Study of Psychological Dualism in Post-war Transitional Era in Hesse’s *Steppenwolf*

A Thesis Submitted to the Central Department of English
in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in English

By
Sagun Sangraula
Symbol No: 000594
Regd. No: 6-2-282-120-2010

Central Department of English
Kirtipur, Kathmandu
March 2018
Tribhuvan University  
Central Department of English  
Letter of Approval  
This thesis entitled “Study of Psychological Dualism in Post-war Transitional Era in Hesse’s Steppenwolf” submitted to the Central Department of English, Tribhuvan University, by Mr. Sagun Sangraula, has been approved by the undersigned members of the Research Committee.  
Members of the Research Committee:  

_________________________________________  
Internal Supervisor  

_________________________________________  
External Supervisor  

_________________________________________  
Head of Department  

Central Department of English  

Date: .........................................
Acknowledgements

I am very much indebted and grateful to my respected supervisor Mr. Jiva Nath Lamsal, Lecturer in Central Department of English, for his guidance, inspiration, and precious suggestions. Without his continuous supervision and intellectual guidance, this research work would never have come in this present form. In this regard, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to him.

I am also thankful to Prof. Dr. Amma Raj Joshi, head of Central Department of English, for the approval of this research work. I would like to extend my gratitude to all other respected Lecturers and Professors who inspired me to materialize my dream of Masters of Arts in English Literature.

I must admire the continuous support and guideline of my parents to reach this level, for which they have played pivotal role for the smooth completion of my research. My special gratitude goes to my friends for their continuous suggestions and valuable insights.

March 2018

Sagun Sangraula
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Abstract:

This research paper explores the distortions of individual’s psyche in a post-war transitional political juncture based on Herman Hesse’s *Steppenwolf*. It studies the deviation in the protagonist’s (Harry Haller) normal life followed by his discontent towards the changes seen in the overlapping phase. While reading this book from psychological and political perspectives, Haller’s deteriorating condition has become inevitable not because he is not following the change but because he denies to submit to the voice of crowd who hanker after the change. This lack of submission has caused insurmountable sufferings in his life, devastating his social and psychological integration. Thus, the primary aim of this study is to probe into the internal conflict of an individual and identify the reasons behind his/her deterioration at the moment of phasic instability. To this end, the paper answers the questions regarding the instability of contradictions formed after war (not specified in the novel); and shows resulting impacts on individuals. It also focuses on how the affected individual reforms himself in a newly formed era. For this, it makes a study of psychological and political dimensions of social formation. It approaches the dimensions through the study of Gustave Le Bon’s mass psychology; Edward Bernays’ implementation of propaganda; and Michel Foucault’s concept of discursive formation, madness and hermeneutics of subject.

The paper comes to a finding that a shift in era comprises of manipulation of conscience and forming a collective unconscious where a projected crowd is oriented. Resistance towards the transition invites further bondage as an individual cannot flee power play.

Key Words: Discursive formation, Collective unconscious, Propaganda, Crowd Psychology, Political subject
Herman Hesse’s novel *Steppenwolf* (1927) depicts an individualistic tension created of behavioural discontent towards a transitional political manifestation. Hesse sets *Steppenwolf* in Germany during post-war period with the taciturn protagonist Harry Haller in his mentally degraded and socially segregated state, unable to cope up the transitional phase set up after the war. It traces a wistful journey of Haller who, confined in his pre-existing prejudices, is unable to accept the changes seen between the pre-war and post-war modern era. This paper primarily studies Harry’s struggle in the inability of psychological and social soundness, along with the basic causes and reasons for the segregation. Commencing in post-war modern era, Haller begins to withstand the unstable era as a war of humanity with machines, for the time period marks the end of a war and the harbinger of another; and advent of modernity. However, he eventually learns to take care of himself in order to deny the root of dissatisfaction for post-war period. Despite this, it is questionable whether he will succeed to adapt to changes of the transitional phase.

Prior to the war, Haller used to be a professor of arts and literature and had a beloved wife. But following the period after the war, he is accused of being “a dastardly figure, one of those chaps without any allegiance to the Fatherland” (Hesse 86). Being divorced from his wife and sacked from his profession, he lives in a rented attic room in a social segregation. On top of that, the country is preparing for another war which is an issue of his disdain. He casts his despair and depression on people’s hankering after war, therefore, finds entangled in-between the two eras.

Every character but Haller seems to be psychologically and socially sound in the advent of modernism backed up by war. The minor characters such as a young professor who invites Haller to his home completely appreciates modifying the portrait of Goethe, a German writer, in a modern style. He applauds Kaisar for waging war. Also, other characters such as Hermione, despite her internal contention for the transitional phase, seems habituated in the
present context. But, Haller, who cannot appreciate nor retaliate the change, unequivocally suffers. Thus, the novel depicts Haller’s “irremediable loneliness and a suicidal repulsion” in an instability of political juncture (Horrocks 243).

Furthermore, the deranged psychological and social condition of Haller is, indeed, an outcome of political transformation. He is discontent of the war “which has just been and those still to come” and about “modern habits of thinking, reading, building, making music, celebrating things, and providing education” (Hesse 163). The modernity is eventually thriving. However, Haller is still to adjust himself on the mechanical lifestyle that the upcoming era has been establishing. Thus, the condition of Hesse projects the role of social transformation in a political level in influencing an individual (Haller) to his degraded state. The paper studies the conditions of overlapping of eras and the reason for any individual’s inability to shift him/herself in commencing social formations.

Moreover, a contradiction is known to be formed in-between as the regulating era begins to culminate with the formation of the new era. The upcoming era is always (in some way or the other) contradictory to the preceding era. In other words, these contradictions formed of the preceding era, acts as harbinger of the upcoming era. The principal issue is then the clash between the eras or the phase of struggle (clash) which (de)shapes the behavioural pattern of individuals because they reside as the fulcrum between “what had been” and “what will be”. Haller is illustrated as an epitome of contradictions (clash); with the formation of wolf and man within himself which appears as a source of his sufferings.

Haller, portrayed as a troglodyte who has consciously “accepted [the] loneliness as his destiny”, generates within himself the boundless capacity of holding frightful pain; hence, known as “a genius of suffering” (4-11). Confirming the extinction of values of religion, country, family and state, he becomes a pariah to the world and wishes to commit a suicide to prevent futile recurring sufferings. He is, on the one hand, determined to his resolution of
death of “absolute certainty with a bullet or a razor”, while, on the other hand, is frightful to
die because of “unconditional and self-willed determination to live” (81-110). This struggle
between desire and dread persists until he meets Hermione, a paramour, in a public house
named The Black Eagle.

Haller’s abhorrence for the so-called decent modern society leads him to an emotional
bonding with the “pale and pretty” girl whom he finds charming despite knowing her position
as a prostitute. The very indecent prostitute, who becomes her sister and eventually a
paramour, having her hermaphroditic charm, makes him recall his childhood along with his
friend Herman; teaches him “to dance, to play, to smile”; and arouse for him a new interest in
life (136). Having surrendered to the magnetic power of the paramour, Haller finds that his
way of life has been metamorphosed. Despite his aversion towards overcrowded railways and
hotels, packed cafes, suffocating and oppressive jazz music, he obeys Hermione regarding
her commands, and offers her of meeting in hotels and cafes (for example: Balance hotel),
participate in Fancy Dress Ball, dance in the music he had once loathed. She also commands
her to fall in love with her and to kill her which he eventually accomplishes.

While participating in the Fancy Dress Ball, he is invited by Pablo, a saxophone
player and a friend of Hermione, to his Magic Theatre. But before entering the theatre, he is
to leave his “so-called personality” and the spectacles of old Steppenwolf behind. But this
confrontation with newness (hence contradictions) proves difficult to him as he neither
obtains humour nor abstains himself from jealousy. To extend the point, he stabs Hermione
when he sees her sleeping with Pablo naked. Out of the theatre, Pablo marks up Haller’s
failure to “learn the game better” and hopes that he may learn it the next time (247). Haller is,
at the end, determined to learn the newness, superseding the old perceptions and
personalities.
The protagonist, hence, comes to a consent that he must undergo change within himself to sustain in the era. Most importantly, the rebellious character who denied the changes that had been going on (who hated war and insulted his Fatherland) eventually goes through a phase of understanding, thereby, no longer expressing discontent over contemporary despairing issues.

Thus, the novel itself glorifies the contradictions of the era and its impacts on individuals. Here, despite Haller’s resistance towards nationalist jingoism, his reluctance for the upcoming war, he has to be a part of the nationalist propaganda of reformation which has affected specific era. So, taking the formation of oppositions between the preceding and the upcoming era (situations) as its primary focus, this paper studies the nature of contradictions and its significance on (de)shaping individuals. In other words, this paper aims to come up with an understanding of the exterior circumstances that form inner duality in an individual who shows contention to the upcoming era.

For this, the paper doesn’t study a particular era but about the political transitional phase between two eras. Then, it shows how an individual adjusts (disfiguring himself) to the era accepting prevailing circumstances. The paper further stresses on how the ‘consent of an individual’ helps to maintain obedience and abort further rebellion in a forming period.

However, there are some critics who completely decline to analyze the novel from the social perspectives. Critic Heidi M. Rockwood in “The Function of Pablo in Hesse’s Steppenwolf” regards the novel in Jungian psychoanalytic view claiming that Hesse had an influence of Jungian individuation in his texts. This view seems justifiable as both Jungian individuation and Hesse’s Steppenwolf deals with an “insecure and disturbed” character (Haller) who “attempts to achieve greater personal fulfillment and inner peace” (Rockwood 47). Haller’s personal fulfillment was manifested after he learned to live his life through
Hermione again. He attains his inner peace after finding himself understood despite several misunderstandings regarding him as an outlaw to jingoism.

This distortion is also acknowledged by Andrew Hollis in “Political Ambivalence in Hesse’s “Steppenwolf””. However, least bothered with any psychoanalytic criticisms, he stresses upon the political state for the distortion in Haller who is obsessed with “anti-modernist, anti-industrial, anti-urban and anti-bourgeois” Volkish thoughts (Hollis 111). Haller is claimed of having “Luddite sympathies” who “railing against the spiritual emptiness of life” keeps turning back towards his pre-capitalist childhood” (112).

Contrary to Rockwood and Hollis, David Atiss does not see the distortion but illustrates unity through the interpretation of the symbols. For him, the novel is a “positive and aesthetic treatment of schizophrenia” (85). Also, he makes a close analysis of metaphors and symbols such as wolf, flowers and laughter. Analyzing through psychoanalytic perspective, he traces “Haller’s progression from bestiality to humanity” marking up his “regeneration” through Magic Theatre and the Treatise (85).

The formation of a distorted psyche is undoubtedly a significant aspect of the novel. Distortions are likely in the face of contradictions. And a gradual healing is probable as one is eventually adapted in the contradictions. However, the trio do not mention is the exterior (where he resides) scenerios for such development of the distorted psyche. While Rockwood and Atiss are highly confined in psychoanalysis, Hollis finds his analytical way through political manifestations. Here, abstaining from the social factors and showing reluctance to these factors in the formation of politics and the psyche would mark a naivety in the understanding of Steppenwolf. This paper studies these factors.

In order to study the phase of contradictions (struggle) and the state of individuals during the phase, the paper takes references from Gustave Le Bon’s *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* and Edward L. Bernays’ *Propaganda*. Taking the references, it studies the
role of unconscious in the formation of newer era. Furthermore, it shows the compulsive state of individual where s/he cannot entertain his/her free will because his/her entire desires and wishes are the product of implementation of propaganda by “small number of persons…who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses” (Bernays 10). Backing up with these references, the primary reasons for Haller’s desperation is revealed.

To clarify this further, the paper brings references from Michel Foucault’s *The Archaeology of Knowledge* to study the significance of discontinuity in the process of discursive formation. The combined study of Le Bon, Bernays and Foucault illustrate individuals as a product of discourse who, despite having the ability to resist, are simply a subject to the discourse. Also, studying the discontinuity in the paper is principle as it shows the state of the protagonist in-between two eras. Discontinuity is marked by “suspend[ing] the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development, and force it to enter a new time” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 4). But entering a new phase attains certain passage of time and within this period a resisting individual creates a duality in his psyche. An example can be taken of Haller who has symbolically become a hybrid of wolf and human beings. The duality is studied as equivalent to madness with references from Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization*.

Resisting against the newer era is the vital purpose behind the duality. Though an individual is likely to undergo resistance, it is proved futile with the study of the trio because an individual is always a product of manipulation and is a subject within the periphery of power. Foucault writes:

> Form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals
subjects. There are two meanings of the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjects and makes subject to. (The Subject and the Power 781)

A free individual, for the French post-structuralist theorist, not possible because everybody is a subject either under a power or by his/her conscience. Here, the conscience itself is an output of discourses whereas for Bernays, it is a consequence of propagandists. In the novel, despite Haller’s attempt to resist, he is a subject because he is tied to his own identity or the self-knowledge. Declining to adjust in the commencing era, he has been suffering in a befuddlement created in the transitional phase.

This befuddlement is further answered by *The Hermeneutics of Subject;* lectures of Foucault delivered in College De France in 1981-82. After illustrating the struggle of Haller, the paper attempts to show a probable escape from the circularity of confinement of a subject. It endeavors to study the dilemmic situation created by the commencement of the new era and approaches to get rid of the dilemma. Despite making an approach to the lectures of Foucault, the paper doesn’t approve the method appropriate enough to break the confinement.

Harry’s futility behind his resistance for the upcoming era is verified by his perpetual confinement in inevitable power relations. Furthermore, Haller abandons his home city and rents a room in a new part of his country. Despite this, he is not free from the social changes that his country is undergoing through. He cannot abandon the newly-formed fact that people have become mechanical, and a war is starting soon (Hesse 84). His disturbing condition is, undoubtedly, marked to be as a consequence of the overlapping of two eras. Making numerous attempts to ram the seclusion, Haller tries to cope up to “find a new interest in living” but ultimately fails (114). Unable to dissolve his personality, the prejudices he had set
up, he fails to convert himself to the newer truths formed by the newer mechanical era that has overlapped the earlier pre-war period.

Haller, a psychologically deluded character, has made a journey from being a respectable, educated man to being Steppenwolf: an alienated entity with a fusion of humble man and a wild wolf. Being no more revered in his profession and having no more family, he comes to a different part of his country (Germany) only to rent a room and live a secluded life. Because his country has undergone a vulnerable war, Haller is “caught between two eras”: a tranquil pre-war era and a post-war era (Hesse 24). The shift in era marks significant changes for Haller which ultimately leads him to becoming a Steppenwolf.

Being a Steppenwolf is a state of anxiety where Haller dwells in a delirium between being a man and a wolf. The unconscious wolf has barged into him because his country has been introduced to a new post-war era. However, his conscious mind wants its own space because of the dominance of the pre-war era prejudices. As a result, he has become “unworldly and withdrawn” from himself and the society (27). His body has become unresponsive to the new era and his soul has been diseased. In other words, his life has become an epitome of suffering.

Every age will take certain kinds of suffering for granted, will patiently accept certain wrongs. Human life becomes a real hell of suffering only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap. Now, there are times when a whole generation gets caught to such an extent between two styles of life, that nothing comes naturally to it since it has lost all sense of morality, security, and innocence. (23)

The process of two ages coming to a point of intersection holds a higher significance for Steppenwolf who shows discontent towards the change. At the time when entire Germans are applauding war, he is one of the least who is unsupportive to the commencement of the
mechanical age which is to wage another war. Insisting that human beings have been living their life on pretence, doing chores without really wanting to do, he argues on their hopeless existence which have become “grotesquely questionable…and barren” (Hesse 84).

With the introduction of newer era, and getting caught between different styles of life, the knowledge of existence is changed and the meaning of morality and ethics are altered. Thus, unable to cope up with the scenarios, Haller ends up as a “Steppenwolf”: “wolf of the steeps” (3). The name, thus, symbolizes his psychological duality.

Haller could have escaped the duality had he understood the impermanent functioning of a leadership or a discourse. All the “organized habits and opinions of the masses” are a product of an aggrandized manipulation (Bernays 9). Thus, neither the habits nor the opinions can hold its permanence. He is not able to understand that what he believes as right is simply an output of manipulation. Bernays claims in Propaganda that our minds, tastes, ideas, and habits are all governed and are not a product of free will. However, Haller’s rigidity towards change, here, suggests his rigidity towards previously manipulated thoughts and opinions which has ceased to function in the period of intersection between eras.

Within intersections, two opposites meet and a greater chaos is likely to commence. At this stage, anybody can to undergo through “progressive isolation and emotional decay” given that s/he prioritizes his/her conscious (rationality) over unconscious. Prioritizing consciousness is synonyms to valorizing “a knowledge of their existence and their activities” (Chase 116). Given that the conscious part of the mind adheres with the pre-existing understanding of ethics, morality and existence, one is not able to understand the processing of collective unconscious that plays a major role in shaping an era.

Thus, this situation of detaining oneself from the period reflects his inability to be a part of the crowd. For instance, in case of Steppenwolf, he is among the minimal who hates war. However, entire Germany, along with the medias, are in favour of Kaiser who is,
according to Steppenwolf, responsible for waging war. He blames “[T]he Kaiser, the generals, the big industrialists, the politicians, the press” for “ten million slaughtered men…lying buried in the ground” (Hesse 126). This act of blaming for atrocity stresses the impasse of his psychological state.

However, the act of holding responsibilities to the leaders seems quite obvious because leaders play a major role in modifying, demolishing, or re-building a political state in a country. Le Bon stresses upon the vital role of the founders of any religion or empires, or a pioneer groups, or statemen, for establishing mastery upon a crowd. This crowd is not a scattered crowd but an accumulated crowd that looks forward for a change. They are easily manipulated by leaders who “have always been unconscious psychologists, possessed of an instinctive and often very sure knowledge of the character of crowds, and it is their accurate knowledge of this character that has enabled them to so easily establish their mastery” (Le Bon xxii). Bernays also asserts the leaders as a first impulse to shape the mind of people.

There are a small set of people in a “democratic society” whom he calls “invisible government” who “understands the manipulation of the public opinion” (Bernays 9-92). In another word, whether in a rebellious or a democratic society, leaders play a major role in forming the collective unconscious. Regarding the finding, two features of a leader must be held in account: 1) that a leader penetrates into the unconscious of the crowd. 2) that a leader looks forward to reveal the instinctive part of the crowd. The first feature leads to the second one.

Unconsciousness is also being focused by Foucault in his archeological approach towards history. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, he argues that the “sovereignty of collective consciousness” has become a prime aspect for “the principle of unity” which has become a traditional way of approaching a history (22). He rejects history as an output of unified consciousness. Instead, he develops an archaelogical approach which looks at the
breaks and ruptures in-between; thus, valorizing the discontinuities. These very discontinuities have worked as “possibility of unconscious functioning” which means “hidden, inaccessible rules, codes and beliefs” that has not been studied in traditional approach of history, also known as history of ideas (Downing 10). This history of ideas is, according to Michel Foucault, an output of valorization of consciousness on looking towards a history.

Thus, interpreted so far, Le Bon has prioritized the unconscious through the psychological study of manipulating crowd whereas Foucault has departed from the historians who has created a conscious history. According to both the theorists, unconscious plays a major role in forming and establishing an era. And this formation cannot be reached by a conscious mind. Despite their prioritization on the unconscious mind and the collective unconscious, Haller seems to be reluctant to dissolve himself in the mass of Le Bon where consciousness dissolves and no rationality exists, or, in Bernays’ words, where a different conscience is created through manipulation.

Le Bon, focused on the nature of communist/socialist crowd, talks about the vanishing state of rationality at the moment of rebellion. The crowd which is devoid of rationality obeys the leader who works on collective unconscious of the mass; thereby manipulating their consciousness. The same formula also applies to a democratic mass. According to Bernays, “the conscious and intelligent manipulation” of a mass “is an important element in democratic society” (Bernays 9). And this manipulation is possible through propaganda which is defined as “an organized effort to spread a particular belief od doctrine” (20). Thus, either it be a communist/socialist crowd or a democratic mass, people are prone to psychological diversions reaching to it through a collective unconscious which marks changes in their thoughts and habits. And the one who understands the method may become reluctant to dissolve in the crowd.
Haller’s reluctance seems to be worthwhile because Haller has somehow understood the functioning of a leader. He has known that the Kaiser has struck at the unconscious and instinctual part of the citizens. While the entire crowd favours the mechanical modern life and waging of another war, he is consciously aware that the crowd is “being manipulated every day, admonished, incited, made to feel anger and discontent” (Hesse 127). Haller is troubled on how everybody chooses to take part in the crowd despite knowing that its direction has led astray.

All this is clear and simple enough for anybody to grasp; anyone could reach the same conclusion after merely an hour’s reflection. But nobody wants to, nobody wants to avoid the next war, none of them want to spare themselves and their children the next bloody slaughter of millions, if the price they have to pay is to reflect for an hour, to look into their own hearts and ask to what extent they themselves have a share in and are responsible for the chaps and evil in the world. None of them are prepared to do this! And that’s the reason things will go on as before. (127)

Haller’s wondering, however, on the other hand, blurs his understanding on knowing a leader. The point here is: a leader doesn’t just manipulate a crowd. But the crowd allow themselves to be manipulated. To clarify, any individual may have a conscious personality in an isolated form but once s/he gets to be in a crowd, the consciousness vanishes. In other words, “isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian – that is, a creature acting by instinct” (Le Bon 13). The disappearing of conscious mind is justified by Bernays in a different way: re-shaping the conscious mind. He believes that people’s voices are the output of their mind’s state and “that mind is made for it by the group leaders” who understand the ways of deviating public conscience (Bernays 92). Here, Bernays supports Le Bon’s idea that leaders are the master mind behind manipulation of crowds.
Steppenwolf is anxietic of the formation of the crowds who have become warmongers. However, he has not submerged himself into the crowd. An undeniably significant question is likely to raise here: why, despite the overlapping of era, has Steppenwolf refrained from the ideology of crowd? And, most importantly, how do the crowds form in first place? Le Bon and Bernays believe that formation of crowd is mainly done by a group or leaders or small number of people by making change in civilian’s conscience.

Le Bon also may have indirectly answered to the latter question by showing the importance of getting back to the human instincts. French theorist Foucault also believes in different discursive formations although, rather than talking about instincts, he focuses on his own version of genealogy: an inspiration from Nietzsche. Despite the differences, both theorists’ disbelief for reason shows them somewhat similar. Le Bon believes that “crowds, doubtless, are always unconscious, but this very unconsciousness is perhaps one of the secrets of their strength…. Reason is an attribute of humanity of too recent dare and still too imperfect to reveal to us the laws of the unconscious, and still more to take its place. The part played by the unconscious in all our acts is immense, and that played by reason very small” (124). Here, Le Bon subordinates the conscious mind. Hence, also proving why all the characters except Haller undergo through least of the problem in the transitional phase. To be specific, Haller’s rigidity in pre-war conscience and his alarming conscience for war has made him depressive.

Furthermore, Foucault also subordinates conscious mind, prioritising discontinuities rather than linearity. This marks up Foucauldian genealogical investigations that all our naturalized way of thinking “is not natural but the product of force-relations, not universal but historically contingent, and most importantly, not inevitable but transformable” (Karademir 385). This subordination, thus, sets reasoning in marginalization. The act of
reasoning, the established truths, the beliefs, the knowledges are not stable but are the “result of unpredictable epistemic changes and ruptures” (Downing 39). And these changes are brought by crowds as seen in the novel. Despite the change, Haller despises the beliefs of crowds which is also traced in the beginning of the novel through his display of nostalgia for preceding events of his life.

The novel begins with editor’s preface where the speaker introduces the readers to Steppenwolf. Steppenwolf is, for him, a traveler to an alien world, who has rented his aunt’s house only for some months but has lodged for about ten months (Hesse 5). Also, he gives an account of Steppenwolf upon his first sight as a sick person who had hardships in walking. The speaker who was, at the first sight, indomitably erratic about Steppenwolf eventually comes to an understanding about him as a lone wolf who has compulsively become a part of city-dwellers. Ultimately, the speaker comes to understand Steppenwolf’s “wary isolation, his wildness, his restlessness, his homelessness and his yearning for home” (Hesse 18). The yearning is further verified as Steppenwolf compliments the speaker’s aunt that he finds a good smell residing in the house. The aunt interprets his longing for smell as a nostalgia. This nostalgia is significant in two terms.

First, the dwelling in nostalgia signifies his prioritization upon his pre-occupied conscious mind. This feeling or this state of Steppenwolf can be said to be a consequence driven by his ability to reasoning that is regulated by the conscious mind. If all the contemporary practices are an output of prevailing power and discourses, and if they are prone to changeability, use of reasoning upon such impermanence which can undergo unanticipated subversion is also futile and also destructive socially and psychologically. On top of that, Foucault’s emphasis on the “role of power in the constitution of knowledge” takes away the liberty of ultimate freedom of an individual who only exists as a subject (Schneck 28). In such scenarios, one needs to adapt oneself, keeping reasons at bay. Steppenwolf tries
to get along the era making some friends but still cannot succeed because of his inability to get into the collective unconscious of the mass. And, this inability is developed because of his ability of reasoning.

Consequently, he has become a suspect and a subject of disdain to the citizens of his country. Even the young professor who had once admired him regarding his competence on oriental mythologies finds Haller unequivocally abominable. The professor feels that Haller has no loyalty to the Fatherland because he mocks his Kaiser and holds responsibility to his own country for waging war (86). On the one hand, the professor takes him as a traitor for not acknowledging the attempt to wage next war, while, on the other hand, Steppenwolf feels deserted by his own Fatherland.

They [Germans] are being manipulated every day, admonished, incited, made to feel anger and discontent. And the aim and purpose of it all is yet again war…. I have no Fatherland left and no ideals…. There is no point in turning over good thoughts in one’s head because for every two or three people who do so there are…a thousand newspapers, magazines, speeches, public and secret meetings that are all striving to achieve the opposite. (126-127)

Steppenwolf is seen resistant to the newer era because, for him, this change is an epitome of ruin and destruction. And his existing belief is the result of consciously ignoring the currents of the era. In other words, he is reluctant to the truths which the crowd have shaped lately.

Secondly, this nostalgia does not only attribute to his deserted profession and abandoned wife but also to the preceding pre-war era. This lost home belongs to all of those humanely achievements and intellectual attempts, reduced to a “fairground farce” in a present context. It may not be compulsively reduced as a farce but because of the destructive war that has culminated and also because of an attempt to wage next war, it seems to Steppenwolf that all his opinions and intellect which had once made him popular has become “so degenerate
and decadent that people found them suspect” (74). This marks an obvious conclusion that he had not shifted his way of life according to the currents of the era where people had shifted themselves.

Because of inconsistencies of the validity of ideas or belief, it is likely for Steppenwolf to be standing as a suspect. He has a natural presumption that what he believes is the truth and will remain true in a perennial state. Hence, he believes that war declines the state of humanity. However, his inability to comprehend his being in a transitional phase and understand that any truthful beliefs or inevitable ideas may “seem to some future epoch, entirely random and laughable” marks his inability to understand the role of unconscious and nature of truth (Downing 10). His hatred towards war has made the professor whom he met, find him a disobedient citizen who doesn’t respect his nation. War has become a slogan for jingoism and modern style of life style has become the standard way of living. However, Steppenwolf finds war as an epitome of destruction and modern lifestyle as, like the Luddites, mechanical and therefore rootless.

His loathsome approach on war and modern lifestyle seems justified with Le Bon’s study of crowd. Because crowds let themselves to be manipulated, it is itself an output of a leader’s or a group’s propaganda. Hence, a crowd doesn’t have a pioneering belief of its own. This marks up their unpredictability for the mobility and changeability of their thoughts which can be summed up as “total absence of any sort of direction of opinion, and at the same time the destruction of general beliefs” (Le Bon 161). Furthermore, the contingency of ideas is also one of the basic study of Le Bon. If ideas and beliefs were permanent, there would be no reason for the formation of crowd. Le Bon stresses on a validity of certain ideas over a certain period. Certain ideas which had been entertainted in one era will be rejected at the another (77). This is also, as discussed earlier, the concern of Foucault.
In other words, Haller is resistive to the changes seen in the period. This very resistance, according to Foucault, is inevitable though futile because a subject is always entangled in power relations and imposition of power leads an individual to become a subject (The Subject and Power 777-790). A free entity named ‘individual’ does not simply exist. Moreover, Foucault insisted that power doesn’t serve the interests of a specific subject (Schneck 25). And because discourse and power are inter-related, one should also accept the changes brought in general notions of understanding. For example, war was against morality in the pre-war era but post-war era marks upcoming war as a moral, economic, and political support to the Fatherland. Therefore, Steppenwolf’s resistance towards power is futile.

Here, reason behind the futility of resistance must be understood. For Foucault, resistance is an adversary of power but that doesn’t mean that they are quite the opposite poles. Power creates “rational, responsible, productive subjects” and resistance is “what threatens power” (Pickett 458). Despite, these two “ontologically correlative terms” are concomitant to create social changes (Heller 99). In the novel, Steppenwolf resists the post-war ideologies and the state resists his pre-war sentiments. In this case, both resists each other to implement their power. However, state’s resistance is recognized as “power” whereas Steppenwolf’s action as “resistance”. Resistance is also a particular form of power but is differentiated from the implementation of power. Kevin John Heller clarifies Foucault’s concept on these two terms:

Why, then, if resistance is nothing more than a particular form of power, does Foucault consistently employ the term “resistance”? I have already intimated Foucault’s answer: because, due to his political commitments, he chooses to privilege certain categories of power-exercising subjects over others, most often subject-categories that have the ability to exercise less power than their rivals – the power exercised by prisoners, workers, by the “perverse,” by
students, and so on. These forms of power are “resistances” for Foucault, because they are lesser forms of power. (99)

This very resistance may answer his question as he asks to himself in frustration after meeting the young professor – “What had managed to reduce me – inspired youth, man of letters, lover of the arts, widely travelled man and ardent idealist – to such a sorry state…. How had I ended up, my heart empty, in this filthy hellhole of despair” (Hesse 49)? Despite being a well-educated and experienced man, he suffers because of the lack of anticipation of power politics and the discourse. This has also led to duality of his mind.

Furthermore, this duality of Haller is also equivalent to madness. In other words, madness is also an impact which can be traced in Haller during the transitional era. Haller is given a notebook named “Steppenwolf’s Treatise” at the first part of the book and at the later part he is given an entry to “Dark Theatre”. Both the notebook and the theatre are only accessible for the mad people as it is written as the book begins: For Mad People Only. His madness can be further verified with the notion of madness in modern era. Foucault makes an analytical study on madness in his book *Madness and Civilization* arguing the changing notion of madness from the Middle Ages to the Classical era. Unlike in Renaissance, madness, in Classical period, is equivalent to animals who were at times “elevated to spectacle” for public’s delight and at other time “seized with fits of violence…chained like dogs at their cell doors” (*Madness and Civilization* 65-68). Whereas the madmen in Renaissance wandered freely in ship of fools, those in Classical era are confined for bestiality.

During the classical period, madness was shown, but on the other side of bars…under the eyes of a reason that no longer felt any relation to it….

Madness had become a thing to look at…an animal with strange mechanisms, a bestiality from which man had long since been suppressed…. Unchained
animality could be mastered only by discipline…to an ultimate obedience.

(66-71)

The extract marks up the advent of madness in three consecutive conditions: 1) devoid of reasons, 2) confined to being an animal, 3) lack of obedience. The second condition, undoubtedly, echoes the state of Haller as Steppenwolf; hence verifying his madness. However, the first and the third conditions are, too, equally prevalent in Steppenwolf because of his dualism. To clarify it, residing in a transitional era, he sticks to the preceding definition of humanity. He still believes humanity can be saved by avoiding war while majority of the citizens supports Kaiser and his efforts towards war. Haller is unable to understand that any specific definition or specific discipline have “very little importance in the internal changes of scientific disciplines” (Rabinow 4). Thus, Steppenwolf is viewed as “a traitor without any allegiance to Fatherland” because of his anti-disciplinary thoughts towards nation (Hesse 86).

As the operation of power plays a vital role in operating knowledge and discourse, Haller can either submit himself to the direction of power or become Steppenwolf. As a third approach, he can retaliate by creating a greater form of mass in a form of rebellion. While retaliating, he becomes resistive to the power which can be overcome if his force of resistance is greater than the mass supporting the power. But, he can neither appreciate nor retaliate. Also, because an individual is “both subject to and the subjects of the workings of power relations”, he simply cannot flee from it (Downing 2). In this scenario, the greater mass which has been accumulated sees his reasoning as traitor-like thoughts. His anti-war reasonings have become, for the greater mass, devoid of reasoning in the present context.

Thus, his madness is justified in all of the three terms. This verification can be backed up by his own belief that he has become mad. On his first encounter with Hermione, a paramour, in a pub named The Black Eagle, he says, “I don’t need you to tell me I am mad” (96). Some months before the encounter with her, he questions to himself after waking up
from a failed suicide: “Had I not been enough of an outsider, mad enough, for years” (77)? Also, his confession to the young professor and his wife that he is a schizophrenic buttress the fact that he had been suffering from madness (88).

His schizophrenic state is not elongated in the novel in a direct way such as by visiting a doctor or going for some counselling but it is clear from the recurring act of listening to and visualizing the dead poets and musicians such as Goethe and Mozart that he may be actually suffering from the disorder. Furthermore, amidst the pandemonium of the iniquitous war, with catastrophes lurking everywhere, the slipshod protagonist struggles against his psychological incoherencies consisting of “exaggerations of relatively normal fears, fantasies, and mood-states” which is prevalent in Haller (Sass 17). Feeling of immense despair, numerous attempts of suicide, restlessness, lack of belief and faith on the outside world marks up the primary steps towards madness.

I took a moment’s rest in a dreary pub on the outskirts of town, drinking brandy and water, then walked on again, hounded by my demons, up and down the steep, crooked lanes of the Old Town, along the tree-lined avenues, across the station square. Get away from here, I thought, and went in to the station where I stared at the timetables on the walls, drank some wine and tried to gather my thoughts…. I could not avoid that moment when, returning to …my flat…I had to sharpen my razor and cut my throat…. I could see no other way out; nausea, pain and despair were piled up around me; nothing was now capable of attracting me or giving me joy and hope. (Hesse 91)

The extract shows a direct effect of transitional phase on Haller. This “restlessness, agitation, excitement” which “exist[ed] in great quantity in the schizophrenic state” accounts to normal breakdown in Haller (Kantor 236). The transition in the era brought by war and the modernization had greater impacts on people during the era. The demographic shifts to
urbanization, labelled as “frantic, traumatic and anomic”, is confirmed, through the case study of Faris and Dunham, as a major contributor to the “development of schizophrenia” (Eaton 289). In case of Haller, despite war, he also complains about the mechanical lifestyle of people. He claims that people’s activities have become mechanical and are not fostered according to their will.

According to Haller, the era has shifted to becoming a warfare between human and machine. He fantasizes having all the factories set to fire and putting an end of every vehicles. He reveals his wish of “depopulating the populated earth so that grass might grow again and dust-filled concrete jungle might give way to things such as woods, meadows, heaths, streams and marshland” (Hesse 196). Thus, Haller, here, can be termed one of the victims; a sufferer of discursive formation.

Fortunately, as the story proceeds, readers find Haller’s disorder subsiding after meeting Hermione in the pub. Believing that she is protective towards him, he begins to obey her orders. Hermione, in this stage, does not follow the war-mongering modern crowd. Quite contrarily, she despises the war and the transitional phase. She has accepted that the world has become fanatical and it no more belongs to her. Despite her disdain, she has spared from being resistive. At a point of time, she tells him, “I am not going to worry about the war and the press any more” (128). Eventually, in her contact, he finds himself as a child being born in the transitional era. However, in the end, it is found that he is still unable to get rid of preceding ideas, beliefs and prejudices that comprised of his ‘personality’.

As discussed earlier, the madness in Classical era, equivalent to animality, can only be mastered by inculcating discipline in the victim and by making him obedient. Foucault also discusses in Discipline and Punish the “political investment of the body” maintain the fact that a body is itself an outcome of political anatomy (The Body of the Condemned 175). He argues about the change in process of treating madness through appropriate governmentality
in the classical era. Human beings were composed of a beguiling body who were not free to exercise his/her freewill. Foucault writes:

The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it. A “political anatomy,” which was also a “mechanics of power,” was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed, and the efficiency that one determines. Thus, discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, “docile” bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). (182)

The extract provides two important concepts regarding the “docile bodies”. First, a body is a product of the mobilization by power. If any changes show upon a body, it is because of the implementation of power and the body has to acquiesce to the power because of its docility. Second, power implements discipline in a body to reduce resistance and enhance mobilization of a body in its own favour. And in cases such as of Steppenwolf’s, who opposes the currents of power, becomes an outcast being disdained by a greater mass. However, if his resistive forces were greater in number, he would have been the one implementing the power. But, because he falls in a minority of resistive forces and also because he declines to consent, his life has become an immense suffering.

Adding up, Hermione is also equally resistive to the transition that the era has invited. Narrating about her abandoned ambitions and shattered dreams justifies how miserable her life has become. While talking about the miseries life has granted to her, she tells Haller, “the misery I went through was perhaps more financial and moral, yours more intellectual and spiritual, but our journeys were the same” (163). While the discomforting Haller and
counselling Hermione have conversation, they conclude regarding other ages that is to come. Hermione’s consent and Haller’s appreciation to appreciate the transition is revealed when she says: “In the ages like this the world is bound to look well and truly lousy. Let’s hope other ages were better and will be better again, richer, broader, deeper (164). Thus, after coming in contact with Hermione, Haller learns to agree with the ongoing transition to modernity. Here, quite ironically, Haller didn’t agree with the implementation of the state-level power but he agreed to submerge in the powers regulated by Hermione on him. Agreeing to Hermione’s orders, he displays a degree of obedience towards her. It had been “a long time” since he “last had to obey orders from somebody” (93). Thus, the madness seen from the state-level power implementation is tamed through the governmentality of Hermione. This governmentality or, in other words, this submissive attitude of Haller is what Foucault called in lectures at College de France during 1981-82 as ‘the turning to the self’.

Paradoxically, Foucault who confiscated hermeneutics from an individual, talks about the hermeneutics of the subject who has different approaches to turn towards the self. And, Foucault claims, turning towards the self is very important to approach the truth. Because his “historical analysis” is based on the “concepts of discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series, and transformation”, Foucault insists that a subject must know truths with the turn in time because truth changes with the change in discourse (The Archaeology of Knowledge 21). In other words, he is against the Cartesian movement that knowledge solely provides access to the truth and it cannot make an access to the truth (The Hermeneutics of the subject 17, 191). According to him, a subject must undergo certain forms of transformation to know the truth.

Taking a spiritual approach, Foucault makes an analytical study of antiquity showing how the notion of taking care of oneself had been a primary issue in every era; whether it be in Athens or in Rome. In January 6, 1982, during the lecture he talks about the pursuit in
Antiquity about inseparability between “the philosophical theme (how to have access to the truth?) and the question of spirituality (what transformations in the being of the subject are necessary for the access to the truth) (17). Here, Foucault argues on transforming oneself, though, remaining in the confinement of being a subject. His valourization upon antique approach of access to the truth justifies the point.

The approach confirms four ways of accessing the truth by turning to the self: i) technique of purification, ii) concentrating on soul, iii) withdrawal, and iv) endurance. The third and the fourth ways of turning to the self are mostly equivalent to the study of this paper because it is related with the obedience of Haller. Also understood as “the technique of visible absence”, withdrawal allows oneself to abstain from the ongoing world and detach him/herself with prevalent feelings and sensations (47). Also, Foucault traces the fourth way of turning to the self and accessing the truth which was begun in antique Athens and was also found followed in Roman stoicism. In Rome, withdrawal carried the same theme from that of Athens. Being visually absent, an individual “withdraws into himself and cuts himself off from the external world” (50). A least form of resistance which has lesser form of power undergo visible absence before a greater form of mass who stand for power. In case of the opposite, the outcome may be conflicting.

The scenario is equivalent with Haller who suffered endemic suffering while being resistive. After meeting Hermione, he was found withdrawing himself from the entire exterior world. Before that, he thought himself as a “pathologically exceptional case” because he had a feeling that people don’t understand him (Hesse 110). That feeling had previously arose from the unwelcoming advent of modernism. But, after the encounter with Hermione, he was assured that she is the one who understands him. It is revealed in her words:

I understand…your disgust with politics, your sadness at the way the parties and the press…kick up a fuss about things, your despair over wars, the one
that had just been and those still to come, and about modern habits of thinking, reading, building, making music, celebrating things, and providing education. It is impossible for anyone wishing to live and enjoy life in today’s world to be like you or me. It is no home…for people like us who, instead of nonsensical noise, demand music, instead of pleasure, joy; instead of money, soul; instead of industrial production, genuine labour; instead of frivolity, genuine passion. (163)

These soothing words from Hermione made him not only believe in her but also acted as his epiphanic moment as he knew he was not the only one resisting. These words also present a motion of withdrawing from the outer world because it no more belong to them. On top of that, her mentioning of lack of genuineness in modern world exactly matches Haller’s belief that people have become mechanical. Furthermore, Hermione calls him a ‘little boy’ symbolizing an urgent need to begin his life from different perspective. In other words, the need to convert himself was demanding. This follows his realization: “Perhaps I could start to live again, perhaps I could again become a human being. My soul having almost frozen to death in hibernation, was breathing again, drowsily flapping its small frail wings (110). This is the reason behind his submission towards Hermione and abstention from the external world.

Similarly, the fourth practice, technique of endurance holds a primary trait: not responding to the scenario. To clarify, this practice “enables one either to bear painful and hard ordeals or to resist temptations one may be offered” (*The Hermeneutics of the Subject* 48). Here, “to resist” stands for resisting the urge of resistance towards the politics of power. Without having built this ability, Haller had ruined the invitation of the young professor by shouting at him and his wife for admiring and displaying the “tasteless, adulterated and saccharine picture” of Goethe which was for him a totally modernized form of the real
Goethe (Hesse 98). However, after a gradual progression on relation with Hermione, he begins enduring the prevalent changes thinking it as “just a present-day sickness, a temporary misfortune” (164). At the end, after coming out of the “Magic Theatre” where, as discussed earlier, only mad people are allowed an entry, he comes to realize that he still hadn’t dissolved his personality, his preceding beliefs. Thus, the resistive Haller eventually becomes dissolved in the uprising power becoming appreciative to the notion of turning to the self. Though he is not yet satisfied, he has given up his urge to resist against modernity and warfare at least.

To conclude, advent of modernism in the transitional phase is a sole reason for Haller’s psychological duality and social segregation. The introduction of modernism backed up by great war has created “inadequacy of standard meanings and habitual constructions of reality” bewildering the conscience of Haller (Sass 55). His inability to get into the collective unconscious of the crowd have bestowed him immense suffering. Losing his professional status and family, Haller tries to soothe himself by moving to the newer place, however, his inability to flee from the inevitability of power-politics keeps him desperate.

Furthermore, his inability to understand the contingent nature of leadership and his rigidity towards change proves his inability to understand the futility of resistance towards discursive formation. Also, his rationality has made him unable to get dissolved in the crowd and therefore cannot welcome the established truths in the transitional phase. This also reflects his inability to understand nature of truth as instable and prone to change.

Despite this, the war mongering modern crowd in the novel (Steppenwolf) has a similar behavior to Le Bon’s portrayal of formation of communists/socialist crowds. Le Bon, in his book, portrays the “pitiable state of anarchy” in countries run by socialists and acclaim the countries run under “democratic institutions” with prosperity (83). But, the crowd formed in the nation of Haller is not a communist or a socialist crowd and yet hanker after blood
thirsty wars and mechanical way of lifestyle. Le Bon’s act of preserving democracies or capitalists is further answered by Foucault when he affirms that any sorts of power, when implemented, works on docile bodies and undergo political operation. And, submission to the power is known to be disciplined. In the context of the book, people submit themselves to grotesque act such as war because they are disciplined (submissive) to the state-level power. The moment they are undisciplined, they are likely to become Steppenwolf.

To get rid of his dilemmic life, Haller becomes disciplined by obeying Hermione whom he takes as a source of power in his life. And, because of Hermione’s passive submission to the state-level power, Haller ceases to resist the upcoming calamity created in the transitional phase. He tries to turn to his self by submerging his rigid personality by withdrawing himself from the outer world and enduring the contemporary changes.

Here, his later submission towards the change after coming in contact with Hermione is very significant. His disdain to the social world and his inclination for alienation is dismantled by Hermione through the application of discipline on him. Despite his unassertive inclusion to sociability, he eventually becomes oriented towards social life such as singing, dancing, going to pub with Hermione, Maria and Pablo et cetera. This change confirms the presence of his manipulated conscience. In another words, his pre-existing norms, values and prejudices are molded with the change in period.

Thus, the paper shows the significance of psychological and political aspects in social formation. In other words, the primary action behind discursive formation is forming a crowd, accumulated or not, by altering their conscience. Haller, who does not appreciate change is liable to undergo social and psychological alienation. His repulsion towards the crowd keeps him in despair until he submits himself to Hermione for maintaining discipline by obeying her.
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