

**RESPONSIVENESS OF THE NGOS IN POST-DISASTER SITUATION: A
STUDY OF THE EARTHQUAKE-STRUCK LAGARCHE VDC OF
SINDHUPALCHOWK DISTRICT**

SUBMITTED TO

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LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

I am pleased to recommend the thesis entitled *Responsiveness of the NGOS in post-disaster situation: A study of the earthquake-struck Langarche VDC of Sindhupalchowk District*, prepared by Bikala Wagle under my supervision as a partial fulfillment of the required academic course of MA Rural Development Tribhuvan University. This research is original in its content and methods, and has been completed with the help of detailed field study by the researcher. I, hereby, recommend this thesis for the final evaluation before the dissertation Committee of the Department.

.....
Prof. Dr. Prem Sharma
Supervisor

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CONTENTS

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	ii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background of the Study	1
1.2 Research Questions	3
1.3 Objectives of the Study	4
1.4 Rationale of the Study	5
1.5 Limitations of the Study	5
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	7
2.1 Conceptual Review	7
2.2 Review of Previous Studies	8
2.3 Conclusion of the Review	18
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	20
3.1 Research Design	20
3.2 Nature and Sources of Data Collection	20
3.3 Sample and Sampling Procedure	21
3.4 Techniques and Tools of Data Collection	22
3.5 Data Processing and Analysis	23
3.6 Study Site	23
CHAPTER FOUR: COORDINATION MECHANISM OF THE NGOS WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE	28
4.1 Nature of the NGOs and Their Services	28
4.2 Coordination with the Government Bodies	31
4.3 Coordination with local Political Parties	34
4.4 Inter NGOs Coordination Mechanism	36
4.5 Coordination with the Victims	38
4.6 NGOs Meetings in the Village	39

CHAPTER FIVE: SERVICE DELIVERY MECHANISM AND THE BENEFICIARIES' PRECEPTIONS	
	41
5.1 Service Delivery Before the Quake	41
5.2 NGOs Role in Rescue Phase	42
5.3 Service Delivery After the Quake	43
5.4 Analysis of the Needs of of the Affected Population	47
5.5 Embezzlement of NGO Funding	48
5.6 Pros and Cons of the NGOs Service Delivery	49
CHAPTER SIX: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NGOS AND THE EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS	52
6.1 Upper Castes and the NGOs	52
6.2 Ethnic Population and the NGOs	54
6.3 Dalits and the NGOs	55
6.4 Women and Children, and the NGOs	56
6.5 NGOs and Reconstruction of Public Properties	57
CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	59
REFERENCES	62
ANNEX ONE: MAP OF THE STUDY SITE	65
ANNEX TWO: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE	66
ANNEX THREE: CHECKLIST FOR THE DISCUSSION WITH NGO STAFFS	68
ANNEX FOUR: CHECKLIST FOR THE DISCUSSION WITH GOVERNMENT STAFFS	69

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The history of NGOs in Nepal goes back to 1940s when Tharu Welfare Society was established in 1940s with the aim of improving traditional practices of the Tharus largely influencing from the 'caste improvement' campaigns launched in India. Since then, even during the Panchayat rule few NGOs were established to bring the changes in the lives of the people (Guneratne, 2002). Usually NGOs are considered an alternative to the government where the government is not easily accessible in the developing countries like Nepal. The NGOs have appeared an important instrument of mobilizing local people and resources in different parts of the world since second world war.

The end of the second world war brought a new wave of development in newly decolonized countries in the name of modernization but later in 1970s modernization approach of development was severely criticized by the dependency theorists. Thus changes in the development approaches eventually led to the emergence of NGOs centred strategy since 1990s. The impact of the shift in development discourses was realized also in Nepal. As a result, mushrooming of the NGOs after the 1990s political change was seen in Nepal. Nepal realized that NGOs could be the key agents of social change since large population lives in the remote and undeveloped villages where the state's presence usually seems absent; so followed a very liberal policies for the NGO activities.

Since 1990s four types of NGOs have been working to improve various aspects of people's lives. INGOs, national level NGOs, local level NGOs and CBOs have appeared as key actors of change in Nepali society. Among others, many local NGOs

have included disaster in their priority area of intervention. So from generating awareness of disaster to preparedness and coping with post-disaster situation have been given priority while launching their programmes. Besides this, these NGOs are expected to be proactive during disastrous incidents like the earthquake in 2015.

Nepal already had experienced few large scale quakes in 1930s and in 1980s. Again in 2015 April a devastating quake hit the central hill districts resulting 9000 deaths and millions of damage (CNN, 2015). Ghimire (n.d.) has aggregated disaster related data from different sources, which states that Nepal Ranks 11th in terms of Earthquake (NSET, n.d.); 6th to climatic hazards (UNDP, 2004); 30th in terms of floods (UNDP/BCPR, 2004); Kathmandu is 21st most vulnerable city of the world and Nepal is a natural disaster hot spot (World Bank, 2005).

The state alone seemed not enough to respond the post quake situation so the government called for international cooperation and also mobilized all government and non-governmental apparatuses to evacuate, rehabilitate the victims and reconstruct the infrastructures. During this hard time the NGOs' role also seemed inevitable to lessen the pains of the victims. NGOs usually are in close contact with the locals since if the NGOs are local they are more closer with villagers so it is believed that through those NGOs services can easily and efficiently be delivered to the targeted victims. But in practice not all NGOs are equally responsive and efficient so there were several cases of news reporting of delay, biasness and corruption during the service delivery. In many cases overlapping in distributing relief supplies and in other cases absence of those NGOs. Thus the responsiveness and efficiency of the NGOs during post-quake situation turned to be an area of development research. In this background I intend to seek answer to the following critical questions

experienced during post-2015 earthquake situation particularly in Langarche VDC of Sindhupalchowk district.

1.2 Research Questions

There are two ways of formulating research problem in social sciences, including rural development research: a) from the experience of the researcher b) from the review of the gaps in extant literatures and policy documents. You can follow any one or both. Some researchers prefer to formulate their research questions from the gaps in the previous studies but others formulate their research questions from their own experiences of the research issue. Both ways of formulating research questions are equally important in development researches and also widely practiced.

In my case, my personal experience played a key role in identifying research questions. Since I am also associated with disaster related development works and also a victim of the earthquake in 2015 I had a chance to closely observe the hardships that the victims were facing right after the quake. The victims were forced to live in the tents for a long time without proper assistance and rehabilitations. Even in some cases, though the assistance seemed available, the distribution did not appear fair and just. Local politics, personal relation with the service providers and one's caste and ethnicity played a key role. I have seen several NGOs working without coordination in some villages making delivery redundant and overlapping but in other villages no single NGOs were present. Government agencies were almost absent but even the NGOs seemed very late and ineffective in responding the needs of the victims in time which were supposed to the other way round. This experience led me to think what are such impeding factors that are responsible for efficient and quick service delivery of the NGOs because the NGOs are the ones which are supposed to provide

alternative to the government in rural villages. So I decided to study the NGOs' responsiveness and the victims' perception to the service delivery in post-quake situation in the VDCs of Sindhupalchowk district to answer the following questions.

- How do the local NGOs coordinate with other stakeholders during post-disaster situation?
- How do these NGOs deliver the services and how do the beneficiaries respond to the service delivery?
- What is the nature of the relationship between these NGOs and the disaster victims?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The research questions discussions in the preceding section are intended to complement the various aspects of post-disaster situation primarily in relation with the NGOs' post-disaster programmes and their effectiveness. So, the broad objective of this research is to assess the responsiveness of the local NGOs in mobilizing the local population and delivering the services to the earthquake affected villages of Sindhupalchowk district. But, the research has the following specific objectives to complement the broad objective.

- To study the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism of the NGOs with other stakeholders in the study area
- To study their service delivery mechanism and the beneficiaries' responses towards them
- To assess the relation between the NGOs and the earthquake victims during evacuation, rehabilitation and reconstruction

1.4 Rationale of the Study

The main importance of this research is to bring the underlying factors of efficiency of the local NGOs and their service delivery mechanism, and the beneficiaries' understanding of it. It shall provides a clarity in understanding on how people are mobilized during post-disaster situation and how different stakeholders build networks in such hard times in which urgency is the key. Since the research was conducted on the severely affected district and its VDC it would be instrumental to assess the practicalities of the non-governmental service delivery mechanism in hardest times. Moreover, the study area is backward hill villages with worse development indicators so only the most efficient service delivery and quickest responsiveness of the NGOs can pacify the sufferings of the quake-victims because in such places government agencies seem very late to respond.

Form disciplinary perspective, my study uncovers the various dynamics of NGOs-beneficiaries relation in post-disaster situation. Different reports state that there are more than 15000 active NGOs working in various sectors of development in Nepal. Even in the case of disaster, several NGOs have set disaster as their areas of intervention so the study of the NGOs responsiveness in post-quake situation can provide an analytical framework which could be useful even in other post-natural disaster situations such as recent floods in several parts of the country.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

The main limitation of this study is that it does not study the responsiveness of all stakeholders working in local level such as DDC, VDCs or other state and non-state apparatuses excluding local NGOs/CBOs. So the findings of this research cannot be generalized on these stakeholders because the basic principle of the organization and

service delivery as well as internal mechanism between the local NGOs and other stakeholders differ fundamentally. Moreover, this study is not a large scale survey so I did not use complex statistical analysis; rather I focused on the people's subjective understanding of the service delivery of the NGOs which only provides broader analytical frameworks to understand the similar problems but does not provide the findings that could be generalized. In addition this research does not cover all affected villages of the district because of the time and limited resources so it would be a form of case studies from few villages but not the complete picture of the district.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

For the purpose of this proposal this section has been divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section deals with the conceptual aspects of the proposed research in brief. The second provides a quick view of existing literatures and policy documents on disaster with reference to Nepal.

2.1 Conceptual Review

There are several theories and conceptual frameworks developed by various scholars and experts working on disaster, the victims and the NGOs. For this purpose it is not possible to discuss these theories and frameworks in detail but I try to give a concise picture which could help me to frame my conceptual framework. Disaster preparedness is one of the main component of disaster risk reduction but the central question this research intends to answer is how to handle the post-disaster situation. Theories on disaster either discuss preparedness or post-disaster management. My focus here shall be on the second as the objective of this research is to assess the post disaster situation from the victims' perspectives.

There are two sides of disaster management cycle; risk management and crisis management. The former is associated with pre-disaster context or disaster preparedness and the latter is related with post-disaster situation or crisis management. These two sides are linked in chain-relationship in a cyclical order supposedly beginning from the disaster (Khan, 2008). Even in post-disaster situation there are two parts; emergency response and recovery stage (Khan, 2008) but this research focuses on the NGOs responsiveness during emergency response right after the earthquake.

This research has identified the NGOs, the victims, disaster, rescue, community and rehabilitation as main variables of the study. All these variables have operational definitions to make them more contextual and practical to be studied. But in general, the conceptual framework I have envisioned for this study includes two way relationship between the local NGOs and the victims; government agencies as intermediaries; heterogeneity of the community and its reflection of victimhood; and last but not least the victims' subjective understanding of the rescue and rehabilitation in relation with the NGOs.

2.2 Review of Previous Studies

Person-relative-to-event theory posits the importance of personal responsibility as necessary for individuals and populations to form greater behavioural intentions to prepare for disasters such as earthquakes (Miller, Adame and Moore, 2013). This theory emphasised the role of the individuals in terms of preparing themselves through behavioural changes. On the other hand Lindell and Perry (1992) have developed a protective action decision-making processes which extent to three stage model of decision making; risk identification, risk management, and risk reduction (Rowe, 1977).

Vested interest theory (VIT) in disaster preparedness also emphasizes the importance of individual behaviors and attitudes. This theory brings out the possibilities of vestedness in understanding the risk situations in line with their losses and benefits (Miller, Adame and Moore, 2013). In addition this theory has identified five dimensions of vestedness of the people in responding the disasters which are namely stake, salience, immediacy, certainty and self-efficacy (Miller, Adame and Moore, 2013).

Social cognitive theory brings out the framework that highlights the interactive dynamic relationships of personal and environmental factors, which determines an individual's behaviours in responding to the disaster (Espina and Tenj-Colleja, 2015). This means individuals' motivation is linked to the intentions of preparedness and DRR. The same can be applied regarding the NGOs; their motivation may have close connection with their responsiveness and efficiency during post-earthquake relief.

The article will attempt to answer these questions through the lens of Beck's risk society framework, which provides an alternative entry point for examining how societies are reacting and reorganizing themselves to respond to new risks (Floristella, 2016). Risk societies are the result of modernity, which has left the world more exposed to a range of unforeseen, unintended and unknowable outcomes (Floristella, 2016). The notion of risk society asserts that contemporary risks are different from traditional risks because of their distinct context and nature.

Recent study on violence against women and girls in post-earthquake situation has revealed the increased threat of violence against weakest of the victims such as women and girls which indicates the social aspects of the post-disaster risks (Standing, Parker and Bista, 2016). On the other hand Flint and Luloff (2005) emphasise the role of community because, according to them, disaster is a social vulnerability. The response of the community is of prime concern while addressing pre and post earthquake situations. In this regards, local NGOs which are based on local communities could play a key role to deal with the consequences of the earthquake.

NGO-centred development strategy challenges the importance traditionally given to the state in terms of leading development and emphasises the NGOs role of mobilising local communities and resources for the development where the state is

usually does not present. Even in disaster situation in remote rural areas where the presence of the state is not expected NGOs are expected to serve as alternative to the state bodies. But this strategy also fails to deal with the shortcomings and the hidden interests of the NGOs and also their treatment to the villagers as no more than 'development beggars'.

Disasters are occurring around the world with increasing frequency. The people affected by the disasters are predominantly from developing countries and are among the poorest population. Disasters disproportionately affect the poor: over 90 per cent of the total disaster-related deaths occur in developing countries; and the economic losses they cause represent a percentage of their gross national product estimated to be 20 times greater than in industrial countries (IFRC). The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), a global disaster database maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Brussels, records upwards of 600 disasters globally each year (CRED, 2016).

The apparent hesitance to share information with other operational humanitarian agents involved in an operation, is explained by Stephenson (2005). He highlights both the limited encouragement given by the environment in which they are operating and the structure of the operational relationship between the agencies. The complex work environment challenges cooperation in many ways. These includes the cost of operation and cooperation, the variety of mandates among the agencies, a wish to “be first on the spot” so as to draw media’s attention and thereby possibly attract new donors and finally, competition for scarce resources (Stephenson, 2005).

Currently there are three dominant approaches in anthropological researches on disaster. The first, behavioural response approach tends to view disasters as challenges to the structure and organisation of society so emphasises on human

behaviours. Second is the social change approach that views disaster damages society's capacity to address the needs of its members. Third is political economic/environmental approach that considers deterioration in human-nature relation due to political and economic factors (Oliver-Smith, 1996).


Review of disaster management policy documents

Nepal government has expressed its sincerity to reduce the risks of the disasters so it has adopted several policy documents which are supposed to be instrumental in reducing the risks and facilitating the risk management and relief because Nepal falls on 20th topmost disaster prone in the world; 4th rank in climate change vulnerability; 11th rank in earthquake vulnerability; 30th rank in flood vulnerability. I shall review the following policy documents to get a sense of the state's position in disaster management in Nepal.

There has been a change in the traditional practice of availing demand and requirement based rescue and relief measure upon occurrence of disaster. After promulgation of Natural Calamities (Relief) Act, 1982, emphasis is also given to preparation and mitigation measures besides relief and rescue operations. Special importance started being given to preparedness activities for disaster management upon declaration of International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction in 1991.

Local Disaster Risk Management Planning Guideline 2011 (2068 VS) has identified five phases of disaster management planning in District level. These phases begin with a) coordination and initial preparation b) Potential risk and capacity analysis c) Local disaster risk programme planning d) approval of the programme and implementation, and e) monitoring, evaluation and reassessment (MoLD, 2011).

Local Disaster Risk Management Planning Process



Source: *Local Disaster Risk Management Planning Guideline 2011*

The committee and taskforce for both the district level disaster risk management plan is headed by LDO and other heads of district level offices as well as development partners serve as the members of the committee and taskforce. Similarly, NSDRM has stipulated five priority actions to address the challenges of disaster risk management in Nepal (MoFA & LD, 2008, p. Vii).

These policy guidelines in aggregate emphasize the cluster approach in DRM. At national level, clusters (or sectoral groups) are normally established for any major emergency – any situation where humanitarian needs are of sufficient scale and complexity to justify a multi-sectoral response with the engagement of a wide range of international humanitarian actors. Cluster approach has been widely adopted all over the world as a best means of coordinating with various stakeholders in local level.

Efforts were initiated for adoption of various measures towards addressing different types of natural disasters with the introduction of National Action Plan for managing disaster in Nepal in 1996. Expected results could not be achieved as envisaged in the Action Plan due to lack of resources on the one hand, and lack of coordination between the concerned agencies and stakeholders on the other. Major reasons for such inability to achieve the expected result in the areas of preparedness, reduction, and mitigation as envisaged (in the Action Plan) can be attributed to absence of appropriate institutional arrangement equipped with technical capability.

Apart from the National Action Plan, the National Planning Commission developed Tenth Five Year Plan (2002 - 2007), and the Interim Three Year Plan (2007 - 2010) are the other important policies towards reduction of hazards. The Guidelines implemented for distribution of relief to disaster affected people is another policy measure in that direction. Sector policies on water resources, agriculture, housing building, mines and geology, and health have also been playing major roles in managing disaster risks.

Natural Calamity (Relief) Act, 1982 (clause two) defines natural disaster as 'earthquake, fire, storm, flood, landslide, heavy rain, drought, famine, epidemic, and other similar natural disaster and this expression also includes the industrial accident or accident caused by explosions or poisoning and any other kinds of disaster. This act has allowed to form a district level natural calamity district and local committees besides, many other regional and central committees, and has also stipulated the provision of relief funds in district level and above but the act has not acknowledged the overt role of the NGOs in post-disaster relief. Similarly there is a provision of local committee but the role of the local community has not been defined clearly.

Local Self Governance Act, 1999 has assigned the responsibility of carrying out preventive and relief works to lessen the loss of life and property caused from the natural disaster to all local government bodies; VDCs, municipalities and DDCs.

National Strategy for DRM 2009 states that the middle part of the country is estimated to be more susceptible to earthquake hazard than northern and southern parts. The role and activeness of national NGOs in disaster risk management in Nepal has been appreciative. These organizations are active especially in mitigation, reduction, preparedness, and countering disaster. In addition, these organizations have been playing valuable roles in the operation of new policies, plans, and programs; community-based risk management; and raising public awareness. Their contribution to joint participatory work has been result oriented.

DRMSP 2009 envisions to mainstream the disaster component into development plans right from planning stage to post-completion of projects for awareness raising towards containment, mitigation, and preparedness against potential disaster as a measure for further intensification of DRM. It has also emphasised the need of quake-resistant construction. Similarly Prime Minister Natural Calamity Rescue Fund, and District Disaster Preparedness Plans also deal with the earthquake casualties.

There are several other disaster related sectoral policies which also have highlighted the need of precaution, risk reduction, efficient coordination between the stakeholders, community participation, sustainable use of natural resources, quick and efficient evacuation and rescue, relief distribution, rehabilitation, and awareness on the calamities. Basically, National Building Act, 2007; Building Code 1994; Local Self Government Act, 1999; Soil and Water Conservation Act, 1982; Environment Protection Act, 1996; National Agriculture Policy, 2004; National Shelter Policy, 1996; National Urban Policy, 2006; National Water Resource Strategy, 2002; Water

Induced Disaster Management Policy, 2006 are covertly or overtly have addressed the various aspects of natural calamities including earthquake.

Besides this, at the district level, DDRC which is chaired by Chief District Officer, is responsible for coordination and implementation of disaster risk management. Chhetri (2001) claims that a concrete, practicable, effective and proactive policy is need to address the concerns of the disaster. He lists the Lack of coordination, insufficient funds and resources, poor public awareness and resource mobilization problems as the existing challenges in the disaster management.

Rawal and Nair (2001) claim that the rehabilitation package, prepared in unhealthy haste by the government, is based on conventional bureaucratic understanding and interpretation of people's needs and priorities could not be efficient in responding the risks of Gujarat quake, which also indicates the effectiveness of the policies and practical understanding of the situation. Similarly, Mishra (2008) has illustrated the challenges faced by the Koshi flood victims in 2008 due to inefficient state policies.

Natural disasters in Nepal cause a significant impact on the national GDP particularly due to infrastructural damage, destruction of public and private properties, and loss of life. The loss of life and property in particular may be attributed to lack of public awareness, inadequate disaster preparedness, weak governance practice, lack of coordination among the government agencies, inadequate financial resources, and a low level of technical knowhow as well as skill in mitigating natural disasters. In recent years, however, development planners in Nepal seem to have understood the intimate link between the disasters and development strategies. DDMP guideline has clearly stipulated the framework for district disaster management plan in eight phases as given below but all these phases include few other micro-processes (MoFA & LD,

2012). Moreover, the DDMP has also defined the responsibilities of DDCs, VDCs and Municipalities in terms of formulating and implementing DMP.

1. Preliminary preparations
2. Analysis of DR and capacity analysis
3. Preparation of the DDMP
4. Approval of the plan
5. Provision of the budget
6. Implementation of the programme
7. Monitoring and evaluation
8. Plan review and feedback

In average, per day at least two people die in Nepal due to natural disasters (MoHA et. al., 2008). In landslides and floods, the human casualty reaches as high as 288 per year. An existing data record in South Asia shows that Nepal stands third in annual average human deaths per million living population after Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. These disaster statistics have always motivated and justified an urgent need of DRR works in Nepal. Therefore, Nepal is one of the 168 countries that have adopted the HFA. So far, the Government of Nepal has assigned a national mandate towards disaster risk reduction and its mainstreaming through various programs.

Following the HFA strategies, various international nongovernmental organizations working in the field of DRR have begun some ambitious programs designed to reduce people's vulnerability to natural disasters and build a stronger base of community-based disaster education. In Nepal too, especially after 2006 many programs have been introduced and implemented by various government and nongovernment agencies. A little change has also been made in the school-level curricula. Many disaster education-related programs have also been initiated by both governmental

and nongovernmental organizations (Action Aid, 2011; UNESCO and UNICEF, 2012; Mercy Corp, 2013) in community levels.

Raising DRR awareness level among the communities is one of the well-implemented programs in Nepal. The activities include teachers' trainings, disaster quiz competitions, youth club activities on DRR knowledge, disaster safety campaigns, and disaster drills. Establishing a sense of prevention in communities is another widely practiced DRR initiative in Nepal. For this, NGOs are involved in developing disaster education materials, coordinating for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in national education system, and teaching youths, leaders, and parents the disaster risk reduction issues.

Building earthquake safe communities and retrofitting existing structures are other areas of interest for the NGOs in Nepal towards building a disaster safe society. In this program, the government and NGOs are involved in assessing the vulnerability of school facilities, retrofitting school buildings, building earthquake-resistant schools, relocating schools in high disaster risk areas, and building new schools in low disaster risk areas. Results and progress of a few disaster risk reduction (DRR) initiatives taken in the schools of Nepal are well documented (Shiwaku et al., 2007; Action Aid 2011), and DRR has already been incorporated in the education system and school curricula (UNESCO and UNICEF, 2012).

Nepal's National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF) of 2013 replaced the previous laws and regulations, including them in a single DRR framework, in order to formulate a *National Disaster Response Plan* that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of Government and Non-Government agencies involved in disaster risk management. It expands the power of the Ministry of Home Affairs as the main

actor for emergency management under this decision-making framework (EIAS, 2016).

Besides these few studies, there are several studies which either focus on the natural factors of the disaster or human or community factor but very few studies discuss the interrelationship between the NGOs and post-disaster rescue and rehabilitation. Other studies have brought out the weaknesses of government policies but failed to discuss the weaker or stronger aspects of NGOs' service delivery and mobilization of the locals. So my study has endeavoured to unearth the possibilities underlying NGOs and natural disasters especially April earthquake in 2015 in Nepal.

2.3 Conclusion of the review

The brief review of the theories and national policies on disaster suggest us the interrelationship of the human and natural factors. Human behaviour, intentions and motivations have been taken as key variables in addressing the disaster related issues; though it be preparedness or post-disaster relief and recovery. Few theories have devised analytical frameworks to facilitate the understanding of the interrelationships among several human and non-human components.

Since the NGOs can be a catalyst in mobilizing the people and the victims, invoking changes in their behaviour, intentions and motivations, these NGOs could bridge between the human and non-human components before, during and after the disasters. In addition, human activities and development works are also held responsible in increasing the risks of the disasters but the case of earthquake is a bit different. Earthquake itself cannot be claimed as an unintended consequence of development projects since there are no such researches yet but the casualties and the damages that result after a quake is not because of the quake per se but of the human-made factors.

Moreover, the communities' responsiveness has also been recognized in pre and post disaster situation in the previous studies.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

This research has been planned to seek the beneficiaries' responses to the service delivery of the local NGOs and their effectiveness in delivering such services primarily during natural disaster like earthquake in 2015 in Nepal. As the research intends to explore the factors associated with the NGOs' efficiency in service delivery in post-disaster situation in Langarche VDC of Sindhupalchowk the design of the research largely is exploratory rather than descriptive.

Exploratory research design seems useful in the researches which are more qualitative in nature and intend to grasp the respondents' perception. With exploratory framework of this research I tried to unearth the influencing factors that either facilitate or impede efficient delivery of the services that the local NGOs are providing in the studied VDCs. Exploratory research design helped me to identify the key components of service delivery and its effectiveness in post-earthquake situation in two aspects; a) to identify what factors the quake-victims consider responsible for the NGOs' service delivery in difficult times, b) to assess the service delivery mechanism of those NGOs and their responsiveness. So, I followed exploratory research design for my research on the NGOs' responsiveness.

3.2 Nature and Sources of Data Collection

Both qualitative and quantitative data are equally important in rural development researches. Generally survey researches prefer quantitative data and grounded theory research, ethnography and different forms of participatory researches use qualitative data. Both data possess their own distinctive features and significances in development researches. In the researches like this where the relation between

different stakeholders is a crux use of both data is important so I collected both qualitative and quantitative data with the help of respective tools and techniques.

I collected quantitative data mainly to study the damages, compensation, income, expenditure and also demographic features. Moreover, I also collected qualitative data through key informant interview, observation and focus group discussion, and through PRA.

Regarding the sources of data, primary sources were the interview, household survey, FGDs, key informants and PRA which obviously provide first-hand data. The primary sources of data provided the fresh perception of the victims which would be more subjective in nature. In addition, informal and personal discussion with the NGO office bearers, local leaders, government staffs involved in post-quake evacuation and rehabilitation also yielded primary data. This is not enough, so I had to depend on the NGO documents, records, DDC and VDC records such as list of victims and compensation, NGOs policy and programme documents to triangulate the primary data so both primary and secondary sources are equally important in my research.

3.3 Sample and Sampling Procedure

Researches on the topics like mine requires more qualitative and subjective inclination because only close interaction with the victims can uncover their inner understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the NGOs efficiency. Since I am not following probability sampling it is not necessary to define the size of the universe. Probability sampling is usually done in large scale surveys whereas in small research like mine purposive sampling is a good option. So, first I identified few quake-hit VDCs of Sindhupalchowk where large number of NGOs are working and high casualties has been reported. Then, I identified Langarche VDCs where the NGOs are

or were more active. I did this in coordination with DDC, NGOs and village key figures.

In the second phase I identified the affected households; listed them out and chose few of them purposively and conveniently for the interview and group discussion. On the other hand, I chose few local NGOs (district level) working in those VDCs during post-quake situation and study their service delivery mechanism, programmes, policies and material support to the victims. The number of the affected households and the NGOs were fixed only after the first round of field visit.

3.4 Techniques and Tools of Data collection

Since the survey of the affected households and material losses in the village had already been done by the government I borrowed the same data merely to understand the demographic, socio-cultural composition of the population as well as the economic situation of the villagers. So unlike other researchers I did not realise the need of conducting the survey of the whole village which helped save the fieldwork time. Additionally, I gathered village population and other details from census report and village profiles so that I could save time not by surveying the whole VDC.

My association with the village as a staff of an international organisation working on the rehabilitation of the earthquake victims also helped to get some data with ease. DDC provided me the details of the organisations both national and international working in the village of which I was also familiar with many of them. Having obtained survey and NGO details I identified the potential key informants, members for FGD and PRA.

Key Informants and personal communication were one of the main tools of my research. Key informants were the local leaders, social activists, NGO staffs, health

workers with whom I interacted to know the key aspects of post-quake situation and challenges.

Observation was done to complement the information collected from other sources. I observed the physical damages, rehabilitations and new constructions to get a sense of the situation. Besides this, I remained conscious of making balance between the genders, ethnicities, castes and class during the data collection.

3.5 Data Processing and Analysis

My data were largely qualitative in nature so first, after data collection, I sorted the data to make the analysis handy; then coded keeping the objectives in mind. I presented quantitative data in a tabular and graphic forms whereas qualitative data were analyzed triangulating in accordance to the given objectives. I tried to relate both qualitative and quantitative data to answer the research questions. Quantitative data have passed through simple classification and tabulation and qualitative data have appeared in a narrative form.

3.6 Study Site

Choosing a site for fieldwork in for qualitative studies like this needs to be linked with the research questions or objectives, methodologies and the researcher's interest because cases are more important than the numbers in such researches. So, I have selected Langarche VDC, one of the quake-affected VDCs, of Sindhupalchowk for this study aiming to bring out the unique cases of how the NGOs, despite their claim of bridging the gap with the local people, are they responding to the masses in difficult. Moreover, there are several NGOs and CBOs which are providing various services to the quake-affected population. Sindhupalchowk district is a mid-hill district situated east from Kathmandu and can be reached by four hour drive. This

VDC is close to Melamchi which is well known site for the people of Kathmandu because of long-awaited Melamchi drinking water project. According to census 2011 the VDC has 592 households accommodating 2590 headcounts altogether of which 1252 are males and 1338 are females (CBS, 2012).

Table 3.1: Demographic distribution of the VDC

Ward	Household	Population		Total
		Male	Female	
1	102	214	214	428
2	110	265	263	528
3	36	72	70	142
4	31	56	71	127
5	46	79	89	168
6	78	143	164	307
7	52	111	125	236
8	58	141	147	288
9	79	171	195	366
Total	592	1252	1338	2590

Source: CBS, 2012

The sex ration of the VDC is in favour of the females Sex and ward-wise distribution of the population uneven. The caste and ethnic composition of the village population suggests the numerical dominance of the ethnic population. Despite the numerical majority of the Tamangs, the village population is absolutely subsistent farmers who hardly make their livelihood from the farming. Few youths are in gulf and other countries for labour primarily sustaining the village economy trough remittance. Such a remote village was severely hit by the quake casing massive human and physical losses and still trying hard to stand it its own strength.

Table. 3.2: Beneficiaries of the VDC

Ward No.	Beneficiary Households	No. of females	No. of males	Total
1	155	454	444	898
2	137	403	347	750
3	76	233	223	456

4	42	108	104	212
5	59	158	155	313
6	99	269	273	542
7	64	195	192	337
8	82	216	222	438
9	109	278	280	558
Total	823	2314	2240	4504

Source: NRA, 2016

The caste and ethnic composition of the village illustrates that the Tamangs are in majority by number followed by the Brahmans and Chhetris. Sherpa, Gurung, Magar, Bhujel and the Dalits are the others who constitute the total village population. The study of the list of the beneficiaries indicates that no caste or ethnic group available in the village has been left unaffected by the quake. The comparative study of the 2011 Census data and the data on earthquake affected population varies significantly which may be at least due to two reasons; the natural growth of family size or the manipulation of the household and population figures to receive more benefits because inflation of the household numbers has been reported elsewhere also. As a result more than 40, 000 have been put under review suspecting the fake registration for the compensation from all over Nepal (NRA, 2016)

Current situation of the Village

It has already been one and half year the quake hit the village and primary relief packages distributed. Even the tasks of rescue and evacuation have been old now but the affected families are still in makeshift shades and eagerly waiting for housing grant from the government. National Reconstruction Authority has recently started to release first tranche (NRS 50,000) of its committed support of three hundred thousand Nepali rupees (NRA, 2016). Many families have already received the first tranche of 50 thousand and others are still waiting. Few families had lost their one or more family members along with their house and large number of people had been

seriously injured whereas some other people had got minor injuries. Besides this, Almost 90 per cent families had completely lost their shelter and 55 per cent families had lost their livestock.

Now, many families at least have constructed at least temporary shelters. Both the government and the NGOs' support for temporary shelter significantly helped them to cover their heads. Although few families have the capacity of building new houses they are also waiting for the government support so very few families seem eager to invest in the house with the fear that they would be excluded from the housing grant.

3.7 Operational Definitions

Disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR, 2016).

Disaster Preparedness is an aggregate of the activities that contribute to the pre-planned, timely and effective response of individuals and communities to withstand, reduce the impact and deal with the consequences of a (future) disaster.

Disaster Response is an aggregate of the coordinated activities aimed at meeting the needs of people who are affected by a disaster.

Disaster Management is a collective term encompassing all aspects of planning for and responding to disasters, including both the pre- and post-disaster activities. It refers to both the risk and consequences of a disaster.

Disaster Risk Reduction is the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events (UNISDR, 2016).

CHAPTER FOUR: COORDINATION MECHANISM OF THE NGOS WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE

This chapter deals with the NGOs which provided or have been providing various services to the quake-affected population in the village, their coordination mechanism with other stake holders mainly the government and community based machineries. This research expects to deal with the NGOs and their service delivery mechanism during and after natural calamities because the role of the NGOs in several other cases have been severely criticised for not being enough transparent, efficient, quick and neutral. According to United Nations Special Envoy to Haiti former President Bill Clinton, Haiti had the second highest number of NGOs per capita in the world (USIP, 2010) but the same country when hit by the devastating quake in 2010 did not leave a good image of the NGOs. The mushrooming of the NGOs and INGOs in Nepal since 1990s also illustrate the similar trajectory.

4.1 Nature of the NGOs and their services

Several NGOs were working there even before the 2015 earthquake but as soon as the quake hit the village these NGOs along with few others chose the village for their rescue and rehabilitation programmes. Usually the roles of the NGOs are criticised nowadays in Nepal because of their non-transparency, exaggeration of the contribution and preoccupation with populism. Stacy Leigh Pigg has discussed how the NGO-funded development in Nepal has created various unintended consequences including the aid dependency and development hierarchy (Pigg, 1993). She asserts that the people, because of this, view the development as something 'given' from the top and they have the right to 'beg'. This sort of dependency thinking is ruling over the

development debate in normal times. Then we can expect increased dependency thinking during difficult times created by the calamities. The following is the list of NGOs working in the VDC especially in disaster risk reduction and rehabilitation.

The close study of the NGOs suggests that they exhibit the following nature. First, one can easily identify the political affiliation of these NGOs. The villagers clearly identify that who runs particular NGO; who are directly or indirectly associated with it; what is the sources of funding; and which political party is supporting it. Second these NGOs are dependent on INGOs' funding so they themselves do not generate the funds, except in emergency cases like this quake. In such cases they are found collecting money within Nepal also. Third, they are more interested in those programmes and areas which could help publicise them. The publicity seems highly emphasised. The quake affected people shared their bitter experiences that how the NGO workers were preoccupied to take the pictures while distributing even the smallest amount of the relief.

As per records maintained at the District Administration Office (DAO) and District Development Committee (DDC), a total of 152 NGO/INGOs are at work here. The record on the aid agencies has not been updated. Currently, 46 organizations, including aid agencies, NGOs and INGOs, are working in the district, according to Anirudra Nepal, internal auditor at the DDC. Going by this figure, the remaining organizations are still missing. It is not known whether they are still active in the district or not.

Leaving the shortcomings of the NGOs aside, they have obviously appeared instrumental to complement the government efforts of reconstruction. Usually government is late to reach out village or remote areas so in such circumstances non-governmental organisations are considered more effective. They can mobilise the

local people, train them to be self-reliant and self-resilient, empower them to handle the hard times. Now the NGOs working in Langarche have also prioritised these issues along with financial and technical support for the physical reconstruction.

Types of the NGOs working in the village

Basically three types of NGOs are working in the village currently. The first are those registered in the district level and the second are those registered outside the district but having branches or programmes there. Although their broad objectives seem varied and different the programme intervention seems overlapped. That is, they are delivering similar services and programmes to the affected masses for Risk reduction. When asked about the overlapping the NGO staffs could not come up with logical answers rather merely try hard to differentiate their programmes with the others.

Nature of service delivery

Delivery of the services before the quake was seen somewhat diverse but as soon as the quake hit the village all NGOs concentrated to provide relief packages leaving their programme priorities aside. These NGOs helped the people cope with the basic needs daily needs in the beginning by distributing tarpaulin (most demanded), teen sheets, primary health care, foodstuffs and emergency services but now few of them are supporting to reconstruct schools, reproductive and sexual health services, food security and working on preventing gender based violence that could be generated by traumatic condition produced by the quake (CARE, 2016). The highest budget spent by aid agencies in the district as well as in Langarche is for housing followed by in early recovery.

NGOs in many cases turned to be an important source to which people could depend on for their basic daily needs but they are not sufficient to reconstruct the private

properties of the villagers because the NGOs are not investing in private reconstruction. Uncoordinated distribution of basic stuffs in the beginning resulted in misuse of the resources. One quake affected villager who received basic relief materials commented that one NGO working on adult literacy distributed sanitary pads. Similarly another NGO working on girls' trafficking distributed packets of toothbrushes and hand wash. Many villagers showed me the packets of toothbrush and dish-cleaning liquids and told 'what to do with these toothbrushes... we cannot cook it... neither we can build our house from them.' The statement suggests that need was not the dish-cleaning liquid in the village but something else. I asked them then why did you bring these things? They usually replied 'they have allotted us ...our name has been recorded even if we did not take somebody will take and misuse...' Besides primary relief packages, many NGOs have come up with reconstruction, social development, training and awareness programmes having long term effects.

4.2 Coordination with the government bodies

Disaster management plays an important role in the development of a country, especially in the poorer nations. Areas and communities where disasters strike are hindered, particularly in the socio-economic sector. Interagency cooperation plays a significant part in disaster management by minimising the impact of a disaster and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the response. In disaster situations, various agencies have a pre-defined role on how to respond to assist the affected people. In most instances a Government agency plays the coordinating role in the disaster management system. In particular, DDRC functions as a coordinating body in the district level and LDMC serves the same in VDC level. The NGOs and DDRC have been collaboratively in the area of disaster mitigation in the village.

NGOs often have greater capacity and more funding than the Nepal government. Fears of corruption have caused foreign donors to bypass the government and funnel financial and material assistance through NGOs. The government had little chance to develop the human or institutional capacity to deliver services. The Nepali people have learned to look to NGOs, rather than the government, for provision of essential services. Funnelling aid through NGOs perpetuated a cycle of low capacity, corruption and accountability among Nepali government institutions.

This coordination mechanism primarily emphasises the role of government agencies and ignores the role of the non-government sectors although the government has acknowledged the need of mobilising non-government sector during natural calamities. Joint coordination mechanism of the government and the non-government agencies seems missing which has resulted either overruling by the government or leaving the NGOs with weak monitoring. This was experienced in many instances during 2015 quake. National Reconstruction Authority was created in 2015 in the centre as an apex body with the aim of planning, implementing, monitoring and assessing the post-quake losses after a continuous hue and cry learning from the past cases in Haiti, Pakistan and Gujrat. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) was established by the Pakistani government immediately after the earthquake in Pakistan. It was mandated to plan, approve, coordinate, facilitate, monitor and evaluate the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the affected areas (Sarwar, 2005) like in Nepal Earthquake.

This section deals on how these local NGOs working in Langarche VDC coordinated with the district and VDC level government bodies during post-quake programme implementation. There does not seem any coordination mechanism of the

stakeholders in VDC level that could be activated during or after disasters although local governance act has stipulated the provision of local committee to respond to the disaster related concerns. Lack of elected representatives in the DDC and VDC has made the local level governance dysfunctional and this vacuum has not been fulfilled yet. But there is a committee in district level chaired by CDO to respond to the post-disaster needs. The committee usually becomes activated when a disaster such as earthquake, flood, landslide hits to an area. So the NGOs usually coordinate the government bodies through CDO. During the April quake also Sindhupalchowk CDO appeared a nodal point of coordinating the rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities of the NGOs.

The quake victims shared that they could have reported their voices to the centre more loudly and more strongly through their elected representatives; and the representatives also would have forced to listen their electorates voices. In a sense people expect from the NGOs but not from the government because the latter has not been given anything till date. At least the NGOs become ready to respond whenever they are asked for the help. This is because of the failure of the government not because of NGOs effectiveness or transparency.

Besides this, many NGOs not working in the village before also approached the village with relief packages direct from Kathmandu bypassing the district coordination mechanism. It was really difficult to keep record of how many NGOs visited the village with relief packages, and how many unorganised groups distributed the relief. There is an example from Haiti. Haiti's government has been criticized for not taking a more visible role in responding to people's needs following the earthquake (USIP, 2010). The same was experienced in Nepal in 2015 because government bodies are always slow to respond and entangled in a complicated

bureaucratic hurdles. Few NGOs like CARE Nepal and Fairmaid Foundation sought permission from central monitoring authority, NRA to work on different aspects of the lives of the quake-victims but few others are still seem out of the framework of NRA.

Since last year's earthquake, three CDOs and three LDOs have been transferred at the district. Frequent transfer of government officials has also affected relief distribution, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts by the aid agencies (My Republica, 16 April, 2016). CDO Gokarnamani Duwadi, admitting the lack of accountability among the aid agencies, said they should make their activities and budgets transparent. 'We're looking for detailed reports on expenditure and effectiveness', he said.

4.3 Coordination with local political parties

The villagers claim that political parties usually are engaged in an unfair competition of manipulating the electorates. During the post-quake situation also the villagers reported these parties' unfair favouritism to their electorates while coordinating the relief packages. Many NGOs seemed working through political line but very few tried to through non-political channel. One Tamang male whose house had completely collapsed and was waiting for the relief shared that how the NGO staff came from District with relief materials and directly approached to local leader of a party. Then the leader selectively informed only his followers and distributed the relief.

But the local leaders are not ready to accept the allegation. They claim that no such political biasness they were very cautious not to bias the villagers on the basis of their political affiliation. Chairperson of the village unit of Nepali Congress narrated:

we are first the residents of this village then only the leaders. If we bias politically where everybody is familiar to each other in this small village how can we show our

faces to our neighbours, friends and relatives? ... the reason of such allegations is that some people want to spoil our relation with our villagers.

From his narration it can be inferred that lack of political trust is there. When asked about their relation with the NGOs his explanation seems not much convincing because many villagers claimed that the staffs of many NGOs had consulted only with him while distributing relief packages sponsored by this organisation due to his political connection with the district head of that NGO.

The NGOs visiting the village with various relief and programme packages were classified by the villagers on the basis of their covert or overt relation with political parties and leaders although they might not have such relationship. The main basis of the classification by the villagers was whom in the village these NGOs approach first or who was coordinating to bring them in the village and then what is his/her political background. Even the INGOs local programmes cannot totally bypass the local politics. The participation of village political activists in NGO meetings, their regular contact with NGO staffs and interest of mobilising the electorate in their favour have added challenges even for the desired output of the NGO programmes. In past the government had formed all party committee in the villages to overtake the responsibility of the elected committee due to the failure of conducting local elections. This mechanism was severely criticised on the ground institutionalising corruption and mismanaging the local development projects. Several cases of embezzlement of the village budget were reported by the members of the committee. Eventually supreme court annulled the provision of all party committee in few years ago. Now, VDC secretary is the only government representative in the village who usually lives in the district headquarter. On the other hand the secretary is not the local usually which reduces his emotional attachment to the village and can be transferred at any time.

When the sole government agent turns indifferent to the village how can the NGOs coordinate with him/her for efficient programme implementation. Then obviously the NGOs have to coordinate with the local party leaders.

4.4 Inter NGOs coordination mechanism

Popular trust in the system and the ability to prepare for action play important roles in the success of the disaster management and the time aspect and information sharing are key elements to the efficiency of operations. Governmental organisations with specialisations in different areas work alongside various non-government agencies to reduce the recovery time for those affected by a disaster.

Another factor influencing relationships and cooperation is trust. It seems likely that trust plays a vital role in establishing the conditions for effective coordination among otherwise separate organisations in the humanitarian relief environment (Stephenson, 2005). Although interagency trust is a must to bring the affected population out from the risk and make resilient there seemed no effective coordinating mechanism among the NGOs even in the central and district level but few INGOs which have launched projects through local NGOs at least have established connection with their partner NGOs. This is obvious.

The lack of inter-NGO coordination appeared a major challenge, as asserted by the villagers, because it produced over-distribution of the relief packages in many cases and also repeating to the same family time and again. The overlapping is not only in terms of providing reliefs but also in terms of collecting data of affected population. One Dalit female told 'every NGO comes, asks, takes our name and goes. This was continued for months. Nobody studied in detail that whose damage was of what extent. By the end of the collection of data every family had been recorded as the

affected by one or other NGOs.' Similar narratives have to be told to this researcher in Gorkha when visiting few affected VDCs there.

The government has also not suggested any inter-NGOs coordination mechanisms despite there is the presence of the Federation of the NGOs. The Federation of the NGOs, nevertheless an umbrella organisation of the NGOs, did not appear effective or had not the mandate of coordinating its members to make their programmes more transparent, accountable, efficient and non-overlapping. Later it seems that NRA has done a bit through keeping approving their proposals and keeping the records of the works done by them but the NGOs were let free to choose the area, community and the priorities. As a result few NGOs tried to impose their values to the victims in the name of the support. For instance a Christian organisation invested huge amount to reconstruct the private houses in the district but not a single penny for the public properties. Similar case has been reported by Simson (2007) from Gujrat quake. He writes that some private organizations built temples for their own deity in the new villages and assigned a manager to ensure that the beneficiaries of the houses the private organizations had provided attended that temple regularly.

Inter-NGOs coordination seemed weakest in the village because of their undeclared competition and sometimes even because of contrasting priorities. This does not mean that they do not communicate each other; they do. Several inter-NGOs meetings have been held; they have discussed the problems and the needs of the villagers but a permanent and efficient coordinating mechanism between them is still missing that naturally has affected the relation with the victims.

4.5 Coordination with the victims

These NGOs coordination with the quake affected families or population did not happen directly. Usually there seemed one or more intermediaries between the NGOs and the affected population. What happened after the initial rescue in the village is that most NGO staffs approached the victims either through village political leaders, influential persons or through partner organisations. This led to a sort of political or factional division in the village such as one upper caste male who supports Nepali Congress shared his experienced during a discussion that he was invited to receive the relief materials (few kg beaten rice, noodles, cooking oil and a small piece of tarpaulin); he went but he was told to take a picture of receiving the materials; he rejected the request and returned bare hand because the distribution was being coordinated by the local Maoists so he thought his pictures would be misused. There were several such cases of political and fractional infiltration during relief distribution.

This sort of factional infiltration mainly affected to those who did not have close connection with the village leaders because there was high possibility of excluding them from the priorities of any party leaders. Mainly INGOs programmes were seen less politicised than the NGOs. For instance, one NGO decided to help reconstruct a collapsed school building but nobody knew that how it chose the particular school building since many school buildings were waiting for the reconstruction. One participant suspected that that ward is the stronghold of NC and Mr. Ramesh (pseudonym) has good familial connection with the head of that NGO so he would have used his link.

Problem in prioritising the needs

Launching post disaster programmes are substantially different from launching other development programmes because the disaster does not affect the social groups selectively although the degree of effect may vary. Villagers always express two types of needs; felt and real. It is difficult to prioritise felt and real needs during hard times. When the NGOs fail to coordinate with the victims it becomes more difficult. Langarche VDC also faced this to some extent because of relatively poor condition of the villagers. Villagers believe that poverty adds the post disaster needs. A rich family can be resilient soon even if it losses many things but the same is not for the poor. Many organisations in Langarche supported for shelter, small amount of food and logistics temporarily but how could they live a whole year only by few kg rice and flour who have lost all stock of food grain. Some families received tin sheets twice or thrice but they did not have a kg food grain to cook.

Now there is no need to provide emergency relief packages because the victims have already passed through the difficult transition so the NGOs have come up reconstruction and social development packages which obviously leave long term impact. But the question is if the targeted population consulted before nor not. Generally the villagers allege that although the NGOs claim the participation of the targeted section principally, practically they impose from the centre. This reflects the weaker part of the NGOs coordination with the targeted section. CARE Nepal launched PRAYAS project focusing on DRR but the villagers knew only after the programme staffs came there with the programme.

4.6 NGOs' meetings in the village

A dozen NGOs have been working in this VDC. They have their own separate agendas, priorities and targeted population. They regularly interact with the villagers

but very rarely among themselves. During last six months this researcher also participated in dozens of meetings with them but mainly outside the village. Usually their meetings take place in regional or district offices in which the targeted populations are missed. The NGOs' present in Langarche VDC suggests that the villagers are not the active participants of development which many rural development experts expect but only passive recipients. The villagers are not deciding what actually they need but the organisations from the top imposing what they think is the victims' requirements. So, according to the villagers there are projects supporting for the shelter but not for the foods and the compensation for the loss of livestock, which sometimes, may exceed higher than the collapse of a house.

If enough interactions with the victims had been conducted before this also might have been noticed. Unless they are noticed they will remain unaddressed. There were few interactive meetings in the village in which the junior NGO staffs, school teachers, few senior women and men, and active political cadres usually were present. The meeting of held in November 2015 clearly divided into pro-government (supporting CPN-UML and Maoist Centre) and anti-government (NC) although the meeting was organised by the NGO. The villagers had a hot discussion almost close to a spat simply on a matter of evaluating the WASH programme.

Only the NGOs are not responsible for the penetration of political interest in the local post-quake development programmes but local political mechanism and the villagers are also seem responsible because the villagers are also want to follow political channels for any benefits as much as possible and the political cadres see it as an opportunity of expanding their electoral support. That is why local discussions and meetings also are always at risk of being politicised.

CHAPTER FIVE: SERVICE DELIVERY MECHANISM AND THE BENEFICIARIES' RESPONSES

This chapter brings out how these local NGOs provide their programmes and services to the villagers during natural disasters like April quake because delivering services during hard times substantially differs from normal times. In addition, this chapter endeavoured to unearth the beneficiaries' responses towards the NGOs programme and service delivery.

5.1 Service delivery before the quake

There were very few NGOs working in the VDC before the quake mainly in the areas of reproductive health, family planning, girl's trafficking, adult education and income generation. Even few INGOs had provided direct programmes to the village and also had funded the local NGOs to implement the programmes on aforementioned areas. Local level NGOs operate in district level providing services in selected VDCs. So, the villagers usually question on the transparency of the NGOs while they are selecting the VDCs and targeted population. Pre-defined images of the Dalits, women and the janajatis work as guiding principles of identifying the areas to be intervened nevertheless the need of the time may be different.

These NGOs were providing programmes on reproductive health and family planning, adult education, preventing girls' trafficking and micro credits to the poor before the quake. NGOs working on girls' trafficking have been flooded there since Sindhupalchowk is one of the high risk district for the trafficking having majority of the Tamangs. The reflection of this stereotyping image of the district has also been seen in the village because several such programmes had already been launched in the village. And, there were few other projects supporting to the children and older

population for their literacy but unfortunately no projects working on DRR before the quake were reported.

Nowadays NGOs generally choose social issues for development intervention. This priority shift has been experienced since long. The NGOs working in this village also had prioritised SGBV, WASH, literacy and income generation in the past which are the most common areas of their intervention across the country. Particularly local NGOs seek those areas where minimum investment could yield more results to the projects rather than to the beneficiaries.

5.2 NGOs role in rescue phase

Before Nepal Gujrat, India and Haiti were hit by similar devastating earthquakes in 2001 and 2010 respectively resulting in huge casualties. Basically the role of the NGOs during and after the quake in Haiti were highlighted much and also criticised outrageously. The memories of some community members who had lost nothing during the disaster but took advantage of aid compared to others who had lost everything but were denied access to help led to much resentment and divisiveness. One informant, who lost everything in the village, says that some NGOs entered the area to distribute items to help deal with the impact of the quake. He knows that aid arrived, but he was largely unable to describe what NGOs were doing or how aid was distributed.

The NGO 'mysteriousness' can also be attributed to peoples' lack of understanding about where the money comes from and how and where it is allocated. The NGO evaluates itself by straightforward, quantitative measures. In official reports, numerical figures were used as indicators of a projects success. Villagers in many instances look at NGOs rather than their government for basic public services.

According to Asia Foundation (2015) the poor and farmers were most likely to have lost their homes. In high impact areas, most people are living in self-constructed temporary shelters. Schools were the most affected public infrastructure. Lower caste and indigenous groups were not disproportionately affected by the earthquakes. They did not appear to be discriminated against in accessing most types of aid but they were much less likely to have received cash.

Regarding the rescue and the role of NGOs in Langarche one should note that these NGOs are not really prepared for such emergency situations. This village did not see the presence of the NGOs instantly after the quake struck the village so the villagers themselves were compelled to complete the rescue of their kins and neighbours. Though they were late and unprepared to respond the emergency rescues they actively joined during the distribution of basic relief packages despite their shortcomings discussed elsewhere in this document.

5.3 Service delivery after the quake

A dominant theme that appeared throughout conversations with informants was the lack of knowledge about how NGOs operate. The analysis of people's narrative regarding the rescue reveals that neither government bodies nor the NGOs were quick in reaching out to the village so the locals themselves had to handle the situation right after the quake. Relatively far distance and remoteness of the village kept it away from accessing the district headquarter, which was the centre of coordination of the service delivery.

Post earthquake survey reveals that almost all houses are damaged either partially or completely. The quake did not only bring the losses of buildings but also large numbers of livestock kept by the villagers were also killed, excluding the human loss.

The absence of the NGOs after the quake to rescue and evacuate the people in the the village was really notorious but the NGOs' role in assisting the villagers to meet short term basic basic needs complemented the state's relief packages. Their absence during rescue and evacuation can be accorded with their unpreparedness for such emergency cases. One NGO staff responded 'actually we were not prepared for that... and we were not trained also because that was not our area of expertise but we did individually wherever we were during that time.' This seems partly true all NGOs do not work on disaster so they could not be ready as soon as the calamity hits but it also cannot be ignored that they could have made collective efforts right after the quake hit.

The villagers narratives suggest that the NGOs were seen more interested to distribute basic relief packages rather than practically working on rehabilitation of the affected families. They thought that when they distributed the relief materials what they had brought the recipients would settle themselves. But the situation was not that much comfortable. When one informant was asked about the distribution of aid after the quake, the system of how this was executed didn't make sense:

But they [NGOs] did not come here [our neighbourhood]...they arrived over there. Those who lost [houses, property] were not given anything; but the ones who didn't lose anything were given help...those who didn't lose anything in the quake were the ones who took advantage and filled up.

This obviously added to the confusion dealing with the aftermath of the disaster. As discussed in preceding chapter the problem of effective coordination between the NGOs working in the village appeared also during relief distribution, which resulted in overlapping and over concentration of the relief in few hands. Besides this initial relief distribution another important aspect of the NGOs' service delivery is the

implementation of long term programmes of reconstruction and social development. An individual who supported basic relief packages commented the situation there in his facebook:

We distributed food and medical supplies along with tents for the affected people in Gurnung Gaon, Bika Gaon, Chettri Gaon, Patale Gaon and Dhule Gaon of Langarche VDC, Sindhupalchowk. We were both saddened and angry to know about the ineffectiveness of our so called government since we were the first group of people with the relief supplies to arrive in that VDC since the earthquake (from Rishesh KC's facebook page on 04 May 2015).

Help Nepal Network in coordination with Nepal Scout distributed food for the villagers in June 2015. Sindhu Development Centre is also working in this VDC. It has been one and half year the quake hit the village but still many villagers are living in a temporary makeshifts, and public properties are also waiting for their reconstruction and renovation.

Service delivery through long term programmes

According to NRA report 2016 the proposals of 123 NGOs and INGOs for reconstruction and assistance have been approved of which 37 NGOs and INGOs have done contract with the NRA. Many of them have proposed to reconstruct the public properties mainly school and health post buildings. Few others applied for reconstruction of private houses and remaining have prioritised WASH, mason training, children and other areas of social development. For instance Fairmaid Foundation has agreed to reconstruct the damaged health post buildings of few VDCs including Langarche.

CARE Nepal had reached the village through distribution of ready to eat food, emergency shelter, household non-food items, water purification and hygiene

consumables but now has been addressing the specific needs of women through distribution of hygiene kits, reproductive health kits as well as disseminating messaging and referrals on SGBV issues in partnership with local women's organizations.

CARE prioritizes to support the most vulnerable Population in its response in terms of addressing their needs of Shelter; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH);, Food Security and Livelihood; Sexual and reproductive health; protection and gender based violence. According to CARE the vulnerable populations include poor, vulnerable and socially excluded women and girls; female-headed households, including single women, widows, wives whose spouses have migrated and/or who have been abandoned; pregnant and lactating women; people belonging to excluded groups, including lower Nepali caste groups and ethnic minorities; households with houses totally and partially destroyed; those applying crisis and distress coping strategies; people living with HIV, People with Disabilities, infants, unaccompanied children and the elderly (CARE, 2016).

Now, PRAYAS (a CARE Nepal's subsidiary programme) and few other projects (name of those?) have been initiated targeting to the earthquake affected population and also for the preparation of future risks. PRAYAS is mainly working on to build awareness on DRR in the village. The villagers have mixed feelings regarding the DRR projects launched after the quake in the sense that they are like 'medicine after death'. One Dalit participant commented 'now they [DRR project] are teaching us how to respond to the risks of disasters like the 2015 quake but they were somewhere in five star hotel in Kathmandu having chicken and *pulao* when the quake hit and we were screaming for help.' He further added 'nobody will come to help us, ... we will

have to do ourselves. This is our destiny in the villages. They come with huge cameras and takes pictures only after when the situation becomes normal.'

5.4 Analysis of the Needs of of the Affected population

Sociological and development researches illustrate that the needs of the beneficiaries are influenced by their past or present location in the social system, experiences, past and present social identities such as caste, class, gender, age cohort, language, religion, political affiliation and regional location. On the other hand when natural calamities strike a section of population they do not leave same impact to all. Outwardly the impact may be seen similar but if one closely looks at the long term consequences obviously it differs.

The experiences from Langarche VDC exhibit that some people emphasized the urgent need of reconstructing their damaged houses but few others were seemed worried about the loss of stocked food grain although the latter also had lost the houses. The reason of their emphasis on food grain was because they did not have other means of coping with loss of food grain at least for a year but they believed that they could manage shelter temporarily.

During personal communication with the villagers this researcher came across a fact that those who had enough agricultural land were less worried about the loss of food grain in quake so emphasized for house reconstruction. The Dalits who had made stock of paddy, maize, and millet which were given to them by their *bistas* (patrons) as annual wage lost along with the house so then they had to wait for the next year to receive. For the other castes the case is bit different because they do not depend collecting annual wage.

Few other families expressed their anxieties on losing their livestock in the quake since they had invested huge capital on livestock specially buffalos, cows, oxen and goats. The keeping of these livestock is a good source of livelihood in rural villages including this VDC so the villagers have been making considerable capital from this. Simply, a milking buffalo costs normally 50,000 NRS nowadays and a family generally keeps two to five which costs a hundred thousand to 250 thousand. If a family losses one or two the family's economy traps into trouble.

The problem with the NGOs working here is that they failed to identify such micro aspects of the problem but put all families in a same basket and came up with universal issues of NGO intervention; SGBV, WASH, trafficking, inclusion and so on. Although it has been noted how family networks and organizations at a community level have proved valuable in the first stages of recovery, real development of local level resilience is still at an early stage (EIAS, 2016) due to the skipping of such micro realities. Traditional way of assessing the needs even in post-disaster situation ignores the hidden but important aspects of the people's concerns. The NGOs also have some limitations of the terms of reference they are bound to follow so without effective and strong coordination among the government agency, NGOs and the beneficiaries the post-disaster needs of the victims cannot be handled properly.

5.5 Embezzlement of NGO funding

Frequent cases of misuse of the funding from NGO side has been reported in Gorkha, Dhading and other districts. Even in Sindhupalchowk transparency of the NGOs has been questioned seriously due to the lack of weak government monitoring (My Republica, 16 April, 2016). Among the aid agencies, non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) and international NGOs have failed to maintain transparency in their relief and rehabilitation activities for the quake-affected in the district. The quake-affected masses also expressed serious concern of embezzlement of the funds allotted by the NGOs for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Many people whom I interviewed suspect that only the smallest portion of the funds arrives up to them. The NGOs generally try to make extra money by making exaggerated and even forgery bills of payments and supports. One villager interestingly commented 'the organizer distributed expensive pens and notebooks to all participants in a sensitization programme gathering where more than 60 per cent were *lyapche chhap*' (lit. illiterate).

This is simply an instance how the locals view NGOs' transparency. Even in Langarche the villagers believe that these NGOs have enough money which invokes the villagers to expect more from them. NGO-dependency was apparent in this village after the quake because of the belief that 'they have brought money for us'. Sheer money-mindedness of the NGOs and the villagers naturally leads to the higher possibility of embezzlement.

5.6 Pros and cons of the NGOs service delivery

Changing pattern of cooperation to tackle with the natural calamities emphasizes the role of international cooperation agencies which usually comes through INGO/NGOs (Gul and Noor, 2005). Several UN agencies and organizations from developed countries have been providing huge amount of financial aid and technical supports to different parts of the world. Nepal also received considerable amount of their support from which Langarche VDC is also getting benefitted.

Many NGOs, INGOs and donor organizations are presently engaged in restoring livelihood. However, there are places which have been left out while, at other places,

time and money is being wasted by duplication. This strategy aims at setting up an effective mechanism to end duplication and ensure equitable distribution of resources (Sarwar, 2005) but it is not that much easy as expected. The problem of ending duplication of the NGOs service delivery is primarily rooted in the lack of inter-agency coordination. The NGOs are not eager to establish and strengthen interagency coordination mechanism which could monitor the duplication of the programmes. This has happened due to different and conflicting sources of funding for the programmes.

On the other hand, these NGOs are not seriously paying attention of how they are creating the culture of dependency among the villagers. There are no programmes in the village which help self-assess the strength of the villagers. It has become a tradition to expect from the others whenever something bad happens. Another problem experienced in Langarche is that the asymmetry between the NGOs priority areas and people's felt needs. The NGOs are launching post-disaster SGBV and WASH projects but the victims are expecting some compensation of the lost livestock. There are several such instances in the village. One NGO staff believes that reconstruction should be linked with the income generation to make it sustainable therefore, numbers of livelihood support programmes are going together with reconstruction projects in the area.

This does not mean that these organisations are completely worthless in terms of post-disaster situation. First they have appeared easy alternative of the government agencies to the villagers. Second, they have better service delivery mechanism than the government agencies so the victims express more trust to them. The villagers believe that they have appeared instrumental in generating social awareness but not successful in enhancing the economic well-being of the people. This allegation seems

partly true because NGOs invest only in micro-credit which only facilitates hardly to manage family expense but not enhance overall financial condition.

The need of the villagers of Langarche after April quake is not the same as before the quake. This becomes evident when one interacts with them because the quake has added several other challenges to the villagers. The villagers now need an earthquake resistant house, to make family economy self-resilient and be ready to cope with future disasters along with other needs. The NGOs collectively should be able to respond both needs otherwise the people will start to question the legitimacy of these organisations.

CHAPTER SIX: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NGOS AND THE EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS

The aim of this chapter is to seek answer the reciprocity between the local NGOs and the quake affected people of the village. That is, how the NGOs have been dealing with different sections of the victims in terms of caste, ethnicity and gender. The social position of the victims in terms of caste, ethnicity or gender largely structures their relationship with service providers, which eventually results in further marginalising the weakest among the weak. Besides this, individual connection with the NGOs, political leaders and local key figures as well as the location of the village also influence the service delivery mechanism there in post-quake situation. In this chapter it is intended to discuss the social groups and their nature of relation with the organisations which are providing post-quake development packages to the village.

6.1 Upper castes and the NGOs

The field survey of the quake affected population of the VDC illustrates that Brahman and Chhetris are one of the largest groups in the village along with the Tamangs. Many of these families, although economically not well off, claim their connection or familiarity with some NGOs, district level government staffs and political leaders. Nepal outlawed caste based discrimination long ago and current Constitution also clearly stipulates that any form of caste based discrimination is prohibited but few discriminatory practices are still in practice in everyday life.

The Brahamans and the Chhetris are placed topmost position socially and culturally, and then the ethnics and the Dalits at last which eventually provided the former a quick and easy access to the power. Although natural calamities do not discriminate on the basis of social identities of the people but the unequal and different space of

these groups in society is obviously linked with the differential and unequal impact of the quake. For instance, the upper castes' houses were better-constructed than that of the ethnic groups and Dalits, so the latter faced greater physical losses. This is not only because of their caste identity but also because of the intersection of caste and class.

The intersection of caste and class in the village correlates accessing the services and benefits delivered by the NGOs both in normal and hard times. The village could be a good choice of the NGOs due to the large presence of ethnic population; the Tamangs and others. Tamangs are not better off than other even among ethnic groups such as Gurungs, Magars and Newars because the Legal Code of 1854 had placed the Tamangs below them which systematically kept the Tamangs in lower social and economic position (see also Hoefler, 1979). Langarche is ethnically heterogeneous village, so it is not difficult to infer the complicated picture of caste, class and ethnicity since these three variables contribute for the maintenance of the other in Nepal. The upper castes in the village represent the core of the village social system, the come ethnic groups and the Dalits constitute the outer layer of the system in the sense of exercising power and recognition in the village. The exercise of power in village seems inextricably linked with how the villagers respond to the development agencies which is going to be discussed below coherently.

The Core: Brahamans and Chhetris

The share of Brahaman and Chhetri population in the village is significant. These people have settled there since long migrating from all around. Their literacy rate is higher than others and also relatively better off economically. They have good representation in different CBOs such as CFUGs, women's groups, micro-credit groups and school management committees. Their association in these groups has

made easier to access district level development organisations since these development organisations also generally utilise these groups as gate-keepers to enter into the village.

When the NGOs tried to approach the VDC's affected population, one organisation interested to rebuild health post approached through a chairperson of a CFUG who was a Brahman and well known figure in the VDC. This researcher asked him why that NGO approached to you and he replied that they know him very well and he also had political connection with the management of that organisation so he had requested to help rebuild the health post building. The NGOs also usually depend either on their partner organisations' information or some other sources to select the villages for programme implementation.

6.2 Ethnic population and the NGOs

Tamangs, the *masine matwali* according to the legal code of 1854, are the largest group among ethnic groups in the village. The lower ranking of the Tamangs in the traditional caste hierarchy has been continually sustaining their subordinate position in the village excluding very few well off families. The Relative poverty of the Tamangs pushed them into severe hardship when they were hit by the quake. During FGD many interactants responded that neither they were approached by the NGOs nor they themselves could manage the temporary residents. Even the NGOs' relief were distributed as per the recommendation of the party activists of the village. Those who were not politically active were left behind.

Many NGOs have targeted ethnic population for the community based reconstruction projects because ethnic population is a preferred section of the NGOs. Specially projects against girls trafficking, literacy, Reproductive Health and income generation

programmes have been targeted for ethnic and Dalits of the village. The problem is that the NGOs overtly do not declare that they prioritise the ethnics and the Dalits but systematically choose such settlements in which these groups are in majority. In a informal personal communication an NGO staff told that they had been instructed to select settlements with ethnic or Dalits majority. She further added that the bosses of the NGOs prefer that because having beneficiaries from these sections helps them to get more funding.

6.3 Dalits and the NGOs

The Dalits comprise very few of the village population and most of them are severely affected by the quake. These Dalits have lost the houses completely and lost family members as well. The traditional Nepali caste system, nonetheless not legally functional nowadays, has placed them in the lowest rank of the caste hierarchy and defined as the 'untouchables'. This discrimination existed for centuries has placed them in the underdog position economically, politically, socially and also culturally. The consequences of their underdog position have been apparently reflected during and after the quake.

All Dalit families in the village have stone and masonry houses which were already in dilapidated condition. So the severity of the quake was experienced by them than the others. These families experiencing some difficulties while receiving basic relief packages during initial relief distribution but as far as the rehabilitation and compensation processes were initiated they were forced to access the state through the upper caste and local political leaders.

Even accessing to the NGOs they were forced to go through the same channel. There are no Dalit specific projects in the village but they have been amalgamated with the

others basically ethnic population. The Dalits' sufferings are worse than the non-Dalits due to the lack of means by which they could be resilient soon. Besides the reconstruction of the collapsed houses the Dalits are also facing food shortage but the NGOs' post-quake programmes seem not concerned with the food security or the right to food security of the Dalits which the Constitution of Nepal 2015 has guaranteed.

6.4 Women and children, and the NGOs

The women and the children, most possible sufferers of the disaster, constitute majority of the village population. The women, because of gender, and the children, because of minor age, usually suffer much than others in any natural disasters. Lower ranking of women in gender hierarchy and the children's natural association with them makes them weaker than others. That is why Simone de Beauvoir has termed women 'second sex' in her seminal book *The second sex*.

According to Asia Foundation (2015) women did not appear to have been disproportionately affected by the earthquake and were accessing aid. There were no substantial differences in the perceived safety of men and women and there have been very few incidents of abuses targeting women but the risks of trafficking in girls after the quake have been continuously brought into notice by the media. Several cases of such trafficking from Sindhupalchowk had already been reported in various media. So it has been a fact that the girls, women and children of the village are also in severe risk of being victimised.

The NGOs have acknowledged this threat and launched awareness campaigns targeting particularly quake affected families. But awareness only does not challenge the risk, villagers comment, because although they are aware of risks the financial hardship compels to send their girls and women for employment opportunities which

sometimes end with bitter reality. Few other NGOs have tried to respond the reproductive health needs of the women and SGBV that may affect the lives of the females. Awareness raising and capacity building in the NGOs' language are the main tools on intervention in the village which in many cases have turned effective in mobilising the community.

6.5 NGOs and reconstruction of public properties

The construction of public properties is going effectively with community participation in some Village Development Committees in Sindhupalchok district. The NGO's and the locals have joined hands in reconstruction of drinking water supply, irrigation canals, culverts and other public properties. The people from Thangpaldhap, Thangpalkot, Gunsar and Bhotang VDC's of the district have been volunteering for the reconstruction works when unskilled human resource is required while the NGO's are paying for the skilled labour (Kathmandu Post, 15 Oct, 2016).

Reconstruction of public properties in Langarche is also taking pace with supports from various NGOs and INGOs. It seems that school buildings are in the first priority of these organisations' support programmes. Out of the NGOs/INGOs having allowed to work in this district many have chosen school buildings to reconstruct.

The NGOs which are supporting to reconstruct the public properties usually provide financial support and sometimes also provide technical expertise such as for the designing of the buildings. One NGO in the village is providing trained masons and the other is paying for the labour cost. Some other NGOs are supporting tin sheets to the schools. Thus, the NGOs support seems diversified in terms of types and processes of support.

The villagers' perception is that even the government is not much enthusiastic to support the reconstruction of public properties rather suggests to look for other alternatives such as the NGOs, if cooperation is sought. So the villagers frequently have approached the non-governmental sources for funding to reconstruct the schools and other public properties. Several researches have suggested that not only the people but also the government is also turning to be dependent on NGOs for development support.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Nepal is highly disaster prone zone which has been proved by the several floods, landslides, avalanches and earthquakes experienced frequently such as 2015 quake. The high risk usually is accorded to volatile seismic zone, difficult geography, varied ecology and haphazard development works. On the other hand Nepal is also known as the country of having large number of NGOs and INGOs like Haiti. But very few of them work for DRR and rehabilitation.

As soon as the quake struck Nepal the government asked for help from the NGOs and INGOs to rescue, rehabilitate and reconstruct the damages and thousands of NGOs and INGOs were seen enthusiastic to support. The study of the NGOs responsiveness after the quake in Langarche VDC, in a nutshell, displays the following findings.

Many NGOs chose this VDC for their programmes due to the severity of the damage here. The village is relatively poorer than the other villages but the settlement is heterogeneous along with Tamangs' majority. The findings suggest that the inter-NGO communication and coordination seems satisfactory though each NGO has its own priorities and interests. The NGOs usually are working in coordination with the district and village level disaster risk management mechanisms. Even if they have different priorities and interests these NGOs seem eager to work collectively except in few cases because of political and private concerns. Their networking with the government agencies seem better organised than with co-NGOs. Sometimes, overlapping of the programmes observed in the village helps validate this claim.

These NGOs are aware of the government policies of disaster management and risk reduction so they have launched programmes after consultation with the government

agencies to address the policies. Moreover, the problem with the NGOs is that they are unable to generate internal funds; always depend on international funding, which raises the question of their legitimacy despite their effort to facilitate the villagers.

Many NGOs have already defined common priorities such as reproductive health, WASH, SGBV, trafficking, micro credit etc; whatever happens these NGOs go with these priorities. This problem was evident in post-quake Langarche when people were keenly waiting for Tarpaulin and foodstuffs the NGOs came with condoms and sanitary pads. So, in terms of addressing the felt and real needs of the targeted population there were several instances in which the quake-affected families expressed needs differently than the NGOs had designed the programmes.

Very few NGOs are known with their particular political affiliation that eventually divided the affected population into political categories. These NGOs were used to safeguard one's electorate rather than benefitting the people. Instead of these shortcomings they at least complemented to the government efforts of rehabilitating the people and incurring the damages. The NGOs were more accessible than the government agencies in the village so the affected families seemed trusted NGOs to a greater extent than before.

There are few suggestions the villagers have suggested to the NGOs to make their programmes more people-friendly, transparent and responsive. First, inter-NGO communication is mandatory to build the network and not to let the programme duplication. Second, they should make effort to generate internal funds and be transparent to the targeted populations. Third, non-developmental cost must be minimised. Fourth, they must be prepared for addressing the natural calamities although this may not be their first priority.

With reference to Langarche, the quake-affected population expressed mixed responses. They believe that at least these NGOs approached the villagers, listened them and tried to respond on their capacity. These NGOs are not the substitutes of the government but, of course, complement the latter's efforts, so their importance cannot be underestimated if one looks at the cases in Langarche but this does not mean that there is not the space for further strong network between the NGOs, government agencies and the beneficiaries.

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
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ANNEX ONE: MAP OF THE STUDY SITE

SINDHUPALCHOWK DISTRICT



ANNEX TWO: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

Name of the Respondent:

Age		No. of family members	
Sex		No. of dead in quake	
Caste/Ethnicity		No. of injured in quake	
Education		No. of employed family members	

Qualitative questions:

1. Did you lose any residential building in the quake?
.....
2. How are you living since then?
.....
3. Did you receive any supports from the government agencies?
.....
4. If yes, explain a bit what and how you received?
.....
5. Did you receive any supports from the NGOs?
.....
6. If yes, explain a bit what and how you received?
.....
7. If not, why did not you receive? Explain.
.....
8. Did you receive 50000 reconstruction grant?
.....
9. If yes, what problems did you face to receive the amount?
.....
10. If not, why are you not receiving? Give reasons.
.....
11. How many NGOs approach you after the earthquake to provide support to your family?
.....

12. What is your experience with those NGOs in terms of supporting the quake-affected villagers?
.....
13. Do you think that those NGOs were able to address your needs?
.....
14. What is your observation of those NGOs' internal networking and coordination?
.....
15. 15. What is your assessment of those NGOs' coordination with the villagers?
.....
16. 16. How do you evaluate the coordination of government agencies and the NGOs who approached in your village?
.....
17. 17. How do you assess the financial transparency of those NGOs who approach to this village?
.....
18. How quick were those NGOs in responding the emergencies after the quake struck the village?
.....
19. What is your experience of those NGOs' preparation of disasters like the earthquake in 2015?
.....
20. Finally, what do you suggest the villagers, NGOs, government agencies to respond to the natural calamities like earthquake for the future?
.....

Thank you for providing your valuable time.

ANNEX THREE: CHECKLIST FOR THE DISCUSSION WITH NGO STAFFS

1. Name of the organisation
2. Name of the programme
3. Areas of priority
4. Working Langarche since
5. Target groups
6. Types of support provided
7. No. of staffs working in Langarche
8. Networking and coordination with other NGOs
9. Networking and coordination with GOs
10. Coordination with target groups
11. Quickness in responding the post-quake situation in Langarche
12. Preparedness in responding the post-quake situation in Langarche
13. Support received from the villagers
14. Your financial and technical costs to the target groups
15. Support received from local political parties and their leaders
16. Your self- evaluation of addressing the needs of the target groups
17. Challenges that you faced during your work in the village
18. Your suggestion for DRR for the villagers, NGOs and other stakeholders for the future

Thank you for providing your valuable time.

ANNEX FOUR: CHECKLIST FOR THE DISCUSSION WITH GOVERNMENT STAFFS

1. Name of the organisation
2. Areas of priority
3. Working Langarche since
4. Types of support provided
5. No. of staffs working in Langarche
6. Networking and coordination with other NGOs
7. Coordination with target groups
8. Quickness in responding the post-quake situation in Langarche
9. Preparedness in responding the post-quake situation in Langarche
10. Support received from the villagers
11. Support received from local political parties and their leaders
12. Your self- evaluation of addressing the needs of the target groups
13. Your financial and technical costs provided to the villagers
14. Challenges that you faced during your work in the village
15. Your suggestion for DRR for the villagers, NGOs and other stakeholders for the future

Thank you for providing your valuable time.