

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CHINA-INDIA COOPERATION IN NEPAL

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LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

I certify that this dissertation entitled “**Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal**” was prepared by **HEMANTA BUDHATHOKI**, under my supervision. I hereby recommend this dissertation for final examination by the Research Committee Master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy, Tribhuvan University, in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of **MASTER’S IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY**.



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
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ABSTRACT

Nepal's geographical location is geopolitically, geo-strategically, and geo-economically important for its immediate neighbors China and India and other great powers of the international arena. Nepal can be developed as a transit point for trade between China and India. Also, if trilateral relation between China-India and Nepal could be conducted, Nepal can be developed as the trilateral junction between China and India. China-India – Nepal Economic Corridor proposed by some of the scholars can be useful for proper trilateral relations between these countries.

Lack of infrastructure is one of the major causes of backwardness of Nepal from the development perspective. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be an important platform for infrastructure development. Nepal is a mountainous country and one of the important destinations from a tourism point of view. There are also some effects of the China-India cooperation in Nepal. There are possibilities of pressure and intervention of Nepal's internal affairs by China and India, due to the geopolitical, geo-strategic, and geo-economic importance of Nepal. There are also possibilities of effect/encroachment of national interest, independence and, integrity, due to keeping China-India cooperation as current Lipulekh territorial issue. On the other hand, China and India are emerging powers of the world. So, there is a possibility of increasing concern towards Nepal by other great powers of the world as well. So, Nepal has to remain more conscious and aware to protect and promote its national interest, independence, integrity and unity.

Being a small state; Nepal has to be conscious of the security aspect while cooperating with China, India, and other countries. Lastly, Nepal is sensitive in terms of geopolitics, geo-strategic, and geo-economic aspects. The immediate neighbors China and India have been emerging as a new great power of the world. On the other hand, other great powers of the world also have prioritized Nepal strategically. So, Nepal has to continue its non-alignment trend and focus on its economic development and prosperity.

Key Words: China- India Relations, China-India Cooperation, China- Nepal Relation, India-Nepal Relations, Realism, Liberalism.

2.2.6.1	China-India Trade Relations	29
2.2.6.2	China's FDI in India and China-India Bilateral Investment	32
2.2.7	China-India Socio-Cultural Relations	32
2.2.8	China-India Cooperation in Technical, Academic / Educational, Energy and Sweet Water Security, Manufacturing and Services Sectors	34
2.2.9	China-India Treaties, Agreements and Protocols	35
2.2.10	China-India Cooperation in Environmental Issues	36
2.2.11	China-India Cooperation in Security Issue and Counter-Terrorism	36
2.2.12	China-India Rivalry	37
2.2.12.1	China-India Border Dispute	37
2.2.12.2	China-India Doklam Issues	40
2.2.12.3	China-India Relations and Tibet Issue	40
2.2.12.4	China-India Relations in BRI and OBOR	43
2.2.12.5	China-India Relations and Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS)	45
2.2.13	Recent Trends of China-India Relations	46
2.3	China-India Cooperation and Nepal	47
2.3.1	China's Foreign Policy Towards Nepal	47
2.3.1.1	Glimpses of China-Nepal Relations	48
2.3.1.2	Glimpses of Diplomatic Relations between China and Nepal	49
2.3.1.2.1	State Level Visit of China and Nepal	54
2.3.1.3	China-Nepal Bilateral Treaties and Agreements	55
2.3.1.4	Socio-Cultural Relations between China and Nepal	58
2.3.1.5	China-Nepal Strategic Partnership	59
2.3.1.6	China-Nepal Economic Relations	60
2.3.1.6.1	China-Nepal Trade Relations	61
2.3.1.6.2	Chinese Aid to Nepalese Development	62
2.3.1.7	China-Nepal Relations and Security Issue	63
2.3.1.8	China-Nepal Cooperation in International /Regional Organizations /Institutions	64
2.3.1.8.1	China -Nepal Relations and Boao Forum (BFA)	64
2.3.1.8.2	China-Nepal Relations and BRI and OBOR	64
2.3.1.9	Indo-Pacific Strategy and China-Nepal Relations	66
2.3.1.10	China-Nepal Relations and India Factor	66
2.3.1.11	Recent Trends in China -Nepal Relations	67
2.3.1.11.1	China Nepal Relations in Xi Era	67

2.3.2	India's Foreign Policy towards Nepal	68
2.3.2.1	Glimpses of India -Nepal Relations	69
2.3.2.2	Diplomatic Relations between India and Nepal	69
2.3.2.2.1	State Level Visit of India and Nepal	70
2.3.2.3	Bilateral Treaties and Agreements between India and Nepal	70
2.3.2.3.1	Treaty of Peace and friendship between India and Nepal	70
2.3.2.3.2	India-Nepal relations and Water resources of Nepal	71
2.3.2.3.3	India-Nepal Trade and Transit Treaty	71
2.3.2.3.3.1	Treaty of Trade and Commerce, 1950	72
2.3.2.3.3.2	Treaty of Trade and Transit,1960	73
2.3.2.4	India-Nepal Special Relations: Myth or Reality	73
2.3.2.5	India Nepal Economic Relations	73
2.3.2.5.1	India's Aid to Development of Nepal	74
2.3.2.5.2	India's Investment in Nepal	74
2.3.2.6	Indo-Nepal Relations and Security Issue	75
2.3.2.7	Indo- Nepal Border Issues	75
2.3.2.7	India's Big Brother Attitude Towards Nepal, Sphere of Influenceand Nehru Doctrine	77
2.3.2.7.1	India's blockades on Nepal	78
2.3.2.8	Nepal's Proposal of "Zone of Peace (ZOP)" and India	79
2.3.2.9	International/Regional Organizations and India -Nepal Relations (SAARC, NAM and BIMSTEC)	79
2.3.2.10	Recent Trends of Indo-Nepal relations	80
2.3.2.10.1	Indo -Nepal Relations in Modi-Oli Era	80
2.3.2.10.2	Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh Issue	80
2.3.2.10.3	India- Nepal Relations and China	81
2.3.3	China-India's Joint/Common Interest Towards Nepal	81

CHAPTER-III:CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH

METHODOLOGY

83-86

3.1	Conceptual Framework	83
3.1.1	Theory	83
3.1.2	Epistemology	84
3.1.3	Ontology	84

3.1.4	Methodology	84
3.1.5	Variables	84
3.2	Research Methodology	86
3.2.1	Research Design	86
3.2.2	Nature and Sources of Data	87
3.2.3	Area of Study	87
3.2.4	Data Analysis and Interpretation	87
CHAPTER-IV ANALYSIS		89-112
4.	Analysis of Implication, Effect and Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal	89
4.1	Implications, Effects and Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal	89
4.1.1	Implication of China-India Cooperation in Nepal	89
4.1.2	Effects of China -India Cooperation in Nepal	92
4.1.3	Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal	101
4.2	Analysis Implications, Effects and strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal	104
4.2. 1	Conceptual Analysis	104
4.2.1.1	Realism	104
4.2.1.2	Liberalism	106
4.3	Theoretical Analysis of Implications, Effects and Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal	107
4.3.1	Analysis of China-India Joint/Common Interest towards Nepal	109
4.3.2	Analysis of Chinese Foreign Policy towards Nepal	109
4.3.3	Analysis of Indian Foreign Policy towards Nepal	111
4.3.4	Analysis of China-India Joint/Common Interest towards Nepal	112
CHAPTER-V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION		113-130
5.1	Summary	113
5.2	Conclusion	121
BIBLIOGRAPHY		131-152

LIST OF ABBREVIATION/ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFTA	Asian Free Trade Agreement
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia –Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	Asian Development Bank
ARF	Asian Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEAN-FITA	Association of South East Asian Nations-Free Trade Agreement
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BBIN	The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal
BCIM	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
BCIMEC	Bangladesh-China- India -Myanmar Economic Corridor
BDCA	Border Defense Cooperation
BFA	Boao Forum
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral and Economic Cooperation
BIPPA	The Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Bank	Brazil Russia India China South Africa Bank
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAFTA	Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CDB	China Development Bank
CENTO	Central Treaty Organizations
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
EEU	European Economic Union
EPG	Eminent Person Group
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	China-Africa Cooperation Forum
FTA	Free Trade Area
FTAAP	Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBN	Investment Board Nepal
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IPR	Indo-Pacific Region
IPS	Indo-Pacific Strategy
KLL	Kalapani-Lipulek-Limpiayadhura
LAC	The Line of Actual Control
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LLDC	Landlocked Least Developed Countries
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDORI	Ministry of Defense of Republic of China
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NDB	New Development Bank
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NEFA	North-East-Frontier Agency
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSS	National Security Strategy
OBOR	One Belt One Road
OECD	Organization for Economic –Cooperation and Development
PBC	People’s Bank of China
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PLA	People’s Liberation Army
PRC	People’s Republic of China
RNA	Royal Nepalese Army
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCIG	Sichuan Investment Group
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organizations
SCS	South China Sea
SEATO	Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SREB	Silk Road Economic Belt
SRF	Silk Road Fund
TFCMSR	The Twenty First Century Maritime Silk Road
THM	CN-Trans-Himalayan-Multi Dimensional Connecting Network

TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNO	United Nations Organizations
UNSC	United Nation's Security Council
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZOP	Zone of Peace

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Nepal has close ties with both of its neighbors, India and China. By a long-standing treaty, Indian and Nepalese citizens may travel to each other's country without a passport and visa (Mishra, 2013,p.22). Until the 1970s, the world economists believed that India and China would never be able to reach the level of prosperity that the people of the western world are enjoying (Lohani, 2019, p.8), due to the huge and ever-increasing population of their countries. With increased economic production, scientific and technological innovation, industrialization and commercialization of agriculture, expansion of markets, China and India have proved that they are capable of competing with the rest of the world while ensuring a highest level of public welfare (ibid). During the past three decades, the ever-bitter relations between India and China have improved significantly, and they have come up with compromising terms on many conflicting issues. This has gradually increased the volume of mutual trade between China and India (ibid). As an immediate neighboring country of China and India, Nepal can benefit from tremendous economic progress and prosperity in India and China. So, the cooperation between China and India is important for Nepal strategically. From AD first to 1820, the two largest economies were always those of China and India. Only after that period did Europe take off followed by America (Mahbubani, 2019,p. 3).

There have been 16 bilateral meetings between Chinese president Xi Jinping and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi since 2014. Around 50 dialogue mechanisms exist between China and India for exchanging views on various bilateral, regional, and global issues (Poudyal, 2020, ¶. 14). Following the end of British rule in India, there was continued tension in the border areas of India and the Tibetan region of China. The two countries even waged war in 1962 over territorial claims (Lohani, 2019, p. 8). Hundreds of Indian and Chinese troops have been facing each other since early May at three or four locations on the disputed border in the uninhabited, barren mountains of Ladakh (*The Himalayan Times*, 2020, June 18, ¶. 14). India and China said they wanted peace but blamed each other on June 15 after soldiers savagely

fought each other with nail-studded clubs and stones on their Himalayan border, killing at least 20 Indian troops (ibid, June 18, ¶.1).

After the death of 20 Indian military personnel on 15th June 2020 in the Galwan Valley of disputed territory between China and India, the China-India relation also has entered into critical condition once again. The British magazine Telegraph online edition published on the afternoon of 16th June 2020 that 34 Indian military personnel were lost in a fight between Chinese military force and Indian military force in Galwan of Ladakh, the disputed area between China and India. The Indian side said that three military personnel including a colonel died on the evening of 16th June but at 11 PM on the evening of 16th June the defense ministry of India verified that 20 Indian military personnel were killed. Also, *Daily Bhaskar* Indian Newspaper, mentioned that additional 15 Indian military personnel were lost in that incident. The disputed area was controlled by China. The number of killed military personnel was confirmed only they reported the dead bodies to the base of Indian military forces toward. According to the daily Bhaskar Indian newspaper 43 military personnel killed on the Chinese side, but there is no authentic proof of such casualties. The Chinese magazine *Global Times* mentioned that there were casualties that happened on both sides China and India but this magazine has not mentioned casualties of the Chinese side.

According to the online edition of Indian Magazine *Hindustan Times*, tensions between India and China have surged after the Galwan Valley brawl on June 15 that resulted in 20 Indian deaths including that of the commanding officer and the Chinese army possibly suffered more than double casualties, which also included a commanding officer; said another officer (Tripathi, 2020, ¶.7). Carefully balancing the influence of its two giant neighbors has been Nepal's guiding foreign policy principle since the reign of Prithvi Narayan Shah. It has never been easy to maintain the political balance with two giant neighbors (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.1).

India's suspicion of China at this moment would be reasonable. India is in a serious military standoff with China in its northern frontier for over a month. Let us hope China and India will soon sit for diplomatic dialogue to deescalate the tensions (Poudyal, 2020, ¶.8). Eventually, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi led cabinet committee on security, the highest body in India to decide on matters of national

security, had recently concluded that it was meaningless to hold talks on Kalapani after the amendment of the constitution of Nepal (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.2).

The e-inauguration of Darchula to Lipulekh road by Indian defense minister Rajnath Singh on May 8, was a surprising move at a time when Nepal was offering to hold foreign secretary-level talks to resolve an outstanding dispute (KC, Ivar originally from 2020, ¶.1). After Nepali reaction towards road construction in the disputed areas, New Delhi asked Nepal to hold the talk until the end of the COVID - 19 crisis. However, on May 11, Nepal's Minister summoned a strong protest to the Indian Ambassador in Kathmandu and handed over the diplomatic note about the new road (KC,2020,¶.2). The border disputes regarding Kalapani-Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura started after 1879, when the British rule changed the name of the original Kali River originating from Limpiyadhura to Kuti Yangdi, and the small river originality from Lipulekh was labeled as Kali River in the maps. They produced and referred to as the border between India and Nepal (Upreti, 2020, ¶.4).

During a telephone conversation between Nepalese prime minister KP Oli and Indian PM Narendra Modi on April 10, the former had briefly broached the border issue stating that the two countries needed to sit for dialogue without further homeworks. The next phone conversation had scheduled for May 18 the scheduled conversation was canceled by the Indian side at the eleventh hour (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.13). Nepal India ties again hit rock bottom following the disputes over some 372 sq. k.m. of land at the border abutting the Kali River. India built a road through the Lipulekh Pass without consulting Nepal and it has also been stationing its army Kalapani, since early 1950 (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.1). The high-level talks came a week after 20 Indian Army personnel were killed in the violent clash between two sides in the Galwan valley, significance escalating the already volatile situation in the region (Rohatgi, 2020, ¶.6). After the slight retreat of Chinese soldiers in the Galwan region, the Lt. Generals from India and Chinese armies will hold talks in a rare meeting after several rounds of military dialogue failed to yield any results to end the month-long standoff in Laddakh (Bhalla, 2020, ¶.5).

China had blamed India for the clashes and had reasserted its claim to the entire Galwan Valley (Mishra, 2020, ¶.8). The death of 20 Indian soldiers at the hand of Chinese troops in the Galwan valley in Ladakh on the night of June 15-16 is the

most serious national security crisis after India has faced the Kargil war in 1999 (Baruah, 2020, ¶.2). Analysts have pointed out that the nature of the current tension in Ladakh is the worst since 1967. In several periodic skirmishes at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) not even a single round of bullet was fired. The recent Lieutenant General level talk of June 6 was indicative of an “impasse”. (Sharma, 2020, ¶.4). Under an old agreement between the two nuclear-armed Asian giants China and India, no shots are fired at this border, but there have been fisticuffs in recent years between border patrols (*The Himalayan Times*, 2020, June 18, ¶.6).

The rival armies have been eyeballed to eyeball at their border for decades, but it was the worst clash since 1967, five years after China humiliated India in that war (Ibid, ¶.8). Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of China, Wang Yi, mentioned that in the evening of June 15 that Indian frontline border forces openly broke the consensus reached at the commander- level -meeting between India and China when the situation in the Galwan valley had deescalated the Indian forces crossed the LAC (ibid, ¶.2). Indian Foreign Minister Jay Shankar shared India’s position and expressed India’s readiness to act in the interest of their bilateral relations, implement the consensus reached by two leaders together with China, peacefully resolve disputes in the border region through dialogue and reduce tensions in the border area (ibid, ¶.5).

After Nepal published a new national map of Nepal incorporating all disputed territories, China said it hoped both Nepal and India would stop all irrelevant activities. It added the dispute over the Kalapani region in particular in entirely up to Nepal and India to settle (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.2). Regarding the unbecoming act of road construction up to Lipulekh, India’s condescending behavior has hurt Nepal’s emotion and especially more with false narrative by eminent Indian diplomats and scholars (Sharma,2020, ¶.13). The Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura issue in an unresolved border legendbetween two nations, also recognized as ‘outstanding’ by the unpublished report of the Nepal -India joint Eminent Persons Group (formed for a comprehensive issue of bilateral relations (Wagle,2020, ¶.3). Nepal is now trying to get back its territory i.e., Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh. As India also claims the same territory, the dispute is likely to escalate unless Nepal convinces logically, it will not agree to return the land Nepal needs to channel its resources wisely to convince India (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.1).

The official spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of India Anurag Srivastava mentioned that dialogue with Nepal require “positive efforts” even as a Nepalese media outlet reported on May 28 that unexpected telephone conversation between Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and his counterpart, Nepalese prime minister KP Sharma Oli has failed to materialize (*The Hindu*, 2020, May 28, ¶.2). India and China themselves have set the precedents of preventing tensions from escalating further through diplomatic means on multiple occasions in the past. In 2017, for example, it almost seemed like there out would be an all-out war in the Doklam plateau (*My Republica*,2020 June 18, ¶.5). At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a clash with Chinese forces in Ladakh in the disputed Kashmir region, the Indian Army said on 2020 June 2020(*My Republica*,2020 June 17, ¶.1). Indian and Chinese troops on border patrol duties had a brief skirmish in Sikkim another eastern Indian state bordering China in the Indian Defense Ministry said on May 9, blaming both sides for the incident.

Two nuclear-armed countries with second and third highest military spending encountering an eyeball-to-eyeball faceoff at the disputed border at Galwan valley in the ‘Aksai Chin’ Ladakh area of the western Himalayas is not only shocking but concerning to the world (Ghimire,2020,¶.1). The geopolitical competition of India being rival powers both in the western and northern front, some argue, obliged India to expand its military spending (ibid, ¶.4). On the Indian side, the China threat remained as a historical stain in the Indian military and civilian psyche, whereas, on the Chinese side, India’s greater influence over South Asia and the Indian Ocean region is coming in the way of explanation of its interest vertically to the warm water of Indian Ocean (ibid, ¶.5). Entering the 21st century there are more and more predictions about when China will become a superpower. Some guests that China, will be as strong as the US in the coming decade, some between that in 20 years zone. Predict its rise in the years 2040 (Kumar,2016,p.12).

India and China are two of the world’s most ancient civilizations. For centuries they shared advanced ideas, inventions, religious and philosophical traditions. But their economies and societies stagnated during the colonial period (Kumar,2016,p.57). China and India are seen as contributors, rather than competitors to each other’s development. This is welcome by India, which has adopted a “Look East” policy to expand trade and investment links with East Asia and forge strong ties

with regional institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific economic Region (APEC) (ibid, p.74). China and India have had largely peaceful relations over thousands of years. However, despite being agreed to coexist based on peaceful coexistence long ago, border disputes have marred their relationship again (Dingli,2010, pp.139-163). Sino-Indian relations were based on Buddhist religion, art, and culture during the ancient period. However, the link between the two countries became weaker during the Islamic era. Buddhism ceased to serve as a link between China and India (Ghoble, 1995, pp. 833-845). India became independent two years before the CCP secured power in China in 1949. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, initially conceived for a synergistic relationship between New Delhi and Beijing: Both countries had huge populations and immense developmental challenges and were thus natural partners, respectively (Rusco and Sasikumar, 2007, 99-123).Some scholars of India claimed that China has been increasing its footprint in Nepal. This Research paper will be studied and analyzed about implications, effects, and strategic importance of the China-India relation in Nepal.

1.2 Statement of Problem

The rise of China and the rise of India are unmistakable. In 2009, China's and India's economics had already become the second-and-fourth-largest, respectively (Wang,2012, pp. 81-109). Nepal's two Neighbors-China and India are today the world's fastest-growing economies. Yet Nepal has been unable to take advantage of this strategic geographical location (Sood, 2016, pp. 1-12).

Nepal is directly and broadly affected by hostile, cooperative, and competitive relations between China and India. China-India relations are antagonistic based on the border, cooperative based on trade, and according to strategic issues sometimes cooperative and sometimes conflictual (Khanal, 2016,p.286). India takes Nepal as her "sphere of influence" according to Nehru doctrine and China wants to counter the traditional influence. During India's visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that "China and India have to cooperate for development in South Asia". China has been launching a policy of active diplomacy to destruct the Indian influence (ibid).China's interest in Nepal shifting from being almost exclusively focused on Tibet-related security issues (essentially preventing any 'free Tibet' activity out of Nepal) to being part of Beijing's larger geostrategic plan for South Asia (Karki,2015,p.317).

This study will be focused on Nepal's geographical conditions and its strategic importance in interrelationship with immediate neighbors China and India. Geographically Nepal has surrounded by China from the Northern part and by India from the Eastern, Southern, and Western part. On the other hand, Nepal is the least developed landlocked country (LLDC) in the world. It is also a small state possessing an area of 141,516 Square Kilometer. Being a landlocked country Nepal has to depend on immediate neighbors India and China for its transit facility. Nepal signed a transit treaty with India in 1978 A. D. and with PRC in 2016 A. D. Nepal also signed dozens of bilateral trade treaties and agreements with both neighbors. But Nepal has been facing a huge amount of trade deficit with immediate neighbor India. On the other hand, Nepal's trade deficit has been increasing day by day. So that, due to trade imbalance with immediate neighbors India and China, Nepal has been facing problems. But there are many possibilities for Nepal to strengthen its economic condition by taking advantage of both immediate neighbors China and India respectively. This study will explore the new economic possibilities of China and India.

Also, PRC and India are economic powers in the world. On the other hand, China and India are the most populous countries in the world. Both countries are known as Asian giants. PRC is a permanent member of the security council of the United Nations Organizations (UNO) Since 1971 A. D. India is trying to obtain support to become permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Both countries are cooperating in several issues of the world. China and India are cooperating in Brazil, Russia, India China and South Africa (BRICS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB), etc. But People's Republic of China (PRC) and India are also competing in various issues. The border disputes of Doklam and Galwan Valley between China and India have been settled recently. Doklam standoff raised as the unsettled border problem on 2017 A. D. On the other hand, the major problematic issues between China and India are Tibetan refugee and Dalai Lama's asylum issue, Indian Ocean Region (IOR) issues, Presence of India in the East Asian region and South China Sea issue, the strategic partnership of India with the United States of America (USA), China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), etc. are major problematic issues between China and India. Besides, India has not been involved in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative to this date. India has been taking the OBOR initiative as the expansionist policy of China towards the South Asian region

and another part of the world. But the major concern of India is related to the construction of CPEC through the border of India and Pakistan.

Nepal is located between China and India, so that, Nepal has both opportunities and challenges from the cooperation of the two Asian giants China and India. Economically, PRC and India both countries are both emerging. Being an immediate neighbor Nepal can cooperate and gain economic benefit from both neighboring countries. If trilateral cooperation among Nepal, China, and India create, Nepal will be benefited more from two immediate neighbors. On the other hand, Nepal can get benefit from the investment of China and India's hydropower sectors and other possible sectors. But Nepal has to attract and guarantee to secure investment in Nepal. On the other hand, if China and India compete with each other, Nepal will be influenced badly. Due to geographical location, Nepal has to depend upon both immediate neighbors than other countries of the world. So that, Nepal has to maintain impartiality while conducting its foreign affairs. This Research paper will be studied and analyzed about implications, effects, and strategic importance of the China-India relation in Nepal.

1.3 Research Questions

- a) What are the implications of China-India cooperation in Nepal?
- b) What are the effects of China-India relations in Nepal?
- c) How and why is China-India cooperation is strategically important for Nepal?

1.4 Objectives of Study

- a) To analyze the implication, effect, and strategic importance of China-India cooperation in Nepal.
- b) To assess the implications and effects of China-India cooperation in Nepal.
- c) To explore how and why China-India cooperation is strategically important for Nepal.

1.5 Significance of Study

This research paper will be very fruitful for Nepal. Being a landlocked country located between rising world powers China and India, Nepal has been very often influenced by the relations of China and India. This paper will be assisted to understand the seriousness and sensitivity of small states surrounded by large powerful states. But Nepal also possesses lots of opportunities from the cooperation between two powerful states China and India. Successful diplomatic maneuvering by

the smaller, landlocked, and least developed countries (LDCs) is an important means to carry out their economic development, internal peace, and security, apart from preserving and consolidating independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Dahal, 2009, p.30). In changing political scenarios, the study of cooperation and rivalry between China and India is very significant to global politics. So, being an immediate neighbor of emerging global powers China and India, this study also has significance to Nepal. The positive and negative impacts of China-India relations have significance to Nepal. Though some studies on the impacts of China-India relations have been done, still no sufficient academic research has been conducted regarding the Impacts of Nepal by China-India cooperation. So, in this study China- India cooperation from a Nepalese perspective will be conducted.

1.6 Limitations of Study

The study will examine the impacts of China-Nepal cooperation and rivalry in Nepal. As a researcher, this study has certain limitations due to limited time, broad study area, and financial resources as well as lack of adequate previous studies. The study will cover an analysis of the strategic importance of China-India cooperation in Nepal. On the other hand, the study area of this research paper will be the interrelationship between and among Nepal, China, and India. So, it will not study the interrelation between Nepal and other external powers of the world except China and India. Therefore, it may not apply to other external powers of the world.

1.7 Organizations of Study

This research paper has been divided into Five chapters.

-) The first chapter deals with the introductory part.
-) The second chapter consists of a review of related literature.
-) The third chapter deals with the conceptual framework and research methodology of this research paper.
-) The fourth chapter consists of the analysis of the implication, effect, and strategic importance of China-India cooperation in Nepal.
-) The fifth chapter consists of a summary and conclusion

CHAPTER-II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the reviews of collected literature that are related to the dissertation topic and the statement of the problem of the study. The study focuses on China-India cooperation, especially the historical background on China-India relations, China-India diplomatic relations, China-India cooperation in international forums i.e., in UNO, BRICS, SCO, AIIB, and, New Banks., China- India Economic Cooperation China-India, Socio-cultural relations, China-India Strategic relations, etc.

2.2 China-India Relations

2.2.1 China –India Cooperation

Chietigj Bajpae addresses the idea of how China and India have been managing their bilateral relationship. He states that while the Sino-Indian relation has improved in recent years, it continues to oscillate between periods of cordiality and competition. This is exacerbated by a fundamental mismatch of threat perceptions between both states rooted in the shifting balance of power and conflicting signals in the bilateral relationship. Moreover, the rise of both countries as major powers has provided them with new tools and platforms to interact with each other, contributing to a spillover of the Sino-Indian relationship from the bilateral to regional levels. Nowhere is this spillover effect or “nested security dilemma” more evident than in the maritime domain-amid the rise of both countries as major trading and resource-consuming powers. After charting the evolution of the Sino-Indian relationship (Bajpae, 2015, pp.108-145). Vincent Waei–ChengWang (2011) has analyzed that to measure China’s relative position in the world, Chinese security writers have developed “comprehensive national power” as a convenient way. According to Wang whether and how India and China manage their international relations in changing world politics is the major thing. These two countries demonstrate critical contrasts in terms of their political, economic, and social aspects, despite their common aims for greater stature in the international political arena. Historically, they have very complex relations but also offer promising opportunities, in the era of globalization. The implication of the rise of China is a debatable issue, scant scholarly attention has

been devoted to the rise of India and or how these two Asian great power perspectives each other's ascendancy (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469). Srinivasav Sitaraman Commented that India is struggling to adjust to a China that has emerged as a major power. Although bilateral trade between India and China has been increasing drastically the bilateral relationship is dominated by enormous districts and India remains deeply suspicious of Chinese intentions. Deep insecurity prevails specifically, regarding the Chinese military's growing assertiveness and China's strategy in countering India's South Asian neighbors. Concerns and mistrust on the Indian side are further inflamed because India and China shared a 4,057 Kilometer boundary, and the current status –quo demarcation is vigorously contested by both claimants (Sitaraman, 2014, pp. 89-97).

In Nishchal N.Pandey's conception it is one of the most complex relationships, yet also the most crucial for peace and cooperation not only in South Asia but Asia. Both India and China are fast gearing up to become the political and economic giants of the 21st century. While the border dispute, presence of Dalai Lama in India, military built up in the border, history of a strained relationship, are some of the hindrances for the healthy growth of the bilateral ties," in the sphere of economics, the relations between China and India are yet once competitive and complementary. The two countries constitute the globe's two largest markets and are also among the world's fastest-growing economies. They compete for foreign direct investment (FDI) and export promotion as an instrument of job creation (Pandey, 2012, pp. 87-95). In Surjit Man Singh's conception there are elements of cooperation as well as competition in present India-China relations, reflecting their separate and contrasting effort to build modern nation-states out of their old, but newly independent or "liberated societies in the latter half of the 20th century. Also, they both have a wide spectrum of dealings with America that resist simple depiction such as "ally" or adversary what seems certain is the complex interplay of China, India and the United States in the context of a changing international scenario (Mansingh, 2006, pp. 69-78). In Jean Francious Huchet's conception the geopolitical context has of course changed greatly today, but the clash of two nationalisms on the Asian scene continuous to influence Sino-Indian relations. Some underlying tensions felt during the 1950's such as competition for Asian leadership, and Beijing's fear of military

containment and a US-India alliance, continue to weigh heavily on bilateral ties today (Huchet, 2008, pp. 50-67).

2.2.2 Historical Background of China-India Cooperation

Chinese and Indian territories belong to the most ancient and the most magnificent civilizations in world history. Whose influence spread beyond their river valley origin some 5,000 years ago, and whose respective traditions remain strong despite many adjustments made to changing circumstances over the millennia, especially those of the modern age (Mansingh, 2006, pp. 69-78). The actual war was fought between China and the British over the issue of the opium trade in 1842. Since then; Indians were identified in China as “Soldiers of the British Indian Army who came to China to loot and kill”. They saw Indians in China as ‘zhou giu’ (running dogs). Of the British; whenever an India-China conflict surfaced, the Chinese propaganda was heard with the ‘zou gou’ slogan, leading to ill feelings about Indians (Ghoble, 1997, pp. 808-818).

Although China and India were two adjoining civilizations, there was remarkably little historical evidence of direct political interaction between them. However, there was mutual intellectual fascination (Wang, 2011, pp.437-469). While establishing the League of Nations at the close of the First World War the India and China were comparatively in an insignificant position in international matters. China could at the most get a non-permanent seat on the League Council, with the result that the League of Nations could not give adequate attention to the questions in which Asiatic countries were vitally interested (Ram and Sharma, 1945, pp. 206-213). Some historical facts have special pertinence to present-day interests. The Silk Road, for example, captures, imagination worldwide. It refers to a network of land routes connecting China, India, Central Asia, Persia, Byzantium and, Rome from the earliest time. Traders, pilgrims, teachers, and travelers of various nationalities used these routes for many hundreds of years exchanging ideas as well as goods (Mansingh, 2006, pp.69-78).

Chinese Kuomintang rulers Chiang Kai Shek and Nehru visited each other’s countries. Nehru, during his visit to China in 1939, said that China and India should come closer and discussed with the Chinese leaders about the possibility of future co-

operation between the two countries, respectively (Ghoble, 1995, pp.833-845). Mao Zedong in April 1945, declared that “they hope; India will attain the independence. For an independent and democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people but is essential for world peace (ibid). Independence and democracy are not only the need of the Indian people, it is rather essential to maintain global peace. Friendship with China had always been the priority concern of Jawaharlal Nehru. After independence; India followed the British policy of Tibet for dealing with China and the Lhasa mission turned into an Indian mission. Tibetans also expelled the Chinese mission from Lhasa in mid-1949(ibid). Among the geopolitical tensions, that bedeviled the two countries during the 1950s, China’s fear of being encircled through India’s Strategic military alliance with the United States and the Soviet Union contributed greatly to the deterioration of bilateral ties. During the 1950s, Nehru succeeded in adroitly maintaining close relations with both sides of the Cold War despite nettlesome relations with Secretary of state John Foster Dulles, a fervent anti-communist and initiator of the pact with Pakistan in 1954(Huchet, 2008, pp.50-67).

China became a member of the U.N. O. in 1971. The United States of America became friendly with China, and the Sino-US axis was formed. Though the differences between India and China persisted till 1976, both sides observed restraint so as not to damage the resumption of bilateral relations (Balakrishnan,1997, pp. 819-829). The trajectory of relations between China and India has direct implications for the rest of the world by the sheer weight of numbers and magnitude of their geography. Despite their public pronouncements of friendship and growing economic interdependence, China and India have made little genuine progress towards the resolution of major issues, including the border dispute and the mounting trade imbalance (Jain and shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267). China is presently the world’s most populous nation, with India poised to overtake it by 2050 according to most projections. Together these two nations house over a fifth of humanity and represent two of the largest markets and most rapidly growing economies on the planet (ibid). The third-generation leaders and fourth generations leaders had followed the strategy of Deng Xiaoping i.e., China’s post –Deng leaders celebrated their tactics. Third-generation leaders (centered on Jiang Zemin) successfully returned China to international respectability from the Pariah state in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. China’s fourth-generation leaders (centered on Hu Jintao)

work to rectify some of the consequences of the policies of their predecessors (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469).

China and India both countries would be better served by making efforts to sincerely understand and accommodate each other's point of view. Such efforts to promote greater understanding are already underway (Jain and Shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267). The Strategic Economic Dialogue between China and India began in 2011, and the conclusion of a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement in October 2013. This Complements earlier measures reached in 1993 and 1996 (Bajpae, 2015, pp.108-145). The improvements that have taken place in Sino-Indian relations in the recent past only show that both countries have understood the present shift in international relations from military-strategic alliances to economic linkages (Balkrishanan,1997, pp. 619-629). The uprising in March 2008 by the Tibetan populations again upset whatever understanding existed between China and India on the Tibet issue. Despite the arrest of some Tibetans for staging "anti-china" activities on Indian Soil, the Indian authorities have allowed demonstration in major cities and the foreign ministry shed its reliance for once in calling for negotiations between the Dalai Lama and Chinese authorities and a non-violent resolution of the trouble Tibet (Huchet, 2008, pp. 50-67).

China and India have been in a border conflict. Since the 1950s and owing to claims and counterclaims. On large areas of land in India's northern frontier, the two countries have not been able to demarcate the boundaries over this matter they went to the war in 1962 (*My República*,2020, June 18, ¶.3). In 1950, the Tibet question and boundary disputes deteriorate Sino-Indian relations. In 1959 India becomes the first non-socialist country to establish ties with China. Border conflict and confrontation culminated in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. In 1972, India and China restored ambassadorial relations between them. After Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China, both sides agreed to expand relations in all fields in 1988 (Guha, 2012, pp. 26-29). It was a high-profile visit within 25 years. The two countries set up a joint working group to settle the boundary issues. But, India's nuclear tests produced a minor setback in China-Indian relations in 1998. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jia Bao visited Bangalore to promote the Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries. India and China signed an agreement for resolving disputes over their

Himalayan border. Additionally, in 2005 China and India set the trade target of US\$ 100 billion by 2015 (ibid). After the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to China in January 2009, bilateral trade between both countries surpassed \$90 billion. China became India's largest trading partner in goods. In October 2009, China expressed "dissatisfaction" over Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, a "disputed territory". But India responded that it is an internal part of India. In August 2010, India cancels defense exchanges with China after it refuses to give a top Indian army officer a visa their "control" over Jammu and Kashmir. India refuses to allow two Chinese defense officials to visit New Delhi. In 2010, both countries established a strategic and cooperative partnership for Peace and Prosperity (ibid). In October 2013, India and China signed the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), a major "confidence-building" measure in light of several Chinese "Incursions" along the LAC.

2.2.3 China-India Diplomatic Relations

For decades, China's foreign diplomacy centered on major western powers- the United States, Europe, and Russia. Mere lip-service was paid to neighboring countries and regions. The Chinese government likes to frame its diplomatic strategy as "big countries are the key, neighboring countries are priorities, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateral relations are an important stage (Xin, 2013, pp. 13-21). There was a duality in the Indian attitude to the Shimla Conference of 1914. Nehru was agreeable to disowning the extra-territorial rights in Tibet inherited from the Shimla Convention. On the other hand, he was determined to maintain the Mc Mohan Line of the Shimla Convention as India's north-eastern frontier with China (Gupta, 1978, pp. 696-702). Sino-Indian relations are complicated for a variety of historical and geographical reasons, but if approached correctly, they can be managed peacefully and constructively. Doing so will require that each side engages with full consideration and understanding of the other party's concern (Jain and Shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267). There were very few direct contacts between China and India before the successful liberation of India from the British East India Company government. After the establishment of independent India, the relations between India and China started to become cordial. But at the International Congress

against Colonial Operation and imperialism held in Brussels in 1937 delegates of the Kuomintang government of China and Jawaharlal Nehru the need for cooperation between two parties. Nehru also came to Chongqing, China, in 1939 having sent an Indian medical mission to assist the Chinese force battling Japan in 1938. Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek visited India in 1942 (Mansingh, 2006, 69-78).

A study of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibetan Trade and intercourse signed in April 1954 shows that a new treaty relating to Tibetan trade and intercourse was naturally incumbent recognition to the People's Republic of China. The undue privilege enjoyed by the British in Tibet was based only on the secret Anglo-Tibetan Trade regulations of 1914 concluded without the knowledge of the Chinese (Gupta, 1978, 696-702). The Zhou's visit to New Delhi in 1960 produced nothing more than meetings between officials of two sides (ibid). Nehru's foreign policy was premised on his conviction that friendship between India and China would bring about Asian resurgence in the post-colonial era and is resolved to keep India away from the power politics of groups military aligned against each other in the cold War (ibid). Jawahar Lal Nehru was keen to maintain good neighborly relations with China. India was the second non-communist country after Burma (now Myanmar) to recognize the People's Republic of China when it was established in October 1949 by the communist party of China, and the first newly-independent country to foster diplomatic relations with its government in 1950 (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 819-829).

Since the 1950s India's relation with China has undergone various stages of development Nehru's dream of converting Asia into an "area of peace" under the joint leadership of India and China led to an exuberant phase of Friendship (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115). In 1959 the then President of Soviet Union Khrushchev openly criticized China's stand over Taiwan, Tibet, and Sino-Indian border, and in July 1960, Khrushchev recalled thousands of Soviet Experts working in China. This rupture with the Soviet Union put China in a state of total isolation (Huchet, 2008, pp.50-67). Though the Sino-Indian border conflict ended with friendly relations between the two countries, India continued to support the cause of China's entry into the UN. After 1974, a change occurred when Chinese policy toward the South Asian region underwent modification. (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115). There was the freezing of diplomatic relations after the 1962 conflagration, which only thawed in 1976 when

relations were tentatively restored. From 1976 to date, the salient feature of bilateral diplomatic negotiations has been the cloak of confidentiality and secrecy maintained by the government and key negotiator of both sides (Jain and Shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267). The Indian Foreign Minister's official visit to China in 1979 was the first high-level visit since the 1961 border conflict and provided an opportunity for an exchange of views between two countries (ibid). The double alliance India was pursuing with the US and the Soviet Union that worried Chinese leaders who feared being surrounded and forced to guard a new hostile front along the Himalayas with Korea and the maritime borders with Taiwan and Japan (Huchet, 2008, 50-67). The major points of the Indo-China Pact 1954 A.D. were the Success of the Geneva conference on the Indo-China, Peace in Indo-China and to contribute area of peace in Asia, etc. (Sharma, 1955, pp. 390-398).

In Surjit Mansingh's perception, the uneven pace of the Sino-Indian rapprochement in 1980 is best explained by the impact of international events on domestic politics. Sino-Soviet tensions remained high during the last year of the Leonid I Brezhnev era (1964-82) and a well-entrenched Soviet lobby in India restrained overenthusiastic Indian responses to Chinese overtures made to wean India away from reliance on the Soviet Union (Mansingh, 2006, pp. 59-78). China's reciprocation was evident in Foreign Minister Huang Hua's attendance at India's Republic Day celebration at the Indian embassy in January 1980 (Basu, 1991, pp.103-115). The process of normalization of relations began between China and India from 1976 onwards. The credit goes to late Deng Xiao Ping, the former Chinese Vice Premier, and the late Indira Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India. She took the initiative to restore ambassadorial level relations between India and China (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 819-829). Like China's relations with other major powers, its relations with New Delhi evince a complex mix of cooperative and competitive elements. After decades of tense relations, limited rapprochement began in the late 1980s (Kelly, Dobbins, Shaklapak, Gompert Heinbotham, Chlak and Thrall, 2014, p. 134). China's Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited New Delhi in 1981. This led to further normalization of the relation between the two countries as it was agreed during this visit to have an annual dialogue at the vice-ministerial level and to restore relations in trade and culture (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 819-829). There were launched five-round negotiations between China and India regarding a border dispute between two

countries during a period from 1981 to 1983. The first-round negotiation was held in Beijing in December 1981, the second-round negotiation commenced in New Delhi in May 1982, third round talks January-February 1983, the fourth-round negotiation held in October 1983, and fifth-round negotiation held in 1984 but these negotiations produced nothing more than an agreement to continue talking (Basu, 1991, pp.103-115). In 1985 the late Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India met the Chinese prime minister Zhao Guiyang at New York and talked of stepping up bilateral negotiations between the two countries. The official level talks which began in 1981, continued to be conducted annually, but nothing concrete emerged. China establishes a permanent border post in the Sum during Chu area in 1986 (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 619-629).

According to A. R. Basu in 1985, China adopted a distinctly harder attitude on the border dispute, perhaps to position itself real bargaining with Rajiv Gandhi's government. While India pressed to define package proposal, China defined it as "mutual concessions" that are returned for Chinese concessions in the Ladakh (western) sector ten India would be expected to offer concession in the eastern sector (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115). China rethinks its relations with India in Asia amidst the changing global scenario. Both countries agreed not to resort to force, too, exercise restraint on the border to and resume negotiations. The result was the historic visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988. Before he visited China, eight rounds of official-level talks were held between the two countries with a stalemate in the improvement of relations (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 819-829). Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China on December 19-23, 1988. During his visit, China and India signed three agreements. The first agreement was on cooperation in science and technology, the second agreement was the air services agreement and the third agreement was the cultural agreement (ibid). During the state visit of the then-late prime minister of India Rajiv Gandhi in China the discussion between Rajiv Gandhi and his Chinese counterparts also focused on the border issue, Tibet bilateral relations and, the international situation. During that moment the then Chinese vice-premier Deng Xiaoping urged that China and India should "forget unpleasant past" (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115). Rajiv Gandhi received a great deal of publicity in China in 1988 and his assassination by a suicide bomber in May 1991 was vocally mourned. To the first Indian Prime minister to visit China since 1954, Deng Xiaoping and other

Chinese leaders meeting Rajeev Gandhi stressed their hope for a peaceful international environment in which China and India could promote the economic and social development of their peoples and ensure “Asian Century “ahead (Mansingh, 2006, pp. 69-78). After three decades of “freeze” following the war between the two countries in November 1962, India and China resumed diplomatic and trade exchange in the early 1990s (Huchet,2008, pp. 50-67).

Another breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations was achieved when the Foreign Minister of Chandra Sekhar’s government paid an official visit to China in February 1991. The outcome of the visit, which was immediately followed by another official visit of the Indian Commerce Minister, was very encouraging (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115). The Chinese Prime minister, Li Peng, visited India in December 1991, which was followed by the visit of the then President of India, R. Vankataraman to China in May 1992. In the subsequent year P. V. Narsimha Rao, former Prime Minister of India Visited China (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 819-829).

The Presidential visit of Chinese President Ziang Zemin in India was thus more like sustaining Sino-Indian ties that are clearly on the upswing, but the underlying reality is that it is not a relationship between equals, much as India would like it to be so. There is the weight of humiliation of 1962, “Outstanding problems left over from history”, as every speech will unfailingly mention, the greater military might of China, its far superior economic progress, and achievements and the inarguable greater international profile of the PRC (Acharya, 1996, pp. 3356-3357).In the last few years, there have been a series of high-level visits from both sides that have further helped the process of mutual understanding and laid the foundation for cooperation in a diverse set of sectors. In the last decades, there has been a series of high-level visits by the heads of states of both countries, who have reiterated their friendship and goodwill towards each other. Chinese premier Zhu Rongji visited India in January 2002 (Konwer, 2011, pp. 238-292). In an overall context, the thrust of Chinese premier Zhou’s visit was commercial. In retrospect, it appears that he came only to further explore, expand and enhance economic ties. He led an impressive business delegation including the representative of some state-owned enterprises in China (Acharya and Deshpande, 2002, pp. 367-370).

On June 3, 2003, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a historic visit to China, the first in over a decade. The two countries have elevated their relationship to one of “strategic and cooperative partnership” for peace and stability (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-467). In the first decade of the 21st century, the two nations tried hard to rebuild up political trust. During the state visit of Indian Prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Beijing, the two sides tried for the first time to define the essence of the bilateral relationship. In the joint statement afterward, they announced a new definition, which focused on constructive and cooperative partnership. That was very useful for improving people-to-people contacts (Gancheng, 2012, pp. 65-77). Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005. The joint statement issued by the Chinese premier Wen Jia Bao and Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh characterizes India-China relations as a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity”. This signals a new stage of development in their relations which was until now described in a general way as “constructive and cooperative”. It puts the bilateral relations in regional and global perspectives and widens the sphere of strategic interaction between the two countries to include cooperation in economic, technical, and cultural fields, besides the political and military areas (“India and China Moved Forward”, 2005). Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao have met regularly on the sidelines of regional and multilateral meetings and conferences on several occasions in 2005 (Konwer, 2011, pp. 238-292). During the state visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jia Bao visited in New Delhi, the two sides decided to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity”, politically speaking, it would play a crucial role in the development of China-India relations in the year to come (Gancheng, 2012, pp. 65-77). Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India in November 2006. During this visit, the two sides adopted a ten-point strategy to further strengthen the bilateral cooperation. (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469). Officially, both Chinese and Indian Governments are committed to regional and sub-regional cooperation, and bilaterally both accord priority to resolving their border disputes as well as to their partnership in overseas investment (Konwer, 2011, 238-292). Exchanges of official visit led to diplomatic advances of symbolic nature such as the reopening on 4 July 2006 of the Nehru La border pass between Sikkim and Tibet after 44 years' closure. Likewise, in trade two countries have experienced substantial thaw, as bilateral commerce which, was negligible before 1991(\$260 million at best) is expected to reach 36 billion dollars in 2008

(Huchet, 2008, pp. 50-67). These developments highlight the extent to which Sino-Indian relations have improved over the past decades, driven by increasing economic integration (ibid). Even though there was clear political will on both sides to push ahead of the bilateral relationship, constraints were there including the border issues, water resource issues, and the Dalai Lama issues, etc. That constantly cause friction and mutual accusations between the two nations. It would be difficult not to see the increasingly negative influence resulting from it, which would create unfavorable conditions for ordinary people to take interest in the other country in a positive way (Gancheng, 2012, pp. 65-77).

Yet China-India engagement spread far and wide. High-level exchanges between the two have been two frequent (especially after 1988). Every two or three years, either a Chinese President or Premier is in New Delhi or Indian President or Indian PM in Beijing (Paudyal,2020, ¶.13). Contacts between Chinese and Indian civilizations ceased during the colonial period because the new rulers of the world did not encourage such contacts. In more recent times. When these contacts were revived, they formed into conflict and hostility between a democratic India and a totalitarian China over the issues of outstanding territorial claims, the Chinese annexation of Tibet, and the exile of Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, India. The visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Delhi in November 2006 was a significant move in initiating a platform on development, peace, and stability in Asia and the world (Kumar, 2016, p.74). During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit culminated in a pledge to double trade between the two nations to \$ 40 billion by 2010 AD. The contrast with \$ 250 million in the 1950s (ibid).

2.2.4 China-India Strategic Relations/Partnership

China and India both countries view their relationship with each other as one of the global and strategic importance that is long-term and confidence between their militaries. Likewise, National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon who was in Beijing in October 2010 said "India-China Relations have global significance and India hopes to work closely with China in politics, trade and economics, infrastructure, culture, and other fields to take the bilateral strategic partnership to a new level (Pandey, 2012, pp. 87-95) The interest that China and India share as large developing states will work to mitigate the risk of war between them. For many Asian

states especially China and India, economic growth is regarded as a critical strategic priority (Kelly, Dobbins, Shaklapak, Gompert Heinbotham, Chlak and Thrall, 2014, p.36). In 2005 A.D. Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and Indian foreign secretary Shyam Sharan, on behalf of their respective government, sat together for a “strategic dialogue”. The two countries were pushing their bilateral relations on to a new stage (Konwer, 2011, pp. 238-292).

The India-China ‘strategic partnership’ was not aimed against any third country was indicated by saying that it was for achieving ‘peace and prosperity.’ Thus, neither should it be constructed as anti-US nor anti-Pakistan (Mohanty, 2005, pp. 1671-1673). The ever happened “strategic dialogue 2005” of China and India fully demonstrate that the two neighbors have already raised relations above a lingering and plaguing border disputes that once plunged their relationship into an icy period (ibid). From the geopolitical perspective, China has increasingly relied on its military diplomacy –establishing a wide variety of security dialogue, joint maneuvers, and military exercise –to advance its strategic ambitions (Konwer, 2011, pp. 238-292). The strategic economic cooperation between China and India can compare with the alliance between “world’s back office” (India) and the “world’s workshop” (China) is certainly one that has captured the imagination of many people. During a visit to India’s “Silicon Valley” Bangalore, in April 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao went so far as to do the comparisons of “two pagodas, hardware, and software; combined China and India can take the leadership of the world industry (Huchet, 2008, pp. 50-67).

The defense collaboration between China and India has started in 2006. According to the Memorandum of Understanding between National Defense of People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of India (MDORI) for exchanges and committed, by the relevant purposes and principles of the charter of United Nations for developing the strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity between India and China (Konwer, 2011, pp. 238-292). Both China and India should also try to improve their relations better to gain strategic leverage. By 2008, the trade has exceeded \$ 50 billion. China and India have common interests and positions for many global challenges, such as; environmental issues, climate change issues, and from Jihadi terrorism to global solidarity, respectively (Bindra, 2009, pp. 1163-1178). To have a complex partnership

that somewhat belies the “strategic partnership” they profess. India may feel that an ever-rising China challenges its standing (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163).

2.2.5 China-India Involvement in International/Regional Forums

Over the years, India has participated in Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting at the foreign ministers’ level that has embraced Brazil, Russia, India and even joined the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation (SCO) as a full member (*The Hindu*, 2020, June 17).

2.2.5.1 China-India Involvement in United Nations Organizations (UNO)

From October 1950 to July 1953, the People’s Government of China was involved in the Korean War against the United Nations’ Army, led by the United States of America and India was also busy, involved as a peace broker between the contending sides inside and outside the United Nations (Gupta, 1978, pp. 696-702). According to Karl F. Indurforth and Bruce Riedel even by the rules of 1945 of United Nations Organizations (UNO), India was a strong candidate for Security Council permanent member. More than a million Indian soldiers fought with the Allies in the Second World War. In the 21st century, the case for a permanent Indian place at the table is even more persuasive given India’s thriving democracy, billion-plus population, expanding economy, and long-standing contributions to UN peacekeeping (Indurforth and Riedel, 2007, pp. 56-62). More than the efforts to secure China’s support for a permanent seat for India in the UN Security Council, the joint statement between Chinese Premier Wen Jia Bao and Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh had taken as the new framework of mutual respect and a common commitment to work for creating a fair and just international order and build structures of cooperation’s for the benefit of peoples of both countries that were noteworthy results of the Chinese premier Wen Jia Bao’s visit to India (“India and China Moved Forward”, 2005).

Still, this period of reckoning will be difficult for the UN because tough decisions need to be made. The Organizations will need to abandon its old mindset and move in directions that it may find uncomfortable (AL-Kawari, 2020, ¶.10). The UN’s role has been steadily declining, and its influence on world events and the government has waned. Once the world’s pre-eminent moderator and arbitrator, it has

become too constrained by old concepts and doctrines to be the truly effective, collaborative global governing body that its founder envisioned (ibid, ¶.4). Reform of the UN should start at the top with the security council whose five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US-continue to exert vet wielding power commensurate with a bygone age. Expanding the Council's Permanent membership to include other countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the middle east would deliver a more equal table balance to global decision making (Ibid, ¶.5). India was not seated at the high table of global politics, alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Racine, 2008, pp. 65-78). India has been unwavering in committing to a “One China” position, and China seems to be supportive of India's bid for a permanent seat in a reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163). New Delhi has called for a reformed and equitable multilateral system more open to emerging countries. India will probably become a member of G13 (the present G8 enlarged to include China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico) before the UNSC is reformed (Racine, 2008, pp. 65-78).

2.2.5.2 China-India Cooperation in BRICS

The contribution of BRICS countries to world economic growth during the past decade is known to have exceeded nearly 50 percent, and those countries 'economic growth rates will be higher than those of developed nations and other emerging economics by 2030 (Rasouliazhad and Jabalameli, 2018, pp. 59-73). One important global development in the first decades of the twenty-first century is the shifting of power in the world economy. Symbolized by the rise of several large developing countries grouped as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICS) or Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC) (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469). In Rasouliazhad and Jabalameli's perception, the dominance of China in total trade flows of BRICS has made the Chinese Yuan's effects on trade with partners from different groups stronger than other BRICS members' national currencies impacts (ibid). Geographical distance as a proxy for transportation costs has a weaker negative effect on the manufactured goods and raw materials trade patterns of China and India than it does on other countries, creating dissimilarity in the trade patterns of BRICS countries (ibid).

Among BRICS economies, China and India have experienced relatively higher GDP growth from 2001 to 2015. The Russian Federation had a significant negative GDP growth during 2009-2010, South Africa had a smooth GDP growth rate of 0-5 percent except in 2010. Another BRICS member Brazil, faced numerous fluctuations (ibid). China India is not simply one target in a renewed charm offensive on its neighbors. But, also a vital part of BRICS that China sees as a new force capable of challenging existing international institutions dominated by western power (Xin, 2013, pp. 13-21). BRICS has a significant role in global trade flows. According to Trade Map data, the BRICS imports value has increased from 417 billion US dollars in 2001 to over 2,339 billion U.S. dollars in 2016, while the BRICS's exports' value has boosted up from 494 billion U.S. dollars in 2001 to nearly 2,902 billion U.S. dollars in 2016 (ibid). The BRICS's contribution to the global imports has increased from 2.21 percent to 14.5 percent in 2001 and 2016, respectively. In the case of BRICS's contribution to the global exports' flow, it can be expressed that its shares have moved from 0.86 percent in 2001 to over 18.1 percent in 2016. The raised contributions of BRICS in the global flows are evidence of the increased role of international trade (ibid).

From the coefficients of the bilateral exchange rate for BRICS member states in trading with UN member states, the Chinese currency, Yuan shows stronger impacts on trade among the currencies of BRICS, countries. The major cause for the higher power of the Chinese Yuan would be the dominance of this country in the BRICS's trade flows. According to Trade Map Database, China contributes 67.8 percent to the total BRICS imports and 72.2 percent to the total BRICS exports in 2016 (ibid). The BRICS countries have shared a common experience of rapid and substantive economic change over the last decade (Rusco and Sasikumar, 2007, pp. 99-123). Admits talk of "BRIC" countries and the "Asian Century" the past decade has seen as an unprecedented level of Western interest in the affairs of China and India. Despite the obvious differences between the two countries, China's economies are almost three times as large (Guha, 2012, pp. 26-29).

2.2.5.3 China-India Cooperation in Shanghai Cooperation Organizations (SCO)

China expanded its influence in the central and Southwest Asian areas by organizing and promoting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India and

Pakistan became members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on June 9, 2017 A.D. China has gained significant influence in the southwest Asian region by increasing energy investment, trade ties, and military cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors. In contrast, India pursued a “Look East” policy by strengthening its relationships with countries in East and Southeast Asia (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469). Contemporary revivals of China and India easily can be read into the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations initiated by China, in which India joined as an observer in 2005 before becoming a member and in the regular participation of both China and India in the 24 nation Asian Regional Forum (ARF) for a decade (Mansingh, 2006, pp. 69-78). The SCO, established in 1994, Today SCO comprises, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Reflecting China’s instrumental role and influence, a permanent secretariat headquarters have been created in Beijing (Shambaugh, 2004/2005, pp. 64-99).

2.2.5.4 China-India Cooperation in Asian Infra Structure Investment Bank (AIIB)

PRC and India are founder members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established in 2015. In AIIB, PRC and India are the first and second-largest investors of AIIB. The establishment of AIIB has taken as the balancing of the influence of US-led International financial institutions World Bank. A whole host of sovereign funds and domestic financial instruments have been assigned to finance these projects, besides the multilateral AIIB. These include the US\$ 40 billion Silk Road Fund, Exim bank, and other public enterprises (Parajuli, 2017, p. 6). The AIIB approved a \$ 750-million loan to India for COVID-19 response on 17th June 2020 A.D., as the country faces a worsening economy (Global Times, 2020/6/18, ¶. 1). There are 57 founding members of AIIB, began with and focused on supporting sustainable development through infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia and Beyond (Cheng,2019, ¶.13). So far, the AIIB has approved 46 projects worth 8.5 billion US\$ for 18 members and includes building and power plants (Cheng, 2019, ¶.14). At the operational level, the AIIB has been innovative in financing and working with other multilateral institutions, shortly after its creation, the AIIB began working with the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank, and other institutions (Huiyao,2020, ¶.5). The AIIB, which began operating in early 2016, was envisaged to

provide financing to promote interconnectivity and economic integration in the Asia region (Nie, 2016, pp. 422-444). The AIIB, by contrast, has created an unprecedented opportunity for developed and developing countries to engage in dialogue on development finance as equals (Murphy, 2016, pp. 245-251).

2.2.5.5 China-India Cooperation in New Bank Group

PRC and India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa established BRICS in 2001. A New Development Bank was established as a banking institution of BRICS on 11 May 2015. PRC and India are founder members of the AIIB established in 2015. China is fleshing out these rhetorical salvos in proposed institutions, such as the New Development Bank (a project organized by China together with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa), the AIIB, and the Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific (FTAAP).

2.2.5.6 China-India Relation and SAARC

In the face of India's growing strategic influence, China's approach is to develop economic and strategic ties with South Asian nations, insuring that, India is surrounded by countries friendly toward China (Kumar, 2016, p. 75). China's trade with SAARC rose from \$ 42 billion to US \$ 34.7 billion (ibid). China's increasing economic and strategic ties with major South Asian nations paved the way for its entry into the SAARC as an observer at the 13th SAARC summit held in Dhaka on November 12-13, 2005. India's bid to join SAARC in vain (ibid). The Chinese strategic limitations in the South Asian Region in the present scenario, of course, the present has always a close relationship with the past. When the PRC emerged on the world map in 1949, the international environment prevailing was complex (Bindra, 2009, pp. 1163-1178).

2.2.6 China- India Economic Relations

Interest in comparative studies on China and India has been waning and waxing during the past 50 years since the two countries embarked on economic planning. Comparisons were fashionable in the 1950s to early 1980s. Most of the studies were focused narrowly on economic issues, and not on subjects of more recent vintage, such as sustainability and globalization (Bhalla, 2002, 419-439). China's economic reform and opening, orchestrated by Deng Xiao-ping in 1978-1979 AD.,

had gained substantial initial success but also faced obstacles. China's leaders decided that the country needed a peaceful international environment for at least another two decades – a period of “strategic importance” for the country to concentrate on the further development of its economy. Economic development was to be the overriding linchpin to increasing China's wealth, power, prestige, and international standing (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469). India and China have been engaged in a diplomatic War but this relation has also witnessed a surge in economic relations (Konwer, 2011, pp. 238-292). The major instrument used in advancing China's objective is its economic power, which is buoyed by its phenomenal economic growth, rapidly expanding domestic markets, and voracious appetite for raw materials needed for its economic development (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469).

The growing economic interdependence between China and India has also served to deter open conflict between the two countries. China has emerged as India's leading partner while India is China's leading partner in South Asia (Bajpayee, 2015, pp. 108-145). In December 2010 when Chinese premier Wen Jia Bao visited Delhi, the two sides decided to enhance the bilateral trade to an annual 100 billion US dollars level by the year 2015 (Gancheng, 2012, pp. 65-77). A Plethora of deals was concluded during Chinese president Xi Jinping's visit to India on September 14 and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to China in May 2015, including a five-year –economic and trade development plan that entails the development of industrial park and upgrading India's rail network (Bajpayee, 2015, pp. 108-145). Since the end of the cold war, former command and mixed economies have been encouraged by international development agencies to move away from state-led industrial policy and instead to seek macroeconomic adjustment through short-run stabilization via an accelerated economic liberalization package combined with long-term structural fiscal reform (Saez, 1998, pp. 199-220).

As emerging market countries experiencing rapid economic development, both are facing the challenge of maintaining sustainable, balanced, and coordinated development. Both are facing the arduous task of sharing the benefit of economic growth with grassroots communities (Jain and Shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267). In A. R. Basu's conception, economic factors will also assist to normalize Sino-Indian relations in the future, the two countries, which account for 40 percent of the world's

population, have complementary economies where the experiences of one could use to the other (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115).

The impact of tensions between China and India following the latest border brawl seems to be spreading to Chinese companies in India (*Global Times*, 2020, June 18). China and India have been on ironic relations through they cooperate on multiple fronts in trade and commerce (*My Republica*, 2020, June 18, ¶.3). China and India have been accelerating their economic and trade cooperation (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163).

China and India are the two big Asian economies striving for export-oriented trade. The political complexities of their relations can be overcome with the gradual development of commercial relations (Panda, 2001, pp. 105-122). In 2005, the two countries eventually concluded a “strategic partnership” when former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi (ibid). However, Sino-Indian trade crossed the \$2 bn mark in 2000 which was an increase of 44 percent “compared to the previous year. India’s exports to China have increased more than that of Chinese goods to India as claimed by the Chinese ambassador in India which seems to be a positive outcome of the realpolitik approach followed by India through the dialogue process (ibid).

2.2.6.1 China-India Trade Relations

Though the Sung-Shu (420-478 AD) vaguely alludes to maritime trade between India and China as early as the first two decades of the third century AD., definite information regarding such contact is available only from the middle of the third century A.D. The Shui-Ching –Chu based on Fu –Nan –Chuan of Kang Tai states that “Travelling to the North West (from Chu-li) for more than a year, one reaches the mouth river India. Which is called the river of Ganges.” (Chakravarty, 1961, pp. 68-71). China sold silk textiles to India for nearly two millennia from the early years of the Han dynasty (206 BCE to 220 BCE) to the period of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644 CE) and did so even though Indians began producing the cloth in the early Gupta period and vastly expanded silk cloth production from the thirteenth century onwards (Dale, 2009, pp. 79-88).

Apart from cotton and Buddhist artifacts, India exported several other commodities to China. In the late Han, when, Indo-Chinese trade was stimulated by

the Kushanas (first-third century CE) control of Indian and central Asian territory, Indians sent corals, pearls, and glass to China (ibid). The picture of Indo-Chinese trade that emerges from the fragmentary sources of the pre-European era suggests a kind of economic symmetry where the export of cloth and Buddhist artifacts may have a balance of the Indian imports of silk and, during the Sultanate era, the occasional shipment of porcelain (ibid). Both China and India aspire to be global powers and need to cooperate to sustain their growth and catch up with the West, which will undoubtedly place roadblocks along their paths (Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73). The pattern of trade between China and India, however, remained confined to the luxury goods meant for the prosperous few. White coral, pearls, precious stones, glassware, incense and, perfumes from India found their way to Chinese cities and Stupas. Chinese silk continues sly moved along the Central Asian routes to China (Ray, 2000-2001, pp. 754-756).

The official visit of the Indian Commerce Minister in 1991 gave a boost to the existing ties, and both sides also agreed to open consulates in Bombay and Shanghai and to initiate another round of meetings of the joint working group on the border issue, before June 1991. China and India have open border trade and India acquired, in the Commerce Minister of India's words "the China option for petroleum product imports" (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115). The trade and economic relations with China resumed officially in 1978. The trade volume between China and India was \$1.2 billion in 1995, rising to \$3 billion in 2000 and \$51 billion in 2008. Such a rate of trade growth is encouraging; however, India's trade deficit with China has become an area of concern in Indian business circles. In 2009, China enjoyed a \$15.9 billion trade surplus (Jain and Shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267).

Indian intermediaries facilitated trade between China and western Asia for centuries. A branch of the famous Silkroad extended into the plains of northern India. But for the most part, there was little interaction (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469). Bilateral trade between China and India has grown at a fast pace, mutual investment is growing. Economic Relations have improved between two countries but it has not been effective in mutual fears (Konwer, 2011, pp. 238-292). The bilateral trade volume between China and India had reached US\$ 38.7 billion in 2007, about 33 times the figure in 1995, with an annual growth of 34 percent. China had become the

second-largest trading partner of India and India the tenth-largest trade partner to China (ibid). Liberalization in both China and India is constrained by political and ideological factors. For example, the Indian response to the Asian economic crisis in 1997 was colored by political and ideological consideration (Bhalla, 2002, pp. 419-439). In 2000 A.D. the bilateral trade of China and India was 2.92 billion US\$. In 2018 it was 95.94 US \$.

During the State Visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping; he expressed that the People's Republic of China Will invests about 20 billion US\$ in China within five years i.e., within 2019/20 AD. In a later period; India has been facing an economic crisis. In that condition investment of China can assist to resolve the crisis by extension of Economics and creating employment. China became the largest economic partner in 2008 A. D. During the state visit of Chinese prime minister Wen Jia Bao's India visit in 2010 both countries agreed to increase trade between the two countries up to 100 % US \$. But there are trade deficits of Rs. 63 billion US\$. The bilateral trade between China and India is about 90 billion dollars (Nayyer, 2018, p. 229). Chinese and Indian trade remained minimum until 1991, when Indian prime minister Narsimha Rao, encouraged by the success of China's economic reform, launched a campaign to loosen state control over the Indian economy ((Kelly, Dobbins, Shaklapak, Gompert Heinbotham, Chlak and Thrall, 2014, p.34). In 2000-2001, India's trade deficit with China was under US\$1 billion, but in 2008-09, it was US\$22million. In 2015-16, India's trade deficit with China had risen sharply to a massive US\$53 billion (ibid). Expansion in China-India trade may present new and significant challenges to countries within the Asian Region if they successfully combine cutting-edge technical capabilities with low-cost production (Devadason, 2012, pp. 59-83). Among some more institutional frameworks, china and India had launched discussion to evolve a bilateral free trade area (FTA) agreement. This indicates their desire to go beyond the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework and mutually reduce tariffs even further as also to remove non-tariff barriers (Singh, 2005, pp. 23-31).

Total bilateral trade between China and India was 639.5 billion yuan (\$90 billion) up 1.6 percent year on-year. China's exports to India stood at 515.6 billion Yuan, up 2.1 percent and India's exports to China totaled 123.9 billion yuan, down, 0.2

percent year-on-year (Dar,2020, ¶.20). More than 1000 Chinese companies have their investment worth more than eight billion dollars in India (Paudyal,2020, ¶.15). Economic cooperation in terms of trade is increasing between China and India, currently running at \$20 billion from any \$ 1.8 billion in 1989-90 (Kumar,2016, p.61). Trade as a percent of GDP has been 38 percent in China compared to 25 percent in India. This should be seen against a backdrop of relatively open east and South Asian countries. India's import duties as a percent of imports, a key measure of openness, have also been declining in China and India. But it is lower in China compared to India 3 percent in the former and 24 percent in the latter (Kumar,2016, p.71). China's bilateral trade with India rose from the US \$ 2 to US 34.7 billion while China's bilateral trade with China.

2.2.6.2 China's FDI in India and China-India Bilateral Investment

The two-way investment links between India and China are deepening. According to the Reserve Bank of India Annual Report 2017-2018, India received a total of \$ 2.82 billion from China, which constituted hardly 1.88 percent of the total FDI inflows (\$150.5 billion) in India (Lama, 2018, p. 6). Both China and India have now tended to seek staggering and sophisticated projects to incur huge investments. Traditional assistance measures like grants and soft loans are giving way to loans with much harsher conditionality (ibid). The infrastructure deficit of India and the rest of South Asia provides immense scope for Chinese companies to supply these services facilitated by loan finance from China with the latter's historic holding of US dollars (Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73). Investment in trans-border infrastructure provides a double advantage in the sense that it expands trade and investment while creating accelerated employment opportunities to the unskilled and underemployed in agriculture since construction is a high employment elasticity sector (ibid).

2.2.7 China-India Socio-Cultural Relations

Many Chinese scholars visited India in the first millennium to study Buddhism and other subjects and many of them spent a decade or more in India. Chinese monks such as Faxian in the fifth century and Xaunzang in the seventh played important roles in introducing Buddhism to China and work there between the first century and the eleventh (Wang, 2011, pp. 437-469). The introduction of Buddhism into China

further strengthened the linkages between India and Buddhist of China and the trade-in commercial items between them flourished through central Asia (Ray, 1993, pp. 754-756). The Induction of Buddhism into China strengthened the linkage between India and Buddhist China and the trade-in commercial items between them flourished through central Asia. By the time the northern Wei dynasty flourished (386-581 A.D.). Buddhism had already passed its golden age in Gupta India but just reaching its maturity in China (Ray, 2000/2001, pp. 1193-1203).

China and India have quite a few basic similarities. Each covers a large geographic territory, possesses a large population, has a substantial agricultural sector, and is in the process of transforming from a traditional to modern society. Both are facing challenges, such as reducing poverty, increasing access to better health care as well as improving infrastructure and public governance (Jain and Shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267). Some scholars of foreign affairs and diplomacy argued that the lack of mutual interest in cultural respect between both China and India leads to the difficult situation in China-India relations. But some scholars of international relations mentioned that it is part of the outcome dominated by American supremacy. According to them; the world is increasingly becoming west-centric. Neither the Chinese nor Indians are interested in the uniqueness of the cultures other than that of the west (Gancheng, 2012, pp. 65-77).

Traditional Chinese perceptions of India as being beset with irreconcilable socio-religious cleavages within an inherently unstable polity with weak leadership that is easily contained through proxies also aggravate tensions between the two (ibid). After Sino-Indian war in 1962, a dark cloud was seen in the sky of China-India bilateral relations. Thereafter, real improvement of Sino-Indian relations took place only after the 1980s. China has permitted groups of Indian pilgrims to travel to Kailash-Manasarovar Lake since 1981 as a gesture of its goodwill (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 619-629). In the immediate aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi's Visit to India in 1988, specific agreements were concluded for the field of cultural exchanges. These agreements were divided into seven specific sections. Among these sections, there were also included Culture and Arts and Cultural Heritage and Archaeology. After these agreements, China sent the Nanchang Puppet Troupe of Sichuan to take part in the India international Puppetry Festival held in September 1990. In the same year,

China also participated Guangdong Modern Dance Troupe to Participate in India's International Dance Festival in December 1990 (Basu, 1991, pp. 103-115). Bilateral trade between China and India has since come to be recognized as the most reliable as also the most agreeable instrument of China-India rapprochement. Their long-term potential as trade partners, however, remains yet to be fully explored and exploited and their political equations remain yet vulnerable to their problematic legacies (Singh, 2005, pp. 23-31). While growing economic ties have warmed relations between China and India, there remains a fundamental lack of appreciation on the part of each country of the underlying cultural and societal norms that define the other-norms that influence each country's perception of its national interest (Jain and Shufen, 2011, pp. 259-267).

From about the 3rd century A. D. there were periodic exchanges of pilgrims and scholars between China and India. This interchange continued until the conquest of India by Islamic invaders in 1526 when the long period of spiritual and cultural relationships virtually come to end (Stauffer, 1967, pp. 81-117). The impact of Western civilization on Asian civilizations, resulting from the colonial enthusiasms of European powers during the 19th century, had the effect of kindling nationalistic sentiments in both China and India (ibid). While the cultural ties between China and India go back over two millennia, independent India and PRC were born within three years of each other in the late 1940s (Guha, 2012, pp. 26-29). China and India have shared some common cultural legacies such as China's importation of the Buddhist religion from India. China supported India's independence and the two countries collaborated on coining the five principles of peaceful coexistence in 1950 (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163).

2.2.8 China-India Cooperation in Technical, Academic / Educational, Energy and Sweet Water Security, Manufacturing and Services Sectors

While China is the world's manufacturing hub, India has carved its global niche. However, India's jobless growth founded on the services sector has to give way to enhancing its manufacturing sector significantly (Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73). India depends on China for several raw materials and intermediary products (or components). Chinese components are good at heavy engineering. India would do well to tap this expertise and continue to keep these supply chains going in interest

(*Hindustan Times*, June 22, 2020). At present time, there are Confucius institutes and Chinese language centers. Around 20 Universities in India offer Chinese language courses. China-India cooperation runs wide and deep (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.15). Just as Donald Trump has pulled America back in the battle against climate change, the two most populous nations, China and India, have moved forward instead of blaming the west for creating the climate crisis (Mahbubani, 2019, p.52). China and India are bound to cooperate on the energy front given their projected demands for energy and water incommensurate with their economic growth and a massive spate of urbanization. Cooperation is likely as the Himalayas are the source of sweet water for both nations (Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73). While China is the world's manufacturing hub, India has carved its global niche. However, India's jobless growth founded on the services sector has to give way to enhancing its manufacturing sector significantly (ibid).

2.2.9 China-India Treaties, Agreements, and Protocols

In April 1954 China and India signed an eight-year trade agreement on Tibet. Notable for enshrining the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panchasheela, as the basis for interstate relations. The agreement omitted explicit endorsement by either side of border definitions shown on the maps of the other including the "McMahon Line" originally agreed to by Tibetan delegates with British India in 1914 but not accepted by the Chinese government (Mansingh, 2006, pp. 69-78). An Agreement on Peace and Tranquility was signed by India and China on September 7, 1993, during the visit of P.V. Narsimha Rao. It is considered a landmark agreement in the relations between India and China (Balakrishnan, 1997, pp. 619-629). This agreement has provided the basis for handling their mutual concessions-respecting reality while making necessary adjustments along the LAC. In the eastern sector of their border dispute, China has to make major concessions by accepting the McMahon Line, a British-drawn line that has been rejected by successive Chinese central governments (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163). The China-India rapprochement amounts to sharing a common view of a fair world order accommodating multipolarity in the world system. This has reduced. Though not necessarily removed, their mutual apprehension. Both sides recognize the need to tap the opportunities that their

economic development and interaction have provided them in an interconnected world (ibid, 2010).

2.2.10 China -India Cooperation in Environmental Issues

China's environmental challenges had emerged as an evident threat to China's and in turn, the world's growth (and especially, sustainable growth) and as a major contribution to climate change and associated dangers of economic crisis, political instability, and worse (Kumar,2016, p.32). China and India are serious social and environmental problems to encounter a problem of poverty and disparity, the problem of rapidly deteriorating environments due to rapid industrialization, etc. (ibid, p.60).

2.2.11 China-India Cooperation in Security Issue and Counter-Terrorism

China and India are leaving the issue of India's nuclear weapons testing behind. They will not talk officially of their nuclear relationship but have been watching other's nuclear-weapons policy, as that will shape their response to each other on other issues to some extent (Dingli, 2010, pp.139-163). In January 2001 India and China agree to work together on counter-terrorism programs to maintain regional security. Just as the 9/11 attacks have transformed the world political landscape, the anti-terror issue has been increasingly a part of the new Sino-Indian security relationship (ibid). Both China and India have noticed the terrorism threat in their bilateral, regional, and global contexts. They have worked together in supporting anti-terror military action in Afghanistan, though without dispatching their troops (ibid). Sino- Indian military-to-military contact with anti-terror in the background is emerging. In November 2003, China and India carried out a joint search-and-rescue naval exercise in the East China Sea near Shanghai. In August 2004 Indian soldiers joined the Chinese for mountain-hiking training (ibid). The contemporary anti-terror warfare is conducive to improved Sino-Indian relations. Such a global landscape has allowed states to downplay their interstate competition and rivalry and presents ever-unfolding cooperative opportunities (ibid).

2.2.12 China-India Rivalry

2.2.12.1 China India Border Dispute:

The 73 days long standoff between China and India in 2017 over disputed territory between Bhutan and China in Doklam is seen as Beijing's attempts to make inroads into South Asia -a challenge to India, which considers the region to be within its sphere of influence (Bhattarai, 2019, p.7). In the past colonial period, mutual relations suffered a setback due to political and boundary disputes (Kumar,2016, p.57). The history of a border dispute between India and China going back to the war of 1962 is well known. That dispute is yet to be resolved and continues to be a source of tension and mistrust between them. The friction is exacerbated by China's military and nuclear cooperation with archival Pakistan (ibid, p.61). The China-India boundary dispute has two main geographical foci. The core issue in the eastern sector, which extends from Bhutan to Burma, concerns the validity of the McMahon Line and China's claim to 77,000 square Kilometers south of this boundary (Elkin & Fredericks, 1983, pp. 1128-1139).In the West, sovereignty over 24,000 kilometers encompassing northeastern Ladakh and the Aksai Chin in question. New Delhi's frustration over the loss of western sector territory following its conflict with China has been exacerbated by a 1963 Sino-Pakistani border delimitation agreement. Under the terms of the accord, Pakistan assigned to China a section of Kashmir claimed by India. Acquisition of this area allowed Beijing to outflank Indian defense lines in northern Ladakh (ibid).

British India and China gained a common border in 1826, with British annexation of Assam in the Treaty of Yandabo after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826). Subsequent annexations in further Anglo-Burmese Wars expanded China's borders with British India eastwards, to include the border with what is now Myanmar (Sen,2014, pp. 1307-1316). In 1913-14, representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a conference in Shimla, India, and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet's status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary between Tibet and India for the eastern sector, was drawn by British negotiator Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement (ibid). The situation became tense when China refused to recognize McMahan Line as a contiguous territory of India's north-east frontier, Chinese illogical and opportunistic position stood self-exposed.

But the Indian government on the contrary adopted a somewhat soft attitude towards this issue (Bindra, 2009, pp. 1163-1178).

The Shimla conference not only fixed the boundaries of outer Tibet and set it up as a completely autonomous state having a nominal link with China; it also fixed the frontier from the east of Bhutan (Stauffer, 1967, pp. 81-117). Along the northern and eastern border of Assam round to the meeting place of China, Tibet, and Burma...a distance of eight hundred and fifty miles ...had never been demarcated (ibid). According to L. C., Green tripartite participation was again a feature of the Shimla Convention dram up in 1914. This Treaty arranged for the division of Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet, the latter being separated from India by what has become known as the McMahon Line, after the British negotiator (Green, 1960, pp. 42-58). The issue of adverse territorial claims has generated profound discord between India and China for a generation. In consequence, the reinstatement of formal border negotiations in December 1981 after a gap of 21 years, was an event of a considerable moment (Elkin and Fredericks, 1983, pp. 1128-1139).precisely on maps in the profession of both India and after the early 1950s-China (Maxwell,1970, pp. 47-80). by the end of the 1950s, irritation over the northern border dispute had become a prime determinant of Indian policy toward China. Indian concern was manifested both by the delivery of censorious diplomatic communications and the positioning of troops in contested areas in response to similar actions by China (Elkinand Fredericks, 1983, pp. 1128-1139).

In 1960 based on an agreement between Nehru and Chou En-Lai, officials from India and China held discussions to settle the boundary dispute. China and India disagreed on the major watershed that defined the boundary in the Western sector (Sen, 2014, pp. 1307-1316). The Chinese Minister, Zhou Enlai argued that the Western border had never been delimited, that the Merchantry-MacDonald Line, which left the Aksai Chin within Chinese borders was the only line ever proposed to a Chinese government, and that the Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction and these negotiations should take in to account the status quo (ibid). Chou En-Lai has referred to the McMahon Line as a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and therefore in an illegal line. Further, the Shimla convention was never ratified by China (Stauffer, 1967, pp. 81-117). China-India

border dispute is essentially what has brewed the deep distrust between China and India, though another major factor is their ever-increasing economic disparity despite India's outstanding growth (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163). The perennial headache of the Sino-Indian border dispute has presented a seemingly insurmountable barrier to the complete normalization of their relations. Indeed, there exist certain military CBMs among both armed forces along the LAC. However, without total settlement of the border dispute, it is hard to completely dispel mistrust between the two countries (ibid).

As Jawaharlal Nehru was to recall, the problem of India's north-eastern boundary was waiting in his in-tray when he took up this responsibility as foreign minister (and prime minister) of the government of independent India in 1947 (Maxwell, 1981, pp. 1545-1548). By the time India became independent in August 1947, the British had made some progress toward making the McMahon Line good on the ground as India's northeast border, in defiance of China's protest: and the successor government in New Delhi took up the task of completion (Maxwell, 1999, pp. 905-918). Nehru's commitment referred to a confrontation that had developed on the McMahon Line-or rather, to be precise, on the Chinese side of the McMahon Line (ibid).

The map on which McMahon had drawn his line was based on an elementary survey, and when in the 1950s Indian administrators reached their frontier area, they concluded that in certain sections McMahon should have placed it several miles further north (ibid). There are two territorial disputes between India and China, now conjoined but separate and distinct from each other geographically. In political origin and in the historical era in which they were created (Maxwell, 2012, pp. 10-13). The diplomatic negotiation of a Sino-Indian border settlement would not be easy now, as it would have been in Nehru's day; there are aggrieved nationalistic feelings in China (ibid).

China and India share one of the longest undermarketed and disputed borders in the world. No treaty has ever formally delimited the disputed boundary, which affects over 1, 25000 sq. km in three distinct sectors (Sidhu and Yuan, 2001, pp.351-376). So far as the McMahon Line was concerned. The Indian Government's approach had already closed off the possibility of a formal agreement with China on

that boundary alignment (Maxwell, 1970, pp. 47-80). China was prepared to accept that as the de facto boundary and, it seems, to make it the de jure boundary by renegotiating it, as she was to with Burma, but she would not agree that the McMahon line was already the de jure boundary (ibid). There was no Indian representative at any of the talks or discussions that took place between British India, Tibet, and China; the people who fought against colonial rule and won independence from the British uncritically accept the borders drawn by them as sacrosanct (Srikanth, 2012, pp. 38-41).

2.2.12.2 China-India Doklam Issues

In 2017, tensions over Doklam extended this irredentism to the Himalayas. China and India have made not adjust to some of their respective territorial claims (Manning, 2018, p.6). From New Delhi's perspective, the perception of Chinese intentions and use of language regarding Doklam seems to reflect a pattern employed in the both South China Sea and East China Sea (ibid). China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang explained that ' Doklam has been a part of China since ancient times. It does not belong to Bhutan, still less, India...China's construction of roads in Doklam is an act of sovereignty on its territory (ibid). The boundary dispute between India and China is but one of the layers complicating relations -bilaterally (Narayan, 2017, pp. 59-70).

2.2.12.3 China-India Relations and Tibet Issue

India has a 2500 mile stretch of the frontier with mighty China, considered that the best policy would be good-will sympathy, cooperation, and friendship. But the Sino-Indian friendship broke up beyond repair when China occupied Tibet in 1950 (Ghoble, 1995, pp. 833-845). In 1950 there began a series of events concerning Tibet which had a direct bearing on the events of 1962. This remote and little-known region at the "roof of the world" has great significance in current Sino-Indian disputes (Stauffer, 1967, pp. 81-117). According to Bhawana Pokhran Tibet due to its geographical location plays the role of a buffer state between India and China. Strategically it occupies a special position for both India and China. It is a vast physical expanse lying athwart the mighty Himalayas, all the way from Kashmir in

the west in the east to Arunachala Pradesh and beyond in the east (Pokhrana, 2009, pp. 611-626).

According to T. R. Ghoble Nehru viewed Tibet as a buffer state, just as the British did. Chinese made no distinction between suzerainty and sovereignty and this made them suspicious of the importance that was given to the autonomy of Tibet. This was the understanding among friends in the Nehru circle (Ghoble, 1995, pp. 833-845). According to S.S. Bindra, Nehru failed to understand what the Chinese were having their mind. If we analyze the proceeding of the Indian parliament particularly on the Tibetan issue, cutting cross-party line, the majority of the members were critical about Nehru's Tibet policy (Bindra, 2009, pp. 1163-1178). During the 1950s the PRC built a 1,200 Kilometer Road connecting Xinjiang and Western Tibet, of which 179 Kilometer ran south of the Johnson Line through the Aksai Chin region claimed by India. Aksai Chin was easily accessible from China but was more difficult for the Indians on the other side of Karakorum to reach (Sen, 2014, pp. 1307-1316).

Even till 1950 new Indian map showed the McMahan line as undermarketed for the middle and western sectors, the legend left the boundary undefined (Ghoble, 1995, pp. 833-845). In that map, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan were shown outside India but in the map published in 1954, the McMahan line was shown as a firm of boundary and so were the boundaries in the middle and western sectors (ibid). In R. Ghoble's perception, the Chinese on the other hand always recognized that the border was not a settled issue; they wanted negotiations and suggested mutual concessions on Tibet. They considered Nehru's view when signing the 1951 agreement with the local government of Tibet on May 23, 1951 (ibid).

Tibet looms large in Sino-Indian relations and politics, even after 45 years of Chinese occupation because of its intimate connection with the strategic interest of both parties (Narayan, 2017, pp. 59-70). India's border with China -its longest with any neighbor -was complicated both by China's acquisition of Tibet and by the fact that the government governing the borderline had been drawn up by officials of the British empire (Guha, 2012, pp. 26-29).

In comparison to the magnitude of China's border problem, the task facing independent India when it emerged from the British raj in 1947 was minor. Extensive

sectors of India's borders had already been transformed into boundaries by the departed imperial power (Maxwell, 1999, pp. 905-918). The reassertion of Chinese authority in Tibet in the first decade of the 20th century-and its collapse in 1912-led to an attempt by the British Indian government to replace the established and traditional limit of its administration in the north-east (ibid). The Chinese did not react as they had done in 1962, however. They heavily reinforced in Tibet, including field forces from Chengdu and Lanzhou with fighter bombers and combat helicopters suited to operations at high altitudes (ibid). The India-China rivalry originated with the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1951. With the occupation, a buffer that insulated direct contact between the two countries disappeared and the Indo-Tibetan border became the Indo-Chinese border (Majumdar, 2006, pp. 4324-4325).

Tibet has attracted widespread international attention and the Chinese have frequently been subject to attacks on their human rights record in Tibet by the international community, especially the west (ibid).The presence of the Dalai Lama and his followers in India is a source of friction between India and China. China has repeatedly claimed that the Dalai Lama is using his position to lobby for independence for Tibet and thus trying to break up China (ibid). Tibet is at the heart of the India-China rivalry for dominance in Asia. When Tibet was occupied, it changed the asymmetry between the two sides (ibid). Upon independence in 1947, the government of India used the Johnson Line as the basis for its official boundary in the West, encompassing Aksai Chin. However, India did not claim the northern areas near Sahidulla and Khotan, for including which in Indian territory, among other things, Johnson had been criticized (Sen, 2014, pp. 1307-1316). India's experience of 1962 indicates that war cannot resolve the border dispute. It is true that after the 1962 war, India had diverted much of its meager resources to substantially increase its military capabilities over the decade (Srikanth, 2012, pp. 38-41). Another war between China and India would be more brutal and devastating. In 1962. The socialist regime in China ensured that the people living along the borders were not affected adversely that cannot be ensured now (ibid). China is a major neighboring country of India, with whom it shares a long border. Right from independence, India desired peaceful and cooperative relations with China. When the PRC was formally proclaimed in October 1949, India became the second- non-communist country to recognize it (Shah, 2010, pp. 559-611).

2.2.12.4 China-India Relations in BRI and OBOR

US and India are competing for strategic dominance or wish to contain China from spreading its wings of influence respectively (Wagle, 2019, ¶. 5). In professor Yubaraj Sangroula's perception, BRI is a new model of international cooperation for economic development proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. BRI is that kind of economic development model which implements the grand strategy of the maritime silk road and economic development (Sangroula, 2020, p.657).

In the past colonial period, mutual relations suffered a setback due to political and boundary disputes (Kumar,2016, p.57). The history of the border dispute between India and China going back to the war of 1962 is well known. That dispute is yet to be resolved and continues to be a source of tension and mistrust between them. The friction is exacerbated by China's military and nuclear cooperation with archival Pakistan (ibid, p.61). Since 2013, China has promoted a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that encourages investment in port infrastructure along its maritime route to Europe, suggesting to some American, India and Japanese analysts the materialization of a "String of Pearls" that would allow China to construct a network of naval facilities around the Indian Ocean under the cover of commercial ventures (Sheldon-Duplaix,2016, pp. 43-52). The first time Xi Jinping introduced the concept of OBOR, in September 2013 in Kazakhstan, he spoke of an SREB specifically, road and rail construction along a route roughly following the ancient trade route connecting China to Europe via Central Asia (Murphy,2016, pp. 245-251).

In David Shambaugh's perception, Under Xi, China has bombarded the world with a welter of new initiatives: "the Chinese dream", "the Asia-Pacific dream", "the Silk Road Economic belt", the "Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road", "a new type of major-country relations", and many others (Shambaugh, 2004/2005, pp. 64-99). Chinese President Xi Jinping's proposed "Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)" and the "Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (TFCMSR)" announced in October 2013 -together known as the OBOR initiative-which aims to promote joint development, common prosperity, and cooperation between China and many countries across Asia (Nie,2016, pp. 422-444). OBOR is also a useful tool for China to shape international rules and norms, as well as influence the global economic order, all of which are crucial to achieving President Xi's domestic "China dream" and

international “national rejuvenation” (ibid). OBOR has also been discussed at multiple international events. As some observers have stated, Xi has ambitions to be a great leader in the mould of Mao and ensure a leading role for China on the world stage (ibid).

Chinese Premier Le Keqiang listed one of the national major tasks in 2014 as intensifying the planning for and building the SREB and TFCMSR, as well as promoting the construction of Bangladesh- China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM economic Corridor) and China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In 2015, the government of PRC established a special leading group to oversee the implementation of the BRI and launched an action plan on how to implement OBOR, which was issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Commerce in March 2015 (Nye, 2016). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that more than seventy countries and organizations had expressed their support and willingness to join the OBOR and thirty-four countries and international Organizations (IO) had signed an intergovernmental cooperation agreement with China to pursue the OBOR project (Nie, 2016, pp. 422-444). OBOR is a project that is both feasible and practical. It is results-oriented and more than mere political rhetoric. According to Xi’s instructions, it is the NDRC rather than the MFA that takes the lead in implementing OBOR (ibid). In China, at almost all levels of government are working to realize the OBOR project and so there is good reason to believe that more progress will be achieved in the coming years (ibid).

OBOR is characterized by development and cooperation. As such it is expected to usher in an unprecedented period of integration and cooperation, not only with countries in China’s neighborhood but also with all countries along the BRI in Asia, Europe, and East Africa (ibid). The central government of PRC’s continued elaboration of its OBOR initiative suggests that China’s leaders, by contrast, are increasingly confident that the lessons of China’s unique experience of development can be applied on a wider stage than previously imagined (Murphy, 2016, pp. 245-251).

Most of China’s largest industrial and financial enterprises also released OBOR plans, which typically integrated their existing projects and future planning with OBOR’s objectives. These statements are beginning to give the OBOR concept

shape and content (ibid). The institutions charged with financing OBOR-the China Development Bank (CDB), along with the new institutions AIIB and Silk Road Fund (SRF)-are all considered development finance will determine the lending practices that will shape OBOR (ibid). OBOR theoretically encompasses over half the world's population, territory, and economic activity, and is backed by an institution much larger than the WB, the question arises as to whether the principles of Chinese development finance are comparable with global norms (ibid). If as the plan for OBOR anticipates, China continues to ramp up its overseas lending to the point that it is responsible for a very large population of global development finance, China's impact on global development paradigms will be considerable (ibid).

2.2.12.5 China-India Relations and Indo -Pacific Strategy (IPS)

China has embarked on a build-up aimed at making itself into a “sea power” mainly in the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR), to deter a US intervention in Taiwan and to protect its trade in the Indian Ocean (Sheldon-Duplaix, 2016, pp. 43-52). According to Robert A. Manning, the US version of the Indo-Pacific Strategy is evolving, and to some degree bumps up against Trump's ‘America First’ ideology. For Shinzo Abe, free trade is central to Indo-Pacific connectivity (Manning, 2018, p.8). This is also a tenet of Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, which also emphasizes the Indo-Pacific (ibid). The US National Security Strategy (NSS) and Defense Strategy were both released in late 2017, which emphasizes the security dimension of the Indo-Pacific. The NSS was the first explicit US definition of China predominantly as a strategic competitor: China seeks to displace the US in the Indo-Pacific region (ibid, p.9). Security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region has been increasing steadily over the past decade, in large measure as a response to a bigger Chinese footprint. US-Japan-Australia defense cooperation and annual trilateral meetings are a staple of US Asian diplomacy (ibid). The US has bolstered its defense relationship with India both bilaterally and in annual Malabar US-Japan India military exercises (ibid).

One question arising from these discordant trends is: how will nations in the Indo-Pacific define their respective interests? That will determine the limits and possibilities of any Indo-Pacific strategy (ibid). In Robert A. Manning's conception, Like China, India has historically been an autonomous strategic actor, away of alliances, and a lingering non-aligned, anti-US mindset remains in Delhi bureaucracy

(ibid). The strategic matrix of Asia-Pacific is nowadays revolving around the US pivot and rebalancing policy vis-a-vis China. The landscape is reflecting a complex state of interdependence between the US, China, and their allies (Khan and Amin, 2015, pp. 3-28). Asia-pacific is presently at the center of global economic activities. According to the US department of state and WB's update on Asia Pacific's 21 states, the economic volume was \$39 trillion of collective GDP, and 56 percent of the economic output of the whole world (ibid). The Asia Pacific's 56 percent entire trade and commerce is with the US, and it is home to energy and trade routes. Demographically, Asia Pacific consists of the world's half population and harbors some of the largest militaries of the globe (ibid).

2.2.13 Recent Trends of China-India Relations

India and China have been holding several rounds of the Lt General- Level talks to discuss ways to de-escalate tension between the two sides in eastern Ladakh i. e. Galwan Valley (Rohatgi, 2020, ¶.5). Twenty Indian Army Soldiers were killed due to a violent face-off between Indian and Chinese troops at a Line of Actual Control in Ladakh's Galwan valley on June 15, 2020's night (*India Today*, 2020, June 16). Over the past dozen years, India has not only closed the gap with China in this military theater, but it may also now have a slender superiority. Indian officials largely concur with this view through prefer to stress India does not enjoy a position of complete dominance (Chaudhary, 2020, ¶.2). State councilors and foreign minister of China, Wang Yi spoke with Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaya Shankar over the phone regarding the recent border clashes of June 15 (*The Himalayan Times*, 2020 June 18). Since 2020 June 15, tensions between the two largest and most powerful countries in Asia are escalating, there have been calls for revenge and retaliation. There is a fear in the region that this tragic incident could trigger an all-out war between the two Asian giants with huge military capabilities and nuclear weapons (*My Republica*, 2020, June 18). KM stretch of the Pangong Tso and China the rest. The current site of confrontation is spurred jutting out of Chang Chenmo, an eastern extension of the Karakoram range (Dutt, 2020, ¶.6). The prolonged comping and a heavy presence of Chinese troops at Pangong Lake in Ladakh at a location that is under Indian control have emerged to be the biggest roadblock for a possible resolution to the outgoing tussle between India and China at the Line of Actual

Control (Bhalla,2020,¶. 1). Unlike the Doklam Standoff in 2017, the Galwan clash - which has caused some satellites might affect bilateral ties for some time if the COVID-19 pandemic persists? (Dutt,2020, ¶.13). China is much concerned as India about the asymmetrical relation among nations underscored in the developing world striving to strengthen their economic and security bases (Panda, 2001, pp. 105-122).

Chinese newspaper Global times wrote that the deadly border incident was something neither party could have anticipated or wanted to see and the consequent rising nationalist fever in India has already caused significant pressure on bilateral relations and economic ties (*Global Times*,2020 June 18). According to Chinese senior research fellow Long Xing Chung, China has always good intentions for India, and it has no intent to hamper India's economic development, China wants to see a prosperous India (ibid). Chinese President Xi Jinping promotes the idea of the 'China Dream 'which is about restoring China's traditional and from its perspectives (Kumar,2016, p.10). A shifting global power balance from west to East has become a much remarked upon the phenomenon of recent years, but its antecedents in an earlier decade (ibid, p.62). Within Asia, the most attention is focused on its pre-eminent emerging global players. China and India, both of which are adding enormously to the global economy while developing huge middle classes larger than the entire population of most G7 countries (ibid).

2.3 China-India Cooperation and Nepal

The Indian reversal in the Sino-Indian war changed the whole complexation of Himalayan politics. India lost prestige in Nepalese eyes as it proved incapable of defending its border against China, not to speak of defending Nepal against China (Ghoble,1992, pp. 598-606).

2.3.1 China's Foreign Policy Towards Nepal

China's foreign policy towards Nepal can be formed classic example of correct international behavior. Sino-Nepal bilateral relationship furnishes strong evidence that ideological doctrine had no place after developing healthy growth and development of amicable relations between two nations (Pradhan,2014, p.231). Chinese foreign policy towards Nepal is guided by sovereign equality and mutual respect. The interrelationship between China and Nepal guaranteed the security and

prosperity of both countries so that there is the strategic importance of China Nepal relations from the ancient period to till date (Sangroula, 2020, p.588). China is a close neighbor of Nepal. The geographical continuity provided by great mountains and rivers has formed a background favorable to the development of long-standing historical ties between Nepal and China (Singh, 2014, p.53). In the historical period; Nepal remained the opening door to Asian regions for China. Nepal is not only important for China but also important for India for trade between China-Tibet and India. Nepal had remained a secured transit point for China-Tibet and Nepal. Nepal always secures the trade between China and India (Sangroula, 2020, pp.588-589). Nepal-China relations are very cordial and deeply rooted for ages it is marked by social, religious, cultural, economic, and politically close ties differences between two countries are solved by amicable and peaceful means (Bhattarai, 2010,p.147). Both sides recognized that the bilateral relationship between two countries was characterized by equality, harmonious coexistence, ever-lasting friendship, and comprehensive operation (*The Himalayan Times*,2019, October 14).

2.3.1.1 Glimpse of China-Nepal Relations

The first recorded official relations between Nepal and China from the middle of seventh century A. D. through cultural delegations (Manandhar, 1999, p.1). Sino-Nepali diplomatic ties duly re-established 70 years ago on 1 August 1955 are poised for new challenges and opportunities. The time these ties were re-established was no less challenging either (Kumar,2013, p.58). InProfessor Yubaraj Sangroula's perception, in the latest era of history, while the Tibetan rulers started to revolt against Chinese emperors in the name of 'independence' from China, it also the weekend the China-Nepal relations. The Nepal-China relation started to become weak from the ruling period of the Qing dynasty. The regime of the Qing dynasty started to challenge by Dalai Lama in Tibet. So, anarchism prevailed due to talk of control by China in Tibet. Anarchism yield loot, it also affected the silk route of Xian-Lhasa (Sangroula,2020, pp.593-594). After creating anarchism and starting a revolt against the Chinese in Tibet, the Tibetan revolt against officials started to obstruct and disturb the Nepalese diplomat. Some of the Nepalese diplomats were killed and capture the gift of Nepalese representatives on the way to Tibet. Due to these reasons, the Nepal-China relation becomes very weak in the 19th century. Due to the transitional political

situation of China, Nepal-China relations also affected worse (Ibid, p.594). The India-China honeymoon of 1950 began to show signs of strain by the latter half of the decade (Rusko and Sasikumar, 2007, pp. 99-123). Today both China and Nepal urgently need sustained international peace for they are facing the different tasks of economic construction and raising the living standard of their peoples (Hong-Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520).

2.3.1.2 Glimpse of Diplomatic Relations between China and Nepal

Geographically, Nepal is located between the People's Republic of China and India. Nepal is surrounded by China in the north and by India in the east south and west. Nepal's border with the Tibet region of China measures 1415 Kilometers along the Himalayan regions. Over 90 percent of Nepal's frontiers with China run through inhabited altitudes with rocks and snow, glaciers, and ice fields. Of the ten tallest mountains, eight mountains, including Kanchanjunga (28,209 ft) and Mount Everest (29,029 Ft) are located in Nepal's northern region bordering Tibet. The main watershed between the Bramhaputra (the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) and Ganges (including different major river systems of Nepal) is located across the Nepal- China border towards the north in Tibet (Jha, 2013, pp. 63-75). The contacts between Nepal and China date back to the early years of the Tang dynasty. Many ups and downs occurred in bilateral relations between Nepal and China (Acharya, 2006, p.29). Nepal's historical relations with China (and Tibet) have been shaped by conflicts over territory and the control of Tibet (Mishra, 2013, p. 68). When the Lichchavi King Ansu Varma gained state authority and started the building of a new national identity King Songstun Gampo as a representative of the Tubo kingdom had been ruling in Tibet (Sangroula, 2020, p.550). During the ruling period of Ansu Varma, the settlement of human beings in Kuti and Keorung had started. These Human settlements had played the role to link Nepal and Tibet (ibid, p.378). During the ruling period of Ansu Varma of Nepal and Songstun Gampo of Tibet Kathmandu of Nepal and Kuti and Keorung of Tibet linked Nepal and Tibet as trade and cultural center. It was also the first step of state-level relations between China and Nepal (ibid, p.550).

Some historians mentioned that the Nepalese princess of the Lichchhavi dynasty Bhrikuti Devi married Tibetan King Songtsan Gampo. But there is the various opinion about Bhrikuti Devi. Some historians mentioned that she was the

daughter of Ansu Verma. Some other historians mentioned that she was the daughter of Lichchavi King Udaya Dev. According to other authors, she was the sister of Lichchhavi King Narendra Dev. But according to the Chinese Buddhist Encyclopedia, Bhrikuti Devi was Lichchhavi Princess and elder queen of Tibetan King Songtsan Gampo (ibid, p.556). She was Buddhist Princess. She brought Some artists and Books of the Buddhist religion to Tibet. After the marriage of Bhrukuti in Tibet Buddhist religion has been contributing to uplift social change, intellectual development, and cultural progress (ibid, p.561). Chinese emperors also started emphasizing Nepal, due to the amazing beauty, unique Geography, and political influence of Nepal at that time (Sangroula, 2018, p. 389).

In 651 AD Lichchhavi king Narendra Dev sent a team of representatives to the emperor of China. Chinese emperor became happy and warm welcome to Nepalese team of representative. Through the visit of that representative direct formal relations were established between China and Nepal (ibid, p.583). Nepal China's relations remained cordial throughout Nepal had a strong influence over Tibet and had comfortable trade ties with Tibet. It contributed to the sound economy of Nepal. This cordiality was broken after Nepal-Tibet War in 1791 (Basnyat, 2019, p. 7). The 1972's China Nepal war was ended by the treaty of the representative of the Chinese emperor and the representative of the government of Nepal but that war became a dark shadow in traditional cordial (based on trust) relations between China and Nepal (Sangroula, 2020, p.589). During the Nepal-China war 1972 A.D. Nepal spent excessive unnecessary expenditure and due to diluted relations between China British rulers were encouraged to attacked Nepal. That was called the Anglo-Nepal War (1814-1816). In this war, Nepal lost a huge amount of territory. During the Anglo-Nepal war (1814-1816), Nepal requested China to assist Nepal in Anglo-Nepal War (ibid, pp.589-590). In 1947 A.D. government of Nepal sent a mission to Peking (now Beijing). The relations of Nepal with the government of Chiang Kai-Shek were quite different than in the past time. The government of Chiang was supported by western powers, especially by the British colonial government. The East India Company government of India had seen the relation between Nepal and other government by suspicious eye. So, the mission of the Chiang Kai-Shek government, representative of the British colonial government also involved (ibid, p.600). Chinese ruler Chiang Kai Shek sent a Chinese mission to Nepal to deepen a good neighborhood with Nepal by

congratulating Nepalese ruler China Juddha Shumsher stated that Nepal can establish a second foreign embassy of Nepal to China in Nanking (ibid).

In 1946 AD Chinese nationalist government sent a Chinese mission to Nepal. At that time China was in serious political condition. Firstly, the second world war destructed China worse, secondly, millions of peoples were killed in the Nanking city of China, and the CPC captured most of the territories of China, and the final decisive war against the government of Chiang Kai Shek proceeded. That mission provided a Chinese medal to Nepalese newly appointed Prime Minister Padma Shumsher on November 26, 1946 AD. After that, the China-Nepal relation was only limited to few bilateral visits. In 1947 AD another Chinese mission visited Nepal (ibid, pp.600-601). The hegemonic behaviors of the Qing palace to Nepal in 1816 A. D., the government of Nepal pressurized to signed in the treaty of Sugauli in 1816 AD with the East India Company. If China helped Nepal in 1814-1816 Anglo-Nepal war the British colonial regime was ended (ibid, p.608). In the 1950's era, the Nepal-China relation renewed the political transition that prevailed in China up to 1950 AD. During the ruling period of the Qing dynasty anarchism and the dark situation remained. So, China-Nepal relations are also worse affected by that situation (ibid, p.594). The sending of a quinquennial mission to the Chinese royal palace started in 1792 AD and it was ended in 1906 AD. During this period 18 quinquennial missions were sent by Nepal (ibid, p.597). In 1910 AD the republican government of China claimed that Nepal was land under the control of China. This statement makes the relation between the two states cold again. After the establishment of a republican government led by Sun Yat Sen. Nepal breakdown sending of a quinquennial mission to China. Up to 1914-1955 AD, China and Nepal did not try to reestablish cultural relations between the two countries. In Professor Yubaraj Sangroula's conception, the republican system of China at that period was under the influence of western power (ibid). The Nepal-India relation during 1914 -1935AD was limited in the four quinquennial missions. In Professor Yubaraj Sangroula's perception, the republican government established after 1910 AD did not understand the interrelation between Nepal and China. That government was affected by western countries and did not try to understand the importance of samal states like Nepal. At that time the Chinese scholars. locked South Asia or Southern territory of the Himalayan as the Indian territory (ibid, p.597).

After the establishment of the republican government in 1911 AD, the permanent government could not be formed in China. Then China was victimized by transition and anarchism. The China-Tibet relation was very worse during the early phase of 1990 AD. The government of the Dalai Lama of Tibet unofficially restricted to Nepalese quinquennial mission to China. In that situation, the head of the nationalist government of China Chiang Kai-Shek tried to connected China-Nepal relations. In 1930 Chiang Kai-Shek sent a representative to Nepal but the nationalist government of China was the puppet of the British and the USA (ibid, p.599). The representative sent by Chiang Kai-Shek brought an official letter for the Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai Shek mentioned in his letter that, Chinese nationalist government went to take responsibility for resolving the disputes between Nepal and Tibet to fulfill the objective of peace and security. That mission helped to re-established the interrelation between China and Nepal (ibid, p.599). Chiang Kai-Shek's government sent another Chinese mission to Nepal. In that mission the representative of the Council of Mongolian and Tibet Affairs. That mission's main purpose was to provide a special degree to Rana Prime minister Bhim Shumsher (ibid, p.599). Two Chinese diplomatic missions for Nepal sent by Chiang Kai-Shek did not affect diplomatic relations between China and Nepal but those helped to renew China-Nepal bilateral relations and tried to correct the unnecessary. The Claim of the Chinese emperor and Chinese republican government to Nepal (ibid, pp.599-560).

People's Republic of China and Nepal signed the formal agreement on August 1, 1955, and renewed their age-old traditional relationship (Shrestha, 2015, p.4). Nepalese and Chinese people have traveled and conducted trade walking through several narrow passages of the Himalayas since the time immemorial from 1960 onward, two highways – Arniko and Rasuwagadhi – have been constructed and operated to link Kathmandu to Tibet Autonomous Region of China (ibid). There are similarities between Nepalese peoples and the Tibet region of China in terms of lifestyle, culture, and social status. Geographic, cultural, economic, social, rituals, history, and politics made bilateral relationships permanent deep and broader (Siwakoti, 2014, pp.1-22). During the Premiership of Tanka Prasad Acharya on August 14, 1556, Chinese delegates led by the ambassador of China and Nepal Pan, Tzli came to Nepal, and a treaty was signed between Nepal and China on September 20, 1956. The preamble of that treaty reaffirmed the five principles of (Panchashila) of

peaceful coexistence. According to that treaty, all past agreements between Nepal and Tibet were abrogated, Nepal was allowed to establish trade agencies at Lhasa, Shiatsu, Kerung, and Kuti in Tibet, and China was given the right to established an equal number of trade agencies in Nepal, Nepalese were permitted to trade at Lhasa, Shigatse, Gyantse, and Yatung, pilgrimage by Nepalese and Tibetans in each other's territory would continue on the based on religious custom and trades involved in local trade in the border regions of Nepal and Tibet may do as they have customarily done heretofore (Rose, 1971, p.210). Except these agreement to maintain friendly relation and trade and intercourse 1956, Nepal China economic aid agreement on Economic aid 1960, highway construction agreement 1961, the treaty of peace and friendship 1960, Sino-Nepal Boundary agreement 1960, Boundary treaty 1961, Boundary protocol 1963, agreements on construction of highway 1965, Economic agreement 1966, Nepal-China trade agreement 1968, agreement on grant assistance completed projects 1972, agreement on trade and payment 1974, agreement for construction of Pokhara, Surkhet highway, trade and payment agreement 1984, agreement on trade, intercourse and related questions between Nepal and Tibet autonomous region of China 1986, an agreement between the government of PRC and HMG of Nepal concerning bilateral road transportation 1994, an agreement between the government of Republic of China and His Majesty's government of Nepal for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion concerning taxes and income 2000, agreement on mutual visa exemption for the holders of diplomatic and Service (official) passport Agreement on trans frontier pasturing by border inhabitants, etc. were signed between China and Nepal (Shrestha, 2015, pp.281-448). Since diplomatic relations between China and Nepal were established in 1955, and especially since the beginning of ambassadorial exchange in 1960, the two countries have developed a good relationship (Hong-Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520). Since diplomatic relations between China and Nepal were established in 1955, and especially since the beginning of ambassadorial exchange in 1960, the two countries have developed a good relationship (ibid).

2.3.1.2.1 State-Level Visits of China and Nepal

High-level visits of two neighboring states can contribute to bilateral relations between concerned states. High-Level visits undertaken regularly do nourish the root of relations and help build confidence and cordiality. High-level Visits are also opportunities to renew, rebuild and reinforce relations to keep them abreast of the contemporary international relations reality (Thapa, 2019, p. 6). In between 1368 AD and 1644 AD, after the Ming dynasty, China sent five missions to Nepal whereas seven missions from Nepal visited China (Sangroula, 2018,p.398). During the last phase of the medieval period, some obstacles were seen in Nepal -Tibet bilateral relations but the trade relation between Nepal and China expanded at that time. After the last phase of the 18th century, the trade between China and Nepal started to decrease respectively (iid, p.589). In the last phase of the 18th century,the Nepalese King imposed unnecessary war against Tibet due to greed to earn more benefit from coins of silver and gold and this became the main cause of decreasing trade between Nepal and Tibet (ibid).Nepal invaded Tibet in 1855, but the Nepalese -Tibetan war ended soon after China intervened, the treaty of Thapathali, concluded in March 1856, recognized the special status of China and Nepal's commitment to helping Tibet in the event of foreign aggression (Mishra, 2013, p. 69). After the Nepal-Tibet-China war (1789-1792) Nepal was forced to sign a treaty stipulating the payment of tribute to China after the latter defeated Nepalese forces in Tibet (ibid, p.68). Nepal established relations with the PRC on August 1,1955, and relations since have been based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (ibid, p.22).

There have been exchanging visits between leaders of two countries. King Mahendravisited China in 1961,Visit of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in1957 and 28 April 1960, Nepalese Prime minister Tanka Prasad Acharya'sChina visit of 1956, Visit of Nepalese Prime minister Bishweshor Prasad Koirala in March 1960, Nepalese crown prince Birendra's China visit in July 1966, King Birendra's state visit of China in 1973, 1979, 1987, 1989, 2001 ,Chinese vice Primer Deng Xiaoping's Nepal visit of 1978, Nepalese prime minister Kriti Nidhi Bista's China visit in 1978, Chinese premier Li Peng's Nepal visit to Nepal in 1989, Nepalese Prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala's China visit in 1992, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's state visit to Nepal in1996, Chinese premier Zhou Rongji's State visit to Nepal in May 2001, Nepalese

Prime minister Mana Mohan Adhikari's China Visit of 1995, Nepalese Prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's state visit to China in 1996, King Gyanendra's visits of China in 2002 and 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jia Bao's state visit on January 14, 2012 in Nepal (Shrestha, 2015, pp. 8-77) and Nepalese Prime minister KP Oli's visit of China 2016 are high level visits of leadership level in two countries. For 11 years since Zhu Rongji came to Nepal in 2001, there had been no high-level visit from the Chinese side to Nepal until Wen Jia Bao came in 2012. For 23 years since Jiang Zemin's visit in 1996, no Chinese president has stopped in Nepal (Poudyal, 2019, p. 6). Nepal's engagement with China has also increased manifold with the visits of delegations both at the state and non-state levels. Apart from visits at the official levels, private visits by political leaders, journalists, and academicians are also sponsored by China as part of public diplomacy (Singh, 2014, p.99). Nepalese Prime minister KP Oli visited China from March 19-24 first time. Nepalese Prime Minister KP Oli visited China on June 19-24 Second Time. Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari visited China to participate in the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv). China and landlocked Nepal seem to have almost finalized the text when President Bidhya Devi Bhandari visited China on a four-day official tour in April 2019 to participate in the second BRI Conference (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6).

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Nepal on October 12, helping strengthen the ever-growing relations of the Himalayan country with the northern neighbors (Pradhan, 2019, pp. iv-xiv). There have been 18 agreements and two letters of exchange between the government of Nepal and the government of China and some of them could be of great substance for Nepal during the state visit of the Chinese President in Nepal (*My República*, 2019, September 14). Nepal's diplomatic relations with China were established despite or because India went diplomatic ties with China soon after the communist takeover in 1949, but it would not want Nepal to do the same (Paudyal, 2010, ¶.16).

2.3.1.3 China-Nepal Bilateral Treaties and Agreements

In 1956, PRC and Nepal signed a new treaty terminating the treaty of Thapathali of 1856 and Nepal recognized Tibet as a part of China (Mishra, 2013, p.69). The Indian embargo (2015 September-2016 February) led to an immediate

understanding between Kathmandu and Beijing that Nepal should not depend completely on India; this understanding gained wide political and public support (Pudasaini, 2017, p. 6). In 1960, Nepal and China signed a boundary settlement agreement (Mishra, 2013, p.69). After returning to Nepal from King his China visit on October 5,1961. King Mahendra presented the boundary treaty as a big achievement (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.27). During signed in China Nepal boundary treaty 1961 King Mahendra stated that “Nepal has gained 300 sq. miles and I feel that all the Nepalese will experience a sense of glory when I state that Sagarmatha, on which the eyes of the world seem to be focused, contours to be as it has been ours and within our territory.” (ibid). On October 5, 1961, the boundary treaty was signed in Peking by king Mahendra of Nepal, and President Liu Shao-Chi of China. On the first anniversary of this treaty, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, declared with ready Nepalese approval, that “should any foreign power dare to attack Nepal, the Chinese government and people will forever stand by Nepal (Dai,1963, pp. 86-98). The Boundary Question Agreement provided for the establishment of a joint committee to “conduct a survey of the boundary, erect boundary markers, and draft a Sino-Nepalese boundary” while each sideline (ibid). Zhou Enlai, while in Kathmandu in April 1960, revealed that Mao Tse-tung had already indicated to Premier Koirala in Peking a month earlier that China would be amenable to accepting joint ownership over the peak, but the Nepalese leader aroused quite a stir before Zhou En Lai’s arrived in Kathmandu by declaring that China “claimed “Mt. Everest for herself (ibid).Although the Sino-Nepalese Boundary Committee was set up in August 1960, it was not able to do any serious work until October. By that time, with increasing unrest in Nepal and the government battling against rebels led by Bajhang and Gorkha chiefs, there seemed to be considerable difficulties among Nepal’s leaders in pressing for order, unity on domestic politics, and a settlement with Peking (ibid).

The protocol of Transit and transportation was signed between China and Nepal during the state visit of then Prime minister KP Oli in March 2016. In the visit of Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari during the second BRI Forum for international cooperation, half a dozen agreements including much-hyped protocol to Transit Agreement between Nepal and China (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv), three agreements signed between China and Nepal during the visit of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in Nepal (Baral, 2019, p. 6). The transit protocol signed between

China and Nepal is an additional opportunity for Nepal to have access to Chinese land and seaports for trade (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). The transit treaty between China and Nepal faces an enormous physical challenge, the Himalayas, in its realization and export concession to Nepal is only one aspect of the deal (ibid). To realize the full potential of transit access, Nepal and China need to work together to evaluate Nepal's needs to facilitate the use of China's port for business trade (ibid). The first agreement between China and Nepal on economic Aid was signed in October 1956 (Dahal, 2017, pp. 27-47). How far the agreements and financial assistance concluded during the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping will translate into reality will largely depend on how Nepal (and also China) will work to advance them to the next levels. But some of the statements made by President Xi during the meeting with his Nepali counterpart are loaded with symbolism and Chinese goodwill (*My Republica*, 2019 October 14). Agreement on the boundary management system, MOU on the exchange and Cooperation on Governance Capacity Building , Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, MOU on Mount Sagarmatha/Chomolungma Protection Cooperation, MOU on promoting Key Projects of Investment and Cooperation on Productive Capacity between NPC of Nepal and China's National Development and Reform Commission, Exchange of Note for setting up a Consulate General of Nepal in Chengdu, MOU on feasibility Study of China-Nepal Cross-Border Railway Project , Agreement between Kathmandu Metropolitan City of Nepal and Nanjing city of China on the Establishment of Sister-City Relationship, Agreement between Butwal Sub-Metropolitan City of Nepal and Xi'an city of China on the Establishment of Sister-city relationship, MOU on Cooperation on Traditional Medicine , MOU Regarding Cooperation in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency response , MOU on Cooperation between Supreme People's Procurator of China and OAG of Nepal, Agreement between Tribhuvan University and Confucius Institute Headquarters on the Establishment of Confucius Institute at TU, Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirements for Export of Citrus Fruits from Nepal , MOU between the Ministry of Industry , Commerce and Supplies of Nepal and the Ministry of Commerce of China on the Establishment of Joint Working Group on Trade, Delivery and Acceptance Certificate for China-Aid Earthquake Monitoring Network Project in Nepal , MOU on Establishment of Investment Cooperation Working Group between the Ministry of Finance of Nepal the Ministry of China , MOU between the Ministry of Finance of

Nepal and China International Development Cooperation Agency on Tunnels Construction Cooperation , Exchange of Letter for Border Security Equipment and Office Equipment and Minutes of Meeting for Feasibility Investigation of China-Aid Municipal Water Supply Improvement Project in Kathmandu valley etc. . are concluded during Chinese President Xi Jinping's Nepal Visit (*The Himalayan Times*, 2019 October 14).

During the visit of Nepalese Prime minister KP Sharma Oli to China, the talks were led by prime minister KP Sharma Oli and his counterpart Li Keqiang, who were seen making warm exchanges standing over the table as senior officials from the two sides signed 14 MOUs and letters of exchange. This follows nine agreements signed by Nepali and Chinese public and private sector companies on 20 June 2022, with major ones being: Investment Board Nepal (IBN) Huaxin Narayani cement; Butwal Power Company and Sichuan Investment Group (SCIG) to work together on Marsyangdi cascade to produce 1,000-megawatt electricity; Nepal Electricity Authority and China's State Grid Corporation will construct a 159-Km Kerung -Galchhi transmission line (*The Kathmandu Post*, 2018, June 22.). During the state visit of Nepalese Prime minister, KP Sharma Oli in 2018 AD Nepal, and China have agreed to rationalize eight border transit points, in connection with Tibetan highways for supplying goods to Nepali citizens close to the northern border. The border points are Uripasa in Bajhang, Rasuwagadhi in Rasuwa, Tinker in Darchula, Tiplapasa in Taplejung, Hilsa in Humla, Kimathangka in Sankhuwasabha, Korala in Mustang and Nagcha in Mugu (*The Kathmandu Post*, 2018 May 18). The treaty of 1993 AD was created constraint to establishing special relation with China (Sangroula, 2020, p.600).

2.3.1.4 Socio-Cultural Relations between China and Nepal

According to the Deng Feng County Recordings, the Nepalese Buddhist sage Buddhbhadra came to China in 465 AD. He was instrumental in introducing Dhyana Buddhism in China and this fact also connected Nepal and China culturally (Sangroula, 2018, p.397). Buddhbhadra was indeed the torch-bearer of Nepalese civilization abroad. Significantly, the Chinese have not only preserved the name of this Nepalese scholar but also have preserved the records of the Chinese Buddhist monk -scholars Fa-shian, Huen-Tsang, Seng-tsa, and others who went to Nepal (Manandhar, 1919, p.2). According to some writers Nepal-China relations began to

develop in 406 A D when a Chinese learned monk Fa Xian visited (Hamal, 2014, p. 76). Nepal played an important role to uplift the cultural aspects of China and Tibet. Nepali artist Araniko visited Beijing and construct bai-ta temple (White Pagoda temple) is one of the important events. That proved deep cultural contact of China and Nepal and it also clarifies that the origin place of ‘Dhyana Buddha’ in Nepal (Sangroula, 2020, p.578).

Buddhism as well the cultural interflow between Nepal and China had taken place as early as over two thousand years ago. Because Sakyamuni Buddha was born in Nepal, his dharma has prevailed in China as early as the beginning of the Christian era (Singh, 2014, p.13). The Keorung was the main entry point for China to come to Nepal and India. Later on, the Keorung route became the silk route to link the trade and people of Lhasa, Kathmandu, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iran, and Europe. That route provided Nepal both wealth and name. Due to that route, Kathmandu became the prosperous model city of South Asia (Sangroula, 2020, p. 583). China has been assisting Nepal in its efforts for socio-economic development since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Dahal, 2017, pp. 27-47). Guru of Magadh Kautilya in his book ‘Arthasastra’ mentioned that Nepal was famous for the trade of wool. On the other hand, Lhasa became an economic hub of Nepal due to trade statutes (ibid, p.584). Friendly cultural exchange between the two countries is another characteristic of bilateral relations in the 1980s. There are frequent visits in both directions by unofficial people’s delegations and cultural and friendship groups (Hong -Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520). There have been visits of journalists, youth groups, cultural arts representatives, writers, swimming coaches and soccer, badminton, and acrobatic teams, visitors from Nepal had been from youths, journalists, and mountain hiking groups, and badminton and soccer team have traveled to China (ibid).

2.3.1.5 China-Nepal Strategic Partnership

Elevating their relationship to the level of “strategic partnership” Nepal and China have agreed to intensify the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation under the BRI to enhance connectivity. The agreement was reached during the two-day state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Nepal (*My Republica*, 2019 October 14). During the official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Nepal on October 12, 2019, both countries decided to elevate

the comprehensive partnership of cooperation featuring, Everlasting Friendship to Strategic Partnership of cooperation Featuring Ever-Lasting and Friendship for Development and Prosperity (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv). The Chinese PLA and the Nepalese Army held a joint military drill for 10 days in Kathmandu in April 2017 A. D (Pudasaini, 2017, p. 6).

2.3.1.6 China-Nepal Economic Relations

Nepal, at present, has high hopes for China. Its moral and logistical support to Nepal in 2015 when India imposed the block was widely hailed (Bhattarai, 2017). In its economic expansion made, China wants to increase its investment in Indiabut is resisted by the Indian government (Kumar,2016, p.61).The economic performance of China and India is critical. This holds the key to global progress. China and India have been relatively closed economics with limited dependence on trade. But they have been opening up. This is particularly so in the case of China (ibid, p.71). China and India need to persist with their integration with the international economy to sustain growth. This should encompass incorporating the poor in the process. This should particularly in India and reducing regional and inter-group disparities in China. Such goals are intertwined with maintaining peace within the respective regions (ibid, p.73). Enhanced economic cooperation between India and China could bolster their economic power despite differing positions in politics and international affairs. Thus, it emerges that the economic relationship between China and India has taken place against a backdrop of tensions (ibid, p.74). In the past bilateral economic cooperation took the form of Chinese economic aid to Nepal, mainly several engineering projects in Nepal undertaken by technicians and workers of both countries. China's aid while modest was given out sincerity to assist Nepal in developing its national economy and did not attach political conditions (Hong-Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520). King Birendra, during his visit to China in 1982, said "the people of Nepal hope for the building of new areas of economic cooperation which will be of mutual benefit to both our peoples" (ibid).

2.3.1.6.1 China-Nepal Trade Relations

Trade with Nepal alone does not make much economic sense for China. It is more interested in what lies south of the border -two big markets: India with 1.2 billion and Bangladesh with over 100 million people (Parajuli, 2017, p. 6). There are areas for cooperation between China and Nepal to lessen Nepal's widening trade deficit (Sharma, 2019, p. 7). Nepal-China secretary-level trade dialogue was determined on 29 September 2020 A.D. The informal Nepal-China trade relation had started 148 years. According to the source of the Foreign Ministry, Nepal China has prioritized improving the trade environment, Chinese officials emphasized upgrading the level of the main trade link of the China-Nepal Syabrubeshi-Rasuwa road. China also presented the agenda of upgrading the weak Nepalese border points. On the other hand, China is willing to discuss the participation of Nepal in the China Import Expo. According to the co-secretary of the government of Nepal, review of the trade relation of China and Nepal, infrastructure and facilitation of linkage, situation of implementation of trade and transit treaty. Also; Nepal is willing to discuss the condition of Nepal-China trade, barrier, and physicality, implementation of previous agreements and bilateral help, the establishment of the special economic zone to increase border trade, possibilities of establishment of traditional trade point, and facilitation of export of Nepalese goods.

China had also promised long-term credit to finance Nepal's purchase of Chinese commodities and products for national construction. Since both China and Nepal are developing countries and can learn from each other, economic cooperation between them will broaden as time goes on (Hong-Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520). Bilateral trade between China had been growing since 1955. According to Nepal's trade Promotion Center, the volume increased from 4 million rupees in 1956-57 to 84.93 million rupees in 1976-77, and it continues to grow in the 1980s. According to a New China Agency report of November 23, 1981, total bilateral trade amounted to US\$ 10 million in 1980, close to twice the 1979 total of US\$ 5.8 million. Chief export items from Nepal are sheepskins', hides, linseed, herbal medicine jute, and cigarettes (ibid). China's export products are mainly textiles, construction materials, steel and steel products, airplanes, apo are parts, medical equipment, Chemical engineering products, machinery, automobile spare parts, asphalt felt, and cement (ibid). To further strengthen trade and commerce between the two countries, trade delegations have been continuously exchanged since 1980. In May 1980 a delegation

of the Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industry visited China and in September 1980 the Tibetan Foreign Trade Survey Team of China went to Nepal; in 1981 a Chinese trade delegation led by Cheng Yishan, deputy minister of Foreign Trade, was in Nepal: in November 1982, Balaram Ghartimagar, Minister of industry, commerce and supply of Nepal visited China (ibid). It should be pointed out that bilateral trade in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly between Nepal and the Tibet region of Nepal. Even in the 1970s with the development of seaborne trade between the two countries (ibid). China and Nepal each side is an indispensable part of the other's economic life. Government efforts on both sides brought trade between Nepal and the Tibet region into a new phase in the 1980s (ibid). Nearly all imports and exports of the country must pass through India, i.e., via Calcutta. India has always given Nepal every facility in this field. i.e., unlimited right to convey goods to transit through Indian territory and ports (Sarup,1972, pp. 287-306).

2.3.1.6.2 Chinese Aid to Nepalese Development

China has significantly helped Nepal through the construction of many projects, establishments of industries, and infrastructure build-ups, such as Kathmandu Bhaktapur road, Prithvi Highway, Muglin Narayangadh road, Kathmandu ring road, Pokhara-Baglung road, Kathmandu–Bhaktapur trolley bus system, Bansbari shoe, and leather factory, Harisiddhi brick and tile factory, Hetauda textile factory, Gorakhkali rubber industry, Lumbini sugar mill, Sunakothi hydel project, an international conference center in Baneshwor, National city hall, B.P. Koirala Memorial cancer hospital, Arniko highway, Syaprubeshi- Rassuwagadhi Road, civil service hospital, poly technique institute at Banepa, etc. (Hamal, 2017, p. 78.) Nepal China relationship strengthened by Gampo Vrikuti Marriage, Buddhism and exchange of Nepalese culture to Chinese Embassy were open in each other's capital in 1960 A.D. During the state visit of Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari China pledged Rs. 16.8 billion (6.8 Yuan) as economic and technical assistance to Nepal (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv).

During the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping on October 12, Beijing offered financial support for several projects, either as grants or loans (ibid). China has been assisting mainly in the field of basic infrastructures such as transport, hydro-electricity, agriculture, industry, communications, health, and education (Lohani,

2019, p. 8). During the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jin Ping in Nepal, President Xi announced to provide financial assistance of around 56 billion to Nepal between 2020 to 2022. This is a substantial amount of money (*My Republica*, 2019 October 14). China has pledged military assistance worth Rs. 2.4 billion to Nepal Army for humanitarian and disaster relief purposes on October 17, 2019 (*My Republica y*, 2019 October 18). Although in general China can not satisfy Nepal's increasing request, China's aid level since 1980 has been at par with or even slightly above the average amount of aid to Nepal in the latter half of the 1970s (Hong-Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520). Gorkha- Narayanghat road, with 22 bridges and more than 300 culverts, was started in March 1978 and completed in November 1981, four months ahead of schedule (ibid). The Pokhara hydropower and irrigation project, including a dam, a 1500 KW generator, and an irrigation system covering 750 hectares, was begun in November 1981. China also is prepared to build a medium-size paper mill, a Sugar refinery with a capacity of 1000 tons of Sugarcane a day and a yearly yield of 10,000 tons of Sugar and an Ethyl Alcohol factory (ibid).

2.3.1.7 China-Nepal Relations and Security Issue

Nepali side reiterated its firm commitment to the One China policy, during the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Nepal, acknowledging that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and Tibet affairs are China's internal affairs (*The Himalayan Times*, 2019 October 14). In 1974, The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) was mobilized to disarm the Tibetan Khampas who had been using Nepalese soil to engage in the guerilla war against the invading of Chinese forces (Mishra, 2013, p. 43). In Ashutosh Kumar's conception, any matter which was prejudicial to China's territorial integrity such as the status of Tibet or for that matter is "independence" was never raised during the re-establishment of bilateral ties as Nepal throughout in history recent or past-never recognized Tibet as an independent state (Kumar, 2013, p.59).

2.3.1.8 China-Nepal Cooperation in International /Regional Organizations /Institutions

2.3.1.8.1 China -Nepal Relations and Boao Forum (BFA)

First Boao Forum (BFA) annual conference was held in Boao on April 12-13, 2002. The second BFA annual conference was held on November 2-3, 2003. The Third BFA annual conference was held on April 24-25 2004. The Fourth annual BFA conference was held on April, 22-24, 2005. The fifth BFA conference was held on April 21-23, 2006, the sixth BFA conference was held on April 11-13, 2007, the seventh annual BFA was held on April 2009, the ninth annual conference of BFA was held on April 9-11, 2010. The tenth annual conference of BFA was held in April 2011, the eleventh BFA annual conference of BFA was held in April 2012, the twelfth annual conference of BFA was held in April 2013. The Thirteenth BFA annual conference was held on April 8-11, 2014 (Shrestha, 2015, pp.246-249). Nepal has been involving BFA and participating actively in most annual conferences except the annual conference.

2.3.1.8.2 China-Nepal Relations and BRI and OBOR

Nepal has seconded China's historical and ambitious proposal on OBOR and remains a staunch supporter of the BRI (Sharma, 2019, p. 7). With BRI, Nepal takes a firm step to emerge from the Indian sphere of influence in South Asia (Bhattarai, 2017, p. 7). In September 2013, China's President Xi Jinping proposed the concept of a "Silk Road Economic Belt", as a foreign policy initiative to link Europe and Asia through the Eurasian landmass. It consists of six core areas including strengthening economic collaboration, improving road connectivity, promoting trade and investment, facilitating currency conversion. And bolstering people-to-people exchanges. The Chinese initiative is about reviving the old connections through investments in infrastructure and creating a better environment for enhanced trade in the Silk Road countries. China has proposed "One Belt, One Road" meaning one major route for each sub-regions the routes cover. South Asia is considered as one belt (Acharya, 2015, p. 21). Though the ancient Silk routes did not include Tibet and Nepal, the availability of connectivity to the Silk Road through the Chinese initiative will provide Nepal with unique economic opportunities. For Nepal, the silk road initiative can provide new avenues to establish connecting links with the otherwise neglected contacts with the central Asian republics through diversification of trade and increased foreign direct investment and tourist arrivals. Nepal can revive its historical significance as a transit country between India and China. It will increase

Nepal's market access to the Silk Road countries, providing alternate ways to connect the markets outside the world which is otherwise restricted to transit through the sea passing through India (ibid, p.23).

As Nepal has already subscribed to China's BRI cross-border rails, it has no longer a matter of ambitions alone. Investment in BRI infrastructures like long-distance roads and trains is meant to enable connectivity among Asian, African, and European countries (Adhikari & Adhikari, 2019, ¶.2). The critiques have been raising questions about the implementation of BRI by the Nepalese government. One of the Nepalese scholars Lokraj Baral mentioned that the past agreements Nepal and China have signed are being questioned now, as the implementation schedule of the much-touted projects under the BRI were not elucidated (Baral, 2019, p. 6). Some of the Western European countries including the USA criticized China's BRI signed by Nepal and other countries as the "debt trap". The visiting the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and South East Asia, Joe Folter mentioned that US welcome a constructive relationship of Nepal with China, US welcome the investment by China, but as long as that involvement is designed to serve the interest of Nepal and not just China (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv).

Lastly, in June of 2017, the government of Nepal decided to form three separate panels led by foreign, finance, and other secretaries from thematic ministries to work with the Chinese side on BRI projects (Parajuli, 2017, p. 6). Analyst Som P. Pudasaini states that:

The OBOR agreement signed by Nepal and China on May 11 encompasses five broad areas 1. Policy coordination on issues related to economic development, 2. Facility connectivity in areas of roads and railways, 3. Trade connectivity (economic zone, industrial Park, and dry port development in border areas) to strengthen trade and transit 4. Financial integration (opening of Chinese bank branches and priority to payment Chinese and Nepali currencies) and 5. People-to-people contact (increasing media relations, visits by parliamentarians and officials, and private sector collaboration). This represents another landmark in China-Nepal relations (Pudasaini, 2017, p. 6).

The first BRI project that China and Nepal signed had been expressed in different ways. It was not a road, railway, and Hydro project, but a US\$3 billion industrial park in Damak, Jhapa, not far from Indian and Bangladeshi borders (Parajuli, 2017, p. 6). According to Professor Yubaraj Sangroula, the concept of inclusive globalization protects economic development and cooperation and advocates the participation of all states in economic development and cooperation without any erosion of their sovereignty. Such a kind of globalization advocates the principle of equal status of the state. According to Chinese scholar Wang; the globalization of the American model is not inclusive and suitable. So, China put forward the new model of BRI. In another word, China transformed the concept of the ancient silk road into Chinese characteristics. Besides; it promotes the people-to-people relation. So, Nepal has to prioritize the implementation of OBOR (Sangroula, 2020, p.669). China has been taking Nepal as an important state part of OBOR, Nepal can play an effective role to maintain a good relationship between China and India through OBOR.

2.3.1.9 Indo-Pacific Strategy and China-Nepal Relations

The USA even wants to become a major actor in its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) floated by the Donald Trump administration last year. But America's offer to Nepal to become a part of IPS is hard to the liking of its neighbors. Neither China nor India would like to see Nepal tagging along the US line even though India is a member state of that strategy (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6).

2.3.1.10 China-Nepal Relations and India Factor

According to T.R. Ghoble in the development of Nepal's relation with China, India played a direct as well as an indirect role. It was Nepal's dissatisfaction with India's overbearing attitude that prompted the Himalayan kingdom to seek diversification of her relationship with the outside world (Ghoble, 1992, pp. 598-606). In addition to difficulties with Nepal and military and power conflicts with China along the border, India was facing increasing diplomatic, political, and administrative difficulties along her entire northern perimeter (Pringsheim, 1963, pp. 474-495). India's concern over Nepal's China policy could not be overlooked by the Nepalese government. To assuage India's feelings, Nepalese Prime minister Tanka Prasad Acharya paid a visit to New Delhi in December 1956 and explained that his policies

were in no way aimed at undermining Indian interest (Ghoble, 1992, pp. 598-606). India began taking relevant countermeasures in the spring of 1962. The highways linking Bhutan and the Assam area of India were completed. Nepalese rebels operating from India were not restrained from launching attacks on the Royal Nepal Army (NLA and Home guard (Dai, 1963, pp.86-98). After succeeding in power in March 1955, King Mahendra accelerated the diversification of Nepal's relationship and promptly reopened talks with the Chinese which Kathmandu had spurned in 1951. India having formally accepted China's incorporation of Tibet of 1954, no longer encouraged Nepal to hold back recognition of new relationships (Brown, 1971, pp. 661-676).

2.3.1.11 Recent Trends in China -Nepal Relations

2.3.1.11.1 China Nepal Relations in Xi Era

During the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping contrary to Nepal's expectation, only the agreement to conduct a feasibility study on the Nepal-China cross-border railway project was reached. Then the finalization of DPR will follow. Only after completion of these two stages, the negotiations on financing modalities be set into motion based on a recommendation (Thapa, 2019, p. 6). Chinese investment in hydropower plants, railways, airports, roads, and tunnels, etc. could regenerate Nepal, strengthen Nepal's exporting capacity and provide meaning to transit protocols being worked out by Nepal and China (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). Discussing and exploring ideas with academia will also help strengthen knowledge production. Some of these ideas have been discussed between President Bidhya Devi Bhandari and President Xi Jinping during her visit to China in April 2019 (Sharma, 2019, p. 7). The Chinese president Xi Jinping's two-day state visit to Nepal has been significant in many ways. Now the onus will be upon the government to follow through with agreements and turn them into substantive gains. Often, the Nepali side has failed to do proper homework on realizing the sign of the agreement during such visits-whether be that from India, China, or other countries- into action (*My Republica*, 2019 October 14). Chinese President Xi's visit has helped cement the age-old and problem-free ties between the two countries. Better connectivity with China is expected to boost Nepal's trade with China and East Asia (Landmark visit, 2019). Nepal and China signed 1 framework agreement on trade and transit when Oli last visited Beijing as

prime minister during the Indian border blockade in 2015 AD (*The Kathmandu Post*, 2018, June 20). Nepal-Tibet transit facilities will deepen in the years to come but it will be a gradual process. China wants to be assured that Nepal is capable of handling its security concerns (ibid).

2.3.2 India's Foreign Policy towards Nepal

Nepal is rage and resentment against India after Indian defense minister Raj Nath Singh March 8, inaugurated the road linking Dharchula of India with Lipulekh of Nepal. The road had been built without Nepal's consent (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.1). Delhi-based expert on Nepal -India ties. In Nihar R. Nayak's perception, as per the 1950's treaty, India could inform Nepal about its tensions with China and may seek its support (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.2). India not respecting Nepal's territorial integrity and sovereignty has been the root cause to spoil the age-old friendly relations between the two countries. Indian sides need to be prepared to give up the old habits and maintain relations with Nepal in a truly friendly and neighborly spirit (Basnyat, 2020, ¶. 14). Nepal felt deeply alarmed, when India's Defense Minister Raj Nath Singh inaugurated the Darchula – Lipulekh road on May 8. It published its new map putting those territories inside Nepal, political parties, people, and media are with the government in this particular issue (Paudyal, 2010, ¶.5). In international relations, the immediate neighbors have always been perceived as an enemy. It has been argued that Indian neighborhood policy has been derived from Arthashastra's Raja-mandala Theory. This Theory had been fathered by Kautilya (371-283 BC), who was a jurist, royal advisor, teacher, philosopher, and economist (Singh, 2016, pp.59-75).

According to Raja-mandala theory, bordering states are hostile states that are forming a circle around the country. Similarly, the next circle of states forms another set of hostile states around the king. The second circle of states could be perceived as the natural allies of the king against, against the first circle of hostile states, which is lying between (ibid). India and Nepal had been sharing civilizational ties since the time immemorial connected by geography, history, geo-culture, and religion, etc. These multifaceted ties had been formalized by the signing of the Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 (ibid). Neighborhood policy has been pursued through the Nehruvian principles by the successors of Nehru, like Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, P. V. Narsimha Rao, and Manmohan Singh. Even the non-congress governments (1977-1980, 1989-1991, 1996-2004), have followed the

Nehruvian principles uninterruptedly (ibid). According to Rajmandala theory, foreign policy is based on the principle 'Peace is preferable to war', Asana (maintaining neutrality), the policy of Yaaanam (preparing for war), samshraya (seeking support/shelter), waging a war, and the last one is Dvqidhibhaava (dual policy) (ibid). According to Rajmandala Theory to make the foreign policy very effective, the Shadgunya (six-fold foreign policy) have been provided with the four-fold Upayas (devices). These devices include Sama (conciliation), Daana (pacifying with gifts), Bheda (aggravating dissension amongst the opposite parties), and Danda (punishment). These devices have been perceived as a doctrine of sorting out the conflicting issues among the neighboring countries (ibid). The Raja-mandala theory is very near to the realist theory. According to scholars of international relations Besche, Michael, and Liebig the basis of Indian foreign policy is Rajamandala theory (ibid).

2.3.2.1 Glimpse of India -Nepal Relations

India-Nepal relation is based on close cultural, traditional, religious, linguistic, and marital relations at the people-to-people level citizens of both countries enjoy free movement across the borders. Such a trajectory has made bilateral relations unique in the world (KC, 2020, ¶.3). Indians often pursue the legacy of the British Raj while executing its foreign policy. Maritime security has become of concern to India very recently and thus Indians have less to learn from colonial history in this regard (Mainali,2020, ¶.1). Nepal-India relations are not limited at the government levels; they go deep down to the people's level. The marital relations that are called roti beti relations are also not limited to the bordering districts of Nepal's Terai region alone; they extend to mountains as well (Acharya,2016, pp.1-10).

2.3.2.2 Diplomatic Relations between India and Nepal

Several factors indicated that Nepal-Indian relations would improve during 1976. The "Emergency" in India brought a newfound convergence of views on the treatment of the press and political opposition. India no longer demanded "liberalization" of the Nepalese system, and clamped strict controls on the Nepalese opposition operating in India which had been too closely associated with Mrs. Gandhi's political opponent (Scholz, 1977, pp. 201-207).

2.3.2.2.1 State Level Visit of India and Nepal

External Affairs Minister of India S Jaishankar visited Nepal in the third week of August where he co-chaired the long-awaited fifth meeting of the Nepal-India Joint Commission (Giri, 2019, pp.iv-xiv). In Joint Communiqué issued after the conversation between Indian Prime minister Nehru and Nepalese King Mahendra during king Mahendra's state visit to India started from April 18, 1962, India and Nepal have a vital interest in each other's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and reaffirmed their intention to consult together on appropriate measures of mutual assistance at the request of either party (Prinsheim, 1963, pp. 474-495).

2.3.2.3 Bilateral Treaties and Agreements between India and Nepal

There are dozens of bilateral treaties held between Nepal and India after the establishment of diplomatic relations to this date. The treaty of peace and friendship 1950, the treaty of trade and commerce 1950, the treaty of extradition 1953, agreements on Koshi Project 1954, Agreement on Gandak irrigation and power project, the treaty of trade and transit 1960, Secret arms agreement between Nepal and India 1965, the treaty of trade and transit 1971, treaties of trade 1978, treaties of transit 1978, Agreement to control unauthorized trade 1978, treaties of trade, transit, and agreements for cooperation to control trade 1991, treaty concerning the integrated development of Mahakali river including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheshwor project 1996, India Nepal power trade agreement 1996, the treaty of transit 1999, Revised Indo- Nepal treaty of trade 2009 and Agreement of the avoidance of double taxation and prevention fiscal evasion concerning taxes on income 2011 BIPPA, etc.

2.3.2.3 .1 Treaty of Peace and Peace and friendship between India and Nepal

The 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and friendship that had established a close Indo-Nepalese relationship on commerce, defense, and foreign relations, was increasingly resented in Nepal (Mishra, 2013, p.69). In Nepal's case, its Peace and Friendship Treaty with India allows for preferential trade agreements and free trade agreements with the rest of South Asia, either under the banner of BBIN and BIMSTEC. Of course, the treaty also offers unique opportunities to access the big Indian markets (Parajuli, 2017, p. 6). According to Article 2 of the treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in Katmandu on July 31, 1950, by India and Nepal "The two

Government hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments (Dai,1963, pp. 86-98). A decade later, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in Kathmandu on April 28, 1960, was between Nepal and China. According to article 2 of that treaty, the two governments undertook not to consult or help each other on “security” but “to settle all disputes between them using peaceful negotiation” (ibid). According to Article 3 to develop and further strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the two countries. These “ties” besides those of the traditional variety, had been established just a month earlier by two agreements, on economic aid and the boundary question along the Tibetan frontier (ibid). According to Article 5, Nepal was “free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal” (ibid).

2.3.2.3 .2 India-Nepal relations and Water resources of Nepal

India has started constructing bigger dams and embankments across the border to divert rivers following from Nepal through big dams towards these canals. It aims to obstruct the natural flow of rivers which ultimately brings disaster every monsoon (Jha,2020, ¶.4). India-funded ‘hydro-electricity’ projects, infrastructure projects were discussed by the leadership of both countries. The major conflicting issues between both the countries were also taken on broad like reviewing the 1950’s Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75). Looking through the various treaties on trade transit between India and Nepal, it will be evident that India’s concessions to Nepal have been increasing steadily (Mukharji, 2003, pp. 37-59).

2.3.2.3 .3 India-Nepal Trade and Transit Treaty

India agreed to sign two separate treaties with Nepal in 1978 and a third treaty to control unauthorized trade. These treaties are veritable landmarks in Nepal-India relations, under which even more concessions are granted to Nepal to support her industrialization drive(Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73). India-Nepal relations reached the nadir when the Indian government refused to renew the two separate treaties of trade and transit in March 1989. It was in retaliation for King Birendra’s geopolitical move to develop strategic ties with China (ibid).Negotiations to renew the 1971 Trade and

Transit Treaty, the most important Nepal-India issue of the year, began with basic agreement on trade objectives, population, and developmental pressures that have seriously eroded Nepal's trade position: greater domestic grain consumption has reduced Nepal's primary raw-material exports while the demand and the relative price of imported Indian manufactured goods necessary for development have continuously increased (Scholz, 1977, pp. 201-207). Nearly all imports and exports of the country must pass through India, i.e., via Calcutta. India has always given Nepal every facility in this, i.e., unlimited right to convey goods in transit through Indian territory and ports (Sarup, 1972, pp. 287-306).

2.3.2.3.3.1 Treaty of Trade and Commerce, 1950

According to Article 1 of this treaty by a Treaty of Trade and Commerce of 1950, the Government of India recognized in favor of the Government of Nepal full and territory unrestricted right of transit of all goods and manufactures through the territory of India (ibid). According to Article 2 Such commodities were to be transmitted across Indian territory to such places in Nepal as approved by the two governments. According to Articles 3 and 4 goods merchandises of Nepalese origin in transit through Indian territory were exempted from excise and import duties (ibid). According to Article 14, the Trade and Transit between India and Nepal concluded in 1960, replaced the Treaty of Trade and commerce between the two countries. The 1960 Treaty came into force on November 1, 1960, initially for five years, thereafter subject to such modifications as may be agreed upon, unless terminated by either party by giving notice of not less than one year in writing (ibid). The aim of the treaty was laid down as. Being animated by the desire to strengthen economic co-operation between the two countries, and convinced of the benefits likely to accrue from the development of their economies towards the goal of a common market (ibid). This Treaty expired on October 31, 1970, after ten years during which the Treaty remained operative, it was quite evident that both countries would feel the necessity of having new provisions incorporated or of having a new in place of the old one (ibid).

2.3.2.3.3.2 Treaty of Trade and Transit, 1960

In the Treaty of Trade and Transit between the two countries, the right of transit was based on Article 1 of the Barcelona Statute of 1921, i.e., it was given the

wider meaning, not limiting the right Statute of 1921, i.e., it was given the wider meaning, not limiting the right for access to the sea as laid down in Article 3 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, and later in Article 1 of 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States (ibid). It may be noted that in the 1960 Treaty, vide Article 10 procedure to be followed for transit traffic was to be laid down in the protocols to the Treaty and, in pursuance of para.1 (iii) (d) of the said Protocol, the memorandum attached authorized the Indian customs authorities to check the goods to ensure that they conform to the description in the invoices (ibid). The signing of BIPPA between Nepal and India would be a major fillip in investment (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75).

2.3.2.4 India-Nepal Special Relations: Myth or Reality

Every country's foreign policy is rooted in its self-defined national interests. New Delhi's emphasis on the special relationships was also based on the belief that it served India's interests whether or not it served Nepal. The feeling in Kathmandu is that Delhi has over the years used special relations to justify its interference in Nepal (Baral, 2020, ¶.5). The strategy to keep Nepal under 'special relations' succeeded when India Gandhi returned to power in 1980 and helped speed up the anti-Panchayat forces with bandhs and strikes to extract economic concessions from Nepal as well as pressuring it to roll back ZOP Idea (Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73). The Roti Beti (Bread and Daughter) and Khun ka Rishta (Blood Relations) rhetoric dominate the border areas that are mostly populated by Indian migrants (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.3).

2.3.2.5 India-Nepal Economic Relations

According to the Government of Nepal, India following a suborn and conciliatory attitude in the context of the trade and transit talks, resorted to pressure tactics by putting restrictions on the import-export trade with Nepal and stopped the supply of even essential commodities to Nepal (Sarup, 1972, pp. 287-306).

2.3.2.5 .1 India's Aid to Development of Nepal

Nepal and India established diplomatic relations on June 13, 1947. Since then, political and economic relations between the two countries have grown. Religious as well as socio-cultural bonds subsisting in between them, nurtured by the interaction between two peoples have got strengthened along with the political and economic relation. There are socio-cultural and religious similarities, the largest trade partners movement of people from one country to another, pilgrimage tourism and employment, Indian cooperation for development efforts of Nepal in different fields highway and health institutions, etc. India has been assisting Nepal for Bishweshor Prasad Koirala Institute of health and Science-Dharan, Bir hospital expansion project, Paropakar maternity hospital, construction of 22 bridges on Kohalpur- Mahakali highway sector, Raxaul –Sirsiya broad- Gage Rail link project, greater Janakpur Development project, Rangeli –Bhadrapur road, Chatara Birpur road, and Janakpur outer ring road, Mahendranagar- Janakpur link road project, embankments along Bagmati, Kamala, Lal bakaiya rivers. Additionally, hydroelectricity, dairy development, east-west Railway project, East-West highway optical fiber project, etc. projects are in pipeline. The Indian government has been helping Nepal in a different sector.

India had been giving Nepal extensive financial aid. In addition to an annual subsidy of \$200,000, she extended a loan of \$ 350,000 in 1952 for development purposes. Indian Army engineers had helped in the construction of a motor road, almost completed, between Kathmandu and India; and an Indian military mission has advised Nepal in connection with the reorganization of its army (Feer, 1953, pp. 137-141).

2.3.2.5 .2 India's Investment in Nepal

The Indian firms are the major investors in Nepal along with 150 Indian ventures. About 40 percent of total approved foreign direct investment is contributed only by these companies. These are engaged in the major areas of manufacturing, services (banking, insurance, dry port, education, and telecom) Power sector and tourism industries, etc. (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75).

2.3.2.6 Indo-Nepal Relations and Security Issue

The Nehru doctrine is a power among bureaucracies that see the Himalayas as a natural barrier to China. Tibet is considered a buffer against invading forces from Central Asia and China (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.6). The Placement of the Indian Army in Nepal's Kalapani can never be acceptable for Nepal. The Indian army post so close to the highland possesses of Tibet and the road to Man Sarovar will not safeguard the security interest of Nepal and China (Sharma, 2020, ¶.10). In Bawa Singh's conception due to sharing an open border with Nepal, Indian security concerns have been emanating from the international criminal organizations operating within Nepal, insecure Indian investment, and Islamic terrorism along with fake, currency, etc. (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75). She added that Nepal has been becoming a haven for potential drug and arms stragglers. Unstable Nepal has been becoming a threat to Indian interest from a geopolitical point of view (ibid). India gave a safe passage into Nepal to 100,000 Nepali-speaking Bhutanese nationals (Baral, 2020, ¶.1). Most of whom have been living in seven refugee camps in eastern Nepal since (Mishra, 2013,p.14).

2.3.2.7 Indo- Nepal Border Issues

In June 1952, 18 Indian check posts were installed on the Nepal-China border during the premiership of Nepal Matrika Prasad Koirala. Prime minister Kirti Nidhi Bista on April,20,1969 removed 17 of 18 posts but the one in Kalapani was remaining (Upreti, 2020, p.5). Over 300 square kilometers of the landmass in Nepal's western frontiers, which Nepal claims that all evidence proves the land belongs it has been under control and occupied by India for at least last 60 years. The matter was raised time and again by the Nepali side and the Indian side always promises the settlement through a bilateral mechanism (Paudyal, 2020, ¶. 2). The latest round of controversy of Lipulek, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani between India and China was triggered by the inauguration of a motorable track by Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on May 8. The track leads to a very popular multi-faith pilgrimage site surrounding Manasarovar lake in Tibet (Wagle, 2020, ¶.2). Nepal had sent two diplomatic notes to India, protesting the new map published by India on November 2, 2019, and in 2015, respectively. When India and China signed an agreement in Beijing to make "Lipulekh Pass" a trading route to increase their bilateral trade (KC, 2020. ¶.1). Nepal

has consistently been requesting to settle this dispute by diplomatic dialogue between the two countries. Diplomatic dialogue is the only way to resolve the boundary issue (Upreti, 2020, ¶.10). There are border debates with India in 70 locations, Kalapani and Susta are the main unresolved those are approximately 374 km. and 1500 hectares of land, respectively for several years. After the political change in 2065 B. S., India and Nepal had agreed to the review of the Sugauli Treaty, and the review committee has already submitted the report (Kandel, 2020, ¶.9).

The open border issue has become more confrontational than accommodative. The 18,80 km open border more troublesome for Nepal compared to India. Which is much larger than Nepal in terms of population and economy (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.2). Nepal set up a new outpost a Chaarung manned by the Nepal Armed Police force in May 2020 after India inaugurated the Darchula-Lipulek link road on May, 8 (Bhattacharjee, 2020, ¶.2) According to some Nepali experts the Kali River originates from Limpiyadhura which is 30 kilometers west of Kalapani. The political map issued by India on April 24, 1956, conforming to the Sugauli treaty, regards Limpiyadhura as the river's origin (Chaudhary, 2020, ¶.2). A joint commission, which currently is inactive has been formed with the foreign secretaries of India and Nepal as representatives (ibid, ¶.9). It is fascinating that the new map issued by India contradicts India's claim to Kalapani. The new map of India considers the river originating from Limpiyadhura as the Kali river, which is the borderline according to the Sugauli treaty (ibid, ¶.10).

A spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs of India, Anurag Srivastav, in response to media queries has stated that Nepal's claim on the aforementioned territories is in contradiction to historical facts and lacks substantial evidence (*The Himalayan Times*, 2020, June 13, ¶.2). The official spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of India Anurag Srivastava said can the recent development on the boundary issue. India is open to engaging with its neighbors based on mutual sensitivity and mutual respect in an environment of trust and confidence making a settlement in India's relation with Nepal (*The Hindu*, 2020, May 28). The disputed land about 372 km (144 square miles in area, is strategically located at the tri-junction between Nepal, India, and the Tibet region of China. In 1956, the CCP promulgated its first official map of China and the surrounding area, rejecting

the McMahon line first demarcated by the British colonial authorities in 1914. The map showed large swathes of the Indian territory at the borders of China (Rusco and Sasikumar, 2007, pp. 99-123).

2.3.2.7 India's Big Brother Attitude Towards Nepal, Sphere of Influence, and Nehru Doctrine

Realizing the geopolitical and geostrategic imperatives, India has invoked all the neighboring countries to be partners and contribute to regional growth and prosperity. But on the other hand, the neighboring countries have been perceiving India as interfering, non-accommodative, selfish, and overbearing (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75). Many of India's neighbors have long maintained that India is a regional hegemon, capitalizing on striking asymmetries to promote its interests: India accounts for 60% of land area, 75% of the population, and 80% of GDP of South Asia (Racine, 2008, pp. 65-78). Jawaharlal Nehru in his first speech on foreign policy, said "The people of India do not quarrel with their neighbors and desire to live at peace with them" (Singh, 2016). The fundamental principles of Nehruvian foreign policy focusing on Asian solidarity, non-alignment, decolonization, and pursuit of international peace (ibid).

Nehru had followed the neighborhood first policy since independence towards the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal. He unfolded his Nepal policy 'Much as we stand for the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would be a risk to Indian security' (ibid). Nehru's policy has been considered as a balanced blend of idealism and enlightened self-interest (ibid). According to Indian foreign Minister Jayant Prasad, the core objective of the foreign policy of the Modi government is to accelerate the ongoing economic transformation of India (ibid). He added that the Indian PM Modi has attached a lot of importance to this objective. A disturbing neighborhood is both distracting and harmful for economically emergent India. The new government realized that without cordial relations with the neighboring countries, India and South Asia cannot continue to grow (ibid). All of Nehru's actions were now examine for evidence of reactionary or pro-imperialistic implications. His action at the Belgrade Conference of Non-alignment states (September 1961) in deemphasizing the issue of colonialism, and stressing the importance of peace and

depicted as serving the interest of the West (Pringsheim, 1963, pp. 476-495). According to Nehru, Nepal was “geographically part of India” although has recognized its political impence. “So far as present (1950) developments in Asia” were concerned he said that the interests of the two countries could not be other than “identical” (Dai, 1963, pp. 86-98).

Nehru, the architect of modern India, had himself acknowledge the Himalayas as the natural defense frontiers of India (Bhattarai, 2017, p. 7). Historically, Nepal has always been closer to India, Socioeconomically, culturally, and geographically. However, with its unveiling of the ‘Himalayan frontiers’ policy under Nehru, Nepal quickly understood that the establishment of independent India still hoped to treat its neighbors with a colonial mindset (ibid). In Mahabir Paudyal’s conception, King Tribhuvan, including B.P. Koirala and Matrika Prasad Koirala used to seek guidance from India on domestic matters as well as Nepal’s relation with the rest of the world, particularly China (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.15). India is one of the countries having frequent border disputes with their neighbors like Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh, respectively (Uprety, 2020, ¶.2). India unilaterally issued a new political map on May 8, including the Kalapani area in it and the Indian Defense Minister inaugurated 80 KM road crossing Lipulek to Kailash Mansarovar from Pithoragarh district near the India-Nepal -China trijunction ignoring the diplomatic notes of Nepal (Upreti,2020, ¶.7). The “special relationship” which Indian statesmen have steadfastly stressed with Nepal rests not only on the advantages of contiguity but also on the urgent interest of India in keeping the Himalayan buffer kingdom out of hostile hands (Brown,1971, 661-676).

2.3.2.7.1 India’s blockades Towards Nepal

The unofficial blockade has been viewed as an intervention in Nepalese internal issues. It has been considered that blockade is not a bilateral matter between India and Nepal, but it is having the potential to damage shared prosperity among the SAARC member countries (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75). According to Nepalese analyst Ramesh Nath Pandey, the Indian blockade hurt Nepal’s supply lines, but it also removed the profile of India inside Nepal. Someone had to fill that vacuum that India left. China is now a psychological force in Nepal because of India’s blockade (ibid).

2.3.2.8 Nepal's Proposal of "Zone of Peace (ZOP)" and India

India refused to recognize Nepal as a zone of peace while as many as 116 countries including America, Russia, China, Britain, and France supported the proposal by king Birendra 1975(Basyal,2020.¶.6). Nepal's active destabilization by India took place after the ZOP declaration when it refused to sign two different treaties of trade and transit following the expiry of the trade treaty of 1971, which was signed in 1961(Rana,2013, pp. 59-73). The ZOP was viewed by India as a strategic attempt by Nepal, with the active support of China and Pakistan, to end special relation with India. Nepal sought a policy of equidistance between China and India, much to the dislike of India (ibid). To protect Nepal's freedom and independence. King Birendra in 1975 made the ZOP proposal and in 1981 this crucial goal was written in Nepal's constitution. China was the first country to endorse this proposal, doing so explicitly in May 1976(Hong-Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520).

2.3.2.9 International/Regional Organizations and India -Nepal Relations (SAARC, NAM and BIMSTEC)

The pre-eminent position in the South Asian region forgiven its size, population, economy, and military power. India has been contributing 75 percent to the South Asian Population. It is holding 80 percent of the total GDP of the region (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75).The neighboring countries had tried to check and restrict India geopolitically and geoeconomically through the covert strategic relationships with the extra-regional powers. India's bilateral relations with all its neighbors remained off the keen in one way or the others (ibid). The neighbors remained suspicious that India has been taking undue advantage of the weak bargaining capacity of each state in bilateral dialogue. They view Indian bilateralism as an instrument of coercive diplomacy and Indian hegemony (ibid). India hosted the seventh nonalignment summit in March 1983, and Mrs. Gandhi will be the NAM's president from 1983 to 1985. Therefore, reaffirmation of India's nonalignment credentials using reduced identification with Soviet policies has become one of Mrs. Gandhi's principal objectives (Elkin and Fredericks, 1983, pp. 1128-1139). Some critiques of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) mentioned that the very idea of nonalignment in foreign policy is neither practical nor double. Yet, many countries

adopted it in the past to this date at least in theory (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). But there is still a relevant nonalignment movement for Nepal as per Nepal's geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economic condition. India's request to join the military drill of BIMSTEC was also opposed by Nepal as Nepal did not participate in this developmental forum to be prioritized as a military pact (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.9).

2.3.2.10 Recent Trends of Indo-Nepal relations

2.3.2.10.1 Indo -Nepal Relations in Modi-Oli Era

In 2016 Nepal and India formed the EPG to study the entire gamut of bilateral relations and to suggest modifications. The EPG prepared a report covering all bilateral issues except Gurkha soldiers. During his visit to Nepal, Indian prime minister Modi made it very clear that he felt a special affinity with the country as argued by senior diplomat Vivek Katju. Narendra Modi became the first prime minister to visit Nepal after a long gap of seventeen years in August 2014 (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75). The Indian Prime minister Sushma Swaraj paid three days visit to Nepal (July 27-29, 2014), after a long hiatus of 25 years. During the visit, she reviewed the Indo-Nepal joint working groups, which had been lying dormant during the last 25 years. Also, she co-chaired the meeting of the commission and discussed various aspects of bilateral relations (ibid). Indian PM Narendra Modi tried to expand and take bilateral relation to a new height. To make Nepala reliable partner in the neighborhood policy, he has given a 'HIT' formula. Under this, India wanted to extend its help to Nepal in building its highways (H). Information High Ways (I) and transitways – transmission lines (T) (ibid). Efforts have been made by India and Nepal to pacify the anti-feeling against each other, soon after the formation of the new government of Nepal after the promulgation of the constitution of 2015, the Indian PM spoke to Nepalese new prime minister KP Oli and congratulated him on the new assignment (ibid). The Nepalese government sent its deputy prime minister Kamal Thapa to India to talk about a wide array of issues with the Indian government. Despite these efforts on both sides, Nepali diplomats and politicians believed that bilateral Ties are at the lowest ebb and damaged (ibid).

2.3.2.10.2 Kalapani Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh Issue

After issuing the new political map by the Survey Department of India on November 2, 2019, having included Nepalese territories Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and

Lipulekh in India, the Nepalese prime minister KP Oli organized an all-party meet in Nepal on November 10, 2019, and sent a diplomatic note to India on November 20 and offered a talk at the foreign secretary-level on November 23 regarding this issue. However, India did not respond for long (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv). One month after, the diplomatic note, India finally responded positively to Nepal's demand for talks but there has been no development on when and where the meeting will happen (ibid). This year, after an uproar in Nepal over the Indian defense minister's inauguration of a road in Lipulekh, Oli too amended the to expand the Nepali map (Baral, 2020, ¶.4). There are already signs of optimism as both sides have officially kept the doors for constructive dialogue open in their official statement. That is exactly what to get about (Wagle, 2020, ¶.10). Every country should fiercely protect its territory but without infringing on other country's right to protect what legitimacy theirs (Paudyal,2010, ¶.28).

2.3.2.10.3 India- Nepal Relations and China

According to analyst Bipin Adhikari, the India-Nepal relation is vast and has multiple dimensions. In comparison Nepal-China ties are small. But after the Indian blockade which has lasted more than two become aware that it urgently needs an option beyond India. China provides an alternative to India and China has always treated Nepal with respect which is missing in India's attitude to Kathmandu (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75). The Buffer zone has various purposes, political or otherwise. They can be set up to prevent violence, protect the environment, protect residential and commercial zones from industrial accidents or natural disasters, keep prisoners' intent on escaping from rapidly acquiring hostage or a hiding place, and have used several other scenarios (Mishra,2013, p.4). According to Writer Arun Kumar Mishra, the Himalayan nations Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were buffer states between the British and Chinese empires, later between China and India, which in 1962 fought the Sino-India war in places where the two regional powers bordered each other (ibid, p.3). In South Asia, Nepal and Bhutan may be considered important buffer states between two Asian giants i.e., PRC and India (Mishra,2013, p.5).

2.3.3 China-India's Joint/Common Interest Towards Nepal

The British Indian government or the Qing emperor each wanted to small landlocked state to serve only its interest. This expectation remains more or less

intake (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.1). In the context of currently shifting global political and economic power, no two nations are better equipped than India and China to show the world how the common concerns of humanity can be addressed through mutual respect, friendship, healthy competition, and sharing of resources (Kumar, 2016, p. 57). The commonality of China and India could help explain their impact on the world system, but it should not lead to a conclusion they will retain their similarities and remain consistent within the international system (Gancheng, 2009, pp. 65-77).

CHAPTER-III

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3. Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology

3.1 Conceptual Framework

3.1.1 Theory

This research has the theory of mental conception; reflection and consideration. Paper realist and liberalist theories will be applied in this research. Basic realists' ideas and assumptions are 1) A pessimistic view of human nature; 2) A conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictual and such international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; 3) A high regard for the values of national security and state survival; 4) A basic skepticism that can progress in international politics, which is comparable to that in domestic political life (Jackson and Sorenson, 2014, p. 66).

Most international relations theories view the world and the politics that surround it through materialism. Theory measures the politics and foreign policy of the global south in the standard set by Euro-centric disciplines and keeps politics, foreign policy choice, and the world view of smaller states under the shadowed corner of global political calculations (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.1).

In Kegley's conception, the liberalist (idealist) worldview can be summed up in the following core principles:

1) Human nature is essentially "good" or altruistic, and peoples are therefore capable of mutual aid and collaboration, 2) The fundamental human concern for the welfare of others make the progress possible (That is the enlightenment's faith in the possibility of improving civilization was reaffirmed, 3) Bad human behavior is the product not of evil people but of evil institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others-including making war, 4) War is not inevitable and it's frequently can be reduced by eradicating anarchical conditions that encourage it and 5) War and injustice are international problems that require collective or multilateral rather than national efforts to estimate them. International society must reorganize itself institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely (Weber, 2014, p. 45).

3.1.2 Epistemology

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that deals with the study of knowledge and theory of knowledge.

3.1.3 Ontology

Ontology is a branch of metaphysics that addresses the nature or essential characteristics of being and of things that exist.

3.1.4 Methodology

The methodology is the study of methods used in a field.

3.1.5 Variables

Behavioral researchers are interested not only in describing and characterizing samples and population but also want to discover the causes of behavior for individuals and groups. One approach to the research problem is to experiment by defining a set of concepts, which are abstractions representing empirical phenomenon (Subedi, 200, p. 11). To conduct such an experiment, a researcher identifies a variable that can have only two values and is called a dichotomous variable. Researchers have also found it important to make an analytic distinction between dependent, independent, and control variables and between continuous and discrete variables (ibid, pp. 11-12). If the independent variable affects a person's behavior, the behavior that is expected to be affected by this independent variable is called the dependent variable.




Fig : A Conceptual Framework of Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal.

3.2 Research Methodology

3.2.1 Research Design

In John W. Creswell's conception, Research designs are plans and procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis. This plan involves several decisions. The overall decision involves which design should study a topic (Creswell, 2009, p. 3). Informing this decision should be the worldview assumptions the researcher brings to the study; procedures of inquiry (called strategies) and specific methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The selection of a research design is also based on the nature of the research problem or issue being addressed, the researchers' personal experiences, and the audience for the study (ibid). There are three types of research design such as exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. This research will follow the explorative and descriptive patterns.

Exploratory research is often conducted to explore the research issue and is usually done when the alternative options have not been clearly defined or their scope is unclear. Exploratory research allows the researcher to explore issues in detail to familiarize themselves with the problem or concept to be studied (Singh, 2010, pp. 63-64). Exploratory research is the initial research, which forms the basis of more inclusive research. It can even help in determining the research design, sampling methodology, and data collection method. In some cases, exploratory research serves as the formative research to test concepts before they are put into practice (ibid, p. 64). This study will be exploratory in its content. This research paper will be tried to explore changing dynamics of cooperation between China and India.

Descriptive research enumerates descriptive data about the population being studied and does not try to establish a causal relationship between events. This is also one of its major limitations as it cannot help determine what causes a specific behavior or occurrence (ibid). It is used to describe an event, a happening, or to provide a factual and

accurate description of the population being studied (ibid, pp. 64-65). This study will be also descriptive as it deals with China-India cooperation and its impacts in Nepal.

3.2.2 Nature and Sources of Data

To explore the strategic importance of China and India cooperation for Nepal. Secondary information will be ascertained from different sources. For this research, data will be collected from sources such as documents, newspaper articles, official reports, journal articles, and books related to the topic of research. Papers presented in seminars, unpublished sources, and newspaper reports will be thoroughly examined.

3.2.3 Area of Study

The researcher will be taken secondary data related to Sino-Indian cooperation especially strategically important for Nepal. Primary fieldwork will not be conducted although the researcher will be focused on the region collecting secondary data from various sources related to China-India cooperation and its impacts in Nepal. This particular region will be selected due to the following regions, first, the China-India cooperation has been influencing Nepal. Secondly, China and India both countries have been trying to increase their presence more strategically in Nepal. As being a student of international relations and diplomacy, this researcher has been studying the contemporary trend of China and India relations and their impacts in Nepal.

3.2.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Methods of Data analysis are primarily determined by the research questions to be answered (which also determine the format of the instrument and how the data are gathered) and the level of data being gathered. When several research questions are being addressed, it is helpful to describe the data analysis that will be used for each research question. Secondary data analysis is performed on data collected by others. A widely used source of secondary data is the census data collected by governments for administrative, and public policy purposes (Subedi, 2009, p. 32). Unobtrusive measures are another source of data that distances the researcher from the population being researched. Unobtrusive measures used in secondary data analysis are Physical evidence,

Simple Observation, Archival Records, and content analysis (ibid, pp.32-33). In this research, qualitative analysis will be the tool for the interpretation and analysis of data. The interpretation will be based on the theoretical perspective of the study. As data were qualitative, the study will be examined the strategic importance of China-India cooperation for Nepal.

CHAPTER-IV

ANALYSIS

4. Analysis of Implication, Effect, and Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal

4.1 Implications, Effects, and Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal

4.1.1 Implications of China-India Relations in Nepal

Nepal is located between two emerging powers of the world i.e., China and India. King Prithvi Narayan Shah stated that “Nepal is Yam between two Boulders”. Nepal’s foreign policy has been guided by this statement of Prithvi Narayan Shah in the present time also. Some of the scholars still guiding by that quotation of Prithvi Narayan Shah. Nepal adopted an isolated foreign policy before the Rana period. After the rise of the Rana ruler especially Jung Bahadur Rana Visited Great Britain and other European countries and tried to establish diplomatic relations. The foreign policy of Nepal became more open after the end of the Rana regime in 1950. After the opening up of the foreign policy of Nepal, the foreign influence also has been increasing. Nepalese foreign policy has been also influencing by the political change of her immediate neighbors China, and India. Nepal has opportunities and Challenges both regarding relation with China, and India. Nepal also can gain more benefit from the trilateral relationship among Nepal, China, and India. Nepal can become a transit point and vibrant bridge between India, and China. If Nepal gets success to become a transit point and vibrant bridge between China and India, Nepal will be transformed into a developed country in the South Asian region. The transit agreement between Nepal and China 2015 and transit treaty between Nepal and India. The trilateral relationship between Nepal-China and India also determines the development of the least developed country Nepal. Nepal has been facing new challenges after the latest unofficial blockade of India in the name of not consulting with India while promulgating the new constitution of Nepal in 2015 A.D. after that embargo the India factor become one of the important factors to determine the foreign policy of Nepal. The 1950-1951 Invasion of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army raised significant concerns of security and territorial integrity in Nepal and India, drawing both nations into a close

relationship with extensive economic and military ties (Mishra, 2013, p.69). There have been requesting visits of heads of states and governments of both Nepal and the two giant neighbors. The recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India and Nepal has added yet another milestone in strengthening mutual relations and in maintaining regional peace and stability (Lohani, 2019, p. 8). The Nepal-India-China trijunction remains undecided which is also a testimony to the fact that is indeed an unresolved border issue. Amid these raging controversies, the Nepal government published a new map of Nepal, incorporating these, on May 20 (Wagle, 2020, ¶.3).

In March 2016, Nepal and China signed 10 agreements and MOU on, among other things, using China's seaports, building a regional airport in Pokhara, exploring the possibility of signing a bilateral free trade agreement, and prospecting for oil and gas reserves in Nepal (Pudasaini, 2017, p. 6). That was the paradigm shift in China-Nepal relations. Nepal's transit pathology need not be overwhelmed. The Nepal China transit protocol should be kind to the problems that Nepal has been facing (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). Nepal has so far not been able to reap benefits from the seven Chinese ports (three land and four seaports) and the protocol to the transit and transport agreement due to the poor condition of roads in Nepal (Landmark visit, 2019). Nepal considers transit through China as not only an addition to its access to India's ports but also as an openness that could have immense potential for the Development of Nepal (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6).

China and India two re-emerging powers that have made great economic trades during the last two decades. Of the two, it is China, which has received wider attention as it has successfully uplifted a significant mass of people out of poverty, which it calls its model of governance (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). However, the west is wrong in believing that democracy is a necessary condition for economic success. If it were China could not and should not have succeeded but it has. This is why many in the West deeply resent China's success. It undermines many key pillars of Western ideology (Mahbubani, 2019, p. 76). In Leo E. Rose's perception, the strategies available to countries in Nepal's geo-strategic situation are limited in number isolation from the surrounding world to the greatest extent possible acceptance of a subordinate position to the dominant power in the

region or a delicate exercise in the balancing of surrounding powers to limit their capacity to interfere (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.3).

In 2007-08, China began construction of a 770 -kilometer railway connecting the Tibetan capital of Lhasa with the Nepalese border town of Khasa, connecting Nepal to China's wider national railway, network (Mishra, 2013, p.70). On the other hand, China's investment pledges in Nepal are higher than India's nowadays (Bhattarai, 2017, p. 7). Construction of the roads and airports in Nepal and economic connectivity through BRI is a project China is bringing forward (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.4). MOU has been signed during the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Nepal regarding the feasibility study of the China-Nepal Cross-Border Railway Project. This will pave the way for connecting Nepal with China through railway, which if utilized well, could prove to be a game-changer for Nepal's economy and infrastructure development. China has offered to assist in the construction of 30 kilometers of the tunnel along Kerung-Kathmandu Road (*My Republica Daily*, 2019, October 14). Both sides will coordinate closely to speed up the construction of Pokhara International Airport so that it would start operation at an early date (*The Himalayan Times*, 2019 October 14). China will also be supporting the construction of a tunnel road and upgrading the Araniko Highway, which was shut down after the devastating 2015 earthquake. Other roads linking Nepal with China's Tibet will also be upgraded. According to officials from both sides, all the Chinese-funded projects will be coordinated under THMCN (Landmark Visit, 2019).

Nepal shares a 1414 km long international border with China. Limited numbers of pillars are erected in physically viable locations only. Rest is followed by crest line, rivers, and passes. In 1962 a border agreement was signed between Nepal and China. There is no much tension on the Nepal-China border. Because it is regulated (Kandel, 2020, ¶.8). Nepal and India share almost 1850 Kms long open borders in 26 districts there are 8553 pillars along the border. About 903 of them have gone missing. Nepal says almost 93 percent of the Nepal-India border has been delivered but India claims 97 percent of it has been finished (Kandel, 2020, ¶.8).

4.1.1.1 Effects of China-India Cooperation in Nepal

The Territory is the first and most important element and the particular territory of a state has to be defined delineated and well protected. People of that particular state have sovereign right within that designed border (Kandel, 2020, ¶.1). National interest is the key concept in foreign policy as it provides the basic guidelines based on formulated foreign policy. Article 5 (1) of the present constitution of Nepal mentions that safeguarding the freedom, sovereignty, territorial integrity, nationality, independence, and dignity of Nepal, the rights of the Nepalese peoples, border security, economic well-being, and prosperity are the basic elements of national interest of Nepal. The secondary national interests of Nepalese foreign policy are promoting peace throughout the world. According to article 51(m) of the present Nepalese constitution to conduct an independent foreign policy based on the charter of United Nations, non-alignment, principles of panchheela, international law, and the norms of world peace, taking into consideration of the overall interest of the nation, while remaining active in safeguarding the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and national interest of Nepal. According to the preliminary report of the national interest protection committee of the first constituent assembly of Nepal, there are three kinds of determinants of the foreign policy of Nepal. To protect the sovereignty and integrity of Nepal, independence of the state, promotion of national interest and internal and external conditions of Nepal are general and objective determinants. Geography, history, population, and natural resources are specific determinants, and international organizations, world public opinion, and the reaction of other states are external determinants of Nepalese foreign policy. The characteristics of the present foreign policy of Nepal are Nonalignment, equidistance, Respect towards panchasheela, United nations, Neutrality, regional assistance, rights of landlocked countries, campaign for small and least developed countries, protest against suppression and discrimination, peaceful settlement of the dispute, international cooperation, the new economic system of the world, non-proliferation and independent policy are main characteristics of the foreign policy of Nepal (Siwakoti and Dahal, 2003, pp.337-339).

Weak diplomacy impacts Nepal's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and even development, harsh and soft loans have inverse correction with self-dependence for development. The inclusion of the Kalapani area in the official map of India is another critical issue pending resolution (Dixit, 2020, ¶.6). In Professor Yubaraj Sangroula's conception, historically, in the Anglo-Nepal war 1814-1816, China has to help Nepal. If China helped Nepal during that war Nepal probably had not lost, two-third of its territory. On the other hand, Nepal helped rescue the Chinese officials arrested by Madgad's rebellion rulers in 684 AD. So, China had a responsibility to help Nepal. But China had not helped during 1814-1816's Anglo-Nepal war. There is still the possibility of western powers attack against China from Nepalese territory. So, both countries China, and Nepal become and sensitive about these matters (Sangroula, 2019, p.609).

Geo-politics does not allow Nepal to play the high game, whereas India's strong influences on the defenses (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.9). After the British (1810), in 1947 the US became only the second country to establish diplomatic relations with Nepal followed by France (1949) and the Russian Federation (1956) (Baral, 2020, ¶. 2). In Professor of Tsinghua University Y. Xuetong's conception, present global configuration is shifting from unipolarity into a bipolarity rather than multipolarity. In this process; structural contradictions between China and the US are inevitable (Xuetong, 2020, ¶.5). According to Gaocheng Chinese research fellow 'China' as a rising power should try to avoid triggering a joint offensive position between the US, Japan, India. The rivalry between China and the US is inevitable (ibid, ¶.4). Indian Analyst Arun Kumar Mishra mentioned that King Birendra of Nepal proposed Nepal as a "zone of peace" between India and China in the 1970 and in 1980s, respectively. Nepal began importing Chinese weaponry in contravention of its 1950 treaty with India and has since sought to establish extensive military cooperation in a move to reduce perceived Indian influence (Mishra, 2013, pp.69-70).

In PHD scholar Gaurav Bhattarai's conception, mentioned that the priorities, concerns, and interests of our two immediate neighbors China and India are different and conflicting. The risk for Nepal is that while it tries to address one country's priority, the other country's concern might be ignored (Bhattarai, 2017, p. 7). In writer Mahabir

Paudyal's conception, the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Nepal had happened at a time when the debate is on the level that Nepal should expand or limit, its engagement with China's BRI and America's IPS, which seem mutually exclusive. But, if we review China's policy towards Nepal as an immediate neighbor China has always stood for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nepal and has been seen as a true friend at the time of need (Maskey, 2020, ¶, 3). So that it is clear that there is no wrong intention of China in OBOR. But, according to scholars of international relations IPS is directly or indirectly against emerging China. So that for Nepal, it is better not to involve in IPS. The Sino-American rivalry followed by India is well reflected in Nepal in the days come (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). In Professor Yubaraj Sangroula's conception, if there is a weak relationship between Nepal with northern immediate neighbor i.e., China, it might be creating unlucky for Nepal. So, for Nepali's existence, geopolitical situations are one of the major challenges. In the latest phase in the context of IPS, there is the possibility of performing fault from the Nepalese Side (Sangroula, 2020, p. 590). In 2015 A. D. India and China signed a bilateral agreement on operating a checkpoint in Lipulek identifying it as a bilateral crossing point and not a trijunction (Chaudhary, 2020, ¶.5). Geographical factor also prevents the country like Nepal from going against the traditional strategic partner India. The massive trade and transit dependence on India prevent Himalayan countries like Nepal from acting against the high game (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.9). Despite the presence of the economic and soft incentive offered by the two neighboring powers China and India, Nepal and other South Asian countries except Pakistan have engaged in complex bargaining to gain economic assistance from both China and India (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.5).

Once America had created a certain pattern of behavior for the world's number one power, the same pattern of behavior would be inherited by the next number one power, namely China (Mahbubani, 2019, p.83). India's indisposition to BRI is justifiable when it materializes under the bilateral framework of Nepal and China. Indian markets in UP Bihar and West Bengal could flow with low-priced Chinese goods routed through Nepal (Bhattarai, 2019, p. 7). The good news is that China, for its reasons is happy to live in a world dominated by multilateral rules and processes. Xi Jinping explained why in the two brilliant speeches he gave in Davos and Geneva in January 2017 (Mahbubani, 2019, p.83). China, India, and the USA have been increasing their competition in providing

grants and loans including infrastructure development sectors. China has been also providing grants and loans under BRI and other titles in recent days. According to some writers; the foreign loans provided from China, India, and other countries including the USA could bring a lot of opportunities for Nepal. But Nepal should carefully assess the costs and benefits while taking in China's assistance. If Nepal falls into the debt trap; it might take years and years to recover from it (Neupane, 2019, p. 7). So, the Government of Nepal and government officials have to pay attention to this matter.

India, with the leadership of PM Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist leader with a victory in the past election, has been developing its political power in recent years by reinforcing the military capabilities (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.4). Post-1962 India's China relations have been driven by the sense of competition, cooperation, rivalry, and occasional border conflict (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.9). The major concern of India in Nepal is rising Chinese influence flexing muscles with Nepal is not going to help India to keep China at bay. The New Delhi becomes assertive in Kathmandu, the more, the more Kathmandu will work up to Beijing (Mainali, 2020, ¶.15). China's growing economic and military power, expanding political influence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions are key development in Asian affairs (Shambaugh, 2004/2005, pp. 64-99). China's regional rise and these changing perceptions have prompted countries along China's periphery to readjust their relations with Beijing, as well as with one another (ibid). India's historical depth and demographic expanse were not matched by the country's economic and diplomatic status. Though it had 15% of the world's population, India was contributing less than 1% of global trade (Racine, 2008, pp. 65-78). With a 10% increase in its defense budget, India has allocated \$26 billion for its 1.3-million-man military force for 2008-2009 (at 2.5 of GDP) and plans to spend some \$ 40 billion over the next five years to upgrade its equipment, tapping foreign expertise as well as its resources (ibid).

In February 2012, during a visit to the US, then Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping proposed building a new model of the great power relationship between China, and the US for the first time (Zhang, 2016, pp. 45-60). In July 2013, during a famous "shirtsleeves" summit with American president Obama at the Sunny land's estate in

California, Chinese president Xi outlined three key components of such a relationship: “no conflict” and “no confrontation”, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation (ibid). China’s remarkable rapid rise as a leading technology innovator, mobilizing its resources to create national champions through programs such as the made in China 2025 plan and declared goal to lead the world in artificial intelligence by 2030 is the economic underpinnings of Chinese ambitions (ibid). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, as China increasingly became incorporated into the Asia-pacific, Beijing sought a position in the region that was commensurate with China’s great power aspirations (Christofferson, 1996, pp. 1067-1085). China’s global Power grows, Beijing is learning that its image matters. For all its economic and military might, the country suffers from a severe shortage of soft power. According to global public opinion, surveys enjoy a decidedly mixed international image (Shambaugh, 2015, pp. 64-99).

OBOR is part of a strategy to win over China’s neighbors and other countries across the region. Although China has tried to construct a narrative to explain its rising power to international audiences, the “China in 200’s created little impact” (Nie, 2016, pp. 422-444). OBOR is also designed to align with several of China’s domestic goals. As Xi started, a new normal for China’s economy has emerged. China’s leadership has been troubled by this new normal, which is mainly characterized by declaring economic growth (ibid). To project an image of China as a rising power with fraternal instincts, they occasionally present arguments that cast the multilateral institutions of development finance as rigidly ideological, paternalistic, or infected by residual imperialism (Murphy, 2016, pp. 245-251). China’s economic rise is one of the factors creating strains in the international financial order. China is already the largest trading nation and the second-largest economy and is likely to emerge in the next few years as the world’s largest net creditor (Dollar, 2016, pp. 197-213). The soft power of emerging India is multifaceted. Long a major recipient of foreign aid, India is now a donor, though a modest one. Indian intellectuals and artists are contributing to India’s new global reach (Racine, 2008, 65-78).

China’s reserve peaked at about \$ 4 trillion at the end of 2014. Since then, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has sold some reserves, but the country as a whole is still

accumulating net foreign assets, as evidenced by the large current account surplus (Dollar, 2016, pp. 197-213). China and India are rising powers and they certainly want to have a more significant position in the international system. In other words, with the increase of their capabilities, their dissatisfaction with reality could be expressed in ways that are not obvious (Gancheng, 2009, pp. 65-77). China and India have been trying to accommodate their respective rises. Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh repeatedly pointed out “the world has enough space for the growth ambitions of China and India (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163). Today “India Incorporated “is going global. Major Indian IT players, such as Infosys and Wipro, have paved the way, but enterprises with multinational ambitions are not confined to the service sector or generic drug companies, such as Ranbaxy or Cipla (Racine, 2008, pp. 65-78). The other dimension is the rising economic profile of China and India on the global stage against the backdrop of a shift in the economic center of gravity of Asia (Acharya, 2008, pp. 10-13).

China as a revisionist power and centrally socialist system aim to come out of the legacy of ‘century of humiliation’ which has led it to be assertive and tighten its control over Hongkong, the South China Sea, and its relations with its neighbors (Ghimire, 2020, ¶. 3). According to some analysts, China’s BRI and the subsequent US response to it in form of IPS have put states like Nepal in a conundrum. Since, both China and the US have heavily engaged in Nepal, India has also scaled up its rail, road, and pipeline projects in Nepal (Bhatta, 2019, p.6). As China-India ties take a sore dive Nepal could once again find itself in the unenviable position of being asked to choose between its two equally indispensable neighbors (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.1). India never wanted Nepal to be a part of BRI. But Nepal wanted to join as Nepal’s geography provides China a strategic gateway into Asia (Bhattarai, 2017, p. 7). After the Indian government released a new map including the Nepalese territory Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh inside the territory of India, the Nepalese government wrote to the Indian government, objecting to the inclusion of Nepal’s territory with India’s border.

South Asia is a vital region of great diversity and major civilizations. Its geopolitics is complex and provides a fertile ground for great power competition. Given the conflicting claims and competing claims and competing aims of India, China, and the

US in the region, along with the expanding Sino-Russian partnership, the complexity gets up-scaled (Bhattarai, 2019, p. 7). Now, through another accident of history; the virtues of modernizations are poised to enter Arab, Turkish and Persian societies, because all these societies are genuinely amazed by the spectacular success of Asia, from China to India, and keen to replicate such success (Mahbubani, 2019, p.78). From the Himalayan frontiers to the Indian ocean, the region is fast becoming a testing ground for geopolitical-muscle flexing between Nepal's close neighbors- India and China -and the US (Bhattarai, 2019, p. 7). Nepal has become an important country for the western powers in recent times. The US has come up with a proposal similar to that of BRI for the instrumental development of Nepal. The announcement of the US\$500 million Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) compact is a case in point (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). The only way to manage this great gameplay to increase Nepal's capacity both in economic and military terms Nepal needs to be economically powerful and it embarrasses enough funds for incidental extension (Paudel, 2020, ¶.9).

The geopolitical threats between India and China are felt day by day in the region with the former's alliance with the US under its "Free and open Indo-Pacific" vision, which is mainly aimed to counter Chinese advance in the region. In this vision; India features as an economic, political, and strategic battleground (Sharma, 2020, ¶.9). If there will be a war between China and India, Nepal will be directly affected by thousands of Gorkha soldiers, most of them from Nepal will likely be mobilized in the frontline as it happened in 1962 and they could be killed in the war as well. Besides, the economic and political fallout will be huge (*My Republica*, 2020 June 18, ¶.4). Geo-political, geo-strategic, and geo-economic effects of China India relations in Nepal, When the US and its allies extending its economic and political pressure on China, the move of China can be understood as one of the many tactics that it has implemented to give a message to the world that it is no more a weak developing country (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.3). According to some analysts not surprisingly Beijing is putting unprecedented political, diplomatic and financial muscle behind the BRI. Since President Xi Jinping took over the region's, first vice-premier of the State Council Zhang Gaoli has been tasked with coordinating BRI-related policy developments and innovation (Parajuli, 2017, p.6).

According to Ashutosh Kumar, China's rise as a "People's Republic" and its immediate weak and small neighbors including Nepal and other countries with different social systems provided a major incentive to the Cold War powers and their allies to reach out to China's these neighbors in whatever expedient ways (Kumar,2013, p.58). The political influence of western European countries in very difficult than the 1818-1816 AD war. It is unseen and more elusive. In that war, counterpart has not seen on the surface. For illustration in the 1960s, Nepal oppressed the Khampa revolt against China. After that Nepal has been in debate and conflict. The major cause of the present situation of Nepal is based on western design i.e., to block and prohibit China. So that, Chinese leadership have not dared it by saying 'it is Nepal's national affairs. Even with the collapse of the cold war, and the clear military and economic superiority that now rests with the remaining superpower, the US still supports the prevailing state system and insensitive to the balance of exercise its role of Super Power critic the need arises (Kumar,2016, p.2). The US has been the unchallenged global power for 20 years but its ascendancy has left it off-balance for most of the time, and imbalance has been the fundamental characteristic of the global system in the past generation (ibid, p.5). concerns over the opportunity for relative economic gains in the short term when weighed against the threat of increased geopolitical competition in the long term (ibid, p.75). It is undeniable that China's growing weight in political and military as well as economic terms is already reshaping the strategic balance in Asia and globally. Much of the attention has focused on China's aggressive diplomacy, an uneasy US-China relationship, and closer US-India relations (ibid, pp.64-65). India's ambitions geopolitical expansion strategy and its economic potential might not only turn India and China into competitions over oil supplies, but might as well increase theirs The US record \$375 billion trade deficit with China, and its building of military bases in the SCS are emblematic of a jolt to US sensibilities, with the evolving free and open Indo-Pacific response (Manning,2018, p.7).

In Robert A. Manning's perception, the biggest fear for nations in the Indo-Pacific region is having to choose between the US and China. It is one thing for nations to hedge with uncertainly over US durability in the region and China's emerging role (ibid, p.12). US-China trade confrontation escalates, both sides believing they can prevail. Trade

disputes hit stock markets and slowgrowth in the region. After a protracted period, mindset steps to partially resolve trade conflicts are taken (ibid). Geopolitical tension grows Sino-India over disputed borders in Himalayas India maritime fears of encircled with China building ports in Gwadar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh; Us-China over Taiwan, and increased the US and Chinese military activities on the nuclear freeze (ibid). Washington's China Policy since late 1993 has reversed the post-Tianmen containment policy and adopted a new strategy of "constructive engagement" that would make U.S. diplomacy less passive towards China and more actively expanding dialogue and exchange to draw China into the triangle (Christofferson, 1996, pp. 1067-1085). In his review of Kurt M. Campbell's book, Friedman (2015) mentions Campbell does not address the claim the shared US-PRC economic interest plus the mutual deterrence brought by both having nuclear weapons would prevent major power war between China and America. In his review of Kurt M. Campbell's book, Friedman (2015) identifies the region's combination of China-centered economic predominance and China-facilitated war-prone forces could not be ignored whoever was the new president and whatever an American Presidential candidate's prior campaign promises.

According to some writers, the Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean and its security interest in the Southern Himalayan states like Nepal use both of its hard economic and soft power to provide the options to these smaller nations which occasionally suffer from India's consideration (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.4). Open borders are always vulnerable to misuse by either side. Security challenges will be far more complex with an open border. It's time for Nepal and India to think seriously about it (Kandelk, 2020, ¶.12). The rise of China is shifting the power equation in South Asia. In this situation, India should not antagonize its neighbors like Nepal (Mainali, 2020, ¶.17). According to Professor Yubaraj Sangroula, most of the portion of the earning is controlled by a limited western capitalist country. This kind of property under the control of the urban rich people and organized companies. Under the control of colonialism and neoliberalism, the peoples of most of the least developed countries are liable to live their life with a vicarious circle of pain and scarcity. The capitalist rich country stands on the behalf of the system with explanations of the poor's and it advocates neo-colonialism and

imperialism by making political influence an explanation of military power as the strategic aim of international diplomacy (Sangroula,2020, p.658).

The conservatism liberalism economy knowingly transfers the economic sources and wealth to the developed capitalist country within these countries it transfers the property from poor workers to rich persons. Also, it transfers the property from the production area to the financial institutions. Finally, that system transfers all wealth and income under the control of limited international financial institutions (ibid, pp.658-659). In Yubaraj Sangroula's conception after 1990 the neo-liberalism enters Nepal with multiparty democracy. In that period some of the Western councilors who are trained by philosophy and theory and some Nepalese specialists' success to influence by Nepalese political parties. They hit industrialization which has been growing under the protection of the Nepalese state (ibid, p.660). In Professor Yubaraj Sangroula's conception, due to a faulty world economic system, the small states have been victimized mostly. Which are located near the large states are responsible to victimized due to their geographical complexity. For illustration, in Asia Nepal is such a country to which British imperialism exploited it for up to 200 years. British imperialism uses Nepalese youth in the name of their regime in India (ibid,p.659).

4.1.1.2 Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal

Strategically, the policy of equidistance indicates maneuvering of small states like Nepal while dealing with big powers like India and China (Bhattarai, 2017, p. 7). Despite the pressure from both India and China to endorse their side, Nepal saw the Doklam crisis as asymptomatic of propensities of the strong countries to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.9). According to Leo E. Rose, small countries situated in highly strategic areas between larger and more powerful neighbors must by necessary, formulate strategies and policies that reduce their vulnerability and exploit opportunities (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.31). Relatively weak and small nations who were asserting independence to a fuller extent were more vulnerable to the Cold War mechanism (Kumar,2013, p.58). Smaller states are positioned very low in the structural ordering of the international system, their influence in international relations is at best considered to

be minuscule (Jaisawal, 2017, pp.1-16). The foreign policy of small states has the primary aim of ensuring survival and strengthening the position of the state in the international environment (ibid).

As a landlocked country; Nepal's concern is with land borders and air space. Border delineation is done by surveyors (Kandel, 2020, ¶.2). After signing transit protocol during the China visit of Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari, Nepal got access to the transit port. But Nepal is not the first country to gain access to transit countries, including five partially recognized states that share the status and fate of landlocked nations (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). Being landlocked, Nepal has suffered from many trade embargoes for political reasons. The Indian hegemony has made Nepal turn to China for trade diversity. Which has been wrongly interpreted by the Indian establishment as Nepal playing China Card (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.3). Chinese President Xi Jinping had expressed a commitment to helping turn land-locked Nepal into a 'land-linked country' by boosting connectivity between two countries (*The Himalayan Times*, 2019 October 14). Chinese President Xi's visit is a landmark visit that China has expressed firm commitment to helping Nepal become a land-linked country (Landmark visit, 2019). Land-locked countries thus face special trading problems which have a variety of economic, social, and political aspects. In the twentieth century, when economic progress requires that international trade be as unhampered, speedy, reliable, and inexpensive as possible, freedom of transit becomes an important consideration for all states, and a vital one for Land-locked countries engaged in a systematic effort of economic development (Sarup, 1972, pp. 287-306). Despite the role played by transit questions in the access of Landlocked countries to the world's markets and the raw materials necessary for their economic prosperity, there is no unanimous agreement as regards the transit rights of these countries. This is partly due to the practical significance of the fact that the problems involved in the accesses of Landlocked countries to the sea do not take the same form in every part of the world (ibid). Nepal is a small Landlocked kingdom of only 54,000 square miles including Mount Everest; it is bounded on the north by the autonomous region of China i.e., Tibet, on the east by Sikkim and Uttar Pradesh (ibid). The facilities hitherto enjoyed by Nepal based on friendship and mutual understanding are now claimed by her under a right of free transit enshrined in

international conventions and earlier bilateral agreements between the two countries (ibid).

A small country like Nepal is gaining special asymmetrical opportunities in the Indo-Chinese economic race in economic globalization without being engaged in the military balancing against either of the big powers (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.11). Thousands of Nepalese work in India, including in the Army. This brings a sizable remittance to Nepal. However, some recent studies show India take back threefold more remittance from Nepal, which is the eighth biggest sources for India's foreign remittance (Upadhyaya, 2020, ¶.6). A common understanding between China and Nepal is necessary to get into the key principles of BRI. BRI is not limited to bilateral agreements. It can be an effective mechanism to facilitate bilateral trade, strengthen relations, and enabling the environment to make our people prosperous (Sharma, 2019, p. 7). Although Nepal is rich in natural resources, it cannot utilize them as a result of its instability to create a competitive market due to the open border and Nepal's instability to control cross border smuggling, Indian product monopolize the Nepali market (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.5).

In New Delhi from the newspaper, commentators, former ambassadors to Nepal to scholars to military and strategic thinkers, all agree on the assumption Nepal is playing the China card against India by raising border issue (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.5). As a small, landlocked country wedged between two larger and far stronger powers, Nepal maintains good relations with both China and India (Mishra, 2013, p.54). It's more than a decade since border experts like Buddhi Narayan Shrestha came out with the finding that thousands of areas of Nepali land have been encroached upon in several places from the Indian side (ibid, ¶.24). Nepal aims to correct with both India and China through railways, with differing jurisprudences, forms of government, and rules and regulations, many legal issues specific to the construction and operations of railways will arise (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, ¶.3). Kalapani and Lipulekh are the most significant strategic points for us to maintain and foster entire regional prosperity and security. Nepal has realized this showed historic unity in passing the new map from parliament (Sharma, 2020, ¶.14). There is the real reason to worry for Nepal and the countries in Asia and beyond: China and India look Like of Actual control region in the Himalayas (*My*

Republica Daily, 2020 June 18. ¶1). As a small, landlocked country wedged between two larger and far stronger powers, Nepal maintains good relations with China and India (Mishra, 2013, p.54). The border between Nepal and India is open, the Nepal-India border is not well marked but more or less regulated border (Kandel, 2020, ¶.3). From a geopolitically and geostrategically perspective, Nepal holds a very prominent place in Indian policy (Singh, 2016, pp.59-75).

4.2 Analysis Implications, Effects, and Strategic Importance of China-India Cooperation in Nepal

4.2 .1 Conceptual Analysis

Theoretical analysis assists to analyze the behaviors of sovereign states and actions towards other states. International relations theories attempt to provide a conceptual model upon which international relations can be analyzed. Each theory is reductive and essentialist to different degrees, relying on different sets of assumptions. A theory that is very useful in bringing about an order in a mass of data. It may work as a guide to action in international life. The theory is a crucial tool for understanding that gives meaning to the mass of phenomenon. The theory would make international relations a real policy science that would be of great help to statesmen and decision-makers. The theory is also useful for further creative research. So, the significance of theoretical speculation and perspective in international relations cannot be ignored (Malhotra, 2010, p. 109). The relevant theories of international relations which assist to analyze the behaviors of one state towards another state in the world system are realism and liberalism. It also helps to find the characteristics of the states.

4.2.1.1 Realism

The core assumptions of realism are system is anarchic, war always possible, insecurity prevails, states are the dominant actors –they alone determine outcomes and the distributions of power are decisive for world politics. Realists although recognizing that human desires range widely and are remarkably variable, emphasize ‘the limitations which the sordid and selfish aspects of human nature place on the conduct of diplomacy’ (Donnelly, 2005, 29-54) Realism emphasizes relations among nations, as they have been

and as they are. It is not concerned with the ideal world. It is an international interpretation of human behaviors. Individuals are essentially selfish and they seek power to serve their interests and prevail over others. (Khanna, 2014, p. 8). According to the realist school of thought of international relations bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity. The distribution of power tends to be balanced and relative gains are more important than absolute gains.

Political realism regards politics as a struggle for power and seeks to explain it with the help of such factors as power, security, and national interest (Ghai, 2017, p. 34). According to realism inherently (claims to be scientific and neutral but has moral qualities). The State is deterministic (does not allow room for human choices and decisions). Change in the international system and balance of power (realist cannot explain changes except through war).

The realist theory explains international politics in terms of the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Interest guides the statesman more than anything else and that it is useless to try and understand his actions in terms of “his motives” or “his ideology”. Ideology is only a cloak for power politics. Statesmen think and act only in terms of national interest (Malhotra, 2010, p. 117). Realism holds that in pursuit of their interests, states will attempt to amass resources and that relations between states are determined by their relative level of power. That level of power is in turn determined by the state’s military and economic capabilities.

The realistic school of international relations led by Kenneth Waltz, Johan Mearsheimer, and Radu Sichweder argues that small nations like Nepal would either bandage or balance against powerful neighboring states (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.1). The competitions between great powers of the world including China and India, anchored through various forms have resulted in a situation close to what the realists call a ‘prisoner’s dilemma (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). According to classical realism theory, a politician will think and act in terms of national interests. The hierarchy of national interests, as mentioned earlier, in the line with a continuum of “significance” at a theoretical level, with the greatest significance being the highest and the least

significant being the lowest priority (Nie, 2016, pp. 422-444). The foreign policy of smaller states has never been much of a concern to mainstream theories of international relations, especially for the realist school (Jaisawal, 2017, pp. 1-16). According to Morton Dutch realism is a power-based, adversarial, confrontational zero-sum, win-lose approach towards conflict. Morton Deutsch (1973) refers to as 'competitive' process of conflict resolution: power-based, adversarial, confrontational, zero-sum, win-lose approaches to dealing with conflict (Shah, 2010, pp. 559-611).

4.2.1.2 Liberalism

According to the liberalist school of thought, the system is hierarchic, the pursuit of wealth is as important as the pursuit of security, power is issue-specific. The additional characteristics of liberalism are the distribution of shared interest is more important than the distribution of power, the regimes and norms encourage cooperation and uncertainty is a problem. The demise of Soviet Communism at the beginning of the 1990s enhanced the influence of liberal theories of international relations within the academy a theoretical tradition long thought to have been discredited by perspectives that emphasizes the recurrent features of international relations (Burchill, 2005, pp. 55-83).

The liberalist approach advocates morality as the means for securing the desired objectives of making the world an ideal world. It believes that by following morality and moral values in their relations, nations cannot only secure their development but also can help the world to eliminate war, inequality, despotism, tyranny, violence, and force (Ghai, 2017, p. 33).

According to the liberalist school of thought, hegemons do not always emerge, any strategy may be an equilibrium with repeated play, iteration requires that players care about the future. Even a large shadow of the future may not promote cooperation. The Liberal theory works well with coordination issues but not with distribution issues and uncertainty may not lead to conflict. The idealist theory promises to bring about a better world with the help of morality, education, and international organization. The liberalist is of the opinion that political conflict in the past was not for power but between

inconsistent principles and ideals. Liberalists presents viewpoints about world politics (Malhotra, 2010, pp. 114-115).

Liberalism holds that interaction between states is not limited to the political / security (high politics) but also economic /cultural (low politics) whether through commercial firms, organizations, or individuals. Thus, instead of an anarchic international system, there are plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power, such as cultural capital. For liberalists, violent conflict can be the result of many contributory factors including learned responses to frustrated goal-seeking behavior. The range of responses to violence is fairly broad including 'counter-violence (in self-defense), but also nonviolent means for bringing about change (Shah, 2010, pp.559-611).

4.3 Theoretical Analysis of Implications Effect and Strategic Importance of China - India Cooperation in Nepal

According to idealist theory the society, a state is the outcome of evolution. This process of evolution is leading us towards perfection from imperfection. At this stage peace and justice can be established in society. Through the establishment of family and nations, war, violence immorally can be curbed (Malhotra, 2010, p. 114). The focus of liberalism has been on freedom, cooperation, peace, and progress (Khanna, 2014, p. 27).

While analyzing China's foreign policy towards Nepal in particular, Chinese foreign policy can be seen guided by sovereign equality. Whereas, China's foreign policy towards Nepal has been guided by mutual benefit. This perspective has become the dominant framework for explaining the foreign policy of China before, during, and aftermath of the post-cold war era. Scholars and experts believe that the Chinese foreign policy towards Nepal has been mainly based on security. Yang Wenwu in his article entitled A Study on Sino-Nepal Trade Cooperation in the Post-Financial Era writes, China-Nepal relations have always remained very friendly and unconditional cooperation. Sino- Nepal trade relations are very important for the economic development of the Tibet autonomous region, China and Nepal, and Sino-Nepal trade also plays an important role in trade intermediates and other aspects (Wenwu, 2017, pp. 341-372).

In Ram Kumar Dahal's perception, in the background of growing anti-Chinese activities and free Tibet movement in Nepalese soil conducted with the help of western powers and forces, it has become essential for Nepal to preserve the charms and beauty of Nepal –china relations and make it an ideal model relation between a big and a small neighbor of the 21st century (Dahal, 2016, pp. 55-64).

Realism assumes that nation-states are unitary geographically –based actors in an anarchic international system with no authority capable of regulating interactions as no true authoritative world government exists. Realists emphasize the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government together. They make international relations largely a realm of power and interest. Human nature has not changed since the days of classical antiquity towards immorality.

India's foreign policy towards Nepal has been guided by realism. It seems that India has been imposing its sphere of influence on Nepal. India has been using various forms of powers in Nepal to protect and promote its national interest which helps India as a state to be regional hegemony of the South Asian region. India has been continuing its hegemonic behave towards Nepal since the independence of India from the British Empire except during the Nehru Era. In other words, India has been continuing its 'big brotherly' attitude even after the end of the cold war. But there has been seen possibilities of change of Indian foreign policy after the reelection of present Prime Minister Narendra Modi. But the changing attitude and scenario are not that clear to this date. Scholars and experts believe that after the end of the Cold War India's foreign policy towards Nepal has been guided by a realist school of thought of international relations.

Kulchandra Gautam in his article entitled Nepal and India: A Case for equal but Non-Reciprocal Relationship writes India has three strategic interests in Nepal. These are first, protecting India's security interests across the open border, secondly, wanting to benefit from Nepal's large water resources, and thirdly domestic stability in Nepal (Gautam, 2016, pp. 53-64). India has been Trying to Imposing "Sphere of Influence" Towards Nepal based onthe "Nehru Doctrine" Basically the 1950 treaty-bound Nepal to a perpetual provision of special relations' under which borders are kept open, thus living

under the Indian security umbrella with no right to independent defense policy. This treaty made Nepal virtual Indian domination (Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73).

4.3.3 Analysis of China-India Joint/Common Interest towards Nepal

The Republic of India and PRC faced a common task when they came into existence in the middle of the century: completion of the conversion of their frontiers into boundaries (Maxwell, 1999, pp. 905-918).

4.3.1 Analysis of Chinese Foreign Policy Towards Nepal

It is said that more than two thousand years ago, Manjushri came from the Wutai Mountains in China to Nepal. He cut open the mountain with his sword and drained the water from the lake, thus creating the Kathmandu valley (Kumar, 2013, p.61). Historical records show that the friendly exchanges of China and Nepal date back to as early as the mid-7th century. At that time China and Nepal already started exchanging emissaries (ibid). Fashien, a Chinese eminent monk in the Qin Dynasty, came to Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, on pilgrimages. Songtsen Gampo, king of the Tubo Kingdom in the Tang dynasty married a Nepalese princess Bhrikuti (ibid). The Nepalese artisan Arniko built a Buddhist pagoda in Lhasa in the Yuan dynasty. The White Pagoda in Beijing's Miao Ying Temple was also built under his supervision. All these stories and historical facts show that China-Nepal traditional friendship is solidly based (ibid).

In the history of China-Nepal while there were worse relations between China and Nepal it brought negative consequences for both countries. The British imperial regime exploited worse Nepal China relations. For illustration in British imperialist regime attacked Nepal while China was not supported Nepal in 1814 AD and it attacked China in 1888AD while the China-Nepal relation was in a worse stage (Sangroula, 2020, p.603). from the expanded history of China-Nepal relations, some of important characteristics and concept has expressed. The cordial and good relations between China and Nepal guaranteed the security and prosperity of both countries. So that, there is strategic importance in China-Nepal. In the historical era, Nepal was remained as the entry point to enter into South Asia for China. That was also important for India because Nepal

remained as a secured 'transit' for trade between India and Tibet-China. From That route, hundreds of merchants enter India from the western region of India. It transformed India as the center of the Silk Route. The trade relation between China and South Asia assists to create peaceful and cordial relations among peoples of different countries. Also, that expanded the educational and religious relations of China and South Asia (ibid, pp.588-589).

All treaties and agreements about Nepal's ties with Tibet were signed between the competent authorities of China and Nepal (Kumar,2013, p.59). Ample evidence to this historical fact is the Sino-Nepali treaty of 1792, the Sino-Nepali Treaty of Thapathali of 1856, and the 1956 Agreement between China and Nepal on the maintenance of friendship and trade and transport between the Tibet region of China and Nepal (ibid). State leaders who contributed to developing stable Sino-Nepali ties were Nepali kings Mahendra (1955-1972) and Birendra (1972-2001), and prime ministers Tanka Prasad Acharya (1956 -1957) and B.P. Koirala (1959-1960) (ibid). From Chinese, the Chinese side, Chairman Mao Zedong, Vice -Premier Huang Hua, and president Ziang Zemin not only nurtured China's Nepal ties with a personal touch but often evaluated it highly as a model of state -to state relations (ibid).

China's new regional posture rests on the following four pillars: 1) participation in regional organizations; 2) Establishment of strategic Partnerships and deepening of bilateral relations; 3) Expansion of regional economic ties, and 4) reduction of distrust and anxiety in the security sphere (Shambaugh, 2004/005, pp. 64-99). The Chinese president Xi Jinping's two-day state visit to Nepal is significant in many ways. For one it broke 23 years' hiatus of Presidential level visit from China to Nepal. And it was equally rich in symbolism. China has sent a message that Nepal is an important country and that the bilateral relations between the two countries can be taken to new heights (*My Republica Daily*, 2019 October 14). As much as 20 thousand Tibetan refugees live in Nepal and this has been a major issue of concern between China and Nepal. Kathmandu has in several instances been brutally tracking down on activities of the Tibetans receiving international condemnation (Mishra, 2013, p. 56).

The visits of many top leaders of both countries over the past decade have further strengthened China-Nepal cooperation and taken the China-Nepal friendship to a new height. The recent visits of President Bidhya Devi Bhandari to China and President Xi Jinping to Nepal and various agreements linked during those visits, particularly the multi-dimensional trans-Himalayan connectivity, have laid another milestone in Nepal-China's journey to shared prosperity (Maskey, 2020). It was expected that the Visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Nepal would help render the possibility of transforming Nepal from 'landlocked' to a 'landlinked' country into reality. Nepal's former prime ministers in recent years, during their visits to China and meetings with Chinese officials, have shown a firm commitment to BRI by signing trade and transit treaty, joining, OBOR and allocating budget to carry out DPR of railways (Sharma, 2019, p. 7).

4.3.2 Analysis of Indian Foreign Policy towards Nepal

India's engagement with immediate neighbors including Nepal is closely in line with the legacy of British colonialism (Mainali, 2020, ¶.1). The most prominent evidence which proves that India's occupation of the Kalapani region is illegal that the treaty of Sugauli has started that the Kali River originating from Limpiyadhura is the western boundary river between Nepal and India (Mainali, 2020, ¶.14). According to the realist, many smaller states with less economic and military resources find balancing more difficult as it might drain the country's national resources (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.8). India has been selling soft powers like world view political literary, food language, and religion along with the hard-economic power to attract smaller South Asian states including Nepal to its eco-strategic frame (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.3).

Right since its independence since the time of prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. India has considered the Himalayas as its natural frontiers in the north. In this narrative, Nepal and Bhutan are seen as India's backyards, where Chinese influence must be checked (Mainali, 2020, ¶.2). As a consequence of the defeat of Nepal by the British Indian government. The system of recruit in British and Indian military force was established. Due to that reason, there is a trend of recruitment of Nepalese Youth in

British and Indian military forces. This tradition is one of the dark aspects of the sovereignty of Nepal (Sangroula, 2020, p.610).

The meeting of the Indian prime minister led cabinet committee on security, the highest body in India to decide on matters of national security had recently concluded that India would not accept the Nepal India EPG report and that the ‘special ties’ with Nepal would be revised (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.2.). The relationship between the two countries India and Nepal has been guided by the 1950 Nepal India treaty of peace and friendship lately has not been satisfied with the treaty and in this case, both governments have agreed to revise it. To give the final shape two governments form EPG but the Indian side does not seem to be willing even to accept its Report (K.C., 2020, ¶.3).

Indian defense minister Rajnath Singh has seen in fit to ‘inaugurate’ the shortest route to Mansarovar in the middle of the pandemic of COVID -19. A reasoned Nepali foreign policy analyst who has worked extensively in both India and China speculates the inauguration is a subtle message to the present government of Nepal (Baral, 2020, ¶.2). India has kept a security presence in the area since the border war with China in 1962 (*The Himalayan Times*, 2020, May 22, ¶.10). The Indian government on October 31, 2019, published a new political map of India comprising the newly formed union territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. The new geographical map of India however has triggered widespread national outrage in Nepal (Chaudhary, 2020, ¶.1).

4.3.3 Analysis of China-India Joint/Common Interest towards Nepal

India-China diplomatic relation is much older than Nepal-China diplomatic relation, until the border war of 1962, the relation between the two countries was guided by the spirit of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (India and China are like brothers) at least officially (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.10). China and India may stand together on many issues for their economies are interdependent and getting bigger and bigger (Shrestha, 2019). Lipulek also serves as the Indo-China border. The British military during the Indian occupancy intentionally shifted the border and legalized its ownership of the territory. This was done in an attempt to direct the trade route to China, shortening distance (Chaudhary, 2020, ¶.4). In Nepal, both ruling and opposition party leaders have been

urging prime ministers KP Oli to use his diplomatic skill to bring back Nepal's territories through negotiations with India. Similarly, there is growing domestic pressure on Indian Prime Ministers Narendra Modi to talk with Nepal without delay (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.2).

A tri-junction at Limpiyadhura can be designated with a new agreement among three countries Nepal, China, and India. For this reason, Nepal's resentment against India and China develop Lipulekh pass as a bilateral trade route, bypassing Nepal will be much realized and defaulter revealed (Sharma, 2020, ¶.12). Some of the sources mentioned that India had proposed foreign secretary-level talks just before starting the constitution amendment process of Nepal, but the Nepali side says it has not received any request for talks from India (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.7-8). The Modi government is likely to adopt a policy of silent diplomacy against Nepal. To exhaust it. In that case, Nepal needs to use its soft powers by integrating the countries intellectual, political, economic, and military powers, and diplomacy is the way to go about it (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.7). In 2025, when China agreed to open a trade route to India via Lipulekh, without taking Nepal on board, without even security Nepal's consent, the image of 'benignity' is being questioned (Paudyal,2020, ¶.24).

CHAPTER-V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5. Summary and Conclusion

5.1 Summary

The history of China's relation with India dates back to the distant past. Buddhism spread from India through Tibet to China in the early centuries of the Christian era, which led to a sort of spiritual kinship between the two countries (Stauffer, 1967, pp. 81-117). During the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, escaped from Lhasa and crosses into Indian territory. India granted him asylum. In October 1962 the Sino-Indian war erupted over a disputed Himalayan border. In March 1963 China and Pakistan signed a boundary accord between Kashmir and Xinjiang. Pakistan agreed to cede 2000 square miles of Pakistani-occupied Kashmir territory. In October, 1964, China conducted its first nuclear test. In 1971 /1972 China vetoed a resolution sponsored by India for the admission of Bangladesh to the UN. In 1974, it conducted its first nuclear detonation, aggravating relations with China. In July 1976 diplomatic ties between India and China were reestablished for the first time after the Sino-Indian War.

The contemporary China and India have only enjoyed a history of some seventy years. On the part of China, it was only able to discover a flourishing path to success three decades ago. For India, its democratic institutions did not deliver substantial economic goods for many years and many resources have been diverted in the non-civilian processes (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163). Future Sino-Indian relations cannot be predicted with precision, but it would be surprising if a close relationship were formed. These are the two massive societies of Asia; both are conscious of the prerogatives as well as the burdens of size. In each country, powerful nationalist strains are to be found, exhibited against dramatically different cultural backgrounds (Scalapino, 1991, pp. 63-74).

In contemporary times China and India have re-emerged as leading tech-economic nations. It is high time for them to move beyond conflicts and start cooperating politically, economically, and technologically for mutual benefits (Kumar, 2016, p.57). Both of these Asian giants (China and India) their strengths and weaknesses, their unique

cultural traditions, and political histories. They both are halfway and a long way to go, as the saying goes toward becoming advanced industrial societies (ibid, p.60). The 1962 war between China and India came as a damper and soiled many things, but since Rajiv Gandhi's overtures for mending the tenses in 1988, many things have fallen in proper shape between these two countries (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.10). China and India – the two sleeping giants of Asia -were waking up (Mahbubani, 2019, p.22). Even were China not displaying signs of a competing vision of regional and world order, the USA has had great difficulty in adapting its policies to the dynamics of a multipolar world. But the pace and scope of China's economic and strategic ascendance have been something of a shock to the system (Manning, 2018, p.7). India's relation with China in the post-war world was largely characterized by this perspective though the territorial issue had sown the seeds of acrimony even though India was friendly in pioneering China's struggle for freedom and its place of the p5 (five nuclear-weapon states) (Panda, 2001, pp. 105-122). Of course, fluctuation in Sino-India relations will remain and will be marked by occasional tension altering with cooperation. In the new international milieu, both countries are challenging the Uni-polar world led by the USA and desire a multi-polar world where they can have an equal voice (Bindra, 2009, pp. 1163-1178). The icy relationship between China and India was warm after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as economic interests have gained primacy over political agenda but were again on the verge of being frozen after the Pokhran II incident (Panda, 2001, pp. 105-122). The key factors which shape their policy in the post-cold war world are their perception of the changing contours of world politics, consensus on several issues, and the desire to tune friendship in line with the demands of domestic priorities (ibid).

In the Korean War, Indian diplomats at the UN proposed UN membership for the PRC as a necessary part of any ceasefire. While the popular Hindi slogan "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indo-Chinese Friendship) contained an element of exaggeration, relations during the early and mid-1950s were broadly congenial (Guha, 2012, pp. 26-29). Historically, China and India have found it difficult to handle each other's sensitivities. Because the two Asian powers are neighbors, there is a geopolitical element in their perceptions of one another (Gancheng, 2009, pp. 65-77). Now that China and India have acquired great momentum and are recognized as rising powers, this historical lesson is

significant in policymaking. One could argue that, even if they are unable to solve the border issue in the years ahead, this is unlikely to impose a significant negative impact on their respective behavior towards each other within the international system (ibid). The two countries are home to over been involved in an actual shooting war with each other (Ruso & Sasikumar, 2007, pp. 99-123). Diplomatic and economic relations between Beijing and New Delhi collapsed after the 1962 war. In the three subsequent decades, bilateral trade figures dwindled to a negligible amount (ibid).

China's creation of the AIIB and BRI, a \$ 1.2 trillion vision to reconnect the Eurasian landmass and maritime SilkRoad, stand as major signposts of China's desire to play a leading global role (Manning, 2018, p. 7). OBOR has become a prominent issue in China's political discourse. OBOR is primarily an economic initiative, but its political and strategic significance cannot be overlooked. China expects that OBOR will strengthen its influence in both global economic and political affairs (Nie, 2016). The dazzling shift of China-India relations since the end of the Cold War would not have occurred had it not been for the transformation of the world political landscape as well as China's and India's respective rise (Dingli, 2010, pp. 139-163). China's rise as an economic dragon and aspirations to create its world order through a trillion-dollar BRI has kept the world mesmerized for quite a while India, too, is trying to reinforce its sphere of influence in South Asia and beyond (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6).

The politico-structural compulsion of both China and India is the main reason for them not to back up from their military and political stand (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.2). China's greater friendship with countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives, which was considered as the region of Indian spread and Indian association with the countries like Mongolia, Vietnam, and Myanmar, what China considers its sphere of influence' are also additional factors for India and China to flex its muscles at the border (ibid, 2020, ¶.5). The military standoff between India and China over their disputed border in Ladakh is escalating. India says 20 of its army personnel died in a hand-to-hand clash with PLA personnel on the night of June 15. This had further neglected the possibility of Nepal-India dialogue to settle the Kalapani issue (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶. 17). There is a suspicion in Nepal that since India offers China huge markets at its doorstep, Beijing will

silently support India's bid to link the two regional giants, including through passes like Lipulekh (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.4). The India-China border dispute covers the 3,488 km long Line of Actual Control. China claims Arunachal Pradesh s part of Southern Tibet while India contests it (Rohatgi,2020, ¶.7).

To maintain Sino-India solidarity India gave up all extra-territorial privileges inherited from the British rule in India and recognized Tibet as a region of China though at the same time appraised it about the harmful impacts of forcible occupation of Tibet (Panda,2001, pp. 105-122). The 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement is cited as declarative of the established Central Sector boundary location. Several Agreements are invoked to support India's placement of the Sikkim and Bhutan boundaries. The 1684 and 1842 treaties are cited in support of Indian boundary claims in the western sector (Sharma, 1965, 16-47). Between 1954 to 1959, the incident of increasing seriousness occurred along the frontier. These incidents had, however, had little effect upon Sino-Indian friendly relations. The Indian government wishfully believed to solve the dispute through negotiations (ibid). The April 1960's talks between Zhou and Nehru failed to achieve the goal of both countries. Nevertheless, China's attempt to compromise its dispute with Indiasupports the logic of regime insecurity (Fravel, 2005, pp. 46-83). On 21st November 1962 when its advance was its fastest, China dramatically declared a unilateral ceasefire along the entire border, announcing its withdrawal twenty kilometers behind the LAC (Shah, 2010, pp. 559-611). Though China desisted after a very short period and withdrew to positions 20 kilometers behind the LAC, the setback in Sino-Indian relations continued throughout the Cultural Revolution taken place in China during 1966-1976. (Panda, 2001, pp. 105-122).

In 1962, a diplomatic attempt was made to resolve the border problem between China and India by the Colombo Plan, which however could not be succeeded. In 1969, strong signals were sent by the Indian Prime minister for the normalization of the relationship (ibid). India and China clashed several times in the 1970s and 1980s with the standoff at Sundering Chu in the eastern sector from October 1986 to March 1987 being the most serious confrontation between two countries (Sidhu & Yuan, 2001, pp.351-376). In 1979, Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. Slow and tentative

steps were taken to reduce tension and the two countries began to explore ways to resolve their territorial disputes. To this date, no solution to the border issue is found to have been worked properly (ibid). In May 1982, discussions were structured along the lines of the Beijing round, involving plenary sessions and subgroup meetings on the border, cultural relations, science and technology, and trade and economic affairs, respectively. As in December 1981 meetings, China and India embraced antithetical approaches to the resolution of border problems (Elkin & Fredericks, 1983, pp. 1128-1139). In 1993 and 1996, though China and India signed two important agreements to maintain peace and tranquility and reduce tensions along the LAC, including force reductions and limitations on military activities (Sidhu & Yuan, 2001, pp. 351-376).

It has been widely noted by political scientists that the coexistence of China and India in the international state system is highly unusual in that they both aspire to superpower status as share a border. Fifty years ago, this border was both *casus belli* and battleground between two countries (Guha, 2012, pp. 26-29). The border between India and Tibet, the McMahon Line, had never formally been recognized by China, which now coveted Aksai Chin, a portion of eastern Ladakh in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, as a means to link Tibet and Xinjiang by road (ibid). China claimed the region controlled by India south of the eastern end of the McMahon Line, an area then administered as the North-East-Frontier Agency (NEFA) and now as the state of Arunachal Pradesh, but known to the Chinese as south Tibet (ibid). This area had historically been claimed by Lhasa but was ceded by Tibet in the 1913-14 Shimla agreement that saw the drawing of the McMahon Line (ibid). The settlement of the China-India border dispute is best pursued its own sake, for gaining the agreed border and the completion of the “unfinished businesses of demarcating India’s northern frontiers” (Noorani, 1981, pp. 1185-1186).

At least 20 Indian Soldiers including a colonel-level commanding officer have been reported to have been killed on June 16 in fierce clashes in LAC (Sharma, 2020, ¶.6). Recent fatal skirmishes in Galwan valley in Ladakh have once again proved the strategic importance of Nepal’s Lipulekh region. The 1700 feet high important tactical feature belongs to Nepal on the ground (Sharma, 2020, ¶.7). India-China border clash can

also be considered as frustration and misunderstanding that was piled up historically (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.5) Chinese leaders focused their foreign policy concerns on establishing a “peaceful environment” around China’s periphery in Asia (Bindra, 2009, pp. 1163-1178). Since the late 1950’s relations between India and China have been fraught with tension and conflict. Yet the two countries have recently enjoyed a significant improvement in bilateral relations (Rosco & Sasikumar, 2007, pp. 99-123). During the last seventeenth year, no Indian PM Modi has given priority to the neighboring countries. He had invited all the heads of SAARC countries for his been given an important place (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75). Nepal formally established relations with the PRC in 1955, and since then their bilateral relations have generally been very good (Mishra, 2013,p.22).

Nepal has been preserving its independence for over 250 years, despite its precarious geopolitical multiple factors that may play they are important ranked in line with the political persuasion and understanding of international relation (Baral, 2020, ¶.1).Nepal and China will need to work closely together to ensure the development of systems and facilities that will truly foster the trade and connectivity between the two countries, and between China and other South Asian countries including India (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). Two countries China and Nepal now have the opportunity to explore and enhance areas of cooperation in multiple sectors like connectivity, infrastructure, energy, and security. Many of them can be perused under the frame of BRI (Pandey, 2018, p. 9). Nepal-China relation experiences a fresh and pleasant turn by the exchange of goodwill and official visits. In this regard, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s arrival in Kathmandu on October 12, 2019, will mark the renewal of cordial ties between China and Nepal (Basnyat,2019, p. 7). Since the Sino-Nepalese war of 1792, the Nepalese government had renounced all claims of influence in Tibet and maintained a policy of non-intervention in its affairs (Mishra, 2013, p. 70). After invasions of Nepal to Tibet China supported Tibet. Hundreds of casualties happen on both sides i.e., China - Tibetan side and the Nepalese side. The Qing commander General Fukang’ and then sent a proposal to the Government of Nepal for ratifying a peace treaty. Bahadur Shah also wanted to have cordial relations with China. He readily accepted the proposal and they concluded a friendly treaty at Betravati in 1792(ibid, p.76).

During the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Nepal and China decided to extol the elevation of bilateral relations and signing over two dozen agreements and a memorandum of understanding, primarily concerning infrastructure projects (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv). In the context of BRI, such potential includes additional Chinese investment in Nepal in heavy infrastructure, like hydropower plants, railways, airports, roads, and tunnels as well as the promotion of Nepali agricultural and tourism sectors (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). China has also been deepening the engagement in Nepal in the social and economic sectors (Pudasaini, 2017, p. 6). Xi Jinping is the first Chinese President to visit Nepal after a hiatus of 23 years. The last Chinese President to visit Nepal was Ziang Zemin (Landmark visit, 2019). China and Nepal are neighbors with a 2,000-year history of a traditional friendship and relationship between the people of two countries. In the recent past; both countries have tested the bitter fruit of imperialism and colonialism, respectively (Hong -Wei, 198, pp. 512-520). Since diplomatic relations were established in 1955, a move based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, bilateral relations between China and Nepal have weathered the stormy international situations and continuously developed (ibid). There are some concerns in Beijing over “little progress on the ground” in the last years since the two sides signed landmark agreements on trade and transit to cut down Nepal’s historical dependence on India (*The Kathmandu Post*, 2018 May 18).

Though the cultural, religious, and political relations with China and India were rightly maintained by the rulers of the respective small principalities before the unification of Nepal, all the later rulers of unified Nepal also did their best to maintain their good relation and please both the neighbor’s China and India, respectively (Lohani, 2019, p. 8). According to historical facts and evidence, there were close cultural and economic relations between China and Nepal and Nepal and India in history. At that time Nepal was the only bridge to linked China and India (Sangroula, 2020, p. 586). On October 9, 1959, Zhou Enlai met with visiting Nepalese minister and expressed China’s willingness to enter into border talks. After a second armed clash took place between Chinese and Indian forces in late October 1959, Zhou offered to hold talks with Nehru. In December Nehru still refused to meet with Zhou (Fravel, 2005, pp. 46-83). Nepal and India do not have a separate border Treaty. Sugauli Treaty has defined borders of Nepal

and India and it clearly shows Kalapani-Lipulekh Limpiyadhura (KLL) as Nepali territories. Let's not pretend ignorance this. The moment India recognizes the Kali River as border review, which demarcates the boundary between Nepal and India.

It is not inevitable that China will lead the world, even though it is inevitable that China will have the world's largest economy (Mahbubani, 2019, p.91). Nepal and China have enjoyed mutual respect and friendship for a long time (Sharma, 2019). Nepal's relationship with China will be evident when the interactions at the multiple level increase in the days-to-days exercise. However, as of now, the established 'belief' with some sections of society is that China does no wrong with Nepal (Bhatta, 2019, p.6). Easy entry in the borders, the favorable business environment for Chinese companies and vice-versa, mutual accreditation for trade opportunities, simplifying custom rules, positive quarantine regulations at the entry points, and removal of non-tariff barriers are crucial areas for China and Nepal to consider easing businesses and strengthen Nepal's longed cherished relations (Sharma, 2019, p. 7). At the end of Xi's visit, both countries signed as many as 20 agreements to further enhance the bilateral relations that have remained cordial since the establishment of diplomatic relations between both sides in 1955 (Landmark visit, 2019).

Nepal has been preserving the independence for over 250 years despite its precarious geopolitical positioning multiple factors may play their important rank in line with Nepal's political persuasion and understanding of international relations (Baral, 2020, ¶.1). Nepal is the oldest country in South Asia with full independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity due to the vested interest of its autocratic rulers to prolong their regime with the support of neighbors it has been fallen to trap many times (Bhattarai, 2020, ¶.6). India has been continuing its "big brotherly" and "hegemonic" behaviors towards small states of the South Asian region including Nepal. After New Delhi divided Jammu and Kashmir into two federal territories and rescind Kashmir's autonomy, the Survey Department of India took issue with the new political map that places Kalapani of Nepalese territory, within India's territory (Giri, 2019, pp. iv-xiv). The strength of India's influence vis-à-vis, other powers are dwindling in Nepal, which certainly is not good for both countries. India, however, has limited choices: It cannot ignore Nepal, nor can it put

under ‘undue’ pressure (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). As India stood reluctant to resolve the border matters with Nepal, the government of Nepal published the new political map including Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani region within Nepalese territory, the land which belongs to Nepal but India claims as to their and has been occupying India (Basnyat, 2020, ¶.1).

India has been occupying Nepali territories in the Kalapani region, Susta, and other places. Nepal state and intelligentsia have made public several evidence that proves that India’s occupation of the Kalapani region is illegal (Mainali, 2020, ¶.14). The relationship between India and Nepal has always seen ups and downs due to various factors such as the economic blockade of 2015 and ongoing border disputes (KC, 2020, ¶.3). The boundary disputes between India and Nepal were observed and many of them were resolved by Nepal-India. Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee established in 1981 (which worked until it was dissolved in January 2008) except Susta and Kalapani (Upreti, 2020, ¶.6). When the government of India published its new political map in November 2019, incorporating the Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh-Kalapani region inside Indian territory. Nepal denied the claim promptly objected to the matter (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.5). There is no alternative to meaningful dialogue to resolve border issues between India and Nepal, including Kalapani, Limpiadhura, and Lipulekh issues based on historical facts, treaties, evidence, and existing ground realities (Wagle, 2020, ¶.10). In the context of Nepal, India’s support is often held under deep mistrust because of its dillydallying in the projects and its unwillingness to sort out the difference on border-related issues such as Kalapani and Susta (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). Despite several calls from Nepal to resolve, Kalapani issue, EPG report, and others, India’s higher decision-making echelon has not shown any more interest to address the border issue India has often pointed to the existing mechanism at the foreign policy level (Sharma, 2020, ¶.1).

5.2 Conclusion

The research questions of the study are related to the statement of the problem. Three research questions were prepared for the study of research questions. The research

questions have focused on the whole parts of the study. During the wrapping up of the study following conclusions are made.

Q. No. 1 What are the Implications of China-India Cooperation in Nepal?

While the engagement of great powers including China and India in Nepal might have the potential of creating opportunities, they have also unleashed implications of critical geopolitical science particularly for Nepal (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). China and landlocked Nepal seem to have almost finalized the text when President Bidhya Devi Bhandari visited China on a four-day official tour in April 2019 to participate in the second BRI Conference (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). Nepal needs to leverage its position as a gateway between two countries to create advantageous access to these transit hubs as it has been sandwiched between two transit countries (ibid). The China-funded BRI aims to connect people across the world, giving them a platform for businesses and contributing to everyone's well-being (Sharma, 2019, p. 7).

With the rapid economic development of China and India, Nepal's prospect of a prized development is not distant but India should adopt the idea of "shared Prosperity" such as a building bridge with China via Nepal for commerce expansion and tap many more unseen opportunities (Sharma, 2020, ¶.6). Nepal would benefit largely if it could become a major transit point between India and China's trade route. For this, Nepal should have a smooth network of highways and rail routes connecting India and China, respectively (Lohani, 2019, p. 7). In Professor Yubaraj Sangroula's perception, Nepal was a transit point between China and India while the ancient trade route was in existence. At that time, Indian, as well as western merchants, used Nepal as the trade route between China and India. At that time, Nepal has contributed to contact with China and South Asian countries (Sangroula, 2020, p.589). Metro development should also foresee possible international routes, which could pass through the valley for connection to India and China. Only with such trans-country connection or potential connection would grand the success of metro scheme materializes in the future (Amatya, 2019, p. 6). The joint statement issued during the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Nepal mentioned that two sides will work to enhance connectivity, encompassing vital

components like ports, roads, railways, aviation, and communications within the overarching framework of trans-Himalayan multi-Dimensional connectivity Network to contribute to Nepal's agenda (*My Republica Daily*, 2019 October 14).

Some scholars of international relations mentioned that Nepal may be considered a buffer state between two Asian giants PRC and India in South Asia (Mishra, 2013, p.5). But some scholars deny it and they argue that Nepal is the dynamic bridge between China and India. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, during his meeting with his Nepali counterpart, Pradeep Gyawali in Beijing in April, floated a proposal of the China-Nepal-India economic corridor. India is yet to consider this idea affirmatively (Pandey, 2018, p. 9). If China-Nepal- India economic corridor is launched, then Nepal will be established as a dynamic/vibrant bridge between China and Nepal. During the state visit of then and present, prime minister KP Oli to China, a 16-point agreement was signed between China and Nepal including a trade and transit treaty. After signing the China-Nepal trade and transit treaty, China and Nepal have entered into agreements for the supply of petroleum products and other goods through the new transit routes that pass through the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China. It is said that if these arrangements are implemented, they will be a part of the BRI (Baral, 2019, p. 6). Nepal should benefit from BRI by exploring areas of cooperation within its framework. The Kerung railway is one such project and China has proposed to make this a gateway to South Asia (Sharma, 2019, p.7).

Nepal's participation in the BRI goes beyond physical connectivity. The people-to-people relations have opened up opportunities to explore projects and ideas beyond infrastructure and development (*ibid*). As an immediate neighbor, China and India have been assisting in the development of Nepal. China has provided economic assistance for Nepali infrastructure (Mishra, 2013, pp.22-23). The large gap between development funding needs and the resources-both domestic and in terms of foreign aid -means that infrastructure financing available under BRI comes as a much-needed respite for developing countries (Bhattarai and Uprety, 2019 p. 6). As an official signatory of BRI, Nepal has become a part of the railway connectivity of Shigatse-Kyirong that is planned to be extended up to Kathmandu (Neupane, 2019, p. 7). As long as Nepal uses the funds to complete the infrastructure projects in time, Chinese President Xi is willing to help Rs.

56 billion starting next year for three consecutive years or even more, if the Nepali government can spend the money on a development project (Baral, 2019, 6). Since joining the BRI in May 2017, the government of Nepal is looking to cash in the promise of Chinese investment in the infrastructure sector (Parajuli, 2017, p. 6). China's road, rail, and air transport network has almost reached the areas bordering Nepal and this has open new avenues for Nepal's development (Lohani, 2019, p. 8). These roads, rail, and air transport also can be extended to Indian borders. Nepal will be benefited using these infrastructures' development. During the China visit of Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari in April 2019, she discussed with Chinese President Xi Jinping ways to carry out feasibility studies connecting two countries via railways (Sharma, 2019, p.7). Under the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network (THM-CN), which is the Nepali version of BRI of which Nepal is a member, President Xi said the feasibility study of the trans-Himalayan railway would start shortly (Landmark Visit,2019).

China is Nepal's second-largest tourist source market after India (Pudasaini, 2017). During the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Nepal, there is a commitment to strengthening cooperation in fields of the economy including, trade, tourism, and investment (*My Republica*, 2019 October 14). Chinese tourists are increasing each year (Neupane, 2019, p. 7). There are prospects of exporting Nepal's hydropower to both immediate neighbors China and India and even beyond as the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China is also rapidly developing, the need for energy is increasing there and it would be easier for China to import it from Nepal rather than have it supplied from far-off mainland China (Lohani, 2019, p. 8). China has also pledged FDIs on Nepal's hydroelectricity sector (Neupane, 2019, p. 7).

Q. N. 2. What are the effects of China-India Cooperation in Nepal?

The Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani issue that has been prevalent for a long time resurfaced, once again after the inauguration of the road through the Nepali territory on May 8, 2020 (Chaudhary, 2020, ¶.1). The map and the territorial claim can be established only after the borderline is resolved for all through due diplomatic process and agreement (Wagle, 2020, ¶.3). The dispute over the Limpiyadhura region has its

roots in the 1960s. Part of Indian contingents retreated to the region after suffering defeat at the hands of the Chinese at the India-China war over Arunachala Pradesh (the Chinese call it Aksai Chin) in 1962 (Gautam,2020, ¶.2).

In 2015-16, the then government of Nepal led by the then Prime Minister KP Oli turning to China for new trade and transit points and a higher degree of road and rail connectivity to reduce Nepal's overdependence in India (Baral, 2019, p. 6). India was controlling most of Nepal's foreign policy moves, mainly our engagement with China and the US, tendency in Nepal between 1950 and 1955 was such that Nepali leaders (Paudyal,2020, ¶.16). Some analysts mentioned that countries like Nepal are in a state of dilemma as to how to sail in the murky water filled with 'old-power -the US-and 'new 'emerging powers -India and China (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6).

China is eager to bring countries and continents together through BRI and to connect their immediate neighbors with global value chains. India, meanwhile, aspires to restrict the neighbors like Nepal within their traditional "sphere of influence" thinking (Bhattarai, 2017, p.). China and India offer key global questions. India is against China's BRI projects and is a close ally of the US under the IPS China's Bête noire (Paudyal, 2020, ¶.12) According to some writers, China has been extending its support by providing huge loans and grants to vulnerable countries. In the name of the trade, grant support, infrastructure development, and diplomatic ties (Naupane, 2018, p. 7). They further argue that China seeks to break the Indian monopoly in Nepal in hydropower and other infrastructure development projects (ibid). On the other hand, China, the USA, and other world powers also have been extending their support and concern in this field. So, there is also the possibility of unhealthy competition and clashes between China and India and other world powers including the USA in the name of supporting Nepal. According to some writers, the excessive economic loan provided by China, India, or other countries will further add to foreign loan burdens to Nepal. Thus, before embarking on big projects like BRI and others, Nepal needs to carefully assesses their possible impact on Nepalese the economy (ibid). Some of the writers argue about the agreements.

The central challenge before Nepal is to manage sensitive and fragile geopolitics skillfully. Judge every issue on its merit without fear or favor, take no sides, maintain a healthy balance and stand out with clarity and consistency in the best interest of the nations (Bhattarai, 2019, p. 7). The big danger that America faces if it wakes up and begins to deal with China is that it will make the same mistakes that the Soviet Union made when it dealt with the US (Mahbubani, 2019, p.71). For America; China is an economic competitor, not a military competitor. The biggest mistake that America could make is to step units' military deployments in East Asia to balance a resurgent China (Mahbubani, 2019, p.71). The USA and the West have been Nepal's partners in its development for nearly 70 years. China and India are its immediate neighbors with whom it shares close cultural and civilizational ties and day-to-day interactions (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). The worst violence in the India-China border since 1967 claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers. The clash occurred in the Galwan Valley, which hasn't been a site of conflict since 1962, on June 19, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in a statement that the entire valley is located. On the Chinese side of LAC (Krishnan, 2020, ¶.1).

Regional powers including China and India are competing fiercely to influence the smaller states and rally from them to support their rise, chances are that it will unleash problems not only for Nepal but also in the South Asian region (Bhatta, 2019, p. 6). If Nepal ignores its next-door neighbors, the consequences may be stark even if not very immediately. Ignoring the west may also be costly for Nepal's development endeavors (ibid). The government of Nepal should go a step further and form its thinking to recommend policy options on BRI (Parajuli, 2017, p. 6).

Q. N. 3. How and why China-India Cooperation is strategically important for Nepal?

The Chinese president Xi proposed BRI in 2013 to build the 21st century maritime Silk Road. The proposal so far has been seconded by more than 80 countries. In addition to this, several international organizations have signed cooperative memoranda with China on BRI (Sharma, 2019, p. 7). Both India and China have been assisting Nepal in their economic development endeavor from the time, Nepal opened itself to the world in

1950 (Lohani, 2019, p. 8). Nepal can cooperate with its immediate neighbors China and India through economic diplomacy. By maintaining political stability, Nepal can invite the investments of China and India, respectively. As the birthplace of Gautam Buddha Nepal can develop itself as a center of peace. A cooperative approach has to be followed keeping in relation with its immediate neighbors, China, India, and other neighboring countries, respectively for the development of Nepal.

There are hundreds of places that can be developed and maintained as tourist destinations. Nepal can cooperate with China and India for further development of the tourism sector internationally. Nepal is one of the richest countries in historical aspects and cultural variation. Nepal can attract the international community by developing it as a historical and cultural destination to promote the tourism sector. Nepal is the second richest country in the world in terms of freshwater. It has a total capacity of 83000 megawatts of hydropower production. So, Nepal can attract China, India, and other countries investors to invest in the hydropower sector and commercialize it in the world market. India is keen to double the power supply as per the demand of Nepal. To facilitate this, there will be developed the pipeline in Nepal to supply oil to the Himalayas nation (Singh, 2016, pp. 59-75).

A commendable thing about Nepal's foreign policy and diplomacy is that during the 1962's war between China and India and the Cold War that ensued, Nepal never took the side of any of them, nor did these nations try to use Nepali territory during the war (Lohani, 2019). Nepal has traditionally maintained a non-aligned policy and enjoys friendly relations with neighboring countries (Mishra, 2013, p. 64). China-led BRI is projected to generate immense benefits for Nepal and this is being said even by policy experts and Nepalese development planners. Nepal thinks of China as a counterweight to combat Indian interference in Nepal (Bhattarai, 2017, p.7). Landlocked countries have an opportunity to leverage their position in unique ways if they are strategically located, as is the case for Nepal (Adhikari & Adhikari, 2019, p. 6). Chinese President Xi Jinping during his state visit to Nepal has said that Nepal will no longer remain 'landlocked', but will become a 'landlinked' country through a better connectivity network with the

northern neighbor (Landmark visit, 2019). Being a land-locked country, Nepal shares a border on three sides with India and to the north with China (Lohani, 2019, p. 8).

Being a small, landlocked but naturally resourceful country Nepal can promote soft power in the international arena including China and India. The highest peak of the world Mount Everest, the birthplace of Gautam Buddha Lumbini, and unique cultural customs of Nepal like the “Kumari Custom” of the Newar community can be promoted as the soft power of Nepal. Nepal, being not only landlocked but “India-locked” from three sides, accepted the terms of the treaty for its security (Rana, 2013, pp. 59-73). Nepal is a landlocked and geographically isolated country. Since the external contacts of Nepal have to go through the Indian Territory, logically Nepal must maintain its good relationship with India. Nepal’s relations with China are regarded purely as balancing its relation with India (Hong-Wei, 1985, pp. 512-520). The BRI can be an incredible opportunity for the least developed countries to leverage their (limited) soft-power and bring diverse parties together to advance global development (Bhattarai and Uprety, 2019, p. 6). So, if India is also involved in BRI, then it will assist in the development of LDC like Nepal.

The US government has been trying to get Nepal under the fold of the Indo-Pacific Strategy mainly because of Nepal’s geo-strategic location between China and India (Shrestha, 2019, p. 7). Nepal is strategically important to both the powers China and India. It is the gateway to the sensitive Tibet Autonomous Region, which plays a vital role in China’s South Asia Policy (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.8). Nepal’s immediate neighbors, India and China have been stunning the world with their outstanding advancement through economic development. Both these neighbors are emerging as economic power (Lohani, 2019, p. 8). The bilateral relations between Nepal and PRC have been friendly and defined by Nepal’s policy of balancing the competing influence of China and Nepal’s southern neighbor India, the only two neighbors of the Himalayan state (Mishra, 2013, p.68). If bilateral (India-Nepal) and trilateral (China-India -Nepal) engagements fail to yield results regarding the dispute of Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura, Nepal should have the courage to take the matter to an international forum. Apart from the

Limpiadhura region, Nepal has suffered encroachment upon swathes of its land along and close to its border with India, in the hills and the plains (Gautam, 2020, ¶.9).

Nepal is surrounded by China from the North Side and India from the East, South, and West sides. King Prithvi Narayan Shah mentioned that Nepal is a yam between two boulders. Nepal has been mostly dependent on India for trade and other necessary goods and services due to its geographical situation. But in recent years Nepal also has been deepening its relationship with northern immediate neighbor China. Especially, after the unofficial blockade of India towards Nepal, it has signed the trade and transit treaty with China. Nepal also signed the BRI. So asymmetrical dependency with the northern immediate neighbor, India has been diluting in present days. But Nepal has to maintain a balanced relationship with China and India. Nepal is the least developed country. So, Nepal has to proceed with its economic diplomacy with both immediate neighbors China and India for its balanced development. So, Nepal has to be benefited from both immediate neighbors China and India for infrastructure development and positive economic transformation. So, Nepal is not only important from a geopolitically and geo-strategically perspective. But also, geo-economically in the present era.

Situated between two rival powers China and India, Nepal has not only geopolitical relations with these countries but also has geo-economic interest to expand its economic ties with both India and China (Ghimire, 2020, ¶.8). Ironically, China may be privately happy that America focuses on military solutions while it focuses on economic development (Mahbubani, 2019, p. 73). Respecting and consolidating mutual trust and adjusting existing regulatory frameworks to increase cooperation is one way to move forward. China, India, and Nepal need to sit for constant dialogues and exchanges of ideas. As a small land-locked country with a non-aligned record, Nepal's policy of equidistance with its immediate neighbors China and India in this regard is the correct one (Baral, 2019, p. 6). In Yubaraj Sangroula's perception, Nepal itself is located as strategically important but Nepal has been in deficit rather than gaining profit from its geographical situation. So, the use of a Eurasian portion of the Silk route assisted Nepal to end the dependency with India and the Bay of Bengal in international trade and commerce to Nepal (Sangroula, 2020, p.678).

Nepal is located between two rising powers of the world i.e., China and India. After COVID-19 pandemic, the prevailing world system also has been changing. The prevailing superpowers of the world the US and China, are contesting in the name of a trade war. The competition between USA-China also has been influencing in China-India cooperation. The USA has been trying to involve Nepal in its IPS and Nepal has already been a member of China's BRI. India is cooperating with the USA in some aspects, including security-related matters. But India has not become the state party of IPS and BRI. So, Nepal is strategically important for immediate neighbors China and India and other great powers of the world. It is better to maintain a balanced relationship with both immediate China and India by not being involved in IPS and other any strategic alliance.

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