ceremonial King in Nepal introducing the concept of baby King or cultural King".

This was made clear in Prime Minister Prachanda's speech in September 2008, which he gave shortly after returning to Nepal and in which he requested India's support to assist Nepal draft an entirely new constitution. The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was formed to amend the 1950 treaty, but India is unwilling to accept the reports yet. However, Kavitha (2016) remains silent on various topics of India's interest in Nepal.

Lohani (2016) has written that the decade-long rebellion, initiated by the Maoists in 1996, ended with the acceptance of 12-point agreement facilitated by

Delhi in November 2005. As a result, India has also been very closely involved in Nepal's political changes since 2006 (pp. 107-114).

This was stated by Pokharel (2016) following the adoption of a new federal, democratic, and republican constitution by the people of Nepal. The Modi government's actions sparked a serious worry because Nepal and India's relations were in a terrible state. A humanitarian crisis has erupted in Nepal as a result. By adopting a new constitution for itself, Nepal has not engaged in a serious crime. It's not good for the largest democracy to make a big deal out of past events. These questions can only be answered by asserting that India is attempting to reduce Nepal to a submissive position. But, Nepal should be allowed to take independent decisions for its own development (pp. 123–132).

Raj (2016) explained that 2016 is likely to be a pivotal year in the warmth triangle between Nepal on the one hand and her two neighbors India and China on the other. This is due to the unofficial "blockade". Therefore, the first constitution was drafted by Nepal's elected representatives and was not welcomed by the Indian government (pp.155-160).

He (2016) also argued that this violated the 12 point agreement as there is no provision to abolish the monarchy. Moreover, after the Madhesh based political parties protested a declaration of interim constitution on the issue of "Ek Madhesh Ek Pradesh" (One Terai, One province), India supported the Madhesi political party.

Rana (2016) showed that King Birendra's geopolitical move was to establish a strategic partnership with China. India proposed a new peace and friendship treaty to King Birendra in 1989 in return for rescuing the Panchayat system and crushing popular movements, but the King compromised with the political parties (pp.161-190).

Shakya (2016) found that Nepal and India have always maintained an exemplary relationship. It is worth noting that both countries have had open borders since the beginning of the nation-state history from the mid-17th century onwards (pp. 197-228). India openly involved in Nepal's internal affairs after King Tribhuvan sought asylum at the Indian embassy against the will of the Rana

rulers. It has participated in all political events in Nepal, from the restoration of the parliamentary democratic process, in April 2006, to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPA and rebel Maoist. It gave space to India to penetrate in Nepal's domestic politics. P. Dhakal (key informant interview, September 8, 2021) also has opined, "India came in Nepali politics with 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty and more through Tripartite agreement held in Delhi under India's mediation."

Poudel (2016) noted that Indian President Pranab Mukherjee has repeatedly stated that the relationship between India and Nepal goes back centuries and that the two countries share the elements of same civilizations, religions and cultures. The leaders retaliated against him. They have gone to great lengths to demonstrate the importance of Nepal's relationship with India. The Government of Nepal made every effort to make the visit cordial and successful. After the visit, relations between Nepal and India have returned to normal as recent visits have strengthened them. However, Poudel (2016) ignored the Indian influence in Nepal.

Singh (2016) opined that New Delhi could become a monumental strategic mistake over time by 'promoting' the de facto Maoist takeover of Nepal. Nepal's new political era is the result of a peace deal facilitated by India held on 21 November, 2006 between the seven-party democratic coalition and the Maoists embroiled in its decade of riots. The United States and India see the monarchy as an important pillar of Nepali politics and advocate a constitutional monarchy in Nepal. In addition, the author comments on Nepali politics up to top-level discussions on political issues of Nepali politics. Singh (2016) does not give enough space on the influence of India on Nepali politics and administration.

Patel (2017) stated that Nepal has embarked on a new path with the proclamation of its current constitution, but political and developmental crises should be minimized. Nepal's foreign policy has focused primarily on maintaining balance between its two large neighbors. Nepal has played an important role in local politics and external forces. In terms of close social, political and cultural ties, India is Nepal's most important neighbor and it has provided its due support

in all its hardships. Patel (2017) is convinced of India's positive role in Nepal but major sections of Nepali take such Indian role as her interference in Nepal's affairs.

Saran (2017) argued that while physical proximity often helps create positive borders between nations, it can easily create misunderstandings and points of contention, sometimes leading to strong and lasting political, economic and cultural conflict. He explained that it can create connections (p. 149). Saran (2017) also endorsed physical proximity and its impact on international relations. However, there is a widespread perception in Nepal that India does not respect the country's sovereignty and independence. Often meddling in Nepal's internal affairs and generally acting like an overbearing big brother (p.149).

Subedi (2017) explained that India and Nepal are perhaps the closest neighbors and share most differences while the two seem to have a lot in common, they usually struggle to resolve key issues such as border disputes, trade and transit issues, and issues related to water sector cooperation. Through cooperation and mutual understanding, both sides can achieve much for the benefit of their respective people (p.1). However, his claim did not appear to be justified. The border issues, trade and transit, sharing of water resources, Nepal's rights under international law makes Nepal overly dependent on India's access to and from the sea through its sovereign territory.

Baral (2018) has opined that shortly after the promulgation of the Constitution on 20 September 2015, India's role changed in many ways, creating tensions between the two countries. China and other friendly nations welcomed the new constitution. But India's government would be willing to accept Nepal's new constitution. He (2018) stated that while Nepal is undergoing a process of transformation, the traditionally stable India-Nepal relationship is also undergoing a period of upheaval. In order to assess the continuity and changes in the relationship between India and Nepal from today's perspective, the traditional parameters and elements of this relationship, its possible evolution, and what should be considered new factors must be taken into account. India came to Nepal with an

influential role after the Popular Uprising II (p.5). Furthermore, Baral (2018) argued that the Madhesh movement (2008) was held and that Nepal had sought Indian mediation to calm the unrest, but failed. This led to her 2015 unofficial blockade, in which India was overtly dragged into Nepali politics through Madhesh politics.

Dhungel and Dahal (2018) have reported that Nepal's rebellious Maoists, led by Puspa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda,' and GP Koirala signed a 12-point agreement in New Delhi to abolish the monarchy and restore democratic rule in Nepal in Delhi. After signing this agreement, the Maoists and his SPA formed a united front and launched a campaign against King Gyanendra with the support of outside forces, particularly India (p.244-258). However, the author is not clear about India's involvement in political change in Nepal.

Simkhada (2018) noted that the relationship between India and Nepal is very ancient and deeply ingrained, dating back to the distant past of history and encompassing all aspects of interstate and interpersonal interaction, politics, economics and infiltration. We believe that it covers all aspects of security, culture and religion. Unfortunately, however, official politics often obscures the nature of this relationship. Similarly, Dahal (2019) argued that Nepal's new geopolitics needs to be based on subjective frameworks, not just geographic decisions of policies and winner-take-all markets, in order to achieve sufficient objectives in a nation-state (p.219).

Additionally, India and China's neighborhood preferences have moved Nepal from a periphery to a geopolitical focus. Nepal's strategic geography is crucial to the security of neighboring countries. Nepal's proximity to India's heartland, the Ganges Belt, open borders, recruitment of Gorkha soldiers in the Indian army, and shared communities all contribute to Nepal's geopolitical value for its security and stability.

Simkhada (2018) argued that advocating for democracy and modernity has long included the Westernized ambitions of Nepal's leaders to contain communism and make it subsisted by a democratic state. Realism rescued geopolitics from the grip of ideology (p.220). As a result, the 1950 treaty became

the other treaty raising the question of amendment or repeal justified by the EPG report, but the EPG report has not yet been published (p. 220). Dahal (2019) asserted, "Raising nationalism marked Nepal's shift from buffer to sovereignty. It can free its leaders from the snooze and rethink the utility of employing old concepts-semi-colony, sphere of influence, special relationship, equidistance, balancing or non-alignment" (p.221).

It has stated that China is happy to address Nepal's domestic and political issues because it's only interest in Nepal are to ensure that Nepal accepted the one-China policy and it did not want to take any action on behalf of Tibet. And after the 2015 earthquake, China's interest was heightened by India's blockade. Similarly, Simkhada (2018) further documented the use of the RAW in Nepal by India (pp. 243-269). He further claimed that the leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal, namely Prachanda, Oli, Nepal and Khanal, became prime ministers with Indian support (P-262), although China does not exert such pressure on Nepali leaders as India does. (p.253)

Josse (2020) presented a clear picture of the Divya Upadesh (Divine Council) that the kingdom is like the yam between his two stones. We should maintain friendly relations with the emperor of China, and converse with the emperor across the South Seas, namely Great Britain (pp. 32-63).He (2020) states that the Rana ruler's foreign policy was to isolate Nepal from the world and appease the BEICG.

Upadhya (2020) argued that Nepal pursued a balanced relationship with both neighbors and expressed neutrality in her 1962 Sino-Indian War (p. 19). He further expressed the opinion that Prime Minister Modi's visit to Nepal (3 August, 2014) emphasized the implementation of India's neighborhood policy, When he was warmly applauded at the CA conference in Nepal he said it was not India's foreign policy to interfere but to support the progress of neighboring countries. However, it seemed like undeclared blockade in 2015 it seemed like lip service. However, the Upadhya (2020) does not reveal India's influence on Nepal's politics and administration.

Acharya (2021) mentioned that Nepal has historically embedded outsider influence (p.13). He presents a theory of Indian aloof behavior, dependency and IR sphere of influence in highway construction in Kathmandu to Kodari (p. 184). It was the Nepal's efforts to reduce dependence following an undeclared blockade (2015) and Nepal's signing of BRI (2017).

India's role in the conflict in Nepal and its path to democracy has not been without accusations of "interference" in internal affairs. Nepali leaders do not hesitate to seek Indian unnecessary concern in Nepal's internal affairs when it is convenient, and lament foreign concern when it does not (p. 139). India has supported nearly every major political upheaval in Nepal, including the overthrow of the Rana oligarchy in 1950, the demise of the Panchayat in 1990, and the establishment of a republic following the popular movement in 2006. However, he does not reveal India's involvement in Nepali politics.

2.3 Summary

For a nation to survive, it must be guided by security as its most basic national interest. Without security, no other goals take precedence. However, the interests of great nations are different. Similarly, the literature suggests that an increasing role in international and regional politics in dealing with IR will further enhance survival, security, and democratic influence in clarifying politics and maintaining international relations.

The above documentary evidence showed that the relationship between Nepal and India has always had its ups and downs. According to the empirical literature, various practices and major issues in Nepal-Indian relations were considered important to continue this study. A revolution in the 1950s sidelined the Rana oligarchy and established democracy in Nepal. India's role was crucial in facilitating Nepal's maiden voyage to democratization. Independent states conduct their international relations on the principle of sovereign equality.

India has great tensions over China's growing footprint in Nepal. In light of this, if we were to design a scenario for the 1950 Treaty of Peace and

Friendship that governed relations between Nepal and India following the 1951 armed revolution. In the 1970s, Nepal introduced a 'diversified foreign policy', marking a departure from its previous isolationist policy. Since the 1990s, Nepal has moved to liberal principles in its foreign policy, while India has sought a special relationship with Nepal in every political campaign. India has a natural hegemony in this sub-continent, and the allegation that domestic factors play a deeper role in defining India's foreign policy boundaries when outside actors interfere in regional affairs has been explored. India's foreign policy appears to strike a balance between appeasement and aggression, rather than focusing on claims of national self-interest that justified the economic blockades of 1970, 1989 and 2015. Nepal believes in Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Panchaseela (principle of sovereign equality), regionalism, globalization, UN charter and international law, so India, theoretically, bases its foreign policy on the same principles, however, the practice is rather outdated.

2.4 Research Gap

Literature dealing with the IR field i.e. Realist, Sphere of Influence, Dependency, Constructivist, and Geopolitical, mentioned above, addressed a consensus perception of Nepal-India relations, but Nepal's politics through neighborhood policy to justify India's influence on Nepal-India relations and Nepal's political change, a variable, geopolitical influence, has explored through this study.


In addition, the literature dealing with Nepal-India relations mainly from a historical perspective focused on socio-economic and political aspects, but the literature were silent on India's influence on political change in Nepal. However, from an Indian perspective, the literature explained India's growing concern over Nepal's growing engagement with India. Post-monarchical literature indicated an increased Indian activity in Nepal. Others suggested that India wanted to remain at the centre of Nepal's political and governmental affairs. After reviewing relevant theoretical and empirical literature the following research gap were identified:

- a) Pre-1990s Nepal's relations with India have not studied in realist perspective,
- b) Nepal-India Relations, political changes and India's influences in Nepal have so far not been studied in constructivist ways, and
- c) Nepal-India Relations have been undergone in controversies. This narrative has been created by one section of academia which has not been yet analyzed independently using geo-political, realist, dependent and spheres of influence dynamics.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

In this study, the relationship between Nepal and India, which is primarily based on key variables i.e., 'geopolitics' and 'Indian influence', as an analytical framework and briefly include other variables based on those relationships (*see*; Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The study of political relations between Nepal and India focused on domestically relevant topics such as relations between peoples, border issues, trade and transit issues, immigration, religion, open borders between the two countries, and security.

With a primary focus on the public upheavals of 1990, 2006, and the years that followed until 2020, as an attempt at an independent political exercise, this study examined and analyzed Nepal-India relations, in particular India's influences on political change in Nepal. A few other topics that were briefly discussed and determined to be pertinent in the research include security, interpersonal relationships, trade and transit, border control, etc. Political relations are primarily related to these topics. In the same way, this study explained legal documents related to political connections, such as treaties and agreements with India, such as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 and the Treaty of Trade and Transport, as well as the challenges associated with renewing them, etc.

Figure 2.2*Conceptual Framework*

Note: Diagram created by researcher on the basis of above studied literatures on Geo-political, Realist, Sphere of Influence; Constructivist and Dependency (GSoIRCD) Theories and its implications in Nepal-India relations.


The above conceptual framework is as a tool of inquiry in the examination of Nepal's relations with India on the basis of IR theory i.e., Geopolitics, Realist, Sphere of Influence, Constructivist and Dependency (GSoIRCD) theories. On this framework, Nepal's relations in the context of geo-politics and India's role in Nepal's political changes have been examined through the means available for Nepal in maintaining its bilateral relations and ways to march towards independent political activities.

For more clarity, few key variables or tools of inquiry have been considered in this research. Nepal -India relations were observed through historical lens and after 1990s political changes, India's involvement in Nepal's

political activities from 2006 to 2020 AD were considered based on the specific objectives of this study. To further facilitate to this research, the following guiding framework is considered.

Figure 2.3

Guiding Framework of the study: Factors Influencing Nepal-India relations



The insolent instrument of the discourse on Nepal-India relations was based on 'India's impact on political change in Nepal. It marked Nepal's presence as an independent political entity in world politics. Independence determines de facto and statutory existence, as well as new and changed political developments. Based on the above theoretical and empirical literature, as well as research objectives and research questions, the above framework for conducting research has been developed. The various references relevant to the scope of this study, discussed and conceptually and theoretically illustrated in this chapter, constituted the data for the qualitative analysis of the research objectives detailed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER-III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

This research is descriptive, analytical and explorative. Plans for research determines the outcome of proposals and their effects (Raj, 2000, p. 63). Any study's basis is its study design, which addresses a research issue and illustrates the appropriate approaches to data collecting in light of the study's particular objectives. However, the design of the study relies on the goals of the research, and exploratory or formulation studies should differ from other studies like descriptive or diagnostic investigations (p.63).

The objective of this study is to collect information about Nepal-India ties that is both directly and indirectly pertinent to that goal. This chapter has concentrated on research methodology, including information sources, data collecting methods, and study design, data and their nature. Halperin and Heath (2012) have viewed that, "Methodology is concerned with how we obtain knowledge, with the means and methods, which can provide the researcher with lawful informations of the political world" (p.26).

As qualitative research, it follows descriptive, analytical, and exploratory research design to achieve stated goals based on IR theory.i.e., Geopolitical, Realistic, Spheres of Influence, Constructivist, Dependent (GRSoICD). When used as a descriptive research design to describe a situation, topic, action, or phenomenon used to answer questions about who, what, when, where and how to relate things to a particular research question or problem.


Descriptive research is often described as research that is concerned with discovering "what is". We try to collect qualitative information that can be analyzed to achieve our intended goals. It is used to observe and explain research topics and problems without influencing or manipulating variables.

In the social sciences, descriptive research is frequently employed. They offer extensive data sets and frequently make known fresh insights and viewpoints that might otherwise go unreported. Descriptive research may collect quantitative, qualitative, or both types of data. Information categories and interaction patterns are described using qualitative data. The topic is constrained by the use of primary and secondary data within the framework of qualitative research designs and more analytical and descriptive methodologies. Ahuja (2009) has stated:

The main goal of a descriptive research is to explain events, phenomena and situations. Further, he opined that Since discription is made on the basis of systematic and scientific observation and it is assumed to be more authentic and precise than friendly. (p.131)

It helps to highlight recent bilateral relations between India and Nepal, particularly between 1990 and 2020. Additionally, a qualitative study approach is used to analyze Nepal-India relations (1990–2020) and political changes in Nepal, including India's impact on the changes.

Figure 3.1



Note: Figure created by Reaseacher using data from Qualitative research design

The goal of a qualitative research design is to learn about and comprehend the experiences, viewpoints, and ideas of participants. To put it another way, this research uncovers reality, meaning, or purpose. Various viewpoints and counter arguments on Nepal-India ties have been explored during the use of this methodology, notably in reference to India's influence on Nepal's political changes from 1990 to 2020.

3.2 Sources and Nature of Data

This study has employed both primary and secondary data sources. Library data collecting techniques were used to get the necessary data and information. Among these well-known academic works, news, views, opinions, and formal and informal ideas and concepts from credible publications have been used. They have also been published online, in PDF format, and elsewhere. Key Informant Interviews (KII) is used as the main source of information for studying Nepal-India relations and India's influence on political change in Nepal in order to gather trustworthy data and information.

3.3 Universe and Sampling

To obtain the required information, the purposive sampling method has used. The area of Nepal- India relations through the lens of India's influence in Nepal's political changes have been focused. For this sake, the various scholars who have acquired better knowledge regarding Nepal-India relations have been consulted. And then the researcher has interviewed three experts of foreign affairs, four academies, nine political leaders and four civil society members. They are interviewed through face to face contact being based on semi- interview guidelines (*See*; Appendix 8 & 9). Further diplomats, academics, and members of civil society have also been chosen as key informants (KI) in order to obtain their representative opinions on Nepal-India relations, political changes, and India's influences in Nepal. Politicians have been chosen as KI in order to learn the opinion of policy makers and decision makers in this regard.

3.4 Data Collection Technique

The respondents were given the assurance that the information they provided would remain private and anonymous. Using semi- informants interview guidelines (*See*; Appendix 8 & 9) created for the study's purposes, information was gathered by making key notes. The respondents' convenient time for information collection was used. Written field notes were used to get responses from the respondents. At the time of the interview, careful attention was paid to how they spoke and how they were feeling. The opinions of the respondents and

the findings of the literature review on connected topics and incidents have been evaluated impartially and objectively.

The following techniques are employed for the researcher's convenience, but there are many ways to gather primary and secondary data and information for social science research. Interviews with key informants, observation, online tracking, social media monitoring, library methods, etc. have been followed.

3.4.1 Primary Data (Key Informant Interviews, KII)

To gather primary information, official government press releases, reports, publications, and Key Informant Interviews (KII) are carried out. Primary data sources included diplomats, representatives of civil society, academics, and political figures.

3.4.1.1 Sampling

In order to gather primary data for this study, a purposeful sample of 20 people was used comprising 9 politicians, 4 members of civil society, 3 diplomats, and 4 academics. The Key Informants Interview (KII) guidelines were prepared by the researcher (*See*; Appendix 8 & 9), who conducted the interviews by meeting the participants face-to-face and asking them questions about the topic and goals of the study.

3.4.2 Secondary Data

The researcher used secondary data from books, journals, magazines, newspapers, dissertations, websites, and other sources that were relevant to the topic. Additionally, the library method has drawn attention as a practical approach to study social phenomenon. Under this approach of data collection, the books, articles, opinions, and viewpoints of well-known authors are carefully used. In order to use secondary sources of information, this strategy is actually used, and the relevant writers are truthfully cited in references for both in-text and other citations.

3.5 Data Interpretation and Analysis

Because it was a qualitative study, textual analysis and KII data were mostly used to evaluate and interpret secondary data. Constructivist, realist, spheres of influence, geopolitical, and dependency theories have all been applied to assess the data that has been gathered.

According to Pathak, Jena, and Kalra (2013, July-September, Para 2), qualitative research focuses on comprehending a research question from a humanistic or idealistic perspective. Various IR theories are used to analyze the information or data that has been gathered. Based on the analysis of two fundamental factors-political changes and influences-the study identifies and describes the main features of interactions between Nepal and India. Pathak, Jena, and Kalra (2013, July-September) outlined:

Although once viewed as philosophically incongruent with experimental research, qualitative research is now recognized for its ability to add a new dimension to interventional studies that can not be obtained through measurement of variables alone.

The straight-line projection of Nepal's drive for national interest based on geopolitical reality, Nepal's dependence on India for trade and transit, people-to-people relations based on constructive theory, and all of its impacts on Nepal's political changes were all examined in order to outline on "Nepal's relations with India and political changes and influences." Halperin and Heath (2012) proposed that realistic and sphere of influence theories of IR have also been examined in order to draw factual literary justification to the research's goals. They (2012) postulated, "The link between theory and evidence is central to sound research, to how researcher actually go about collecting and analyzing the information or evidence that researcher needed to support an argument" (p.8).

The relevance of Nepal-India ties in the liberalization of Nepali politics with the overt and covert participation of independent India has been examined on the basis of the Spheres of Influence theory of international relations. The British rule had a significant impact on the entire state structure of India, but Partition, a version to the West, and a focus on domestic economic development made it

difficult to maintain that legacy. Although Delhi faces new obstacles in reestablishing a South Asian sphere of influence, its capacity to do so have increased in tandem with economic growth. Instead of focusing on setting lofty and unachievable goals, India must instead gently cultivate the region. This study has also examined Nepal-India ties in several ways, taking into account this fact to some extent.

In chronological order relationships between Nepal and India: Political changes and India's influences in Nepal from unification to the second decade of the twenty-first century have been described and analyzed using systemic and scientific methods of conducting social science research in accordance with the relevant research questions and objectives of this study.

The relationship between Nepal and India was also examined using the IR's sphere of influence theory. This is because it is clear how crucial overt and covert cooperation between independent India and Nepal is for the liberalization of Nepali politics. The British- Indian Empire had an impact on the entire Indian system of nations, but it is challenging to preserve this legacy due to divisiveness, hostility toward the West, and economic inwardness. The restoration of South Asian spheres of influence is a formidable new challenge for Delhi, but as its economy develops, so does its capacity to do so.

In this study, systematic and scientific techniques of carrying out social science research have been defined and assessed. The study is arranged into several suitable areas and infiltrated descriptively and analytically with data and information gathered through various sources. This study has used a chronological approach to depict the interaction between Nepal and India in a descriptive and analytical way.

3.6 Research Ethics

In such scientific study, ethical discourse is crucial, particularly when gathering, presenting, and explaining data and information. The academic approach places a premium on scholarly honesty and the citation of other scholars' work. This reality is maintained by the researcher. Besides, a value free intellectual perspective in analyzing and interpreting data to a reliable finding

addressing the objective of the study. While adhering to such reality, this research has examined the data and presented the findings of the study.

CHAPTER-IV
NEPAL-INDIA RELATIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN NEPAL
(1816 -1990): A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4.1 Introduction

Although Nepal and India have a deep and special relationship, they also face challenges related to geography, the economy, issues with major and small power relationships, and shared ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identities. Over 2500 years ago, people who may have belonged to the Kirat (Acharya, 2021, p. 2) ethnic group appear to have inhabited in Nepal. However, humans have been present in the Himalayan region for approximately 9,000 years, according to Neolithic artefacts discovered in the Kathmandu Valley (Shrestha & Singh, 1972, pp. 5-12). The Kirats are a tribe of people that originated in the Himalayas and various regions of India who live in the jungle and mountains.

Little or sporadic information is known about Nepal's early history, but the legends and documented references mentioned below date back to the 1st millennium Before Christ Era (BCE):

- a) The presence of historic sites, e.g. *Valmiki Ashram*, indicates the presence of ancient Hindu culture in Nepal at that period.
- b) The epic *Mahabharata* mentions Kirat among the inhabitants of Nepal. Kirati King *Yarambar* had the dubious honor of witnessing the battle of *Mahabharata* where gods and humans fought side by side. Legend has it that he met *Indra*, the ruler of heaven, who stepped into the valley in human form. During the battle of *Mahabharata*, *Yalambar* is said to have witnessed the battle to assist the defeated. Lord Krishna, knowing *Yalambar's* intentions and *Kirat's* strength and unity, thought that the war would be unnecessarily protracted if *Yalambar* took Kaurava's side. Lord Krishna thus cut off "*Yalambar's*head" with a skillful diplomatic blow.

- c) Though it is mythology, one of the key informants of this research Tank Karki has viewed that Nepal-India relation is historical and ancient. During *Dwapar yug*, Arjun had come in Nepal at *Pashupati* for *Pashupatastra* (*lethal weapon*). Nepal had helped to Kauravs in the *Mahabharat* war.
- d) According to some chronicles, the successors of 'Ne' were the '*Gopalava*' or '*cowherd family*' whose names often end in-*gupta* and are said to have ruled for some 491 years. They are said to have been followed by the *Mahaispalava* or '*Buffalo-herder dynasty*', which was established by an India's Rajput named Bhul Singh.
- e) Inscriptions found in archeological stoneworks, which list mostly the dates and commissioners of these constructions, also communicate royal verdicts, religious *mantras* or historical notes sometimes; and through the corroboration of local myths with such evidence, people prior to the *Lichhavi* have been identified known as the *Kirats* (Acharya, 2021, p.2).

Nepal's first recorded history begins with the Kirat tribe who ruled in the 7th or 8th century BC. They came to Kathmandu Valley from the west. The Kirats tribe ruled for approximately 1225 years (800 BC-300 AD). Their reign had a total of 29 kings during this period. Their first and most remembered king was *Yalamber* mentioned in the epic *Mahabharat* who was killed in the battle of *Mahabharat* and the last king Gusti weakened his kingdom and was later occupied by Lichhavis (Shrestha & Singh, 1972, pp.7-12).

The Lichhavis are said to have migrated to Nepal from northern India around AD. 250 (Acharya, 2021, p.2). The first Lichhavi king was *Manadeva I*. Another of the popular Lichhavi kings, King *Narendradeva*, initiated friendly relations with China, and his successor laid the groundwork for friendly relations with India by entering into marriage alliances with the Indian royal family. It underscores the historical and unique relationship between Nepal and India, which is deeper than the people-to-people relationship from the distant past. They ruled until the 12th century. With the defeat

of Lichhavis, Malla from Simrangadh begins their rule in Nepal. During their dynasty, Nepal (Kathmandu) had better ties with the British East India Company government. This government was maintained from 1846 until the 1950/51 rule of the Rana Dynasty (Shrestha & Singh, 1972, pp. 14-15).

4.2 Nepal-India Relations after Unification of Nepal

King Prithvi Narayan Shah, who formed modern Nepal by launching a drive for unity, was aware of the presence of strong monarchs in the area when he began the Shah dynasty's rule in unified Nepal (Acharya, 2021, p.71). His successors carried forth the unification drive after his death in 1774 AD. By the first decade of the 19th century, Nepal had taken control of Shimla's territory, the Dun valley, Kumaun, and Garhwal. Gorkha conquered Sikkim in the east up to the Tista River. It is depicted in the below-provided map.

Map: 4.1

Map of Nepal Before Sugauli Treaty



(Source: <https://myincrediblenepal.wordpress.com/2014/07/24/the-greater-nepal/>)

Regmi (1961) has stated that greater Nepal was built and amassed on the map above by valiant, patriotic Nepali troops, but it was lost during the Anglo-Nepal War (1814-16) and defeat at the Treaty of Sugauli. Due to Nepal's dependency on India for trade and transit, its trade with India would have been difficult if India had not shown benevolence. In this pretext, India has always influenced the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nepal. The conflict between

Nepal's government and the British East- India Company (BEICG) quickly moved to northern and northwestern India, close to the Nepali border, as a result of this development as through this pact, British India planted the roots for its continued political and governmental influence over Nepal long before India gained independence. Likewise, Upreti, (2009) has opined that third of the land that had been held east, south, and west by 1815 through the Peace Treaty, i.e., the Sugauli Treaty, as well as the British army's invasion at the western most tips were faced by Nepal while it was expanding outside. It was formally signed on December 2nd, 1815, and only ratified by both parties on March 4th, 1816 (pp.49-51).

Nepal was forced to stay in the mountains and hills as a result of the Anglo-Nepal War held inbetween 1814–16 (Acharya, 2021, p. 4). For a variety of reasons, including Jung Bahadur Rana's plan to placate the British East- India Company Government BEICG, certain Terai areas were returned to Nepal in 1816 and 1861 (Josse 2020).

According to Bhasin (1994), Nepal did play a significant role despite respecting British authority on the subcontinent and never again challenging it. The Sugauli Treaty was signed by Nepal. By doing this, BEICG's presence in Nepal was meant to persuade the British that Nepal is a close ally. Because of this, Nepal's influence in South Asia was diminished and it continued to be dependent. The idea that the Treaty of Sugauli (1816) "squeezed" the land to a third of what it was before (Acharya, 2021, p. 72). In the same context, Karki (Interview, March 26, 2019) states that "Nepal had the power to influence both India and the states of South Asia. When British East India company started to rule in India, Nepal's presence became very weak."

From the above statement, it is clear that Nepal was badly defeated in the Anglo-Nepal War due to China's treason promise to provide assistance to Nepal if war broke out between Nepal and the British East - India Company government. The British attacked Nepal while China was suffering from civil war. European powers marched toward China, Tibet, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, expanding their colonies and strategically invading Nepal for that purpose. The influence of the British East -India

Company government in Nepal began after Nepal's crushing defeat in the Anglo-Nepal War (1814-16). Khanal (Interview, February 9, 2018) says, "The influence of British East India Company Government has been seen since Sugauli Treaty. Nepali politics became agendaless after this treaty. With this treaty British East- India Company government started power game in Nepali politics and Palace."

The Treaty of Sugauli marked a turning point in bilateral ties as well as Nepal's domestic growth. The handover of Nepal's territory and renunciation of claims, the granting of specific pensions to Nepal's "chiefs and vardars" who have lost their area and Nepal's vow not to "harass the country" make up the majority of the treaty's clauses. Its two main tenets, which were included into Article 9, were outlined in Articles 7 and 8 (Dharmadasani, 2001, pp. 20-21). According to Article 7, Nepal agreed 'never to take or retain' any British, European or American national in the country's service, 'without the consent of the British Government' (Upreti, 2009, p. 51).

This clause underscores the fact that this pact degraded Nepal in the same way that the Treaty of Versailles humiliated Germany. For a nation like Nepal, which was never made a colony, this provision was degrading (Acharya, 2021, p.5). Article 8 provided that 'accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other'. This was also a question of prestige of Nepal as she was not prepared to accept the British representative in Kathmandu. Nepal had agreed to this clause 'under duress' as General Ochterlony's threatening offer of 'either you have a 'Resident or War' clinched the deal (p. 51).

According to Hast (2016), the inclusion of this item has brought Nepal's politics and governance under the IR's influence, giving the simple solution and the plot to overthrow the government precedence. Prithvi Narayan Shah and his successors have expended a great deal of effort and money to stop this. The British agreed to give back some of the territory in Nepal that the Treaty of Sugauli had given them in a letter exchange between the two nations in December 1816 (pp. 52-53).


The Terai areas, with the exception of a few contested regions between the Kosi and Gandaki rivers, and the Terai region between the Gandaki and Rapti rivers were included in the restored lands. The 200,000 rupee stipend for Bhardhars and Chiefs of Nepal was abolished as a result of the repatriation of these regions to Nepal. Young soldiers from Nepal were enlisted in the British and Indian armies at the same time (pp. 52-53). Under constructivist views of international relations, it led to Nepal's dependence on India.

Nepal went through a period of political unrest from 1815 to 1846 following the conclusion of the Anglo-Nepal war as a result of political influence on Nepal's domestic and foreign policies as well as the seeming "rising" of the British side in Nepal's internal affairs. Muktiyar Bhimsen Thapa, one of the key centers of power, made agreements with China, Tibet, Burma, Iran, and others in a failed effort to drive out British influence from South Asia (Acharya, 2021, p.4). Fatte Jung, a victim of the Kot Massacre, and General Mathbar Singh Thapa, who has held the position of authority for more than 30 years and was the first to be given the title of prime minister.

Such occurrences gave British India (BI) access to Nepal's politics and government. India gained its independence in a slightly different manner after that (Dharmadasani, 2001, p.21) British India consequently meddled in Nepal's politics and government, which was completely unsuitable for an independent state.

4.3 Nepal-India Relations under Rana Regime (1846-1950)

The British East India Company administration helped the Ranas rise to prominence in Nepali politics. In 1846, Jang Bahadur Rana took over as prime minister and Shree Teen Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung after a brutal massacre known as the "Massacre of Kot, Bandarkhal, and Alau" and the killing of practically all rival forces. He essentially pursued the two pillars of his foreign policy as stated below:

Figure: 4.2*Foreign Policy of Ranas*

(Source: Rose & Fisher, 1970, p.149)

The Rana ruler's loyalty to British India set the stage for the unhealthy political culture of dominating a sovereign nation's politics and administration. In order to demonstrate to Gorkhas their fidelity and willingness to shed their blood for those who treat them with honor and have confidence in them, Rana rulers adopted a pro-British India policy (Josse, 2020, pp. 4-5). While participating in the fight against the British might have temporarily succeeded, the Gorkha dynasty would later have been destroyed and this country would have been destroyed as a result.

A few significant events that had a significant impact on Nepal's social, political, and even economic developments as well as Nepal-India relations included Nepal's express consent to the widespread induction of Nepali citizens into the British Gorkha Brigade, visits to Europe by Prime Ministers Jung Bahadur and Chandra Shumsher in 1850–1851 and 1908, respectively, and Nepal's assistance to the British side in the suppression of the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, also known as India's first rebel (Rose & Fisher, 1970, p. 147).

In fact, Nepal asked the British East India Company for assistance in May 1857 to quell a rebellion that threatened the authority of the BEICG (Acharya, 2021, p. 5; & Savada 1993, p.31). The British India Company government restored Banke, Bardiya, Kailali, and Kanchanpur, also known as "Naya Muluk," as a token of gratitude to Jung Bahadur Rana for his assistance (Dhungel et al., 2020). The British eliminated the BEICG in 1858 and assumed direct control of

India during World Wars I and II after successfully quelling the uprising and rewarding Nepal for its loyalty. It asserts to have delivered resources and products to the British side (Savada 1993).

In 1923, Nepal and the British administration of India signed a treaty. The treaty acknowledged the internal sovereignty and independence of Nepal (Rose & Scholz, 1980, p. 39), but it also stipulated that Nepal would follow the British Government's advice in international affairs. One of the "decisive" causes that led the British Indian administration to forge favorable relations with Nepal was the military prowess of the Nepali people because the conscription issue was a fundamental pillar of British India policy (Jain, 1959) as argued on the dependency theory of IR.

Nepal has always maintained its independence and gained the reputation of being one of the few countries that has never been conquered by an outside force, despite being right on the doorstep of the forces of invasion, colonialism, and expansion. Nepal will never be directly dominated by a colonial or occupying force like the British, who ruled neighboring India for three centuries, or the Mughal Empire, who ruled the rest of the subcontinent until the British came (Acharya, 2021, p. 5). Furthermore, Acharya (2021) has opined that, "the Ranas preserved Nepal's independence through a policy of appeasement to the British colonial power in India" (p. 5).

As already said, the Ranas' neighborhood policy contributed to the extension of their dictatorial authority, but it also unavoidably allowed foreign meddling in Nepal's internal and external affairs. The long-term freedom of Nepal was also destroyed because an independent India maintained the same policies toward its neighbors. It can be interpreted on the basis of spheres of influence theory (Hast, 2016).

During the end of Rana dynasty, Nepal strove to broaden its foreign connections, particularly under Juddha Shumsher (1932–1945). The Nepali Embassy started operating in London in 1934. India's stance in this instance was harsh, but Prime Minister Sri Teen Padma Shumsher has filled this gap once again by forging diplomatic links with the United States and boosting the relationship

between Nepal and the United Kingdom to ambassadorial status. A significant delegation from Nepal was also present at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi (Jain, 1959).

India also adopted two strategies to deal with the Rana rulers: either the continuation of the Rana or the restoration of the kingdom. Knowing this, Padma Shumsher and Mohan Shumsher, the prime ministers of Rana, renounced the isolationist foreign policy that had been first maintained by their predecessors and established Nepal's diplomatic ties with the United States (1947) and France (1949).

4.4 Nepal-India Relations after India's Independence

The Indian sub-continent saw significant changes when it gained independence on August 15, 1947 (Acharya, 2021, p. 6), and a gradual social and political awakening in the area started. The Gurkha League was the first contemporary organization to operate in India and arose among the Nepali population, and the fact that many Nepali residents reside in India provided the ground work for change-making operations in Nepal (Sharma, 2006).

As their measures grew, Indian authorities also made the decision to add Nepal to a tighter security framework. India's security strategy after becoming independent affected how it handled Nepal. Nepal was first seen as India's "spheres of influence" and "security backyard." Clauses in the 1950 Treaty and Nehru's speech from that same year both indicate this (Acharya, 2021, p. 131). Similarly, Acharya (Interview, 2019, December 3) opined that "due to geographical constraints, India is closer to Nepal than China, but we need to maintain a balanced relationship that strengthens the bilateral relationship."

Jawaharlal Nehru and Rana Prime Minister during the final years of their family's power both agreed that improving ties between Nepal and India was the only viable option. The Ranas were eager to build ties with the new government in New Delhi, whilst Nehru supported a suitable transformation of Nepal to a democratic regime.

Following that, there were some significant developments, including the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India on July 31, 1950. It was

the the successful conclusion of the tripartite agreement on the recruitment of Nepali youths in both British and Indian armies, the dispatch of ten battalions of Nepali troops for garrison duties in India during the "Hyderabad Action" in 1948–1949, and the dispatch of Nepali troops for those tasks.

However, the underlying drivers of Nepal-India relations are their shared geopolitical and strategic imperatives. The two nations have a unique responsibility to foster and uphold cordial relationships in order to protect their core national interests, which is a result of both history and geography. Mao Zedong's swift military campaign to conquer Tibet in the 1950s and the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1949 led to the signing of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between New Delhi and Kathmandu (Jain, 1959, p.84).

The two nations also agreed to exchange letters that had been held secret for about ten years along with the treaty. The letter was more comprehensive and basic than the actual pact (Muni 1992, pp. 49-50). The concept of India's "exclusive existence" was discussed in items 3 and 4 of the exchanged letters. In this context Uprety (2009, p. 79) mentions:

Point (3) In regard to Article 6 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship which provides for national treatment, the Government of India recognized that it may be necessary for some time to come to afford the Nepalese nationals in Nepal protection from unrestricted competition. The nature and extent to this protection will be determined as and when required by mutual agreement between the two Governments.

Due to the unnatural national treatment of each other's citizens among nations with significant demographic differences, it is believed that India's covert interest in Nepal is to bring it under its spheres of influence under constructivist notion of IR or make it a regional state when evaluating the provision of secret letter item number three. For instance, if all of Nepal's citizens merged with India, India's population would increase by just about 2.5%, whereas Nepal's population would increase by 100% in the reverse scenario. Uprety (Upreti, 2009) adds the following:

Point (4) If the government of Nepal should decide to seek foreign assistance in regard to the development of the natural resources or any industrial project in Nepal, the Government of Nepal shall give first preference to the government or the nationals of India, as the case may be, provided that the terms offered by the Government of India or India's nationals, as the case may be, or not less favorable to Nepal than the terms offered by any other Foreign Government or by other foreign nationals (p.79).

The ability for investment of Indians and Nepalis is also unmatched. Once more, India wants to challenge China's footprint by documenting Nepal's development initiatives. As per the opinion of dependency theory of IR, the Kodari highway's Nepal-India tussel and the Kohalpur-Banbasa section's ongoing road building provide as proof of its legality.

Indeed, India took advantage of the Ranas' trimmings. Given India's central location, shared borders with other neighbors, and "unbalanced and asymmetric power structure," South Asia is known as the "heartland of India," and Nepal's neighboring countries are aware of the necessity to further develop their various interactions with India (Muni, 1979). Bordering states have claimed that because of its position, it gives India an unfair advantage.

4.5 Bilateral Help in Political Movements

The involvement of Indian politicians in the anti-Rana campaign and Nepali youth in the movement for India's independence is a recurrent occurrence between the two countries. The 1942 "Quit India" campaign in India was a significant issue that affected the political evolution of both the two countries as well as Nepal (Rose, 1971, pp. 177-183). In the same tune, Dhakal (Interview, September 8, 2021) said that, "Nepal-India relations are mutual, the Nepal's army that were sent to suppress Hyderabad revolt and Indian leaders' support in anti-Rana armed revolution justifies the claim."

The Rana family oligarchy was overthrown and a democratic system was established by the Nepali parliamentarian as a result of a wave of independence that hit the area. In order to remove British control in India, several Nepali leaders

who were later banished to India joined the struggle. Acharya explains (2021): "B. P. Koirala had participated in the Indian independence movement and had been jailed in India for that" (p. 30).

Because Chandra Shamsher's administration was so brutal and strict, symptoms of discontent with it started to emerge. Under the direction of Thakur Chandan Singh, the All India Gurkha Federation was founded in Dehardun in 1924. The Himalaya Times and Gorkha Sansar were published in 1926, and Tarun Gorkha, a publication that promoted the promotion of democracy in Nepal under the constitutional rule of Kings, was published in 1928.

The "Prachanda Gorkha" incident in 1931 and the founding of the "Prajaparisad" by Prime Minister Thanka Prasad Acharya in 1957 served as the first signs of the pro-democracy movement's revival (Devi, 2011, p. 16-17). Because they shared a prison and actively took part in several anti-BEICG demonstrations, leaders of the pro-democracy movements in Nepal and countless political personalities in India became acquainted with one another quite well. The pro-democracy movement in Nepal was seen as a "complement and extension" of the anti-British struggle because the Rana administration had the full support of the British side (Dharamdasani, 1995, p. 23). They exercised unrestricted totalitarian power over the nation. In support of the concept of Dharmadasani, Kayastha (Interview, February 12, 2019) said "this 1950 treaty, known as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, was signed by Rana to appease Indian authorities in hopes of retaining in power".

India put pressure on democratic forces to put an end to the movement after the pact, but Ranas reassured them that democracy was prepared. It was thought that the Rana family would swear allegiance to India if they remained in power, and that even if the dissident parliament triumphed, they would thank them for their cooperation and continue to be faithful to the Indian rulers. As for expecting improvements from Ranas, Bisheswor Prasad (BP) Koirala, speaker of the Nepali Congress, stated that it was imprudent. He added that Marxists in India and Burma are more amicable to the Nepali Congress. The Nepali Congress decided to take action against Ranas as a result of this relationship. India was

initially in a predicament, but eventually played a significant influence in Nepali politics.

Following the political exile of King Tribhuvan, India was allowed plenty of room to participate in Nepali affairs as it saw fit. The Rana administration was toppled as a result of Nehru's gradual democracy policy, which was based on a "middle-way approach," and economic assistance to Nepal was multiplied. In the same line, Khanal (Interview, April 12, 2019) says, "Rana ruler dethroned the current King Tribhuvan, but India thwarted this plot by the rulers of Rana to stay in power. It was seen as India's support for the rebelling Nepali Congress to establish democracy."

Nehru favored a proper transition of Nepal to a democratic society, as claimed by Hast (2016) in reference to the IR's spheres of influence theory, India was interested in the movement for democratic change in Nepal or in a government that would be friendly to India in this case. By easing limits on India to increase India's influence, recruiting young Nepalis into the British and Indian armies, and establishing an anti-state treaty of friendship and peace in 1950, Mohan Shumsher made every attempt to hang onto power.

According to Nepal (Interview, March 24, 2019), the Ranas accepted Nehru's proposal for a tripartite agreement known as the Delhi Agreement, which formally ended the 104-year-long rule. However, India once again became the king-maker of Nepali politics because the country's first prime minister following democratic infiltration was also going to be Mohan Shmsher. In the context of India's two-pronged Nepal policy, Nehru strategically leveraged his involvement in the Delhi Accords to secure the guardians (1951) for the political transition held in Nepal. However, it was unsatisfactory for a sovereign nation.

4.6 India's Role in Armed Revolution of Nepal (1951)

Prior to India's independence, BP Koirala claimed that Nepal could not achieve democracy. India too maintained a dual policy in the lead-up to the peaceful movement. Ram Babu Sharma, Kedarman Bethith, and other young men from the Nepali Congress attempted to establish a branch of the Nepali Congress in India. India attempted to arrest them with the intention of extraditing them to

Nepal, but BP requested Nehru for dropping the potential extradition known as *Jharokhar Kanda*.

India was reluctant to instigate an armed rebellion against the Ranas in Nepal without their consent and active participation. This amply demonstrates India's legitimate interest in holding onto control of Nepali politics, as advocated by Karpowicz (2010, July 26) on the basis of the realist theory of international relations. This theory holds that power and security have a greater impact on the IR than morality, and in its own hands under the pretext of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Dahal (Interview, April 9, 2019) asserted that, "India had its decisive role in 1950s political change and Nepal's leaders staying in India also had played their role in India's political change and vice-versa. They had used Burmeli Airport while bringing weapons from Burma".

Moreover, B P Koirala had healthy relations with Burmeli socialist that helped him to bring weapons but the dual policy of Indian authority toward Nepal confiscated about 20,000 Indian currencies from BP's custody. In March 1950, Nehru addressed the Indian Congress that any invasion in Nepal from any where is not possible to tolerate to any India's government (Rowland, 1967). He opined:

India and Nepal swiftly inked two new pacts to discuss China's assertiveness and quell Beijing's claims. The first, which was signed on July 31, 1950, was a friendship treaty that safeguarded Nepal's sovereignty and called for consultation in the event that either country was challenged. It also ensured that products could freely flow through India.

This perspective makes it evident that India is concerned about a potential Chinese presence in Nepal and Nepal's growing relationships with China, which are leading to reduced unilateral dependence. This situation pushed India to sign treaties with Nepal that enabled it to maintain control over Nepal. According to Khanal (Interview, April 12, 2019), on July 31, 1950, India signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty with Nepal out of such anxiety, thereby gaining control of Nepal's security issue. After the British abandoned power in India, a political vacuum developed, which gave rise to Indian concerns about Chinese assertiveness in the area. By signing a mutual

security pact and offering free transit for outside trade, India began establishing a "special relationship" (Dharmadasani, 1997, p. 25) with Nepal in order to maintain Nepal as a buffer state.

Similar to this, the concept of a "special relationship" between India and Nepal has historical relevance and is mostly ascribed to China's position in the 1950s and India's growing security concerns as a newly independent nation. With these worries in mind, India and Nepal agreed to a Peace and Friendship Treaty on July 31, 1950, which helped Nepal resolve its security issues. After the British colonial authorities withdrew, India experienced a political vacuum and grew wary of China's intrusive plans for the area. Similar to this, Nepal and India's historical "special relationship" is largely a result of her 1950s beliefs about China and, conversely, a newly independent India's security worries. In this context, Dharmadasani (1997) has further viewed, "Nepal's democratic forces were keenly seeking support of any external forces against Rana autocracy. China was not near to us, politically, and due to our compulsion we went on the hands of India" (pp.25-26).

Nehru wanted to use the political upheavals in Nepal to his advantage. The Nepali Congress planned to bring King Tribhuvan to Palpa with the intention of running a parallel government. However, King went to India through the Indian embassy in Lainchaur, Kathmandu. Here, the Nepali Congress was forced to undertake an armed revolution on the basis of the *Bairganiya* conference as socialist thinkers in the Indian Congress genuinely supported the Nepali Congress in defending the anti-Rana movement.

A century of Ranas dictatorship came to an end on February 1, 1951, with the settlement of Delhi with direct Indian participation. Bhattarai contended that the 1951 military revolution utilised both Indian land and the tripartite agreement held between the Rana, King, and Congress was made public (Interview, December 11, 2018). Congress leaders' complained that they were not invited in the meeting to discuss on Delhi Accord even though they were in Delhi was also planned and staged in India's best interests. As a result, it turned into a legal tool for India to use to increase its influence in Nepali politics and administration. In contrast, Joshi and Acharya (Interviews, December 12, 2018,

and, December 3, 2019, respectively) have argued, "Political movement of 1951 was succeeded due to the democratic aspiration of Nepali people but Indian back up was also remarkable."

India has primarily had a dual role in Nepal. It supported both the Nepali Congress and the Rana because the Rana has been a truly credible power in Nepal for more than a century and because, on the one hand, it was scared of upsetting the situation. An illustration of this is the Mohan Shamsher led Rana-Congress coalition administration. Unfortunately, under the spheres of influence and dependency theories of IR, India views Nepal through the lens of British-Indian domination. Furthermore, according to Gurung (Interview, February 12, 2019), "King, Congress, and Rana signed the Delhi Agreement in India's best interests. India's influence in Nepal officially began at this point since the provisions and conditions of the agreement were worked out to open up a simple door for India to enter Nepali politics and administration."

However, Nepal's feudal rulers were the target of the armed revolution of 1950. The upper middle class, middle class, and elite of Nepal participated in this revolution. Another factor for creating the anti-Rana scenario in Nepal was the post-World War II global trend of nationalism and democracy. A favorable environment was created by the demise of the British Empire and the success of the Chinese popular revolution. India's support for the anti-Rana movement can be shown in the decision of India to grant political asylum to King Tribhuvan.

India also served as a mediator to help Rana and the King come to an agreement. The king ignored the revolutionaries while requesting the Nepali Congress to put an end to it. The king had betrayed the insurrection, according to Matrika Prasad Koirala. He was called to New Delhi to express his support for the upcoming trilateral agreement, but he declined. To save their wealth and power, Rana ultimately reached an agreement with the revolutionaries. India had got the opportunity in this context to have continuous influence over Nepal's politics as a king maker. Moreover, (Interview, 24 March, 2019) has claimed as:

"India had a direct influence in the armed revolution of the 1950s." The three participants to the tripartite agreement had an equal distribution of power. Along with Praja Praised and NC, the Nepal Communist Party also had a part to play. The liberation army that the NC organized played a decisive role.

Similar to this, India played an important role in the political upheavals in Nepal because although India's geopolitical interest in Nepal is logical from a global political stand point, Nepali see it as an intrusion into the domestic affairs of an independent nation. Due to Nepalis' excessive dependence in India, it has a significant influence over Nepal's political leaders.

The practice of asking for assistance from the North and South is quite old. Indicating his ambitions for China, King Anshuverma, and King Jay Prakash Malla were backed in the Sindhuli War by the British East- India Company Government. Bahadur Shah was deported to India where he received the necessary assistance and protection to seize power. Thus, India played a role in both the before and subsequent 1951 political shift in Nepal. Baral (Interview, April 4, 2019) has opined:

"The Ranas failed to appease the people's wants and aspirations, and the people sought their alternative in democracy." Additionally, he believed that India was able to penetrate in Nepal due to Nepal's governance issues i.e., namely, the absence of peace and order.

Another Dahal (Interview, April 13, 2019) viewed that India has openly interfered in Nepali politics. In place of B P Koirala, India managed the scenario for appointing Matrika Prasad Koirala as Prime Minister. Moreover, K C (Interview 2019, April 10) has suggested that the armed revolt of 1951 was directed towards the King-Rana Alliance. Nehru wanted to establish India's preferred form of government in Nepal and gave legitimacy to King Tribhuvan. Finally, India played a significant role in the political change of the 1950s. The environment was right for an armed uprising. India's main objective was to assist Nepal in pursuing its wide range of interests. However, India's dual position

emphasizes its justifiable desire to persistently meddle in Nepal's politics and administration.

4.7 Nepal-India Relations After 1950

India thought that the survival of the hereditary Rana dynasty would be vulnerable to Chinese communism due to the power vacuum because they had maintained close relations with the British rulers throughout their time in India following India's independence in 1947. India was eager to assist Nepal with political reform. When the time was favorable, numerous organizations in India, including multiple political parties in Nepal, were already active and planning to undertake some coordinated measures to topple the Rana administration. Rose (1971) has opined:

India's main concern at the time was the safety of its northern border. Similar to the Rana sought trustworthy partners in India when the British departed. Chandreshwar Prasad Narayan Singh of the Government of India and Prime Minister Mohan Shmusher of Nepal signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship there on July 31, 1950, taking advantage of the new circumstances in the Himalayan area. Along with the pact, a private letter bearing the signatures of the two governments was sent, and it "was not publicized until 1959" (pp. 177–194).

This is clear from the fact that India had a great stake in the 1950 treaty since it served its security interests, and because of its support for the first democratic revolution, it was able to make its domains of influence in Nepal visible. Upreti (2009) asserts:

With the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship and related covert letters, relations between the two nations were established. It outlines the two nations' security ties as well as the pact controlling their bilateral trade and transit through Indian Territory. (pp. 79-80)

No government shall tolerate a threat to the security of another country by a foreign aggressor, according to the Indian government of the time and the Rana rulers of Nepal (2009, Upreti, p. 79) "These accords solidify the'special

relationship' between Nepal and India so that the two governments can communicate with one another about severe disagreements and frictions with neighbors that could derail the current good relationship between the two governments (Sood, 2016, 23 July, p.3). The majority of Nepalis still travel to India for tourism, medical care, education, and religious ceremonies (Shakya 2021, p. 246). That has enhanced the special relationship between the two nations according to the IR constructive theory.

As advocated by Bhattarai (2005) on the constructive theory of IR, the treaty also provided Nepali with the same economic and educational opportunities as Indian citizens in India, but Indian citizens and enterprises were given preference over those of other nationalities in Nepal (Uprety, 2009, pp. 76-78). India and Nepal have an open border. Without a passport or visa, citizens of Nepal and India can travel freely and live and work in either nation. The relationship between India and Nepal has improved as a result of this scenario.

Indian citizens of Nepal are not allowed to own land or work for the Nepali government, despite being allowed to work for several Indian government agencies, many states, and some public services, including IFS, IAS, and IPS. About 32,000 or more Nepalis are currently on active duty in Indian army (Sood, 2016, 23 July, p. 3). There may be a further million Nepali migrant laborers in India (720,892 in 2011). By 2021, 600,000 Indian citizens in Nepal would have registered their documents with the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, according to the Indian Embassy in Nepal (Sood, 2016, July 23, para. 4).

This is evident from the fact that relations between Nepal and India developed under the dependence and constructivist theory of IR. It is worrisome that this kind of public diplomacy is being used by India as a pressure tactic to influence the political system and achieve favorable government in Nepal. We reviewed issues related to human access (Subedi, 2005). It has been taken that the treaty and exchange of letters were guided by security concerns in the general context, and that many provisions of the treaty were more flexible to India's presence in Nepal's politics.

4.7.1 Special Relations Era between Nepal and India (1951-1955)

After the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nepal and India in the 1950s, ties between Nepal and India began a new phase, the special relations period (1951–1955). Rose and Fisher (1970) mentions, "King Tribhuvan had strong familial and personal ties to India and a number of Indian figures" (p.151).

In fact, India backed Nepal-India relations when King reclaimed power in February 1951, and a special relationship grew as a result. According to Rose and Scholz (1980), the Indian embassy in Kathmandu arranged for King Tribhuvan to seek political refuge in India in November 1950 so that he could begin a serious anti-Rana campaign (Dharmadasani, 2001, p. 27). Indeed, after King regained power in February 1951, India supported Nepal-India relations and a special relationship developed. Rose and Scholz (1980) state that in November 1950, the Indian embassy in Kathmandu arranged for King Tribhuvan to flee to India for political asylum in order to launch an anti-Rana campaign in earnest (Dharmadasani, 2001, p. 27).

India has demonstrated its support for the Democratic Party and the King of Nepal in the regime change process. Its curiosity was initially focused on learning about the Holy Spirit's apparent discovery, but later shifted to learning about Nepal's politics and government. This was clear from the relationship-building era and India's involvement in Nepal. As a result of the Delhi Compromise of February 1951, the Ranas, the King, and the Nepali Congress decided to form a coalition government that would work under King Tribhuvan's overall direction. India, who is acting as a conduit in these negotiations, is largely responsible for putting this formula into practice. Rose and Scholz (1980) meant that every member of the new government was dependent on India.

According to them (1980), independent India wanted to start relations with Nepal by bringing it under its security discretion. This move can be justified by Prime Minister Nehru's parliamentary proclamation, but it would need to adhere to both large and small scale international legal and ethical standards.

One section of India's and Nepali politicians opines that relations with India need to be further strengthened, mainly due to China's growing confidence in the region but other section advocates on balanced relations. After conquering Tibet, China declared, "Tibet is the palm of China, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier of Assam is her five fingers, and now that the palm is back in China, the fingers should join" (Rowland, 1967).

He (1967) argued that this situation casts doubt on China's future intentions and that India should approach its northern border more cautiously. Here, relations between Nepal, India and China are guided by geopolitical sensitivities, with Nepal following the theory of survival in international politics. Acharya's Key Informant Interview from December 3, 2019 has asserts, "The relationship between Nepal and India was extremely close at the government level from 1951 to 1955". In addition, " the leaders of India shared with Nepal's internal matters during the 1950s in order to obtain and retain power."

Open, easily accessible borders and mutual support for each other's regime change are variables in Nepal and India's public diplomacy, though Acharya (December 3, 2019) did not go into specifics. Nepal and India usually communicate on a personal level rather than at the level of government to government. On October 7, 1950, China invaded eastern Tibet, and on October 25, it seized power. Beijing Radio claims that Tibet is a part of China, but India thinks it ought to be free. China, which also occupied Tibet, opposed India's uprising (Rowland, 1967). The geopolitical situation in Nepal has caused the insurrection to dominate domestic politics to the point where the Nepali parliament is organizing an armed uprising to overthrow the Rana government. The anticipated revolution was frequently postponed because the rebels took too long to procure weapons and ammunition. The Nepali Congress then joined Marxists in India in urging for an armed uprising.

4.7.2 India's Military Mission to Nepal

Modernization of the disorganized and ill-equipped Nepal army was considered necessary to closely monitor threats both within and outside the country. The two governments decided to send an Indian military mission to Nepal in January 1952 to help the Nepali army get trained and modernized. But it began watching the Chinese actions of Nepal's geopolitical sensitivity (Shrestha, 2003, pp.50-51). Although its overt goal was to counter the Chinese threat emanating from Nepal's Himalayan border, it actually came to Nepal to modernize the country's military. The mission undertook a number of actions to modernize and reform the Nepali army.

Politicians in Nepal soon condemned the military mission. In fact, it was believed that India was interfering with Nepal's domestic affairs by deploying a military post there. Since the deployment, Nepali political parties and members of civil society have repeatedly expressed strong opposition to the issue. Military protests against India were launched in 1959 without any success. Shrestha (2003) further claimed that:

On 20 April, 1969 the check - posts were removed and the India's army personnel's sent back home during the time of Premiership of Kirtinidhi Bista. But the India's para- military force stationed at Kalapani in Darchula district of Nepal ever since 1962 during Sino - India War are still not withdrawn. P.M. Kirtinidhi Bista believed he was unaware of the Indian military's presence in the Nepali territory of Kalapan. (p. 52)

Nepal government, however, supported the mission's role and goal (Upreti, 2009). Bijuchhe and Bhattarai (Interview, November 3, 2018, and December 11 2018, respectively) argued that the following incidents pushed Nepal into India's spheres of influence.

- a) Provisions of article 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of 1950s treaty (Yadav, 2011, p. 221)
- b) Constitutional law experts were called from India in Nepal to draft Interim Government Act, 1951
- c) To modernize Nepal army India's army officials were called

- d) The 1st university of Nepal i.e. Tribhuvan University got affiliation from Patna University
- e) 1st five year plan (1956-62) was totally funded by India as its own provience
- f) Nepal's currency making task was also supported by India,
- g) King Tribhuvan's personal nurse *Erika Lutchet* was also India's national of British origin,
- h) Cabinet meetings of Nepal were held in Delhi,
- i) An India's envoy used to be present in cabinet meetings in Kathmandu and many more events clearly justify that there was *mid-wife* relations between Nepal and India.

Further," through a secret accord concluded in 1965, similar to an arrangement that had been suspended in 1963, India obtained the exclusive right to sell weaponry to Nepal (Yadav, 2011, pp. 221-227). Nepal's "special ties" with India did not prevent Nepal and China from establishing diplomatic relations in 1955 and created a new understanding of essentially new geopolitical dynamics. While keen to maintain its commitment to the One China Policy (Shakya, 2021, pp. 252-253), India is keen to keep Nepal within its spheres of influence (Yadav, 2011, pp. 223-224).

4.7.3 Rising Anti-Indian Sentiment

Up until the accession of King Tribhuvan, India and Nepal enjoyed a period of greater understanding. However, after King Mahendra came to power in 1955, Nepali perspectives towards India started to shift. King Mahendra's approach to the relationship between Nepal and India was very different since he shared the sentiments of Nepali people. This point of view claims that India's influence in every aspect of Nepali life is harsh and disrespectful to Nepal's own national identity (Rose & Fisher, 1970, pp. 151-152).

King Mahendra, by adopting the principle of “equiproximity or equidistant”, has made great efforts to achieve Nepal’s unilateral interdependence, which many argue is Nepal’s sovereignty and to protect independence. A wave of nationalism formed in Nepal and anti-

Indian sentiment became a large part of it. Nepal, which claims to be threatened by India's excessive interference in the country, has begun to assert its identity and independence (Upreti, 2009, p.245). He (2009) further mentions, "In Nepal, nationalism has been equated with "anti-India" for decades. This sentiment is regularly fostered by all politicians, right or left, in order to gain maximum popularity in elections" (p.246).

With developing nationality awareness, Nepal began to resist India's political security interests in Nepal. In this context, Palmer and Parkins (1979) have asserted that international relations believe in co-existence, protection and security of independence countries under realism theory of IR. King Mahendra pursued a policy of extricating Nepal from India's spheres of influence. Nepal's influential section has grown more critical of what they perceive as excessively haughty behavior on the part of Indian diplomats and other officials in dealing with their Nepali counterparts. He tried to arouse nationalist sentiment in the people and downplayed the reality of the special relationship with India (Yadav, 2011). And he further emphasized equiproximity or equidistant foreign policy and diversification of Nepal's foreign policy. Since 1956, the notion of special relation has been rejected in favor of the slogan "equal friendship with all" (Rose & Fisher, 1970, pp. 152-153).

Due to the illogical and unjust stipulations of the 1950s treaty that dragged Nepal into the midwifery community, anti-India sentiments started to emerge in Nepal, mostly from leaders of the Communist Party, nationalists, and members of civil society. The deal was highlighted by the Communist Party as electoral propaganda to highlight India's influence in Nepal. Yadav (2011) reflects, Nehru had reiterated in 1954, "foreign policy of the Nepal government should be coordinated with the foreign policy of India" (pp.221-227).

Furthermore, P.M. Nehru emphasized the geopolitical vulnerability of India to China's aggression in Tibet, but Nepal, which is constantly eager to maintain balanced ties with both of its neighbors, does not find this saying to be appropriate. Upadhya, (2020) has written that, " India and China, our giant neighbors, were on the brink of war in December 1960 and they were too preoccupied with each other to intercede in Nepali politics" (p.19). It shows that

both of Nepal's immediate neighbors have special interest in Nepal either for their own security or for extending influence.

For example; ex- Prime Ministers Man Mohan Adhikari, Puspa Kamal Dahal and Prime Minister KP Oli raised the voice against 1950's Peace and Friendship Treaty and thought the bilateral discussion on formation of EPG was begun by former Prime Minister Babu Ram Bhattarai (Jha, 2011). PM Oli formed Eminent Persons Group, (EPG) to all the treaties held between Nepal and India with the objective to reach on reform, amendment or repeal of such treaties that have increased anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal.

4.7.4 Royal Takeover and Nepal-India Relations

King Mahendra's foreign policy appeared to have been guided by realist approach since his accession to the throne in 1955. Despite the first general election in February 1959, he abolished democratic practices by seizing state power (Whelpton, 2005). His political moves are claimed to have reduced Nepal's dependence on India and to develop relatively closer relations with China (Rose & Fisher, 1970, pp. 156-157). His portrayal of Rajendra Prasad, the four-day state visit that President Sharma of India made to Nepal in October 1956, shows that the Indian government is still striving to impose special ties. In this context, Rose (1971) writes, "Any threat to the peace and security of Nepal is as much a threat to the peace and security of India, and your friends are our friends and our friends yours" (p. 215).

This demonstrates the geopolitical significance of Nepal to India's foreign and security policies. On the basis of our shared heritage and culture, we also reaffirmed our friendship. But India's intention to keep Nepal within its spheres, as Deudney (n.d.) has opined of influence is clear. In his speech to the parliament in November 1959, Nehru declared that "any aggression against Bhutan or Nepal shall be regarded as an aggression against the response that "unilateral action". This can never be taken is what every "aggression calls for" in order to quell potential anti-Indian demonstrations and criticism of his own government or as an effort to save face (Dharmadasani, 1997, pp. 28–30).

According to Nehru, India was in charge of maintaining the security and prosperity of the Indian subcontinent. The issue may have been opposed by royalists because they believed it was intolerable for a country that was independent and sovereign. These attitudes, however, have been criticized as reflections of India's colonial legacy. The Nepali Congress has secured a two-third majority since the start of government formation based on the first general election of the House of Representatives (1959). BP Koirala was well-liked by Nepalis, but India endeavored to place Subarna Shumsher as Nepal's first elected prime minister in the Nepali parliament (Pandey, 2072 B.S).

Acharya (2021) mentions that Nepal vehemently upheld its sovereignty, and supported India's influential P. M. Nehru while signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the boundary agreement with China. On a number of matters relating to India's position toward Nepal, Koirala dared to disagree with Nehru and expressed Nepal's independent foreign policy (p.75).

The socio-economic change supported by Prime Minister B.P. Koirala, such as the Raj-Rajauta abolition act, land reform policy heightened his popularity but disliked by one section of Indian and even King of Nepal. As a result, the scenario for royal take over prepared (Prajapati, Interview from November 19, 2018). With this "despite the Nepali Congress launching a "mass-criticize campaign" against the King's takeover, nothing happened." He further (2018, November 19) has indicated that, "Nepali Congress declared 'mass-criticize campaign' against the King's take over but due to India's back up nothing resulted."

In a same context, India authorized King Mahendra's 1960 royal takeover with his consent because it was worried about BP Koirala's rising notoriety in socialist international forums. In order to provide the Nepal army with weapons so that it could put an end to the Khampa uprising, King and India reached an agreement in 1965 (Bhattarai, Interview, 2018, December 11). Indian troops arrived in Nepal after completing their mission in Kalapani, but they did not leave. Likewise, B. M. Joshi viewed that it is very typical that political changes were mostly brought about by the influence of neighboring nations. For instance, Russian influence had a role in the 1949 Chinese political uprising. Additionally,

Hast (2016) argues that Josse tunes' perspective on the factors that affect IR is sound (Interview, December 12, 2018,).

King Mahendra exploited Nepal's ties with its northern neighbor to balance its act with India in Nepal's foreign policy by making strong overtures to China. Through the Kodari highway, he improved Nepal's ties with China while allegedly utilizing the "China Card" as leverage in negotiations with India (Acharya, 2021, p. 76).

There are opinions that the religious ties to India are not given enough weight (Sharma, n.d.). Hinduism's development is a further feature of the Nepali state that was included in the 1962 Constitution in order to give Nepal a separate political identity from India and to support the monarchy's function following the dissolution of the country. The action took advantage of the sentiments of the Indian people, who saw Nepal as the realization of their cherished dream of seeing India as a Hindu nation. The political relationship between the two countries was heavily clouded after King Mahendra abrogated the parliamentary democracy in December, as Sharma (n.d.) further quotes that Nehru had stated:

The establishment of Panchayat system in 1962 under the overall active leadership of the King, nullified all the possibilities of the growth and substance of parliamentary democracy in the Kingdom. Thus, Nehru's perception of political stability through democracy was also ignored.

King Mahendra attempted to operate internal affairs independently in the 1960s, but Bisheswar Prasad Koirala's goal was to avoid open hostilities with India made the effort fail. BP Koirala visited India in January 1960 as adherents of the constructivist opinion on international relations (Dharmadasani, 1997, p. 30). Both governments declared in a press release issued on January 28 following his visit that "Nepal and India have a critical stake in each other's freedom, integrity, security, and progress."

However, India accepted Nepal's new political structure and agreed that the stability of the monarchy was more vital than democracy (Rose & Fisher, 1970, p. 159). In this case, it has shown out that India does not favor a government that is pro-democracy in Nepal, but rather one that is pro-monarchy

in general. The geopolitical environment has also been crucial in this. Otherwise, it always seeks to influence Nepali politics.

4.7.5 Nepal-India Relations During Panchayat Period (1960-1989)

Following the nationalist King Mahendra's royal takeover, relations between Nepal and India deteriorated. Because Nepal want to keep good relations with China and is very interested in reducing the perceived threat from India, which makes it a significant player in Nepal's domestic affairs. It also demonstrates King Mahendra's aim in a harmonious relationship between Nepal and China as well as between Nepal and India.

The King's acts were given weight and legitimacy by India's inadequate management of its obtrusive and obvious presence in the 1950s and 1960s, when there was a gap between its aspirational and actual power status. This situation was exploited by the US, China, Pakistan, and other external actors, who encouraged Nepal to secede from India. The main driving force behind this break was the King's concern that, after 1960, India would always support and sympathize with his domestic democratic rivals a concern that was validated by India's involvement in Bangladesh and the unification of Sikkim in the middle of the 1970s.

At most, India may allay these concerns by making an effort to appease the King and the political, ideological, and socio-economic constituency of the Nepali democratic movements in India. The question of whether a return to the King and democratic forces' early 1950s alliance or the rise of democratic supremacy starting in 1959–60 in Nepal would result in a favorable shift in Nepal's perception of India was a crucial one for policy makers (Muni, 1992, pp. 8-17). It highlights how Nepal must base its foreign policy on geopolitical sensitivity and prosperity through bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

The bulk of the Third World nations, including Nepal, and India, one of the five founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), joined the organization in 1961. The movement was started in order to detach the country from the Warsaw Pact (WTO) and NATO alliance of military blocs and ensure its

independence in foreign policy. As part of a strategy to distance Nepal from Indian influence, China offered assistance to Nepal to build a road between Kathmandu and Kodari which fueled mistrust in Nepal-India relations.

India responded by pointing out that the terms of a treaty signed by King Mahendra in the 1950s, which prohibited the Chinese government at the time, led by Chairman Mao Zedong, from building the Kodari route, should be the basis for tenders. In order to intervene in plans to connect, Koirala hurried to Delhi to meet with Nehru, then-Prime Minister of India. This prompted China to back out of its promise to construct a highway suggested by King Mahendra (Upadhyaya, February 2, 2022).

Upadhyaya (2022, February 2) mentions that Nepali leaders hurried to Delhi to get Pundit Nehru's required "orders and instructions" even on the subject of ruling Nepal. The late BP Koirala's "elected administration" was overthrown by King Mahendra, who then assumed control of the nation himself, in order to protect a free and independent Nepal from "Indian coercion and twisting of the arm."

BP Koirala was once asked by Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong during an official visit to China if he needed a road connecting Tibet and Kathmandu, to which Koirala replied emphatically, "no". Today, thanks to Mahendra's persistence and Chairman Mao's wisdom, the Kodari Highway connects China and Nepal by the shortest route. In this context, Acharya (2021) opines that the Chinese-built highway sparked a discussion in India, whose leaders then praised King Mahendra, declaring that "Nepal's King is to import Communism from China" via this roadway (P.184). "Communism does not travel by Taxicab," King Mahendra quipped in a sly media campaign directed at India (Upadhyaya, 2022, February 2).

King Mahendra's humorous remarks, as claimed by Hast (2016) on the spheres of influence of IR, hushed the leaders of India and Nepal. Through the covert participation of Indian paid and despatched operatives, they had a strong desire at the time to turn Nepal into another Indian influencing state (Acharya,

2021, p.184). A major step toward lessening Nepal's reliance on trade and transit on one side only was construction between China and Nepal via the challenging Tibetan route (Muni, 1992, pp. 24-30). The process of becoming independent is now well underway.

These were viewed as security threats to India after India's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1962, but Nepal successfully demonstrated its neutrality in the conflict. As Nepal was experiencing difficulties due to its geopolitical sensitivity, the King of Nepal took wise measures to protect Nepal's independent existence. Since its reorganization in December 1963, the Indian Military Advisory Group (IMAG) has only been responsible for coordinating Indian military aid to Nepal. Nepal likewise took action to diversify its military's supply sources after this reorganization. According to the terms of the 1965 agreement, supplies from the United States were to be managed by a commission made up of representatives from India, Nepal, and the United States. However, after a short period of time, India was no longer necessary in this regard. Nepal was therefore completely free to purchase military weapons from whatever supplier it chose (Muni, 1992, p. 45). Muni (1992) further mentions that:

In 1969–1970, Nepal additionally compelled India to remove its Military Liaison Group from the northern border of the Kingdom. In a statement on October 20, 1970, King Mahendra pledged to exchange "Military intelligence with India on developments of adverse conditions to each other's countries as a substitute. (p. 47)

King Mahendra's security perception was introverted as a result of these issues with the Nepali Congress after December 1960 and the country's increasing friendship with China. The trilateral ties were dictated by the geopolitical sensitivity between Nepal, China, and India. Since then, the King has considered domestic political instability as his greatest concern, and India has been perceived more as an enemy than an ally. One of the main driving causes behind King Birendra's proposal for Nepal to be declared a Zone of Peace (ZoP), which is the sensible move to help Nepal leave India's security sphere, was this domestic threat.

4.7.5.1 Undeclared blockade 1969

In 1969, dissatisfied India obstructed the movement of goods into Nepal after the latter built the Araniko Highway linking Kathmandu with China, and opened Tatopani as a trade route with the northern neighbor. Even though the economic blockade of 1969 was for the short period of time, it had created a problem in smooth supply of some commodities such as salt, spices products in the country as Nepal was dependent for these products on India (Subedi, 2016). Nepal's efforts to lessen its reliance on India alone infuriated India.

After the 1950 Trade and Transit Agreement expired in 1969, India's government placed quantitative restrictions on cross-border trade, creating the first barrier. But because there are not any hard numbers for that time period, its unknown how much Nepal's economy was impacted (Shakya, 2016). The aforementioned information makes it evident that India has a limited view of landlocked Nepal because both countries have violated the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Nepal is not breaking the pact independently because India also routinely does so by acquiring weapons and ammunition and signing security arrangements with Russia and other nations.

4.7.6 Zone of Peace

King Birendra assumed the throne in 1971 and generally adopted his father's framework for both domestic and foreign policy, adapting it to new challenges and contingencies in that area. King Birendra asserted that he had made a novel contribution to the Zone of Peace (ZoP), with the goal of removing Nepal from India's unfavorable influences.

Similarly, King Birendra included the same proposal in his farewell banquet in 1975 (Savada, 1993, p. 179). The main motivation behind such a proposal was to remain neutral or it seems to balance it out by not belonging to either side of the alliance with India. King Birendra made the proposal at the NAM summit in Algiers in 1973. The security situation in the region had grown complex and ambiguous as the China-India conflict and the nuclear race progress, endangering the security of the region's smaller nations.

In addition, the 1965 and 1971 Indio-Pak conflict that led to the liberation of Bangladesh, and the 1975 acquisition of Sikkim by India as its 22nd state, drove the situation to a state of flux. In defining its foreign relations in the 1970s and 1980s, Nepal weighed the complexity of these unfolding events and the courses of action that its neighbors in the region should take.

Crossette (1993) claimed:

One nation, the Kingdom of Sikkim, completely vanished in the middle of the 1970s when India engulfed it up after ruthlessly destroying its ethnic harmony and peace. After removing the Sikkimese monarch from power, Chogyal Tunzin Topgyal Wangchuk Sisum Namgyal, an agent of Indira Gandhi, continued to pursue the overthrown monarch until his death from cancer in New York in 1982. (p.110)

The ZoP proposal was formally presented in February 1975, valuing the delicate position for Nepal's sovereignty that had been a main focus of Nepal's foreign policy since the middle of the 1970s. Evidently, as a foreign policy idea, it had significant and far-reaching effects on internal politics, including the maintenance and survival of both the monarchy and the panchayat system. Moreover in his address King Birendra vowed that they were in favor of the non-alignment strategy because he thought it would increase the chances of a peaceful growth. He suggested designating Nepal as a zone of peace out of a desperate attempt to institutionalize peace.

According to Dharmadasani (2001), Nepal is not a part of the subcontinent. It borders both China and India and is a region of Asia. King Birendra suggested in February 1975 designating Nepal as a Zone of Peace (ZoP). The proximity of Nepal to India in terms of geography, culture, history, and economy gives the impression that it favors India. In this context, Acharya criticized that "India's viewpoint of ZoP believes India will lose its influence in Nepal if it is declared a peace zone" (Interview, 2019, December 3).

This claim was then clarified and reiterated in a number of public and informal remarks. Nepal had consistently worked to keep the same distance between the two enormous neighbors in order to uphold the credibility of the ZoP.

In the process of lessening Nepal's dependence on India, Nepal developed direct aviation lines to Tibet in China during the King's visit to Sichuan. Since then, these ZoP clarifications had been included in every major document or declaration that outlines Nepal's foreign policy. In July 1985, Nepal's Foreign Minister Randhir Subba stated that his country did not perceive China as a security concern and that Nepal's security interests did not coincide with those of India. To secure internal political stability and economic progress was another ZoP concern.

He further (2001) opined that Chinese Prime Minister Hau Guofeng stated that His Majesty King Birendra's suggestion to designate Nepal the ZoP would maintain the country's independence and national sovereignty during King Birendra's visit to China in early June 1976. He claimed that it demonstrated the great hopes of the Nepalese people in 1992 (p.72).

In June 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proclaimed a state of emergency in India. According to Gurung (Interview, February 14, 2019), B P lost Indira Gandhi's support and had to halt all of his NC actions in order to win King's confidence and backing. When requested to return to Nepal while in political exile since 1968, BP chose to quit. Morarji Desain, the Indian Prime Minister who assumed office in 1977, refused to meddle in Nepal's domestic affairs, but after Indira Gandhi won the election to retake the presidency in 1980, she took control of the country and a referendum in support of the royalists was conducted.

4.7.7 India's views

Political backing for the initiative had only reached the level of sycophancy and lip service inside the Panchayat system. The relevance, utility, and viability of the ZoP proposal were further questioned at the international level by seminars and discussions sponsored by the foreign ministry and the TU in 1983 and 1984. Muni (1992) mentioned that in public debates and discussions, it was rare to find an intellectual in Nepal defending this proposal with persuasive arguments and logical justifications (p.85).

Moreover, Muni (1992) writes a similar reason for India's hesitation to accept the Nepali proposal and the responsibilities it included was to appease the King. When they became aware of the proposal's various aspects that would affect both short-term and long-term Indian interests, both Morarji Desai (in 1977) and Rajiv Gandhi (in 1985) had to renege on their initial commitments to give the proposal favorable consideration. Desai, who had raised King Birendra's hopes on India's positive response to the ZoP proposal, eventually sidestepped India's endorsement. Muni (1992) extends his writings and states, "It was enough if nations of the subcontinent contributed their mite towards making the region free from tensions and strife" (pp.84-85).

India interpreted the ZoP proposal as an attempt by Nepal to undermine its security interests and historical ties to the Himalayan Kingdom. India specifically did not support democratic forces, but instead supported the Panchayat system, which it helped win a referendum on. Although Kings of Nepal made numerous attempts to avoid it, the impact of India on Nepal's domestic political activities became evident in the 1970s. There was a rumour in Nepal that India tried to take advantage of political dissent in Nepal by proposing some controversial treaties.

After ten years, the relationship between Nepal and India had deteriorated significantly, with an explanation for military trade between Nepal and China in 1988. However, India has frequently purchased weapons from the United States. In this context, Dahal claims that India has broken the pact numerous times (Interview, April 9, 2019), He questioned why Nepal should be forced to observe the treaty unilaterally.

India blamed that the 1950 treaty and the 1965 Arms treaty were found to have been broken by Nepal's security-related choices that were made without informing India. Nepal had made tariff reductions to China for its goods. Relations between the two nations had been negatively impacted by the agreement with China. The trade pact also ran out of time in March 1989. In this way, in addition to political issues, other elements also affected the relationship between Nepal and India. Nepal demanded a new treaty from India or renewed the current treaty, but India did not take this seriously. Their strained relationship was brought on by it.

In 1989, when King Birendra turned to China and bought weapons there, Saran (2017) asserted that "the de facto blockade placed on Nepal increased the siege" (p. 154). However, the contradictory roles played by Nepal's leaders also contributed to the blockage. According to Prajapati (Interview, November 19, 2018), "Agitating political parties in Nepal had requested India to impose blockade against Nepal to weaken Panchayat (leader Madav Kumar Nepal had put this proposal strongly), but it was their mistake because they once again opened door for India's intrusion in Nepali politics" (Pandey, 2072 B.S).

The relations between India and Nepal have fluctuated greatly since their union. By India's favor, Nepal gained democracy in 1951, but a 1950 treaty also rendered Nepal a peripheral state of India. During the thirty years of Panchayat government, India adopted a dual policy. In addition, a personality conflict between the two country's leaders harmed bilateral relations. In the same line, Simkhada (2011) has stated that, "personality and policy could never be fully divorced."

Simkhada (2011) further mentioned that there were tensions between Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian prime minister, and King Birendra that led to a blockade in 1989–1990. Relations between Nepal and India under the Panchayat regime were also unsatisfactory. India generally saw its relationship with Nepal through the perspective of security and desired a privileged regime in that country (Subedi, 2017, pp. 53-83). When Nepal's government attempted to manage its internal affairs freely, India left its mark in the country. In order to keep Nepal appealing from 1989 to 1990, it appears that India imposed an economic blockade against international law.

4.8 Blockade and Nepal-India Relations (1989, March 23- 1990, April)

The trade and transit treaty, which expired in March 1989, were not canceled by the administration of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (Dharmadasani, 1997, p. 68). In 1989-1990; Nepal was the target of India's fury. Savada (1993) argues that India also refused to ship petroleum products to Nepal, which resulted severe shortages of basic necessities in Nepal. As a result, Nepal experienced a political crisis that was hastened by New Delhi's imposition of harsh economic

sanctions on Nepal. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's government refused to continue the Trade and Transit Treaty, which expired in March 1989 (Dharmadasani, 1997, p. 68). Crossette (1993) mentioned that the government of King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev supported protests against India's imposition of an "economic blockade" (p. 112).

The King had also brought up the subject in a variety of international fora. In addition, Nepal bought weapons from China and had welcomed high-level visitors from Pakistan and China. Chinese Premier Li Peng and Pakistani Foreign Minister ShahebazadeYokum Khan both paid visits to Nepal in June 1989 and November 1989, respectively, stoking tensions between Nepal and India (Crossette, 1993, pp. 112-113). It validates India's constant desire for exclusive influence over Nepali politics.

Simkhada (2011) analyzed this incident and mentioned that "Our foreign policy will break down at the point where India or China loses faith in us and concludes that the vital national interests and sensitivities do not receive proper recognition in our conduct of relations" (p. 14). He (2011) further mentioned that the misunderstandings between neighboring countries should be resolved through bilateral and trilateral meetings. Both parties completed and started the formation of separate trade and transit agreements to regulate illicit commerce. The crisis in trade relations between India and Nepal started before these agreements were actually signed in 1989.

The letter provided that, in view of the anticipated expiration of the India-Nepal transit treaty on March 23, 1989, the trade treaty and the "Illegal Trade" control agreement would be regarded to have expired on that date. Since Nepal is a landlocked country, India refused to complete two separate treaties with extension clauses that should be governed by international law and restricted business practices. The letter noted that India wanted to negotiate new agendas, including a new unified trade and transit treaty and a new agreement to prevent unlawful trade (Vaidhya, 2001).

The distance between Nepal and India had widened due to a number of additional variables. When India pressed for the eviction of Nepali settlers from

nearby nations in 1987, Nepal replied by establishing a work permit system for Indian citizens engaged in employment in Nepal (Thapa 2010, December 10). Additionally, it was perceived as deliberately encouraging India to compromise its own security by acquiring weapons and ammunition from China. The real cause for the blockade, according to Pandey (2072 B.S.), was an endeavor to lessen Indian influence in Nepali politics during the reign of King Birendra, not the stated reason for it.

The historical relationship between Nepal and India is called into question by this circumstance. However, Nepal made significant diplomatic efforts to communicate to the world community its views on trade and transit issues. Due to India's displeasure with Nepal since the 1960s, particularly because of the reign of King Mahendra and the continuation of King Birendra's policies, the considerable divergence in Nepal-India relations observed in 1989 could be linked to these factors.

The monarch's policies of balance and equidistance toward both China and India seemed to be violated by the Indian ruling elite, if not outright. Other factors that contributed to the blockade scenario are included. Informally, Indian and Nepali diplomats and decision-makers had discussed their "cold" relationship with Nepal's King Birendra Bikram Shah Dev (Mandal, 2014).

The two fairly unloving and image-conscious males were instrumental in this circumstance. At the SAARC meeting of seven countries in Islamabad in December 1988, the mutual resentment reached a peak. While Nepal claims that King Birendra refused to pose for photographs with Gandhi or the King of Bhutan, India believed that Gandhi had declined King Birendra's offer to breakfast. Whatever actually transpired in Islamabad, King Birendra would eventually suffer, not the people of Nepal. They proved to be more durable under Indian pressure than New Delhi had anticipated. The aforementioned information made it obvious that he had been sucked up in two separate viewpoints by the 1989 crisis. In the 1950s, India wanted to execute its policies through treaties whereas Nepal, an independent state, sought to exercise its rights. The personalities of Rajiv Gandhi and King Birendra clashed as well. In this regard, Karki & Gurung have opined:

King Birendra, a nationalist monarch, had invited the crisis by refusing Rajeev Gandhi's formal and informal calls and meetings and looking for better alternatives to the 1950s pact, which had unduly made Nepal dependent on India. Rajeev Gandhi once believed he was in charge of a sizable country and that the King of Nepal should treat him with respect, but King Birendra fought for equal sovereignty. (Interviews, respectively conducted on March 26 and April 12, 2019)

Regarding India's strategy in Nepal, PV Narsimha Rao, the foreign minister of India then poured his word in a statement to the Lok Sabha on April 26, 1989. The lowering of tariffs on Indian commodities supplied to Nepal is one of these commitments. According to the Indian Ambassador's letter, Nepal further reduced its tariffs on Indian goods on April 11, 1989, following the breakdown of their trading system on March 23, 1989. It was blamed that the issues with Nepal's procurement of Chinese weapons in the middle of 1988 and the deterioration of a number of treaty clauses in the 1950s. The problem has also been met with a direct and unyielding response from Nepal (Vaidya, 2001).

Following the coexistence and security approach espoused by Palmer and Parkins (1979) on the realist theory of IR, Nepal's responsibility in this situation was to prevent India's influence. The new Indian government, Bharatiya Janta party government, however, was unable to immediately take action to normalize trade relations between India and Nepal as the pro-democracy movement gained strength and the king and his Panchayat institutions' isolation grew. In this case, India failed to implement its Nepal policy. In this context Hamal (2011) argues that "the personality clash between India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and King Birendra also supplied fuel for the embargo against Nepal" (Interview, February 28, 2019). Because India refused to accept the Zone of Peace (ZoP) proposal forwarded by Nepal, King Birendra was not happy with India, and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was even less pleased with Nepal because of its purchases of Chinese weapons.

As a result, India was planning a scenario in which the King of Nepal would be overthrown by a large-scale rebellion against him. The King was attempting to establish an independent government and administration, but India

was worried that Nepal would leave its desirable region. India put a blockade on Nepal and the left-wing parties in Nepal resolved to launch a coordinated campaign against the Panchayat system after realizing the potential for increased global influence. India supported this since it would be against the despotism of the West for it to have any influence over Nepali politics.

India, meanwhile, reacted to the 1960s coups with a fair amount of indifference. The king's control over both internal and external matters was influenced by India during Panchayat's 30-year rule. Although relations between Nepal and India remained shaky, India's displeasure with King Birendra intensified. Nepal made every effort to maintain its unique identity and reject the idea of over dependency with India.

Nepal- India relations since the Sugauli Treaty onwards have been going through the colonial lagecy of India. After independency of India, it was thought that India will follow its Nepal policy based on sovereign equality but that assumption went on vain. Throughout the panchayat rule Nepal-India relations remained on suspicion and ego tussel between the Indian PMs and Nepal's Kings. Country like Nepal in a geostrategic position and passing through the competing interest of two rising powers with opposite political ideological leaning, it is crucial to consider 'India's influence in Nepal's political changes' in the changed political system have been studied in next chapter.

CHAPTER-V

NEPAL-INDIA RELATIONS:POST PANCHAYAT (1990-2005)

5.1 Popular Movement (1990's) and Role of India

It is asserted that the Janta Dal, under the leadership of VP Singh and supported by the BJP administration, had a special political affinity towards Nepal's palace. However, as the pro-democracy movement gained strength and the King and his panchayat institution became more isolated, India's new government was unwilling to take swift action to restore trade ties between Nepal and India. Hamal and Gurung (Interview, 2019, February 28 and 14, respectively) expressed the opinion that India had prepared a scenario for a mass uprising in Nepal against the King because the King of Nepal was attempting to remove the country's internal affairs from India's sphere of influence as a sovereign state, whereas India's concern was that Nepal was slipping out of its control and King was tilted towards India's well-known competitor, i.e. China and Pakistan.

Following the crises of 1989–1990, mass uprising I developed as a political movement to call for multi-party democracy in Nepal. Anguish lasting a year was brought on by growing political unrest and the resulting embargo, some of which were openly supported by Indian politicians who visited Nepal and delivered speeches critical of the royalists (Crossette, 1993, p. 113).

Crossette (1993) further noted that beginning in 1990, "the political crisis culminated in street demonstrations suppressed by the royal government, leading to the left-wing bloc in Nepal and the media outlets have greatly inflated the toll on global consumption." According to Shah (2004), on March 31, 1990, the king of India was forced to issue a decree from a besieged government to New Delhi at a time when the country was at its most vulnerable (Upadhyay, 2015). The draft treaty placed four limitations on Nepal at its core (p. 112) i. e., Nepal will not import arms or additional military units without India's consent. Nepal does not form military alliances with other countries. Indian companies are preferred for economic or industrial projects in Nepal. Exclusive Indian

participation in the development of 'shared rivers' in Nepal would be guaranteed (Shah, 2004, pp. 204-205).

India put forth a draft treaty that would more specifically define Nepal's security relationship within India's interpretation of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. It is true that no independent nation will ever agree to have other countries undue influence in its domestic affairs. Shah (2004) asserts:

Instead of ratifying the pact with India in an effort to preserve the Panchayat government, King Birendra "preempted Delhi calculations by quickly transferring power to the combination of the Nepali congress and the ULF without seeking India's assistance" (p.205).

It is obvious that India's interests have bound King Birendra to his own interests in this case and persuaded him that India has preserved the impartial Panchayat despite the King's opposition to his direct authority. Many believed that the Nepali Congress and the left coalition agreed to launch a joint campaign against the Panchayat rule after seeing the possibility for increasing foreign support. He was prepared to compromise with the Nepali political parties it agitated. India supported it because it would be threatened if western nations had any influence over Nepali politics. Here, out of concern for losing its spheres of influence, India backed a democratic movement basically to maintain its influence in Nepali politics.

On February 18, 1990, mass movement I (1990) began based on several scenarios, leading to multi-party democracy in Nepal. Nepal's democracy was either directly or indirectly impacted by the third wave of democratization, the 1986 Burmese Revolution, the Bangladesh factor, the fall of the former Soviet Socialist Russian Federation (Soviet Union), and India's blockade of Nepal due to a misinterpretation of the 1950 treaty. Joshi and Acharya expressed the following opinions:

India's leaders, including Chandra Shekhar, S. K. Sinha, Sitaram Yachuri, Har Kishan Singh, and Subramaniam Swami, were invited to attend the General Assembly of the Nepali Congress, which met at NC leader Ganesh Man Singh's residence at Chaksibari. They addressed the meeting

giving a unified voice for democracy in Nepal (Interview, November 12, 2018 & December 3, 2019, respectively).

However, political parties once more provided India a platform to shape Nepali politics, and in appreciation for India's assistance in the 1990 political reforms, the government and political parties reiterated their allegiance to that country (Muni, 1992, p.166).

Bhattarai (November 11, 2018) asserted that Indian political figures publicly exhorted conference attendees to fan the flames of the movement. The NC and the communist parties had previously engaged in separate conflicts with the King and the Panchayat, but this time both sides were involved in the movement (Key Informant). It has been challenging to reestablish democracy in Nepal without India's backing, despite a national scenario that is vehemently hostile to the rule of the King. We were successful because we consented to take part in the initiation. Furthermore, Joshi, Kayastha, Gurung and Khanal (Interview, November 12, 2018, March 12, 2019, February 12, 2019, and March 10, 2019, respectively) stated that "with the self-interest India extended help to Nepali leaders." Similarly, Khanal (Interview, 2019, April 2) claimed that the restoration of democracy was made possible in 1990 because of India's unofficial backing.

When the Rana became futile for India, which supported the NC for an armed revolution, a concerted attempt was made against the Panchayat regime by the Nepali Congress and the Left-wing coalition. This revolt lasted 49 days and was ultimately successful in toppling nonpartisan Panchayat authority. When the Panchayat threatened India due to its ties to China and Pakistan, it backed the pro-democracy movement. Such backing was motivated by, and continues to be motivated by, a covert desire to retain Nepali politics within its own area of influence (Crossette, 1993).

This is how India motivated political parties in Nepal for her 1990s political changes. The India's democratic forces greatly supported the Nepal's democratic forces. Neighboring countries and other countries around the world support political change, but in return they form privileged

governments and influence the domestic and foreign policies of sovereign nations (Crossette, 1993). However, Dahal opined (Interview, April 9, 2019), "Indian leader Chandra Shekhar believed that Nepali citizens should bring about democracy in their country. However, it is important to remember that India has always had a dual strategy in Nepal, which can be viewed as interference.

It is evident from the statements above that India had a two-pronged approach to Nepal. The only issue that worried India was the potential security risk provided by the powerful governments of China and Nepal. India opted to back political groups opposed to King Birendra's authority and his excessive proclivity toward communist China when he attempted to strengthen Nepal's sovereignty and exercise independence in internal and external matters. In actuality, though, India feared losing control over Nepal's politics and government.

5.2 Nepal-India Relations after the Restoration of Democracy

Nepal and India decided to resume trade and transit contacts following the political shift in Nepal (in April 1990), which resulted in the restoration of a multi-party political system. The current problems between Nepal and India were resolved by the joint communiqué of Kathmandu and Delhi, which was released on June 10, 1990 (Telegraph Nepal.com, 2013, September 5). All of these things frequently occurred when India's preferred administration was put in place and India was able to go against the Panchayat regime.

Moreover, new treaties were concluded in December 1991 to maintain extensive trade and transit between India and Nepal. Following the political transition that was intended to normalize India, the administration of Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala paid a visit to India. With that, Nepal's foreign policy has undergone some significant changes as a result of the restoration of democracy. This implies that Nepal and more than 100 other countries would establish bilateral connections (Savada, 1993).

The monarchs who encouraged the democratization of India and Nepal, however, were ecstatic once democracy had returned. This was communicated through reciprocal visits, declarations of intentions, and news announcements that

updated trade and transit accords piece-meal. The democratic forces in Nepal took this for granted because they are socio-culturally close, according to scholars of dependency theory of IR. Opponents, however, criticize it as a tool to influence Nepali politics. Many argued that the leaders of India seemed to be pleased to see governments in Nepal that are more favorable to them than democratic governments. Again, because of India's assistance during the political transitions of the 1990s, Nepali politicians were perceived as being more devoted to India. Following the restoration of democracy in 1990 and during a multi-party pro-democracy movement, India attempted to rekindle its "special relationship" with Nepal.

We have safeguarded India following the political unrest of the 1990s with a number of treaties and agreements, but the frequency of bilateral visits had significantly grown. The foreign ministers of the two nations, along with other representatives, met from February 3 to February 5, 1990, to discuss trade and transit, economic cooperation, security awareness, the ZoP proposal, industrial cooperation, water resource sharing, and other areas (Shaha, 1995, pp. 70-96). They also talked about how our discussions could benefit each other, such as finding comprehensive solutions to an ongoing issue

As a result of Nepal's extreme allegiance, which is the guarantee of our political future, the outcome was not favorable to Nepal but rather to India. The long-standing close relationship between Nepal and India is constantly discussed by Indrar Kumar Gujral, India's ambassador to Nepal, who also pushed for comprehensive solutions to all unresolved bilateral issues. A draft treaty paper was what they set out to create.

India's dedication to the democratic causes of equality and human decency was underlined by him. According to others, this is a well-deserved act of sympathy for the Nepalese people, who long for a truly democratic form of governance. A broad vision had been provided by Gandhi, Sri Jaya Prakash Narayan, Ram Manohar Lohia, Jawaharlal Nehru, and other notable figures, highlighting the universality of their demands for freedom and democracy. Gujral

largely kept his verbal vow to avoid meddling in the domestic affairs of other nations.

Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh said in an address on June 5, 1990: "I have no words to thank you for this." As a result, Nepal and India have a special connection in which both nations contribute to the political transformation of the other. Accepting such mutually beneficial positions entails accepting each other's autonomous and sovereign identities. As a result of political changes in the 1990s, this significantly improved Nepal's relations with India.

However, India has a lot of leeway to micromanage Nepal due to Nepal's commitment to all forms of political change and its reliance on India. It is stated in the letter from Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, who was fired on May 29, 1991, by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. Another link in the complex and unusually close relationship between Nepal and India is the growth of multi-party democracy in that country. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when relations between Nepal and India were tense, frequent political and administrative visits by officials from both nations helped to normalize things. The theme of Nepal-India relations in the eye of Rose (1971) as, "The major issue of poor relations between Nepal and India was Nepal's closer to China but for Nepal to come closer to China is neither feasible nor attractive"(pp.10-17).

As stated by Dahal (2011) on dependency, constructivist theory of IR, and geopolitical reality, the author's indication is Nepal's simple socio-cultural and economic ties with India at the government and people to people level (Dahal, 1997). Furthermore, it is simpler to geolocate Nepal and India than China. Additionally, the open and uncontrolled border between Nepal and India has facilitated public diplomacy that is impossible with China because of the abrasive mountainous terrain and restrictions on open entry for the inhabitants of Nepal and China.

5.3 Second Phase of Intimate Relations (1990-1998)

India's emotional and physical support during the 1990 uprising contributed to the much-needed restoration of democracy. Without India's assistance, the restoration of democracy would have been challenging, as we all

know very well. We value India's assistance, but in return for helping to reform politics, India wants to have a bigger influence on Nepal's politics. N. M. Bijukchhe asserts, "Since the 1990s, Nepal has dealt with India on a bureaucratic level, and they have begun to entice Nepali leaders and bureaucrats by offering small support, such as scholarships, health facilities and so on" (Interview, November 3, 2018)

Nepal lacks the moral strength to deal with India, its friend, as a result. Nepal is also losing progress in its political efforts to retain relations with India (K.C. 2020, November). Due to this, the first five years of the 1990s were a particular time in relations between Nepal and India, comparable to the five or six years between 1950 and 1956. Additionally, S.K. Sinna, the Indian ambassador to Nepal, headed a large protest in Lalitpur (Starline TV, 2020, May). Similar to this, a special security partnership was established between Kathmandu and New Delhi in June 1990. That same month, interim prime minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai paid an official visit and wrote a letter to his counterpart. As result, separate transit and trade treaties with highly flexible clauses were agreed on December 6th, 1990. In the reading of Acharya (Interview, December 3, 2019), India played a covert role in the 1980 referendum to support the adoption of a reformed panchayat system, but it came out in the open during the 1990 political agitation. The reality is supported by the leaders of India's participation in the NC Meeting held at Chaksibari and by their moving addresses to the conference.

The Panchayat government's repeated demands have brought the situation to a standstill. According to Yadav (2011), India acquired a monopoly on the sale of armaments to Nepal by a covert 1965 arrangement that was like to her 1963 pact that was broken. The Nepali Prime Minister's visit served to highlight the unique security connections between New Delhi and Kathmandu (pp. 221-227).

In December 1991, Nepal and India signed the Tanakpur Treaty. In 1996, a new trade agreement with very progressive clauses was signed. India made every effort to take Nepal's economic interests into account. From 65% to 55% of all exports to India, Nepali goods now make up less of the total (Upreti, 2009, p.21). Baral (1996) alleged, "India signed two separate Trade and Transit Treaties, agreeing to new facilities and concessions for Nepal's trade after King Birendra's

rule ended, before adamantly opposing the renewal of the Trade and Transit Treaty" (pp. 109-110).

All this became easy due to appeasement policy of Nepali Congress to India. Further, India's Prime Minister P.V. Narsinga Rao argued that Nepal needs India in many ways during an official visit to Nepal in October 1992. He cited actions India had taken to counteract Nepal's sentiments, such as protecting the environment and sparing the Gangetic plains from flooding caused by rivers that originated in Nepal. The views of Rao had shown India's hidden interest to take undue benefits from Nepal through water resource concerned treaties.

5.4 Politics on Tanakpur Agreement (1991, December)

There have been a number of changes in Nepal-India relations since the 1990s that highlight substantial diplomatic attempts to uphold India's "special status" in Nepal. Indian Prime Minister Chandra Shekher visited Nepal in February 1991 and declared that his country would assist Nepal with projects related to transportation, flood control, and other issues (Pokharna, 2009). The frequent trips highlight India's strong preference for Nepal in the years since 1990, and at India's request, the Nepal government accepted signing the Tanakpur Agreement in December 1991. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister of India PV Narasima Rao also paid a visit to Nepal in October 1992.

A contentious topic has always been the sharing of river water between India and Nepal. Rather than focusing on water sharing, the Tanakpur Agreement adopted a more political tone. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Nepal agreed to offer India the 2.9 hectares of land needed for the building of the Tanakpur barrage. To irrigate almost 5,000 hectares of land in Nepal permanently, India will offer up to 4.24 cubic meters of water. Additionally, as a gesture of "good will," India pledged to deliver 10 million units of electricity from its Tanakpur power plant to Nepal for free. However, when Indian Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao paid a visit to Nepal in 2003, the agreement was increased to 20 million units (Shrestha, 2003).

However, the UML began a nationwide movement in August and September 1993 in opposition to the agreement between India and Nepal for the

construction of the Tanakpur Dam on the Mahakali River. Girija Prasad Koirala's mislead of the Tanakpur conflict is one that most Nepalese believe, rightly or wrongly, was planned. The agreement included the handing over of new hectares of Nepali territory, so the communists "attended the joint session of the parliament, took up the dispute, and had a two-thirds majority of the members present at the joint session of the parliament." They thought that the Mahakali River, where they are, would be subjected to a barrage would "do awful things to them" (Gupta, 1993). In this context, Khalim and Lama (1995) have opined:

Ganeshman Singh demanded Koirala's immediate dismissal, arguing that it was improper for anyone in a democratic set up to hang on to chair by misleading parliament even after having faced allegations of anti-national work." Even some top Congressmen accused the government of "imperiling national interest. (pp.78-79)

This issue has consumed all political and government bodies of Nepal's press, political elites and parties, government, parliament, and even the Supreme Court for almost three years. The dispute over the Tanakpur agreement is a clear and basic agreement between the ruling and opposition parties on how to use Nepal's water resources for mutual benefit in cooperation with India.

It appears that Congress could not have made a final decision on the pact before the House of Representatives was dissolved on July 11, 1994, without fully understanding the problem. Congress's lack of action was not indicative of how the system and the nation as a whole were seen. Bharat Mohan Adhikari, the president of the CPN (UML), saw that the administration was deceiving the populace by claiming it approved of the transaction. S.D. Muni (1992) issued a warning against all water treaties between India and Nepal, nevertheless. India subtly coerced Nepal into signing this contract. Dhakal (Interview, April 13, 2019) opined that the majority of Nepal's communist parties, including pro-Chinese organizations, capitalize on anti-Indian sentiment. They declared that Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala had "sold away" Nepal by signing the Nepal-Indo Tanakpur pact. At first, anti-Indian rhetoric was effective, and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai ran for office in Kathmandu on the platform that India was attempting to expand its dominion over Nepal.

Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala explained the issue, "of course, it is in our interest to build friendly relations with India in all respects and not break friendly relations with China" (Saran, 2017). However, India has always been the patsy for Nepal's opposition parties, and this time diplomacy has been accused of being overly associated not only with the NC and Sadbhawana, but with some groups within those parties. India's reputation as a despotic, large, and arrogant neighbor was expressed in the mid-term elections, despite the fact that topics like Tanakpur have long been a source of inspiration and fervent debate in Nepali politics. Pokharna (2009) writes that domestic pressures forced Prime Minister Koirala to step down and a mid-term election was held in November 1994. In April 1995, Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari, the more recent Prime Minister, traveled to India to launch his diplomatic activities. "I would like to assess all elements of relation as well as changes taking place in international relations as well as in South Asia," he said in a press conference (p.169).

He had reservations about the 1950 treaty and wanted to make some changes; especially regarding the provisions on security matters. He had concerns with the 1950 treaty and sought to make certain adjustments, particularly to the clauses relating to security issues. He told India that Nepali land will not be utilized for anti-Indian operations, but added that "Nepal fully supports India's security concerns" (Pokharna, 2009, p. 169).

Meanwhile, a technical committee had been formed to talk about the problem of observing cross-border movements. The Adhikari government was eager for Indian investments in the hydropower sector, but it was unable to hold onto power for more than nine months (Mandal, 2014, p. 13). Through the motion of no confidence, the Nepali Congress, led by Sher Bahadur Deuba, came to power with the support of the RPP and Nepal Sadbhawana Party. They assumed India had orchestrated these political changes. Hamal (Interview, February 28, 2019), Man Mohan Adhikari's communist minority government's popularity as well as his public request for a review of the 1950s Treaty and his pro-Chinese stance caused him to be quickly removed from office. Similarly, according to Joshi "The government of Man Mohan Adhikari was taken readily but

unofficially, the communist government was looked at with suspicious view by India's bureaucrat," (Interview 2018, November 10).

Adhikari led the first communist minority government that ruled Nepal for nine months after the election results showed that the CPN (UML) was the largest political party, but this government was overthrown by a vote of no confidence imposed by the Nepali Congress and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party. A coalition government led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur was created soon after the Adhikari government was overthrown as a result of the voting on the motion (RPP). Once more, this government felt more obliged to India and that increased the level of Indian influence in Nepal's politics and administration excessively. Similar to how they did with India and Bhutan, intellectuals started to critique the state of relations between Nepal and India (Pandey, 2072 B.S.).

India made an attempt at a long-term policy of friendly relations shortly after the United Front Government was established in 1995. Indar Kumar Gujral, India's former foreign minister and current prime minister, was determined that they should have a tolerant attitude toward the issues of our neighbors without even anticipating reciprocity from them. India attempted to develop a different viewpoint on its interactions with its neighbors in the shape of the so-called Gujral Doctrine. She consented to the creation of a single portal for India in order to boost investment in Nepal, prevent double taxation, and expedite the acceptance of India's investment requests. India also acknowledged Nepal's long-standing request for a different trade route via the Fulbari region of India. However, Nepal will not benefit from it as just 10 trucks per day are permitted to import and export via this port.

Since the 1990s, Nepal has been progressing toward democratization, but succeeding governments have not succeeded in establishing a solid foundation for democracy in the nation. State instability and chaos marked the process of democratization after 1990. Almost a dozen governments have changed by the year 2000. Naturally, this had an impact on the democratic process and the effectiveness of the administration. The socio-economic concerns were seldom taken into account.

5.5 Integrated Mahakali River Treaty (12 February, 1996) and India

The Mahakali River runs along Nepal's western border with India in the Himalayas. The treaties are a classic example of India's influence in Nepal. It is created by the meeting of her two head waters, the Kutiyanki River and the Kalapani River, which originate from the western edge of the Lipulek Pass and the Limpiyadhura River, respectively. The two Gunj streams that flow through these hills meet at a point where they are known as the Kali River. It is known as the Sharada River and drains into the Terai Plain after Brahmadev Mandi, close to Tanakpur (Walton, 1911). The river empties into Gagra, a tributary of the Ganga, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which is in the southeast. Tridevi (1917, August 9) argues:

Although it is disputed between India and Nepal, the Kalapani territory is administered by India because it is a part of the Pithoragarh district of the state of Uttarakhand. Nepal asserts that it is located in Sudurpaschim Pradesh's Darchula district.

It is shaped by the Kalapani River, one of the main Kali Rivers of the Himalayas, which is located at an elevation of 3600-5200m. Along the path from India to the historic pilgrimage site of Kailash Manasarovar, Lipulek and Kalapani Valley cross the top. The Uttarkhandi Botiya people use it as their historic trading route to Tibet. In this region, the Kali River serves as the border between Nepal and India. The sources of rivers, according to India, are not part of the boundary. The border here follows the basin. This is a role that has its roots in British India.

The Tinkar Pass is another adjacent pass in Nepal. A large portion of Botiya traffic was routed through the Tinkar Pass after India blocked the Lipulek Pass following the 1962 Sino-Japanese War. After India and China decided to reopen the Lipulek Pass in 1997, protests against the Kalapani area in Nepal started (Rose, 1999, pp. 155-162).

Currently, Nepal asserts ownership of the entire region up to the Kalapani River. This region, which is 395 square kilometers in size and is located in Nepal's Dharchula district, is 335 kilometers and 60 kilometers from Kalapani,

where Indian army camps have been forcibly erected. When India published a new map of the Commonwealth of India on November 2, 2019, it included Jammu and Kashmir, which contains Kalapani (disputed) in Nepal (Bhattacharjee, 2020, May 24). This caused a fresh crisis in relations between Nepal and India. Gyawali and Dixit (2008) mention that the the Mahakali Treaty, 1996 is the water agreement that has generated the most debate between India and Nepal. It is "a classic example of marry in haste and repent at leisure," as shown by the deadlock around its execution (p.80). Similarly, Mandal (2014) argues:

The Tanakpur Treaty had a significant impact on Nepali politics. It caused a significant rift among Nepali Congressmen, which led to the majority administration of Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala facing the 1994 mid-term elections on an anti-India platform. (p.13)

The Mahakali Treaty states that Nepal has raised a number of objections to this; hence the project has not yet begun. Even a modification of this treaty was desired by the Maoists. Since that time, Nepal has consistently been reluctant to sign new agreements on Transboundary Rivers, or water, but has not voiced any significant objections to the continuation of existing agreements and projects.

In February 2012, New Delhi hosted the Joint Ministerial Committee on Water Resources' first meeting, during which steps were taken to establish the Pancheshwor Development Authority in an effort to break the impasse over the construction of the 6000 MW multipurpose Pancheshwor Dam. By February 2013, the parties agreed to swiftly finish a thorough project study on the conversion strategy for the Sapta Koshi Dam and Sun Koshi reservoir by February 2013. The outcomes are still unknown, though.

The two nations stated their intention to merely retain control of Nepal's significant rivers pending further negotiations in 2014, during a visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Nepal. In Nepali politics, Pancheswor understanding was mostly used by hardline communists and ultra-nationalists to criticize Nepali Congress (Times of India, 2014, November 26).

5.5.1 Mahakali Treaty and Its Impact on Nepal-India Relations

The initial terms of the deal required to complete the 6000 MW Pancheswor power facility in eight years (1997 to 2005). In addition, the two governments committed to work together for reciprocal power marketing and have agreed to assist Indian investment in Nepal's hydropower sector, as part of an action plan to strengthen further bilateral economic cooperation. Since the Detailed Project Report (DPR) was intended to be drafted within six months of the date on which both parties agreed, it has now been 26 years but nothing resulted yet. By delaying Nepal's prospective river investments, India has made it abundantly obvious that it wants to maintain Nepal's dependence on it, which strengthens India's control over Nepali politics and government. It also wanted to keep international investors out of Nepal's hydro business.

A pact that was ordinarily well-liked by the public was met with an unexpected response from left-wing groups, according to Prime Minister Deuba. CPN (UML) was originally happy and his chairman of CPN (UML), K.P. There was a tiny downside to the agreement between the Nepal Communist Party Maoist and the CPN (UML), which was that many political groups and individuals have qualms about negotiating a water arrangement with India after her 1996 election victory (Jaiswal, 2014, September 10).

Sher Bahadur Deuba, the prime minister, is charged with weakening the agreement and signing a new one that New Delhi instigated in Nepal. Deuba defended the treaty, claiming that the accusations were "unfounded and false, and as a brilliant attempt to abandon and criticize it, the parties ratified the treaty with certain amendments in parliament on September 11, 1996." Nepal viewed the proposal as an Indian-designed project to irrigate a sizable portion of the farmlands in Uttar Pradesh (UK Diss.com, n.d.). This will not only maintain Nepal's dependence on India and prevent Nepal from being out from its sphere of influence.

5.5.2 Internal Dispute in CPN (UML)

The Joint Statement of Nepal and Republic of India concerning use of Mahakali River water was released on April 4, 1995, during the visit of Prime

Minister Man Mohan Adhikari, the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the Government of India examined the draft treaty (GoI). He relocated to Delhi in 1995 but never showed up (Pokharna, 2009, p. 169).

A coalition led by Sher Bahadur Deuba and supported by the NC was created in place of the minority CPN (UML) government. The Deuba administration maintained the two nations' negotiations regarding the 1995 Mahakali package agreement. Finally, on January 27, 1996, Pranab Mukherjee (GoI), then the minister of foreign affairs, traveled to Kathmandu for two days to discuss the treaty. On January 29, Pranab Mukherjee, the minister of foreign affairs, and Prakash Chandra Lohani, the head of His Majesty's Government, each signed a contract named "Integrated Development of Mahakali River including Sharada Dam, Tanakpur Dam, and Pancheswar Project." known as the Mahakali Treaty, 1996.

In a party conflict over the Mahakali Treaty issue, the CPN (UML) split. The CPM was created by the disgruntled (ML). Disagreements over the 1996 Mahakali Treaty between Nepal and India caused Bamdev Gautam, CP Mainali, and other prominent former UML leaders to split the party (The Himalayan Times. 2020, June 29). According to Deputy Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal (2019, 24), the Tanakpur Barrage Accord and the Mahakali Treaty both created Communist Party divisions and sub-factions with a pro-Indian blend.

However, many detractors of CPN (UML) leader K.P. Oli viewed his inclusion in the historic Mahakali Treaty (1996) as a demonstration of loyalty to the Indian government (18 July 2016). Analysts claim that KP Oli, the Nepali prime minister, used to be known as "Man of India," previously but now this may be the reason that influenced his criticism (Scroll. in. 2016, July 18).

5.6 Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and India

One section of Nepali Politicians criticized the Mahakali Treaty, and at the same time, Baburam Bhattarai, the head of the Nepalese People's United Front, presented 40 points demand to the coalition led by Sher Bahadur Deuba to deal with it right away.

Table No.5.1

Nine points out of 40 points demand of United People's Front

Concerning nationality

-
1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated.
 2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January, 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources.
 3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematized. All vehicles with Indian license plates should be banned from Nepal.
 4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centers should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country.
 5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 'work permit' system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country.
 6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped.
 7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant.
 8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed.
 9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.
-

Source: <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/40points.htm>, accessed on November, 2021

In addition to the Mahakali Treaty and up to nine areas of disagreement with India and imperialist forces, the first of the 40 demands was about independence and sovereignty. On February 12, 1996, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba went to India and signed the treaty despite mounting opposition to the agreement at all levels and the prospect of violent confrontation (Upreti, 2009, pp. 324-331).

On September 20, 1996, Nepal's water resources Minister Pashupati Shumsher JBR submitted the treaty for parliamentary consideration and ratification. Two-thirds of Nepal's MPs approved the treaty. When Indian Prime Minister Indar Kumar Gujral visited Nepal on June 4, 1997, the Mahakali Pact's instruments of ratification were exchanged, and on June 5 the treaty finally came

into effect (Dhungel, 2009). Gyawali and Dixit (2005) mention that "The Mahakali treaty was highly criticized since the inception of the package deal and the controversy flamed further as a result of the differences in the interpretation of the provision of the treaty".

Furthermore, Gyawali and Dixit (2005) asserted that the treaty contains clauses for arbitration in case of problems and for revision of the accord after ten years, but none of the signatories are involved in these clauses or the treaty as a whole. British after receiving permission from the GoN in 1920, India constructed the Sharaddha Dam on the Mahakali River in 1928. Without Nepal's consent, India constructed the Tanakpur Dam on a portion of the Mahakali River, claiming that it was a better option than the Sharada Dam. The Tanakpur Dam illustrates India's dominion over a minor adjacent sovereign state in the international community by its unilateral construction (Dhungel, 2009).

India practically encircles Nepal, and India views Nepal as part of its own backyard. While India plays a significant role in Nepal's foreign policy, Nepal is also a significant player in its own foreign relations despite its modest size. India has criticized the Nepali leadership's propensity to portray itself as an obnoxious neighbor that lacks the capacity to view bilateral relations in a more comprehensive manner. In a regional framework, India views its relations with Nepal. Nepal, meanwhile, sees its relations with India as bilateral. The Maoist rebels benefited from the open border between Nepal and India on the one hand, but India also originally displayed a compassionate side to them.

The CPN (United Center), which predated his CPN (Maoist) and played a significant role in the organization, made the decision to relocate its primary operations to the countryside during the 1992 national strike. The first Maoist-inspired peasant uprisings then broke out, primarily in the regions of Rolpa and Rukum, and police were sent under the guise of "Operation Romeo" in 1995 (Ibrahim, 2013, p. 254).

The Maoist CPN formally began the People's War on January 14, 1996. That year, the CPN broke apart from the CPN (United Centre), and Puspa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' and Baburam Bhattarai served as its leaders. Various Nepalese

governments have viewed the Maoist conflict as an issue of "law and order" ever since the uprising started in 1996. Through policing, the government has made an effort to repress the Maoists. All of these initiatives including "Operation Romeo," "Kilo Shera Two," "Jungle Search Operation," "Search and Destroy," etc. failed because the Naxalites in India had stronger contacts with the Maoists in Nepal (Ibrahim, 2013, p. 254).

At first, neither the federal nor state governments of India paid any attention to the Maoist uprising in Nepal. According to Indian authorities, the Nepalese government's failure to address India's interests in Nepal since the mid-1990s is to blame. Indian authorities frequently accused Prime Minister Koirala of being a self-centered leader. They asserted that after obtaining positions of power and authority, he abandoned India while accepting their support when he faced challenges within the party (Pandey, 2072 B.S.).

India's treatment of rebellious Maoists amply demonstrates its double standard policy. Five years after the riots, in 2001, the opposing side first referred to the Maoist leaders as terrorists (Ibrahim, 2013, p. 248 -252). Because of Chinese influence remained a worry for New Delhi despite unfavorable political outcomes since Maoists intended to replace parliamentary democracy with active and open support. As opposed to this, Pandey (2072 B.S.) added that India was antagonistic to the Maoists in Nepal.

It is alleged that the Indian government gave the Nepal army all the tools and instructions it needed to contain the Maoists. The armed perspective was also used by the insurgent Maoists to justify India's assistance in arms imports and purchases. Mohan Kiran Baidhya, CP Gajurel, and other prominent leaders assert that despite India categorizing Maoists as terrorists, they have sought refuge there. Joshi, Bijukchhe, Kayastha and Khanal allegedly stated that "India helped the revolting Maoists" (Interview from April 12, February 12, 2019, December 12, 2018, and November 3, 2018).

Contrary to India's complaints, the scenario shows unequivocally that they had Indian aid in bringing weaponry from India and that India provided safety and training for their commanders and cadres. When the Maoist uprising first started,

India had close relations to it. However, when Western nations arrived in Nepal to help the government there, India took the initiative to put an end to the Maoist movement. Thus the revolting Maoists in Nepal were protected from India.

The Maoist movement in Nepal began a second, more violent phase in the years 1999–2000. Muni (2003) said that India had a dubious role in the Maoist insurrection and that it was nothing more than a "proxy war" fought by foreign forces in Nepal. As there is "no evidence available that the Maoists were inspired, encouraged or sponsored by foreign powers," Muni disregards the cross-border operations of Nepali militants, but he conceded that the Maoist leader and rebels in Nepal had taken up residence in India and received medical care (Muni, 2003, p. 134). Furthermore, it is impossible to ignore Nepal's long-term strategic advantages, which most likely grew as China became a global economic force.

They obtained support from India to import weaponry, and their cadres were trained there (Pandey, 2072 B.S.). This assertion supports the notion that India used the Maoist rebellion to advance its own objectives in Nepal. The Nepali Maoists were initially given permission by India, but once they joined up with the Indian Naxalites, India designated them as terrorists. The Maoists received protection from India. Actually, India used the Maoists as a bargaining tool in its negotiations with the Nepal government in order to enforce its own interests there.

It seems far-fetched that India adopted a "twin pillar" policy to maintain constitutional monarchy or multiparty democracy. According to KV Rajan, a former Indian ambassador to Nepal, "there is no place for revising this policy." Some advisors pushed India to establish back channels of communication with the Maoists, but others objected to this. The rules of interaction were critical and nothing should be done to support or legitimize them. There is agreement that a long-term solution must be found in Nepal, and it will depend on Nepal's political class' ability to cooperate (Jha, 2005, 13 - 19 May). Furthermore, Dhakal viewed that, "The revolting Maoists in Nepal had the green signal of India because it had utilized Maoists as a negotiation tool with governments to secure its interest in Nepal," (Interview, September 8, 2021).

India's approach to combating the Maoists was paradoxical. On the one hand, the Nepali government was supported by the Indian nobility in its fight against Nepali Maoists operating in that country who were linked to the Indian Maoists. On the other hand, when it came to taking action against Nepali Maoist commanders that were hiding in Indian Territory, India was quite tactful. According to Yadav, "India was concerned about King Gyanendra's overt tilt toward communist China, and Maoist was employed to undermine him before parliamentary parties were later advised to overthrow the kingship which the USA also backed" (Interview, August 12, 2021). She asserted that India wished to keep the king of Nepal as the only Hindu ruler in the world. As a result, he kept a ceremonial or "baby king" proposal in the dialogue, but the majority of protesting Maoists opposed it.

In essence, the Indian ruling class was looking for ways to negotiate with the Maoists instead of government of Nepal. However, when the international forces arrived in Nepal under the guise of a peace process, India supported the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) when they united to fight the monarch's regime. India's security is in peril, and Nepal's political stability may be in jeopardy due to a worldwide community that destroys communities. India then contemplated her 12-point agreement.

5.7 Royal Steps of King Gyanendra and India

Following the bloodshed that claimed the precious lives of King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya, and 10 other members of the royal family on the evening of June 1, 2001, political ties between Nepal and India experienced a sudden and severe shock. King Gyanendra, the late king's brother, was then crowned after that. According to official Indian circles, the events in Nepal are thought to have aided those who have strong ties to Pakistan as well as anti-Indian ideologies. It is truly regrettable that he was crowned king. India-Nepal ties are not well suited to it (Singh, 2009, p. 328).

However, the political picture took a drastic change after the royal massacre in which the nationalist king and his family were killed. His murder was the result of an elaborate plot with anti-national components. Narayanman

Bijukchhe said that King Birendra would be compromising with political power in Nepal rather than India if micro-level research highlighted all of the events connected to him, such as his ZoP from 1989 to 1990 prior to his blockade. According to Gurung (Interview, February 12, 2019), India had a tight eye on Nepal's royal status as it developed into a stable power that was closely associated with China and only harmed it in China. Mandal (2014) argues:

India interpreted the takeover (2001–2005) as a rejection of a negotiated resolution to the Maoist conflict. On February 25, 2005, it decided to halt the sale of armaments to Nepal as a result of its rather supply-oriented response. At a meeting with the King of Nepal in Jakarta in April 2005, the Prime Minister of India also pushed for the restoration of democracy in that country. (p.15)

King Gyanendra eventually seized direct control in 2005 after three rounds of negotiations with the Maoists who revolted in April, May, and August 2003 ended in failure (Saran, 2017, pp. 149–74). He promised to defeat the Maoist rebels within three months and swiftly declared a state of emergency before sending the Nepal Army (NA) in that direction. However, he was unsuccessful.

At first, India's reaction to the developing crisis in Nepal was muted. Prior to 2001, when Maoists assaulted military targets, India was unaware of Maoist attacks but did not consider them to be a significant issue. It did not take seriously the links between "Naxalite" Indian Maoist groups and Nepali Maoists, or the claims that the former had spread to Indian states (Muni, 2012, pp. 13-14). Muni further opines:

Within two months of the terrorist assault on September 11, 2001 in the US, the Maoists in Nepal conducted their first attack on the RNA located in Dang district. He (2012) described how this attack caused India to abruptly wake up. Even before the Nepali government branded the Maoists as terrorists, India did so. (pp.13-14)

India continued to appeal through informal and diplomatic channels that mutual assistance was required, even though it did not publicly contest the King's actions against parliamentary and popular leaders chosen before 2005. This is

because an effective response to the Maoist uprising requires broad agreement between the King and India. The two cornerstones of Nepal's political stability-multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy-have received unwavering support from India (Saran, 2017, p. 156).

Moreover, the current royal assumption of authority violates this concept. India has always held that in order to address Nepal's political and economic problems, there must be broad national agreement, notably between the monarchy and political parties. The events in Nepal put the monarchy and the major political parties at odds with one another. This only helped those groups and individuals who wanted to destroy the monarchy's institutions as well as democracy.

Following this course of action, India started to exert pressure on the king by reducing the supply of armaments and isolating him on a regional and global scale. The king invited the Indian envoy to Kathmandu to his residence for a "briefing and consultation" to voice his discontent with the acts of the king. L.-R. Baral (Interview, April 4, 2019), "It was a blunder of Nepal once again, which enhanced India's influence in Nepal's internal affairs due to the incompetence of our governments and autocratic governance". India's authority decided to act as a link between the rebelling Maoist and the pushing Seven Parties' Alliance (SPA) to form an alliance against the Palace As a result, India's agencies (Saran, 2017, p.157) mediated a 12-point agreement between Maoist and SPA with the intention of launching mass uprising II (2006) against King Gyanendra (*See*: Appendix-1).

India attempted to influence King Gyanendra for its own favor during his five-year reign, but when that failed, it created an adverse situation against the regime of King Gyanendra (Saran, 2017, p.157). India categorized its observed influences on Nepali politics according to spheres of influence and dependence theories of IR over the course of a decade and a half (1990–2005).

In its first five years (1990–1995), India attempted to bring back the special relationship that existed during 1951–1956. Making the Tanakpur Treaty and Pancheshower Project in 1991 and 1996, respectively, involved receiving unfair gains. It helped facilitate the 12 Point Agreements, supported rebel Maoists, and strongly backed Mass Uprising II (2006). The following chapter

examines India's concerns on changes of government in Nepal, including India's role in Mass Movement II (2006), its effect on the Madhesh issue.

CHAPTER-VI
GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN NEPAL AND INDIA'S CONCERN
(1990-2020)

6.1 Government Changes in Nepal and Nepal-India Relations

Nepal's political ups and downs are allegedly caused by India. High-ranking bureaucrats being ousted or installed raise questions about Nepal's politics and India's ability to act as a micromanager in the country's public administration. If the government does not serve out its term in office, criticism will be leveled at India. According to Crossette (1999, April 11), the task made by Nepal government to purchase Chinese weapons in 1988 and Indian resentment at Nepal's decision on requirement of work permits for Indians working in Nepal both contributed significantly to the deterioration of relations between Nepal and India.

During 1980s Nepal was struggling to survive economically as a result of the dispute with India. In order to reinstate the multi-party system, India publicly supported agitating political parties that sought to overthrow the King (Khanal, 2073 B.S., p. 341). According to a segment of Indian society, Nepal is not only opposed to an agreement that would integrate transit and trade, but New Delhi is also reluctant to change its mind. The imposition of tariffs on Indian goods and the requirement of work permits for Indian nationals in Nepal are examples of these transgressions. Dahal (Interview, April 9, 2019) opined:

India, which has repeatedly broken the terms of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, brought up the matter of China importing weapons from Nepal on its own in 1988. Because Chinese weaponry was affordable, Nepal used to import them. It was not against India's security interests because it was imported by the Nepali military for training purposes.

Nepal refused to lower its tariffs, according to Indian authorities. Thus New Delhi rejected the new trade agreement that Nepal and India had proposed. The monarch and his administration must defend their decision to defy New Delhi if Nepal's economic crisis persists, and they must trust Nepalis to be willing to

make adjustments to what is already a frontier for many. The majority of Nepalis claim they are vehemently opposed to India's sizable presence there and New Delhi's efforts to dominate the nation's politics. In this context, Ibrahim (2013) opined, "Nepal-India relations are so strong that it's very hard to shape in mere words because these two neighboring nation has a history of deep ties and shared concern from ancient times" (p.5).

In addition, many claimed that treaties should not be used to measure the quality of relations between the two nations. Conflicts can be settled and agreements established between two friendly nations by trusting each other's roles. Some contend, however, that Nepal and India's bilateral relations should be regarded from a position of reciprocal equality of sovereignty. Following a meeting between India's Deputy Prime Minister Singh and Nepal's Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai after the conclusion of India's 13-month economic blockade of Nepal, the special security relations between New Delhi and Kathmandu were declared. Moreover, Uprety (2009) writes:

In his speech to a joint session of parliament, Indian President V.P. Singh expressed India's desire to enhance relations with Nepal and hinted at its plan to do so. Hopes for the restoration of relations between India and Nepal have increased given the new political climate in the nation, which is supportive of democracy. (p. 20)

Following a state visit by the interim prime minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai in the 1990s, there was a political transition, but relations between Nepal and India seemed to be returning to normal. A news release that was released after the visit reflected the agreement. Because of this, his government has come under fire for being more devoted to India.

6.1.1 Krishna Prasad Bhattarai's Government (1990 April-1991, May)

Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, a leader of the NC, was appointed as a prime minister of the interim administration following the 1990 movement. In actuality, KP Bhattarai was chosen to lead the interim government in place of the co-revolutionary commander Ganeshman Singh Shrestha, who turned down the invitation to become prime minister. Bhattarai thinks the embargo from the

previous year should have taught us that it is in our best interests to keep cordial relations with India (Menon, 1991, May15, Paragraph 4). Because of India's assistance with political campaigns in the 1990s, the Bhattarai government was perceived as being overly loyal to the country's establishment.

We have now put an end to our tragic beginnings and have totally normalized ties, Prime Minister V.P. Singh declared at a press conference along side Nepali Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai (Crossette, 1990, June 12) (Para-2). India is exerting significant pressure on the Bhattarai administration to implement a number of goals, including eliminating the requirement for Indians to obtain work permits in Nepal. According to a signed joint declaration; Nepal has consented to the majority of these (Crossette, 1990, June 12) (Para 5). Despite the distance between China and Nepal, Kathmandu may have decided to take New Delhi's worries about Chinese influence into consideration. It is unclear, though, whether Kathmandu promised India any military security.

The agreement's alleged secret addendum was refuted by both prime leaders. Confidentiality clauses were inserted in previous treaties between India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. No trick; if there ever was a trick, it was undone (Crossette, 1990, June 12) (Para 7). However, a politician from Nepal stated that his countrymen were unpopular at home because they were sensitive to Indian involvement and worried that India might adopt the same stance as Bhutan after the discussions began here. He claimed that Bhattarai was greatly relying on by India for deaf commitments.

As anticipated, India adopted a tolerant attitude toward Nepal's transitional administration and began the process of normalizing relations. India has decided to cooperate with Nepal in an interdependent framework. In line with the dependence theory of IR, Cooperation and Benefits. Upreti (2009) claims, those relations between Nepal and India have taken certain turns (p. 20).

6.1.2 Government of Girija Prasad Koirala (1991 to 1994)

In 1990, Koirala was the leader of the People's Movement (Jana Andolan), which gained democratic restoration in Nepal. In 1991, he won a seat in the

House of Representative, and from 1991 to 1994, he held the position of prime minister for the first time. After being prime minister he opined that we want to maintain good relations with India. In this regard he further expressed economically and geographically, we are closer to India than any other country, and our interest lies in building closer ties (Menon, 1991, May 15) (para. 7).

Notwithstanding its lack of hyperbole, according to Bhasin (1994), Girija Prasad Koirala's visit was a notable achievement in terms of preserving bilateral ties through diplomatic channels. He had good reason to be pleased with the conclusion of his worldwide debut as the nation's first democratically elected prime minister after Nepal's democracy was restored. India claimed that the choice of GP Koirala as prime minister led to the expansion of Nepal's multi-party democracy and the creation of new ties in their intricate and unusually close relationship (p. 514).

Koirala urged India to promote Nepal's economic interests while swiftly putting aside bilateral disputes over trade and transit agreements. A trade pact that lowers tariffs and boosts Nepali exports to India would benefit Nepal economically. Nepal would gain from the transit agreement's reduction in customs requirements. The Indian economy would benefit from a deal to regulate unlawful border trade. A deal was also signed for the utilization of water resources. As a result, six of her hydroelectric projects were proposed to be built in Nepal, providing electricity to energy-strapped India.

Koirala's visit helped India's reputation as the continent's greatest tyrant recover from his recent SAARC fiasco. Koirala, meanwhile, did not yet sell a package at home. As a result of suspicions that India would take advantage of Nepal's water resources, contracts for their use have so far been set ablaze. But the initial obstacle has been overcome (Baweja, 1991, December 31).

Yet, according to Thapliya (n.d.), during the three years of Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala's administration, India was able to gain greater favor with the Koirala ally government in order to exert influence. On the other hand, the media and opposition groups criticized the notion of a "shared river," asserting that it would be a waiver and compromise of Nepal's sovereign rights to water resources because the Tanakpur Accord (1991) failed to create an environment of

trust and confidence. In the meantime, India's involvement in Nepal's political developments aims to include India in the resolution of the refugee problem for Bhutanese as well.

6.1.3 Manmohan Adhikari's Government (1994, September 30-1995, June)

The CPN (UML) emerged as the dominant party following the NC split and established a Communist Party minority government. Communists viewed India as an ally of imperialist power from an ideological standpoint. India was thought to be more sympathetic of the Nepali Congress (Mandal, 2014, p. 13).

The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) established a minority administration led by Man Mohan Adhikari on September 30, 1994, following the 1994 general elections. Both parties failed to put together a coalition and win the majority of the 205 seats. Adhikari was appointed prime minister of the minority administration with the support of the NC, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, and the Nepal Sadbhawana Party following the failure of coalition negotiations.

When Manmohan Adhikari, the prime minister of Nepal at the time, first visited India in 1994, he saw that the "security realm" of India had become obsolete due to globalization and the resulting geo-economic competition. He proposed that India revise the 1950 treaty while he was still prime minister, but Nepal wholeheartedly backed India's security worries and advocated against the safeguard clause. Never was the area utilized for anti-Indian operations (Pokharna, 2009, p. 169).

Many contend that he was the first sitting prime minister to criticize the unequal and hegemonic treaty between the Ranas and India in an effort to remove Nepal from India's security sphere and prevent Indian influence on Nepal's politics and government. In order to offer a new "friendship and peace" treaty in keeping with the changing geopolitical circumstances, Nepal's foreign minister Kamal Thapa also traveled to India. Although it made similar promises, the Indian government has not made much progress in this area (Kaushiki, 2021, March 22). India and China will always deserve Nepal's resolve not to use its territory against India and China, according to IR realism and geopolitical theory.

6.1.4 Coalition Government and Nepal-India Relations (1995-2001)

The Supreme Court ruled that Manmohan Adhikari's 1995 attempt to dissolve parliament was illegal after he made a second attempt, according to Pokharna (2009). In 1995, Sher Bahadur Deuba was appointed prime minister and led a coalition administration with his party. He also made the promise that "Nepal will never pose a security threat to India" (p. 169).

In order to improve the Mahakali River Basin, he and the Indian government signed the Mahakali Treaty on February 12th, 1996. When his administration fell in March 1997, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, the leader of the RPP, took over. During this time, a Maoist uprising had just begun. The Mahakali Treaty, which facilitated the building of the Pancheswar Dam, was signed on January 29, 1996 by the foreign ministers of Nepal and India (Dharmadasani, 2000, p. 81–85).

The Maoist Communist Party of Nepal, citing among other things the "unequal" pact between Nepal and India, proclaimed the "people's war" against the "parliamentary system of the bourgeoisie" the very next day (Ibrahim 2013, pp. 239-242). The rioting continued right up until 2006. On September 11, 1996, despite major worries and misunderstandings over the status of the upper Mahakali River basin and the sharing of Indian waters, there had been some adjustments (Singh, 2016, p. 33). The Mahakali Treaty was ratified around midnight on the third day of the combined session of the upper house and House of Representatives.

Another set of previously approved caveats raises questions about the legality of the treaty. The fact that not a single work has been finished on time, no thorough project report has been created, and no funding has been given in six months. The dam's construction was scheduled to be finished in 8 years under the deal. The United Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Nepal, the largest opposition group, is divided as a result of the ratification (Singh, 2016, pp. 34–35). The Joint All-Party Committee established on October 10, 1996 to look into the effects of strong criticism of the Mahakali Treaty. It did not make any headway from that date until May 26, 1999. Memorandums of Understanding were signed quickly with private hydropower developers.

The Nepali Congress party once again held the majority government position following the May 1999 legislative elections, scoring a resounding victory (113 out of 205 seats). However, the pattern of transient governments persisted. K.P. Bhattarai, G.P. Koirala, and Shah Bahadur Deuba were appointed prime ministers following the 1999 election. King Birendra perished on June 1, 2001, at the same time as the Royal Palace massacre. Prince Dhirendra, Queen Aishwarya, and a few other families were also murdered. King Dipendra passed away, and his surviving father's second younger brother Gyanendra was crowned king in his place.

In February 1996, violent riots were started by rebellious Maoists in more than 50 of the country's 75 districts, resulting in the deaths of 17000 Maoist combatants, police officers, civilians, and members of armed organizations. In this regard, Pathak (2009, May 23) opined:

At the beginning of the People's War, the Maoists were very hostile towards India. However, after importing weapons and ammunition from the Indian people and government, providing shelter to Maoist leaders, and receiving significant support to treat wounded fighters, they gradually reverted to their initial stance. (p. 10)

Ineffective peace negotiations between the government and the Maoists in August, September, and November of 2001 led to the Maoists' return to a bloody rebellion. King Gyanendra quickly proclaimed a state of emergency following the failure of peace negotiations in 2001, and the declaration was accepted by Parliament with a two-thirds majority. On May 22, 2002, the King disbanded his house at the suggestion of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba.

In a sudden turn of events, on October 4, 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed Prime Minister Deuba and assumed executive power. Elections were held to fill the vacant House of Representatives and disband the full Council of Ministers. Additionally, the King ordered the dissolution of the whole Council of Ministers and the postponement of the November 13, 2002 elections for the disbanded House of Representative. On October 11, 2002, the

King nominated Lokendra Bahadur Chand as prime minister following a week of discussions with the heads of several political parties.

The government and the Maoists announced a truce on January 29, 2003, marking a significant development following Lokendra Bahadur Chand's selection as prime minister. His previous truce with the Maoists was this one. The Maoists violated the first cease-fire pact in 2001. An agreement to settle the Maoist issue, through dialogue and to take steps to reintegrate, the Communist Party of Nepal and Maoists into mainstream politics were both contained in the 2003 cease-fire. In April and May, it held two rounds of negotiations with the Maoists (Relief Web, 2006, November 22).

However, in its attempt to put a stop to the political upheaval, it was unable to secure the backing of the major parties. After more than seven months in power and under mounting pressure from political parties and allied popular movements, Chand announced his resignation on May 30, 2003. On 4 June 2003, the King appointed Surya Bahadur Thapa as the new Prime Minister amid opposition from major political parties. Further peace talks took place in mid-August 2003, but on 27 August 2003 the Maoists broke the ceasefire. Thapa resigned in May 2004 due to political pressure. In June 2004, the King reinstated the previously dismissed Sher Bahadur Deuba as Prime Minister.

King Gyanendra disbanded his cabinet and appointed a Council of Ministers on February 1, 2005, in response to the nation's slowly deteriorating position. During his three-year term, he declared that the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) will try to develop a multi-party democracy. Then the king proclaimed an emergency and revoked practically all fundamental rights. On February 2, 2005, his new administration came into power.

Indian influence permeated Nepal's politics and government from 1995 to 2005, during the aforementioned Nepal Royal takeover. India's recurrent regime changes in Nepal had an impact on his two-pronged approach to the sanctuary of Maoist leaders, the training of Maoist fighters in India, and the overthrow of the elected Deuba administration. It served as an illustration of how this entire

situation has resulted in a struggle for control among foreign forces in Nepal.

6.2 Mass Movement II (2006) and International Actors

When the democratically elected government was overthrown on February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra proclaimed an emergency, threatened a crackdown, and assumed power. By limiting fundamental rights and freedoms, media freedom, and communications, the Nepali army had demonstrated its readiness to use force to oppose the Maoists and the king's takeover. Political parties and national and international human rights watchdogs have opposed military riots in Nepal. RNA's chief spokesman, Brigadier General Deepak Gurung, stated, "Now we can solely go after the Maoists in a single minded manner without having to worry about what is going to happen on the streets" (Muni, 2012, pp.18-28).

Similarly, Raj (2006) mentions that, following the events in Nepal and India, the US, UK and the entire international community condemned and halted military supplies to the Nepali Army. The King failed to convince the international community that his army would not use arms and ammunition against those fighting for the country's basic human rights and democracy. (pp. 78-83)

Media reports claim that King Gyanendra's repeated trips to China, possibly in retaliation for which Nepal received 18 truckloads of weapons and ammunition in November 2005, not only demonstrated China's disregard for democracy, civil liberties, and the suppression of human rights but also contributed to more violence in Nepal. In the meantime, Nepali and Indian newspapers report that India's efforts to support democracy and stability in Nepal are more than just tactically threatened by the ongoing Chinese weaponry transfer to Kathmandu. The royal insistence caused irritant in the relationship between Nepal and India (Singh, 2016, p. 129). Moreover, Singh (2009) writes:

The Indian government has a limited amount of time to hold King Gyanendra accountable for the Chinese plan he chose to play against India and equal their Nepali achievements. Similar to this, after his three-day trip to Nepal in December 2005, Indian Foreign Minister Shyam Saran

advocated participation in international initiatives to restore the people's rule in order to provide King Gyanendra a democracy and insisted that China stop supplying Nepal with arms and ammunition (p. 332).

In this environment, India negotiated a 12-point deal with the Maoists and SPA in November 2005 (*see*; Appendix 1). Shrestha and Shakya (2013) claims that, political parties in Nepal launched agitation on 6 April 2006 against King's moves of October 2002 and 1 February 2005. Increased foreign interference in Nepal through embassies has caused many diplomatic controversies and problems in Nepal (p.140). In April 2006, the royal administration had been forced to accept the demands of SPA. Once more, India was successful in minimizing anti-Indian groups, simultaneously that helped to increase India's influence in Nepali politics more as advocated by scholars in dependency and geopolitical theory of IR.

Before the king abdicated on April 24, India dispatched Karan Singh, a special envoy with connections to the Nepali royal family, to try to convince him to make an offer the king would accept. According to Muni (2012, pp. 313–332), Delhi continued to defend the monarchy despite public uprisings against it, which prompted Karan Singh to put an end to the Jana Andolan. When Singh was sent to Nepal as a special envoy, it was made planthat India would not permit the King to undermine or do away with the monarchical system (p. 329). So, on April 21, 2006, the CPN (UML) disagreed after advising India's representative Karan Singh about the baby-king idea in Nepal. In many ways, Nepal- India relations have become a 'laboratory' for testing various principles of international relations (Singh, 2011; & Whitefield, 2012).

India's political leaders were calling the Maoist problem a common problem and were beginning to increase their share of this problem. Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has appointed several of his ministers. Pranav Mukharjee (Minister of Defense), Shivraj Patil (Minister of Home Affairs), M.K. Narayanan (National Security Advisor) and Air Force and Army Chiefs attend an emergency meeting to discuss the deteriorating political situation in Nepal. As a result of India's efforts, King Gyanendra issued a royal decree. India's media began to plead the need for exerting influence in Nepal

(Sharma, 2070 BS, pp. 232-233). King Gyanendra met agitated parties and people during the uproar over the king's autocratic reign, with UNDP Secretary Kahane and ambassadors from the US, Norway, the UK, and India offering advice to the parties. The political party leaders have sworn that they believe in total people's sovereignty (Destradi, 2012).

After that, the 2006 pro-democracy struggle aimed at reestablishing people's rights was supported by India and other powers. Due to escalating hostility between monarchical institutions and political parties, India has modified its previous "two pillars" strategy towards Nepal (Saran, 2017). The outcome was the historic Second Peoples' Movement in 2006, which resulted in the deaths of over 23 people. The murders of the 17,000 people killed by Maoists and security forces in the 11 years People's War, according to a critical examination of the united action of the SPA and dissident Maoists under the 12-Point Accord, also helped overthrow the King's tyranny (BBC NEWS, March 14, 2013).

Having lost a significant amount of power when the parliament was dissolved on May 22, 2002, King Gyanendra was compelled to reconstitute it in 2006. Additionally, India pushed them to break links with the Maoists in India because India wants the Maoists to take part in democratic elections so they can join the mainstream of politics. Although it may sound reasonable for a democratic movement, its impact in India and elsewhere has grown due to the poisonous effects of poor administration. Baral (Interview, 2019, April 26), the weak Nepal has become more under the influence of India and other countries due to poor governance.

6.3 Nepal-India Relations Since 2006

Long before the first CA elections, in late 2005, India began to get involved in recent political developments in Nepal. During this time, as well as with the Maoists, India served as a forum for discussion (Destradi, 2012). On April 24, King Gyanendra made a second proclamation that was essentially dictated by Girija Prasad Koirala after consulting with other SPA members and the Indian Embassy (Einsiedel et al. 2012). The declaration ended the ongoing violent conflict in accordance with the Seven Political Parties (SPA) roadmap and

reinstated the House of Representatives (HoR), which had been dissolved on May 22, 2002. In addition, the declaration referred to the "inherent sovereignty of the people of Nepal" and offered condolences to everyone who had perished during large-scale protests.

6.4 Girija Prasad Koirala's Government and India

The second proclamation was adopted by the Maoists with few concerns; Mass Movement II came to an end at this point. The proclamation is rife with difficulties that started to materialize after Girija Prasad Koirala assumed office as interim prime minister since it was the culmination of hazy agreements in which different important individuals still maintain their disagreements. After the Terai agitation in 2007, India urged "dialogue between political parties and Maoists and between political parties and Madhesi" (Sood, 2016, July 23).

Mainstream political parties in Nepal, as well as the international community, particularly India, have joined the Maoists in Mass Movement II to pursue their own goals in response to King Gyanendra's dictatorial policies. They provided the Maoist movement with minimal, if any, tactical support in order to recover control. In particular, India's status as a guarantor of the agreement's performance was implied. Saran (2017) argues that, "Karan Singh conveyed a message to King to take mass movement II seriously and to give up his active political role" (p.159).

Mainstream political parties may not be aware of the extent to which the Maoist agenda of Nepal's socio-economic reform permeated common Nepalis' minds. Due to interpersonal issues, India, which was crucial in tying the Maoist faction to mainstream parties during Mass Movement II (2006), lost faith in them (p. 157).

6.5 Puspa Kamal Dahal's Government and India

India has a strong incentive to discredit each Maoist leader in order to prevent the UCPN from winning the 1st Constituent Assembly (CA) election with a landslide. With 228 victories out of 601 seats in 2008, it became the dominant party in CA. As a result, Puspa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda', the leader of the UCPN

Maoists, was elected prime minister with the help of the CPN (UML 101 seats). He visited India on business from September 14 to September 18, 2008. He promised to enact dramatic economic changes to build a "new Nepal," but India was dismayed when he started to cultivate connections with Beijing at the expense of New Delhi.

In 2008, shortly after entering office, he declared the nation a federal republic and dissolved the 239-year-old monarchy. In fact, the 12-point agreement makes no mention of the monarchy's removal, but the first CA meeting made the decision to do so. In this context, Bijuckchhe asserted that India is using the UCPN Maoists as Trojan horses in order to undermine nationalist power in Nepal, i.e., to overthrow the monarchy and the hardline communist party or force (Interview, November 3, 2018). The traditional nationalist elements that are friendly with China have been eliminated by India that helped India to expand its influence in Nepali politics and governance.

There was a lot of controversy around Puspa Kamal Dahal Prachanda's trip to China. Senior Indian politicians advised Dahal not to go because it would send the wrong message to India, but the prime minister insisted Beijing would suffer more attacks if he skipped the conference (Upadhya, 2020, pp. 153–154). Despite Nepal's objections, geopolitics forces Nepal and the nations with which it shares borders to cooperate bilaterally.

At the airport, Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal made a public declaration to the Nepali media during his journey to China for the Olympic closing ceremony that his first official trip had been to India (Upadhya, 2020). After the 2006 royal attempt, which caused India a lot of difficulties owing to geopolitical circumstances, China's interest in Nepal was surprisingly high. The Prime Minister's visit to China on August 24, 2008, was criticized by many commentators as going against precedent (Acharya, 2008, September). Puspa Kamal Dahal told Chinese President Hu Jintao during the visit to reiterate Nepal's adherence to the "One China Policy," and he promised not to permit anti-Chinese activities on Nepali soil (Thapa, 2010, December 10).

Similarly, PM Puspa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda" traveled to India for five days on business on September 4, 2008, at the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. He requested India to assist Nepal in creating a new constitution (Singh, 2011, p. 42). In fact, he was at fault. Because he made Nepal's constitutional process more difficult by once again bringing India's issues into it (*See; Appendix 2*). During the nation's political transition, PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal thanked the people and government of India for their active support. Further he vowed that Nepal wants excellent relations with both India and China. Hence it is absurd for India to claim that Nepal is moving toward China. Although India did not make any formal statements in this regard, many people asserted that Katwal had support from India. Chaturvedy and Malone (2012) viewed:

During Prachanda's travel to India, Indian authorities maintained that one of the "clear red lines" they conveyed to him was not to interfere with the Nepali army. India is upset over the dismissal of Nepal's army head since India and Nepal symbolically share each other's army commanders as honorary chiefs. India does not want any party to interfere politically in Nepal's military institutions. (pp. 287–312)

India's dread increased at this point as Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal attempted to take over the government with the backup of the military. He was expected to sign the treaty, which was feared. India was forced to assist the opposition and the Nepali army in their efforts to protect the nation's democratic system in the face of such occurrences (Thapa, 2010, December 10).

India's ruling class moved right away to block the implementation of the Maoist government's decision to dismiss the Chief of Army Staff on May 3 despite an agitation by the UML and resistance from other political parties. They asked the army chief to remain and pushed the UML to stop supporting the administration by writing to President Ram Baran Yadav, whom Rakesh Sood had met with a few days previously. The following day, Puspa Kamal Dahal announced his resignation, blaming India subtly for the fall of his government (Jha, 2012, pp. 341-42). In this context, Ibrahim (2013) argues:

Since the start of the peace process, has been the one who has talked about India's intervention in the media the most. The ruling class in India went too far. During and after the meeting, Indian Ambassador Rakesh Sood reminded Puspa Kamal Dahal, "Prachanda," of the repercussions of moving forward with the general's removal. All of the political class's non-Maoist members were contacted by Indian diplomats. In any case, the majority of them had doubts about the Maoists' attempt to unite in order to oppose Prachanda's next step. (pp. 263-64)

Shyam Saran, a former ambassador for Nepal and former foreign minister of India, agreed to India's involvement in the Katwal issue. However, the Chinese side made no comments on this circumstance, which runs counter to Susana Hast's (2016) domains of influence theory of IR (Acharya, 2012, July). India, according to Jha (2012, pp. 341-42), had a hand in the decision's quick suspension.

These viewpoints suggest that from 2006 A.D., India became highly involved in Nepal's internal affairs. Delhi asserted that the Maoists would not be let to retake power unless they underwent reform (Muni, 2012). The Maoists, he continued, "will nonetheless behave responsibly as an opposition party, will not meddle in parliamentary affairs, will cease all types of overtly "anti-India" language, and will continue to support South Asian geopolitics."

6.6 Madhav Kumar Nepal's Government and India

Madav Kumar Nepal, the CPN (UML) leader, was defeated as a nominated member in a CA election following Prachanda's resignation on May 25, 2009, by Rautahat and Kathmandu (from both constituencies). In fact, after quitting as a genuine member, he joined CA and was elected Prime Minister of New Nepal. Jain (2011) argues:

Madhav Kumar, the Prime Minister Nepal concentrated on creating a constitution, incorporating Maoists into the army, and advancing the peace process. The UCPN Maoists, however, have referred to the Madhav Kumar Nepal's government as a puppet government (Kathaputali Sarkar). (p. 87)

He visited India on business for five days from August 18 to August 22, 2009. The Indian government has promised to support the NA financially. He also went to China from December 26 to December 31, 2009. In order to maintain the geopolitical reality between Nepal and India-China, a joint declaration was released during the visit to strengthen bilateral cooperation and diplomatic relations, providing equal priority to both neighbors based on equiproximity (p. 87) (*See*; Appendix 3).

The failure of Nepal's foreign policy occurred eight months after his introduction of complete democracy (Loktantra). There is no denying how aimless and ambiguous foreign policy is. That is, it solely targets India or only reacts to requests from that nation. India still reportedly controls politics, much as it did during its 1950s heyday. All internal and international activities are coordinated through the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu (Devi, 2011). Devi further asserts, "Sital Niwas' Ministry of Foreign Affairs could easily be renamed the 'Ministry of India'. Such aggravated situation between Nepal and India has been reasoned towards an equidistant foreign policy between the two neighbors" (p.66).

It is gratefully asserted that during the years 2009–2010, India was crucial in maintaining the Madhav Kumar Nepal government. The administration was kept together in large part by India's influence over local players and India's threat that giving in to the Maoists would result in an authoritarian communist regime. However, opinions on India's presence in Nepal vary. Leaders of non-Maoist parties refute claims that they are following Indian advice in the meantime. Finally, they contended that throughout the peace negotiations, India had long supported the Maoists.

6.7 Jhal Nath Khanal's Government and India

Madhav Kumar Nepal ruled the country for 11 months and 4 months as a caretaker government, but when the Nepali Congress withdrew from the alliance, it gained ample support from political parties. However, he resigned on 30 June 2010 and Legislative-Parliament failed to elect a prime minister. Finally, surprisingly, puspa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' endorsed the CPN (UML) leader, Jhalnath Khanal, who became prime minister on February

6, 2011. In fact, this government was formed as a reflection of Puspa Kamal Dahal's ego, which was forced to relinquish power in 2009, at odds with the India's authorities. However, aside from normal bilateral relations and continuity of previous governments, there has been no significant activity in foreign relations, particularly neighborhood policy. Neither India nor China invited him to an official visit as Prime Minister (Hamal, 2014).

Jhal Nath Khanal received the support of the UCPN Maoists to become prime minister, and his first tasks included creating a new republican constitution by May 28 and negotiating the fates of some 20,000 Maoist fighters (Shrestha, 2011). India did not welcome the Khanal government because, according to criticism in the Nepali Parliament (6 April 2020, 12:50 p.m.), our leaders formed this government by exploiting Nepal's sovereign independence. Seven months after the Jhal Nath Khanal government assumed office, the UCPN Maoist once more withdrew its support, causing the loss of the required majority in the Legislative Parliament and the resignation of the government.

6.8 Baburam Bhattarai Government and India

In May 2012, the UCPN Maoist leader Babu Ram Bhattarai was elected as the fourth Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Nepal in 2011. In his time the first Nepali Constituent Assembly was dissolved before completing the task of drafting constitution (Nayak, 2011, October 31).

Although the UML and NC were excluded from the new agreement, Baburam Bhattarai stated that the formation of a central government with representation from all significant political parties was the top priority. In the 2008 elections for the constituent assembly, the UCPN Maoist gained more seats than the NC and CPN (UML) put together. Building a coalition was the best course of action, leave alone assuring the creation of a new constitution, as the erstwhile rebels lacked the necessary number of legislators to establish a government on their own (Jha, 2012, pp. 340-342). The inauguration of Baburam Bhattarai's administration presents Nepal with a fresh chance to pass the test of fate. This shows that India intended to enter Nepal through CA with Babram

Bhattarai in order to keep its favored political structure and constitution (Mohan, 2018, April 8).

Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai believed that his trip to India on October 19, 2011, was significant historically. Nepal negotiated crucial political agreements. Nepalis have been fighting against feudal tyranny and monarchy as well as for complete socio-economic change for almost 60 years. Some of movements were peaceful, but others were aggressive. But eradicating feudal dictatorships and monarchs and democratizing the state and society remained the overarching objective.

The established parliamentary parties and the UCPN Maoists ultimately came to an agreement to remove the king and establish democracy through the CA. He signed a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) with India during his visit there, which has drawn criticism from a number of Nepali political parties, the civil society, the academic community, and independent freelancers, without taking into account the long-term effects on Nepal's fledgling economy. Dahal argues, "After BIPPA India's unsuccessful attempt to acquire TIA's security contract with Bhattarai, which is when India took him in and prepared for his dismissal (Interview, April 9, 2019).

Moreover, Hamal (2014) states:

Because of our open border and strong economic links, we are actually more closely connected to India. As a result, there are now more interactions with India, which has led to an increase in issues. Nepal will not put India's genuine interests in Nepal's border and strong economic connections in jeopardy. As a result, there are now more interactions with India, which has led to an increase in issues. Nepal will not put India's actual interests in Nepal in danger (security, strategy, economy, etc.). It should not be assumed that this is anti-India since as a sovereign and independent nation; we wish to preserve a healthy relationship with our neighbors. (p.34)

According to the aforementioned opinion, Nepal has consistently respected India's concerns and carefully considered India's sensitivities in a variety of

sectors. Many contend that the foundation of the relationship should be mutual respect. We have adhered to international law, regionalism, Panshaseela, the NAM, and other foreign policy tenets. Additionally, it is asserted that Nepal's attitude toward India, a sovereign nation, should not be seen as anti-Indian activities.

However, the two prime ministers recognized the outstanding work done by Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai during his visit to India and decided to establish the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to study the treaties and the entirety of India-Nepal relations and to recommend actions to further deepen and solidify the close, multifaceted relations between the two nations.

We were successful in overthrowing the monarchy and bringing forth a new age of democracy in Nepal. We are currently working to institutionalize the CA's accomplishments, which are also being accompanied by socio-economic change and federal state restructuring. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in November 2006, is unmistakably evidence of US and Indian political involvement in Nepal.

But since then, the Nepal government has finished a number of tasks related to the peace process and military consolidation. The constitution-drafting procedure by the CA will have been finished by the time this entire process is finished. The nation has entered a new period of democracy, transformation, and development as it heads toward institutionalization.

India actively participated in Nepal's peace process and democratic transition (Bhattarai, 2011, October 19, para- 5). Additionally, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai thought that his visit was particularly significant at a time when the peace process in Nepal was nearing its conclusion. The success of the peace process depends on the cooperation of international forces, particularly Nepal's neighbors, despite the fact that it is primarily organized and led by political forces in Nepal. However, he observed a substantial trade gap with India. He anticipated that in order to repair this deficit, the Nepali productions will also be subject to an unsustainable 7:1 import-export ratio (Bhattarai, 2011, October 19, para- 7).

His second extension of the CA was thwarted by pressure from the ruling UCPN Maoist and Terai-based political groups, as well as everyday push from ethnic groupings to establish an ethnically based federalism. The due date was imposed by the Supreme Court was planned, and ultimately a failure. Nepal is currently at a standstill due to CA's inability to comply with the Supreme Court's constitutional deadline in May 2012 and its contentious dissolution that followed (Sharma, 2012). Small ethnic regional groupings multiplied, and the divided political environment worsens the community's divisiveness. All major political parties experienced fragmentation and factional conflict (The Republica, 2012, November 20, p. 6).

Hachhethu (1999) viewed that, the Madhesi Morcha Front and the Maoists split after the CA was dissolved, and the Union of the Federal Democratic Republic, which had been in power, was overthrown. In this situation, the UML maintained its warmer approach toward India. However, there could be conflict because of their leadership's desire for China to make an economic contribution.

6.9 Khil Raj Regmi's Government and India

Political parties lost their temper immediately following the 1st CA's debacle. They were opposed to forming a government through consensus. A second CA election was declared by the Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai. After much deliberation, the political parties opted to establish an elected government led by Khil Raj Regmi, the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (14 March 2013–February 2014). As it was proposed that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court assumed the presidency of the government without quitting, the agreement brought up the crucial question of "separation of powers." Narayan Kaji Shrestha's said, Khil Raj Regmi led the government following the dissolution of the CA. However, he skipped court appearances during that time, after the vote, the new administration gave him permission to return to his prior position (Sharma, 2013, pp.1-3).

Since the Constituent Assembly's term ended in May 2012 without a new constitution being written, the nation has not had a parliament. Elections for the CA were the legumi government's primary responsibility. His appointment, which

was approved under a consensus between Nepal's four major political parties, has drawn criticism from a number of smaller parties. On March 4, 2013, Khil Raj Regmi was named acting prime minister in place of Baburam Bhattarai. Maoist groups claimed that India is pulling a sophisticated ruse. Khanal asserts (Interview, 10 March 2019):

India first had an impact on the Maoists, and after the EU was persuaded by rebel Maoists to support the peace process, India attempted to involve the rebellious Maoists. The International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) attempts to rescue and treat wounded Maoist fighters were criticized by India. After four years, Nepal's political party, India, started to lose favor with the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).

The appointment of Lok Man Singh Karki as the head of the CIAA (Shakya, 2021, p. 249), the formation of an election government presided over by Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi, and other significant Indian influences in Nepali politics seen in recent years were all been mentioned by Bhattarai (Interview, November 11, 2018). However, the scenario was developed at a time when the major political parties were unable to accept each other as prime ministers and instead opted to blame India in an effort to appear successful.

But everyone in the nation, including the chief justice of Nepal's Supreme Court, was subject to a political impasse. To oversee the CA II elections, Khil Raj Regmi has been named head of the Nepali electoral government. On November 19, 2013, Regmi successfully held the CA II election. On February 11, 2014, when Sushil Koirala took over as head of the Nepali Congress, he was subsequently elected prime minister. However, the selection of the 26 members of the Cabinet was contentious even months after the CA II elections, and superfluous time was wasted discussing state reform and the structure of the political system.

6.10 India's Concerns

India has good cause for supporting pro-democracy movements in Nepal and other countries (Jha, 2014, pp. 43–58). India enjoys a unique and unwavering privilege in Nepal as a result of the open border system as well as geopolitical,

socio-economic, and cultural considerations as vowed in dependence theory of IR (Jha, 2014, p. 6).

Some Nepali claims that India does not want Nepal to have the same diplomatic ties with China or other countries as India does. In order to disarm hostile forces when necessary, India plays the "democracy card," but the growth of anti-Indian groups that aim to lessen India's influence in the country is raising concerns in both India and Nepal. According to the geopolitical theory of IR, China's presence and operations in Nepal's Terai region, which borders India, worry India more than any other nation (p. 6). In one instance, India had to compel Nepal to forbid China from taking part in building roads, bridges, and cotton farms in Nepal's Terai region (p.7).

India has recently shown its concern with non-governmental organizations supported by Beijing (NGOs). In June 2011, the Asia-Pacific Exchanges and Cooperation Foundation (APECF) and the Lumbini Development National Directive Committee signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to spend US\$3 billion in the Lumbini development project (Nayak & Agrawal, 2018, August 29). The birthplace of the Buddha, Lumbini, is about 25 kilometers from the Indian border. However, the International Ecological Safety Cooperative Organization (IESCO) in Beijing released the Lumbini Ecological Safety Plan after APECF's preparations for some reason did not materialize (Jha, 2014, p. 7).

China is particularly interested in building a rail connection that would likely go through Shigatse in Tibet and connect Lumbini to the Chinese border. It is possible that Chinese military personnel and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) operations command will take part in these programs. However, there are worries in India's strategic community that China's rising interest in Lumbini may represent a possible military danger to India (Jha, 2014, p. 7).

In this case, India is concerned about the 109 armed groups that are present and active in Nepal. The most significant factor is that there are around 1,900 of Madarasha in the area, many of whom are thought to be supported by nations hostile to India. Terai is a representative of the United Liberation Front of Aasam (ULFA), Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), National Democratic

Party Bodland Front (NDFB), Punjab separatists, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Indian Mujahideen, Al Qaeda, Lashkar Tayyeva (LET), and Punjab Mujahideen (Natrja, 2014). Due to the close and uncontrolled open border with Nepal, India thought that the deployment of such military forces threatened its security.

India is highly concerned about investment plans in Nepal and does not want strikes or other nefarious activities to jeopardize its investments in general, especially those in the hydropower sector. India might be devastated by a potential sabotage strike on a pricey Indian factory in Nepal.

Battacharya (2009, May 18)) opined that our head of state and government expressed vows during their visit not to allow Nepal's land to be exploited against either country's interests due to India's and China's national interests, and instead committed to make significant contributions to Nepal's road and rail networks. In the same context, Hamal (2014) has detailed that Nepal's Foreign Affairs Minister Shrestha mentioned: "we should rise above the traditional concept of Nepal being a yam between two rocks. We can bridge between the giant countries.... We should have closer relationship with both of our neighbors based on the principle of equi-distance" (pp. 34-35).

China is Nepal's key neighbor due to new geopolitical dynamics (Shakya, 2021, p. 253). According to a common understanding of China's involvement, the country does not "interfere" with Nepal's internal affairs (Bhattarai, 2020, May 22, Para-8). India and China's intense race to announce development assistance in Nepal amply demonstrates their legitimate interests. China wants to invade Nepal to usurp India's monopoly, but India does not want to relinquish its long-standing hold on the country. International affairs, according to Palmer and Parkkins (1979) and Susana Hast (2016), cover economic, legal, political, and a wide range of other issues with a single level of national borders for all human behavior, whether private or public IR. Both parties are extremely concerned about potential security dangers to one another. China has promised to exert more influence over India since the 2006 and worries that it may lose its long-standing sway in Nepali politics (Shakya, 2021, p. 253).

6.11 Constitution Building Process and India

A magnitude 7.8 Richter scale earthquake struck in the east of Gorkha District in Barpak on April 25, 2015, when the nation experienced one of the worst earthquakes in its history. The height of bilateral relations guided by constructivist theory of IR has increased as a result of India's quick arrival in Nepal with relief and humanitarian supplies, as well as an additional commitment of \$1 billion for reconstruction (Shakya, 2021, p. 251). However, an Indian helicopter that went to Mustang was taken as a political interest by India to assess the geographical feasibility from Mustang to Tibet (Shakya, 2021, p. 251).

Additionally, in April 2020, when COVID-19 was causing severe harm throughout the world, India's authority urged that the Oli administration sent a Rapid Response Team (RRT) to Nepal in order to combat the disease (Philip, 2020, March 27), but it was interesting to note that India was actually suffering more than Nepal. India showed its political interest in this situation as well; it wanted to get in Nepal before China so that China will be reluctant to enter if the pandemic worsens (Singh, 2016, pp. 179-184). The head of the largest political party persisted in constitutional negotiations in order to address this humanitarian catastrophe as well.

The powerful earthquake was also a major factor in bringing the previously divided political parties together. They knew that extending the mustache war would damage people's trust in the midst of this crisis. The country's peaceful democratic transition was warmly praised for its new constitution (Pokhrel, 2015, September 20). India, however, objected to the new constitution's exclusionary clauses and brought up the Madhesh conflict in doing so.

6.11.1 Political Scenario (2008-2015)

Since the first CA elections in April 2008, Nepal's major political groups and factions were involved in tense discussions. After years of armed strife, Nepal's recent constitutional process brought the key groups together to design a democratic constitution together. On November 22, 2006, the constitution was formally ratified. Due to the fact that it consolidated the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement, it was exceptionally difficult and divisive (CPA). Former Maoist rebels aggressively lobbied for the new constitutional process, as did traditional parliamentary parties on the one hand, interest groups and identity-based organizations that arose after the end of the military war on the other.

Many international actors, post-conflict, showed a tremendous deal of interest in Nepal's constitutional process from 2006 to 2015. The establishment of inclusive, secular, and decentralized democracies is the overarching goal of Western donors like the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the Scandinavian countries, the United Nations, and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). A vast range of human rights are guaranteed by us. Many of these foreign players have also pushed for a democratic and inclusive constitutional process. Along with the typical democratic boosters, Nepal's neighbors India and China also participated in the constitution-making process.

India's role in advancing global democracy is particularly intriguing. Scholars debate whether India was "extremely" "actively" or even "deeply" involved in supporting democracy in Nepal between 2005 and 2008, despite the fact that India is often thought of as being reticent to do so (Destradi, 2012; & Mehta, 2004).

In fact, India was largely inactive throughout most of the constitutional process (2008–2014), but it started taking an active role in the run-up to and during the implementation of the new constitution in September 2015. The negotiations between India and Nepal regarding democratization are interesting and significant for a number of reasons. However, historically speaking, India has had the ability and connections to influence political developments in Nepal since the 1950s.

At the same time, India traditionally views Nepal as its spheres of influence. India's foreign policy and interest in Nepal are linked to economic ties with Nepal, dependency and constructive theory of IR, security concern over realist theory of IR, possible spillovers of violent transboundary conflict, geopolitical theory of IR, and continued political influence over neighboring

countries. Second, India's interest is in shedding light on the role of typical democracy promoters (Campbell, et al., 2012, June). Mehta (2004) argues, "How '*non-western*' countries have tried to influence the constitution-making process of a third country and how, in the process, democracy-related concerns and more traditional foreign-policy goals are articulated" (pp.87-99).

The idea that the Madhesi people (Madhesh Badi), an ethnic group that primarily lives in Nepal's Terai region, were not included in the country's constitution until India deliberately brought up the idea of a comprehensive constitution to promote their inclusion and participation, is a misconception shared by many Indians. In Nepal's domestic politics, India plays a significant role and, but on occasions India helped Nepal to advance toward democracy. It formally reaffirmed its goal to remain a democratic and progressive country. But it intends to get gratitude of its help from newly established government in Nepal which is not desired by the citizen of any sovereign country.

India's involvement in the constitutional discourse was intended to persuade the major political parties to strengthen the document's credibility. However, like other instances of Indian meddling in Nepal's internal affairs; this official stance was also shaped by Nepal's geopolitical reality as seen through the eyes of Indian decision-makers (Campbell et al., 2012). In fact, India is both directly and indirectly involved in Nepal's constitutional process because India's national security, foreign policy as a whole, bilateral economic relations, and management of water resources are all impacted by the new constitution of Nepal.

The border with southern Nepal is directly tied to India's neighbor issue. Due to the Madhesi people's close ties to its bordering populations on an ethnic, cultural, and family level, India has always defended their rights. Understanding Madhesi discrimination from an Indian perspective is important for the constitutional process and beneficial for Indians who regard this as prejudice against their own people (Majumder, 2015).

Aside from this emotional link, the Madhesi people's discontent and insecurity have spread from Nepal to India due to their borders with two of that

country's most densely inhabited states, Bihar and her UP state. It has a distinct geopolitical strategy and security component. As a result, these factors have influenced Indian thinking towards attempts to influence Nepal's most recent constitutional process. According to India, the new constitution is detrimental to Madhesi interests (RSTV, 2015).

A deal was made between the Nepal government and the Madhesi Party in 2008 as a result of India's long-standing advocacy on behalf of the Madhesi people. It concentrated on locating a political resolution to pressing Madhesi complaints, including members of parliament, discriminatory constitutional clauses, and citizenship. It should come as no surprise that India pushed the Nepalese government to secure broad consensus and inclusion of the new constitutional process to enable the creation of a federal state in response to the Madhesi community's considerable displeasure with the newly adopted new constitution (Jaiswal, 2016).

According to the discourses outlined above, India's political class was more interested in keeping Nepal a Hindu state than in transforming it into the secular state that the new constitution called for. It demonstrates that there the idea of converting Nepal into a secular state has been rejected by the Indian elite, particularly the present Hindu extremist government led by Narendra Modi, as a result of the establishment of a pro-Hindu ruling party in India. India secretly wants to have a role in the constitution-making process in Nepal and more (The Kathmandu Post, 2016, December 4).

Additionally, it is said that India's involvement in Nepal's constitutional process was motivated by a desire to lessen the increasing influence and presence of China and Western nations in the region (Bhatta, 2013). India takes great satisfaction in being the only regional power in South Asia, according to the sphere of influence doctrine. With the exception of Pakistan, India frequently attempted to step in when issues in the area emerged.

Therefore, India's ongoing meddling in Nepali issues might be seen as emphasizing India's regional hegemony. Additionally, India finds it difficult-possibly intolerable-to accept that the NC, UML, and Maoist Center, three of

Nepal's major political parties, refuse to include Madhesi in Nepal's fragile state institutions. The constitution-making process even had a beneficial end, and Nepal's challenges being solved was acknowledged as a factor. India thought it could fend off Western dominance in the area.

India is genuinely concerned about losing its influence in post-conflict Nepal due to the increasing influence of China and the West there. Therefore it has looked for ways to emphasize that it is Nepal's most powerful nation. Such a statement was appropriate given Nepal's problematic political situation and precarious constitutional process. Throughout the constitutional process, India and Nepal's political leaders engaged in a number of negotiations. Long before Nepal's first CA election, in late 2005, India began to get involved in the country's political issues. During this time, India served as a mediator between the SPA and the Maoists. The provision of venues has received special attention (Destradi, 2012).

In order to resolve the issues raised by political parties with roots in the Madhes and Terai regions, the Indian government asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to propose seven significant revisions in late September 2015. According to Rawat (2015), these signals were delivered to Nepali politicians via official channels, i.e. the Indian Embassy, which is strongly disapproved of in Nepal. Additionally, Rawat claims that India meddled actively in Nepal's political and constitutional processes. Without hesitation, the upcoming Indian attempt to change Nepal's new constitution supports India's dominance in Nepal in all respects. India suggests the seven adjustments listed below:

- a) The drafting of electoral constituencies in proportional of the population.
- b) The right to participate in state structures on the basis of principles of proportional inclusion.
- c) Enabling citizens by descent or naturalization to run for and hold all key political offices including president, vice-president, Prime Minister, chief justice, speaker of parliament, chairperson of national assembly, head of province, chief minister, and speaker of provincial assembly and chief of security bodies.

- d) Representation in National Assembly to be based on population of the Provinces.
- e) Delineation of federal states.
- f) Delineation of electoral constituencies in every 10 year, and
- g) Acquisition of naturalized citizenship to be automatic on application.

Source: <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2015/09/23/india-wants-seven-amendments-to-nepals-constitution-confidential>, accessed on 31 July, 2021) and (<https://indianexpress.com/article/world/neighbors/make-seven-changes-to-your-constitution-address-madheshi-concerns-india-to-nepal/>)

Bhattarai (2019, March 10) asserted that a sovereign state would never agree to such a plan, and even the most advanced democracies would not be able to tolerate such behavior. However, India has openly meddled in Nepali politics by playing the Madhesh card. On September 20, 2015, India informally imposed a border blockade that lasted for nearly five months after Nepal's new constitution was promulgated. India is furious that Kathmandu did not contact it and disregarded Madhesh-based political parties' requests. (Para-1)

He (2019, March 10) further asserted that India has utilized four crucial negotiating tactics to influence Nepal's constitutional and revision processes at the late constitutional and post-approval stages. To communicate its concerns and reservations, India frequently used high-level communication through political and diplomatic channels. As Indian leaders and officials saw the value of adoption without acknowledging India's requests, they traveled to Nepal and visited the embassy with ministers and political figures in Kathmandu. In fact, India has been charged with meddling in Nepal's constitutional process and political power struggles while the nation's political culture has long been characterized by appeasing India's desire to maintain its influence.

But Amresh Kumar Singh, a member of Nepal's Congress, has a different opinion. He said India imposed the blockade because of concerns over Nepal's status as a Hindu state, not because of the Madhesh issue. They joined the Madhesh movement that was gaining momentum at the time. But after a few weeks they realized that the ruling hill elites were unhappy, so they lifted the

blockade and started negotiations with the Nepali government and the ruling elite (Bhattarai, 2019, March 10, para-16).

An unofficially declared economic blockade was used by India to significantly alter the newly adopted constitution to its liking after its political and diplomatic efforts failed. In August and September of 2015, the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu began its operations in the last phases of writing a new constitution. The Indian ambassador actively lobbied during the constitutional process for changes to the draft constitution and made numerous trips between Kathmandu and New Delhi to talk with the government about how to best cooperate with Nepal's leaders (Roy, 2015, September 24).

The Roy (2015, September 24) went on to state that on August 25, 2015; Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India personally called Prime Minister Sushil Koirala of Nepal to express his support for a peaceful and truly inclusive constitutional process. On September 14, 2015 just one week before the constitution was ratified, foreign India's minister released a statement to the media. The main idea of the press release was the necessity of a "durable and robust constitution" to create a contemporary Nepal. However, this news release's true intent was to convey India's displeasure with Nepal's draft new constitution, which ignores its concerns.

The trip to Nepal by Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanam Jaishankar on May 17-18 was another widely reported last-minute attempt to change the draft constitution. Jaishankar was a significant political figure in Nepal, including the Prime Minister and leaders of all political parties, including Madhesi, in September 2015 (Shakya, 2021, pp. 150–159), and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated as a special envoy. His message that "ensuring the widest possible agreement on a constitution is important for the peace and stability of the country" was one of his main points (Majumder, 2015).

Roy (2015, September 24) argues that the CPN (UML) leader, KP Oli, stated that before the new constitution was promulgated, the disgruntled Madhesh-based political parties were included in the draft constitution (The Kathmandu Post, 2015b). Oli simply stated that the new constitution was adopted

with his over 85 percent approval of legislators and its 90 percent attendance of all CA members. He met with Prachanda and Prime Minister Sushil Koirala, who both promised a "win-win solution" (The Kathmandu Post, 2015). However, Puspa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' stated that such visits to Nepal with the intent of influencing Nepal's internal affairs were inappropriate and unjust to a sovereign state.

Additionally, all of Nepal's prominent political figures who pledged to swiftly pass a new constitution opposed Jaishankar's plan. They did so on September 20, 2015. As a result, rather than extending a warm welcome to the new constitution, the Indian government simply issued a strong caution against it. India's action not only signaled the start of a diplomatic crisis, but it also fueled anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal. Further, India claimed that Nepal was rejecting its demand because of China's opposition, despite the fact that India has consistently expressed concern for Nepal and that the geopolitical relationship between India and China is the root of all security issues. Their worries, nevertheless, were focused on the Madhesh and Madheshi in Nepal.

6.12 Nepal-India Relations after Promulgation of Constitution -2015

Ironically, India, the largest democracy in the world, rejected the mandate of the people of Nepal and responded by imposing a blockade. One may argue that India's hegemonic arrogance is what drives such overt meddling in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state like Nepal. Similar measures were taken by India in the past when Nepal agreed to purchase weapons from China in 1970 and 1989, demobilizing 13 of its 15 transit stations along the Nepalese border (Nayak, 2016).

The long-awaited constitution was adopted by the legislative assembly on September 20, 2015, but Nepal was surprised by India's lack of response. In addition, protests by political groups based in Terai against their displeasure with the recently enacted constitution have intensified attacks and clashes in several Terai regions (Bhattarai, 2018, para. 1-3).

On September 23, 2015, Nepali Prime Minister Sushil Koirala and Indian Ambassador Ranjit Rae met in Kathmandu to discuss the disagreement on Nepal's

relations with India following the adoption of the new constitution (Bhattarai, 2015a). Ambassador Rae was given the assurance by Prime Minister Koirala that he would take the initiative in settling disputes with opposing Terai-led parties and was urged to take part in wider consultations and, if required, change the constitution (The Rising Nepal, 2015).

Ajit Doval, the national security advisor to the Indian Prime Minister, and Deep Kumar Upadhyay, the then-Nepali ambassador to India, met in New Delhi on September 23, 2015, on the same day as another significant meeting. It happened and delivered the message to Upadhyay that political conversation and consensus among stakeholders were urgently needed (Bhattarai, 2015a, October).

Numerous high-level conversations then ensued. A discussion about how to improve contentious relations between Nepal and India as a result of the conflict took place on October 12, 2015, in Kathmandu between the new prime minister of Nepal, KP Sharma Oli, and the Indian ambassador, Rae. These conversations focused on an unofficial economic blockade put in place by India. For the mutual benefit of both nations, Prime Minister KP Oli emphasized the government's priority of a strong and lasting relationship with India, while Ambassador Rae restated the claim that the blockade was not enforced by India (RSTV, 2015).

According to consensus between NC and CPN (UML) on October 11, 2015, CPN (UML) President KP Sharma Oli was sworn in as Prime Minister. Continuing high-level exchanges, Prime Minister Oli sent Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa to India in the third week of October 2015 to urge Indian political leaders to secure cross-border trade in essential commodities.

The India's side responded that India was not behind the economic blockade but that it was the instability of the Nepal-India border that was disrupting vehicular traffic. Some advised him to respond to the call as soon as possible. On 31 December 2015, Prime Minister Oli called Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi after Nepal's Foreign Minister's visit to India. During the 20-minute talks, Oli discussed obstacles at border crossings between Nepal and India and urged Prime Minister Modi to take initiatives to expedite

the supply of essential goods through various border crossings. Prime Minister Modi reiterated the need to find the '*Sahamati*' in the constitution by bringing the opposing parties into dialogue. He also invited Oli to India (Giri, 2015).

Following this invitation, Prime Minister Oli made an official visit to India for his six days from 19th to 24th February 2016. Prime Minister Oli had only visited India on his longtime position of not going there until the blockade continued. According to Oli (3 August 2016), from 4 August 2016 Maoist leader Prachanda was appointed as a Prime Minister by until 7 June 2017. He made an official visit to India from 15-18 September 2016 to improve relations between Nepal and India. His counterpart Modi appreciated his efforts to improve relations between Nepal and India and proposed broad consensus among all sections, especially the agitation section (MoFA, 2016a, September 16).

However, India's Foreign Minister Jayshankar has suggested that he would not withdraw from the Madhesh issue until India's demands were met. He also believed that Nepal's constitution aimed at its full implementation, accepting only the grievances of all sectors of Nepali society which were lacking at the time (The Hindu, 2016).

So, contrary to what Hast (2016) believed in the spheres of influence theory of international relations, India's relationship with Nepal is hegemonic rather than patriarchal, demonstrating Nepal's legislative status. Several international rules and conventions, according to experts in international relations, were broken by the blockade. This was against the Vienna Convention of 1965 (United Nations, 1965), which established the Convention on Transit and Trade of Landlocked Countries and permitted these nations to freely import commodities from other nations.

Additionally, the blockade contravened the Asian Highway Agreement (ESCAP, 2003), which was signed by Asian nations including Nepal and India in order to connect highways for intraregional trade. The embargo was intended to harm the South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA) pact, which was established to advance trade and business in the region. No country may impose

restrictions on the exports of another nation's goods under SAFTA law (Subedi, 2017, pp.53-96).

6.13 India's Concern in Nepal

Prime Minister Narendra Modi internationalized Nepali violence in Terai by failing to meet India's interests in a number of bilateral meetings (in protest, he killed 45 people). On November 3, 2015, in Geneva, at the 23rd session of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), he brought up the subject. Similar to this, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the United Kingdom on November 12–13, 2015, and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and British Prime Minister David Cameron jointly released a statement addressing the remaining issues with the Nepali Constitution to emphasize the need for a comprehensive and long-lasting constitutional solution (My Republic, 2016b). Similar to this, India and the EU released a joint press release on March 30, 2016, at the 13th EU-India Summit in Brussels (European Union, 2016).

On invitation from India, prominent officials from the Madhesi Morcha (Alliance) visited that country in the first week of December 2015. In Rajbiraj, the scene of the Terai protests, on May 11, 2016, Indian officials even attended a meeting with the head of the Madhesi party. In this context, The Kathmandu Post (2016, December 4) writes:

Madhesi leaders have been urged by Indian officials to concentrate on capital-centered rallies rather than district-level protests, India has continued to participate in the peace and democratic process in Nepal since 2005 by taking part in the country's most recent constitutional process.

Similarly, Destradi (2012) opined:

India's interests initially centered on the general problem of ending the armed conflict and reestablishing democracy in Nepal. Such initiatives will help to stabilize the nation and safeguard India's influence in Nepal.

As claimed by Josse (2020) in constructive theory of IR India's involvement in Nepal's most recent constitution-making process is a continuity of

its involvement in the peace and democratization process since 2005. Initially, India's interests were focused on the overall issue of resolving the armed conflict and restoring democracy in Nepal and also in consideration of the fact that such efforts would stabilize the country and protect India's influence in Nepal (Destradi, 2012). However, Destradi (2012) is found indifferent in India's micro-management in Nepal.

According to Josse (2020), a proponent of the constructive theory of IR, India's participation in Nepal's most recent constitution-making represents a continuation of its participation in the country's peace and democracy efforts since 2005. The initial focus of India's interests was on the general problem of ending the armed conflict and restoring democracy in Nepal, as well as taking into account the fact that such measures would stabilize the country and safeguard India's influence in Nepal (Destradi, 2012). In this context, GLM (2016) further writes:

After the promulgation of the new constitution, India came to Nepal with endowed interests' micromanaging demands from Madhesis and other sectors. The first constitutional amendment of 23 January 2016 increased the number of seats (20 districts) in the Terai region

However, neither India nor the Terai-based parties were pleased with the development. The Maoist-Congress alliance took office in early August 2016 and pledged to modify the constitution to take into account the demands of the Terai's "core parties." India viewed the government's promulgation of new constitutional amendments on November 29, 2016, as a "major step" toward resolving Madhesi complaints. The amendment, however, ultimately failed. In the same line, Bhattarai (2017, June 17) puts an ideas that, "Maoist and UML parties want to cut off India's traditional influence on Nepal and see the constitutional process as an opportunity, while NC seeks to reach out to international actors, including India. It also advocated avoiding India's involvement in Nepal".

The involvement of many foreign actors in the constitutional process is distinctive to post-conflict nations and serves to speed up the transition to a peaceful and democratic society. However, in reality, the government's commitment to advancing democracy and peace is accompanied by more

materialistic foreign policy objectives. This holds true not just for India but also for more established nations, particularly the crucial "receiving countries". The pursuit of strengthening democracy is not inherently hampered by such foreign policy interests, but they will always exist. This is true not only for India, but also for more traditional countries, especially the strategically valuable "recipient countries". Such foreign policy interests do not necessarily mean that the goal of promoting democracy is completely undermined, but they will always shape the way democracy promotion is designed and implemented in each context (Wolff et al., 2013).

India's commitment to advancing democracy and peace is accompanied by more materialistic foreign policy objectives. This holds true not just for India but also for more established nations, particularly "receiving countries" like Nepal. The pursuit of strengthening democracy is not inherently hampered by such foreign policy interests, but they will always exist.

6.14 Summit Diplomacy and India

After CA II members voted him, Pushpa Kamal Dahal succeed KP Oli as prime minister, he took office on August 3, 2016. (The Hindu, 2016 August 4). After taking office, he increased the importance of "visit diplomacy" as a strategy for advancing bilateral ties (*See*; Appendix 4). It was therefore decided to dispatch two special envoys to China and India, whose major duties would be to settle disputes between Nepal and India as well as Nepal's of recent political developments.

To meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other top officials in Beijing, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara was dispatched to China (The Himalaya Times, 2016; August 16). Panda (2016, August 16) said that "Maharah's visit will pave the way for Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Kathmandu in October this year," while Sharma (2016, August 15) provided information on a report stating that the government would continue with all signed favorable accords.

Sharma (2016, August 15) also stated that Nepal's Maoist Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, or "Prachanda," sent one of his dependable lieutenants from

the uprising phase on Monday to dispel uncertainty on China's future. He believed that the reason he was chosen as a special representative to the new administration was because the agreement his predecessor had signed was keen to win India's backing, for which "visit diplomacy" was immediately begun. Such activities were started with both neighbors to send the idea that a relationship requires a balanced approach. Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Bhimendra Nidhi has been sent to India to ease tensions in the wake of a constitutional crisis that started last fall and lasted for a significant portion of Prime Minister Oli's administration. The two countries have had a long-standing, close connection. (Pandey, 2016, May 6). The Himalayan Times (2016, August 20) writes, As decided, on April 19 (August 20) 2016 Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Bhimalendra Nidhi traveled to India as Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal's "special envoy" and met with several personalities (, p. 4).

He also had a meeting with India's President Pranab Mukherjee, who expressed India's constant desire for a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Nepal and asked for Indian unwavering assistance in accomplishing these objectives (The Himalayan Times, 2016, August 20). Further, The Himalayan Times added the following:

President Mukherjee allegedly told Nidhi that India, Nepal's near neighbor, always wants to see peace, stability, and development in Nepal. India is pleased to ensure Nepal's economic success. According to a source at the Nepali embassy in New Delhi, Mukherjee also expressed his eagerness for making a state visit to Nepal on a day that would be convenient for all parties. (p.4)

Similarly, Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, 'Prachanda', made an official visit in September 2016 to promote "visit diplomacy." During the visit, memorandums of understanding covering a range of topics were signed. India also spent a lot of money on building highways, irrigation projects, and Mahakali Bridges. In response, Prachanda gave India his word that Nepal will take care of its security issues (Gupta, 2017, May 16). In November 2016, Nepal received a "goodwill" visit from Indian President Pranab Mukherjee (Gupta, 2017, May 16). Similarly, President Bidhya Devi Bhandari of Nepal visited India from April 17 to

21, 2017, at President Mukherjee's request. Nepal's foreign affairs minister, Prakash Sharan Mahat, said during a press conference that the trip had been successful in improving ties and goodwill between the two nations (The Himalayan Times, 2017, April 19).

The Indian president, prime minister, and leaders of several political parties met with President Bhandari and emphasized the importance of the relationship between India and Nepal. They also wished Nepal success in its attempts to enact the constitution and hold local elections. Additionally, they pledged to assist Nepal in its development efforts (The Himalayan Times, 2017, April 19). Krishna Bahadur Mahara, the deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, visited India in July 2017 at the request of India's minister of external affairs, Shusma Swaraj, helping to advance Nepal-India relations through visit diplomacy (GoN, MoFA, n.d., b).

As the ninth Prime Minister in the post-monarchy period of 10 years, NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba visited India from August 23 to 27 after taking office as prime minister of Nepal on June 6, 2017, at the invitation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi (GoN, MoFA, 2017, August 24). According to Acharya (2017, August 29), the visit of Prime Minister Deuba to India was as follows:

We have not been able to come out from the regular cycle that almost every year government changes and Prime Minister has to visit first and then statements come out and then debates start and the likewise it is going.

Through visit diplomacy followed by Nepal and India to improve bilateral ties some how played vital role to bring relationships in its natural track but India's discontentment in Nepal's new constitution still got continuity that is not desired by the both countries and continued bilateral visits in different levels with the hope of improving bilateral cooperations by reducing thg gap of untrust. Though this assertion supports India's desire to use micromanagement to sway Nepali politics and government.

6.14.1 Frequencies of Bilateral Visits and Its Reflections on Nepal-India Relations

Different heads of state or governments and officials have frequently exchanged visits with the aim of enhancing bilateral ties between Nepal and India. It demonstrated the significance that both countries are on having an influence over one another. With Modi endorsing Nepali voters and political leaders and the CA developing a constitution to support a federal, democratic political structure and equality in the country, the visit represented a fresh beginning for relations between India and Nepal. Many detractors, nevertheless, believed that the Indian elite had broken its promises. India's confidence in Nepal was undermined in this way. Wani (2015, February) asserted that, Madhesi leaders informed Jaishankar about their demands and 'how the state has been suppressing them' by deploying the army in the Terai. Jaishankar just listened to us, and promised to talk to the ruling party leaders about it.

Following his meeting with the Madhesi leader, Jaishankar met in secret with KP Oli, the leader of the UML and the potential prime minister after the constitution is ratified, in Balkot. UML Chief of Staff Agni Kharel, one of Oli's advisers, claimed that Jayshankar had only suggested releasing a new constitution after reaching an understanding with the political agitators (Nepali Times, 2015, September 18, Para 3-8).

IST (2018, May12) writes that India always seemed to be striving to have an impact on Nepali politics. It again endeavored to publicly meddle in Nepal's domestic issues this time. The majority of bilateral trips have aided in mutual persuasion and influence. But because Nepal is a landlocked nation and is disproportionately dependent on India, Indian leaders who traveled there had a significant influence on Nepal's leadership. When Prime Minister Modi spoke to the Legislative Assembly or Second CA on his first visit to Nepal after taking office (2014), the happiness of CA members and citizens in Nepal was visible

6.14.2 Post-Constitutional Visit

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa visited India for business from October 17 to October 19, 2015. There were discussions with his counterpart during his visit about easing supplies and resuming normal relations between the two nations (GoN, MoFA, 2016, June). The GoN persisted in collaborating with India on multiple levels to press for the lifting of the covert blockade to facilitate easier traffic movement at border crossings.

However, due to persistent demonstrations by the Terai Madhesi Group, India has been concerned about the security of its vehicle supply in Nepal. As soon as they crossed into its territory, Nepal accepted responsibility. India, however, did not encourage Nepal's vehicles when importing commodities and was eager to compel negotiations with the government of Nepal.

For five months, India's supply disruption persisted. As a result of continuing obstructions, blockades, and delays at Nepal-India border crossings, many friendly countries, including ambassadors of the European Union and EU countries, have expressed concern about the deteriorating supply situation and potential humanitarian implications of Nepal's supply situation (GoN, MoFA, 2016, June 12). Following that, most border crossings opened on 6 December 2015, while the main Raxual-Brigunj crossing opened on 6 February 2016. (GoN, MoFA, 2016 June 12) According to Ruff (2018, January 30):

If India's traditional dominance in Nepal has waned, it is likely due to India's ruthless diplomacy and new hate politics. Nepal was cut off from fuel and essentials for more than five months after imposing an effective blockade on Nepal for refusing to write a constitution in Nepal. China willingly surrendered to its red neighbor. (Paragraph 16)

The explanation above makes clear that India's moves encouraged Nepal to approach China, and thus created an environment that was deemed to be conducive for China to increase its influence. The Khadga Prasad Oli administration (2016) capitalized on this circumstance by fostering closer connections with China. On the invitation of Prime Minister Modi, Prime

Minister KP Oli of Nepal paid an official visit to India from February 19–24, 2016.

The goal of the trip was to normalize the historically tense relations between Nepal and India. Several significant agreements and understandings between the two countries were reached during the visit in the areas of transit, connectivity, energy, and infrastructure (GoN, MoFA, 2016, June 12).

During his visit, Prime Minister KP Oli stated that the foundations of Nepal-India ties are sovereign equality and respect for one another's interests and concerns. This is supported by the intimate ties that exist between the two nations' populations as well as the fact that their geographies, cultures, and civilisations are similar. In order to further the interests of both countries and their inhabitants, he also emphasized the importance of clearing up miscommunications and resuming bilateral cooperation (GoN, MoFA, 2016, June 12).

In a similar vein, Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized the importance of the constitution's creation for all of Nepal during a news conference on the visit and vowed India would continue to help Nepal's growth and prosperity. Seven distinct agreements were struck between the two nations during the visit in this subject (GoN, MoFA, 2016 June 12). As a landmark of visits a joint statement was released by Nepal and India with the hope of extending cooperation (*See*; Appendix-7). Panda (2016, February 22) explains that the Oli's trip has the overarching purpose of restoring ties between Nepal and India as two neighbors and historic partners have drifted apart over the past year. He has further viewed that PM Khadga Prasad Oli further acknowledged, "In the few months there have been many misunderstanding between our two countries" and said, "We now want to go our relationship back on track (para 1).

In the same vein, the president Bidya Devi Bhandari had been invited by his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, to visit India from May 9 to 13. However, this trip was abruptly postponed. Additionally, the Indian ambassador to Nepal was called back. What was the cause of everything? Baral (2016, November 27) made the case that Nepal's internal political climate produced a constitutional backdrop and a divergence on this matter. Additionally, India urged

Nepal to give less attention to the Madhesh movement and the issue of indigenous peoples.

Additionally, it has been asserted that the cancellation of her visit was largely brought on by the country's shifting political landscape. Specifically the "political instability" caused by his UCPN Maoists, led by Puspa Kamal Dahal who announced the dissolution of the coalition with the dominant CPN (UML) party (The Economic Times, 2016, May 6).

Jha (2016, May7) stated:

Nepal-India ties are set to dip-framing again as Prime Minister KP Oli's government cancelled a scheduled visit of the country's president to its southern neighbor and recalled its ambassador in New Delhi.
(Para 1, 2 and 3)

Additionally, changes occurred the day after the Oli administration manages to win over Maoist supporters and survived the power battle. The visit was peacefully canceled when the establishment in Kathmandu hinted that India was the motivating factor behind the action though no formal justification had been given. Nepal and India relations are still strained. Despite the fact that there are disagreements, it appeared to be stable. The cancellation of such high-level trips does not bode well for relations between Nepal and India and demonstrated that a number of complaints and differences have persisted lately, not just between Nepal but also between Nepal and India. However, it demonstrated that there were conflicts at the political level. It also illustrated Nepal's absence of a consistent foreign policy framework.

As ties between Nepal and India have soured, Nepal's relations with China have evolved in a worrying way. To meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Wei and other top officials in Beijing, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara was dispatched to China (The Himalayan Times, 2016, August 16). The Mahara and the government outlining what was said earlier has entered into a positive agreement which this government was also following. In addition, Panda (2016, August 16) stated that "Maharah's visit will

pave the way for Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Kathmandu in October this year," according to Sharma (2016, August 15). And he said:

In an effort to clear up any misunderstandings over the additional accords struck by his predecessor, Nepal's Prime Minister on Monday despatched one of his loyal lieutenants from the insurgency period to China as a special envoy. He understood Prachanda's message that the new administration is willing to forge friendly relations with China despite recent political developments. (Para 1 & 2)

As is clear from the aforementioned statement, there has been a lot of turmoil and difficulty in the relationship with India. India is a country that the new government is eager to win over. Therefore diplomatic preparations for this visit had already begun. Such interactions were started between the two neighbors to emphasize the need of a relationship that is balanced.

Nilambar Acharya has been chosen by the Oli government as Nepal's ambassador to India in 2018. He has stated that if Indian Prime Minister Modi honestly accepts the EPG report, relations between Nepal and India will advance gradually and steadily. He says he's on the right path. This would be a significant step in furthering the mutually beneficial relationship between Nepal and India and preventing Indian influence and ensuing political upheavals in Nepal.

Over time, the friendship that once existed between these two neighbors has cooled. The debate makes it evident that New Delhi must exercise extreme vigilance to prevent giving in to China, Nepal, and India's increasingly aggressive, unfriendly, and confrontational socio-economic policies. Over the next 10 to 20 years, we must greatly strengthen our socio-cultural relations before we can begin cooperating to establish solid strategic, geopolitical, and diplomatic ties. Prime Minister Oli was eager to elevate Nepal-India relations, as was evident during his visit to India in 2018. Nonetheless, India will need to develop cooperatively, eschewing interventionist diplomacy based on IR idealism for coexistence.

Following his second inauguration as prime minister, PM Oli's next official travel will take place from April 6 to 8, 2018, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit on May 11, 2018. He claimed that collaboration is being

built between India and Nepal. Ramayan Circuit, a reliable hub for bilateral personal engagement. Prime Minister Modi stated during a public welcome at the Ram Janaki Temple in Janakpur that India and Nepal will work to develop the "Ramayan" circuit between the two countries, as suggested by IR experts in constructive theory. Ayodhya and Janakpur are related. It is a historical turning point that will provide the groundwork for close interpersonal ties between the two nations. It is a historic moment as the basis for strong personal contact between the two countries." (First Post, 2018, May11)The Prime Minister noted close and similar cultural ties and the two countries share strong ties. To illustrate close tie between Nepal-India First Post (2018, May 11) described:

We are grateful that on behalf of his Nepali counterpart, K.P. Sharma Oli, whom Modi greeted as "Bhai Sahab" (my brother), accompanied him to the Janakpur temple." I am thrilled to be here in Janakpur. To show respect for Mata Janaki and King Janak, I'm here. Prime Minister Modi stressed that his reception in the Himalayan country showed the love of the people of Nepal for the people of India as a big crowd gathered for the public reception.

The Nepal-India Friendship Bus Service (Ramayan Circuit Bus Service), which runs from Janakpur to Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, was jointly launched by the two prime ministers after they had conversed. "Tourism is increasing rapidly over the world," the prime minister stated in reference to the Janakpur and Ayodhya bus route, "The Ramayan Circuit is quite promising" (First post, 2018, May 11).When he arrived at the Ram Janaki Temple, Prime Minister Oli and other dignitaries from Nepal met him at the temple gates. He then worshiped at the temple, where a queue of local performers had assembled to greet the two prime ministers. Then they went to see Lord Ram, Janaki Devi, and Lord Sharigram's shrines together. Along with temple performers, Prime Minister Modi sang local religious melodies.

The two prime ministers were seen getting along with one another. Then, a member of Modi's Temple Panel made a help offer to him. He was given a souvenir that featured a religious environment. According to scholars of constructivist theory of international relations, Modi attempted to win over the trust of Nepali people. The relationship between Nepal and India is examined in

the next chapter through an examination of India's impact on Nepal's political developments between 1990 and 2020 AD as indicated for the purposes of this study.

CHAPTER-VII

ROLE OF INDIA IN POLITICAL CHANGES OF NEPAL

(1990 -2020)

7.1 India's Role in 1990's Political Change (During and After)

Geographically, Nepal, which has a total area of 147516 square kilometer is situated between China and India and has excelled in its role as a pious land connecting two burgeoning Asian superpowers. Some academics contend that in order for Nepal to avoid economic setbacks and deal with ongoing political instability, it must abandon this buffer zone attitude (K.C; & Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 175–196).

Moreover (K.C. & Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 175–196) explained that Nepal should be concerned about the security of her two neighbors for geopolitical reasons. Additionally, Nepal must show that it is a linked nation while still attempting to benefit economically as much as possible from being a landlocked nation. King Birendra reportedly declined Gandhi's invitation to breakfast, according to Crossette (1993). They turned out to be more resistant to Indian pressure than New Delhi had thought (pp. 112-113). In this context, Crossette, (1993) described:

The foregoing fact, in the author's opinion, suggests that there were two opposing viewpoints on the 1989 crisis. Nepal, a sovereign nation, was attempting to exercise its rights while India was attempting to arbitrate on Nepali political developments. (pp.111-112)

Beijing, on the other hand, "is extremely silent on public criticism of India's aggressiveness against its neighbors." Following the crises of 1989–1990, a political movement, known as mass movement I (1990), arose that called for multi-party democracy. According to Crossette, "the suffering persisted for a year, and some of it was publicly condoned by Indian politicians who travelled to Nepal and made public remarks against royalists" (1993, p. 113). Moreover, Crossette (1993) explained, "In early 1990, as Crossette (1993) posited, "The political crisis peaked in street demonstrations suppressed by royal

government, with the Nepali left and the India's press greatly inflating the causalities for world consumption" (P.112).

Since 1990, politically aware Nepalis have understood New Delhi's occult influence over the country's multi-party system (Upadhya, 2020, p. 106).

According to Shah (2004), on March 31, 1990, New Delhi handed the King a draft treaty to sign in exchange for a chance to lessen pressure on the struggling government. This was a very fragile movement (p. 204). According to Shah (2004), the four constraints on Nepal were the bases of the treaty proposal. They were:

- a) Nepal would not import arms and raise additional military units without India's approval
- b) Nepal would not enter into military alliance with any other country
- c) India's companies would be given first preferences in any economic or industrial projects in Nepal, and
- d) India's exclusive involvement would be ensured in the exploitation of commonly shared rivers in Nepal (p.205).

Subedi (2017) mentioned: "King Birendra was wise to sense India's broader aims and was able to defuse the situation by giving powers to his own people rather than agreeing to India's draft agreement designed to limit Nepal's freedom of action" (p.9). It is clear from the aforementioned occurrences that the nationalist leadership was categorically unable to tolerate this kind of Indian involvement. King Birendra could have extended his independent Panchayat rule for decades by adopting this plan, but he chose to make a deal with the leaders who were then in disarray rather than submit to India (Pradhan, 2019, January 2). In light of the aforementioned realities, India has somewhat pressured Nepal in terms of its foreign policy by restricting its ability to use geopolitics to expand outside of its immediate boundaries. In this connection Muni (1992, p. 166) explained:

The Janta Dal administration supported Nepal's democratic movement. Striking proof of this support was evident when members from the Janata DAL, CPM, CPI, and Janata Party joined a Congress (I) representative to show their support for the anti-panchayat movement.

The Muni (1992) has also observed that during the period of January 18–29, 1990, leaders from India chose to visit to Kathmandu in order to formally introduce a movement to restore multi-party democracy (p. 166). Then, when Indian officials sided with Nepali political parties, the pro-democracy movement in Nepal gathered steam. It has been denounced, nonetheless, as an intrusion into Nepal's internal affairs by India. The democratic peace theory contends that as India is the largest democracy in the world and the dominating regional force in South Asia, it should foster democracy among its neighbors. The record of efforts to advance democracy in the region thus far is, at best, mixed, and New Delhi has no formal policies in this regard (Destradi, 2011, June 24, online).

Given that India prioritizes its ideal government over democracy in the area, facts demonstrate that its policy of regime change in South Asia is flawed. In addition, considering their disparate territory and population, locations, and economic and military prowess, Nepal and India are asymmetrical friends. According to IR's spheres of influence theory, India may be firmly classified as a "regional power" in South Asia dealing with outlying nations.

7.2 Maoist Insurgency and India

India blatantly backed authoritarian regimes in the past, including Sri Lanka in 2009. In addition, India's contribution to the current "wave" of democratic efforts in the South Asian region has been minimal, if any. India is constantly ready to use its clout in Nepal in exchange for backing for political reform. One way to repay India for its help with the anti-Panchayat regime is through the formation of special security ties between New Delhi and Kathmandu in June 1990 (Singh, 2016, p. 128).

The events might indicate that India's strategy for advancing democracy has changed. India made allegations to topple the monarchy and was a key player in the 2004–2008 restoration of democracy in the neighboring nation (Josse, 2020, p. 416). From this perspective, Ghimire (2020, June 24) viewed that India has long played a role in Nepal's domestic affairs and is essentially the only outside actor. When India formally oversaw Nepal's transition from a Hindu kingdom to a secular republic, it sparked a chain of events that cost India its influence and allies in Nepal.

Ghimire's (2020, June 24) critique of India's 2006 assumption that the Maoists represented the new state office and that placing them at the core of democracy would prolong the struggle led to this conclusion. He claimed that everything was fine. Given what has been said that Gopalman Shrestha, the head of the NC, was one of the eight individuals to sign the 12-point agreement (paragraph 8). Lalit Man Singh, a former diplomat and minister of foreign affairs, refuted the claims. Although India has played a highly positive role in Nepali politics, Puspa Kamal Dahal has publicly denounced that position since Madhav Kumar Nepal's administration was formed and toppled in 2010 (Ghimire, 2020, June 24, para. 8). In this sense, Anderson (2004, March) mentioned:

K.V. Rajan claims that "India would never anticipate the Maoists continuing to use violence in Nepal to further their ideological goals. In contrast to the past, he also promised that the Nepalese Maoists will show a genuine commitment to multi-party democracy".

Since only India will acknowledge them as proponents of multiparty democracy, Government of India decided anti-government Maoists to give up violence and settle disputes through peaceful means of settling it. Here, India's two pronged strategy to appear Maoist is also evident. Moreover, Upadhyya (2020) has claimed that, "Maoist supremo Prachanda was staging the final battles of the insurgency out of safe houses in and around India's national capital region" (P.106).

A former royal assistant released a book bomb nine years after the sad assassination of Nepal's King Birendra, alleging foreign forces may have been behind the incident. Two days before the slain king turned 65, the accusations were presented in a spectacular way on his private network chat program on Monday night. General Vivek Shah, a former Military Secretary of the King (Place), claims in his autobiography *Maile Dekheko Darbar* (The palace I saw) (Upadhyya, 2020) that India opposed the fact that Nepal has more sophisticated weapons than its own and that New Delhi also arranged for the training of Monarchist-leaning Maoist rebels against the provided weapons. India was worried about what would happen if the Maoists acquired such cutting-edge weapons.

Shah said that during King Birendra and Gyanadhra's journey to India; Indian politicians had put pressure on him to buy weapons from native Indians at "friendly" prices. Later, India provided the Insas Rifle to the Nepali army at a 70% subsidy (Pandey, 2072, pp. 544-605). On this basis, Josse (2020) claimed that the Nepal army intends to progressively swap out Indian SLRs for American M-16s, adding that "Indians do not like it, but they can not do much about it" (p.421). In this regard, He writes that India clearly opposes foreign forces operating in and around Nepal, as per Hast's IR spheres of influence theory. India aims to dominate the region alone. Girija Prasad Koirala, the head of the NC, agitated against the US. Speaking to party members, he criticized "foreign forces," saying that it was impossible to "empower the King by publishing remarks to sideline the democratic forces" (p. 421).

Additionally, Girija Prasad Koirala and Madhav Kumar Nepal tried to obstruct this effort by following the Phantom's "outside forces" (Josse, 2020, p. 422). Therefore, our escorts were in charge of transporting foreign troops into Nepal, whether they were coming from India or from other nations. A group of armed police officers claimed that locals and instructors had informed them that other parties were also receiving training at the same location. The two pronged South Asian policy of India was showed that India had trained Bangladesh's Mukti Sena as well as Tamil tigers at the same location. It is said that he learned about the circumstance from a senior police officer, and he made an effort to learn the truth. King asked to quit this immediately owing to pressure from India (Everest Sanchar. 2021, January 29).

The Maoists have been forced into a corner because of the long-standing tie. The Nepali Maoist authorities took a harsh stance against the dissident Maoists who wanted to relocate to India. To dispel up any misunderstanding over Maoist rebels, Foreign Minister Rao Indrajit Singh dispatched assistance to screens (Press Trust of India, 2005, July 23). Not in the Nepalese highlands, but rather in the streets of New Delhi, was the pivotal struggle (Rose, 1971, p. 194). Regarding the significant dialogue that is typical in India on the issue of Nepal, Rose's scenario is still valid.

New Delhi maintained that the Madhesi people, who shared a similar obstinacy with some of India's population, were discriminated against by Nepal's new constitution. It has been charged with enforcing an unofficial economic blockade in Kathmandu, which is said to have contributed to the worsening of bilateral ties toward the year's conclusion (Mishra, 2019, August 27).

Sijapati (2020, February 10) asserts that an Indian intelligence agency by the name of Research and Analysis Wings (RAW) micromanages Nepal's politics both during the war and after the 2001 Royal Palace massacre in order to gain fresh perspectives into a world of eerie evenings and fog. In order to ostensibly weaken nationalist forces, Shyam Saran contends that India assisted in integrating refractory Maoists into mainstream national politics.

Furthermore, he (2020, February 10) describes that by 2005, the King had publicly endorsed New Delhi's adoption of his two-pronged ideology in support of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. However, when this proved to be problematic, Delhi joined the Maoists in the Seven-Party Alliance and Maoist (also known as "SPAM"). From the 1950 treaty to the 2015 blockade, Saran claims that the relationship between Nepal and India during these tumultuous years is evidence of India's ongoing meddling in Nepal's domestic affairs.

Any of the several political interests in Nepal that are pursued by Indian politicians may be affected. The Himalayan area continues to be considered by Delhi as a "buffer zone," which limits external influence from nations and international organizations that are perceived as being Western-oriented as well as from competing neighbors. In the same vein, Naazer (2012, March) mentioned:

India's engagement in domestic affairs in Nepal has been a repeating phenomenon throughout its history, given its backing for, either overtly or secretly, dissident political parties, militant democratic movements, armed rebels, terrorists, and insurgents for various causes.

Additionally, like in 1951, India subverted many governments in Nepal using armed groups. On occasion, like in 1950, India even imposed "unjust and unequal" treaties on the waning Kathmandu government. Delhi also made several

attempts to modify the debt regime. This assertion is supported by the reign since 1950 as King Tribhuvan, his reign as NC since 1990, and their support of India.

Conflicts and Maoist uprisings had a long history in Nepali politics. The poor members of a population attracted to revolutionary beliefs were generally disenfranchised as a result of socio-economic disparity, horizontal inequality, injustice, and a repressive economic and political system. Following the communist takeover of China's neighbor, socialist and communist tendencies became more pronounced in Nepal's politics. The idea of a "people's war" appealed to the Maoists, who also resented New Delhi's influence over and interference in Nepal's affairs as well as the enforcement of multiple unfair treaties on Kathmandu (Muni, 2010). It is also claimed that a number of Indo-Nepal treaties were opposed, and India continued to meddle in Nepal's internal affairs, which led to the development of strong nationalist-minded politics in Nepal, notably for the left movement, which finally gave rise to the Maoist insurgency.

The government was given an immediate deadline to comply with 40 demands. The removal of the "unjust" clause from the 1950 treaty, the Kosi (1954), the Gandak (1959), the Tanakpur accords (1991), and the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River Treaty of 1996 were all directly related to India, while the two agreements that were related to the India-Nepal "unequal and unjust" agreement were also directly related to India (Mishra, 2004, pp. 334–36).

The role played by India throughout this phase was much in doubt, as was the nature of New Delhi's alliance with the Maoists. The Maoists started the People's War in the name of Nepali nationalism. It had utilized the Indian borderlands as a sanctuary. Training camps for Maoist fighters were situated in border regions, Baburam Bhattarai and other top leaders were given a safe haven, and injured rebels were typically treated in hospitals (Josse, 2020, p.425). Secret stocks of weapons were maintained, and its commanders conducted regular meetings throughout India (Upreti, 2010, pp. 211–25). Under the protection of Indian security forces, some even moved freely (Mishra, 2004, pp. 338–339) as a "gratitude anti-Indian sentiment" in among the Maoist gradually softened (336-42). Shyam Saran, however, refuted India's

backing for the Maoists. Both Nepal and India share responsibility for this issue (Josse, 2020, p. 428). However, The US ambassador to Nepal, J.F. Moriarty, claims that Maoist rebels in Nepal are smuggling weapons from India (p. 437).

The majority of New Delhi did not cooperate with Kathmandu to confirm Maoist activities or share intelligence, despite the fact that the Indian government sometimes detained Maoists and sent them over to Nepal. Publicly supporting the Nepalese Maoists were some nonprofit actors, mainly on the left. The authorities in charge of security have been accused of failing to take any action. The Nepali government raised the issue at the highest levels, but aside from the sporadic supply of weapons and approval of assistance, Kathmandu sought Washington and London for cooperation with its counter-insurgency efforts (Upreti, 2010, pp. 210–221).

Finally, India was crucial in building coalitions with the Maoists and other organizations to overthrow the monarchy. New Delhi dealt with them quite successfully, but King Gyanendra was less astute. In response to New Delhi's indignation over the king's numerous policies, the Maoists and the SPA formed an alliance to come to the 12-point agreement that was signed in November 2005. In the end, India overthrew the monarchy in Nepal based on the geopolitical and realism theories of IR. India's influence and position in the accord were vital (Upreti, 2010, p. 221-225). Some people believe that because "foreign forces" were actively involved in Nepal's political events, India's fears have grown. In this connection, Mishra (2004) mentioned, "India utilized Maoists as a negotiating chip and to maintain a condition of perpetual terror in Nepal. The tight regulations have undermined the contentious India-Nepal accord" (p. 645).

In order to weaken Washington's influence over Nepalese affairs and boost its own, New Delhi utilized its Maoist connections to demand the departure of its American advisers (Mishra, 2004, p. 640; & Josse, 2020, p. 255). Nepal, a vital section of the frontier and a Delhi ally, is found in the geopolitically delicate Himalayan region that borders Tibet. India is extremely susceptible to political and social changes in Nepal because of their shared open borders, connected populations, and common rivers (Lima, 2014).

The new democratic and federalized secular republic of Nepal is the result of the 2006 peace agreement that put an end to decades of Maoist "People's War." Delhi has viewed this upheaval with what appears to be ambivalence, although its interactions with Nepal have consistently been driven by security considerations rather than democratic or other ideological considerations.

7.3 India and Its Neighbors

India's regional policy has consistently been strongly impacted by domestic and external security concerns, although being frequently passive and hindered by factional disagreements. Its forceful pursuit of those interests has frequently been viewed by smaller neighbors as invasive and domineering, and as a result, it frequently backfires by leading to non-cooperation. From this perspective, Malhotra (2014, March 6) mentioned, "The idea of the "big brother," from the divisive border controls in Bangladesh and the unfairness in the two countries' trade dealings to the civil war in Sri Lanka and India's military engagement" (para 11).

Relationships between Nepal and India have also been impacted, as suggested by the IR dependency theory, with dependency and India's engagement causing the Nepali political classes to become more resentful. At bilateral discussions, the growing trade deficit is undoubtedly a worry. New Delhi has grown more sensitive to the region's reputation as a result of its awareness of the detrimental effects of this impression. Similar to the replacement, the removal of the ostensibly undemocratic pro-India Prime Minister Nasheed was met by an Indian response that seemed only natural (diplomatically promoting discussion).

Delhi was prepared to intervene in Bhutan's issue as well under some circumstances. In contrast to the Maoists in Nepal the strong line taken against Bhutanese groups seeking democracy within Indian Territory. This demonstrates Delhi's readiness to aid in the undemocratic Thimphu's upkeep while closely collaborating on the latter's security and placing a greater priority on preserving its spheres of influence.

A democratic India is likely to adopt a democratic foreign policy, particularly regionally, given the probability of similar interstate cordial ties. Given its lofty goals and concerns about its security and reputation, India should

avoid the heavy-handedness associated with Western interventionism (Mohan, 2006). Additionally, Delhi is averse to having India's democracy internationally contested, despite the fact that it is functioning. So long as it does not jeopardize security, democracy is cautiously accepted in public. Thus, pro-democracy, albeit hesitantly, might be interpreted as India's regional strategy (Destradi, 2011, June 24).

India is unquestionably the most powerful country in South Asia, but it has had difficulty playing a fully hegemonic regional role, especially in the face of rivalry from Pakistan and the powerful East Asian country i. e., China. In view of this geopolitical position, India aspired to collaborate with its neighbors to establish a strong government. In such a circumstance, how could Nepal avoid India's concerns?

In this case, Nepal urged that a new location be selected rather than urging a boycott of a Delhi, according to Pradhan (2018, September 24). Islamabad also expressed low faith in its capacity to host the summit. In March of this year, Nepal took the lead in attempts to reintegrate Pakistan into the SAARC alliance. The statement made it obvious that, in light of a changed geopolitical environment, Nepal's India policy was moving in a new path. India should try to foster trust and uphold a relationship based on equal sovereignty if it wants to keep its good relations with Nepal. Delhi does not seem to have a long-term plan for India to really implement the "neighborhood first" policy underlined in the BJP platform, even though the reality does not appear to be as portrayed. It has been said that Nepal's posture toward New Delhi is blatantly opportunistic, soliciting its assistance when necessary and criticizing it when China approaches.

India's foreign policy toward the countries of South Asia is centered on acting to further its own interests (First Post, May 11, 2018). India, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh continue to have good relations. At the event on May 26, relations with the other South Asian countries present did not go smoothly. The two countries' ties have had their own ups and downs, as well as sporadic times of stability, and later in India, Mahindra Rajapakse and Modi met in New Delhi.

Additionally, it should be recalled that the previous leader charged India with meddling in Colombo's affairs prior to the 2015 presidential election. This

demonstrated India's clear involvement in the political reform of South Asian nations. And how can Nepal leave the domain of independent foreign policy?

Bipin Rawat, the secretary of the army, stated in September 2018 that geographical considerations prevented Nepal and Bhutan from being cut off from India. He told the reporters that accepting Chinese aid was merely a temporary measure. He stated that all nations seeking economic growth should be bilateral or multilateral in his remarks at the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technological and Economic Cooperation's (BIMSTIC-MILEX 18) concluding ceremony and field military drills. It is necessary to conduct inter-exploration in accordance with the cooperative method. China has wealth and employs it (Rawat, 2018).

First Post (May 11, 2018) writes that nations requesting such aid would quickly discover that nothing is given for free. These relationships are all merely transitory, and they will all inevitably alter when the global socio-economic environment changes. He was well aware of China's potential as a rival. Everything is based on the state of the economy. There is competition since they are looking for markets and the Nepalis are looking for the same markets. So the winner of the race is whoever performs best. In order to improve member state collaboration in the fight against terrorism, only 5 of the 7 Member States participated in the exercise this year (2018), namely India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan. However, Nepal declined to participate in this drill after its military force denied participating. Actually, Prime Minister KP Oli's resolute attitude was what enabled us to reduce India's influence over Nepal and Nepali politics. From this perspective, Bhattarai (Interview, November 11, 2018) opined:

Independent politics found a clear path after the 2018 federal elections, when the CPN alliance formed the majority government. However, given Nepal's geographic location, which is split between India and China, the country must maintain a balanced relationship with both of these countries.

After Mass Movement II, the political system in Nepal was in shambles, and India began to influence even the tiniest things, according to Gurung (Interview, February 14, 2019). The failure of CA I has further shifted India's

place in Nepali politics. He (February 14, 2019) further claimed that when India's influence increased, China backed Nepal. Sushil Koirala, the country's prime minister, also remained devoted to his own objectives and was able to enact a constitution. After the present constitution was adopted, it is said that Nepal's politics changed. Prime Minister Oli was now pursuing an independent political trajectory in Nepal in the hopes of achieving rapid economic growth through connectivity rather than reliance. While PM Khadga Prasad Oli's trips to Nepal's southern neighbor may have justified this, it was closely watched for a number of reasons at the national and regional levels, with great hopes that certain unresolved issues with India would be resolved (Bhattarai, 2018, April 10). In this sense, he (2018, April 10) opined, "P.M. Oli gave emphasis on "resetting and redesigning" relation with India which revising or scrapping the treaty 1950 that has served as the bedrock of bilateral relation since 1950".

In addition, Prime Minister Oli stressed the importance of economic diplomacy and development with the aim of "a Prosperious Nepal and happy Nepalis." First, a new conversation was started by his visit to New Delhi. India must respect the independence of Nepal. One of the fundamental principles of bilateral ties is respect for one another, therefore India should not meddle in Nepal's domestic issues or become alarmed by China's increasing investment there (Panda, 2016, March 23).

First, it might exert pressure on the Narendra Modiled government in India to cooperate with him and to normalize relations with Nepal on the basis of these ideals. Second, it appears that PM Khadga Prasad Oli made it obvious to India that he wished to support economic growth and prosperity. Geopolitics must be included when analyzing development (Panda, 2016, March 23). India, meanwhile, did not want to relinquish its influence over Nepali politics. It refers to Nepal's compulsion in trade and transit and applies constructivist theory under the term of "Roti-Beti Rista," or dependency theory.

7.4 Peace Process of Nepal and India's Role

As the democratic movement grew impatient, the CPN (Maoist) started the People's War against the Hindu monarchy in 1996 (Hutt, 2004). With the

promise of gradual change, they gained support, especially among marginalized communists in poorer districts (Whelpton, 2005). Delhi publicly backed Nepal's monarchy during the majority of the conflict while decrying "terrorism" by the Maoists (GoI 2002, Point 6).

Maintaining the "two pillars" of a constitutional monarchy and a multi-party democracy, according to Delhi, is the best course of action for maintaining political stability (Destradi, 2011, June 24, online; Saran, 2017, p. 158). India, meanwhile, exhibited flexible diplomacy embraced the aspirations of its people, and renounced its "two pillar mantra" (Rae, 2021, p. 42; Saran, 2017, p. 162; & Josse, 2020, p. 427). As a result, the military of India and other forces, particularly the military of the United States, effectively provided continued support for the RNA through the provision of equipment and training (Josse, 2020, p. 417).

King Gyanendra's increasingly anti-democratic actions drew a swift rebuke from Delhi, which feared the monarchy would resort to other measures given the geopolitical sensitivity between India and China. Delhi's consistent anti-Maoist stance was driven by Naxalite relations in addition to the threat they posed to a friendly government. Gyanendra's administration gravely harmed democracy after Birendra died in the 2001 tragedy (Saran, 2017, p. 155). Delhi began attempting to include the Maoists politically as the autocratic monarchy's hold eroded as early as 2002, openly supporting the monarchy but linking it with rebels and parliamentary parties. It made easier for them to have a private conversation. Indeed, throughout the struggle, Indian officials maintained their opposition to the monarchy (pp. 158–160).

It's significant that a Maoist leader likes were permitted to dwell safely in Indian Territory (Baral, 2012; & Josse, 2020, p. 425). Mission Raw and the Maoists formed a strategic alliance. Notably, a significant Maoist figure during the 2005 negotiations was the future prime minister Baburam Bhattarai (Adhikari, 2011, October 21). Due to these parallel approaches to the issue, the Indian government was to offer Nepali actors a comfortable and private forum for negotiations. The Indian government took pains to avoid labeling this as "arbitration," which suggests undue engagement. However, these discussions

ultimately helped to achieve the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2006, which ended Gyanendra's tenure. Delhi thus had a significant impact on the peace talks.

7.4.1 The Peace Process after Mass Movement II (2006) and India

Delhi publicly argued for the creation of an inclusive democratic government for a negotiated settlement, with the monarchy and RNA on one side and popular support from India on the other. In fact, diplomatic cables show that this was secretly thought very soon after the Gyanendra's arms purchase (Narayan, 2011, May 1). He (2011, May 1) further asserted that Delhi thought this was the greatest choice for the establishment of Nepal. Due to an unsustainable monarchy, parliamentary parties, widespread mobilization, the RNA, and entrenched Maoist rebels, Nepal was on the verge of institutional collapse.

Similar to this, India's "two pillars" strategy was rendered useless because the columns were no longer able to sustain one another. King Gyanendra was consequently compelled to reinstate parliament in April 2006. It is possible to see Delhi's ostensible change in strategy as a "predictive attempt to stabilize Nepal" (Destradi, 2011, June 24 online). India reaffirmed its commitment to backing whatever the Nepali people might choose (p. 158).

However, as shown by its actions in Nepal, there are fundamental inconsistencies between Indian foreign policy doctrine and practice. The UNMIN (Nepal Mission) was founded in January 2007 with the very narrow mandates of overseeing the peace process and assisting with elections (Suhrke, 2009). There has been criticism of the general approach toward the peace process as a result of Delhi's relatively equivocal stance with UNMIN and other foreign actors.

However, there were strained Maoist relations between Nepal and India in 2009 and 2010. President Ram Baran Yadav and Prime Minister Prachanda had a falling out, and Prachanda resigned as prime minister in May 2009. Conflicts between political parties stopped being an immediate threat to Nepal and could be seen as Delhi finding a safe place to put pressure on the Maoists without running the risk of significant destabilization.

After Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai was named prime minister in late 2011, talks between the Maoists and India and the Madhesi party were at a standstill. It was a widely recognized choice for both Delhi and the Maoists. Despite sometimes being reactive rather than proactive, Delhi's efforts had consistently been geared toward bringing stability to Nepal, which is riven by strife.

It is possible to see Delhi's cooperation with the dissident Maoists during the conflict as an effort to influence its impulsive and more reliant neighbors. Despite the impasse in negotiations, the peace process made significant progress in the first few months of 2012, with Indian diplomatic personnel playing a crucial role in encouraging more direct communication between the sides (The Times of India, 2013, April 13).

In order to balance Maoist vote rights, India wanted the United Madhesi Political Force (UMPF). With Mohan Baidiya Kiran in charge, the Maoists broke apart, criticizing Prachanda's dovish demeanor and the installation of the Khil Raj Regmi government, which was blamed as product of India's influence. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, he emphasizes the value of Delhi's past and present in advancing the peace process. India should alter the Maoist view of itself as being "distant," it is even suggested. This unmistakably shows that Delhi's practical involvement strengthened relations with Maoist leaders and would thus likely be sustained strategically.

7.5 Different Madesh Movements and India's Concern

Since 1990, the term "Madhesi" has gained widespread acceptance as a designation for Nepalese people with Indian cultural roots (Gellner, 2019). Although the term "Madhesi" etymologically refers to the Madhesh people, the Hill Nepalis (the pahadis) use it politically to refer to "non-pahadis having plains languages as their mother tongue, regardless of their place of birth or domicile" (Crisis Group Asian, 2007, July 9, p. 2). After 1990, the term "Madhesi" came to be extensively used to refer to Nepali nationals with an Indian cultural background (Gellner, 2019).

7.5.1 Indian Immigration to the Terai of Nepal

Indians were encouraged to settle in the eastern Terai by the Shah monarchs of Nepal starting in the late 18th century by providing different subsidies to incoming settlers. Following catastrophic flooding of the Kosi River and ensuing drought in the 1770s and 1780s, famine-stricken Bihari farmers moved to Tarai, Nepal (Hachhethu, 2007). The ratio between farmers and laborers was very high starting in 1846 and lasting through the Rana dynasty's control until 1950. Between 1933 and 1966, they immigrated from at least 21 different Indian ethnic groups, settling primarily in the Terai region of eastern Nepal.

In addition, the Nepali Citizenship Act was passed in 1950, enabling all immigrants who had lived in Nepal for at least five years to become citizens of the country. According to the Citizenship Act of 1963, foreigners who could read and write Nepali and conducted business were eligible to become citizens of Nepal. The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMoFA), claimed that there were over 3.2 million persons of Indian origin residing in Nepal in 1981, with about 2.4 million of them having acquired Nepalese citizenship. The Nepali Citizenship Act was changed in 2006 to allow anyone who were born before 1990 and currently reside in Nepal to be granted citizenship. Citizenship documents have been given out to over 2.3 million people. However, the issue that Madhesi face has yet to be fixed.

Yadav (Interview, August 12, 2021) observed Bedananda Jha formally addressing the Madhesh issue during Panchayat rule (Terai Congress Party). Later, Gajendra Narayan Singh founded Nepal Sadbhavana Party in 1990 and Sadbhawana Parisad before 1982, but because of India's divide-and-rule strategy, it was a political party with a limited platform centred in Madhesh.

The attraction of Madhesi leaders to prestige and power has also continually been a significant element in the demise of Madhesi-based political parties. India's assistance with Nepal's political changes always has a favorable outcome, but meddling in Nepal's internal affairs ought to be viewed with disrespect as an act of "gratitude."

7.5.1.1 Madhesh Movement I

Several Madhesi organizations have supported the aspirations of the Madhesis throughout the years, with varying degrees of success, notably Vedananda Jha's Nepal Terai Conference and Gajendra Narayan Singh's Sadbhavana Party (Rae, 2021, p. 45). In the southern Nepali plains in 2007, the first Madhesh movement began. When the mainstream political parties and the then-seven-party coalition of CPN Maoists simultaneously promulgated the interim constitution in 2007, the beginnings of the first Maoist movement were utterly disregarded. The federalist idea was the preferred political platform for the Madhesi and other oppressed people (pp. 45–47).

Rae (2021) argues that a group of Madhesi activists working for the Maddeshi Janaadhikar Forum-Nepal, then a social intellectual NGO, led by Upendra Yadav, burned a copy of the interim law of the Maitigarh Mandala, which was allegedly destroyed in Kathmandu (p. 46). "Madesh Movement I" was sparked as a result. They are to blame for the Constitution's blatant disregard for the demands for federalism and equitable representation made by the Madhesi and other oppressed communities. In the public conversation about national restructuring, it introduced ethnonationalism. The initial Madesh movement was succeeded. Yadav, Dhakal and Yadav (Interview, August 12, 2021 & September 8, 2021, respectively) opined, "Terai-Madheshi people and their leaders went on the lap of India that spurred Madhesh uprisings" because it was their readings that they were suppressed under Hilly-Khas-dominated Brahmin's rule.

Therefore, the Madhesh movement was the outcome of all these ethnic groups' discontent with the Nepali government. It had supported the settlement and legal rights of the Indian Madheshi people in Terai Madhesh, Nepal.

7.5.1.2 Madhesh Movement II

The Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party, the Sadbhavana Party led by Rajendra Mahato, and the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum Nepal jointly launched the second Madhesh Movement in 2008. It demanded electoral constituencies based on population, proportional representation, and federalism. A temporary constitution was later adopted and three main agendas were presented. The

Madhesi Party collectively formed their three political platforms for this movement. This covered federal elections, proportional representation, and election constituency based on population. Federalism was later inserted into the constitution as a result of violent demonstrations.

In this context, Rea (2021) asserts that on February 8, 2008, the United Madhesi Democratic Front, a coalition of Madhesi parties, and the Government of Nepal, led by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, met in the presence of Madav Kumar Nepal, the head of the CPN (UML), and Maoist Chairman Prachanda, and reached an eight-point agreement. (p.46)

Given the foregoing, it is evident that India encouraged Nepal to grant it adequate room to have an impact on Nepal's politics and administration and to settle local issues. Actually, all of this is a result of our politicians and bureaucrats' ineffective management of good government, Baral (4 April, 2019) opined.

7.5.1.3 Madhesh Movement III

Despite social transformation initiatives, the Madhesi people endured brutality and inequality. While none of these issues were addressed in the 2015 Nepali Constitution, the 2008 Interim Constitution made sure that the demands of the Madhesi were taken into account. In this sense, Rae (2021) argues, "Following the promulgation of the Constitution in September 2015, the Madhesis intensified their protests in the Terai, particularly in the area between Nepal and India" (p. 81).

Influential Nepalese voices started accusing India, alleging that India was driving the Madhesi uprisings, namely the border dispute. India is "paying regard to its constitution" with respect to Nepal. The idea that India just "noted" the Constitution but did not support it was becoming more widely held in Nepal. In this circumstance, Yadav (Interview, 2021, August 12) argued, "Mainstream political parties wanted to pass a new constitution without specifying the number and boundaries of states. As a result, protests erupted on the southern plains, with more than 50 people killed in violent clashes."

The Third Madesh movement was sparked by the unjust formation of the seven federal states under the new constitution. Only 8 Terai districts

obtained provincial status, whereas the other 14 districts were from hilly regions, and this was seen unfair. The Hilly Brahman and Chhetri-based political system's harsh politics have caused the Madhesi to implore the Indian government for assistance in the fight for their rights (Rae, 2021, p. 44). This is why it is natural, and it cannot be said that Indian presence in Madhesh constitutes meddling.

A principle that had already been secured by the 2008 Nepal Interim Constitution was reinstated by the 2015 Nepal Constitution. The new constitution falls short of Nepal's Interim Constitution of 2007 in several other areas. The issue of proportionate representation or participation in all governmental institutions is the most glaring one among all the flaws (Yadav, 2010). This led to the third Madhesi Movement in Nepal (Nayak, 2011, October). In this context, Malla (2017) mentioned:

The Madhesi and Tharus continue to face opposition notwithstanding the first constitutional reforms. The Terai region, which borders the neighboring country of India, has come under influence as a result of discontent among Madhesi leaders and their supporters. People who felt like they were being watched expressed displeasure with the constitution and said they would reject it until their worries were addressed. (pp. 45-46)

The Nepalese Constitution (2015), which underwent its second revision, aimed to stifle the politics of inclusion and proportionality, which were among the primary demands of the Madhesi demonstrators. The Madhesh based Party disagreed with this amendment. The amendment of the constitution was also confusing because the rights of the Madhesi people were not made clear. The Constitution states that 45% (Panday, 2019, February 19) of all positions in state institutions and civil officials go to 17 categories, including minoritized groups, Muslims, the underclass, gender and secular minorities, youth, farmers, workers, the downtrodden, and residents of underdeveloped areas (Gellner, 2019).

The issue with this development is that the "young" and traditionally marginalized populations like the Madhesi and the "Khas Arya," upper-caste communities in the hill country, already dictate policy. It fell under the general heading of being subjective. In an interview with a key informant on August 12,

2021, R. Yadav asserted that "the movement and its rise since the Madheshis have been ill recognized by the political elites of the hill and they face prejudice."

In addition, the Madhesi are now advocating for "human-centered nationalism." It is defined from the bottom up rather than by the hills' political elite. They disapprove of nationalist movements that are concentrated on the state and on the hills. They demand acknowledgement of their ethnicity, nationalism, and contribution to Nepal's economic growth. According to contributions and needs, they aim to redistribute resources.

7.5.2 India in Terai-Madhesh

Politicians from India continued to work to protect their strategic interests in Nepal's Terai after the 2008 elections for the Constituent Assembly. These interests included hydropower, development projects, business, and trade. India had been accused of inciting undesirable conflict in Nepal's Terai by backing the 2015 blockade of the country in an effort to exert political control. (RSTV. 2015, December 7)

The blockade imposed by India led to a serious humanitarian situation in Nepal. India refuted these accusations, blaming the Madhesi Party for border tensions and internal unrest in Nepal, while Kathmandu claims the problem was necessary to advance "stability and tranquility" in the Terai region and "uninterrupted trade" (Jaiswal, 2016). However, Jha (2012) opined that the Madhesi movement was not created in India. Over time, certain members of India's ruling class sponsored minor Madhesi groupings, much like other politicians in Nepal, but these groups lacked a solid organizational base and the general public was never urged to be the center of attention (p. 345).

However, it is also alleged, particularly among Nepalis in Kathmandu, that India fostered and nurtured the Tarai extremists. India's role in the mainstream Madhesi political system ranged from shaping its shape to affecting intra-party dynamics, helping certain actors while hindering others, and setting between 2007-2010. It rose quickly till Delhi's pressure was crucial in breaking the impasse in talks between the administration and Madhesi-supporting organizations (Jha, 2012, pp. 345-348).

Dhakal (Interview, September 8, 2021) claimed that although Nepali and Indians in the neighboring regions had close personal ties that make their bilateral relationships special and intimate, the Nepal government's discrimination motivated them for making alliance to overthrow the Khas-Brahmin dynasty. However, considering that Karnali is the region of hill-brahmins' origin, Dhakal's alliances appear to be a little skewed. It's possible that the state is prejudiced in some of the ways it distributes opportunities, and this has to be addressed.

7.5.3 Nepal's Constitution and India's Discontentment

After ten years of post-conflict transition and two elections for the Constituent Assembly, Nepal eventually enacted a constitution. India was displeased about this development for both symbolic and strategic reasons. One reason was that India believed it was not being treated with the respect it desired when Nepal finally made a significant choice, which coincided with the day Nepal celebrated its new constitution. India only noted this (Rae, 2021, p. 80) and expressed worries regarding tensions in border regions. India especially brought up the unrest being experienced by some Madhesis, who believed the constitution did not adequately address their issues. In this context, The Citizen Bureau (2015, September 21, Para-5) writes, "India's ambassador Ranjit Rae telephoned Nepal's Prime Minister Sushil Koirala hours before the promulgation ceremony, reiterating India's disappointment to the constitution in its current form".

In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi dispatched Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar to Kathmandu to make the following appeal: "I hope that its completion is an occasion for joy and satisfaction, rather than excitement and violence." The Citizen Bureau (2015, September 21, Para-5) further notes "At this crucial juncture, I hope that Nepal's political leaders would exhibit the adaptability and wisdom required to establish a broadly supported, long-lasting, and resilient constitution." It alleged that, "If we fail to issue constitution on time we will reach in huge constitutional and political crises. It will lead foreign interference and revive of tyranny feudal simultaneously".

India's displeasure stemmed from the fact that the Madhesi people of Nepal who reside on the Indian border, lack rights under the country's constitution (Rae, 2021, p. 82). Of course, a furious Madhesh is an issue for India. After all, turmoil in India's southern neighbor, Nepal, might cause instability on the Indian side of the border. To address these issues, India could have partnered with Nepal's official election administration (Para-7). Yadav (Interview, August 12, 2021) opined that, "Madhesi Claimed focus on various issues, including as state borders and the awarding of citizenship to families. Although these allegations had been refuted, there were some valid issues."

"It is also true that Nepal's political leaders have neglected to interact with the Madhesi community and expand their ownership of the new constitution," Yadav (August 12, 2021) continued. All of these, meanwhile, were domestic matters, and the constitutional change process had already started in Nepal. Additionally, Kamal Thapa headed a group to New Delhi where they discussed positive sentiments and pushed for Madhesis' goals, including proportional inclusion and demarcation of voting districts, as well as demographic and geographic priority as secondary reasons. Thapa regularly visited India where he spoke with his counterpart, Sushma Swaraj, who conveyed India's support for the proposal as a step forward (Rae, 2021, p. 83).

In January 2016, the first changes to the Nepali Constitution were put into effect. In light of its micromanagement, the entire situation endorsed India's presence in Nepal. India's engagement in Nepal's internal affairs were taken uncomfortably under the excuse of Madhesis of Indian origin living in Nepal's Terai as well as *roti-beti rista* advocating constructivist theory of IR is taken uneasily. Many contended that India's assistance for the Madhesi movement, and in particular the widely held belief in Nepal that India is responsible for the economic blockade, were causes for alarm.

Moreover, under Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), there was yet another reason for India's dissatisfaction with Nepal. For Hindu

nationalists (BJP), Nepal's majority Hindu population was an important tool for expanding their political influence. Modi himself and his party leader had invoked religious narratives on several occasions to redefine the relationship between Nepal and India. However, despite the overwhelming Hindu majority, Nepal's political parties advocated secularism, clearly separating the state from any particular religion. That has been criticized as meddling of western powers mostly EU in Nepal's politics, religion and socio-cultural sovereignty.

Ojha (2015, November 27) mentions:

The argument put up by Indian politicians were that India's desire for a larger role in Nepal was not the sole source of the geopolitical issue surrounding Nepal's constitution. Many news reports and intellectuals hold the view that Nepal's hegemonic Pahade mentality-that was, that linked to the hill tribes that control Nepal's state affairs-dominates the decisions for Tharu and Madhesi concerns when it comes to important constitutional decisions, particularly regarding the new state boundaries in Nepal (Paragraph 6).

Mountain Brahmins followed by Chhetri and Newar-all of mountainous descent-rule the political parties throughout the nation. The inability of these parties to integrate members of agitation groups into national political parties is the main cause of the representation dilemma. At the time, inclusive governance was crucial in Nepal's post-monarchical society because many communities had just recently learned of their rights. This failure of the Kathmandu leader sparked unrest in Madhesh, where the populace had the support of the Modi government (Ojha, 2015, November 27). (Para-7)

Nepal was in the midst of a humanitarian crisis following blockade. By holding the "Kathmandu elite" accountable for aiding demonstrators in Mahesh, Nepal, and holding power over an elected government, India made a mistake. Currently, a blockade pits one group of Nepalis against another. The issue is made worse by the widespread perception among Nepalis that parts of the Madhesi people's demands are really based on India's strategic objectives. If kept, the two Madhesi republics would form a lengthy strip in the country's southern plains that

would benefit India and disadvantage Nepal. This strip would be 800 km long and 20–30 km wide. Many Nepalis think that the construction of two Terai provinces poses a threat to Nepal's integrity, especially given the notion that "India and the Madheshis have worked together to impose the blockade." (Ojha, 2015, November 27). (Para-7)

India runs the risk of being portrayed as callous if it permits the economic blockade to continue while Nepal attempts to recover from a terrible earthquake. The adoption of a new constitution for Nepal is a significant first step, and Nepali authorities should be empowered to change it to accommodate concerns from regional groups like the Madhesi. India should withdraw, provide Nepal space to do so, and stop agitating groups that are dissatisfied. Rae (2021, p. 83); and Yadav (Interview, August 12, 2021) opines:

The Roti-Beti rista which accords naturalized citizens the same status makes relations between Nepal and India more distinctive. I believed that limiting India's influence in Nepal's domestic affairs would be more practicable. Similar to this, for Nepal's political parties to be stronger in their ability to lobby India if necessary, they must collectively represent national interests.

The claim is that the Madhesi people of Nepal is safeguarded from outside intervention by offering equal rights to naturalized citizens due to the discrimination against citizenship of Indian origin in the Nepali Constitution and Citizenship Law.

7.6 Crucial time of Constitution making (2014/2015) and India

Bagchi (2015, September 21) wrote that with the ratification of the constitution, media reports indicate that India, which significantly influenced Nepal's politics during the overthrow of the monarchy, has not been dissatisfied. It was said of the Hindu kingdom that it was "highly disputed and clearly flawed". Following ratification, an "unofficial economic embargo" on the India-Nepal border immediately caused political instability in the nation. According to the

Indian media, the "Madesi," a minority of Nepalis who felt discriminated against by the new constitutional state and incited a protest, were the driving force behind the embargo (Pokharel, 2015, September 20). In this context, Pokharel (2015, September 20) writes, "India denies meddling in the internal affairs of Nepal, but it has enforced an unofficial economic embargo (2015)". In a similar context, Majumder (2015) asserts that India, Nepal's neighbor, supports the process of creating and ratifying the constitution.

On August 3, 2014, Prime Minister Modi made an address to the Nepali constituent assembly in which he stressed his belief that the constitution should be drafted by consensus rather than by a majority. India, an ethnic community, was a significant supporter. Despite the necessity for such a federation, China warned Nepalese political authorities against adopting it (Shakya, 2014, June 17). Roy (2015, September, 24) further mentioned, "The Indian government was unhappy with the Nepal CA and wanted to amend it to reflect". He further mentioned "Madesh prescribes voting districts based on population, geography, and distinctive qualities before ratification"(pp. 155–162).

The Nepali administration, however, disregarded this request, which led to an improvement in amicable relations between the two nations. As a result, there were protests, border problems, and an unofficial Indian economic blockage of Nepal. A new constitution was overwhelmingly enacted by the Nepali CA, which was elected by the people, in September 2015. On the government's side, more than 90% of her CA members assert that some socio-political groups have voiced opposition to some provisions of the new constitution in the nation's southern areas. India stood with these disgruntled southern groups despite the country's opposition to Nepal's new constitution (Ghimire, 2015, September 19; & Malla, 2017, pp. 31-62).

After the 2015 embargo, Modi promised to look at areas of mutual cooperation to restore the nation's deteriorating reputation among Nepalese citizens (Pokharel, n.d.). India has traditionally viewed Nepal and its South Asian neighbors as peripheral states with whom to have a conversation. Although it supports the value of respecting national and sovereign equality, it does not uphold it. India's interactions with its neighbors were not founded on respect for

one another and equality. Even now, India seems determined to ignore international law and treaties in order to broaden its areas of influence in the area. Pokharel (n.d.) claimed additionally that the Federal Republic of Nepal's Constitution, which was enacted with the support of 90% of CA members, was not welcomed by India. India instead requested that the constitution be altered by the Nepali government. Although it has always supported Nepal's pro-democracy movements, it weakened the country's independence this time (p.6). In this sense, Malla (2017, pp. 31–62) opined:

Political groups with roots in Madhesh have not yet embraced the Constitution, therefore it is understandable that the Indian government is doing the same, and vice versa. However, India once more exerted pressure on Nepal to accede to the demands of Madhesi political leaders.

Ironically, India, which claimed to be the largest democracy in the world, rejected the people of Nepal's mandate and responded by imposing a blockade. Motivated by Indian democracy, this was an outright intrusion into the domestic affairs of a sovereign, independent nation like Nepal. India attempted to pressure Nepal into changing its new constitution by establishing an economic blockade. Similar strategies were tried in 1989, when Nepal decided to purchase weapons from China. India increased pressure by blocking 13 of Nepal's 15 transportation points. As a result, India portrayed its relationship with Nepal as domineering rather than paternal, and sees itself as Nepal's legislator (Nayak, 2016, pp. 101–21). Based on this, Gupta (1984); and Josse (2020, p. 440) opined:

"And the seventh, being India, must demonstrate to the six that it is big yet lovely." For each of the six people, the elephant might have to extend its trunk. The elephant's gigantic feet, however, catch six's attention instead of its trunk (Big Brother Syndrome).

India is working to enhance its policy with Nepal. It is claimed that Indian authorities and strategists dispute the increasing relations between China and Nepal and treat Nepal as a part of India's sphere of influence, or India's backyard. From this perspective, Simkhada (2011) mentioned, "Today, Nepal is one of the epicenters of conflicting interests in an imminent global paradigm shift. In the past, it was the meeting place of two great civilizations" (p. 13).

Nepal should pursue diplomatic ties in such a situation and should not intend to play each other's cards against the other's important security interests. We continue to use the same procedure for viewing (Shah, 2017). More importantly, India sought political plunder during and after the subtle political transition in Nepal, as shown by a number of ill-advised influences, in order to play a significant role in Nepal's internal affairs. The most recent in the series was the blockade put in place against Nepal in 2015 after India was denied its fair share.

As per customary, that India was behind the ouster of the Oli administration, despite the fact that internal conflicts within the ruling CPN party were mostly to blame. But the contrary happened: after losing power, KP Oli developed a deep dissatisfaction with India. He claimed that his administration was of nationalist and disliked in India. As a result, frosty ties developed between India and Nepal. President Bhandari's scheduled trip to India has been canceled, indicating that Oli's India policy has adopted a tough stance (Onlinekhabar, May 6) (Section 1) (Para1). However, following the defeat, KP Oli (2016) developed a deep aversion to India, and the outcome was changed. Oli did not always have a bad relationship with India, though. Oli, in contrast to his current views, was once referred to as an "Indian man" or pro-Indian (Scroll. in. 2016, July 18,) (Para-4).

Likewise, Puspa Kamal Dahal succeeded him as prime minister in August 2016 by successfully managing three levels of government and upholding equitable ties with two neighboring nations. After him Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba became prime minister and conducted elections of three tiers of government successfully.

The CPN (UML) and Maoist Center coalition won a convincing majority in the 2017 parliamentary elections. This is seen as a pressure tactic used by Nepal to steer India in the desired direction, and by concluding transit agreements with its northern neighbors. The government is said to have tried to force India into the country. Khadga Prasad Oli was elected as parliamentary leader in February 2018 (Rae, 2017) and became Prime Minister of Nepal with a nearly two-third majority led by Oli.

It is obvious that India affect not just our political parties but also our individual leaders. The majority of political parties from Nepal allowed intra-party lobbying from India, which increased India's influence in Nepal's politics and government. In this circumstance, scroll.in. (2016, July 18) notes, "Together with Modi, he established the EPG to examine Nepal-India relations in depth. India would continue to support Nepal, PM Modi promised, citing the country's long history of assistance to Nepal."

Furthermore, the fact that India agreed to put the EPG concept into practice was a success because it accepted the 1950 treaty. The other treaties and agreements were determined to be unfair, and the EPG was accepted. The establishment of ties between Nepal and its two neighbors has been a priority for PM Oli. The people who want to profit from China's economic expansion now support Oli.

However, infrastructure linkages to China had not yet been established by that point, leaving Nepal dependent on India. Although it is common knowledge that shipping products by sea is less expensive than shipping them by road, these initiatives only offer minor cost advantages. Although Nepal and road projects may not be as economically interesting, they are more significant politically and geopolitically.

Oli, the Nepali prime minister, chose India as his first visit, adhering to a more formal tradition. Strong political and socio-cultural linkages have been reinforced, with a focus on economic growth. This trip was more about steadfastly continuing to work on ongoing projects than it was about making significant discoveries.

The terms "connectivity" and "infrastructure linkages" are currently popular. Projects for rail and road connectivity between India and Nepal have already been signed. The railway connection between Jayanagar and Janakpur is anticipated to be finished in 2020; several projects were going through thorough project reports. Within the already existing notion of connectivity, the current agreement on the rail connection from Raxaul to Kathmandu is another agreement. With the increase in connection, the two nations also decided to

investigate using waterways for the transportation of products (Thapaliya, 2018). The general public believes that China has these linkages, even though China has no socio-cultural ties to Nepal and is not known for its flat topography, so it doesn't hurt.

When a government has recently escaped a coup attempt, abolition occurs. India took part in a scheme where the largest opposition party in Nepal's parliament and its coalition partner, the UCPN-Maoists, worked together for a while to bring about collapse under various pretexts. There are also rumors that the Maoist Party withdrew its support for the biggest opposition party as a result of pressure from China (Onlinekhabar, May 6) (Paragraph-2). In this circumstance, Rae (2021) described:

Oli summoned Deep Kumar Upadaya, Nepal's ambassador to India, accusing him of failing to do enough to alleviate tensions between Nepal and India. Additionally, he was charged with taking part in the Oli regime change effort from within. (p. 88)

It has been argued that such actions by Prime Minister Oli has contributed to creating tensions between Nepal and India, and that this kind of aggression is fruitless for bilateral relations between dependent countries. In addition, Nepal should try to allure the large investments of both neighboring countries to achieve the envisaged development. Similarly, Nepal should follow a balanced relationship instead of using an anti-India card and vice versa.

PM Oli witnessed the signing of the accord between the two nations. This included setting up trade and transit arrangements, which was a significant national accomplishment. Oli was actually thrilled with China's backing of his government and Nepal's initiatives to break up India's shipping and trade monopolies. Prime Minister Oli was also pleased with China as it welcomed the adoption of a new constitution (The Himalayan Times, 2016; March 27). In the meantime, High-level meetings between the two nations were also successfully conducted in an effort to forge a long-lasting and mutually beneficial partnership (*See*; Appendix-5).

In addition, in this highly developed scientific era of the twenty-first century, the relationship between Nepal and India needs to be seen differently. Although the Nepalese unorthodox perspective of Nepal-Indian ties is a democracy, the reality of Nepali-Indian relations may be the most significant security concern faced by China's expanding position in Nepal. It will not be as rigid. India did in fact play the Madhesi card. India's silence over the Madhesh movement, which caused the blockage in Nepal, serves as evidence (Bhattarai, 2019, March 10).

7.7 India's Concerns Over 2017 Federal Election

Despite numerous ups and downs after the approval of the 2015 Constitution in November 2016 and December 2017, Nepal successfully held elections for state and federal administrations, as well as all three levels of federal institutions, in May 2017, June 28, and September 18, 2017. The left-wing coalition gained the majority of seats in the legislature and placed KP Oli, the UML leader, as the next Prime Minister (Khalid & Chugutai, 2017, December 7).

In response to Prime Minister Sri Narendra Dash Damodar Modi's invitation, Prime Minister KP Oli paid an official visit to India from April 6 to 8, 2018. On May 11 and 12, 2018, Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi made an official trip to Nepal as part of his "Visit Diplomacy" at the request of Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli.

As Henry Kissinger on "*Libertarian Party of Ohio*" has rightly put it "in foreign relation there are no permanent enemies or friends but only permanent interest" (Kissinger, n.d.). It is imperative that state redefine its foreign policy to promote the political stability including socio-economic interest of Nepal. Kissinger's word-for-hire KP Sharma Oli may have written to Prime Minister Modi citing bitterness over bilateral relations after his allies' landslide victory in the 2017 elections. Prime Minister Modi also shows the same spirit in bilateral relations with Nepal (*See; Appendix- 6*)

During the visit in April 2018, Prime Minister Oli informed party leaders and the populace that no agenda would be pursued at the expense of the interests

of Nepal. During this trip to India, Oli intended to end mistrust and reestablish trust. He made an effort to represent both Nepal and India as having a just relationship with China. Nepal must maintain a cautious balance in its interactions with its neighbors due to its geopolitical situation (Thapa, 2022, April 14). GSoIRCD's IR theory is deeply ingrained with reference to Nepal's ties to China and India. But according to the IR sphere of influence theory, both China and India will fortify their ties to Nepal.

The delicate balance between India and China in Nepal must be understood as typical of the contentious nature of the two nations' relations, with New Delhi constituting a threat to Kathmandu and Beijing offering a better arrangement. The environment has been ruined by Nepal's constitutional reform and India's "economic embargo."

7.8 Nepal-India Relations (2018-2020) and India

The subsequent K.P. Oli administration had widespread support from the CPN (UML) and the Maoist Center in the years that followed as a result of its uncompromising position on the blockade. This was the alliance that competed in the general election of 2017, winning by a wide margin. He came very close to winning the two-thirds majority. K.P. Sharma Oli conducted an official trip to India over the course of three days immediately after taking office as prime minister of Nepal from April 7 to April 9 (MoFA, 2018, April 7).

In the same line, DD News (2018, April 9) notes that his visit was expected further solidify relations between the two nations and would center on India's assistance with commerce, agriculture, connectivity, and border security. In addition, the two nations decided to create a railway from Lakshar to Kathmandu and an interior waterway. In addition to breaking ground on the Motihari-Amlekganj border pipeline, Prime Ministers Oli and Modi of the two nations also jointly opened a check point in Birgunj, Nepal

In order to improve relations with Nepal, lessen Nepal's reliance on China, and maintain India's domains of influence there, India was helping Nepal under this way. This is why Oli's three-day visit offered a chance to resolve the issues that have arisen between the two nations, resulting in the quick implementation of his upcoming infrastructure initiatives and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This

was expected to aid Nepal in coping with its dual landlocked situation and is a crucial step to leave India's spheres of influence in Nepal's internal affairs (Chaudhury, 2018; April 10).

Oli's trip to India was undoubtedly very useful because it was inspired by Sushma Swaraj's post-election visit. The development partnership's course was decided during a historic visit. During Prime Minister Oli's meeting with India's Prime Minister Modi in Delhi, India purposefully suggested an effort to Nepal for high-speed connectivity via inland waterways (Chaudhury, 2018, April 10). With the election, Nepal-India ties were thus returned to normal because India wanted to improve its tense relationship with Nepal following the 2015 economic embargo.

7.9 Nepal's Stand on Its Territory and India

Nepal's position on its own territory was that India had taken possession of a region known as Kalapani, which Nepal also claimed as its own. The Nepali Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press release four days after its publication denouncing the inclusion of the Nepali territory of Kalapani on the map of India (The Record, 2020, May 9). By asserting Nepali lands under the terms of the Sugauli Treaty and starting a campaign to lessen India's influence, Nepal is attempting to maintain its current level of sovereignty. India's claim is seen in the following statement as noted on Press Trust of India (2019, November 2):

Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh are labeled as Pakistani federal areas on an Indian map that depicts them. A area named Kalapani, also known as Pithoragarh, is depicted on the map as being part of the Indian state of Utrakhanda. This state shares a 344-kilometer border with China and an 80.5-kilometer porous border with Nepal. Due to the fact that Nepal views Kalapani as a part of the Dharchula district in the Sudurpathim state, it is unhappy with Kalapani.

In counter of Indian claim, the Nepal government announced through diplomatic channels and based on historical documents that Kalapani was a region of Nepal in response to widespread protests against India's "intervention" or "occupation" in Kalapani. He demanded that the India-Nepal border problem be


resolved (MoFA, 2020, May 9). India's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Anurag Srivastav refuted all of these allegations of "land invasion" by stating that the map of India appropriately reflects India's sovereign territory (MoFA, 2020, May 9). The borders with Nepal remain exactly the same on the new map. He added the following details:

We reaffirm our commitment to using conversation to find solutions in the interests of improving bilateral ties. Nevertheless, I believe it is crucial to exercise caution. Both parties should be aware of the interest groups that exist in order to create a rift between the two nations (MoFA, GoI, 2019, November 7).

Ghimire (2019, November 18) described that Prime Minister Oli, amid the nation's rising protests, fiercely declared that the Kalapani region belonged to Nepal and that "India will immediately withdraw its forces from there" rather than handling the situation diplomatically. Similarly, Oli reportedly said, "That should be done," according to Ranjan (2019, December 7). India needs to eliminate it, he continued. Talks would not start until India "withdrew its military from our country," he continued. Rae (2021, p. 108) stated in this regard that Nepal claims the region in accordance with the Sugauli Treaty (1816) between Nepal and the British East India Company, which establishes the bounds of the Kali River. Nepal asserts that the Kali River originates at Limpiyadhura, using maps created by the British surveyor general of India between 1827 and 1856.

7.1 Map

Map of Kalapani prepared in 1827



(Source: <https://www.worldpedia.info/category/kalapani-nepalese-territory/details>)

The British government created the map in the year 1827 AD. All three of these locations-Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani-clearly belong to Nepal, and Limpiyadhura serves as the source or origin of the Mahakali River, which originates at Lipulekh.

7.2 Map

Maps of Kalapani prepared in 1856 AD.



Source: <https://english.onlinekhabar.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/nepal-india-Map.jpg>. Accessed on 6th may 2020

Regarding the cartographic issue, Uprety (2009) mentions:

The Sugauli Treaty was signed on March 4, 1816. According to Article 5 of the treaty, the Rajah of Nepal will make resource claims for himself, his heirs, and successors, as well as at different points for or in relation to the area west of the Kali River in Nepal. It asserts that every map has already been made and that it does not give a damn about this or that nation (p. 50).

At the same time, they provided the 1856 surveyor's map of India as proof. The Indian delegation asserted, however, that the earlier maps could not be accepted because they were created without any scientific or inscription investigation. They claimed that the 1850 and 1856 atlases lacked accuracy and objectivity. In its place, they recommended utilizing the 1928–1929 maps as a starting point. They were created by surveying India because the 1879 map matched them. The 1879 map of India, according to a delegation from Nepal, was inaccurate (Shrestha, 2003).

Since 1960, India has kept a military installation at Kalapani. They removed a further 17 border troops from Nepali territory, but they continue to

hold Kalapani. India constructed a double Kali temple, identified a man-made pond as the Kali River's source on the new Tulsi route, and asserted that the river east of Kalapani was the principal Kali River in order to convincingly refute Nepal's claims. India owns the territory of Kalapani. Due to the incursion at the border, Kalapani was transferred to the Indian side, costing Nepal an additional 62 square kilometers (Shrestha, 2003).

The origin of the Kali River, which is located roughly 16 kilometers northwest of Kalapani, is supported by enough evidence (Shrestha, 2003, pp. 121–126). Maps from 1860 to 1880 retain the position of Kalapani and the Kali River but rename Kali as the Kuti and Kuthiyanthi rivers (Shrestha, 2003, pp. 124-137). Similar to this, Nepal is located almost to the west of the Lipu River, and the river that flows from close to the Lipulek Pass is known as the Kali River. 310 square kilometers of land were lost. As a result, the name of the Kali River gradually evolved to Kuti and then Kutiyanthi. The Kali, Lipu, and Kalapani map symbols for the east and southern borders alter on the 1879 Survey of India map named "Nepal Almorah, United Province," which has a scale of 1 inch to 1 mile (Shrestha, 2003, pp. 124-137). According to Lok Raj Baral, Nepal did not have the resources to develop its own maps and instead relied on those produced by British India, leaving space for various interpretations by its two neighbors. Nepal initially asserted its borders in 1962 (Sigdel & Panta, 2020, June 12).

Mechi border disputes are settled by applying the Meteorological Protection Principle (*Panidalo*) which also acts as a guide for settling the Kalapani problem. The governments of Nepal and the business challenged border demarcation on a number of sites following the Treaty of Sugauli. Sikkim and Nepal argued over who should own Antu Hill. This has to do with the two rivers that originate in the northwest and northeast of Antu Hill and form the Mechi River's headwaters. Sikkim asserted that because the Mechi River originates in the northwest, Antu Hill belongs to them.

Last but not least, the British hypothesized that main streams and other tributaries are rivers that are longer, larger, deeper, and release more water. The new Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura map was approved by the Nepali government on May 18, 2020, and it was published on May 20, 2020. The new

beaked (*chuche*) map was added to the national emblem on June 13, 2020, along with the constitutional amendment.

7.3 Map

New Beaked Map of Nepal Issued on 20th May, 2020



(Source: <https://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.swadeshsandesh.com>)

Rajnath Singh, India's defense minister, actually voiced his happiness at the opening of the Road to Mansarovar Yatra on May 8, 2020 (Gurung & Ranjan, 2020, December 28), as this road went through Nepali territory that Nepal claims as its own. India's Army Chief Manoj Mukunda Naravane said in a statement on May 15 that there is cause to think that Nepal may have brought up this matter at the behest of someone else when protests in Nepal started despite the pandemic (The Indian Express, 2020, May 15). Here, India's allegation against Nepal made by Naravane is baseless and against Nepal's neighborhood policy balanced.

This also seemed to allude to China's potential involvement in the situation. He claimed that there was no conflict between Nepal and India in the region and that India had the advantage on the route (Sharma & Khadka, 2020, May 21). Following the claim and counterclaim in territorial disputes between Nepal and India, India has repeatedly ignored the *diplomatic notes* (Neupane, 2019, November 22) delivered by Nepal, reflecting Indian motives of maintaining its influence in Nepal, instead of taking further initiative to settle the issue as a large and responsible state.

The already tragic situation between Nepal and India has worsened as a result of Prime Minister K.P. Oli's remarks in a parliamentary address that the coronavirus from India "seems more lethol" (Razdan, 2020, May 20; & Rae, 2021, p. 102). He further said that *Satya Mev Jayate or Singha Maye Jayate* would be practiced in India (Joshua, 2020, May 19). Trust between Nepal and India was further damaged by Prime Minister Oli's crude remarks. Notwithstanding the fact that academia who favour China and members of the civil society saw this as a departure from India's area of influence.

7.9.1 India's statement

An "inappropriate cartographic claim" was made by India in response to the publication of a new political map depicting Kalapani as a part of Nepal (The Wire South Asia, 2020, May 20). This beaked map, which includes Lipulek, Kalapani, and Limpiyadura, was authorized by the Nepali Cabinet on May 18, 2020. Shortly after the new map was accepted by the Nepali government, India released an official declaration.

"Oli government has produced an updated version of the official map of Nepal that includes portions of Indian Territory," said Anurag Srivastava, a spokesman for the foreign ministry. "This unilateral action is not supported by historical data or facts" (Gurung & Ranjan, 2020, December 28). Such an artificial expansion of territorial claims, according to Srivastava, "would not be accepted by India" (The Wire South Asia, 2020, May 20). The Wire South Asia, 2020, May 20 has stated that Nepal should respect India's sovereignty and territorial integrity and acknowledges India's persistent stance.

China had not commented on the matter, but on May 20, 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a brief reaction. We sincerely hope that the two parties can appropriately settle their disputes through cordial discussions and without taking unilateral moves that might exacerbate the circumstance. According to Zhao Lishan, a spokesman for the foreign ministry, the term "unilateral action" suggested disapproval of India's activities (Sigdel & Panta, 2020, June12).

In the meantime, outgoing Assistant Secretary of State Alice G. Wells assured reporters via video conference call from Washington, D.C. that Nepal could speak for itself. Nepal is an independent nation and is assured that it would not accept any directives from China (The Wire South Asia, 2020, May 20) (Para-3). In light of Communist China's support for KP Oli's communist government out of exclusionary fear, the US and India have agreed to new ups and downs in Nepal-India relations.

7.9.2 India's Efforts to Maintain Its Influence

Since India added Kalapani to its new political map in November, it has been implemented in accordance with New Delhi's plan to split Jammu and Kashmir. Three times since then, Nepal has requested a meeting with India to discuss the matter, but India has been unresponsive.

In response to Nepal's foreign minister-level discussions being scheduled, India made a statement. This occurs after the two nations and their governments successfully overcome the difficulties of the COVID-19 emergency and decided on a date. Nepal, meanwhile, is not pushing for a quick meeting. Nepal cannot wait till the COVID-19 problem is resolved before meeting with India, according to Nepal's Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali. At the prime ministerial or foreign ministerial levels, we are prepared for discussions with India. He added that China would be the next country to be discussed after India. We will talk to China after talking to India because Nepal, India, and China have not yet established a genuine trijunction (The Wire South Asia, 2020, May 20).

Since then, India has ignored Nepal's request to discuss border concerns under the guise of COVID in favor of resolving a border conflict with China. India has recently taken a soft position toward holding bilateral discussions to resolve the issue, despite its rising concerns over China's expanding influence in Nepal. As a result of India's low priority for Nepal, it is manipulating events to maintain its power rather than engaging in high-level table talks that is helping to expand anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal too.

Press Trust of India (2020, August 15; & MoFA, August 15, 2020) notes: Actually, when PM Oli called PM Modi on the occasion of India's independence day, that is, on August 15, 2020, the standstill in relations between Nepal and India caused by the cartographic problem (November 2, 2019) ended.

However, protests in Nepal in response to his visit (Haider, 2020, November 23) are the result of a lack of understanding of diplomatic techniques and plans to end the standoff and open the door to bilateral talks. On November 26, 2020, Indian Foreign Minister Harsha Vardhan Shringala traveled to Nepal on official business (MoFA, 2020, November 23). After Nepal's foreign minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali visited India ahead of the impending Joint Committee meeting, India's foreign minister S. Jaishankar asked Harsha Vardhan Shringala about the bilateral relationship in general.

On January 14, 2021, Nepal's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, went to India at the invitation of the Indian Foreign Minister to examine the country's borders and other points of contention. The matter was further discussed in order to find a solution. Since Foreign Minister Gyawali was unable to discuss border issues, particularly the Kalapani incident, with his Indian counterparts, it was regarded as a routine visit.

In this regard, Chaudhury (2021, January 14); and Raj (2021, January 16) wrote that the Indian side claims that Prime Minister Modi's unwillingness to offer help out of courtesy to Foreign Minister Gyawali may be interpreted as such and that India is still uninterested in hearing Nepal's pleas on the topic. The meeting between Jaishankar and the Nepali delegation, led by Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, signaled a substantial improvement in the two nations' relations, which last year teetered on the brink due to territorial claims and counterclaims by both sides.

The Joint Commission "comprehensively discussed all elements of diverse cooperation between the two nations and explored measures to further improve the historically close and cordial ties, "the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (IMAE) stated in a statement following the recent meeting."Both sides discussed

a number of cooperation areas, including connectivity, economics and trade, power, oil and gas, water resources, political and security concerns, border control, development partnerships, tourism, culture, education, and capacity building," the statement continued (MoFA, 2021 January 15). (Para.2)

The IMEA statement underlined development of infrastructure to facilitate cross-border mobility, such as new integrated check posts, as well as work on connectivity initiatives, including a new India-Nepal rail link and suggestions for further railway projects. Discussions were undertaken to hasten cooperative hydropower projects, such as the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, which has several advantages for the citizens of both nations, according to the statement (MoFA, 2021, January15) (Para.7).

Despite the fact that the IMEA statement calmly and appropriately avoided the topic of whether the territorial dispute was discussed on either side, Gyawali asserted during a public event that the Nepali side had in fact brought up the issue. The Hindu also emphasized the "urgency of completing and finishing" the boundary and mapping between India and Nepal while reporting on the foreign minister of Nepal's speech before the Indian Council on World Affairs and a think tank supported by the IMEA in New Delhi (Raj, 2021, January 16). In this circumstance, Prasad (2020, June 13) writes:

As PM Oli stoked Nepali nationalism, India and Nepal spent the most of 2020 squabbling over a territorial issue. Early last summer, Nepal approved a new map that included territory India claims as its own, and New Delhi had grown suspicious that Beijing was behind Nepal's vocal territorial assertiveness-a view Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane undiplomatically expressed in May at a think tank event-which had complicated things

After an unofficial Indian embargo of Nepal in 2015, ties between the two neighbors. New territorial conflicts and Nepal's continuous development of relations with China have added to the list of pre-existing issues in the India-Nepal bilateral relationship, as evidenced by President Xi Jinping's high-profile visit to Kathmandu in October 2019 (Jha, 2019, October 21).

The beginning of a breakthrough in relations, however, was signaled by a flurry of trips by top Indian officials to Nepal in the last quarter of last year. Domestically, Oli keeps sending the message that he is open to better ties with India as long as they are "equality-based," as he stated to the Upper House of Nepal's parliament on January 10, 2021, during an emergency session. DNA aired the exclusive interview with Sudhir Chaudhary of Zee News. The relationship between India and Nepal is not one of a greater and smaller nation, claims Prime Minister Oli. He stated that both are independent nations of equal standing, with India "self-identifies as the master." Speaking of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, he remarked that "PM Modi believes in equal relations, but when I say that I am the Prime Minister equivalent to Modiji, people feel uncomfortable" (DNA Live.2021, January 13).

The prime minister of Nepal added, "We do not play cards against each other and do not use the India-China dispute for our profit." "We maintain a healthy relationship." He stated that Nepal might mediate between India and China in regards to the tension on the India-China border. If there is conflict between India and China, Nepal will suffer. "We seek peace and progress." "Nepal will not permit anyone to utilize our territory or the sky to engage in combat," Oli declared. He added, "India inaugurated on Nepal's soil during the crisis over Galwan Valley." "We rejected it because our territory was depicted on the map of India." Oli further said:

This is the century of Asia, he said in reference to it the welfare is attained by applying the soil from the actual *Ram Janma Bhoomi* to the forehead. "All people should receive equal treatment" (DNA Live, 2021, January 13).

The open border system and the familial interpersonal relationship based on shared tradition and culture have long been the foundations of Nepal and India's special human ties. Due to the open border policy, citizens of these nations can travel to Nepal and India to find work outside of marriage. Both nations participate in the same cultural, social, and economic activities, and their sizable Hindu populations foster intercultural harmony.

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi has traveled to Nepal four times throughout his six-year term due to his Neighborhoods first policy (Kandel, n.d.) and the country's strategic importance. However, at least on a government level, relations between Nepal and India are not perfect. The relationship between the two nations is subject to some variations. After many map releases in 2020 that included the Kalapani, Lipulek, and Limpiyadhura regions in each nation's respective territory, tensions between the two nations deteriorated.

On this basis, Gurung and Ranjan (2020, December 28) opined that Nepal's Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli has reopened diplomatic relations with India in an effort to mend Nepal's relations with that country. In a telegram sent to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 15, 2020, in honor of India's 74th Independence Day, Prime Minister Oli expressed his desire to resume "meaningful bilateral collaboration." As a result, there were several one-way trips

Then three Indian authorities visited Nepal, including Secretary of State Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Army Chief M. M. Naravan, and RAW Director Samanta Goel. In addition to Vijay Chautaiwale, the BJP's head of its foreign cell visited Nepal in December. These trips restored the communication path that had been closed for more than a year. As a result, aviation travel between Nepal and India has resumed (The Economics of Time Industry, 2020, December 10). In this context, Rae (2021) mentions, "Historically, India has always supported movements for progressive change, inclusive democracy and rule of law. A tactical approach by India may yield short-term gains but complicate the longer-term engagement with Nepal and weaken democratic governance" (p.103).

To this purpose, despite the strife brought on by India's meddling in Nepal's internal affairs, Nepal is expected to work to lessen both of their undue influences and realize the present administration's campaign promise of "Prosperity of Nepal." To improve trade in commercial transports between the two nations, Nepal and India should construct a global corridor along their 1,753-kilometer border. Along with participating actively in various important multilateral fora like BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal), BIMSTEC, NAM, and SAARC, linkages to the air, road, rail, and water ways are a shared issue.

Through out the three decade's (1990-2020) Nepal- India relations, India remained at the core part of political changes occurred in Nepal. It played crucial role in 1990's anti-Panchayat movement, anti-Gyanendra's steps taken in 2002 and 2005, facilitating on 12 point agreement. Moreover, India's concern in Madhesh movements, Indian discontentment on new Nepal Constitution, cartographic claims and counter claims etc. also made direct impacts on Nepal-India relations during this three decade. Despite all these issues other factors influencing Nepal-India relations is dealt in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

FACTORS INFLUENCING NEPAL-INDIA RELATIONS

8.1 Trade and Transit Relation

Nepal and India have a long history of trade and transit. Due to its remote location, Nepal has made an effort to develop a trading system based on commercial principles; yet, since 1951 and 1960, respectively, it has only maintained economic ties with India and China (Timilsina, 2000, p. 105–133). From this perspective, Shakya (2021) opined that, "India has historically been one of Nepal's key trading partners. According to constructivist theory and IR dependency, IR has a significant influence in Nepal as a result of the country's close socio-cultural and linguistic ties" (p. 246).

Based on the movement of commodities and services across the roughly 1750 km long Nepal-India border, there is economic cooperation between Nepal and India. Movement is unrestrained and unplanned. The mobility of individuals for economic, social, and cultural reasons served to fuel this movement even more. The lack of a visa requirement and cultural linkages has improved the conditions for unfettered trade between the two nations (Dharmadasani, 2000, p. 106). Upadhyaya (1992) writes:

One of the old manuscripts, "Mulasorvativada Vinagasangraha," expressly states that Gautam Buddha traveled to Kathmandu with a group of Indian businessmen. Similar Kautilya explains the appeal of Nepali blankets known as "Bhingise" and "Apesarak" in the Indian market (p. 27).

Since at least 500 AD, Nepal and India have had commercial ties. In the first half of the seventh century, Nepal served as a hub for trade in transit between Tibet and India (Singh, 1997, pp. 1–2). In the fifth century, the Sarthavaha Ratna Sangha was a significant trading group in Nepal. Nepal's trade with the rest of the world as a significant exporter of goods such wool, copper, pepper, skins, wolfberries, sugar, and budja leaves since those items were still among the most crucial ones. These products were traded with Babylonia, Greece, Rome, Egypt, and other nations via India by Nepal (Singh, 1997, p. 2). Upadhyaya (1992) again

notes, "The illustrious Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang learned that Nepal's economy was flourishing while he was in Bihar in 637 AD. He disclosed that Nepal sent copper, thread, fruit, maize, and other goods to Tibet and India" (p. 27).

The middle ages saw a continuation of the development of trade between India and Nepal as well. However, the aggressive practices of the Gurkhas and the BEICG, which uses Nepal as a commercial route, both had a role in the downfall of Nepal's trade. King Rana Bahadur Shah, John Duncan, and his G.H. Barlow on behalf of Nepal and BEICG, respectively, witnessed the signing of a trade pact between the two nations on March 1, 1792 (Upreti, 2009, pp. 39–40). The agreement was progressive since it placed a 2.5% tariff on imports from both nations. The restriction of double duty, extra protection against potential theft or robbery of products, control over items, and the security of merchants' operations were additional high-level restrictions.

A commercial agreement was also made with the Rajah of Nepal in 1801 A.D. by the BEICG and Nepal. As stated in Article 6 of the Convention: This demonstrates how trade agreements have traditionally served as a way for Beijing to exert political influence in Nepal. According to Article 4, "in the case of any dispute, conflict, or split between any of the adjacent countries the representatives of the two countries shall view the enemy as the enemy and the friend as the friend and shall tell each other." By using Nepal against it, it sent a message to China (pp.42-43). In this context, Singh (1997) mentions, "Hodgson calculated the total value of Nepal's exports to India at Kuldaras Rs. 1064833 and imports at Kuldaras Rs. 1611000 before the country's unification in 1830–1831, leaving a favorable surplus to British India" (p.9).

The rise of Nepal –India trade is actually influenced by external economic reasons rather than only external political ones, and Nepal has adopted a policy of collaboration with the UK (Singh, 1997, p. 11). In addition to establishing two political parties, Jung Bahadur embraced an absolutist stance. Like Prithvi Narayan Shah, he was fiercely opposed to the trade between Nepal and British India and wished to have a monopoly on it. At this time, Nepal was a sophisticated nation and its trade was centered on forest goods. As an illustration, the following export and import figures:

Table 8.1*Showing condition trade between 1895-1900*

Year	Export Rs (Million).	Import Rs.
1895-96	18336959	13623888
1896-97	18930554	15367519
1897-98	20565292	18288102
1898-99	21409805	16063496
1899-1900	20934621	13744745

(Source: Singh, 1997, p.11)

Table 8.1 above demonstrates Nepal's strength in trading with British India. Nepal had a trade surplus of Rs. 27,13,071 from 1859 to 1896, and it persisted in the years after. During the 1890s, the following items were Nepal's main exports and imports from India:

Table 8.2*Imports and exports items between Nepal and outside trade*

Export items of Nepal	Import items of Nepal
Rice, husked and unhusked, food grains, mustard, rope, oil seeds, ponies, cattle, sheep and goats, hides and skins, ghee or clarified butter, timber, cardamom, red papeper, turmeric, and others spices, opium, musk, borax, muddier, turpentine, lycium, catechu, and chisettia etc.	Cotton piece goods, cotton, yarn, wollen cloth, fiannel, silk, salt, spices, shells, copper and other metals, tobacco, petroleum, indigo and dyes of the aggregate value of the trade etc.

(Source: Singh, 1997, pp.7-14)

Table 8.2 demonstrates that there was no significant change in imports and exports. However, goods like grain and pulses, fruit, vegetables, nuts, metal and metal manufactures, provisions, living animals, raw-wool, raw silk, oil seeds, tea, and other goods were imported into India from land-frontier countries with significant trade with Nepal. Prior to 1920–1921, Nepal's export and import did not significantly alter.

But because Nepali trade was intertwined with Indian trade, World War I (1914–1919) had an impact on trade between India and Nepal. India's imports from Nepal fell dramatically. The government of independent India adopted a political stance toward commercial relations with Nepal following the overthrow of the BEICG because of China's invasion of Tibet. The previous 1923 treaty was made irrelevant under this new scenario. As a result, the Indian government has resolved to examine its economic connections with Nepal and built a strong foundation for Nepal's integration into the Indian economic system. On July 31, 1950, a trade pact was concluded with Nepal for this reason.

The governments of Nepal and India desired to promote trade and business between their respective nations' borders. The treaty served as the foundation for resolving commercial disputes after Chandreshwar Prasad Narayan Singh and Mohan Shumsher were appointed plenipotentiaries (GoI, 1950, July 31).

The symbolism of the two countries' incredibly close connection is largely reflected in bilateral treaties. The 1950 Trade Transit Treaty and its updates and revisions regulate bilateral trade and commercial activity between Nepal and India. India and Tibet were Nepal's two main trading partners before the 1950s. The 1950 Trade Treaty, however, was signed without reciprocity. The pact, which acted as a fair tool, kept tensions high between the two nations for more than 50 years.

The Trade and Transit Treaty took the place of the 1950 Treaty in 1960. As a result of Nepal's dissatisfaction with this arrangement, India decided to provide unrestricted transportation services for commodities carried from one section of Nepal to another via India in 1964. In 1966, India provided a distinct and self-contained area at Calcutta Port for Nepali commodities, exempting them from Indian law while they were crossing the country. Negotiations in 1970 lasted nearly a year because Nepal demanded unrestricted transit rights under a UN treaty (Lama, 1985). India refused Nepal's request for two separate trade and transit agreements. The pact was eventually updated in 1971 (Banskota, 1981). In this regard, Upreti (2009) rewrites:

But until 1978, two different treaties were signed. The Indian Janta Dal-led government then attempted to enhance relations with its neighbors and engaged in negotiations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to pave the way for the new treaty's adoption, but not independently .(p. 118)

These agreements were extended in 1983 and ran their course until March 1988. The Transit Treaty of 1978 was unilaterally terminated by India in 1989 (Shakya, 2021, p. 246). Unauthorized imports of commodities from Nepal into India, especially those from regions where Indian expatriates live in Marwari and are well-protected by a strong government, were brought up during contract extension talks by Nepali business houses. It was noticed that the surge was caused by the panchayat system's self-interested trade exploitation.

The Nepali side promised India that excessive taxes on some Indian items would be decreased as they were drafting the new pact. This did not actually occur, and in order to offend India, tariffs on products from other nations, including China, were reduced. Rajiv Gandhi's administration opted to return to the practice of signing broad trade and transportation agreements rather than individual agreements as a result of India's robust response (Bhattarai, 2015, October 5).

8.2 Impact on Trade and Transit Relations

After the previous trade and transit agreements expired (1988), Nepal demanded a new agreement, but India declined. As a result, the two nations' stalemate over Nepal's decision to purchase Chinese weapons reached a boiling point (Shakya, 2021, p. 246). Even with her six-month extension, India frequently closed all but her two transit points in March 1989 because blockades were intractable at that time. The common people of Nepal suffered significantly as a result. There was a shortage of necessities like salt, oil, petroleum products, baby food, and medications. Based on this, Rawat (2018) mentions:

Other matters that are especially important to India are the introduction of work permits for all foreigners, including Indians working in Nepal, the imposition of tariffs on goods imported from India, the importation of

Chinese anti-aircraft artillery, and the imposition of tariffs on goods imported from other countries.

The 1950 accord was broken in the most recent action. India's blockade of Nepal exacerbated anti-Indian sentiment there, and its "twist of the arm" approach toward its small neighbor amounted to nothing more than the imperialism of a powerful country. There was a lot of propaganda that claimed there were no political changes between 1989 and 1990 in India and Nepal, which helped to improve the mood. After the non-partisan government was overthrown, an interim administration was established, and it has taken the initiative to reset relations and bring bilateral economic ties back to where they were on March 23, 1989. In this regard Bhattarai (2015, October 5) remarks:

The current state of circumstances would not have been feasible if the pro-democracy movement had begun half a year earlier, but the leader should not jeopardize the nation's sovereignty and internal disputes should be resolved internally. India will have the opportunity to play the game again if people are not satisfied.

The Indo-Nepal dispute was mostly resolved as a result of these political reforms. The newly elected prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala traveled to India on business on December 5, 1991. The prime ministers of India and Nepal promptly started talking to each other after his arrival. The two prime ministers were aware of one other's political inclinations and agreed on a method of partnership on economic matters pertaining to the repression of cross-border terrorist operations. They signed two trade and transit pacts that are a part of numerous additional pacts and memoranda pertaining to the Kingdom's projects, industrial growth, and water resources. The prior trade deal, which was concluded in June 1990, was fully incorporated.

India was happy with the political changes that had emerged in Nepal as a result of the extremely forward-thinking transit and trade accords. Pro-performance clearance dates for Nepali exports are time-limited for four months, and the validity period for such releases is extended from two years to five years.

Tariff reductions on Nepali items entering India and entrance from 65% to 55% of the quota are also in effect.

The transit treaty's longer duration, which are seven years, and its inclusion of simplified customs and other processes for the benefit of Nepali importers and exporters? A five-year agreement was also created to regulate unlicensed trading. Both parties agreed to collaborate closely in order to combat this spreading epidemic, which has had a detrimental effect on the Indian economy. In this sense, Muni (1992) writes:

Nepal and India signed two trade and transit treaties on December 6, 1991. The Kingdom's water resources, agriculture, industrial development, and diverse projects are covered by a number of additional agreements and memoranda of understanding. It included every component of the earlier trade pact agreed in June 1990. (pp. 211-223)

It was believed that these distinct trade and transit agreements would end Nepal's 20-year trade imbalance after the political change in 1990. The trade deficit for Nepal from 1975–1976 to 1991–1992 is shown in table 8.3.

Table :8.3*Showing condition of trade from 1975/76-91/92.*

Fiscal year	Amount in (Million) exports	Imports	Trade deficit
1975/76	1185.8	1981.7	-795.9
1976/77	1164.7	2008.0	-843.3
1977/78	1046.2	2469.6	-1423.4
1978/79	1296.8	2884.7	-1887.9
1979/80	1150.5	3480.1	-2329.6
1980/81	1608.6	4428.2	-2819.6
1981/82	1491.5	4930.3	-3438.8
1982/83	1132.0	6314.0	-3182.0
1983/84	1703.9	6514.3	-4810.4
1984/85	2740.6	7742.1	-5001.5
1985/86	3078.0	9341.2	-6263.2
1986/87	2991.4	10905.2	-7913.8
1987/88	4114.6	13869.6	-9755.0
1988/89	4195.3	16263.7	-12068.4
1989/90	5235.5	18401.5	-13166.0
1990/91	7387.5	23226.7	-15839.0
1991/92	13939.4	32951.3	-19011.9

(Source: <https://www.nrborg.np>vol.pdf>, accessed on 14 February, 2016)

As seen in Table 8.3, the trade deficit between Nepal and India was rapidly growing. Since the 1990s, Nepal has done several things to improve the situation, including abolishing the import-export licensing system, making the Nepalese rupee completely convertible in the current account, lowering tariffs, and enacting paratariffs to promote international trade. In this connection, Shakya (2021) has professed that:

The Nepal-India Treaty of 1996 allowed duty-free access to Nepali exports, and Nepal gained from the new arrangement as it benefited from the low duties it imposed on raw material imports compared to prevailing tariffs on many products in India. (p.247)

Nepal joined the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA), respectively, in 1995 and 2004. Similar to this, in 2004 Nepal joined BIMSTEC and the WTO. With the trade deficit growing at an unprecedented rate, Nepal's foreign trade has, nevertheless, painted a gloomy picture throughout the past decade and beyond. Since the 2006 upheaval, even India's and Nepal's trade deficits have not decreased. The challenging trade scenario that Nepal has with India is shown in the table 8.4.

Table 8.4

Table to show Nepal' s trade-2006/07-2016/2017

Nepal's Trade Deficit with India of last 10 years	
Fy2006/07	Rs.74.14 billion
Fy2007/08	Rs.100.82 billion
Fy2008/09	Rs.121.54 billion
Fy2009/10	Rs.174.35 billion
Fy2010/11	Rs.216.29 billion
FY2011/12	Rs.270.41 billion
Fy2012/13	Rs.346.16 billion
FY2013/14	Rs.422.89 billion
Fy2014/15	Rs.444.19 billion
Fy2015/16	Rs4479.7 billion
Fy2016/17	Rs4910 billion
	*first 10 month's record

(Source: <https://www.google.com/search>, accessed on 12 March, 2018)

Table 8.4 has reflected that Nepal's dependence on trade with its southern neighbors increased between 2007 and 2017, and its foreign trade is strongly skewed in favor of India. In a study released by the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), India's part in Nepal's exports has increased fourfold since the 1990s, while India's share of imports has increased threefold. Timalina (2000) mentions:

According to central bank records, India bought 28.00% of Nepal's exports in the 1980s. Shipments fell to 16.15% in the 1990s and increased to 59.04% in the 2000s' first decade. Similarly, 22.39% of Nepal's imports

came from India in the 1990s, up from 24.01% in the 1980s. In the 2000s, the nation's reliance on imports from India increased to 58.06%.

A significant portion of Nepal's trade can be attributed to India. According to India, which benefits politically from Nepal's trade deficit, "Nepal's exports to this country have started to expand since India started offering preferential treatment under certificates of origin in 1996." Due to Nepal's reliance on India for trade and transit, India's political influence is expanding both surreptitiously and publicly (The Kathmandu Post, 2014, February 4).

Nepal is once more incensed by the amended Nepal-India Trade relations treaty of 2002, which imposes quantitative limitations on all goods produced in Nepal. Vegetable ghee, acrylic yarn, copper goods, zinc oxide, etc. all have quota systems in place. A distinctive VAT was imposed by this agreement on exports from Nepal. However, it has given Nepal flexible transit options for commerce with third-party nations. The contents of the 2009 and 2016 revisions of the Trade and transit were basically the same, although the 2016 revision's expiration date was raised to 2023.

In general, India advances political lobbying into Nepal by leveraging Nepal's reliance on trade and transit. Unanimous trade and transit agreements, as well as India's devotion to her IR dependency theory in an effort to influence Nepal's leaders, are to blame for the blockades of Nepal in 1969 and 1989.

8.3 Water Resources Sharing

Nepal has an abundance of water resources, and the amount of surface water that is accessible there is estimated to be around 225 billion cubic meters (BCM) year, or an average flow of 7125 m³/s. Hydropower would work well in Nepal. The hydropower potential of Nepal is projected to be 83,000 MW. These 114 projects, with a combined capacity of 45610 MW, have been found to be technically feasible, and only 66 projects, with a combined capacity of 42133 MW, have been found to have commercially viable hydropower potential.

It was vital to talk about the political ties between India and Nepal in order to take into account the water dispute between Nepal and India. Relationships

involving the sharing of water are influenced by bilateral ties, or rather, one mirrors the other. When relations between the two nations were cordial, they agreed to exploit hydropower for the benefit of all. But when ties between Nepal and India deteriorated or the opposition took control in both countries, the growth of Nepali ties and cross-border opposition organizations raised questions about such accords.

8.3.1 Koshi and Gandak Agreement

The Kosi (1954), Gandak (1955), Tanakpur (1991), and Mahakali (1996) agreements have received harsh criticism from the public, particularly in Nepal. It is argued that because the barrier was constructed very near to the Indian border, Nepal was unable to gain from it. They would have received a lot more water for irrigation if the project had been finished in Nepal higher upstream. In order to address the complaints of the inhabitants in the Nepali basin, both water agreements-Gandak and Koshi-were updated in 1964 (Gandak) and 1966 (Koshi).

On this issue the exploitation of interests supported by the IR dependency theory and the feeling that "India has misled us" that was attained in this nation, for instance after the accords of Koshi (1954) and Gandak (1959) respectively are distinct. So, in December 1991, during Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala's official visit to India, a declaration declaring unwavering loyalty to Thanakpur was signed (Josse, 2020, pp. 503- 507).

Conflict between Nepal and India over the distribution of the benefits of the Mahakali River started shortly after India unilaterally decided to construct the Tanakpur Dam in 1993. In 1996, the Mahakali Treaty was ratified. King Birendra Shah proposed the idea of regional cooperation in the development of Nepal's significant water resources in 1977, taking seriously India's interest in Nepal's water resources (Dixit, 1997). Based on this, Iyer (2002) writes, "The regionalism over water issue is difficult to attain in South Asia because of various reasons" (pp.365). This is because to India's policy of keeping possession of important rivers and Nepal's trade deficit with India, both of which are results of India's veiled desire to restrict Nepal access to its water resources. Nepali citizens and the Communist Party have both opposed the agreement.

8.4 Mahakali Treaty 1996

The Mahakali Pancheswar River Integration Agreement, which Nepal and India signed in the Himalayas in February 1996 after Kali and Kuti met at Kawa Mala in the Dharchula district of Nepal, is the water agreement that has generated the greatest controversy. Similarly, Gyawali (2007) contends that the treaty only grants Nepal 4% of the rights to the Mahakali, and that as a result, significant rights have been lost. Political parties created a contractual structure through the *Sankalpa Prastab* in parliament to conceal their failings (p.54).

Later, the Constitutional Commission eventually inserted a clause stating that any agreement regarding the use and distribution of Nepal's natural resources must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of both houses. (Bhasin 2005, xiviii) (Constitution of Kingdom Nepal, 2047, Article 126).

The project has not yet begun because of the Communist Party of Nepal's resistance, which is prohibited by the Mahakali Treaty. Even CPN (Maoist) demanded that the treaty be changed. Since then, Nepal has resisted signing new agreements pertaining to transboundary river resources, but has not raised any significant objections to the continuance of previous accords and projects. The Pancheshwor Development Authority was established at the Joint Ministerial Committee on Energy Conservation's first meeting in order to break the deadlock in the construction of the multi-purpose 6000 MW Pancheshwor Dam, which was discussed at the water resources conference in February 2012 in New Delhi. The parties agreed to work quickly to finish the thorough project report (DPR) (Pun, 2012, December).

The two nations signed a hydropower agreement in 2014, during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Nepal. Arun-III project development agreement between the two nations was inked. Additionally, the Pancheshwor and Upper Karnali projects have advanced. A water agreement with India has drawn opposition from Nepal's tiny Communist Party (Jaiswal, 2014, September 10). In this connection, My Republica (2017, November 20) notes:

S.D. Muni has said that, "Nepal has taken a denial mode in Mahakali project so it is failed due to Nepali side. But Dwarika Nath Dhungel has

opposed Muni's views and said that Nepal was not in a denial mode to all" (Para.10-11).

Water ties between Nepal and India have interrupted due to ongoing delays and issues with the Pancheswor project, which is being implemented in accordance with the Mahakali Treaty. In 2018, Prime Minister K.P. Oli traveled to India from April 6 to April 8. Prime Ministers Oli of Nepal and Modi of India agreed to build an interior waterway to link their countries during the visit. Given that China has already started to extend its rail network into Nepal, India's commitment to develop a rail network is crucial.

However, the lack of mention of specific rivers or inland waterways in the joint statement raises concerns about whether India is sincere in its offering or only seeking to protect Nepal's water resources for upcoming political negotiations. Nisha (n.d.) has asserted that, " India is reliable ally of Nepal for sustainable economic development through large investment in hydro sector and allowing Nepal's easy trading in India and via India" (p.7).

Although the dispute over water resources between Nepal and India has a natural form, political negotiations are difficult. India has controlled over the use of all the major rivers with the highest potential for irrigation and electricity, including the Gandaki, Kosi, Karnali, and Mahakali. Here, India has not taken the agreement on sharing water resources seriously and has prohibited others from using such rivers. The notion that India is trying to detain potential refugees in Nepal is leading to anti-Indian feelings among Nepalese people on the one hand, and on the other, it has frequently influenced political connections.

8.5 Migration

Migration between Nepal and India is not a recent development, but rather a long-standing one. Since the beginning of civilisation, Nepal has experienced a flood of migration from Indian Territory. The free and unregulated borders between Nepal and India have traditionally promoted human relations, as suggested by academics in constructive theories of IR. People from one nation are allowed to work and live freely in the other, and migration between Nepal and India is a historical and current reality (K.C, 1998).

However, despite the continued high levels of migration, these cross-border movements have largely received little attention at the state level. People continue to cross the border in an uncontrolled two-way flow despite anticipation that both sides will tighten boundaries to serve their own objectives.

The army of Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh and other hill states of East India's Punjab region helped to promote Nepali exodus to India after the founding of the modern state (Nepal) in 1768–1789. The recruitment of Nepalis served as the catalyst. The Treaty of Sugauli in 1816, which authorized Nepal to enlist in the British army, was ultimately the outcome of the Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816). It was not until 1885 that the Nepali young were formally conscripted into the British Army. After the collapse of British control in India in 1947, conscription for the Indian Army did not start immediately (Singh, 1996).

The immigrants from India and Nepal are those who are most aware of the open borders. In other words, neither nation's nationals must register in order to travel the land border freely. According to the 1991 Nepal Census, 89.2% of all immigrants came from Nepal to India. Four Indian states UP, Bihar, Uttaranchal, and West Bengal occupy this portion of Nepal's population (ESCAP, 2003).

Antagonism between the Bengali-speaking native peoples and the Urdu-speaking Muslims of Bihar caused the latter to be suppressed during Bangladesh's liberation effort toward eventual independence, which caused a considerable number of Bihari Muslims to seek sanctuary. Most of the remaining refugees are clustered in the Kathmandu Valley, with just a small number having been returned to Pakistan thus far.

Rana's rule, though, saw a significant number of political exiles from Nepal. When they were enlisted into the Burmese Army during World War I and World War II, Nepalese began to migrate farther east of Burma in the early 20th century. That amounted to 20% of all males in the nation. In this regard CBS Census (2011) mentions:

During the time of the census, Nepal's absentee population is expanding quickly. In 2001, 76,218 people were counted as being absent. By 2011, it had more than doubled that amount, up to 19, 214,974. According to

estimates, there were 10.77 immigrants for every 1,000 people in the country in 2011; during the same time period, there were 0.46 immigrants for every 1,000 people.

A bilateral agreement dated 1950 states that Nepal and India have an "open border." Since they are treated like locals, the treaty's provisions make it simpler for Indians and Nepalese to move across the border and do business. Upreti (2009, pp.77-78) referres:

Article VI of 1950's treaty reads:

Each government undertakes, in token of the neighborly friendship between India and Nepal, to give the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development

Article VII has provisioned:

The governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.

In fact, the Indian goals underlying these restrictions will forever have an impact on Nepal's politics and economics given the enormity of the demographic disparity between Nepal and India as well as the distinctions between them, such as the capacity of traders in each nation. Despite the fact that Nepal is the victim of harsh laws, this circumstance has helped Nepalis move to India. On the other hand, migration is a two-way street. People have been migrating from India to Nepal for a long time, much like Indian Nepalis. While they may vary for immigrants from different nations, there are still certain procedures and variables that determine migration (Shamead & Thapa, 2013).

According to Section 3 of the Passport Act of 1947, citizens of Nepal are not permitted to leave the country unless they hold a valid passport in their name.

However, unless a treaty or agreement between the government of Nepal and a foreign authority calls for passport processing, it is not necessary to obtain a passport in order to visit the nation (GoN, MoFA.n.d.b.). Basyal (2020, November 1) mentions, "There are a large number of India's immigrants in Nepal, consisting of recent migrants from India to Nepal. There are currently estimated over 4 million India origin immigrants are living in Nepal."

Both Madhesis from Bihar, UP, and other states as well as Pahade people from Assam, Darjeeling, etc. are Indian immigrants to Nepal. A large number of Indian citizens may travel to Nepal and work because of the country's open borders. Regarding Indian immigrants, the Madhesi community of Nepal-whose culture and language are similar to that of some Indians-represents 25% of Nepal's total population (Timalsina, 2022, January 1).

Sarangi (n.d.) claimed that Nepal has suffered from backwardness, unemployment, and poverty for a very long period. That's why Many Nepalis traveled to India in pursuit of employment, such as seasonal migration and better income, as a result of numerous challenges. Although there have been large-scale migrations from India to Nepal in the past, neighboring countries have had migrant streams since the dawn of time. About 200 Nepalis cross into India every hour, according to a report from 2004. India continues to be the primary destination for the majority of seasonal migrants from rural Nepal, despite the fact that Nepalis also migrate to other nations.

8.5.1 Political Impact

"Homeland politics," sometimes known as "remote nationalism," "the deterritorialized state," or "the globalization of domestic politics," is a phrase describing the various ties to immigrant political activism (Anderson, 1995). This form of transnationalism also applies at the local level to economic sectors where international trade is a significant factor. The diverse immigrant communities connected to mainland politics also come in numerous shapes and sizes. Organizing repatriation programs by the groups that were studied, influencing mainland politics, forming migrant home country associations, and speaking on behalf of mainland social and cultural groups are a few examples of these actions.

Additionally, they consist of opposing groups running campaigns or organizing events to advance politics.

In reality, immigrant political activity in host nations does not go smoothly. A key factor is the host nation's policy toward the sending nation. The degree to which immigrants participate in politics is, for the most part, determined by the power dynamics between the two states. State-building and state-weakening are both conventional and political actions carried out by cross-border migration. There are many instances of state-building initiatives that were not merely conceived of but also managed from abroad. Political leaders from Nepal who were in exile helped to facilitate the anti-Rana campaign in 1951. Political leaders from Nepal who fled to India backed the 1990 political turnabout as well (Basyal, 2016).

India has a long history of founding NGOs in Nepal that are focused on national identity. Numerous organizations that are engaged in Nepal's political, cultural, and economic realms were created in India by Nepalese people. The All India Gorkha League, established in Deharadun by Thakur Chandan Singh in 1924, serves as an illustration of this. In a similar vein, Assamese Nepali-speaking professional herder Chhabilal Upadhyaya has sought to increase levies on herders' rights and to expel Nepali herders from specific areas. One of his Nepalese defectors, Dalbir Singh Lohar, is another important Indian National Congress (INC) figure in Assam. "A number of Nepali started getting involved in the India's freedom struggle, i.e. Quit India Movement (QIM)" (1942).

Many young people from Nepal also took part, learned a lot about politics, and made plans to protest against the autocratic Rana government there. The history of seasoned leaders in modern Nepali politics is one striking example of this (Subba, 2002, pp. 121–122). Organizations that have actively contributed to political change in Nepal include The Immigrant Nepali Association, Bharat (INA) which is linked to Communist Party of Nepal i.e., CPN (UML), All India Association of Nepalese Unity (AINUS), which is affiliated with CPN (Mashal), Nepal Jan Samparka Samithi, which is affiliated with NC, All India Unity Association (AINUS), which is affiliated with United Communist Party of Nepal

(Maoist), and the recently established Nepal Revolutionary Communist Party Maoist (Basyal, 2016).

India openly endorsed the entire network of sister organizations made up of migrant workers and young people from Nepal who secretly funded a number of political movements in that country. It amply demonstrates how Nepalese immigration from India has influenced political development in Nepal. A few young people from Nepal took part and learned a lot about politics, which helped them, get ready to rebel against Nepal's despotic Rana administration. One of the most striking examples of this may be seen in the backgrounds of seasoned politicians in modern Nepal (Subba, 2002, pp. 121–122).

All of these sister organizations of Nepali youth and migrant workers that discreetly supported the country's various political movements were actively endorsed by India. It demonstrates unequivocally that India, through its immigration, also influences political changes in Nepal.

8.6 Public Diplomacy

Due to their shared ethnic origin and open borders, Nepal and India enjoy a unique connection. These elements have fundamentally affected human interaction. For Nepalis, the top destinations are Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakanda/Utranchal, while the East Terai of Nepal is the top destination for Indians (Rae, 2021, pp. 172–190).

Who must have migrated from several regions of India and the Himalayas, and were likely Kiranti tribes. In a similar manner, the Lichhavis are thought to have moved from northern India to Nepal around 250 A.D. Popular Lichhavi ruler King Narendra Dev started cordial ties with China, and his son-in-law established cordial ties with India by entering into marriage alliances with the Indian royal line. Relations between India and Nepal in Kathmandu grew more cordial under Malla's leadership (Devi, 2011, p. 8). In this connection, Devi (2011) writes:

"During Rana rule people to people relation became narrow, but Gorkha recruitment continued. Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950

permits that "on a reciprocal basis the nationals of one country to another became formal for migrating" (p.8).

According to Mahendra P. Lama, the 1950 treaty allows Nepali immigrants to stay as legal immigrants instead of citizens. The India-Nepal Agreement prohibits the illegal return or repatriation of Nepali migrants from any part of India (Mohan, 2018, August 3). Contacts between individuals were made legal. Open borders greatly help, especially when it comes to shared resources at borders, which can be repeatedly exploited as a springboard for chances on both sides of borders (Mohan, 2018, August 3). No two countries have more intimate and intricate ties than Nepal and India. Nepalis go to India to study, find employment, get married, buy residences, and go on pilgrimages. However, some Nepalis charge that India intervenes in Nepal's domestic affairs and ignores Nepal. In this regard, Acharya (Interview, 2019, December 3) opined, "There was no sense of borders between Nepal and India sharing socio-cultural and religious similarities, but the situation has steadily altered as a result of globalization".

Similar tribes, castes, languages, and religious and social customs characterize Nepal's Terai frontier, which is near to India's Indo-Ganga Plain. They celebrate comparable holidays and have similar folklore, festive music, foods, rituals, and traditions. The same caste makeup of surrounding regions encourages strong relationships. Marriage relationships serve as a means of keeping the people of India and Nepal connected. These coalitions are frequently formed. In fact, according to the constructivist theory of IR, the Tarai people of India and their neighbors refer to their interpersonal relationships as Roti-Beti Rishta (Rae, 2021, p. 172–190). This way of thought is shared by the majority of political parties located in Terai. This demonstrates how crucial personal touch is in marriage. People have become more receptive of immigrants from various cultures as a result of cultural overlap, and this trend is continuing. Based on this, Subba (2002) remarks:

However, the situation has altered so that Nepal is now viewed as "too far" by residents of southern India, who would prefer to travel to Singapore or any other developed South East Asian nation rather than Nepal, which is considerably lower on their list of priorities.

Additionally, Nepalis now favor attending western universities for their higher education. This will undoubtedly affect the relationship between India and Nepal (Pandey, 2072). A younger generation is becoming apprehensive about relations between Nepal and India. These include businessmen and dealers, professionals, and employees who have lived in Nepal for a considerable amount of time, according to Dahal (Interview, April 15, 2019). Working-class Indian authorities see Nepalese as disenfranchised non-citizens and subject them to a variety of types of discrimination. In India, migrant laborers from Nepal were regarded as cheap labor and mocked as *Chaukidar*, *Gurkha*, *Dware*, and *Magne*. Indians seeking part-time jobs in Nepal also encounter difficulties. *Dhoti*, *marsya*, and *bhaiya* are examples of terms used to bully people. In Nepal, Indian immigrants work as *aalupyajwalas*, *tarkariwalas*, and *kawadi* gatherers, among other jobs. It indicates that the two neighboring countries' interpersonal ties are strong (Key Informant). In this connection, EoI (n.d.) notes, "An India's Citizen's Association (ICA) of Nepal was formed on 14 September, 1990. ICA is the only association of resident India's citizens in Nepal with branches at Pokhara, Damak and Bhairawa."

Press Trust of India (2019, January 26) writes that the relationship between Nepal and India on a people-to-people level is the best in the world, according to Manjeev Singh Puri, the Indian ambassador to Nepal from 2016 to 2019. On the eve of the 70th Indian Republic Day, at a special exchange event hosted in Kathmandu, Ambassador Puri emphasized that the strong people-to-people relations between the two nations support economic growth and cooperation. Puri promised that the Government of India will assist the Government of Nepal in achieving its objective of "a prosperous and happy Nepal."

8.7 Religion

Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister, used cultural diplomacy as one of his tools to protect and celebrate shared values and cultural diversity. The potential for Nepal's cultural and religious values to be powerful diplomatic tools in a global context has not yet been fully realized (Jha, 2018, September 17).

In addition to sharing a social, religious, and cultural legacy, this relationship is based on physical geography. Once more that it is a continuous process and that some of the frustrating issues are simply the result of natural processes. India's cultural and political diversity is now viewed as being crucial for the creation of a Nepali national identity that is both viable and autonomous and prevents the country from becoming assimilated into India's mother culture. In this sense, Rose (1971) rewrites, "Relations between Nepal and India were as old and stable as earth itself and nature has bound the destinies of the two countries together" (pp.16-17). It signifies Nepal-India grass-root level relationship and its impact in political and other sectors.

Here, Modi's trips to Pashupatinath, Muktinath, and Janakpur are about bringing people together to advance national interests based on win-win outcomes and promoting religion (Rae, 2021, pp. 172–190). It should be a means of fostering relationships through cultural diplomacy. Each year, tens of thousands of Indians and Nepalis go to both nations to see sacred sites. South Indian visitors value Muktinath and Pashupatinath as significant pilgrimage sites.

The Janaki Shrine serves as the primary temple for the common people of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, along with Pashupatinath. There spent three days in Nepal between May 26 and May 28 2014, Modi emphasized the significance of religion in promoting travel. Kathmandu is revered by Prime Minister Modi as Nepal's spiritual and political capitals as well. Moreover, by referring the Janakpur-Ayodhya bus route, he highlighted the "Ramayan Circuit." In reference to the people's religious beliefs, he added, "Ayodhya is incomplete without Janaki." Without Nepal, Indian religious institutions and Ram are inadequate (The Statesman, 2018, May 12).

In order to achieve peace, harmony, prosperity, and dignity at the national level, the cultures of India and Nepal may provide good models and practical tactics. According to experts in constructivist approach of IR, cultural interaction should take use of shared traits and boost coordination and collaboration in order to advance in the economic, social, political, and cultural realms.

8.8 Madhesh Factor

The first ethnic Madhesh party to advocate for the political, socio-cultural, and linguistic rights of the Madhesi people was the Nepal Sadbhawana Party founded in 1972. Discussions regarding Madhesi rights and demands grew after the Maoist War (1996–2006), particularly among the political and intellectual elites of the region.

Political organizations like the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha and the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum are in favor of the creation of "*Ek Madhesh Ek Pradesh*," an independent Madhesh province that would include the whole Terai (Hargen, 2007). Under the slogan "One Madhes, One Pradesh," the United Democratic Front for Madhesi, which was established by the Madhesi faction, has urged the government to accept this idea of autonomy. The Tharus first accepted their status as Eastern Madhesis, but they gradually asserted their distinct Tharu identity. They dissociated themselves from their Madhesi identity and declared their own state in 2009. (Pandey, 2017, pp. 304–322)

Armed groups such as the Terai Army, the Madhesi National Liberation Front, the Terai Cobras and the Madhesh Mukti Tigers have used violence to pursue this autonomy goal (Press Trust of India, 2016, December 8). More than 24 political parties based in Madhesh were registered for the 2008 CA election. The Madhesh based Parties won 50 of the CA's 575 seats.

After Nepal's first CA elections in 2008, an Indian politician imposed an unofficial economic embargo to promote the Madhesh movement till 2015. This was done in an effort to protect India's strategic interests in the Terai. India wanted protection on the grounds that the around 400,000 Madhesis with Indian origin and the Roti-Beti connections to the Madhesi of Nepal were Nepalese. India is thus aiming to influence Nepali politics by using the Madhesi issue while disguising it as a means of fostering intergroup ties.

8.9 Open Border

As per Buddhi Narayan Shrestha (2003), China only shares Nepal's northern border with India; the other three sides are all political borders. The border between Nepal and India is mainly linked by the southern border,

or Terai. Of its total land border (2926 km) (1818 mile), Nepal shares about 1690 km (1050 mi) with India and about 1236 km (760 mi) with China. Nepal has few border disputes with China. Chinese encroachment on 36 hectares of land in four districts was identified in a 2015 assessment by Nepal's ministry of agriculture that wasn't published until 2019. But Shrestha (2003) further claimed that there are more border problems with India, Kalapani, Mechi Simana, Susta land encroachments, and many other regions (pp. 35-67). In this context Shrestha (2003) mentions, "After Sugauli Treaty (1816) only the border demarcation and management between Nepal-India began. The efforts were made in 1817-20, 1859-60, 1880-83 and 1940-41. For that, strip maps were erected at a distance of every 5-7 miles."

The boundary line had side posts and was zigzagged rather than straight. To oversee the boundary, Nepal and India established the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee (TLBC) in 1981. It was in place up until 2007, controlling 97% of the border, which Nepal had not yet agreed to ratify with India, with 183 strip maps avoiding Kalapani, Susta, and other contentious areas (Pant, 2006). In the same context Sharma (n.d.) writes, "Due to the open borders, the crimes with an involvement of international gangsters are mostly related to fake currency and terrorist acts, including bomb blasts and other forms of explosions."

Open borders have been abused by the Indian side through disagreements over the use or exploitation of rivers, and both sides have unilaterally endorsed high dams, walls, and corridors. One of the key elements contributing to the deterioration of relations between Nepal and India appears to be the boundary dispute between the two countries. Nepal's independence and sovereignty are incompatible with India's interpretation of borders. Rose (1971) says:

The Himalayas to the north of Nepal have historically been seen as India's northern frontier. Indian authorities view the Himalayas as a natural barrier between India and China because there is not a well defined natural barrier separating Nepal from India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru specifically underlined this justification in his speech to the National Assembly in December 1950. (p.192)

In addition, Bashin (1994) says that the Himalayas are not on this side of Nepal, but rather on the opposite side. Therefore, the biggest obstacle preventing anyone from reaching India is on the other side of Nepal, and we do not permit anyone to do so. We cannot put our personal safety in danger even if difficulties develop or even if we are successful in crossing this border or barrier (p.45). Neheruvian mindset still shapes India's opinion of Nepal today. The nationality and sovereignty of an independent state that is rejected by China and Nepal for security grounds are opposed in Neheruvian thought.

Due to free cross-border mobility, political impurity from India, particularly from Bihar, has been openly brought across open and unregulated borders. The advancement of Nepal has suffered as a result. Former Nepali Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala once claimed that the "Bihari style influences" Nepal's politics both inside and outside of the legislature and that the open border system is to blame for the expansion of Nepal's tainted politics. It is normal practice to hire muscular men to unlock polling places or influence elections on both sides of the border when Nepal and India have open crossings. Muni (1992) explains that the Nepalese monarchy prior to 1990 also experienced ongoing anxiety over the introduction of democratic ideas from India because political parties and, in many instances, India, openly backed the path to democracy. These issues have compelled many governments in Kathmandu to impose tight restrictions on work permits and citizenship in order to regulate Indian immigration (p. 49).

The Terai movement, which invited India's unofficial economic blockade of Nepal, exhibits similar fear (2015). Moreover, during the decade-long Maoist rebellion, rebels unfairly were profited by finding safe haven and bringing arms to India. The Kalapani issue and other sustainable border crossing issues have become hot topics as campaigning parties set up anti-India agendas and extremely loud hymns. The governments of Nepal and India should address open border controls, as recommended by the EPG report. Unfortunately, India has shown apathy toward accepting the EPG report under the pretext that an open border between Nepal and India is a lifeline for both sides. According to EPG's report, ID cards could be used to control passenger flow at the border. According to

Ranjit Rae, Nepalis disregarded the crucial ties that existed between their country and India. It is not surprising that India and Nepal have more complex issues as a result of their strong links. However, the Nepali people may not agree with his assertion that "Nepal could not exist as a sovereign state without India" (Rae, 2021).

However, there are some unwanted incidents that go unnoticed because of certain vigilantes. Because of the multifaceted relationship that has existed between the two countries for centuries, the border between Nepal and India is not without problems.

8.10 Major Political Parties in Nepal and India

In Nepal, political parties emerged in the 1930s and 1940s in opposition to the century's long oligarchic Rana regime (1846-1951 AD). This can be traced back to the history of Nepalese and Western political parties, where they first emerged within parliament as a result of the expansion of popular suffrage, or other forms of political parties. There political parties emerged as part of a nationalist movement against the colonies. The Nepali Congress is the first political party to oppose the Rana regime and advocate for democracy. In addition, "Nepali Congress Party was founded with the sole purpose of liberating the country from Rana tyranny and establishing a political system in the country based on the parliamentary system of government" (Dhungel, 2007, p. 29).

The AakhilBharatiya Rastriya Nepal Party's Congress was established in 1946 A.D under the leadership of Chairman Devi Prasad Devkota and Secretary General Krishan Prasad Bhattarai, according to Joshi (Interview, December 12, 2018). The mentor is similar to his Tanka Prasad Acharya, who was deeply connected with B.P. Koirala, Bal Chandra Sharma, Dilli Raman Regmi, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, Surya Prasad Upadhyaya, Ganesh Man Singh, and Subarna Shamsher Rana to form the Nepali Congress through Indian mediation. Aside from that, the oldest party in the exiled Nepali Congress was founded in Calcutta, India.

Both the Nepali National Congress and the Nepali Democratic Congress, which it separated from the NC to create on August 4, 1948, were political

parties. The Nepali Congress was formally constituted on May 9 in Calcutta (Gupta, 1993a, p. 165). According to its founding, the 1995 campaign of the Nepali Congress Party, CPN (UML), which took note of India's connections, provided the NC with the opportunity to usurp the CPN as the nation's foremost pro-Indian political party (Upadhyaya, 2020, p.37).

Under the leadership of notable NCP member Pushpal Lal Shrestha, the Communist Party of Nepal was formally established in India on April 22, 1949 (Baishak 10, 2006 BS). The other NCP co-founders are Moti Devi Shrestha, Nala Bahadur Karmacharya, Niranjana Govinda Vaidia, and Narayan Bilash Joshi (Rawal, 2007 b, p. 20). In India, the Communist Party of Nepal was also founded. This is attributed to Indian influence on major political parties dating back to their inception.

Between 1994 and 1999, Nepal underwent eight different governments, leading some to assume that open power conflicts had taken over the country's politics (Hachhethu, 2007, p. 134). Maoist organizations responded to this degradation and the corruption and instability it brought about with the "People's War," which they waged from 1996 to 2006, merely by offering safe haven to key Maoist leaders in India (Subba 2006, p. 31).

More than 10,000 people are believed to have died as a result of the conflict. The unofficial data puts the number at 17,000. Many more have been injured; and an estimated 200,000 people are believed to have been internally displaced (Lawoti, 2005, p. 61). In this context, Karn (n.d.) says, "Political parties in Nepal and the extent to which external actors' support and engagement with parties responds to this context. Democratic politics in Nepal has its roots in India." (para.3)

The most pro-monarchy party, though it was mostly disbanded when the nation became a republic, is the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), which is connected to the Panchayat leaders. In 1991, it led two separate independent political parties, which it merged in 1994 to form one. The RPP served as the third party and had significant influence on who might form coalition governments during the 1990s. Over the past ten years, it has become weaker as a result of numerous breakups and reunions. Due to its ties to the king and

Hinduism, the Bharatiya Janta Party has greater influence over the party than other Nepali parties do in the Indian National Assembly. In this connection, Nepal Press (2021, April 26) notes:

While KP Oli and Madhav Kumar Nepal supported the Mahakali Treaty, Bamdev Gautam and other prominent former UML leaders were oblivious of the 1996 agreement between Nepal and India. But to pass the Mahakali Treaty, a bloc with Indian influences was created (para.16).

The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) administration of India, which was backed by the Communist Party of India, facilitated negotiations on a 12-point agreement in 2006 between the Nepal Communist Party (NCPM) and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on November 21, 2006, by the Government of Nepal and the NCPM. The UPA administration supported the NCPM as it promoted democratic forces. The NCPM thought that a military victory over the Nepalese Royal Army would be unachievable. The SPA was unhappy with King Gyanendra, who presided over the executive branch following the coup in 2002 (Muni, 2012, pp. 1–28). It is considered to be a violation of democratic values and a heist against the democratic constitution that was established on an equal footing with India's backing.

India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government was not satisfied with the 2015 Constitution. A special envoy from Prime Minister Modi was sent to Kathmandu to brief the Nepali parliament and the political parties, which are mostly United Marxist-Leninist, on their concerns about accepting all sections of society and their basic constitutional rights. Madhesi, Janajatis, Tharus and the monarchist Rastriya Prajatantra Party have not recognized the constitution promulgated on 20 September 2015. It accomplishes this by integrating Maoists in two ways into a democratic framework. On the one hand, it should have used military force to subdue the Maoists, but it did not. It can be argued that the monarchy's tilt to China and influence on anti-Indian discourse was a significant cause of the transformation. The monarchy concentrates political power in the hands of a select few on the domestic front (Basnyat, 2021, July12). In this connection Upadhya (2020) opined:

Gyanendra detailed his takeover in a constitutional clause that gave him residual powers to "remove hardships." By excluding them entirely from

the new power equation, the Indian, in defending political parties, has found the fine line between his two cornerstones of the 1990 Constitution that was a constitutional monarchy and a multi-party democracy. (p.95)

It can be argued that the popular war waged by the UNCPM was a strategic miscalculation and did not correctly predict the security of South Asia. Geopolitical problems and rising risks to Nepal's national security led to a Maoist People's War, although Maoists maintain that the war was intended to overthrow the monarchy. They sometimes undermine ties between Nepal and India by opening the door for powerful governments to interfere or intervene in their own philosophical notions. Kiolala was a frequent visitor while Maoist leader Pachanda and his party were safely detained in New Delhi under the protection of the Indian authorities (Upadhya, 2020, p. 105).

Due to a number of perceived conditions, Nepal and India have a special affinity that has existed for more than 50 years. However, this does not imply that Nepalese decision-makers are sincere and perfect. There is no denying the pervasiveness of the mindset in Nepal that India is to blame for all internal issues, particularly at a time when relations between New Delhi and Kathmandu need to be strengthened even more.

The 12-point agreement between the Maoists and the Nepali Democratic Party was signed in New Delhi in November 2005 and marked the beginning of the current peace process in Nepal. However, New Delhi was unprepared for the swift and wide-ranging course of the political deluge that swept through Kathmandu and undermined the basic premises of India's Nepal policy.

King Gyanendra's rule faced its greatest street threat when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators flooded Kathmandu's streets in April 2006, demanding the removal of the monarchy. As part of a two-pronged strategy, the Indian has pushed for a deal between the king and the opposition to preserve the Nepalese monarchy. The king was forced to reinstate the disbanded legislature and give Nepal's Seven Party control (SPA).

There has never been a stronger commitment from New Delhi to help this peace effort. Much of India's security and foreign policy has been extremely pessimistic about the possibility of a negotiated settlement between Nepal's political parties and the Maoists as the threat of a violent Maoist insurrection has

grown in the nation. Instead, he argued for continuing to help the Nepali army and king in their efforts to defeat the Maoist troops. Deep misgivings about Maoist objectives were also held by Nepal's divided and beleaguered political parties. It was still the most common and the preferred route. This course was impeded by King Gyanendra's rigid position and the security forces' failure to put a stop to the riots, which led Nepal's political parties to negotiate a peace deal with the Maoists. The king's tough stance alarmed the New Delhi, but he stopped short of calling for a power-sharing agreement with the Nepalese Maoists.

The BJP-led coalition was abruptly replaced after the 2004 elections by a legislative partnership that depended on the backing of India's left-wing front-line parties. The prospect of reconciliation with Nepali Maoists was seen by the Left Front leader, particularly his CPIM, as an opportunity to distinguish Nepali Maoists from Indian Maoists and to pave the way for Indian Maoists as well. Therefore, the logic of India's coalition policy realigned India's Nepal policy rather than conscious adjustments in Indian foreign policy. The approach was untested and imperfect.

The following quote from a renowned Indian expert exemplifies the nature of this conundrum. They may envision the effect on the Naxelites, as was already described (maoist insurgents). The problem has already become so large that it is reason for concern. According to government reports, the Naxelite faction apparently controlled the majority of the Indian countryside, including a quarter of 600 districts in 13 of the 28 states (Sahoo, 2019, June 13). Armed conflict is being used to construct a communist South Asia. The Nepali peace process made sporadic progress. The Constituent Assembly, which was chosen in April 2008 for a two-year term, has regularly failed to carry out its duties. There have been a few changes. By incorporating thousands of Maoist militants into the Nepali army, non-Maoist parties in Nepal successfully attracted considerable collaboration to resist Maoist attempts to put their policies into action.

However, the strained relationship between the leaders of the two parties and the endless intra- and inter-party squabbles over the choice of political leaders made governance intolerable for the populace. The majority of Nepalese members in a meeting with a cross-section of them in the summer of 2010 were angry. In Nepal's internal affairs, India frequently using its "veto power" has drawn criticism for making Nepal's leaders unduly reliant on Indian impulses. India's intervention was so blatant that it had to boomerang back to New Delhi. Members

of the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal expressed dismay at India's disregard for Nepal's human rights status. He claimed that other countries' attitudes and India's were at variance.

Some political parties are thought to have been significantly influenced by outside parties, like India. For instance, India was credited with helping to include political organizations like the Maoists in the peace process in 2005. Some have accused Nepal's political elites for being excessively submissive to India after they supported the new government in 2009 and overthrew the Maoist-run one. It also acknowledges that without India's assistance, forming a government would be challenging.

8.10.1 Madhesh Based Parties and India

Gajendra Narayan Singh established the Nepal Sadbhawana Party in 1985 as a regional political group in Nepal to support Madhesi rights. He established the Nepal Sadhbhavan Party (NSP) following the restoration of democracy in 1990. In Nepal, this party took part in every election. Under the leadership of Rajendra Mahato, Anil Jha, Sarita Giri, Bikash Tiwari, and Shyam Sundar Gupta, the party Singh created has split into various groups. Currently, the Sadbhawana Party has merged with a group of Madhesh-based parties to create the Rastriya Janata Party (RJP) Nepal, a new integrated party.

Similar to this, the Naya Shakti Party and the Upendra Yadav-led Madhesi Janadhikar Forum have united to form the Federal Socialist Forum Nepal, also known as the Sanghiya Samajbadi Party Nepal. From India's declaration of independence in 1947 until Nepal's declaration of the Republic in 2008; Nepal and India have always supported one another on their political journeys. India's "neighborhood first" policy has caused its focus to frequently shift to South Asia (Basnyat, 2021, July 12). The 12-point agreement as well as the political, governmental, and social developments in Nepal has been questioned. According to Jha (2012), India's engagement in the mainstream Madhesi political parties between 2007 and 2010 ranged from creating its form to influencing intra-party dynamics, meddling, and setting agendas. In order to create the Terai Madhes Democratic Party, India encouraged a number of Madhesi leaders of recognized national political parties to collaborate.

Since August 2007, when an agreement was facilitated between the government and the MJF and then an eight-point deal was visibly mediated between the government and the Madhesi faction. As a result, pressure in Delhi has increased. In addition, India's relationship with Nepal, a neighboring nation acting as a bridge for kinship, culture, and religion between the two countries, must find a place of significance for its people. The Madhesi people experience a sense of neglect if there is an unnatural hostility toward India among Kathmandu's elite. This also applies to other Nepalese ethnic groups (Saran, 2021, May 29) (Para-8).

Political parties in Nepal are inspired by India, but those located in Terai Madhesh and led by those parties have strong ties to the leaders of India, according to R. Yadav, R.R. Yadav, and P. Dhakal's (Interview August 12, 2021, and August 9, 2021) respectively. Not only because of the increasing number of Indians moving to Terai, but also because of the political parties derived from their geographic links and socio-cultural affinities, which prevent them from entering owing to their fundamental socio-political rights and protection difficulties.

Following the Constituent Assembly's promulgation of the draft constitution on September 17, 2015 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar hastened to Kathmandu to make a last-minute influence. While Indian media observed that Jaishankar's visit occurred mere weeks before the start of Bihar's general elections on October 16, Nepali media referred to the visit as "premature."

A senior Indian consulate official denied suggestions that the involvement was related to the impending elections in Bihar, but he voiced outrage at what he called the Indian government's "unilateral" ratification of the constitution of Nepal. The official stated, "The ruling party unilaterally retracted these accords, despite the Indian government standing as a guarantor of earlier commitments throughout the constitution-drafting process. The continued turmoil on the other side of the border poses a security risk. Madhesis benefited from the frosty relations between the two nations following Jaishankar's visit, despite the Indian government's denial of any involvement. Yadav (2016, February 4) mentions:

The Indian government enforced an unofficial blockade on Nepal in 1969 and 1989, according to the government of Nepal. Kathmandu claims that it is taking this action as retaliation for New Delhi's recommendation that Nepal alter its constitution. It demonstrated a disregard for the demands of many ethnic groups, including the Madhesis. India asserts that the unrest in Nepal's plains is preventing freight forwarders from moving cargo because of threats of violence.

General political party leaders claim that India is guided by a coherent strategy designed to keep the Maoists, the largest party in parliament, from regaining power. These are all Maoist leaders, whose economic and political figures have criticized the use of force in achieving this goal. Puspa Kamal Dahal has claimed that since Nepali authorities were attempting to push the Indian line in the Katwal affair, there was not much purpose in talking about civil hegemony. He was frustrated by India's hostility to the Maoist position. He stated that he hoped to engage with India about the issue. We might debate the win-loss breakdown of India's objectives in Nepal, but political parties played a crucial role in how New Delhi responds to the crisis there.

8.11 India in Nepal's Political Parties Since 2008

Conflicts between Nepali political parties over adherence to the CPA are a continual factor in the dynamics of internal and external factors in the country's slower change. The Madhesi Party's emergence as a significant player on the national scene When Nepal's Maoists unexpectedly performed well in the 2008 CA elections, Indian spectator Ashok Mehta's predictions that no Maoists would take power in Kathmandu were proven false in 2009 after the election. New Delhi saw the emergence of a new ruling coalition. We were referring to Madhesh-based political parties. Singh (2011) writes:

Different reactions are elicited in Kathmandu over India's connection with Madheshi leaders. Dev Gurung, a local development minister in the Maoist party, said: "India has demonstrated how it meddles in Nepal's domestic affairs by calling representatives of the United Madheshi Democratic Front (UMDF) to the Embassy's grounds for talks. This type

of meddling in Nepal's internal issues is unacceptable. We reject any intervention of any nature." (p.1)

After the 2009 elections, which eliminated the UPA's reliance on the left-wing front that had assisted mainstream Maoists in Nepal, India's loathing of Maoists reached new heights. There are too many players with considerable influence in Nepal's political environment, which is referred to as the political environment, making them hostile and obstructive. The firing of Army Chief of Staff Rukmugat Katwal in 2009 caused the sharpest rupture between the Maoists and other political parties in Nepal. Ignoring his coalition partners, the Maoist prime minister refused to seek re-election and selected a replacement. Bagchi (2009, May 4) mentions:

As the Southern block was fighting for the survival of the Chief of the Nepal Army, this is a major loss for India. India looked so ridiculous as a result of Prachanda's choice that the Indian ambassador essentially set up camp on Prachanda's doorway (Para-2-3).

The political parties in Nepal were unable to prevent the Maoists from taking control of the country by force despite India's support. The Maoist camp has been inspired to be more enthusiastic about the peace process by India's scheme to keep the Maoists from attempt to retake power. Deep conflicts and discussions among Nepal's Maoists developed after Bhattarai's government was established, and as a result, the party has now been divided into three factions. The latest alliance was put up by a group led by Puspa Kamal Dahal and Baburam Bhattarai, who also reaffirmed their support for the peace process.

The new administration signed an eight point agreement with other parties to quicken the peace process after a breakthrough in the number of Maoist rebels being integrated into the Nepali army. The early transition in Nepal raised new hopes for recovery because Maoists were significantly involved in the peace process. There are drawbacks to India's overt coercion and engagement. The chance of failure rises when India employs its switch and decoy strategies against an increasing number of Nepali political interests, as indicated above. For instance, during an operation that resulted in the creation of a coalition under

Bhattarai, numerous Madhesi leaders cautioned India that embracing the Maoists in a coalition would advance their ambitions for regional autonomy more than other mainstream political parties in Nepal.

Additionally, Madhesi leaders have been obliged to frequently use destructive street rallies to advance their agenda due to India's disinterest or indifference towards their demands. It's interesting to note that the mobilizations and protests in the plains are attributed to India by all of Nepal's major political groups, including the Maoists. According to the R. Bhattarai Key Informant Interview from December 11, 2018, protesters were occupying a bridge on the Indian side and claiming that India's backing for the blockage was harming bilateral relations on both sides of the border. The search for political groups with a Madhesh base is reflected in this.

Vijay Chautaiwale, the foreign affairs director for India's ruling party, traveled from Gorakhpur to Kathmandu by land in December 2020 to meet with Prime Minister Oli and discuss a number of issues involving Nepal and India. As reported by one of his colleagues, Oli discussed the religious and cultural connections between Nepal and India. The visit occurred at a time when pro-monarchy protests were taking place all throughout the nation and discussions are being had about improving links between Nepal's political parties and the Bharatiya Janata Party, which controlled the Indian parliament (The Kathmandu Post, 2021, September3).

Additionally, Subash Chandra Nemwang told the Post that "We emphasized healthy people-to-people relations between Nepal and India." We also talked about methods to improve relationships between the BJP and Nepali political parties (Behera, 2021, June 27,). A Communist Party of Nepal (NCP) member who works in the ministry of foreign affairs claimed that the cell was not aware of the visit or its objective. The finance minister and general secretary of the ruling party, Bishnu Poudel, invited Chauthaiwale to Kathmandu, according to a tweet he posted, although the Communist Party of Nepal made no formal announcement of his visit. In the referred scenario, Behera (2021, June 27) mentions, "The Central Committee member further explained that by receiving

Poudel's invitation, Chauthaiwale is also conveying to Poudel's opponents that he does not intend to offend India".

There was no formal confirmation of whether Chauthaiwale would meet with Madhav Kumar of Nepal, a senior party official, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the leader of the Communist Party of Nepal. Within the ruling party, Dahal and Nepal were both fierce opponents of Oli. In a meeting with Chautaiwale, the chief of the research and analysis division of India's external intelligence agency offered him a reprieve. Behera (Behera, 2021, June 27) further mentions, "Chauthawale's presence suggested that the BJP is worried about the development of relationships between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nepal Communist Party on multiple levels."

Under the alarming frequency of visits, Vijay Chautaiwale, head of the foreign affairs wing of India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, was in Kathmandu on an unofficial visit. He was invited to visit the Nepali Congress Party led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. Chauthaiwale paid a courtesy call on his Prime Minister Deuba on 22 August, 2021. The guest took to twitter to reveal that he congratulated the prime minister on his election as chief executive of the country, adding that he also agreed to intensify dialogue between political parties. He also met with Deuba's close friend Prakash Sharan Mahat, leader of the Nepali Congress (Onlinekhabar, 2021 August23).

India, the largest democracy in the world, should only defend democratic ideals and values that support the creation of a healthy political culture. The interests of the people and India would be best served by a stable and democratic Nepal (Behera, 2021, June 27). Making progress in the current geopolitical situations and putting a stop to the volatility in Nepal-India relations depends on four different variables. First and foremost, India's foreign policy toward Nepal needs to be thoroughly thought out. Second, improve interpersonal ties by drawing on shared cultural experiences. Third, a dedication to making comforts for residents of South Asia's most powerful nation and a functional foundation for strategic linkage finally, it highlights the importance of working together to address shared security issues.

India's approach to South Asia is based on "neighbor first" (Pal, 2016; January 14). However, the relationship between Nepal and India also upholds the colonial history in addition to being based on proximity, culture, and people-to-people links. On August 3, 2014, Prime Minister Modi visited Nepal and expressed his desire "to support you and Nepal in whatever path you choose" (Upadhya, 2020, p. 136).

8.12 Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal and India

Roshhampa, who speaks Nepali, is Bhutanese. Padmasham Bahawa travelled to Bhutan in the 18th century with sculptors, architects, and other employees from Nepal to manufacture arts and crafts (Aris, 1979). They were migrated to Bhutan in the late 19th century after being sent there by contractors for farming.

Aris (1979) has claimed that approximately 60,000 Nepalis reportedly reside in Bhutan. They started to protest the state's persecution of them starting in the middle of the 1950s. Southern Bhutan was increasingly perceived as a threat to the political system in the 1980s (Hutt, n.d.). The 1985 adoption of a new citizenship statute served as the foundation for the so-called census in the southern counties. This mandated that everyone living in the South present proof of their rightful residence in 1958 in order to avoid being deported. The Nepali language was eliminated from the educational curriculum, and if they were seen outside in anything other than their typical northern dress, they would be punished or sent in custody.

For months, thousands of people in Southern Bhutan were detained in inhumane conditions. Hutt (n.d.) claimed that more than 2,000 people were tortured while they were detained, although only a small number were legally prosecuted. The residences of several people who were later granted amnesties by the King of Bhutan were destroyed, and their families had left the country. Hutt (n.d.) further opined that the first refugees fled to the neighboring country of India but were forced to migrate to eastern Nepal since they could not establish permanent camps there. Restrictions against alleged dissidents, their families, and southern Bhutan in general continued in 1991 and 1992. The 1991 refugee influx

into Nepal became a flow of up to 600 refugees per day by mid-1992 as more and more people lost their citizenship in subsequent yearly censuses. The two camps in southeast Nepal, run by the UNHCR, had received 80,000 refugees. That number has grown by another 20,000 since then. Some were overdue, but the majority was camp-born kids.

Hutt (n.d.) explained that none of the 100,000 Southern Bhutanese who lost their homes, possessions, livelihoods, and land between 1990 and 1993 were allowed to go back. Although the Bhutanese government compelled thousands of people to sign "voluntary migration" documents, it has hinted that some actual citizens who were mistakenly removed from Bhutan might be living in the camps.

Josse (2020) has viewed that the Bhutanese government started moving landless people from the north of the country to land that had previously belonged to and been farmed by refugees in 1998. A total of 219 relatives of alleged "anti-nationalists" (refugee activists) were fired from the civil sector in the same year. South Bhutanese were ousted one by one from government positions ever since. Southern Bhutanese who stay in Bhutan endure significant discrimination that frequently borders on persecution. Bhutanese in the South are classified into a variety of categories by the annual census activity, ranging from F1 (full Bhutanese) to F7 (non-Bhutanese), including the classification of members of the same family into several categories (p. 60).

In order to make sure that neither she nor her family members are engaged in pro-democracy protests or other "anti-state" activities, southern Bhutanese forced to receive their security clearance since 1991. Although obtaining this credential is extremely tough, it is required for business permits, allowing access to government facilities like schools and other services, cooperating with governments, and selling cash crops (AHURA Bhutan, n.d.).

Finally, Bhutan and Nepal made the decision to start screening their refugees in one of their refugee camps in the year 2000 as a result of increasing pressure from the international community for a solution. A joint Bhutan-Nepal verification team inspected 12,173 inhabitants of Khudunabari camp in 2001, or nearly one-eighth of the overall refugee camp population. No UNHCR or

unaffiliated third-party monitoring was allowed. At the conclusion of 2003, the processes outcomes were made public. It was concluded that 75% of individuals who underwent screening were eligible for repatriation to Bhutan. AHURA Bhutan (n.d.) asserts the following types of refugees: 2.5% of the population in category one is allowed to re-enter Bhutan as citizens, but not to their original homes or lands. After serving a two-year probationary period in a Bhutanese closed camp. Category two (70.5%) will have to reapply for citizenship under the stringent conditions of the 1985 Citizenship Act. Non-Bhutanese category third (24.2%) has the right to independently challenge the verification's findings. In categoryfour (2.8% of people), there are relatives of those who will face criminal charges. They'll be held captive in a special camp.

According to the report of AHURA Bhutan (n.d.) refugees expressed their displeasure, and a Bhutanese member of the verification team was hurt in the initial confrontation. The procedure for their repatriation has been blocked ever since they left for Bhutan. Refugees from Bhutan are still unsure and hazy about their future. People in the camps are still waiting for answers, such as resettling in Bhutan, moving to other country, assimilating into the community, or some unspecified combination of all three. Violence in camps between those who support unconditional repatriation and those who support resettlement in a third nation is on the rise.

In this connection of this issue, AHURA Bhutan (n.d.) mentioned that an estimated 35,000 people reside in Nepal or India outside of the camps without UNHCR protection or legal standing in their home countries. Asylum seekers are being forced to travel to foreign nations in greater numbers. Due to ongoing prejudice and the prospect of being excluded from the new democratic processes outlined in the new constitution, southern Bhutanese who remain in Bhutan also face an unclear future.

8.12.1 India's Perception

India is in charge of looking for a long-term answer to the refugee problem. The two refugee communities were therefore treated very differently although residing in the same nation, depending on the political and geopolitical

objectives they pursued for their own state (Sigdel, 2014, September). However, because of India's passive role, Nepal perceived it as a significant concern stalking Nepal.

Pranab Mukharjee, India's foreign minister, rejected Nepal's plea for India's assistance in the repatriation of Bhutanese refugees to their country, saying that the issue was between Nepal and Bhutan (DAP, 2006, December 17). Similar to how P. M. Koirala requested that there was no Indian involvement in the Bhutanese refugee issue; Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao responded in the same way (Josse, 2020, p.60). But the reality is absolutely opposite as further Josse opined (2020) that, "Bhutanese refugees came in Nepal crossing at least 100 km of Indian Territory but restricted them from returning via same land is Indian prejudice" (p.61).

But at the mid 2007, India for the first time, said that the Bhutanese refugees issue is an international problem saying, "It is an international problem and the government of India is trying to work out a solution" (Xinhua, 2007, June 11). In this sense, Mukharjee further stressed that repatriation of the refugees to their homeland would cause demographic imbalance in Bhutan (Nepali Times, 2007, June 1). Here, India seemed decisive on refugee issues between Nepal and Bhutan with the motto of sphere of influence theory of IR.

The issue of Bhutanese refugees is getting worse by the day, but Prime Minister Koirala has not made the issue's generalization a priority. India has chosen to remain a neutral party despite the tremendous appeals from the world community as the US, Canada, Australia, Norway, and New Zealand raised their voices against an "indifferent" India (Nepali Times, 2007, June 1).

Pattanaik (1999, January) opined that despite 16 ministerial meetings between the governments of Nepal and Bhutan to explore the situation' solutions, nothing real progress was made. Bhutan rejected Nepal's requests for foreign participation in the talks. India insisted that this was a problem between two countries on a bilateral basis. Leaders of refugees as well as the government of Nepal were very unhappy with how India was viewed. Since the migrants

traveled through India before arriving in Nepal, Nepal asserts that India was a point of transit and was therefore involved in the entire situation. However, despite the fact that India had formally participated in numerous meetings on the matter, India claimed that the issue was bilateral and needed to be resolved bilaterally.

Further, Pattanaik (1999, January) claimed that the 1949 treaty, which is close to be founded on the IR dependence theory, pragmatic theory, and geopolitical theory and is not subject to manipulation by India. This is the cornerstone of India and Bhutan's friendship. There isn't much room to do that. India has individual strategic objectives. The large number of refugees dispersed over the area does not help to stabilize India's unpredictable politics on its northern border, but India wishes to keep a balanced relationship with the Himalayan countries. In Bhutan, the refugee issue is also a political one (p. 6).

The problem of the Bhutanese refugees concerned the right of refugees to seek asylum in neighboring nations, but India was not a hosting country. It is therefore particularly problematic due to its political nature which India placed Nepal. Instead, it suppressed numerous initiatives to repatriate Bhutanese exiles, including the 2007 "Long March from Bhutan to Bhutan" (The New Humanitarian, 2007, May30).

Over 350 million Bhutanese people are refugees in Nepal as a result of India's passive attitude toward the situation. As they are being repatriated, about 90,000 of them have found asylum in the United States, Europe, and other nations. Since 1990, this issue has bred mistrust between Nepal and India, and it continues to do so today. If India wants a trustworthy relationship with Nepal, it must take this matter seriously.

8.13. Kohalpur-Banbasa Section of East-West Highway Construction and India

In developing nations of the Third World, the execution of economic diplomacy by central powers like India and the sphere of influence theory of IR are becoming more significant. India is a unique example of a developing nation

receiving the greatest aid from industrialized nations to least developed nations (Dharmadasani, 1984, p. 31). He opines:

India's aid program can, in fact, be viewed as the operational side of India's foreign policy. Nehru's perception of the third world dynamics made him envisage the increasing importance of the third world and its impact on the politic-economic power structure of the region. (P.31)

In an opinion of Dharmadasani (1984, p. 31), India views each of its bilateral relations as a means of influencing its neighbors politically, in line with the notion of IR's spheres of influence in international politics outlined by Hast (2016). India is without a doubt Nepal's most significant development partner, and this is one of the foundational principles of the long-standing alliance. The goal of development cooperation, which includes a variety of fields like energy, health, education, and transportation, is to fortify ties between adjacent nations as well as to increase infrastructure and cross-border connection. Additionally, emphasizing people will assist (Chaudhury, 2022, March 31).

With the goal of retaining its influence across all facets of government work, it contributes to the development of the situation in Nepal. Although the majority of the time, such help aims to increase investor trust Nepal has developed an anti-Indian mentality as a result of its interventionist strategy good for both the sides. The construction of the "East-West Highway," also known as "Mahendra Rajmarga," was the most significant and substantial undertaking. India was initially hesitant to participate on this large-scale project because China was involved 100 kilometers to the east of the construction site.

Chaudhury (2022, March 31) further asserts that international agencies like the World Bank and the Saudi Development Fund have provided funding to Nepal for this initiative. Therefore, based on a global public tender, it was to be granted to the most advantageous bidder, which just so happened to be the Chinese bid. Therefore, the project's ordering from China seemed to be in order at first glance (p. 44). In this connection, Dharmadasani, (1984, p. 44; & Muni, 1992, p. 44) opined:

However, even though New Delhi worked hard to avoid partiality, it was impossible to prevent it under paragraph 4 of the 1950 treaty and letter; for the purpose of constructing the highway, Ambassador Shliman and Narain were successful in installing a king.

Instead of being a great ally of developing and landlocked countries, India's development endeavors are justified as a strategy to increase its influence in Nepal. India is thus increasing influence in Nepal under the dependency paradigm of IR, which Nepali officials reject as being inappropriate for a sovereign state.

CHAPTER-IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Summary

This research examined at Nepal-India relations from 1990 to 2020 AD. On the basis of geopolitical, sphere of influence, realist, constructivist, and dependency (GSoIRCD) theories, it has investigated the relationship employing factors like political changes and influence and its consequences in Nepal-India relations. It has provided an overview of the historical development and practices of Nepal-India relations, emphasizing the historical influences of India on Nepal's political changes.

It is mostly focused on researching Nepal-India relations in connection to India's influence on Nepali politics and various events in an effort to obtain a wider knowledge of the relationship since the mass uprising of 1990 to 2020 AD. In order to make a new and innovative contribution to the field of this study, the researcher gathered the opinions and views of policy-makers, political leaders, academics, scholars of international relations, history, and geography, as well as members of civil society. The key informant interviews have been done carried out and various discourses on Nepal-India relations in electronic and print media have been observed and listened and placed them in respective part of this study with critical appraisal.

The theoretical paradigm of Nepal-India relations has been reviewed in order to better understand. The objectives of this research. To highlight the major contours of Nepal's bilateral relations with India, pertinent international relations theories-mostly geopolitical and focused on spheres of influence-are reviewed and examined in this context. In addition to this, important empirical literatures have been examined to fill in any gaps in the literature and to obtain a greater comprehension of the topic at hand.

The empirical research has shown that Nepal's interactions with India are primarily defined by historical, socio-cultural, economic, and common civilization elements, and that too is only discussed in terms of the period before

1990. These few works on Nepal's post-democracy restoration, which are primarily written from Nepal's perspective, only reflect on India's growing influence on Nepal's political developments.

Little has been investigated the post-official blockade (1989) and India's influences on Nepali political changes, primarily in mass movements I and II under geopolitical, spheres of influence, realist, constructivist, and dependency (GSoIRCD) theories and their implications in Nepal-India relations. A perspective on Nepal-India relation has not been offered either. Moreover, it seems as though India's influence on Nepal-India ties has mostly been revealed thus far. The main contribution of this research is the examination of Nepal-India relations in light of India's influence on Nepal's political changes.

The majority of the reviewed literature consist of books, journals, and scholarly papers, as well as web-archived interviews with key informants and online key sources. They are relatively authentic sources for the research even if it has depended on secondary data. The study's content approach aimed to build a bigger picture by describing variables that have offered substantial significance leading to key findings of the study in order to accurately present data and explore key variables.

While Nepal and India play a bilateral role and impact in each other's political changes, Nepal-India relations are exceptional due to similar civilizations reinforced by open borders that have improved people-to-people relations like the so-called "Beti-Roti" relationship. B.P. Koirala, Manamohan Adhikari, Puspa Lal Shrestha, Ganesh Man Singh, Subarna Shumsher, and other leaders who stayed in India supported the campaign for India's independence and worked to quell riots (such as the Haidarabad crisis and others) and Nepal helped India and in return India helped Nepal in 1951's political movement, and since then it has influenced every political changes.

India has frequently made an effort to impose its will on the ruler of Nepal, sending draft treaties during mass movements I, a seven-point plan to amend the constitution in 2015, and so on. Another group in Nepali society, however, sees India's interest in these activities more realistically. However, in

line with IR (GSoIRCD) doctrines of equal sovereignty, India should recognize Nepal's independence and refrain from seeking plaudits for its support of the nation's political change. The study's findings and conclusions on this subject are as follows:

9.2 Findings

Nepal's political changes were significantly influenced by the leaders of India. The young Prince Gyanendra was the only male member of the royal family in Nepal when his father, King Tribhuvan, and other royals left the country in November 1950 as part of a political plan. The Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher escorted him back to Kathmandu and had him proclaimed king on November 7, 1950. In addition to being crowned, Gyanendra also had coins created in his honor; however, India rejected Ranas' idea.

Publicly, India set up a tripartite agreement between the King, Rana, and Nepali Congress. Nevertheless, it is contested that NC officials were invited to participate during this arrangement. It was actually discussed between Rana, the King, and India. However, the NC opted to adopt it because it suited some of the NC leaders. Although India assisted Nepal in many ways some influence was already there as observed.

Following the "equidistance" theory of international relations, King Mahendra put an end to the era of special relations between Nepal and India. India did not feel comfortable in Nepal's independent international relations. India was apprehensive when Nepal proclaimed Israel's independence. On the surface, Nehru referred to the January 1960 royal takeover as a setback for democracy, but at the time the coup was planned. India's army chief, Thimaya, was in Nepal, and Subarna Shumsher, the country's leader, was not there either. On the basis of this scenario, it is asserted that King's actions against the democratic government were supported by India's side lines. Because of the conflict between India and Sri Lanka and not because its neighbors were democratic, India desired Nepal's goodwill.

Later, King Mahendra strengthened ties with China to diminish India's influence. Nepal negotiated trade agreements with China in 1961 and Pakistan in

1982 with the goal of breaking away from India's influence. King Birendra was suspicious of India's role in the creation of independent Bangladesh in 1971 since India was using the democratic card with its neighbors and backed up the agitators and rebels. In that scenario how could Nepal be far from Indian interest and influences.

Koirala, a leader of the NC, said that he had hijacked a Royal Nepal Airlines plane in 1973 along with millions of Nepalese rupees with the help of Indian intelligence operatives to fight against Nepali monarchy. The personality clash between King Birendra and Rajeev Gandhi, as well as between Nehru and B.P., harmed relations between India and Nepal. Parliamentarians in Nepal have also asserted that Indira Gandhi supported the Panchayat system's change in the 1980s in order to make peace with King Birendra's role-seeking nature. In this case, India's dual Nepal strategy was obvious. India has repeatedly wished for Nepal and other South Asian countries to be secretly administered by the government it has handpicked and by democracy overtly.

Rajeev Gandhi had assured King Birendra that he would maintain power throughout the public uprising in a compromise proposal, but when the King eventually made a deal with national forces, India put an embargo on Nepal rather than allowing for democratic rule. The King's inclination toward China and Nepal-India relations during Panchayat government were complicated by the ZoP proposal and a temperamental conflict between Rajeev Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, and King Birendra.

Mostly, India looked its relation with Nepal through overtly security perspective and covertly desiring favorable government in Nepal. When the government in Nepal tried to operate its internal and external affairs independently, India felt trouble that Nepal is getting out of its grip. With the fear of the King's independent polity and preferential relation with China, India gave support to agitating political parties in Mass Movement I (1990 AD).

Due to the Maoist people's war, peace process, constitution-making, and micro-management in Nepali politics and administration, Nepali political parties became more beholden to India as a result of its assistance in restoring a

multiparty system, which gave India the freedom to infiltrate Nepal after the mass uprising was successful. However, the independent conduct of internal affairs has been given top attention by governments established since the Republic of Nepal's constitution was issued as opined by Key Informants followed in this research.

The core findings of this study

1. In accordance with the *spheres of influence theory* of IR, it appeared that the government of India made an overt interference in the 1990 anti-Panchayat movement. A notable example is the participation of Indian leaders at the Nepali Congress convention and their aspiration for the effective beginning of a popular movement.
2. It is claimed that Rajeev Gandhi's government opted to assist the people's movement under pressure tactics based on *dependence theory* of IR as a result of the personality conflict between King Birendra and India's P.M.
3. Political parties in Nepal that were outraged requested India to put a blockade on the nation in an effort to weaken Panchayat, but this was a folly because it gave India another opportunity to engage in Nepali politics considering the global uncertainties that existed between Nepal and India.
4. According to *realist and geopolitical IR theories*, India gave top Maoist leaders temporary shelter during the Maoist insurgency and assisted their troops with training as a strategy to influence a war-prone government. Even though India stops using its "two pillar" strategy in Nepal, it still seems to be in place. The dual role that India has played in the Maoist insurgency-designating Maoists as terrorists and supporting Maoist top leaders in their battles-justifies India's desire to maintain influence inside any kind of Nepali power bloc.
5. The free and unregulated borders between Nepal and India have traditionally promoted human relations, as suggested by academics in *constructive theories of IR*. People from one nation are allowed to work and live freely in the other, and migration between Nepal and India is a historical and current reality.
6. Indian psychoanalytic theory, IR realism, and geopolitical theory all had an influence on the 12-point agreement that was made prior to Mass

Movement II, which significantly increased China's influence in Nepal. Concerned about a possible Chinese trend, the peace process' leaders in Nepal took this action. India returned to Nepal in order to rekindle relations utilizing the Madhesis Card after the success of Mass Movement II (2006 AD). Nevertheless, it asserts that India's defense of Madhesis of Indian origin dwelling in Nepal is justified by several *constructivist IR* researchers' opinions.

7. However, Nepal is looking for a balance between its neighbors based on the geopolitical idea of defending national interests through integrated relationship strategies and prosperity through connectivity. India seeks to maintain Nepal under its security domain to reduce China's dominance.
8. India's intervention may be seen in the toppling of Prime Minister Prachanda and the installation of Madhav Kumar Nepal as leader of the CPN (UML) in Nepal's government in 2009. Prachanda frequently referred to that government as *Kathaputali Sarkar* in reference to India.
9. Nepal's political ups and downs are allegedly caused by India. High-ranking bureaucrats being ousted or installed raise questions about Nepal's politics and India's ability to act as a micromanager in the country's public administration.
10. India wishes to continue functioning as a micromanager in Nepal and expects its own favored government there. The formation and appointment of an elected government led by Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi, the appointment of former royalist Lok Man Singh Karki as head of the CIAA, the failure of the CAI, the proposed surrender of the TIA to India, the BIPPA and security agreements, and a number of other internal issues demonstrate that India has had a significant impact on important political issues of Nepal.
11. When political parties agreed to promulgate a constitution, India started playing the Madhesi card against Nepali political elites. The leaders and ministers of India, Jayshankar and Sushma Swaraj, have publicly and informally criticized the constitution.
12. India has imposed an unofficial blockade on Nepal for more than five months as a result of its displeasure with the 2015 constitution of Nepal and its backing for the Madhesh movement. In Nepal, India continues to

use Madhesh card tactics. Seven constitutional amendment proposals had been transmitted via a representative of the embassy in Kathmandu.

Furthermore, India's influence and the problems with the demand of Indian backing to secure power and authority are the cause of Nepal's frequent government changes and the failure of majority governments.

13. It is obvious that India affect not just our political parties but also our individual leaders. The majority of political parties from Nepal allow intra-party lobbying from India, which increases India's influence in Nepal's politics and government.
14. PM Oli's foreign policy started to clearly move in the direction of independence during his first term as prime minister (2016). The majority of communist friends, communist China, together with Prime Minister K.P. Oli's strong backing is indicated by its denunciations of its opponents, but most significantly, India's influence is currently being spurned by Nepali politics. Oli altered how others interpreted his politics in order to stand out from the crowd. The publication of the beaked (*Chuche map*) map with the National Consensus is another potent illustration. In order to avoid India's influence, Prime Minister K.P. Oli wants to start an independent foreign policy. The national stance against blockade, ZEE News interview with Sudhir Sharma, his address in the parliament raising question on India believe on '*satya meba jayete or singha meba jayate*' are its examples. The stance of PM Sushil Koirala and Prachanda on proclamation of new constitution is also remarkable in this regard.
15. Furthermore, the fact that India agreed to put the EPG concept into practice was a success because it accepted the 1950 treaty, other treaties and agreements were determined to be unfair, and the EPG was accepted. This may take concrete shape in the days to come if Nepal constantly could follow the issue keeping national interest at centre of their rule.
16. According to L.R. Baral key informant interview, 2019, April 26, because of poor governance, the weak Nepal has become increasingly under the influence of India and other nations.

17. Additionally, it was noted in the R. Yadav (key informant interview from August 12, 2021) that the Roti-Beti rista, which grants naturalized citizens the same status, distinguishes relations between India and Nepal. I thought it would be more doable to limit India's role in Nepal's internal issues. Similar to this, Nepal's political parties must work together to represent national interests if they are to be more powerful in their abilities to lobby India if necessary.

9.3 Conclusions

Why do international relations have to be a part of global politics? This concern is not novel to international relations in the twenty-first century. But a physically small nation like Nepal, situated between two superpowers striving for supremacy, with such an irreconcilable geopolitical position, has gone through a period of political and historical transformation.

In this approach, Nepal-India relations should be influenced less by dependency and spheres of influence theories of IR and more by the overarching realistic theory and security agenda, followed by the geopolitical situation and democratic transition, or constructivism. A shared civilization, socio-cultural comforts, geographic comforts, and other factors have established an unavoidable closeness between Nepal and India that cannot be overlooked when dealing with their relationship. Nepal-India relations should therefore be led by IR theories and their consequences.

Both nations must act independently if amicable relations between the two separate states are to be maintained, and Nepal must avoid being utterly reliant on India for political and administrative changes. Other sovereign states in the region have claimed that India should be recognized as a regional power in global forums. In order to maintain amicable relations, India should forsake the Neharuvian view that its actions against Nepal are inappropriate

India must as soon as possible accept the findings of the EPG report and abandon its colonial tendency of micromanaging Nepal. If Delhi truly wishes to

reduce anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal, it must respect the country's sovereignty and be prepared to repudiate or amend any unfavorable treaties with Nepal.

The GSoIRCD suggests that considering the complexity of Nepal-India relations should be taken into consideration. Nepal must therefore understand its geopolitical presence with both China and India while maintaining relations. Similar to how India and Nepal should interact in their national interests should guide those relations. The "national interest" must be protected, the people's self-worth must be maintained, and transparent diplomatic channels should be enhanced.

In the same line, Nepal should continue to have cordial relations with India. We shouldn't encourage India in its efforts to handle our political issues and changes. We must work to develop the competence to manage our own political reforms, as we did in the case of the 'beaked map' released by the Oli government in 2020, and unite behind the national interest as outlined in the HoR.

Political leaders in Nepal should improve their ability to deal diplomatically with political changes by avoiding intra- and inter-party conflicts on matters of national interest. They ought to act on their own as true nationalist leaders.

It justifies Nepali leaders and top bureaucrats taking it seriously that they should engage in rigorous policy discussions with those affected before embarking on any new course or making any new decisions in political change or other sectors in order to build a national consensus that helps to demonstrate unity in important national issues. By doing this, Indian influence and her meddling in domestic issues can be avoided.

The policy of "balanced ties with neighboring countries" should, nonetheless, take precedence in Nepal. By fostering open relations and strengthening Nepal's ability to manage and deal political movements in accordance with its own national interests, India's influence can be minimized. Nepal should also observe protocol when dealing with Indian authorities and pursue an equal distance foreign policy in order to avoid India's influence.

The majority of the concepts assembled and finished as study topics, including the conclusions, will be helpful in advancing understanding, igniting scholarly discussion, and generating policy alternatives for Nepal and other nations in a similar situation. Recent advancements in the field of study will reduce India's excessive influence on Nepal's politics, uphold harmony between the two triumphant neighbors, counter anti-Indian propaganda in the coming days, and offer a more comprehensive understanding and policy options.

9.4 Further Research Potentials

Since there are many facets to Nepal-India relations, additional research into concepts like people-to-people ties, resource sharing, open border management, cross-border crime and security threats, and trade and transit relations etc. are always open and need areas ahead.

APPENDIX-1
12-POINT UNDERSTANDING HELD BETWEEN SPA AND NCP
(MAOIST), 22 NOVEMBER 2005.

1 12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists). The struggle between absolute monarchy and democracy running for a long time in Nepal has now been reached in a very grave and new turn. It has become the need of today to establish peace by resolving the 10-year old armed conflict through a forward - looking political outlet. Therefore, it has become an inevitable need to implement the concept of full democracy through a forward - looking restructuring of the state to resolve the problems related to class, caste, gender, region and so on of all sectors including the political, economic, social and cultural, by bringing the autocratic monarchy to an end and establishing full democracy. We hereby disclose that in the existence of aforesaid context and reference in the country, the following understanding has been reached between the Seven Political Parties within the parliament and the CPN (Maoists) through holding talks in different manners. The points reached in understanding:

1. The democracy, peace, prosperity, social advancement and an independent, sovereign Nepal is the principal wish of all Nepali people in the country today. We are fully agreed that the autocratic monarchy is the main hurdle for this. We have a clear opinion that the peace, progress and prosperity in the country is not possible until and full democracy is established by bringing the absolute monarchy to an end. Therefore, an understanding has been reached to establish full democracy by bringing the autocratic monarchy to an end through creating a storm of nationwide democratic movement of all the forces against autocratic monarchy by focusing their assault against the autocratic monarchy from their respective positions.
2. The agitating Seven Political Parties are fully committed to the fact that the existing conflict in the country can be resolved and the sovereignty and the state powers can completely be established in people only by establishing full democracy by restoring the parliament through the force of agitation and

forming an power full - party Government by its decision, negotiating with the Maoists, and on the basis of agreement, holding the election of constituent assembly. The CPN (Maoists) has the view and commitment that the aforesaid goal can be achieved by holding a national political conference of the agitating democratic forces, and through its decision, forming an Interim Government and holding the election of constituent assembly. On the issue of this procedural agenda, an understanding has been made to continue dialogue and seek for a common agreement between the agitating Seven Political Parties and the CPN (Maoists). It has been agreed that the force of people's movement is the only alternative to achieve this goal.

3. The country, today, demands the establishment of permanent peace along with a positive resolution of the armed conflict. We are, therefore, firmly committed to establish a permanent peace by bringing the existing armed conflict in the country to an end through a forward-looking political outlet of the establishment of the full democracy by ending the autocratic monarchy and holding an election of the constituent assembly that would come on the basis of aforesaid procedure. The CPN (Maoists) expresses its commitment to move forward in the new peaceful political stream through this process. In this very context, an understanding has been made to keep the Maoists armed force and the Royal Army under the United Nations or a reliable international supervision during the process of the election of constituent assembly after the end of the autocratic monarchy, to accomplish the election in a free and fair manner and to accept the result of the election. We also expect for the involvement of a reliable international community even in the process of negotiation
4. Making public its commitment, institutional in a clear manner, towards the democratic norms and values like the competitive multiparty system of governance, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, principle of rule of law etc., the CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment to move forward its activities accordingly.
5. The CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment to create an environment to allow the people and the leaders and workers of the political parties, who

are displaced during the course of armed conflict, to return and stay with dignity in their respective places, to return their homes, land and property that was seized in an unjust manner and to allow them to carry out the political activities without any hindrance.

6. Making a self-assessment and a self-criticism of the past mistakes and weaknesses, the CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment for not allowing the mistakes and weaknesses to be committed in future.
7. Making a self-assessment towards the mistakes and weaknesses committed while staying in the Government and parliament in the past, the seven political parties have expressed their commitment for not repeating such mistakes and weaknesses now onwards.
8. The commitment has been made to fully respect the norms and values of the human rights and to move forward on the basis of them, and to respect the press freedom in the context of moving the peace process ahead.
9. As the announcement of the election of municipality is pushed forward for an ill-motive of deluding the people and the international community and of giving continuity to the autocratic and illegitimate rule of the King, and the rumor of the election of the parliament are a crafty ploy, announcing to boycott it actively in our own respective way, the general public are appealed to make such elections a failure.
10. The people and their representative political parties are the real guardians of nationality. Therefore, we are firmly committed towards the protection of the independence, sovereignty and the geographical integrity and the national unity of the country. It is our common obligation to maintain friendly relation based on the principle of peaceful co-existence with all countries of the world and a good-neighborhood relationship with neighboring countries, especially with India and China. But we request all the patriotic peoples to remain cautious against the false attempt of the King and the monarchists to create confusion in the patriotic people by projecting the illusory the fake ('Mandale') nationalism to prolong the autocratic and illegitimate rule of the King and to raise question mark over the patriotism

of the political parties, and we appeal to the international powers and the communities to support the democratic movement against the autocratic monarchy in Nepal in every possible way.

11. We heartily invite the civil society, professional organizations, various wings of parties, people of all communities and regions, the press community, intellectuals all the Nepali people to make the Movement succeed by actively participating in the peaceful People's Movement launched on the basis of these understandings reached by keeping the democracy, peace, prosperity, forward-looking social transformation and the independence, sovereignty, and dignity of the country in centre.
12. Regarding the inappropriate conducts that took place among the parties in the past, a common commitment has been expressed to investigate the incidents raised objection and asked for the investigation by any party and take action over the guilty one if found and make informed publicly. An understanding has been made to resolve the problems if emerged among the parties now onwards through the dialogue by discussing in the concerned level or in the leadership level.

22 November 2005.

*Source;*file:///C:/Users/DELL/Desktop/nepal%20india%20treaties/12_Point_Understanding.pdf

APPENDIX-2**JOINT PRESS STATEMENT ON OFFICIAL VISIT OF RT. HON'BLE
PUSHPA KAMAL DAHAL 'PRACHANDA', PRIME MINISTER OF
NEPAL TO INDIA (14-18 SEPTEMBER 2008)**

September 17, 2008

1. The Rt. Hon'ble Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda', Prime Minister of Nepal, is on an official visit to India from September 14-18, 2008 at the invitation of H.E. Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India. The Prime Minister of Nepal is accompanied by Hon'ble Mr. Upendra Yadav, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hon'ble Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Minister for Information and Communication, Hon'ble Mr. Bishnu Prasad Poudel, Minister for Water Resources and Hon'ble Mr. Rajendra Mahato, Minister for Commerce and Supplies. The delegation includes four members of the Constituent Assembly, senior officials of the Government of Nepal, a business delegation and a delegation of media representatives.
2. During his visit, the Prime Minister of Nepal called on H.E. Smt. Pratibha Devisingh Patil, the President of India, and on H.E. Shri Mohammad Hamid Ansari, the Vice President of India. The Prime Minister of Nepal had a meeting with the Prime Minister of India, which was followed by delegation level talks, led by the two Prime Ministers, on issues of mutual interest and concern. The Prime Minister of India hosted a banquet in honor of the Prime Minister of Nepal. Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of External Affairs, Prof. Saif-u-Din-Soz, Minister of Water Resources and Shri L.K. Advani, Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha called on the Prime Minister of Nepal. The Prime Minister of Nepal had a meeting with Smt. Sonia Gandhi, Chairperson of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the President of India's National Congress. The Prime Minister of Nepal also visited Rajghat and paid homage to the memory of Mahatma Gandhi. An interaction with the India's business community was jointly hosted by ASSOCHAM, CII and FICCI in honor of the visiting dignitary. During his stay in India, the Prime Minister is visiting Bangalore from September 17-18, 2008.

3. The Prime Minister of India extended a warm welcome to the Prime Minister of Nepal as the first Prime Minister of Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the age-old close, cordial and extensive relationships existing between Nepal and India. Both Prime Ministers expressed their support and cooperation to further consolidate the relationship in the days ahead.
4. The talks were held in an atmosphere of utmost cordiality and warmth. They shared their views and assessment of the situation. The two Prime Ministers acclaimed the importance of peaceful, political, democratic transformation of historic significance in Nepal.
5. The Prime Minister of Nepal appreciated the positive support extended by the people and Government of India throughout the peaceful political democratic transformation in the country.
6. The Government of India expressed full support to the peaceful, political, democratic transition in Nepal.
7. Both leaders recognized the historic changes that have taken place in Nepal with the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the declaration of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal according to the wishes of the people of Nepal.
8. The Prime Minister of Nepal stressed that following the Constituent Assembly elections, bringing the peace process to a logical conclusion, writing a new Constitution and accelerating the pace of economic development are the main priorities of the Government of Nepal in the days ahead.
9. The two sides felt the need to inject new dynamism into the relation between the two countries for a forward looking change in tune with the realities of the time as well as the wishes and aspirations of the people of both the countries.

10. Both sides agreed to reactivate the existing bilateral mechanisms in the evolving context.
11. Both sides noted that the multi-faceted and deep-rooted relationships between the two countries needed further consolidation and expansion in a forward-looking manner to better reflect the current realities. It was in this broader context that the two Prime Ministers agreed to review, adjust and update the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and other agreements, while giving due recognition to the special features of the bilateral relationship. A High-Level Committee at the level of Foreign Secretaries will be set up for this purpose.
12. The Nepalese side informed that Government of Nepal will take further necessary measures for the promotion of investor friendly, enabling business environment to encourage India's public and private sector investments in Nepal.
13. Both sides agreed to enhance cooperation in handling cross-border crime and security concerns. Home Secretaries will meet soon to implement this decision.
14. Government of India will continue to assist the Government and people of Nepal in its peaceful, democratic transition; its economic development and reconstruction. The areas of assistance would include infrastructure, human resource development, health and education.
15. Both sides expressed concern over the large-scale damage caused by the breach of embankment by the river in the Kosi barrage area and decided to launch relief and rehabilitation measures for the victims and the reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure, and other measures as per the agreements, immediately, and take up preventive measures to avoid the recurrence of such events in the long term. They decided to take up preventive measures for the Gandak and other barrages under existing bilateral arrangements. Likewise, the two sides also discussed the problem of inundation in the border areas between Nepal and India and agreed to

take up necessary work for its effective prevention on the basis of bilateral consultation.

16. Government of India will provide Rs. 20 crores as immediate flood relief to the people in Nepal. Government of India will also rebuild the segments of the East-West Highway, damaged in the recent Kosi floods.
17. Both sides agreed that Government of India will set up a camp office in Biratnagar for facilitating movement of Nepali vehicular traffic through Bihar for improved access to other parts of Nepal till the Highway is repaired.
18. A three-tier mechanism at the level of Ministerial, Secretary and technical levels will be established to rationalize and raise the efficacy of the existing bilateral mechanisms in order to push forward discussions on the development of water resources in a comprehensive manner, including hydro-power generation, irrigation, flood control and other water related cooperation. The Secretaries will meet in two weeks.
19. The two Prime Ministers directed the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) at the level of Commerce Secretaries to meet in one month to initiate a comprehensive review of the existing trade and transit arrangements with a view to promoting industrialization in Nepal, expanding complementarities of bilateral trade on a sustainable basis and removing the barriers to trade.
20. Both sides agreed to further enhance the pace of economic development between the two countries by extending support for the preparation and execution of mega projects, including infrastructure development such as road, rail and hydel-power projects. As a gesture of goodwill of the Government and people of India, Government of India agreed to implement the Naumure Hydro-electric Project on Rapti River.
21. In view of the shortages felt in Nepal for the essential commodities, Government of India will remove bans on the export of rice, wheat, maize, sugar and sucrose for quantities agreed with Nepal. Government of India

will also provide a credit of up to Rs. 150 crores to Government of Nepal for the next three months to ensure uninterrupted POL supplies to Nepal.

22. The Prime Minister of Nepal extended an invitation to the Prime Minister of India to pay an official visit to Nepal at an early date. The Prime Minister of India accepted it with pleasure. The date of the visit will be decided through the diplomatic channel.

Source: <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5351/Joint+Press+Statement+on+Official+visit+of+Rt+Honble+Pushpa+Kamal+Dahal+Prachanda+Prime+Minister+of+Nepal+to+India+1418+September+2008>

APPENDIX -3**JOINT PRESS STATEMENT ON THE OFFICIAL VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER MADHAV KUMAR NEPAL OF NEPAL**

August 22, 2009

1. The Rt. Hon. Madhav Kumar Nepal, Prime Minister of Nepal, paid an official visit to India from August 18-22, 2009 at the invitation of H.E. Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India. The Prime Minister of Nepal was accompanied by Hon. Mr. Sharat Singh Bhandari, Minister for Tourism and Civil Aviation; Hon. Mr. Rajendra Mahto, Minister for Commerce and Supplies; Hon. Mr. Surendra Pande, Minister for Finance; Hon. Dr. Prakash Sharan Mahat, Minister for Energy; and Hon. Mr. Mahendra Prasad Yadav, Minister for Industry. The delegation included Members of the Constituent Assembly, senior officials of the Government of Nepal, a business delegation and a delegation of media representatives.
2. On August 19, the Prime Minister of Nepal called on H. E. Smt. Pratibha Devisingh Patil, the President of India, and on H.E. Shri Mohammad Hamid Ansari, the Vice-President of India.
3. The Prime Minister of Nepal had a meeting on August 19 with the Prime Minister of India, which was followed by delegation level talks led by the two Prime Ministers, on issues of mutual interest and concern. The Prime Minister of India hosted a banquet in honour of the Prime Minister of Nepal and Mrs. Gayatri Nepal. Hon. Shri S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister; Hon. Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Finance Minister; Hon. Shri P. Chidambaram, Home Minister, called on the Prime Minister of Nepal. The Prime Minister of Nepal had a meeting with Smt. Sonia Gandhi, Chairperson of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the President of India's National Congress.
4. An interaction with the India's business community was jointly hosted by ASSOCHAM, CII and FICCI in honour of the Prime Minister of Nepal and his delegation on August 19, 2009. During his stay in India, the Prime Minister visited Mumbai from August 21-22, 2009.

5. The Prime Minister of India extended a warm welcome to the Prime Minister of Nepal. The two Prime Ministers warmly recalled their meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, on July 16, 2009 on the sidelines of the 15th NAM Summit. They expressed their satisfaction regarding the age-old, close, cordial and multi-faceted relation existing between Nepal and India and agreed to expand these further. The talks were held in an atmosphere of utmost cordiality and warmth.
6. The two Prime Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the state of bilateral relation between the two countries and resolved to work together to further strengthen and enhance cooperation consistent with the wishes and aspirations of the people of both the countries. Reiterating the importance of the cordial and multi-faceted relationship between Nepal and India, the two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their determination to consolidate and expand the areas of cooperation with a view to taking the relationship to a new height on the basis of mutual respect, understanding and mutual benefit.
7. The Prime Minister of Nepal stressed that bringing the peace process in Nepal to a positive and meaningful conclusion in coordination and cooperation with all concerned parties, writing a new Constitution within the stipulated time frame and accelerating the pace of economic development are the main priorities of the Government of Nepal. The Prime Minister of India expressed full support for the ongoing peace process and efforts to bring about economic transformation in Nepal.
8. The two Prime Ministers agreed on the need to reinvigorate bilateral relation in all areas and directed that all the established institutional bilateral mechanisms should function effectively, in time bound manner and lead to concrete outcomes for the benefit of both countries.
9. The two sides agreed that enhancing trade between Nepal and India was a priority for both countries. Both sides agreed that the Inter Governmental Committee (IGC) at the level of Commerce Secretaries should look into the relevant issues with a view to promoting trade, investments and industrialization in Nepal, expanding complementarities of bilateral trade on

a sustainable basis and further removing barriers to trade and investment. The two Prime Ministers directed that the IGC should meet within the next two months. The two sides completed negotiations and initialed the revised Treaty of Trade and Agreement of Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade, which would contribute to further enhancing bilateral trade.

10. To facilitate Nepal's foreign trade, India agreed to the utilization of its port at Vishakhapatnam for movement of transit traffic to and from Nepal. It also expressed willingness to favourably consider request for usage for trade purposes of an additional sea port on its western coast.
11. The Nepalese side expressed satisfaction for the India's assistance to control Goitre and other forms of Iodine Deficiency Disorders. The Foreign Secretaries of India and Nepal signed a MoU regarding continuation of India's grant assistance for the Goitre control programme in Nepal.
12. The Nepalese side informed that the Government of Nepal will take further necessary measures for the promotion of an investor friendly and enabling business environment to encourage India's public and private sector investments in Nepal, and a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement would be concluded and signed at an early date. The India's side would encourage its business and industrial community to increase investment in Nepal. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the growing commercial relationship between the two countries but agreed that there was much untapped potential. In order to further deepen the economic engagement and utilize the full potential for such cooperation that exists between the two countries, it was agreed that a new Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation would be concluded and signed at an early date.
13. The two sides discussed security concerns relating to the open border between the two countries. The Nepalese side assured that it would not allow its territory to be used for any activity against India and the India's side also gave the same assurance to the Nepalese side. It was agreed that the Bilateral Consultative Group on Security Issues and the Home

Secretaries of the two countries will meet within two months to enhance bilateral cooperation to effectively address all issues concerning security, including cross-border crime, and establishing effective communication links between and along the bordering districts to further facilitate the exchange of information. The two sides agreed to consider steps to further facilitate cross-border arrangements in order to resolve border related issues and to assist local populations in the border areas on both sides. The two sides also stressed on the need for strengthening the legal framework, in order to counter their common cross border security challenges.

14. To enable the Nepal Police to meet the emerging challenges and help it build its capacity to train police personnel, the Government of India agreed to the request of the Government of Nepal for the development of infrastructure and construction of buildings of the proposed National Police Academy at Panauti, Kavre in Nepal at an estimated cost of India's Rs.320 crores.
15. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the progress made by Nepal-India Joint Technical Committee (JTC) in preparing and finalizing the boundary strip maps. The Government of Nepal agreed to take further necessary steps to facilitate the early signing of the strip maps.
16. The two Prime Ministers directed the Foreign Secretaries to discuss and review the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and other bilateral agreements with a view to further strengthening the bilateral relationship.
17. The Government of India will continue to assist the Government and the people of Nepal in their economic development and reconstruction. The areas of assistance would include infrastructure, human resource development, health and education.
18. The Nepalese side expressed appreciation of India's contribution for the development of BP Koirala Institute of Health Sciences at Dharan and its support in providing India's faculty with India's Rs 5 crores for a further period of two years.

19. The Nepalese side highlighted the need for human resource development, particularly vocational training in the Central region. The India's side conveyed that they would commence the construction of a polytechnic at Hetauda at a cost of approximately India's Rs.22 crores.
20. For implementing an effective and integrated border management system, development of border infrastructure along the India-Nepal border will be undertaken immediately. India's side conveyed that construction of two Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) at Birgunj-Raxaul and Biratnagar-Jogbani at an estimated cost of India's Rs.200 crores will commence soon. The early completion of these modern facilities would contribute considerably to facilitate people-to-people contact and trade.
21. To enhance connectivity of feeder and lateral roads in the Terai (hulaki roads), twenty roads of a total length of about 660 kms would be undertaken with India's assistance in the first phase at an estimated cost of India's Rs.805 crores. Both sides will strive to complete the work expeditiously. Both sides also agreed to expeditiously implement the Tanakpur-Mahendranagar Link Road as per bilateral discussions.
22. To improve rail connectivity between the two countries, two cross-border rail links would be constructed with India's assistance at the following two points along the India-Nepal border at an estimated cost of India's Rs.680 crores:
 - I. Jogbani-Biratnagar (18 Kms)
 - II. Gauge conversion of Jayanagar to Bijalpura (51 kms) and extension of the same to Bardibas (17 kms).Both sides will strive to complete the work expeditiously.
23. For accelerated development of financial markets in Nepal the Government of India would provide technical assistance for establishment of a Central Depository System (CDS) in Nepal at an estimated cost of India's Rs.9.2 cores towards consultancy, development of application software and training. Relevant stakeholders in Nepal such as the Nepal Stock Exchange

Limited (NEPSE) are to provide the necessary infrastructure for the System. Completion of the project is envisaged within a year.

24. In response to a request from the Nepalese side for enhancing scholarships in order to further assist with human resource development in Nepal, the Government of India agreed to double the number of scholarships. The Government of India also agreed to increase the number of slots for training and exchange programs for Government of Nepal officials, including police personnel, to further strengthen capacity building and expand interaction between the civil servants of the two countries.
25. The Nepalese side expressed satisfaction that India has responded promptly to Nepal's request to send an expert to advice on the development of National Museums in Nepal.
26. In response to a proposal from the Nepalese side to keep the Bagmati River and its tributaries clean and safe, the India's side agreed to send a technical team to Nepal to study the Bagmati Civilization Project.
27. Both sides expressed satisfaction over the timely completion of the technically challenging task of the closure of the breach of Kosi embankment last year. They stressed the need for constant vigil and continuous maintenance, as well as other necessary measures so as to avoid the recurrence of such incidents in the future. They decided to take up preventive measures for the Gandak and other barrages under the existing bilateral arrangements. The two sides also discussed the problem of inundation in the border areas between Nepal and India and agreed that the Joint Ministerial Commission on Water Resources should address these issues regularly, and the agreed work would be implemented expeditiously.
28. In order to accelerate the implementation of Pancheshwar Multi-purpose Project, the two Prime Ministers directed the Joint Ministerial Commission on Water Resources and Joint Committee on Water Resources to expedite the finalization of Terms of Reference for Pancheshwar Development Authority and the Detailed Project Report of the Pancheshwar Project.

29. The Prime Minister of Nepal conveyed that the Government of Nepal planned to generate 25,000 MW of hydro-electricity in the next twenty years, and sought India's active participation in the development of this potential. The two sides agreed to facilitate increased India's public and private sector involvement to harness Nepal's hydropower potential. Both sides also agreed to expedite progress on the SaptaKoshi High Dam and Sunkoshi Diversion Project and the Naumure Project as per bilateral discussions. Both sides also agreed to expedite the construction of Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur 400 KV cross border transmission line for which the modalities are to be developed. In order to facilitate power trade in the short run, India's side agreed to examine the Nepalese request for improving the transmission lines in three border areas.
30. The two sides agreed to further extend bilateral cooperation on culture, science and technology, tourism and sports. The Nepalese side said that they would welcome more India's tourists to visit their country and explore its immensely rich cultural heritage and natural beauty. Experts of both sides would meet to study and explore the potential areas of cooperation in this important sector.
31. Parliamentarians of both sides can make valuable contribution in sharing experiences, exchange views on strengthening democratic norms and for generating fresh ideas to promote bilateral relation and understanding. The two Prime Ministers agreed that there should be regular exchange of Parliamentary delegations. They also agreed to establish Young Parliamentarians Forum.
32. In response to a request from the Nepalese side for the removal of ban on the export of essential commodities from India to Nepal, the India's side conveyed that the issue would be considered on receipt of specific proposals.
33. Climate change is an issue that directly affects the ecological resources of India and Nepal. Glacial meltdown in upper reaches of Himalayas and the gradual ecological degradation of the Chure-Bhawar range are leading to

natural disasters in the form of floods which are a common threat to both our countries. Both sides agreed to undertake joint scientific collaboration between India and Nepal in hydrological and glaciological study of the impact of climate change for mutually beneficial cooperation.

34. The Prime Minister of Nepal renewed the invitation to the Prime Minister of India to pay an official visit to Nepal at an early date. The Prime Minister of India accepted it with pleasure. The dates of the visit will be decided through diplomatic channels.

Source: <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/5214/>

APPENDIX-4**JOINT STATEMENT ON THE STATE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL, RT. HON'BLE MR. PUSHPA KAMAL DAHAL 'PRACHANDA' TO INDIA**

(15-18 September, 2016)

1. The Rt. Hon'ble Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda', Prime Minister of Nepal, and Ms. Sita Dahal are on a State visit to India from 15-18 September 2016 at the invitation of the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi. The delegation includes the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal Dr. Prakash Sharan Mahat, the Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport Mr. Ramesh Lekhak, members of the Legislature-Parliament, and other senior officials of the Government of Nepal.
2. During the visit, Rt. Hon'ble Prime Minister of Nepal was accorded ceremonial reception at the Rashtrapati Bhawan on 16 September 2016. He paid courtesy call on the Hon'ble President of India Shri Pranab Mukherjee, and held talks with the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India. Smt Sushma Swaraj, Minister of External Affairs, Shri Arun Jaitley, Minister of Finance, Shri Piyush Goyal, and Minister of State for Power (Independent Charge) called on the Rt. Hon'ble Prime Minister of Nepal. Hon'ble Prime Minister of India hosted an official banquet in honour of the visiting dignitary and the accompanying delegation. Prime Minister Prachanda will be visiting NathpaJhakri hydro-electric power project in Himachal Pradesh and the Food and Herbal Park at the Patanjali Yogpeeth near Haridwar. An interaction with the India's business community was jointly hosted by ASSOCHAM, CII and FICCI in honor of the visiting dignitary.
3. Bilateral meetings were held in an atmosphere of utmost cordiality and warmth that have characterized the close and friendly relation between India and Nepal. The Prime Minister of India thanked the Prime Minister of Nepal for accepting his invitation, and warmly welcomed him in India on his first visit abroad since assuming office in August 2016. He stated that the visit

would help further strengthen the age-old bonds of fraternal relation between the people of India and Nepal, and expand the multi-dimensional cooperation between the two countries. The two Prime Ministers agreed that the high-level exchanges are vital for maintaining the momentum towards further deepening of the close and cordial ties between the two countries.

4. The Prime Minister of Nepal thanked his India's counterpart for the invitation and warm hospitality extended to him and his delegation since their arrival. He stated that his visit to India demonstrates the importance that the Government of Nepal attaches to good neighborly relation with India. The two countries and their people share an ancient, deep-rooted and vibrant friendship based on a shared cultural and civilizational ethos. He expressed the willingness of the Government of Nepal to explore newer areas of mutual cooperation and partnerships and to take our age-old and unique ties to new heights, while reinvigorating the existing mechanisms for enhancing mutual benefit.
5. The two Prime Ministers reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral cooperation and underlined the need to further deepen and expand bilateral cooperation in all areas for the mutual benefit of the people of the two countries. They directed that all bilateral institutional mechanisms be convened regularly and their decisions be implemented expeditiously. Both sides agreed to hold the next session of the India-Nepal Joint Commission in 2016.
6. The two Prime Ministers noted the progress in promoting sub-regional cooperation, and agreed that the two governments should explore ways to further enhance it, particularly in the areas of trade, transit, connectivity and power. They also stressed the importance of enhancing regional cooperation within the framework of the SAARC and the BIMSTEC.
7. The two Prime Ministers noted that the first meeting of the Eminent Persons Group on Nepal-India Relation was held in Kathmandu in July 2016, and hoped that the Group would work intensively and look into the totality of India-Nepal relation from independent perspective and suggest measures to

consolidate and further expand the close and multi-faceted ties between the two countries.

8. The Prime Minister of Nepal thanked for the prompt and extensive assistance provided by the Government and people of India in the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes of 25 April and 12 May 2015. He conveyed his gratitude to the Government of India for the latter's special assistance package of US\$ 1 billion for Nepal's post-earthquake reconstruction.
9. The Prime Minister of India welcomed the setting up of the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) in Nepal, which will coordinate post-earthquake reconstruction projects. The two Prime Ministers agreed that expeditious action should be taken to implement mutually agreed projects in the identified sectors for post-earthquake reconstruction in accordance with the bilateral MOU signed in February 2016. At the request of the Nepali side, the India's side agreed to extend assistance to the NRA, including through sharing of experience and capacity building by the National Disaster Management Authority of India. In response to the declared policy of the Government of Nepal to grant NRs 3 lakh to each beneficiary for reconstruction of houses, Government of India conveyed that it would increase its contribution for 50,000 households from NRs 2 lakh to NRs 3 lakh. For this purpose, US \$ 50 million will be drawn by the Government of Nepal from the LOC of US \$ 750 million for post-earthquake reconstruction.
10. The Prime Minister of Nepal shared with the Prime Minister of India developments in Nepal. He conveyed that the promulgation of the Constitution last year is a historic event in institutionalizing federal democratic republic. He also shared the efforts made by the present Government to take all sections of Nepali society on board for the effective implementation of the constitution. While appreciating the importance of the constitutional consolidation of democracy in Nepal, Prime Minister of India welcomed the ongoing efforts of the Government of Nepal to take all sections of the society on board for effective implementation of the Constitution. Prime Minister of India wished the Prime Minister of Nepal

every success in this endeavour. The Prime Minister of Nepal thanked the Government and people of India for their goodwill, support and solidarity in Nepal's peace process.

11. The two Prime Ministers believe that both countries hold similar views on major international issues, including the comprehensive reforms of the UN and other international organizations, affecting the developing countries and work in close coordination with each other in the United Nations and other international fora. The Nepali side reiterated its support for India's candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
12. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the ongoing defense and security cooperation, and the recently concluded Home Secretary level talks and the meeting of the bilateral consultative group on security matters. They stressed the need to ensure that the open border, which has facilitated economic interaction and movement of people and goods on both sides of the border and has been a unique feature of India-Nepal bilateral ties, is not allowed to be misused by unscrupulous elements posing security threats to either side. The two sides committed that they will not allow their territory to be used against each other.
13. The Prime Minister of India expressed India's commitment to continue the close partnership between India and Nepal for socio-economic, scientific and technological development. The two Prime Ministers directed the officials to closely monitor progress of the ongoing projects under bilateral economic and development cooperation, address any bottlenecks, and to complete them expeditiously in a time bound manner. In this regard, both sides agreed to set up an oversight mechanism comprising senior officials from the India's Embassy in Kathmandu and the Government of Nepal, which will review progress together with respective project implementing agencies/developers of ongoing economic and development projects on a regular basis, and take necessary steps to expedite their implementation.
14. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the steady growth of bilateral trade. Prime Minister of Nepal expressed concern over Nepal's

growing trade deficit with India and underlined the need for taking measures to enhance Nepal's exports to India. The two Prime Ministers noted the successful conclusion of the meeting of the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) on Trade, Transit and Control of Unauthorized Trade, at the Secretary-level in June 2016, and agreed that the IGC will continue to discuss trade infrastructure and trade facilitation related measures to boost bilateral trade. They agreed that the Trade Treaty between India and Nepal would be renewed in October 2016 in terms of provisions of the Treaty, with the aim of enhancing the bilateral trade. Both sides agreed to hold civil aviation talks to discuss air services matters, including request for additional air routes.

15. The two Prime Ministers noted the successful completion of two roads totalling about 71 kilometers under Phase I of Terai road project. The two Prime Ministers directed the officials to expedite the construction of postal roads and feeder roads (Terai roads) and complete them expeditiously, in accordance with the modalities for implementation agreed by both sides in February 2016.
16. The two Prime Ministers stressed the need for early development of infrastructure at integrated check posts (ICPs) to facilitate smooth and faster movement of people and goods. They noted with satisfaction the progress in construction of Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) at Raxaul and Jogbani, and agreed that work on the Raxaul-Birgunj ICP project will be expedited with the objective of completing it by December 2016. It was decided to immediately commence construction of the ICP at Biratnagar, and to expedite the Detailed Engineering Reports in respect of ICPs at Nepalgunj and Bhairahawa.
17. The two Prime Ministers reviewed the progress made in the implementation of the two ongoing India-Nepal cross border rail-link project i.e., (a) Jayanagar-Bijalpur-Bardibas and (b) Jogbani-Biratnagar, and agreed that both sides will take further measures necessary for expeditious completion of both the projects. Both sides agreed that steps will be initiated to facilitate development of three other agreed cross-border rail-link projects

(Nepalgunj-Nepalgunj road; Kakarbitta-New Jalpaiguri; Bhairawaha – Nautanwa) so that the land acquisition can commence on the Nepali side.

18. The two Prime Ministers directed the officials to expedite the construction of sub-station at Dhalkebar so that the Muzaffarpur-Dhalkebar transmission line can be operated at its full capacity as planned. It was decided that the construction of transmission lines (i) from Kataiya to Kusaha, and (ii) from Raxaul to Parwanipur will be completed by December 2016 to augment grid connectivity and power supply between the two countries. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction that both countries are engaged in preparation of a Master Plan for the cross-border interconnection for the period until 2035 and Action Plan on power trade until 2025.
19. The two Prime Ministers reviewed progress of other major hydro-power projects, Pancheshwar, Upper Karnali and Arun-III, and noted that various issues be addressed expeditiously with a view to implementing the projects in a time-bound manner so that their benefits start accruing to the people at the earliest. It was decided to expedite finalization of the Detailed Project Report of the Pancheshwar multi-purpose project. It was agreed that both sides will continue to take measures to operationalize the Power Trade Agreement signed in 2014. Both sides agreed to discuss all water resources cooperation related matters such as inundation and flood management, irrigation matters and other major projects, at the next meeting of the Joint Committee on Water Resources at the Secretary level, to be convened at an early date.
20. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the signing of the MOU for the construction of Raxaul-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline in August 2015 and directed that construction work be undertaken expeditiously.
21. Both the Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the utilisation of the two Lines of Credit of US\$ 100 million and US\$ 250 million for development of roads and power infrastructure in Nepal. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the allocation of US\$ 200 million for irrigation projects, and US\$ 330 million for development of roads and Mahakali bridge from the LoC of US\$

550 million. Both sides expressed their commitment to early implementation of these projects. At the request of Nepal, India conveyed its willingness to extend an additional line of credit to take up projects namely, HulakiRajmarg (Phase-II); cross-border transmission line connecting Butwal, 400 KV sub-stations at Dhalkebar and Hetauda, and a polytechnic in Kaski District.

22. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the performance of the India's Joint Ventures in Nepal and emphasized the need for channelizing more India's investments into Nepal according to its development priorities. They underlined the need for a secured environment for the investors to project Nepal as an attractive destination for foreign investment.
23. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the commencement of work for construction of a Dharmashala at the Pashupatinath Area. The MOU between the Pashupati Area Development Trust and the Archeological Survey of India for reconstruction and renovation of the monuments at the Pashupatinath Area will be finalized expeditiously.
24. The two Prime Ministers stressed the need for taking forward the cooperation in the fields of tourism and ayurvedic system of health care. In this regard, both sides will take steps to fully implement the MOUs on cooperation in Traditional Medicine and on Tourism Cooperation, including development of tourism in the form of Buddhist and Hindu pilgrim circuits.
25. The Prime Minister of Nepal extended an invitation to the Prime Minister of India to pay an official visit to Nepal. The Prime Minister of India accepted the invitation. The date will be finalized through diplomatic channels.

Source: <https://mofa.gov.np/jointstatement/>

APPENDIX-5**INDIA-NEPAL JOINT STATEMENT DURING THE STATE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL TO INDIA (23-27 AUGUST 2017)**

1. The Rt. Hon'ble Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba, Prime Minister of Nepal, and Dr. Arzu Rana Deuba, are on a State visit to India from August 23-27, 2017, at the invitation of Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi. The delegation includes Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Minister for Finance of Nepal Mr. Gyanendra Bahadur Karki, Minister for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation of Nepal Mr. Jitendra Narayan Dev, Minister for Commerce of Nepal Mr. Meen Bahadur Bishwakarma, Members of Legislature-Parliament of Nepal and other senior officials of the Government of Nepal.
2. The Prime Minister of Nepal was accorded a ceremonial reception at the forecourt of Rashtrapati Bhavan on August 24, 2017. He paid respects and tribute to the memory of Mahatma Gandhi at Rajghat. The Prime Minister of Nepal called on Hon'ble President of India, Shri Ram Nath Kovind, and Hon'ble Vice President of India, Shri M. Venkaiah Naidu. External Affairs Minister of India Smt. Sushma Swaraj, Minister of Finance Shri. Arun Jaitley called on the Prime Minister of Nepal.
3. Prime Minister of Nepal interacted with India's business community at a function jointly hosted by ASSOCHAM, CII, and FICCI, and will deliver an address at a think-tank in New Delhi. Apart from his official engagements in New Delhi, Prime Minister of Nepal will also visit Hyderabad, Tirupati and Bodhgaya.
4. The two Prime Ministers held comprehensive talks on all aspects of bilateral relationship. The talks were held in an atmosphere of utmost cordiality and warmth that have characterized the close and friendly relation between India and Nepal. An official banquet was hosted by Prime Minister of India in honour of the visiting dignitary and his delegation.

Broadening partnership through high-level exchanges

5. The Prime Minister of India thanked Prime Minister of Nepal for accepting his invitation and warmly welcomed him to India on his first visit abroad since assuming office in June 2017. This is Prime Minister Deuba's landmark fourth visit to India as the Prime Minister of Nepal and holds special significance as it is taking place in the 70th year of establishment of India-Nepal diplomatic relation. The Prime Minister of Nepal congratulated the Government and people of India on marking the completion of 70th year of India's Independence. He thanked Prime Minister of India for the warm invitation and hospitality extended to him and his delegation. He stated that his visit to India demonstrates the importance that the Government of Nepal attaches to good neighborly relation with India.
6. The Prime Minister of India, on behalf of people and Government of India, conveyed deepest condolences and sympathies to people and Government of Nepal on loss of precious lives and damage to property and infrastructure as a result of floods in Nepal. He conveyed that India stands ready to provide all possible relief assistance to Nepal. The Prime Minister of Nepal thanked Government of India for its support to relief efforts of Nepal. He also expressed deepest condolences and sympathies on the loss of lives and damage to property and infrastructure on the India's side.
7. The two Prime Ministers appreciated the regular exchange of high-level visits that have given a new momentum in taking the bilateral cooperation agenda forward. They appreciated the regular meetings of sector specific bilateral mechanisms across diverse sectors of cooperation. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the visits of Members of Legislature-Parliament of Nepal to India and expressed hope to see increased frequency of such engagements between the two parliaments.
8. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction over the excellent state of India-Nepal relation that is deep, comprehensive and multi-faceted. They pledged to pursue new opportunities to further deepen bilateral relation for the benefit of the peoples of both countries, while committing to further

reinvigorate the existing mechanisms. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work towards strengthening bilateral relation on the basis of mutual trust, goodwill, mutual benefit, with due regard to each other's aspirations, sensitivities and interests.

9. The two Prime Ministers underlined the indispensability of democratic institutions for peace, development and prosperity. The Prime Minister of Nepal shared with the Prime Minister of India the recent political developments in Nepal. The Prime Minister of India welcomed the successful conduct of two phases of local level elections and congratulated the Prime Minister of Nepal for this achievement. He appreciated the efforts being made by the Government of Nepal to take all sections of society on board in constitution implementation process and in establishing Nepal as a federal, democratic republic. The Prime Minister of Nepal thanked the Prime Minister of India for the assistance provided for the conduct of local level elections in Nepal.
10. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction on the progress made by the Eminent Persons Group on Nepal-India Relation in their four meetings since its establishment in February 2015. They hoped that the Group would submit its report within its mandated period, suggesting measures to further expand the close and multifaceted ties between the two countries, in accordance with its Terms of Reference, including any recommendations on review of past bilateral treaties.

Strengthening defence and security cooperation

11. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction over the ongoing defence cooperation and committed to further enhancing close cooperation between the India's Army and the Nepal Army. Prime Minister of Nepal thanked the Government of India for continued assistance in training and capacity building of the security forces of Nepal.
12. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the excellent cooperation on security-related matters. The two sides expressed commitment to ensure that the open border, a unique feature of India-Nepal bilateral relation that

has facilitated unhindered movement of people on both sides of the border, is not misused by unscrupulous elements posing security threat to either side. The two sides reiterated their commitment that their respective territories would not be allowed to be used for any activities inimical to the other.

Partnership for sustainable development

13. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction on the functioning of the ‘Oversight Mechanism’ established in 2016, and the progress made through the mechanism in resolving bottlenecks and speeding up implementation of ongoing projects under bilateral economic and development cooperation.
14. The Prime Minister of India reiterated India’s commitment to work with the Government of Nepal to expedite post-earthquake reconstruction projects in a time-bound manner. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the finalization of modalities for implementation as well as identification of projects in the four identified sectors for India’s reconstruction assistance. It was agreed to identify at the earliest projects under the US\$ 750 million Line of Credit for post-earthquake reconstruction.
15. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction utilization of the two Lines of Credit of US\$ 100 million and US\$ 250 million for development of roads and power infrastructure in Nepal. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the allocation of US\$ 200 million for irrigation projects, and US\$ 330 million for development of roads from LoC of US\$ 550 million.
16. The two Prime Ministers urged a constructive pursuit of a forward-looking development agenda wherein each country could learn from and contribute to the social and economic initiatives of a transformative nature. Towards this objective, it was agreed to initiate an annual policy dialogue between the NITI Aayog of India and the National Planning Commission of Nepal.

Enhancing cross-border connectivity through infrastructure development

17. The two Prime Ministers shared the view that enhanced connectivity between India and Nepal will increase people-to-people contacts as well as promote economic growth. The two Prime Ministers reviewed the progress made in the implementation of bilateral connectivity projects. Both sides recognized the need for early completion of two ongoing cross-border rail-link projects: (a) Jayanagar-Bijalpur-Bardibas and (b) Jogbani-Biratnagar rail-links. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction that the railway line from Jayanagar to Janakpur and from Jogbani to Biratnagar Custom Yard will be completed by 2018. The Nepali side committed to resolve all issues for expeditious completion of both the projects.
18. The two Prime Ministers underlined the importance of rail links in India-Nepal connectivity as these links will usher in growth and development by way of enhanced trade and tourism links. The two Prime Ministers also agreed on early completion of the Field Location Survey of remaining three cross-border rail links (a) New Jalpaiguri to Kakarbhitta, (b) Nautanwa to Bhairahawa, and (c) Nepalgunj Road to Nepalgunj.
19. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the award of work of Integrated Check Post (ICP) at Biratnagar and directed their respective officials to pursue its construction and operationalize ICP Birgunj by December 2017. The two Prime Ministers underlined the need for early approval of Detailed Engineering Designs of ICPs at Bhairahawa and Nepalgunj.
20. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction on the award of contract for twelve packages under nine roads, totalling about 240 kms, under the Terai Roads project. The Nepali side assured to resolve expeditiously all encumbrances relating to land acquisition, forest clearances and removal of utility services for early completion of the project.
21. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress in the construction of *dharamshala* at the Pashupatinath temple complex. They expressed hope that the work on the *dharamshala* and Nepal-Bharat Maitri Polytechnic at Hetauda would be expedited.

22. The Prime Minister of Nepal conveyed that the Government of Nepal considers the Motihari-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline project a priority project. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the finalization of Detailed Engineering Route Survey and Engineering Design reports of the project. They directed the concerned officials to expeditiously remove all bottlenecks, including Right of Way, land acquisition, environmental and regulatory clearances, so that the construction work could begin at the earliest.
23. The Prime Ministers welcomed the decision to set up a Joint Working Group on cooperation in oil and gas sectors, which would consider advancing cooperation in areas such as (a) construction of LPG pipeline from Motihari to Amlekhgunj; (b) construction of Natural Gas pipeline from Gorakhpur to Sunwal; c) assistance of IOCL for preparing DPR for extension of Petroleum Products pipeline from Amlekhgunj to Chitwan in Nepal.

Cooperation in projects of national priority for Nepal

24. In response to the Prime Minister of Nepal highlighting priority projects for Nepal's growth and development, the Prime Minister of India underlined that India stands ready to provide economic and development cooperation assistance. The two sides reached in principle agreement for India's grant assistance to support the establishment of Technical Institute in Far West of Nepal, and the GP Koirala National Centre for Respiratory Diseases in Tanahun. In addition, the two Prime Ministers agreed that their Governments would hold discussions to explore the feasibility of cooperation on mutually agreed basis on the following projects:
- Kushinagar-Lumbini-Kapilavastu and Bardibas-Birgunj Railways
 - Up gradation of Birgunj-Pathlaiya-Narayanghat and Butwal-Pokhara roads into express ways
 - International Airport at Nijgadh
 - Motorable Bridges on Mahakali River
 - Maitri Bridge at Birgunj-Raxaul border

- Development of dry port at DodharaChandani
- Developing a Special Economic Zone in Nepal
- Development of new 132 kV transmission lines
- Butwal (Nepal)-Gorakhpur (India) cross-border transmission line
- Lumki (Nepal)-Bareilly (India) cross-border transmission line

Harnessing water resources and expanding energy cooperation

25. The two Prime Ministers, noting the positive and productive discussion on the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, directed the concerned officials to finalize its Detailed Project Report within a month.
26. The Prime Minister of Nepal reiterated the commitment of Government of Nepal to address all pending issues on priority relating to 900 MW Arun-III and Upper Karnali hydropower projects, in accordance with the project development agreements.
27. The India's side conveyed the finalization of Detailed Project Report for the construction of head regulator and link canal from Tanakpur Barrage to the Nepali side.
28. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the recent meeting of specialized committees in water resources, including the Joint Committee on Inundation and Flood Management, and the Joint Team of Experts. They expressed the hope that these meetings would enhance bilateral cooperation in water resources in areas such as irrigation, flood management and river training works. The two Prime Ministers agreed that the work on preparation of the Detailed Project Report for the Sapt-Kosi high dam and Sun-Kosi storage cum diversion scheme be expedited. The two sides also agreed to strengthen coordination and consultation on the pressing matter of inundation and flood management in the border areas. In this regard, it was agreed to take expeditious steps, including joint visits, to consider appropriate measures for sustainable solution.
29. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction that the meetings of the Joint Steering Committee and Joint Working Group on Power are being

regularly held and appreciated the recent steps taken by both sides to enhance supply of power from India to Nepal, including operationalization of Muzaffarpur-Dhalkebar, Kataiya-Kusaha and Raxaul-Parwanipur cross-border transmission lines. The Prime Minister of Nepal thanked Prime Minister of India for swift action by India's entities to install an additional transformer at Muzaffarpur sub-station for supplying additional power to Nepal from Muzaffarpur-Dhalkebar transmission line in January 2017. The Prime Minister of India assured that the Government of India will be responsive to future request for power from Government of Nepal.

30. It was agreed that both sides will continue to take measures to operationalize all aspects of the Power Trade Agreement signed in 2014. The two Prime Ministers appreciated the efforts of both sides in preparing a Master Plan for the cross-border interconnection for the period until 2035.

Scaling up trade and investment links

31. The two Prime Ministers highlighted the importance of realizing the full potential of bilateral trade and investment. They welcomed the renewal of the India-Nepal Treaty of Trade and the Agreement of Cooperation between Government of India and Government of Nepal to Control Unauthorized Trade, in October 2016, for further period of seven years.
32. The Prime Minister of Nepal expressed concern over Nepal's growing trade deficit with India. Noting the current level of bilateral trade, the two Prime Ministers underscored that there is a considerable potential to enhance the bilateral trade, which could be harnessed by addressing infrastructural deficiencies and trade restricting measures as well as by adopting trade facilitation measures for easier market access to agricultural and industrial products. Both sides agreed to cooperate towards strengthening testing and certifying laboratories, establishing quarantine facilities and harmonising standards.
33. Both Prime Ministers also agreed on early conclusion of the Letters of Exchange for transit of bulk cargo to Nepal using multi-modal transport, movement of traffic in transit via Nepal and on amendment to Rail Services

Agreement. Both sides agreed to take steps for early upgradation and operationalization of the agreed trade points namely Dhangadhi-Gauriphanta, Guleria-Murthia, Jatahi-Pipraun and Pashupatinagar-Sukhiapokhri. The two sides also agreed that issues relating to impact of introduction of Goods and Service Tax in India on bilateral and transit trade be examined expeditiously. It was agreed that the next meeting of the Inter-Governmental Committee on trade, transit and control of unauthorized trade at the Secretary level will be held by end-2017, to discuss all trade and transit related issues with an objective to facilitate bilateral and transit trade.

34. The two Prime Ministers emphasized the need for channelizing more direct investments from India into Nepal. The Prime Minister of Nepal shared information on the recent steps taken by Government of Nepal to spur economic reforms with the aim of enhancing investor confidence in his country.

Consolidating cultural links and promoting people to people ties

35. On B.P. Koirala India-Nepal Foundation completing 25 years of establishment in December 2016, the two Prime Ministers appreciated the contribution made by the Foundation in cementing people-to-people ties and acknowledged the immense goodwill that the activities of the Foundation have generated at people's level on both sides.
36. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction that the bus services between Kathmandu-Delhi, Kathmandu-Varanasi, Mahendranagar-New Delhi and Pokhara-New Delhi are operational. It was agreed that the Joint Working Group on Cross-Border Transport Facilitation will meet early to address operational issues for existing and additional routes.
37. The two Prime Ministers stressed the need for taking forward the cooperation in the fields of tourism and Ayurvedic system of health care. In this regard, both sides agreed to take steps to fully implement the MoUs on Cooperation in Traditional Medicine and on Tourism Cooperation, including the development of pilgrim circuits. The two Prime Ministers hoped that the next meetings of the Joint Working Groups on Tourism, Civil Aviation and

Transport Facilitation would be convened at the earliest to carry forward the cooperation to facilitate cultural and tourism links.

38. Both Prime Ministers directed their respective officials to finalize the MoU between the Pashupati Area Development Trust and the Archaeological Survey of India for reconstruction and renovation work.

Working together in international, regional and sub-regional fora

39. The two Prime Ministers emphasized the advantages of cooperation at regional and sub-regional level, including BIMSTEC and SAARC. As the current Chair, the Prime Minister of Nepal thanked Prime Minister of India for the BIMSTEC Leaders' Retreat hosted by India in Goa in October 2016 along with the BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the renewed momentum for cooperation within the BIMSTEC framework, which is observing its 20th anniversary this year.
40. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the successful launch of the South Asia Satellite as a unique example of regional cooperation in space sector, and an initiative that would touch the lives of people in the region through space technology applications in the areas of telecommunication and broadcasting, tele-medicine, tele-education, e-governance, banking and ATM services, meteorological data transmission, disaster response and networking of academic and research institutions.
41. The two Prime Ministers acknowledged that India and Nepal have been working together in the United Nations and other international fora to advance cause of common interest. The Prime Minister of Nepal reiterated Nepal's support for India's candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
42. Recognizing that terrorism remains one of the most significant threats to peace and stability in the region, the two Prime Ministers reiterated their strong commitment to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They called on the international community for early finalization and

adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism by the UNGA.

Agreements/MoUs signed

43. The two Prime Ministers witnessed the exchange of the following documents on August 24:
 - MoU on Modalities for Utilization of India's Housing Grant Component to support Reconstruction of 50,000 Houses
 - MoU on Implementation of the Grant Component of India's Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Package in the Education Sector in Nepal
 - MoU on Implementation of the Grant Component of India's Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Package in Cultural Heritage Sector in Nepal
 - MoU on Implementation of the Grant Component of India's Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Package in the Health Sector in Nepal
 - Cooperation Agreement between Bureau of India's Standards (BIS) & Nepal Bureau of Standards & Metrology
 - MoU on Drug Demand Reduction and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemical and Related Matters
 - MoU for construction of Mechi bridge
 - MoU between Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nepal

44. The two Prime Ministers jointly inaugurated the Kataiya (India)-Kusaha (Nepal) and Raxaul (India)-Parwanipur (Nepal) cross-border transmission lines, which would enable additional 100 MWs of power supply from India to Nepal.

45. The two Prime Ministers agreed that the visit will provide further impetus to strengthening the age-old bonds of friendship between the people of India and Nepal and help advance the mutually beneficial multi-dimensional ties to the next level.

46. The Prime Minister of Nepal extended an invitation to the Prime Minister of India to pay a visit to Nepal. The Prime Minister of India accepted the invitation and it was agreed that the visit would take place at mutually convenient dates.

APPENDIX- 6**JOINT STATEMENT DURING THE STATE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER KP SHARMA OLI OF NEPAL TO INDIA (6-8 APRIL 2018)**

1. The Rt. Hon'ble Mr, Prime Minister of Nepal, is on a State visit to India from April 6-8, 2018, at the invitation of the Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi.
2. On April 7, 2018, the two Prime Ministers comprehensively reviewed the entire spectrum of multifaceted ties between the two countries. They welcomed the growing partnership between the two governments, private sector and at the people's level. The two Prime Ministers resolved to work together to take bilateral relation to newer heights on the basis of equality, mutual trust, respect and benefit.
3. Recalling that the close and friendly India-Nepal relation are built on the strong foundation of shared historical and cultural links and close people to people contacts, the two Prime Ministers underscored the importance of regular high-level political exchanges in cementing bilateral ties.
4. Prime Minister Oli stated that his government attaches high importance to further strengthening friendly relation with India. He expressed the desire of the Government of Nepal to develop bilateral relation in a way so as to benefit from India's progress and prosperity for economic transformation and development. Prime Minister Modi assured Prime Minister Oli that India remains committed to strengthening its partnership with Nepal as per the priorities of the Government of Nepal.
5. Prime Minister Modi stated that Government of India's vision of '*SabkaSaathSabka Vikas*' is a guiding framework for India's engagement with its neighbors for a shared vision of inclusive development and prosperity. Prime Minister Oli stated that after the landmark political transformation, his Government has given priority to economic transformation with the motto '*Samriddha Nepal Sukhi Nepali*'. Prime Minister Modi congratulated the people and the Government of Nepal for

successful conduct of local level, federal parliament and first-ever provincial elections in Nepal and appreciated their vision for stability, and development.

6. The two Prime Ministers inaugurated the Integrated Check Post at Birgunj in Nepal. They hoped that its early operationalization will enhance cross-border trade and transit of goods and movement of people bringing greater opportunities for shared growth and development.
7. The two Prime Ministers witnessed the ground breaking ceremony of the Motihari-Amlekhgunj cross-border petroleum products pipeline at Motihari, India.
8. The two Prime Ministers underlined the need for expeditious implementation of bilateral projects in Nepal, and to reinvigorate the existing bilateral mechanisms to promote cooperative agenda across diverse spheres.
9. Three separate joint statements on the following key areas of mutual interest were issued today:
 - India-Nepal: New Partnership in Agriculture
 - Expanding Rail Linkages: Connecting Raxaul in India to Kathmandu in Nepal
 - New Connectivity between India and Nepal through Inland Waterways
10. The two Prime Ministers agreed that the visit has imparted new dynamism to the multifaceted partnership between the two countries.
12. Prime Minister Oli thanked Prime Minister Modi for the invitation and warm hospitality extended to him and his delegation.
13. Prime Minister Oli extended an invitation to Prime Minister Modi to pay an early visit to Nepal. Prime Minister Modi accepted the invitation; dates would be finalized through diplomatic channels.

Source:<https://mofa.gov.np/joint-statement-during-the-state-visit-of-prime-minister-of-nepal-to-india-6-8-april-2018/>

APPENDIX-7**MoFA RELEASES INDIA-NEPAL JOINT STATEMENT FOLLOWING
INDIA'S PM MODI'S VISIT (11 TO 12 MAY 2018)**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has today released a joint-statement following the India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi's two-day visit to Nepal.

The statement contains point wise details on the India's Prime Minister's visit.

1. The Prime Minister of India His Excellency Shri Narendra Modi is on a State Visit to Nepal from 11 to 12 May 2018 at the invitation of the Prime Minister of Nepal the Rt. Hon'ble K P Sharma Oli.
2. MarKing their second bilateral Summit in 2018, the two Prime Ministers held delegation level talks on 11 May 2018 in an atmosphere of utmost warmth and cordiality that characterizes the deep friendship and understanding between the two countries.
3. The two Prime Ministers recalled their meeting in New Delhi during the State visit of Prime Minister Oli in April 2018 and agreed to maintain the momentum generated by the visit by taking effective measures for the implementation of all the agreements and understandings reached in the past. They also agreed that effective implementation of the bilateral initiatives in agriculture, railway linkages and inland waterways development, as agreed upon by the two sides during the recent visit of Prime Minister Oli to India, would have transformational impact in these areas.
4. While reviewing the close and multifaceted relation between the two countries at different levels, the two Prime Ministers reiterated their resolve to work together to take bilateral relation to newer heights by strengthening ongoing cooperation in diverse spheres as well as expanding partnership for socio-economic development on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual trust, respect and mutual benefit.

5. The two Prime Ministers emphasized the need for regular convening of bilateral mechanisms, including Nepal-India Joint Commission at Foreign/External Affairs Ministers level, to review the overall state of bilateral relation, and for the expeditious implementation of the economic and development cooperation projects.
6. The two Prime Ministers underscored the importance of trade and economic ties between India and Nepal. Expressing concern over Nepal's growing trade deficit with India, Prime Minister Oli stated that measures to address this deficit need to be taken. In this context, the two Prime Ministers welcomed the outcome of the recently held Inter-Governmental Committee meeting on Trade, Transit and Cooperation to control unauthorized trade to jointly initiate a comprehensive review of the bilateral Treaty of Trade, and to consider amendments to the Treaty of Transit and related Agreements with a view to further facilitating Nepal's access to the India's market, enhancing overall bilateral trade, and facilitating Nepal's transit trade.
7. The two Prime Ministers underlined the catalytic role of connectivity in stimulating economic growth and promoting movement of people. They agreed to take further steps to enhance the economic and physical connectivity by air, land, and water. Recognizing the vibrant people to people contacts and friendly bilateral ties, the two Prime Ministers directed the respective officials to expand cooperation in civil aviation sector, including early technical discussion on additional air entry routes to Nepal by respective technical teams.
8. The two Prime Ministers reiterated the importance of advancing cooperation in water resources for mutual benefit in areas such as river training works, inundation and flood management, irrigation, and to enhance pace of implementation of ongoing bilateral projects. They also expressed satisfaction over constitution of the joint team, which will visit areas affected by inundation and floods and consider appropriate measures for sustainable solution.

9. The two Prime Ministers jointly laid the foundation stone of 900 MW Arun-III hydro-electric projects in Nepal. They expressed hope that operationalization of the project would help enhance cooperation in the generation and trade of power between the two countries. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the outcome of the recently concluded meeting of the Joint Steering Committee on cooperation in the power sector held on 17 April 2018. They agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation in power sector in line with the bilateral Power Trade Agreement.
10. Prime Minister Modi also visited Janakpur and Muktinath and attended civic receptions in Kathmandu and Janakpur.
11. With a view to further strengthening the close religious and cultural ties between the two countries and peoples, the two Prime Ministers launched Nepal-India Ramayana Circuit connecting Janakpur, the birthplace of Sita, with Ayodhya and other sites associated with the epic Ramayana. In Janakpur, the two Prime Ministers flagged off the inaugural direct bus service between Janakpur and Ayodhya.
12. The two Prime Ministers directed their respective officials to address outstanding matters by September 2018, with the objective of advancing cooperation in all areas.
13. The two Prime Ministers underscored the importance of regional and sub-regional cooperation under BIMSTEC, SAARC, and BBIN frameworks for forging meaningful cooperation in identified sectors.
14. The two Prime Ministers agreed that the landmark third visit of Prime Minister Modi to Nepal has further strengthened the age-old friendly relation between the two countries and has injected a fresh impetus to our growing partnership.
15. Prime Minister Modi thanked Prime Minister Oli for his gracious invitation and warmth of hospitality.

16. Prime Minister Modi extended an invitation to Prime Minister Oli to pay a visit to India. Prime Minister Oli accepted the invitation; dates will be finalized through diplomatic channels.

APPENDIX-8
KEY INFORMANTS

SN	Name	Position	Interview date
1.	Bishow Mohan Joshi	Associate Professor of History, Bhaktapur (<i>Civil Society Member</i>)	12 December, 2018
2.	Krishna Khanal (krishnakhanal@gmail.com)	Professor Political Science TU (<i>Academia</i>)	12 April, 2019 11AM
3.	Krishna Pokherel, PhD (pokharelkrishna@gmail.com)	Professor of Political Science TU (<i>Academia</i>)	10 April, 2019 4 PM
4.	Lok Raj Baral, PhD (baralokraj@gmail.com)	EX - ambassador to India (1996-1997) & HoD in Central Department of Political Science (<i>Professor cum' Diplomat</i>)	4 April 2019,
5.	Madav Kumar Nepal	EX Prime Minister of Nepal and Head of International Relation Wing of Party. (<i>Political Leader</i>)	24 March, 2019
6..	Narayan Man Bijuchhe	President of Nepal Workers and Present Party. (<i>Political Leader</i>)	3 November, 2018
7..	Parshuram Meghi Gurung (megipr@gmail.com)	President of Parliamentary Committee on Federal Legislation of (<i>Political leader</i>)	12 February, 2019
8..	Pesal Dhakal (Sarlahi)	Central Committee Member (People's Rights Forum) (<i>Political Leader</i>)	8 September, 2021
9.	Pramesh Hamal	EX – ambassador to Belgium (2007-11) (<i>Diplomat</i>)	28 February 2019,

10.	Puruswottom Dahal (pdahal@gmail.com)	Professor, Central Committee Member NC(<i>Political Leader</i>)	13April, 2019
11.	Rabindra Khanal, PhD	Associate Professor of Political Science TU(<i>Academia</i>)	10 March, 2019
12.	Rajan Bhattarai, PhD	IR - advisor of PM Oli <i>Leader CPN(UML)</i>	11 December, 2018,
13.	Raji Raya Yadav (Mohotari)	(<i>Civil Society Member</i>) (Mohotari)	12 August, 2021
14.	Ram Kumar Dahal, PhD	Professor of Political Science TU(<i>Academia</i>)	9 April, 2019 8 PM
15.	Ram Narayan Prajapati	Associate Professor of Political Science, Bhaktapur(<i>Civil Society Member</i>)	18 December, 2018
16.	Rekha Yadav (Morang) thepopulartimes@gmail.com	Central Committee Member (People's Rights Forum)(<i>Political Leader</i>)	8 September, 2021
17.	Surendra K.C. PhD	Professor of History, TU (<i>Civil Society Member</i>)	10 April,2019
18.	Surya Raj Acharya, PhD	Spokes person of Vivekshil Sajha Party(<i>Political Leader</i>)	3 December, 2019
19.	Tanka Karki	EX - ambassador to China (2007-2011)(<i>Diplomat</i>)	26 March 2019,
20.	Tilok Prakash Shrestha	Ex- District Secretary of NC Bhaktapur(<i>Political Leader</i>)	12 March, 2019

APPENDIX-9
SEMI-INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

To obtain the specific objective of the research, interviews with prominent personalities were taken with the help of the following set of semi-interview guidelines. The interviews were selected from the personage, who served at Tribhuvan University as a Professor/Associate Professors of Political Science, Diplomats, Political Leaders and Civil Society Representatives.

A. The following questions were asked to findout the historical evolution of Nepal-India relation till 1989:

1. Respected sir, would you mind explaining the historical presepective of Nepal-India relations since Sugauli Treaty onwards?
2. Sir, how has 1950's Nepal-India Peace and Friendly Treaty affected Nepal –India relations?
3. Would you mind to put your valuable opinion on special/mid-wife relation era (1951-55), 1960s' Royal Coup, ZoP and India, blockade against Nepal 1989?

B. The following questions were asked to find out the influences of India in Nepal's political changes (1990-2006):

1. Honorable sir, how have you analyzed the role of India in 1990s' and 2006s' political changes?
2. Would you please like to put your understanding on role of India in Nepal's peace process concerning to 12 point agreement and mass movement II 2006?

C. The following questions were asked to get an ideas/informations on India's role in Nepal's political activities since 2007 to 2020:

1. Sir, how is India influencing in Nepali politics with the peace process?

2. Sir, in your perception what are the causes of failure of CA I (2008), i.e., Madhesh movements, constitution making process and India's relations with Nepalese political parties, frequent changes in governments, constitution proclamation and Madhesi based parties' quit from CA?
3. Please, feel comfort sir by giving your opinion on unofficial blockade of India against Nepal, Was there India's role to boost up Madhesh based parties ?
4. Sir, would you mind to present some glances on Nepalese march towards independent foreign relation since the formation of present government with nearly two-third majority?
5. Sir, would you like to present any suggestions to strengthen Nepal-India relations?

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