

## Chapter I

### Introduction

This research paper is an attempt to present Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of modernity and the relevance of his ideas to modern age. Nietzsche situates the sense of critique as the pursuit maturity through the reflection on 'modern ideas'. It has implications for breeding mature and autonomous individuals in modernity.

*Beyond Good and Evil* demonstrates Nietzsche's mature critique of modernity. Nietzsche aims to move individuals from prejudice in favour of truthfulness, to a new measure of nobility. For this matter, he begins by philosophy itself. He strives to gain a comprehensive perspective on the world and on the human disposition toward the world, a perspective that can claim to be life-enhancing, life-promoting even species-cultivating. As a consequence, Nietzsche turns to political philosophy in an effort to structure humanity—ethically and politically—according to this perspective. To accomplish this task, Nietzsche enters into a spiritual and intellectual war with the legacy of Plato, who laid the foundation of Western civilization. Plato posited the existence of the good-as-such, which was not good of him but good-in-itself, and built a moral universe around this. For Nietzsche, this moral universe breeds weakness and nihilism, which he seeks to overcome in order to promote human greatness. Unlike Plato, Nietzsche does not hide behind moral fictions. He speaks the truth about the world—that fundamentally its character is will to power and nothing else besides: “wherever I found things there found I the will to power and even in the will of the servant found I the will to be master (TSZ 108). Nietzsche does not conceal the ugly and dangerous ramifications of will to power.

The dogmatic philosopher seeks the true but recoil from the truths he finds, truths that are considered too dangerous and uncomfortable. He embraces the noble lie of a true and constant world beyond this one as the only way to justify suffering. The passionate

search for truth is exposed as the noble lie and with it all claims to truth. Man, therefore, whose essence is to grow and to struggle, is in danger of perishing from a lack of ideals for which he may sacrifice himself. It is at this fateful moment in the history of man that Nietzsche sets for himself the task of returning man to hard and terrifying truths of nature that the long history of Western philosophy has striven to conceal. Nietzsche “has found the exit out of millennia of labyrinth” (BGE 23).

Nietzsche rejects all moral absolutes. He directs harsh criticism on philosophy as it has been practiced, particularly in its assertion that truth is good and beneficial. Nietzsche accuses philosophers of not having understood the problem with will to truth; the will to truth is essentially a way of denying the apprehension of truths of things; it is enemy of both truth and will. He takes philosophers as the very incarnation of this ideal of will-less knower. Nietzsche raises doubts about truth and even his own teaching. As he writes: “there might be a more laudable truthfulness in every little question mark that you place after your special words and favourite doctrines (and occasionally after yourself) than in all the solemn gestures and trumps before accusers and law courts” (BGE 36). Nietzsche wants philosophers to learn how to love a womanly truth. While dogmatic philosophers have sought to know truth as objective truth, Nietzsche teaches that to love truth properly is to possess it as a gentleman possesses a woman. For a philosopher to love truth as a gentleman loves woman requires powers of seduction, for truth as a woman, must give herself willingly in love. New philosophers submit to womanly truth and freely offers himself in “noble bondage to the higher” (BGE 269). At the same time, however, the new philosopher takes truth as his own and acts on its behalf. “the real man ‘master by nature,’ protects and defends truth out of compassion, compassion for humanity, the species with the ambiguous stance toward truth” (285). In coming to love truth—that is, in loving the will to power and with it the world of chance, chaos, danger,

and suffering—the philosopher expresses his gratitude for life and his compassion for man by freely and nobly giving himself to rule and master nature and the world. Out of love for truth, as for new philosophers, the seekers of truth must seek to raise man up to the hard rule of truth, the enhancement of the species in conformity with will to power. Thus, Nietzsche suggests a new approach, a philosophy that is rooted in ugly truth that life itself is will to power.

Nietzsche claims that philosophy is always from a perspective thus, the values are not objective or universal, they arise from human activity of evaluating. This claim undermines the dogmatic philosopher's claim to objectivity. Objectivity is revealed as the hypocrisy of scientific attitude. The quest for objectivity is irresponsible as it ignores its effects and justifies such irresponsibility on the grounds of truthfulness. Nietzsche's claim for impossibility of objectivity is a call for a new responsibility for the effects of offering interpretations. His opposition to philosopher's claim to grasp the world objectively can be found in his doctrine of perspectivism. Nietzsche believes there is no single position from which we interact with the world, there are competing positions from which we receive competing and conflicting interpretations; the world is interpretable in various ways; it does not have meaning behind it, rather countless meanings. Nietzsche's ideas consistent with perspectivism seek to open the path new ways of evaluating among perspectives. Thus, perspectives are left to show their superiority on the ground of how far they are valuable for life. If there is no objective truth, if all human judgments are nothing more than interpretations, then Nietzsche concludes that we should live with a spirit of experimentalism.

As his pursuit to critique modernity, Nietzsche attacks on modern values and institutions, part of his great politics designed to revalue all values. One of the great complaints of Nietzsche against the modern age is the way Christian and post-Christian

equality doctrines have dominated the modern ideas and the way they have discouraged the superior types of individual from recognizing their greatness. It is essentially the slave revolt against the egoistic assertion of noble types evident in its moral designations. The slave revolt manifests itself in act of spiritual revenge; the good are recast as evil. The strength, ego, will are defined as evil and denial of power, victory, independence are acknowledged as truly good. According to Nietzsche, it is the attitude of the oppressed that becomes creative, which is wholly different from the creative will of the noble. With the noble, good is affirmative of self and of will. With the oppressed, good is suppression of self and will. It is not, says Nietzsche, that the denial of will is good, even though current moral sensibilities still hold to this. Thus definition of good and evil arises out of a spirit of resentment against those who have enjoyed their creative power of their will over others. As Nigel Tubbs quotes in *Philosophy's Higher Education*:

The slave revolt in humanity begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values... while every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside,' what is 'different,' what is not 'itself;' and this No is its creative deed. (125)

Nietzsche diagnoses that this natural ideology of the reactive is authentically Christian ideology, it establishes the negative to establish and preserve its own power, established by turning life against itself and preserved through the phantom of affirmation. In this regard, the goal of the reactive man is nothing, for the separation of active force from what it can do overcomes affirmation. In the noble the active is commander and reactive is obeyer, when the reactive prevails over the active as for the oppressed, the slaves, the inferior types, then the obeyer obeys a different form of force, the force of 'ressentiment.' When the slaves (reactive) obeys this force, it ceases to act,

this is why, slave morality, for Nietzsche, is nihilism or will to nothingness. Even when they react, they do not react stronger than activity, they are non-actors. As Nietzsche makes clear in *The Use and Abuse of History*, the man of prodigious memory is the man farthest from activity and the man therefore of deepest 'ressentiment'. As such its relation to the object is one of revenge, for it blames the object for the infinite delay in activity, rather than its own state of mind. Thus, the man of 'ressentiment' experiences every being and objects as an offence in exact proportion to its effects on him. As Nigel Tubbs mentions in *Philosophy's Higher Education*:

*Ressentiment* is the triumph of the weak as weak, the revolt of the slave and their victory as slaves. It is in their victory that the slaves form a type. The type of the master (the active type) is defined in terms of the faculty of forgetting and power of acting reactions. The type of the slave (the reactive type) is defined by a prodigious memory, by the power of *ressentiment*.... (108-109)

The victory of resentment, of the reactive is nihilism, when life as active is opposed by the negative as value, then the negative has already triumphed. This nihilism can be overcome

only by transvaluation of value which is based in Nietzsche's conception of will to power.

A reiteration: if Christianity represents the triumph of the slave morality, then its values are nothing more than life-denying products of 'ressentiment' Nietzsche writes: "From the start, the Christian faith is a sacrifice: a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit..." (BGE 60). Nietzsche senses the greatest danger for humanity in the non-egoistical instincts, the instinct for compassion self-denial, and self sacrifice which Christianity and above all Schopenhauer has constantly glorified. He asserts that the inclination towards self-denial is cruelty towards the self. It suppresses the

expression and enhancement of the self. It attributes over importance to selfless acts like pity, empathy, sympathy and its cognate emotions which promote denial of individuals own concerns and individuality. Nietzsche infers that the religion of self-denial, self-sacrifice finally results in paralysis of will which, according to Nietzsche, is the cause of the overall moderation of abilities of modern men. The exaggeration of self-denial suppresses the expression and enhancement of the higher species of men. Thus Nietzsche comes to a dramatic conclusion: “self-denial and modest self-effacement would not be a virtue but a waste of virtue” (BGE 149).

Nietzsche infers that the religion of self-denial, pity and its cognate emotions is essentially slave revolt in morality. It is the weak; the oppressed who seek to feel powerful by subordinating others. It is the symptom of vanity in modern individuals. Nietzsche says that vanity derives from a dearth of self-love, and this inability to affirm and love the self characterizes the slavish mentality. As he says: “with weak and impotent people it [*ressentiment*] occurs without fail (qtd. in Abbey 44). Because vain individuals are unable to take pleasure in themselves, they look for the confirmation of their worth. The dependence of their self-esteem on opinion of others contrasts markedly with the autonomy of higher types.

Nietzsche depicts modern men as a herd of sick, degenerate, contemptible non-individuals. He scrutinizes that the overall degradation of modern men to a herd animal is the result of their long inherited moral values and ideas that have essentially subjected them to the service of other than self-development. Nietzsche discerns a necessary antagonism between the care of the self and concern for others.

Nietzsche’s practical interest for eroding the faith in the religion self-denial, pity and its cognate emotions is to expand the space for an ethic of care of the self. It is only through the perfection of the self and mastery over the self can individuals achieve

maturity. Thus, Nietzsche feels the need for care of the self in modern age.

Against the victory of nihilism, Nietzsche posits the values of noble man. Overcoming nihilism is a new way of feelings and thinking. It is not even the higher man for it differs in nature from all men; it is from man that overcoming and transvaluation emerge. Nietzsche posits new judgments predicated on the criterion of nobility on which his own philosophy is based, he sets new judgments which lie beyond good and evil. The value judgment beyond good and evil lies at the questioning of the values. Nietzsche strives for the transvaluation from the knowledge of value to the value of knowledge.

Nietzsche seeks to create the new nobility describing their relationship to society and their task of creating values. Nietzsche's new philosophers represent the virtues of nobility. The new philosophers do not speak very often of the good, even as he openly speaks of the problem of truth. They are not like dogmatic philosophers. The will to truth in new philosopher's manifests will to power. "Actual philosophers... are commanders and law givers... their knowing is creating, their creating is law-giving, their will to truth is will to power" (BGE 211). They qualify themselves for independence and command.

Nietzsche's new judgment based on the criterion of nobility takes human life and its capacity as the measure of it. It takes responsibility to consider the effects of its judgment. The new criterion of judgment, nobility, is not simply and individual's thought experiment, its value comes with how far it is valuable for life. Nietzsche's ultimate aim to critique modernity is to develop the ethic of humanity against the pessimism of the prevailing moral frameworks.

### **Rationale of 'Critique of Modernity'**

By 'critique of modernity' the present researcher means Nietzschean pursuit to critique those ideas of modern age which are inconsistent with the modern life. The researcher takes recourse to Nietzsche's autobiographical work, *Ecce Homo*, where he

comments on *Beyond Good and Evil* as a critique of modernity:

In all essential points, this book (1886) is a criticism of *modernity*, including modern science, modern art, even modern politics, along with some indications as to a contrasting type which would be as little modern man as possible, a noble, a yea-saying type. In this latter sense the book as a *school for gentlemen* the term here being used with a much more spiritual and radical significance than it has ever had before. Even to endure the idea one must be physically courageous, one must never have learned fear. All those things on which the age prides itself are felt as conflicting with the type mentioned; they are looked upon almost in the light of bad manners. Among these things are our far-famed ‘objectivity,’ ‘sympathy with all that suffers,’ .... (114-115)

All these ideas on which the age takes pride in itself are explored as the prejudices of the age. The ‘modern ideas’ are conflicting with the values of noble types of man in whom the humanity resides.

Nietzsche’s mature critique of modernity demonstrates the self-overcoming of the prejudices of the age to free individuals from prejudices in favour of truthfulness. In *Literary Theory and Criticism* Kathleen Kerr defines modernity as “an inaugural moment instigating a conclusive break with tradition” (365). Nietzsche’s understanding of modernity as “the will to truth becoming conscious of itself as a problem” (Owen 3) also points to the recognition that individuals must be free prejudices of the age for maturity of the self. Nietzsche recognizes that we have various needs and not one unified need with regard to universal phenomena. On this ground, Nietzsche postulates the doctrine of perspectivism to correct the theories about how we know the world; it is an attempt to evaluate the values in relation to self and world. Thus, he abolishes the ground of



transcendental values and problematizes the will to truth as a problem in itself.

Nietzsche critiques modernity in the way of the enlightenment thinkers like Kant who endeavoured to free his age from prejudices. Therefore, the researcher feels the need to clarify the concept of Nietzschean ‘Critique of Modernity’ in close connection with Kant.

Kant defines enlightenment as “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” (Pandey 15). For him, tutelage is “man’s inability to make use of his understanding without the direction from others...its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another” (Pandey 15). Thus, Kant identifies enlightenment with maturity having reliance on individual’s own understanding. The ability to recognize moral law as individual’s own will is maturity; it is rational self-legislated obedience to moral law. Kant has tendency to locate the source of moral legislation not in individual but in the ‘real world’ he postulates. He devaluates the realm of experience through the creative positing of a realm beyond experience, the ‘real world’.

Nietzsche’s departure from Kant may be accounted by nothing that, while Kant’s vision of maturity may facilitate a strong will (goal-directed agency), he does not facilitate an autonomous will, that is, goal-directed agency who determines his own goal. It presupposes a superhuman authority as a legislator of moral values. Exposing the irony in enlightenment principle: “Argue as much as you will and about what you will, but obey!” (Pandey 20), Nietzsche reveals that “in the presence of morality, as in the face of any authority, one is not allowed to think, far less to express an opinion: here one has to— obey!” (D 2). Therefore, Kant’s vision of maturity breeds individuals without autonomy.

Nietzsche discerns modernity “dressed in moralistic finery as the increase of

compassion” (Early Notebook 178) which results to the weakening of character and ability to act. Modern individuals’ have lost the ability to act, their actions are only re-acts because their whole character is spent “partly in *appropriation*, partly in *defence*, partly in *responding* (Early Notebook 178). This tendency results in profound weakening of spontaneity of action. Nietzsche observes that the ill discipline of modern spirit has curbed the modernity to reach to its maturity.

On the other hand, autonomy is the central criterion to the Nietzschean notion of maturity. He values autonomy in thought, action and care of self “to satisfy one’s necessary requirements as completely as possible, even if imperfectly, are the road *to freedom of spirit and person*. To let others satisfy many of one’s requirements, even superfluous ones... is training in unfreedom.” (qtd. in Abbey 113). Autonomous individual, in Nietzsche’s account, is indifferent to judgments and opinions of others and “act always in accordance with the maxim you can and at the sometime will as returning” (Owen 73). It places the comprehensive responsibility of philosophy; it must bear the burden for interpretations it offers. Human life and its capacity become the measure of perspectives, not the self-legislation of superhuman authority. It comes to put a high sense of responsibility on the part of individual to march modernity ahead with a higher sense of humanity.

It is, therefore, Nietzsche’s category of autonomy is not simply individualistic but an attempt to reconcile individual and collective autonomy. The autonomous individual’s striving for positing goal for humanity does not represent individual’s thought experiment, his value is tested against public that whether it is life-affirming or not. Thus by experiment Nietzsche means testing an outlook by dwelling within it and seeing whether it enhances or diminishes individual’s life. Nietzsche necessitates the values to have value for life.

With his pursuit to critique modernity, Nietzsche aspires for the emancipation of humankind from prejudices of ‘modern ideas’. Nietzsche understands that values are not objective or universal; they arise from the activity of evaluating and because values are human inventions; nothing stops him from creating his own values except the social pressure of conforming to the herd. Nietzsche wants individual to achieve a height of maturity that they become free of prejudices and constitute the values necessary for the present. Nietzsche asserts that modernity can be achieved only by freeing individuals from the prejudices of the age because only free individuals can constitute value necessary for the present. Nietzsche’s recommendation to furnish ourselves with our good and evil, “is a call to arms for those who are willing to overturn traditional morality and exert their will to power over themselves by creating their own values” (Patrik 149).

Nietzsche’s aim to critique modernity bears the project to establish a relationship between morality and necessity, and formulate a workable ground for human conduct.

### **Chapter I:**

The first chapter introduces the overall content of the research paper including the rationale of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity.

### **Chapter II:**

In this study, the second chapter presents the prejudices of the philosophers about the absolutism of truth. It deals with the fundamental problem of this will – namely, will to truth. The main ethos of the revelation of prejudices is to establish Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism.

### **Chapter III:**

The third chapter probes into the ‘modern ideas.’ It analyzes them and reveals the discontents of them. The measure taken to discredit the ‘modern ideas’ is ‘greatness in life rather than goodness.’ It tries to establish Nietzsche’s view self-development is much

more important than other tasks, the view which markedly differs from the ethos of 'modern ideas.'

#### **Chapter IV:**

Chapter fourth presents new measure of judgment: nobility. It is a judgment beyond good and evil though which Nietzsche strives to handle his 'life-enhancing' project establishing the relation between self and world.

## Chapter II

### Prejudices of Philosophers

The researcher endeavours to analyze the systems of thinking made use by antecedent doctrinaires which are presumed as prejudices of the philosopher—a judgment that is given before all the elements, that determine a situation, have been finally examined. So far as the prejudices of philosophers assume the absolutism of truth, the researcher aims to question the assumption striving to show wherein lies the difficulties of a final definition. The exposition is accompanied by defining the hypotheses on which Nietzsche's own philosophy is built. The researcher endeavours to establish Nietzsche's philosophic position—the rationale of his doctrine of will to power.

The initial movements of thoughts in *Beyond Good and Evil* are designed to create the sense of suspicion about the ground of our most fundamental value: truth. Nietzsche raises doubts about the philosopher's famous will to truth. He puts it in riddling form, as he acknowledges by saying that it is hard to know who is Oedipus here and who the sphinx, "what in us really want truth?... we asked about the value of this will. Suppose we want truth, *why not rather* untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?" (BGE 9). Nietzsche strives "to recognize untruth as a condition of life" (BGE 12) which means resisting accustomed value judgment in a new way. Therefore, the chief prejudice that Nietzsche calls into question is the absolutism of truth.

Nietzsche accuses philosophers of being dishonest:

What provokes one to look at all philosophers half suspiciously, half mockingly, is not that one discovers again and again how innocent they are—how often and how easily they make mistakes and go astray; in short, their childishness and childlikeness—but that they are not honest

enough in their work, although they all make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched even remotely. They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish and talk of 'inspiration'); while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of 'inspiration' most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract that they defend with reasons they have sought after the fact. They are all advocates who resent that name, and for the most part even wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize 'truths' and *very* far from having the courage of the conscience that admits this, precisely this, to itself; very far from having the good taste of the courage which also lets this be known, whether to warn an enemy or friend, or, from exuberance, to mock itself. (BGE 12-13)

This extract illustrates the dishonesty of philosophers by revealing their prejudice about truth. They pose to have discovered and reached their real opinions even when they touch truthfulness remotely. They do not want to open their eyes to the problem of truthfulness the lack of any suspicion that there is something problematic here; truth itself is accepted as given in advance. Nietzsche feels this principle to be deeply false and sentimental for the essence of world lies in will to power.

Nietzsche contends that it is only millennia of attachment to an ingrained set of values that makes this reverse pursuit so odd. The will to truth is essentially a way of denying the apprehension of truths of things; it is the enemy of both truth and will. Nietzsche takes modern philosophers as the very incarnation of this ideal of will-less knower. Nietzsche is dissatisfied with the moderners that they are not capable of seeing

the problem with will to truth of the metaphysicians; he problematizes this will by raising the value of this will and asks to “see it with our eyes, and *risk* it” (BGE 9).

Nietzsche moves on to search the fundamental beliefs of metaphysicians on which they postulate their reality. They deny that truth could originate out of error, selflessness out of selfishness, will to truth out of will to deception, purity of heart from lust. They posit “the lap of being, the intransitory, the hidden god, the ‘thing-in-itself’” (BGE 10) wherein lies the origin of their highest value. Their judgment dictates that since the thing of falsity, ugliness and weakness have their origin in mundane, so their opposites must originate in the supra-mundane. Nietzsche probes into the nature of metaphysician’s judgment:

This way of judging constitutes the typical prejudgment and prejudice which give away the metaphysician’s of all ages; this kind of valuation looms in the background of all their logical procedures; it is on account of this ‘faith’ that they trouble themselves about ‘knowledge’ about something that is finally baptized solemnly as ‘the truth.’ The fundamental faith of the metaphysician’s is the faith in opposite values. (BGE 10)

By contrast Nietzsche doubts:

Whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly whether these popular valuations and opposite values on which the metaphysicians put their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression painters use. For all the value that the true, the truthful, the selfless may deserve, it would still be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to

be ascribed to deception, selfishness, and lust. It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of these good and revered things is precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these wicked, seemingly opposite things—may be even one with them in essence. Maybe! (BGE 10)

The argument of this passage falsifies the metaphysicians' positing of intransitory world on which their popular valuations are predicated by revealing that these are only a perspective. It further discredits the highest values of metaphysicians with the argument that values must have value for life and sometimes even deception, selfishness, and lust can be valuable for life.

Nietzsche comes to expose the failed attempts of dogmatic philosopher's attempt to catch the truth. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he identifies truth with woman and therefore, elusive by its nature because it always tries to conceal itself:

Supposing truth is woman— what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman's heart? What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won—and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged. If it is left standing at all! For there are scoffers who claim that it has fallen, that all dogmatism lies on the ground—even more, that all dogmatism is dying.(Preface 1)

It implies that the attainment of truth is not as direct or simple a matter as has been



thought. It suggests that dogmatic philosophers have been dupes of adornment, edifying surfaces, and moral prejudices behind which the truth has modestly hidden. The critique of philosopher's attempt to capture the truth suggests Nietzschean invitation to the free spirited to remove the moral prejudices of dogmatists in order to expose the real truth. The genuine philosopher's goal is opposed to the dogmatic philosopher's goal.

Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics amounts from the metaphysician's belief in the real, intransigent world on the basis of which they posit synthetic *a priori* judgment the judgment prior to experience. Nietzsche says: "Nowadays all the world talks of things of which it *cannot* have any experience, and this is most true, and in the worst way, concerning philosophers and philosophical states: exceedingly few know them, may know them, and all popular opinions about them are false" (BGE 139). Kant's idealism is, for Nietzsche, an exemplary instance of the presupposition in which a distinction between noumena or thing-in-itself and phenomena or thing-as-it-appears is legitimated. Kant epitomizes the tradition of thought going back to Plato which seeks knowledge of final truths beyond the confines of our daily experience: an underlying timeless reality which is later maintained by Schopenhauer's distinction of will and ideas. Kant admits that because we are confined to the use of reason and sensory perception, we cannot know the noumenal world. Yet he insists that it exists: "He thinks we are excluded from it by our senses, which, like rose tinted spectacles, present everything to us under various fixed categories time, space, causality from which we cannot escape" (Gane and Piero 32). A synthetic *a priori* judgment is possible on Kant's account because such judgment presupposes the belief in ahistorical ego which is separable from its contingent, empirical manifestation in thoughts, actions and emotions. Nietzsche identifies that this account is structured around a philosophy of grammar. The structure of our language, Nietzsche argues, is itself by no means philosophically neutral. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he

explains:

The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical function—that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaiic languages (where the concept of the subject is least developed) look other-wise ‘into the world,’ and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germanic peoples and the Muslims: the spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of physiological valuations and racial conditions. (27-28)

The passage reveals that the unconscious domination of language serves as an advocate of certain kinds of world interpretation. This is specifically true with respect to the belief in the transcendental ego and the concomitant belief in a realm of being:

Language belongs in its origin to the age of most rudimentary form of psychology: we find ourselves in the midst of a rude fetishism when we call to mind the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language—which is to say, of *reason*. It is *this* which sees everywhere deed and doer; this which believes in will as cause in general; this which believes in the ‘ego’, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which *projects* its belief in ego—substance on to all things—only thus does it create the concept ‘thing’ ... being is everywhere thought in, *foisted on*, as cause; it

is only from the conception 'ego' that there follows, derivatively, the concept 'being' ....(TI 38)

Nietzsche's contention in this passage is that our belief in 'ego' and 'being' is made possible by the distinction between doer and deed that language imposes on us in the form of subject – object distinction. For example, the proposition 'I think' in which an event 'thinking' is separated into an action-effect 'thinking' and subject-cause 'I' implied in this separation are the claims that it is I who think. 'I' is the condition, 'think' is the predicate and conditioned – thinking is an activity to which thought must supply a subject as cause. It is the construction of ego as transcendental consciousness. The belief in transcendental consciousness assumes to observe the 'immediate certainties' knowledge of object is perceived purely and nakedly as 'thing-in-itself' without any falsification on the part of either the subject or the object.

Contrary to the belief in transcendental ego, Nietzsche argues:

Let the people suppose that knowledge means knowing things entirely; the philosopher must say to himself: when I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove; for example, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think' assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself

which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me. (BGE 23)

Nietzsche's critique of the claim that 'I' effects the action 'knowing' exemplifies the false metaphysics of language. The falsification of the subject-predicate concept falsifies the basic presupposition of Christian doctrine by assassinating the older soul concept. In attacking the idea of noumenal self, Nietzsche involves in reconceptualizing the relationship between self and world. In claiming that 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed — the deed is everything (GM 45), Nietzsche's point is that the self does not effect an action 'knowing' but rather is constituted through knower by activity of knowing.

Nietzsche articulates that the world cannot be said to possess any features in principle prior to interpretation. The world does not exist as a 'thing-in-itself,' independent of interpretation rather it comes into being only in and through interpretations. Richard Tarnas, in *The Passion of the Western Mind* writes very impressively about this view:

The subject of knowledge is already embedded in the object of knowledge: the human mind never stands outside the world, judging it from an external vantage point. Every object of knowledge is already part of a preinterpreted context, and beyond that context are only other preinterpreted contexts. All human knowledge is mediated by signs and symbols of uncertain provenance, constituted by historically and culturally variable predispositions, and influenced by often unconscious human interests. Hence the nature of truth and reality, in science no less than in philosophy, religion, or art, is radically ambiguous. The subject can never

presume to transcend the manifold predispositions of his or her subjectivity. (397)

Nietzsche's basic dissatisfaction with metaphysical perspective is that it begins with a devaluation of the realm of experience, of becoming as against the realm of being. This devaluation is the condition for grounding the universal values of the metaphysicians. Kant's work is exemplar of this perspective where the highest values are those embodied in the moral law like freedom equality, reciprocity etc. Kant's maxim: "Act always according to that maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will" (qtd. in Owen 11) means that morality is grounded on the motive of duty, in the recognition that the essence of man's humanity lies in willing the moral law for its own sake as the condition of his freedom. As Nietzsche states in *Human-All-Too Human*:

The former morality, namely Kant's demanded of the individual actions which one desired of all men: that was a very naïve thing; as if everyone knew without further ado what mode of action would benefit the whole of mankind, that is, what actions at all are desirable; it is a theory like that of free trade, presupposing that universal harmony *must* result of itself in accordance with innate laws of progress. (25)

Thus, to act freely, for Kant, is to act morally. Kant relates the ability to act according to individual's own understanding with the maturity of the self. Thus, Kant's enlightenment is predicated on his identification of willing man's own will with willing moral law. Kant defines an age of enlightenment by reference to the principle: "Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!" (Pandey 20). Nietzsche, on the contrary exposes irony of Kant's enlightenment in *Daybreak*: "in the face of morality one is not *allowed* to think, far less to express an opinion: here one has to obey!" (Preface 2).

Nietzsche discloses the philosopher's hallowed notion of freedom from prejudices as self-

deception for it always demands legislation of those prejudices which cannot produce mature individuals for directing modernity towards its maturity.

Nietzsche exposes the claim to objectivity of dogmatic philosophers as another prejudice. He says that however gratefully modern age celebrates an objective spirit, free of everything subjective, it is essentially a characteristic of the pessimist's school. He cautions against our gratitude to an objective spirit because 'disinterested knowledge' has a problem — it celebrates itself as goal in itself. As he writes in BGE:

However gratefully we may welcome an *objective* spirit — and is there anyone who has never been mortally sick of everything subjective and of his accursed ipsissimosity? — in the end we also have to learn caution against our gratitude and put a halt to the exaggerated manner in which the 'unselfing' and depersonalization of the spirit is being celebrated nowadays as if it were the goal itself and redemption and transfiguration. This is particularly characteristic of the pessimist's school, which also has good reasons for according the highest honors to 'disinterested knowledge.'

The objective person who no longer curses and scolds like the pessimist, the *ideal* scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousand of total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end, is certainly one of the most precious instruments there are; but he belongs in the hand of one more powerful. He is only an instrument; let us say, he is a *mirror* — he is no 'end in himself.' The objective man is indeed a mirror: he is accustomed to submit before whatever wants to be known, without any other pleasure than that found in knowing and 'mirroring'; he waits until something comes, and then spreads himself out tenderly lest light footsteps

and the quick passage of spiritlike beings should be lost on his plane and skin. (126-127)

From the passage it becomes clear that the ideal of objectivity which conceives objectivity as the perception of the will-less knower is the enemy of both will and knowledge. Objectivity, Nietzsche conceives, is a lack of personality, lack of will and incapacity to love. In Nietzsche's account, philosophers strive for objectivity, neutrality; they are content to remain behind as observers because they do not like to be envied, to be attacked and thereby to assume their superiority. Thus, critique of objectivity is Nietzsche's fight against all the hypocrisy of scientific attitude: "Learning something which doesn't concern us; and feeling that 'our duty' lies precisely there, in that objective activity; learning to assess pleasure and duty separately that is invaluable task and achievement of the higher school system" (Early Notebook 176).

He claims that objectivity is essentially a characteristic of philosophers' being an instrument of a slave. The objective man cannot become a model man because he does not go before anyone, nor behind. He places himself too far apart to have any reason to take sides for good or evil. Nietzsche sees no hope in objective spirit for the entire humankind:

The objective man is an instrument, a precious, easily injured and clouded instrument for measuring and, as an arrangement of mirrors, an artistic triumph that deserves care and honor; but he is no goal, no conclusion and sunrise, no complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified, no termination and still less a beginning, a begetting and first cause, nothing tough, powerful, self-reliant that wants to be master rather only a delicate, carefully dusted, fine, mobile pot for forms that still has to wait for some content and substance in order to 'shape' itself accordingly for

the most part, a man without substance and content, a 'selfless' man.

Consequently, also nothing for women, *In parenthesis*. (BGE 128)

Nietzsche goes on to attack the ideal of objectivity as an idle hypothesis:

The apparently objective character of things: might this not amount merely to a *difference of degree* within the subjective? that for example, what slowly changes might become for us something objectively lasting, being, an 'in-itself' that the objective would be only a false category and opposition within the subjective? (Early Notebook 148)

Nietzsche brings the scientific pretension of objectivity of philosophers into the realm of subjectivity. He renders the disinterested perception of objectivity as exceedingly interested perception: "in the claims to objectivity, to cold impersonality, where, as in all valuations, we tell something about ourselves and our inner experiences in a few words" (Early Notebook 20).

Nietzsche posits that every action is interested. He claims that the disinterested action is also exceeding interested action:

Even an action done from love is supposed to be 'unegoistic'? But you dolts! 'And the praise of sacrifices?' But anyone who has really made sacrifices knows that he wanted and got something in return perhaps something of himself in return for something of himself that he gave up here in order to have more there, perhaps in order to be more or at least to feel that he was 'more.' (BGE 148)

The quest for objectivity is not only impossible, but irresponsible as it ignores its effects, and justifies such irresponsibility on the grounds of truthfulness. In his *Early Notebook* Nietzsche explores blindness to judgment in objectivity:



Objectivity in philosopher: moral indifferentism towards oneself, blindness to good and bad consequences: lack of scruples in using dangerous means, perversity and multiplicity of character detected as advantages and exploited My indifference to myself: I want no advantage from what I know, neither do I evade the disadvantages it involves including what one might call *corruption* of the character; this is an external perspective. (235)

Nietzsche's critique of objectivity not only raises questions about the possibility or desirability of truthfulness, it calls for a new responsibility for the effects of offering interpretations. He seeks to promote psychological strength for judgments that do not take recourse in objectivity, but ground themselves in the health of one's disposition towards life. Beyond truth and falsity, Nietzsche introduces a new measure: "The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; .... The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating" (BGE 4).

Nietzsche's opposition to philosopher's claim to grasp the world objectively can be found in his doctrine of perspectivism. Nietzsche disputes the ability of human beings to grasp the world objectively, and that therefore undercuts some presumptions of a simplistically conceived scientific method. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche states "physics, too, is only an interpretation" (21). It becomes clear from it that science, too, is only a perspective. His particular criticism of objectivity in his doctrine of perspectivism is aimed at the notion of an already constituted subject perceiving from fixed position. Nietzsche considers that subject itself is a result of interpretation, just as the different views of the world are interpretations. Nietzsche believes there is no single position from which we interact with the world, there are competing positions from which we receive

competing and conflicting interpretations. This proposition follows from the fact that we have various needs and not one unified need with regard to external phenomena. It is 'our drives and their pro and cons' that determine our interpretation and cognition: "Every drive is a type of thirst for power; everyone has its perspective, which it wants to force on other drives as a norm" (qtd. in Tywan 66). It becomes clear from this remark that perspectivism far from describing a notion of liberal tolerance of all viewpoints is actually closer to the theory of drives and of the way in which internal struggles are fought out in the process we concern as cognition.

Nietzsche's theory of knowledge can be stated quite simply: we don't have any objective knowledge at all. He is a paradigm case of a subjective relativist. The only reality we can know, he says, is the reality that is subjectively constructed by each individual. Nietzsche arrives at this position because he holds to the correspondence theory of truth, one of the most common starting points for an objectivist epistemology. The correspondence theory of truth states that reality has a determinant, objective character and a belief of statement is true or false to the degree to which it corresponds to or represents the objective features of reality. The cruel catch, according to Nietzsche, is that we can never have that sort of relationship to reality. By setting a high standard for truth and noting that we can never reach this ideal, Nietzsche concludes that we can never have objective truth.

It becomes clear that Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism has a clear connection with a general theory of epistemology. The notion of perspectivism is Nietzschean way to correct common theories about how we know the world. In *Beyond Good and Evil* and other works, Nietzsche repeatedly stresses that there is no eternal sense or meaning behind the world of perceptions. With this view, he problematizes a long tradition of Western thought that postulates something real or more than real what we perceive.

Plato's realm of ideas, which Nietzsche considers to be the first in a long tradition of epistemological errors, is exemplary for a tradition that propagates a dualistic view of the world: the split between appearance and reality. Nietzsche observes this split is fundamental principle of all metaphysical thought. With regard to perspectivism, Nietzsche writes: "to the extent that the word 'knowledge' has any meaning at all, the world is knowable: but it is interpretable in different ways; it does not have any meaning behind it, rather countless meanings 'Perspectivism'" (qtd in Tywan 65). It comes out that knowledge is a human way of interacting with the world and for this reason there is no sense or meaning hidden from us. The interpretations or perspectives that we have are all that there is.

If Nietzsche's view does not demand acceptance of his claims as final truths, he is left to show their superiority on some criterion other than truth. Nietzsche's ideas, consistent with his perspectivism, do not seek to undermine all judgments but to open the path new ways of evaluating among perspectives. For him, the multiplicity of possible interpretations, some are more fitting than others; the value for life permits judgment among them. Sarah Kofman in *Nietzsche and Metaphor* shows that the metaphorical status of claims is not merely the avoidance of metaphysical finality, but places the value for life as the crucial of 'judgment: "so between a complete pluralism of interpretations and dogmatism of unique text with an unequivocal meaning, there is room for pluralism of meaning which are not all equivalent equivalence being measured not by reference to a truth of being... but by reference to the value given to life by one who is interpreting" (141). It shows that Nietzsche's judgment is not between truth and falsehood, nor truth and mere appearance, but among appearances.

Alexander Nehman in *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* has argued that an interpretation may be false is not to say that it is false. Nietzsche avoids dogmatism

because perspectivism does not demand acceptance as bedrock truth, but offers itself as a possibility.

According to Nietzsche, if people come to realize that what they consider to be most real and true is just a subjective perspective, they can bear this shattering of their illusions. To this end, Nietzsche reveals that:

Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of— namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: ‘What morality do they (or does he) aim at?’ Accordingly, I do not believe that an ‘impulse to knowledge’ is the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistake knowledge!) as an instrument, but however consider the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here acted as *inspiring* genii (or as demons and cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate *lord* over all the other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as *such*, attempts to philosophise. To be sure, in the case of scholar, in the case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise— ‘better,’ if you will; there may really be such a thing as an ‘impulse to knowledge,’ some kind of small, independent clock-work,

which, when we wound up, works away industriously to that end, *without* the rest of the scholarly impulse taking any material part therein. The actual ‘interest’ of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction— in the family, perhaps, or in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not *characterised* by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as to *who he is*,— that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other. (BGE 13-14)

This extract reveals Nietzsche’s theory of perspectivism. It states that there cannot be any uninterrupted facts or truths for everything we encounter is seen from one perspective or another. Against the long Western tradition of philosophy, science of asserting unique validity of one system of concepts and beliefs, that alone mirrors the truth, Nietzsche sets forth a radical perspectivism: there exists a plurality of perspectives through which the world can be interpreted, and there is no authoritative independent criterion according to which one system can be determined to be more valid than other.

Nietzsche writes in BGE:

After having looked long enough between the philosophers lines and fingers, I say to myself: by far the greater part of conscious thinking must still be included among instinctive activities, and that goes even for philosophical thinking. We have to relearn here, as one has had to relearn about heredity and what is ‘innate.’ As the act of birth deserves no consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, so ‘being

conscious' is not in any decisive sense the *opposite* of what is instinctive: most of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts.

Behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement there stand valuation or, more clearly, physiological demands the preservation of a certain type of life. For example, that the definite should be worth more than the indefinite, and mere appearance worth less than 'truth' — such estimates might be, in spite their regulative importance for us, nevertheless mere foreground estimates, a certain kind of *naïserie* which may be necessary for the preservation of just such beings as we are. Supposing, that is that not just man in the 'measure of things'. (11)

This extract illustrates that our perspectives arise from a very deep stratum within human consciousness that we are inclined to suppress and deny. Nietzsche believes that our primary interaction with the world is in terms of feelings rather than ideas. It means that all judgments arise out of our instinct, likes, dislikes, experiences and lack of experiences and knowledge is nothing other than certain behaviour of instincts toward one another. This view radically differs from both rationalists and empiricists, who believe that knowledge is produced by an intellectual consideration of rational and empirical truths. Nietzsche wants to bring instinctive thinking into the domain of philosophy.

Nietzsche sets prelude to a new philosophy in *Beyond Good and Evil*. He does “not believe that a ‘impulse to knowledge’ is the father of philosophy” (BGE 13). He complains against the development of philosophy as “a theory of knowledge” (BGE 123). It is a reduction of philosophy, it is the end to philosophy itself. That is why, Nietzsche confesses that the present day philosophy does not dominate and it has lost respect. The reason behind it, Nietzsche infers, is the misunderstanding of the basic drive

wherein lies the root of philosophy. As Nietzsche compactly expresses in BGE: “philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the ‘creation of the world,’ to the *causa prima*” (16). It throws light on Nietzsche’s conviction that the strongest impulse in man is the will to power. This unconditional assertion bursts the system of values in which our civilization up to this time has enmeshed itself. The will to power knows no bonds which prescribes what is permitted; for it everything is good that springs from power and increases power; everything is bad which springs from weakness and weakens power. So also in new judgments, in knowledge and in conviction, the important thing is not whether they are ‘true’ or ‘false’ but whether they help us, whether they further our life and strengthen our mind. They have worth only if they strengthen our mind. Thus, Nietzsche places his philosophy ‘beyond good and evil’.

Nietzsche’s philosophical system founded on ‘will to power’ is criticized on the assumption that the universal acceptance of his theories will result in social chaos. But Nietzsche is not among those who do not foresee the effect of their vision. He does not desire the general adoption of his beliefs. In his bitterest criticism against Christianity, his objection is not to shake the faith of the great majority of mankind in their idols. He seeks merely to free the strong men from the restrictions of religion which fits the needs of only the weaker members of society. He neither hopes nor desires to wean the mass of humanity from Christianity or any similar dogmatic comforts. Nietzsche demands the strength of will to breathe the air of his philosophy. As he writes in preface of *Ecce Homo*:

He who can breathe in the air of my writings knows that it is the air of the

heights, that it is bracing. A man must be formed for it, otherwise there is no little danger of chill. The ice is near, the loneliness is terrible – but how quiet everything is in the sunshine! How freely one breathes! How much, one feels, lies beneath one! Philosophy, as I have understood and experienced it hitherto, is a voluntary retirement into a region of ice and mountain-peaks – the search for all that is strange and questionable in existence, everything upon which, hitherto, morality has set its ban. Through long experience, derived from such wanderings in the forbidden land, I learned to look at the causes of mankind's moralizing and idealizing in a manner very different from that which may seem ordinarily desirable. The secret history of philosophers, the psychology of their great names, was revealed to me. How much truth can a mind endure? How much truth will it dare? These questions became for me more the essential criterion. Error (the belief in the ideal) is not blindness; error is cowardice.... Every conquest, all progress in knowledge, is the result of courage, of hardness towards one's self, of cleanliness towards one's self. I do not refute ideals; I merely draw on my gloves in their presence....

*Nititur in vetitum*: by this sign I shall conquer; for that which has hitherto been most stringently forbidden has always been the Truth. (vii-viii)

In Nietzsche's account, the will to truth manifests will to power, the problem with this form of will is when it thinks will rather than creates it. Contrary to the dogmatic philosophers "Actual philosophers, however, are commanders and law givers... their knowing is creating, their creating is law-giving, their will to truth is will to power. (BGE 211)



Nietzsche identifies that philosophy as its own field and says that it has its own problem in those values of universal validity which are the organizing principle for all functions of culture and civilization and for all particular values of life. He forecasts a philosophy that describes and explains these values only that it gives an account of their validity; it treats them not as facts but as norms. Hence, its task becomes 'giving of laws' not laws of arbitrary caprice which it dictates, but laws of reason, which it discovers and comprehends.

Rather than reason being the primary instrument of knowledge, Nietzsche believes it is just a mask we use to disguise a primitive drive that controls our cognitive life. This drive is what he calls will to power. It manifests itself as the desire to overcome, to dominate the environment, to make the personal mark on the world, to create, or to express itself. William F. Lawhead aptly quotes in *The Philosophical Journey*:

'truth' is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered but something that must be created, and that gives a name to a process or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end introducing truth, as *a process of infinitum*, an active determining not a becoming - conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the 'will to power' (193).

The belief in evolutionary human deification is found in Nietzsche's concept of overman who is born out of death of God and overcoming of the old limited man. Nietzsche acknowledges that man's will, not God's is the source of world's betterment and liberation of humanity:

Why atheism today? 'The father' in God has been thoroughly refuted; ditto, 'the judge,' 'the rewarder.' Also his 'free will': he does not hear

and if he heard he still would not know how to help. Worst of all: he seems incapable of clear communication: is he unclear?

This is what I found to be causes for the decline of European theism, on the basis of a great many conversations, asking and listening. It seems to me that the religious instinct is indeed in the process of growing powerfully but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep suspicion.

(BGE 66)

With ruthless perspectiveness, Nietzsche declares the death of god. He holds up a dark mirror to the soul of Christianity:

There is a great ladder of religious cruelty, with many rungs; but three of these are of these are the most important.

Once one sacrificed human beings to one's god, perhaps precisely those whom one loved most: the sacrifices of the first-born in all prehistoric religions belong here, as well as the sacrifice of the Emperor Tiberius in the Mithras grotto of the isle of Capri, that most gruesome of all Roman anachronisms.

Then, during the moral epoch of mankind, one sacrificed to one's god one's own strongest instincts, one's 'nature': *this* festive joy lights up the cruel eyes of the ascetic, the 'anti-natural' enthusiast.

Finally what remained to be sacrificed? At long last, did one not have to sacrifice for once whatever is comforting, holy, healing; all hope, all faith in hidden harmony, in future blisses and justices? Didn't one have to sacrifice God himself and, from cruelty against oneself, worship the stone, stupidity, gravity, fate, the nothing? To sacrifice God for the nothing

this paradoxical mystery of the final cruelty was reserved for the generation that is now coming up: all of us already know something of this. (BGE 67)

This passage throws light on the rationale of Nietzsche's proclamation of 'Death of God'. If God exists, he becomes an absolute standard of truth and value. Belief in God is simply a symptom of the human craving for absolutes. Nietzsche's pronouncement of the death of God signifies not just the recognition of a religious illusion, but the demise of an entire civilization's world view that far too long has held man back from a daring, liberating embrace of life's totality. Nietzsche says that Christian attitudes and values are opposed to man's present existence, to the body, to the earth, to courage and heroism, to joy and freedom, to life itself.

Nietzsche does not leave simply by discrediting the objective truth. He provides a new ground of overman based on the principle of will to power. The will to power is presented as principle of evaluation and explanation. However, it is quite different thing from the unifying causes or transcendent absolutes that previous philosophers had identified as the ultimate meaning of existence. In the will to power, Nietzsche finds a basis of all values that is truly natural phenomenon, clearly reflects for all who incline to see it in the world of nature. It provides an explanation of the world which is life-affirming. Richard Tarans' impressive passage in *The Passion of the Western Mind* puts it more succinctly. He provides the rationale of Nietzsche's striving for new values:

But the world was radically indeterminate, it could be shaped by a heroic act of will to affirm life and bring forth its triumphant fulfillment: the highest truth, Nietzsche prophesied, was being born within man through the self-creating power of the will. All of man's striving for knowledge and power would fulfill itself in a new being who would incarnate the

living meaning of the universe. But to achieve this birth, man would have to grow beyond himself so fundamentally that his present limited self would be destroyed: 'What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal...man is something that must be overcome.' For man was a way to new dawns and new horizons far beyond the compass of the present age. And the birth of this new being was not a life-impoverishing otherworldly fantasy to be believed by ecclesiastical decree, but was a vivid, tangible reality to be created, here and now, through the heroic self-overcoming of the great individual. Such an individual had to transform life into a work of art, within which he could forge his character, embrace his fate, and recreate himself as heroic protagonist of the world epic. He had to invent himself anew, imagine himself into being. He had to will into existence a fictive drama into which he could enter and live, imposing a redemptive order on the chaos of a meaningless universe without God. Then the God who had long been projected to the beyond could be born within the human soul. Then man could dance godlike in the eternal flux, free of all foundations and all bounds, beyond every metaphysical constraint. Truth was not something one proved or disproved; it was something one *created*. In Nietzsche, as in Romanticism generally, the philosopher became poet: a world conception was judged not in terms of abstract rationality or factual verification, but as an expression of courage, beauty, and imaginative power. (370-371)

Nietzsche invites the stronger members of society to overcome the limitedness of human beings and calls to empower them with their own values. He wants to free individuals from the constraints of metaphysicians' prejudices. Nietzsche wants them to recognize the

aesthetic phenomenon of life and to justify life with the same principle.

If there is no objective truth, if all human judgments are nothing more than interpretations, then Nietzsche concludes that we should live with a spirit of experimentalism. An interesting theory should not be thought of as a photograph of reality, but should be treated as invitation to view life in a new way: testing an outlook by dwelling within it and seeing whether it enhances or diminishes the life. The superior ideas for Nietzsche are those that are the most life-enhancing, the most useful, or even the most interesting. Accordingly, he considers the search for variety more important than the quest for certainty.

## **Chapter III**

### **Discontents of Modern Ideas**

Nietzsche's fundamental concern throughout his life is to produce autonomous individuals in modernity. He, therefore, is always preoccupied with the heroic in life and strives to rebaptize overman. It is the basis of his attack on transcendent metaphysics, and on all religions and moralities that postulate an afterlife and hinders the path to maturity of individuals. His interest is in greatness in life rather than goodness. Nietzsche contends that there is no greatness without readiness and capacity to withstand, absorb, and use to best purpose and immense quantity of human capacities and possibilities.

Nietzsche calls the modern age as "the age of the masses" (BGE 174) and infers that it is one of the discontents of the modern age that has curbed the production of the higher types of individuals in modernity. He depicts the modern individuals as a herd of sick, degenerate, contemptible, non-individuals. Nietzsche says that everything around the ethos of modern age is corrupted and corrupts the individuals except the incurable mediocre men. With the instinct of herd, modern age is moving towards the continual development of individuals to the similar, ordinary, average, herdlike, and common with the average and common experience. The degradation of modern individuals to a herd animal is the result of their long inherited moral values and ideas that have essentially subjected them to the service of other rather than self-development. Moral values, according to Nietzsche, are hostile to individuality because morality, a herd instinct in individual, arises to keep the community alive and prosperous. In this way, moral discourse subordinates individuals to collective utility, persuading individuals that they achieve their highest potential by acting in accordance with its rules. It is through the modern education process that society inculcates its collective interests as a goal, no matter what their particular interests and desires.

One of his great complaints against the modern age is the way Christian and post-Christian equality doctrines have dominated the modern ideas and the way they have discouraged superior types of individuals from recognizing their superiority. It is actually the slave revolt. The vain individuals who feel the dearth of self-love remain preoccupied with the opinion of others and look for undeserved greatness. Nietzsche attacks the idea of universal equality and strives to demonstrate the superiority of the higher types of individuals to others.

Nietzsche says that “modern men obtuse to all Christian nomenclature” (BGE 60) are trained in its faith in sacrifice: “From the start, the Christian faith is a sacrifice” (BGE 60). The moral framework of ‘modern ideas’ suppresses the expression and enhancement of individuality for it attributes over importance to selfless acts like pity, empathy, sympathy and benevolence and effaces the self in favour of another. He comes to identify pity and its cognate emotions as dangerous to the promotion of self because they promote denial of individual’s own concerns and individuality by marking the virtue of self denial, of living and feelings for others undermining the task of self-development. Nietzsche strives to discredit the values whose only purpose is to serve the collective interest to develop the consciousness towards individuality and self-development in modern men.

After his careful investigations into the ethos of modern age, Nietzsche comes up with the observation that the lack of knowledge for self care poses the real threats to the procurement of the autonomous and goal-directed agency in modernity. Nietzsche scrutinizes the modern culture in which the capacity of modern individuals for autonomy is tied to the lack of grounds of values which enable the exercise of this capacity. Self-love, Nietzsche prescribes, is the necessary ingredient of nobility. Only when individuals experience self-love and self-affirmation are they capable of noble action.

**(i) The Slave Revolt**

Nietzsche expounds his ethical theory based on the distinction between master morality and slave morality in *Beyond Good and Evil*. He distinguishes between two types of person and their respective moralities. On the one hand, we have master morality, in which good connotes independence, generosity, self-reliance and such noble virtues. The opposed defects are subservience, meanness, timidity and so on, and these are regarded as bad. The contrast between good and bad is here roughly equivalent to that between noble and contemptible. The slave morality, on the other hand, works on quite a different principle. For it good lies in a kind of pervasive reticence, and in all those things that diminish suffering and striving, whereas it condemns the virtues that are good on master morality, calling them evil rather than bad. The good of the master morality is apt to be terrifying, and all fear-provoking action is evil to the slave. Traditional religions he considers to be props to the slave morality. The stock example of slave morality Nietzsche finds in Christianity for it is pessimistic in holding out hopes of a better life in another world. It values slavish virtues like weakness, sympathy and equality.

Just as in *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche describes the conflict of two forces, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, so in *Beyond Good and Evil* he scrutinizes a terrible battle between the two sets of valuations, the master and the slave moralities. This contest, however, does not result on a delicate and productive equilibrium but in the triumph of the slave morality in the modern age shown in the ascendancy of Christianity: “Christian value judgments residually present everywhere in socialist and positivist systems” (Early Notebook 83). Nietzsche holds that it is essentially the slave revolt that has discouraged the higher types of human beings and has brought about the rule of mass in modern time.

Nietzsche traces that the two opposite value systems has come naturally into existence at some point in humanity’s distant past. He says master morality is inherited by



the stronger members of the human race. The moral designation of the stronger members is applied to human beings. The close-knit group of masters feels responsibility only to itself. In essence; it is the morality of self-love and self-affirmation. They exuberate the sense of power in their disposition:

The noble type of man experiences *itself* as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is *value-creating*. Everything it knows as part of itself it honors: such a morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow: the noble human being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power. The noble human being honors himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness. 'A hard heart Wotan put into my breast,' says an old Scandinavian saga: a fitting poetic expression, seeing that it comes from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is actually proud of the fact that he is not made for pity, and the hero of the saga therefore adds as a warning: 'If the heart is not hard in youth it will never harden.' Noble and courageous human being who think that way are furthest removed from that morality which finds the distinction of morality precisely in pity, or in acting for others, or in *desinteressement*; faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a fundamental hostility and irony against 'selflessness' belong just as definitely to noble

morality as does a slight disdain and caution regarding compassionate feelings and a 'warm heart.' (BGE 205)

In contrast to master morality stands the slave morality. It is predicated derivatively to actions. In essence, slave morality is a morality of utility:

Suppose the violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, who are uncertain of themselves and weary, moralize: what will their moral valuations have in common? Probably, a pessimistic suspicion about the whole condition of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man along with his condition. The slave's eye is not favorable to the virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical and suspicious, *subtly* suspicious, of all the 'good' that is honored there for there these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means for enduring the pressure of existence. Slave morality is essentially a morality of utility. (BGE 207)

The passage illustrates quite evidently that the inability to affirm and love the self characterizes slavish mortality. The suffering of such people is caused by absence the lack of self-love. Their unfavourable eye towards everything powerful has its root in their lack of power; it is a sense of frustration in the fact of this poverty. Slave morality, therefore, springs out of the inferior's revenge towards the stronger members and there is every reason to fear from those who hate himself for the opposite can be victims of their wrath and revenge.

The difference between the noble man and weak man is conceived in terms of moral designations: 'good', 'bad' and 'evil'. The slave rebellion against the egoistic assertion of the noble types is evident even in its moral designation. The slave-rebellion has its origins in the repression of the will to power of the members of the herd. This rebellion takes the form of transvaluation of noble attributes: whereas the noble man

designates his own action as 'good' and those which differ from his own as 'bad'; the weak man begins by designating the actions of his betters as 'evil' and his own as 'good'. Thus, the dichotomy of good and bad is supplanted by the dichotomy 'good' and 'evil'; and whereas the first dichotomy is completely amoral, being merely an assertion of the experience of either the pleasure or the pain felt by the individual, the second is quintessentially metaphysical and moralistic, attributing a qualitatively evil substance to actions:

In the first case, when the ruling group determines what is 'good,' the exalted, proud states of the soul are experienced as conferring distinction and determining the order of rank. The noble human being separates from himself those in whom the opposite of such exalted, proud states finds expression: he despises them. It should be noted immediately that in this first type of morality the opposition of 'good' and 'bad' means approximately the same as 'noble' and 'contemptible.' (The opposition of 'good' and 'evil' has a different origin.) One feels contempt for the cowardly, the anxious, the petty, those intent on narrow utility; also for the suspicious with their unfree glances, those who humble themselves, the doglike people who allow themselves to be maltreated, the begging flatterers, above all the liars: it is part of the fundamental faith of all aristocrats that the common people lie. 'We truthful ones' thus the nobility of ancient Greece referred to itself. Here is the place for the origin of that famous opposition of 'good' and 'evil': into evil one's feelings project power and dangerousness, a certain terribleness, subtlety, and strength that does not permit contempt to develop. According to slave morality, those who are 'evil' thus inspire fear; according to master

morality it is precisely those who are 'good' that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear, while the 'bad' are felt to be contemptible.

The opposition reaches its climax when, as logical consequence of slave morality, a touch of disdain is associated also with the 'good' of this morality — this may be slight and benevolent — because the good human being has to be *undangerous* in the slaves' way of thinking: he is good-natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps, *un bonhomme*. Wherever slave morality becomes preponderant, language tends to bring the words 'good' and 'stupid' closer together. (BGE 204-207)

Even as the master morality expresses itself, and in a large measure as a response to it, the weaker masses of humanity turns a warped mirror image of the scheme of things: the weakness that nobles turn bad, are redefined as good and nobility's strength becomes evil. Nietzsche asserts that it is resentment of the slaves toward the masters that drives them to invent the category of evil and it is this resentment that turns the slave morality into a perverse denial of life.

By likening the nobles to birds of prey and the weak to sheep, Nietzsche illustrates how the impotent comes to deny life:

It is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey, but that is no reason for blaming the great birds of prey for taking the little lambs. And when the lambs say among themselves, 'Those birds of prey are evil, and he who is as far removed from being a bird of prey, who is rather its opposite, a lamb, is he not good?' then there is nothing to cavil at in the setting up of this ideal, though it may also be that the birds of prey will regard it a little sneeringly, and perchance say to themselves, 'We bear no grudge against them, these good lambs, we even

like them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb.’ To require of strength that it should *not* express itself as strength, that it should not be a wish to overpower, a wish to overthrow, a wish to become master, a thirst for enemies and antagonisms and triumphs, is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength.(GM 27)

The weakness of the weak is their essence and their sole and inevitable reality which eventually turns out to be grudge against whatever exhibits strength.

‘Modern ideas’ takes the characteristics of noble morality as alien to it and therefore, it is difficult to emphasize the noble virtue in modern age that breathes the air of ‘modern ideas’ and here lies the dissatisfaction of Nietzsche about the modern ideas. As he states in BGE:

A morality of the ruling groups, however, is most alien and embarrassing to the present taste in the severity of its principle that one has duties only to one’s peers; that against beings of a lower rank, against everything alien, one may behave as one pleases or ‘as the heart desires,’ and in any case ‘beyond good and evil’ here pity and like feelings may find their place. The capacity for, and the duty of, long gratitude and long revenge both only among one’s peers refinement in repaying, the sophisticated concept of friendship, a certain necessity for having enemies (as it were, as drainage ditches for the affects of envy, quarrelsomeness, exuberance at bottom, in order to be capable of being good friends): all these are typical characteristics of noble morality which, as suggested, is not the morality of ‘modern ideas’ and therefore is hard to empathize with today.(206)

This passage signals the ascendancy of slave morality and the rule of mass over the noble

in modern time. As noble virtues are embarrassing to the present taste, it gives way to the rule of their opposite.

Nietzsche subsumes vanity in his famous distinction between master morality and slave morality. He connects vanity with the slavish mentality and finally he comes to the dramatic conclusion in BGE that vanity is an atavism:

In accordance with the slowly arising democratic order of things (and its cause, the intermarriage of masters and slaves), the originally noble and rare urge to ascribe value to oneself on one's own and to 'think well' of oneself will actually be encouraged and spread more and more now; but it is always opposed by an older, ampler, and more deeply ingrained propensity and in the phenomenon of 'vanity' this older propensity masters the younger one. The vain person is delighted by every good opinion he hears of himself (quite apart from all considerations of its utility, and also apart from truth or falsehood), just as every bad opinion of him pains him: for he submits to both, he feels subjected to them in accordance with that oldest instinct of submission that breaks out in him.

It is 'the slave' in the blood of the vain person, a residue of the slave's craftiness and how much 'slave' is still residual in woman, for example! that seeks to seduce him to good opinions about himself; it is also the slave who afterwards immediately prostrates himself before these opinions as if he had not them forth.

And to say it once more: vanity is an atavism. (209)

This passage illustrates the slaves as vain who feel the death of self-love and therefore remain preoccupied with the opinion of others. Unable to take pleasure in themselves, the vain people of modern age look to others for confirmation of their worth. Nietzsche

indicates that vanity is a corrupt way of seeking self-affirmation because it signals an absence of self-love and autonomy of action. Nietzsche says “interest in oneself, desire to feel pleasure, attains in the vain person to such an intensity that he seduces others to false, much too high assessment of himself, yet then submits to the authority of these others” (HAH 89). In this regard, vain people do not want to affirm their self as to feel themselves predominant rather they look for their own opinion of themselves from others; they lack the sense of self. Lacking self-love, vain people cannot live by their own opinion of themselves alone; they always look for their self-confirmation. Vain people try to assert their superiority even if they do not deserve. Their assertion of superiority involves diminishing and hurting others; their desire to hurt others is their frustration in the fact of their lack of power. They aspire to compete with or surpass the greatness of others.

Nietzsche hurls a blow to ‘modern ideas’ when he asserts that the longing for freedom is necessarily slave morality: “The longing for *freedom*, the instinct for happiness and the subtleties of the feeling of freedom belong just as necessarily to slave morality and morals as artful and enthusiastic reverence and devoting are the symptom of an aristocratic way of thinking and evaluating” (BGE 207-208). The longing for freedom is the manifestation of vanity of the slave. They aspire for something which they do not deserve. According to Nietzsche, freedom is not a thing to be granted, it must be won with the autonomy of self and independence.

Commenting on slave mentality in BGE Nietzsche says: “Anyone who does not want to see what is lofty in man looks that much more keenly for what is lofty in man and mere foreground and thus betrays himself (223).

For Nietzsche, the consequence of this slave revolt in morality is expressed in the promotion of democratic ethos in ‘modern ideas’:

Moral judgments and condemnation constitute the favorite revenge of the spiritually limited against those less limited – also a sort of compensation for having been ill-favored by nature – finally an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming refined – malice spiritualized. It pleases them deep down in their hearts that there are standards before which those overflowing with the wealth and privileges of the spirit are their equals: they fight for the ‘equality of all men before God’ and almost need faith in God just for that. (BGE 147)

The slave revolt in moral judgments and its condemnation of the noble spirit is clearly expressed in this passage. The designation of moral judgments predicated on God reflects the inability of the slave to acquire equality but before God. The consequence of this slave revolt in morality is expressed in the constitution of morality as a universal code. Nietzsche discerns that modern ideals are the enemy to the production of the greatness of man who can bear and extend the responsibility to enhance humanity. Every time the greatness of man is faced with the hypocrisy, comfortableness, the lies of contemporary morality. ‘Modern ideas’ banishes everybody into a corner and specialty. Nietzsche observes that the taste of the time and virtue of the time weakens and thins down the will and thereby justifies the opposite doctrine and the idea of the dumb, humble and selfless humanity.

Nietzsche argues that ‘modern ideas’ is the protector of the rights of the masses and the sign of creeping democracy. He takes equality to be the fundamental principle of socialist doctrine. His objection to equality is not based on political or economic motives but on the observation that similarities of any sort are contrived and human invention that socialists insist on equality is thus the continuance of unnatural prejudice that expresses itself as a moral postulate and then as a political tenet. In Nietzsche’s thought socialism



does not represent solution to the social question but it is the pernicious continuation:

The doltish philosophers and brotherhood enthusiasts who call themselves socialists and want a 'free society'; but in fact they are at one with the lot in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every other form of society except that of the *autonomous* herd (even to the point of repudiating the very concepts of 'master' and 'servant' — *ni dieu ni maitre* runs a socialist formula). They are at one in their tough resistance to every special claim, every special right and privilege (which means in the last analysis, every right: for once all are equal nobody needs 'rights' any more). They are at one in their mistrust of punitive justice (as if it were a violation of those who are weaker, a wrong against the necessary consequence of all previous society). But they are also at one in the religion of pity, in feeling with all who feel, live, and suffer (down to the animal, up to 'God' — the excess of a 'pity with God' belongs in a democratic age). They are at one, the lot of them, in the cry and the impatience of pity, in their deadly hatred of suffering generally, in their almost feminine inability to remain spectators, to let someone suffer. They are at one in their involuntary plunge into gloom and unmanly tenderness under whose spell Europe seems threatened by a new Buddhism. They are at one in their faith in the morality of shared pity, as if that were morality in itself, being the height, the attained height of man, the sole hope of the future, the consolation of present man, the great absolution from all former guilt. They are at one, the lot of them, in their faith in the community as the savior, in short, in the herd, in 'themselves' (BGE 116-117)

Nietzsche adds:

The over-all degeneration of man down to what today appears to the socialist dolts and flatheads as their ‘man of the future’ as their ideal this degeneration and diminution of man into the perfect herd animal (or, as they say, to the man of the ‘free society’), this animalization of man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims, is *possible*, there is no doubt to it. (BGE 118)

It becomes obvious that the slogans of socialists do not bring about free society but conserve the herd. It is a calamitous kind of arrogance against the whole society because it enfeebles the whole race. It holds the slogan of equality until finally a smaller, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something eager to please, sickly and mediocre has been bred all over the modern age. In essence, it is the saviour of the herd.

Nietzsche expresses his contempt for ‘modern ideas’ that believes almost instinctively in progress and future showing disregard for the present. His perception is that human as species is not progressing with the embodiment of ‘modern ideas.’

Nietzsche’s anti-Darwinism is firmly rooted in his conviction that the mediocrity and leveling he witnesses around him are not progress and do not represent the survival of anything but the average and contemptuous:

The herd man in Europe today gives himself the appearance of being the only permissible kind of man, and glorifies his attributes, which make him tame, easy to get along with, and useful to the herd, as if they were the truly human virtues: namely, public spirit, benevolence, consideration, industriousness, moderation, modesty, indulgence, and pity. In those case, however, where one considers leaders and bellwethers indispensable, people today make one attempt after another to add together clever herd

men by way of replacing commanders: all parliamentary constitutions, for example, have this origin. (BGE 111)

The protection of political parties is one of the reasons for Nietzsche's dismissive attitude towards modern state. He disdains the hegemony of politics over more important areas, such as cultural affairs. He attributes modern parties as "prostitution of the spirit" (GS 103). Nietzsche says in *Antichrist* lying to oneself is the precondition for any party. He observes that everything around the ethos of 'modern ideas' is corrupted and corrupts the individual except the incurable mediocre man. In the modern age, the mediocre alone have the chance of continuing their type and propagating. "Be like them! Become mediocre" (BGE 212) is the only morality that makes sense in the air of modern age.

Nietzsche opposes the apostles of 'modern ideas.' Democratic movement of modern age, Nietzsche observes, is the continuation of Christian movement that promotes herd desires in people:

Now it must sound harsh and cannot be heard easily when we keep insisting: that which here believes it knows, that which here glorifies itself with its praises and reproaches, calling itself good, that is the instinct of the herd animal, man, which has scored a breakthrough and attained prevalence and predominance over other instincts and this development is continuing in accordance with the growing physiological approximation and assimilation of which it is the symptom. *Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality* in other words, as we understand it, merely one type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many other types, above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible. But this morality resists such a 'possibility,' such an 'ought' with all its power: it says stubbornly and inexorably, 'I am morality itself, and nothing

besides is morality.' Indeed, with the help of a religion which indulged and flattered the most sublime herd animal desires, we have reached the point where we find even in political and social institutions an every more visible expression of this morality: the *democratic* movement is the heir of the Christian movement. (BGE 115-116).

Nietzsche's succinct exploration of democratic ethos reveals that the morality of democracy is the morality of herd animal. With the power of the herd, it tries to assert democracy as the only morality. It takes the help of religion to motivate the herd who are trained in the faith of Christianity. The problem with the morality of democracy is that it allows itself as the only morality and with the power of the herd it undermines the possibility of the higher moralities.

Nietzsche says that the democratization of Europe leads to the production of type that is prepared for slavery. The evolving 'modern ideas' has finally led to the condition where man is turned to useful, industrious, handy animal. This new kind of progress has undermined the appearance of exceptional human beings. Modern men are trained in the prejudices of democracy that claims for progress but in essence, turning the whole civilization into leveling and mediocratization of man:

Call that in which the distinction of the European is sought 'civilization' or 'humanization' or 'progress,' or call it simply without praise or blame using a political formula, Europe's *democratic* movement: behind all the moral and political foregrounds to which such formulas point, a tremendous physiological process is taking place and gaining momentum. The Europeans are becoming more similar to each other; they become more and more detached from the conditions under which races originate that are tied to some climate or class; they become increasingly

independent of any *determinate milieu* that would like to inscribe itself for centuries in body and soul with the same demands. (BGE 176)

On the contrary to the faith in progress, Nietzsche directly expresses his own view on democracy: “We have a different faith; to us the democratic movement is not only a form of the decay of political organization but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value. Where, then, must we reach with our hopes?” (BGE 117). It becomes clear that the vow for equality of rights turns out into lowering and mediocrating process of the whole race. Thus, democracy is a form of decay; it bears no hope for humanity.

Will Durant in *The Story of Philosophy* writes impressively on Nietzsche’s view towards democracy:

Democracy means drift; it means permission given to each part of an organism to do just what it pleases; it means the lapse of coherence and interdependence, the enthronement of liberty and chaos. It means the worship of mediocrity, and the hatred of excellence. It means the impossibility of great men – how could great men submit to the indignities and indecencies of an election? What chance would they have? ‘What is hated by people, as a wolf by the dogs, is the free spirit, the enemy of all fetters, the not-adorer,’ the man who is not a ‘regular party-member.’ How can the superman arise in such a soil? And how can a nation become great when its greatest men lie unused, discouraged, perhaps unknown? (431-432)

Nietzsche scrutinizes that the great, advancing and unstoppable democratic movement of modern time, that which calls itself progress – and equally its perpetuation and moral augury, Christianity – fundamentally signifies only the tremendous, instinctive

conspiracy of the whole herd against everything that is noble, to preserve and elevate all the weak, the oppressed, the mediocre. In this sense, democratic movement is essentially a long-drawn-out slave revolt that has become more and more confident, against every kind of the master who possess the capacity to rule. The decline and insecurity of all higher types heralds pessimism; when the existence of higher types who sustains the belief in humanity is vulgarized, and the mass rules and tyrannizes the exceptions, they lose their belief in themselves and become nihilists; moral Christian valuations as a slave revolt has, thus, has turned against the higher species who alone have the privilege of being independent. But so far as the Judeo-Christian democratic point of view has prevailed in modern times that even the strong are now ashamed of their health, and begin to seek reasons. The modern time is based upon the values which are useful to the herd. The ‘modern ideas’ which inspires its followers for the feeling for humanity, morality, humanness, sympathy, justice are superficial values in weakening and softening certain dangerous and powerful fundamental drives. They, nevertheless, are nothing other than the diminishment of the whole human type its irreversible mediocratization.

Democracy this mania for counting noses must be eradicated before it is too late. The first step here is the destruction of Christianity so far as all higher types of men are concerned. The triumph of Christ was the beginning of democracy; “the first Christian was in his deepest instincts a rebel against everything privileged; he lived and struggled unremittingly for ‘equal rights’” (qtd in Durant 428). Nietzsche strives to destroy slave morality and prepare the way for the morality of the masters.

**(ii) Denial of Self**

If Christianity represents the triumph of the slave morality, then its values are nothing more than life-denying products of resentment. And indeed this has always been Nietzsche’s view. As the title of *Human- All-Too Human* tells us, Nietzsche’s goal is to

disclose the crude motives that lay at the base of humankind's supposed ideals: "where ye see ideal things, I see things human, alas! all-too-human!" (EH 79). Nietzsche senses the greatest danger for humanity in the non-egoistical instincts, the instinct of compassion, self denial, and self sacrifice, which Christianity and above all Schopenhauer has constantly glorified. The current moral frameworks suppress the expression and enhancement of individuality for it attributes over importance to selfless acts like pity, empathy, sympathy and benevolence, and effaces the self in favour of another. Nietzsche comes to identify pity and its cognate emotions as dangerous to the promotion and enhancement of the self because they promote denial of individual's own concerns and individuality by marking the virtue of self-denial, of living and feeling for others rather than for autonomy and maturity of the self. It is, however, not to say that Nietzsche sees no room for empathy and its cognate emotions. He strives for a healthy and positive empathy with others; he appreciates genuine goodness towards others the goodness that noble human types embodies.

Nietzsche demonstrates that history of religion is the history of sacrifice:

From the start, the Christian faith is a sacrifice: a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit; at the same time, enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation. There is cruelty and religious Phoenicianism in this faith which is expected of an over-ripe, multiple, and much-spoiled conscience: it presupposes that the subjection of the spirit *hurts* indescribably; that the whole past and the habits of such a spirit resist the *absurdissimum* which 'faith' represents to it. (BGE 60)

This passage illustrates that the ideal to sacrifice rises out of nihilistic life-denying ideals. Modern men obtuse to all Christian ideals are trained in the faith in sacrifice. The faith in

sacrifice is cruelty against the self which markedly differs from the ideal of life-affirming noble values.

He adds:

Once one sacrificed human beings to one's god, perhaps precisely those whom one loved most: the sacrifices of the first-born in all prehistoric religions belong here, as well as the sacrifice of the Emperor Tiberius in the Mithras grotto of the isle of Capri, that most gruesome of all Roman anachronisms.

Then, during the moral epoch of mankind, one sacrificed to one's god one's own strongest instincts, one's 'nature': *this* festive joy lights up the cruel eyes of the ascetic, the 'anti-natural' enthusiast. (BGE 67)

This extract digs out the fundamental psychology behind the religious sacrifice. People perpetuate the history of sacrifice in the hope of better life in an otherworld different from this world. People internalize the hope in future blisses but paradoxically, it worsens the present and even the growth of self and individuality.

Nietzsche diagnoses that the religion of sacrifice has finally presented itself in the form of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial of will. He observes the paralysis of will spread over the modern age:

Paralysis of the will: where today does one not find this cripple sitting?

And often in such finery! How seductive the finery looks! This disease enjoys the most beautiful pomp-and-*lie*-costumes; and most of what today displays itself in the showcases, for example, as 'objectivity,' 'being scientific,' '*l'art pour l'art*,' 'pure knowledge, free of will,' is merely dressed-up skepticism and paralysis of the will: for this diagnosis of the European sickness I vouch. (BGE 130)



Sickness of will, Nietzsche infers, is the overall moderation of abilities of modern men. They lack the virtues of the type of man that is noble, which is to say, a type that does not dominate and is neither authoritative nor self sufficient. The guise of objectivity is a lack of personality, lack of will and incapacity to love the self.

Nietzsche associates the feeling of pity with self-effacement. This association suggests that the exaggeration of pity's importance can be partly attributed to the fact that the current moral framework suppresses the expression and enhancement of the higher species. As Nietzsche expresses in BGE:

It does happen, said a moralistic pedant and dealer in trifles, that I honor and exalt a man free of self-interest not because he seems to me to be entitled to profit another human being at his own expense. Enough; the question is always who *he* is, and who the *other* person is. In a person, for example, who is called and made to command, self-denial and modest self-effacement would not be a virtue but the waste of a virtue: thus it seems to me. Every unegoistic morality that takes itself for unconditional and addresses itself to all does not only sin against taste: it is a provocation to sins of omission, one *more* seduction and injury for the higher, rarer, privileged. (149)

It is clear from this passage that pity and its cognate emotions are seductive to the higher species because they promote the denial of individual's own concerns and individuality by marking a virtue of self-denial, of living and feeling for others rather than for the self. Thus, Nietzsche comes to a dramatic conclusion: "self-denial and modest self-effacement would not be a virtue but a waste of virtue" (BGE 149). Into the religion of self-denial, individuals have to be profitable to others even at their own expenses; it is a seduction of individuals. It distracts individuals from much more important task of self-development,

it blurs the boundaries of individuality; it is simply detrimental to the higher, privileged individuals.

Ruth Abbey interestingly writes in *Nietzsche's Middle Period* that the religion of pity is essentially a slave revolt. Pity seeking tendency in individuals is a manifestation of vanity whereby they feel powerful by subordinating others. It means these people feel weakness, dependence, and dearth of self-love:

The major factor separating higher from lower seems to be the degree of rivalry one feels, the extent to which one takes independent pleasure in the self rather than needing to subordinate other for self aggrandisement. As per vanity, such malicious, hierarchizing pity seems to derive from a shortage of self-love. Hence Nietzsche's observation that 'pity is the most agreeable feeling among those who have little pride and no prospects of great conquests.' (59)

It is evident from the passage that love of the self separates higher individuals from the lower ones. The higher individuals take pleasure in themselves whereas the lower individuals feel to subordinate others to feel the undeserved superiority and one of the instruments they use is the wedge of pity; they try to seduce the higher individuals with such feelings.

The hierarchization of pity in 'modern ideas' represents the triumph of slave ethics. It is observed that pity works against the development of the higher types in whom humanity resides because it attempts to preserve what is ripe for destruction even the death of the weakest. "Hating egoism, whether one's own, like the Christian, or another's, like the socialist, thus proves to be a value judgment ruled by revenge; and on the other hand a prudence of the self-preservation of those who suffer, increasing their feelings of reciprocity and solidarity...." (Early Notebook 243). Thus, the religion of pity is a game

for which only the inferior types are suited. Nietzsche observes that in among the “modern ideas” of preserving the oppressed, the higher types of individuals are the most disadvantageous. It is dangerous to the higher types because it insists on its own sovereign way; it does not have room for the virtues of nobility making the noble individuals suspicious about themselves. ‘Modern ideas’ has degenerated the entire generation by turning all including the higher types into a single feeling of self denial. The religion of modern age sides with those who suffer life like sickness and seek to preserve the sickly and mediocre men; to worsen the entire generation:

They seek to preserve, to preserve alive whatever can possibly be preserved; indeed, as a matter of principle, they side with these cases as religions for *sufferers*; they agree with all those who suffer life like a sickness and would like to make sure that every other feeling about life should be considered false and should become impossible. Even if the very highest credit is given to this considerate and preserving care, which, besides being directed toward all the others, was and is also directed toward the highest type of man, the type that so far has almost always suffered most; nevertheless, in a total accounting, the *sovereign* religions we have had so far are among the chief causes that have kept the type ‘man’ on a lower rung they have preserved too much of *what ought to perish*. What we have to thank them for is inestimable; and who could be rich enough in gratitude not to be impoverished in view of all that the ‘spiritual men’ of Christianity, for example, have so far done for Europe! And yet, when they gave comfort to sufferers, courage to the oppressed and despairing, a staff and support to the dependent, and lured away from society into monasteries and penitentiaries for the soul those who had been

destroyed inwardly and who had become savage: how much more did they have to do besides, in order to work with a good conscience and on principle, to preserve all that was sick and that suffered – which means, in fact and in truth, to *worsen the European race*? Stand all valuations *on their head* – that is what they had to do. And break the strong, sickly o’er great hopes, cast suspicion on the joy in beauty, bend everything haughty, manly, conquering, domineering, all the instincts characteristic of the highest and best-turned-out type of ‘man,’ into unsureness, agony of conscience, self-destruction – indeed, invert all love of the earthly and the earthly – *that is the task the church pose, until in its estimation ‘becoming unworldly,’ ‘unsensual,’ and ‘higher men’ were fused into a single feeling.* (BGE 74-75)

The passage indicates that the religion of self denial has degenerated everything that comes out of egoism. For Nietzsche, modernity can be achieved only through the procreation of mature and autonomous individuals. But the religion of self denial has turned the higher types of individual into unsureness.

Nietzsche discredits the religion of self sacrifice by revealing pity as a waste of virtue and even dangerous to the higher types of individual. Nietzsche further reveals that pity is dangerous also to the aggregate happiness of people. Instead of eradicating suffering and pain, pity multiplies it by requiring pitters to share the suffering of another which finally results in void. Morality’s preaching of pity and self-denial is ridiculous: “in a man devoted to knowledge, pity almost ridiculous, like delicate hands on Cyclops” (BGE 92). People show the feeling of pity out of ignorance and therefore it trivializes the other’s experience. This idea is forcefully conveyed in this passage:

Our personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and

inaccessible to almost everyone; here we remain hidden from our neighbour, even if we eat from one pot. But whenever people notice that we suffer, they interpret our suffering superficially. It is the very essence of the emotion of pity that it strips away from the suffering of others whatever is distinctively personal. Our 'benefactors' [*Wobltäter*] are, more than our enemies, people who make our worth and will smaller. (qtd. in Abbey 63)

Pity, for Nietzsche, is often a mere symptom of a condition which is deeper and more deplorable than it appears. By letting himself be so affected by suffering that individual attempts to mitigate it instead of realizing that it is so ubiquitous that trying to relieve the sufferer looks silly.

A reiteration: the religion of self-sacrifice is revealed as a waste of virtue in Nietzsche's hand. Nietzsche builds his argument even stronger when he states it as "cruelty turned against oneself" (BGE 159). "'Pity for all' would be hardness and tyranny toward you my dear neighbour!" (BGE 81). Even the show of pity pleases those who have them and those who enjoy their fruits and also the mere spectator, this does not constitute an argument in favour of it. Nietzsche makes modern man cautious about this seduction:

There is no other way: the feelings of devotion, self-sacrifice for one's neighbor, the whole morality of self-denial must be questioned mercilessly and taken to court no less than the aesthetics of 'contemplation devoid of all interest' which is used today as a seductive guise for the emasculation of art, to give it a good conscience. There is too much charm and sugar in these feelings of 'for others,' *'not for myself,'* for us not to need to become doubly suspicious at this point and to ask: 'are these not

perhaps *seduction?*' (BGE 45)

Nietzsche contends to take different attitude towards life, which would make pity pointless. The thing to do is to move to a height of maturity where pitying does not arise as a concern. He makes clear his ambition in a highly celebrated passage in *Gay Science*.

Anyone who manages to experience the history of humanity as his own history will feel in an enormously generalized way all the grief of an invalid who thinks of health, of an old man who thinks of the dreams of his youth, of a lover deprived of his beloved, of the martyr whose ideal is perishing .... but if one endured, if one *could* endure his immense sum of grief of all kinds .... if one could burden one's soul with all of this the oldest, the newest, losses, hopes, conquests, and the victories of humanity; if one could finally contain all this in one soul and crowd it into a single feeling this would surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far: the happiness of a god full of power and love, full of tears and laughter, a happiness that, like the sun in the evening, continually bestows its inexhaustible riches, pouring them into the sea, feeling richest, as the sun does, only when even the poorest fisherman is still rowing with golden oars! This godlike feeling would then be called humaneness.

(337)

The passage gives Nietzschean new account of humaneness. If one comprehensively lives out the alternative to the life of pity, individual can achieve the ultimate happiness of life which for Nietzsche is new humaneness, individual can become capable to embrace all aspects of life and thereby individual can achieve a happiness that humanity has not yet known so far. Nietzsche entertains the possibility of the individual with boundless sensitivity that is able to empathize with others and across time. This vision illustrates

that he is not dismissive of all feeling with and for others.

Nietzsche concedes that a higher type of pity is possible. This is a generalized, God's eye pity for the degraded state of humanity. The dominance of slave's pity is one of the major causes of diminution of human stature. Hence, Nietzsche resists slave pity with higher pity:

Whether it is hedonism or pessimism, utilitarianism or eudaemonism all these ways of thinking that measure the value of things in accordance with *pleasure* and *pain*, which are mere epiphenomena and wholly secondary, are ways of thinking that stay in the foreground and nav etés on which everyone conscious of *creative* powers and an artistic conscience will look down not without derision, nor without pity. Pity with you that, of course, is not pity in your sense: it is not pity with social 'distress,' with 'society' and its sick and unfortunate members, with those addicted to vice and maimed from the start, though the ground around us is littered with them; it is even less pity with grumbling, sorely pressed, rebellious slaves strata who long fro dominion, calling it 'freedom.' *Our* pity is a higher and more farsighted pity: we see how man makes himself smaller, how you make him smaller and there are moments when we behold your very pity with indescribable anxiety, when we resist this pity when we find your seriousness more dangerous than any frivolity. You want, if possible and there is no more insane 'if possible' to abolish suffering. And we? It really seems that we would rather have it higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you understand it that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible that makes his destruction desirable.

The discipline of suffering, of great suffering do you not know that only *this* discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In man *creature* and *creator* are united: in man there is also creator, forger, hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh day: do you understand this contrast? And that your pity is for the 'creature in man,' for what must be formed, broken, forged, torn, burnt, made incandescent, and purified that which necessarily must and *should* suffer? And our pity do you not comprehend for whom our *converse* pity is when it resists your pity as the worst of all pampering and weaknesses?

Thus it is pity *versus* pity. (BGE 153-154)

It shows that Nietzsche's aversion to pity is nothing to do with being heartless or ruthless at any rate. He is not talking about giving a starving person food or drink. His attack is concerned with pity as a religion of self denial which ultimately poses threat to egoism and such noble virtues. While he condemns Christian inspired morality of self-denial and its cognate feelings, he does not see all manifestations of fellow feelings as base and spurious. So, it would be misunderstanding to say that Nietzsche advocates neglect of others.

In BGE, Nietzsche evokes again the possibility of higher type of pity the pity of noble human being:



A man who says, 'I like this, I take this for my own and want to protect it and defend it against anybody'; a man who is able to manage something, to carry out a resolution, to remain faithful to a thought, to hold a woman, to punish an prostrate one who presumed too much; a man who has his wrath and his sword and to whom the weak, the suffering, the herd pressed, and the animals, too, like to come and belong by nature, in short a man who is by nature a *master* when such a man has pity, well, this pity has value. But what good is the pity of those who suffer. Or those who, worse, preach pity. (230)

This passage illustrates that Nietzsche sees a room for a healthy and positive empathy with others: whatever is done from love always occurs beyond good and evil (BGE, 90). By his analysis, he comes to appreciate genuine goodness towards others and can be embodied only by noble individuals who are masters and autonomous; it is not the realm of those who are themselves suffering. Only the higher types have access to wider feeling; the inferiors are concerned with themselves and their immediate interests.

On the contrary to the genuine goodness, Nietzsche observes that modern men are receptive only to cult of suffering:

Almost everywhere in Europe today we find a pathological sensitivity and receptivity to pain; also a repulsive incontinence in lamentation, an increase in tenderness that would use religion and philosophical bric-a-brac to deck itself out as something higher there is a veritable cult of suffering. The unmanliness of what is baptized as 'pity' in the circles of such enthusiasts is, I should think, what always meets the eye first. (BGE 231)

Nietzsche wants to emphasize that the inclination towards feeling of pity is bad taste in

modern men. It must be exorcized vigorously and thoroughly for it is the sign of unmanliness the sign of infirmity. The religion of pity in modern men is the consequence of their seeing danger everywhere. It sees suffering as the greatest evil and in its attempt to purge suffering, people lose the capacity to endure hardship and privation.

Nietzsche holds that a necessary antagonism exists between self-denial and self-development. If the soul is enervated by pity, individual cannot focus on the self; his intense concern goes for others. While pity draws individuals into the concern of others, it distracts them from the much more important and demanding task of self development. Nietzsche ultimately concludes that the lack of knowledge of the appropriate ways of self caring for themselves pose the real threats to the procreation of the autonomous and noble individuals in modernity. However, it would be mistake to take Nietzsche as insensitive to humanity. He rather aspires to elevate humanity to a height that can embrace all aspects of life and thereby enriching it. He strives for a genuine goodness of feeling in individuals where individuals can enrich themselves along with the whole humanity. Thus Nietzsche's practical interest in eroding the faith in self denial is to expand the space for an ethic of the care of the self. Self- knowledge, Nietzsche puts, is the precondition of proper care of he self, for an understanding of the self in its specificity is essential if it is to be cared for in proper, individualized way. He sees an urgent need for an ethic of the self care in modern age to bring maturity in individuals.

## Chapter IV

### New Judgment: Nobility

*Beyond Good and Evil* is one of Nietzsche's important contributions to a new system of ethic and touches on many of the deepest principles of his philosophy. He posits new judgments predicated on the criterion of nobility on which his own philosophy is based. In his attempt to provide new judgments, he earns the distinction of being history's most eloquent wielder of the 'anti' while paradoxically serving as a champion of life affirmation. Nietzsche elevates philosophical expression into one of the most basic human will – the will to power which is the principle of explanation and evaluation of the world. His approach to issues is influenced by comparisons between the ancients and moderns on the one hand and his own stand on the other. He rejects the age-old academic standard of comprehensive philosophical system purporting to set the new judgments which lie beyond good and evil.

While some continues to presume their own capacity for freedom while it is lacking, Nietzsche's free spirit comes to acknowledge a hierarchy. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche defines free spirit as "the thinking man, the intellectual aristocrat, the philosopher and ruler.... the 'free spirit', however, must not be confused with the superman. The former is the 'bridge' which the present day man must cross in the process of surpassing himself" (Introduction x). The independence of new philosophers judgments is a function of their height, not mere individuality. They are not dogmatists, but they offer judgments that they declare to be their own:

Are these coming philosophers new friends of truth? That is probable enough, for all philosophers so far have loved their truths. But they will certainly not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman – which has so far been

the secret wish and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations. 'My judgment is my judgment': no one else is easily entitled to do it that is what such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say to himself. (BGE 53)

This passage shows Nietzschean preference for experimentalism and existential quality. For those who incline to see the separation of the true from the good as a clear preference for the true beyond all moral limitations, Nietzsche writes of new understanding of the good: "'Good' is no longer good when one's neighbour mouths it. And how should there be a 'common good'!" (BGE 53). Nietzsche wants to address the moderners to shed the taste of wanting to agree with many. The new philosophers accordingly do not speak very often of the good, even as he openly speaks of the problem of truth. Goods held by all thereby lose their goodness, and so are endangered by open speech. Nietzsche's attention to value is not merely destructive; beyond good and evil is not beyond all claims for good. While he opposes the common standards shaped by morality of good and evil, the good continues to supply the measure for justice understood as "all that is rare for the rare" (BGE 53).

Nietzsche acknowledges the criterion for the rare quality of independence. Having introduced the philosopher of the future as a superior type, the goal of new types beyond good and evil is located beyond the freedom sought by the modern men. He claims that men must qualify themselves for independence and command where they become judge to themselves:

Not to remain stuck to a person not even the most loved every person is a prison, also a nook. Not to remain stuck to a fatherland not even if it suffers most and needs help most it is less difficult to sever one's heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to remain stuck to some pity not even

for higher men into whose rare torture and helplessness some accident allowed us to look. Not to remain stuck to science even if it should lure us with the most precious finds that seem to have been saved up precisely for us. Not to remain stuck to one's own detachment, to that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who flees ever higher to see ever more below him the danger of the flier. Not to remain stuck to our own virtues and become as a whole the victim of some detail in us, such as our hospitality, which is the danger of dangers for superior and rich souls who spend themselves lavishly, almost indifferently, and exaggerate the virtue of generosity into a vice. One must know to *conserve oneself*: hardest test of independence. (BGE 52)

The apparent goal of freedom and independence gives way to higher goals, which include obligations and this high sense of duty and obligations distinguish the new philosopher's striving for independence from the freedom of the modern men. The questioning regarding values acquires new purpose:

We think that hardness, forcefulness, slavery, danger in the alley and the heart, life in hiding, stoicism, the art of experiment and devilry of every kind, that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents, serves the enhancement of the species 'man' as much as its opposite does. (BGE 54-55)

This passage emphasizes that there is the preference for what has been considered evil; however, forced from old restraints the new task emerges in the goal of enhancing mankind beyond the most thoroughgoing truthfulness in their attempts at their higher goal.

In BGE, Nietzsche ventures to baptize the new philosophers as the species who

want to remain riddle:

A new species of philosophers is coming up: I venture to baptize them with a name that is not free of danger. As I unriddle them, insofar as they allow themselves to be unriddled – for it belongs to their nature to want to remain riddles at some point – these philosophers of the future may have a right – it might also be a wrong – to be called *attempters*. This name itself in the end a mere attempt and, if you will, a temptation. (52)

This extract clarifies that the riddle of new philosophers is beyond the unriddling capacity of the modern men. The independence of judgment offered by the philosophers of the future preserves their solitude as riddles. They do not retain the solitude of isolation from humanity, but rather than seeking to reveal themselves, they undertake their monumental obligation to form values that serve life and promote the flourishing of human possibilities.

Having turned the debunking procedure of enlightenment on itself and thereby discrediting the goodness of truth as yet another prejudice, Nietzsche opens the possibility of religious claims. If reason has not in fact debunked claims of faith, religious claims still warrant consideration. Instead of abandoning evaluation, Nietzsche provides new criteria for judgment. The new criteria that follows directly from finding psychology the path to fundamental problem. Nietzsche opens his discussion of religious: “The human soul and its limits, the range of inner human experiences reached so far, the heights, depths, and distances of these experiences, the whole history of the soul so far and its as yet unexhausted possibilities – that is the predestined hunting ground for a born psychologist and lover of the great hunt” (BGE 59). For Nietzsche, the site for discussion of religious possibilities is the human soul. With this, Nietzsche provides some indication of what he means by religious – it concerns the ways of life, the states of soul that

corresponds to them, and the continued possibilities for such states. He announces that all possibilities have not been exhausted, but new possibilities can be discovered or formed by plumbing the depths of human soul in the spirit of a hunter, who is a born psychologist rather than that of the scholar who lacks the courage. The genuine philosophers possess the courage to experiment and bring about new ways of life.

Nietzsche says that the new philosophers have creative task to accomplish. It is only from the scholar's perspective the philosopher's activity looks like arbitrary willful creation. This is from the limited view of scholars habituated to practice of demonstrating the reasons for everything. The genuine philosophers have also their reason for positing values but do not feel the need to demonstrate them with exhaustive supporting evidences. The new philosophers pursue grander goals than presenting their truths. New philosophers are astute psychologists who use that ability to create the values that govern the way humanity lives:

Those philosophical laborers after the noble model of Kant and Hegel have to determine and press into formulas, whether in the realm of logic or political (moral) thought or art, some great data of valuations that is, former *positings* of values, creations of value which have become dominant and are for a time called 'truths.' It is for these investigators to make everything that has happened and been esteemed so far easy to look over, easy to think over, intelligible and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even 'time,' and to *overcome* the entire past an enormous and wonderful task in whose service every subtle pride, every tough will can certainly find satisfaction. *Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators:* they say, '*Thus it shall be!*' they first determine the Whither and For What of man, and in so doing have at their

disposal the preliminary labor of all philosophical laborers, all who have overcome the past. With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their 'knowing' is *creating*, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is *will to power*. (BGE 136)

The new philosophers are themselves the legislators of valuations in contrast to those who hold fast some large body of valuations, that is, of previous assignments and creations of logical or moral values. The real philosophers are commanders and legislators. The affirmation of will by the new philosophers makes the favourable condition of the achievement of stronger species. It supposes the benefit of the future.

In this estimation of religions, Nietzsche demonstrates how psychological strength rather than truthfulness may be used to evaluate competing interpretations of the world and the ways of life they spawn. In Greeks, Nietzsche finds a positive model, and instructive example of his manner of evaluation: "what is amazing about the religiosity of the ancient Greeks is the enormous abundance of gratitude it exudes: it is a very noble type of man that confronts nature and life in *this* way" (BGE 64). The ancient Greek religiosity is noble because it confronts life rather than forming a life-denying morality, such as creates the saintly type. Nietzsche has now provided a clear example of what it does mean to evaluate by the extent to which a judgment is life-promoting rather than by whether it is true or false. The literal falseness of the myths that generate Greek religions is no objection for Nietzsche. Avoiding oppositions, its anthropomorphic gods characterized by imperfections, strivings, attachments, and conflicts elevate human life without denying its character. Its presentation of the world shaped by the conflict, generation, and preferences of the gods reflects human life and promotes an embrace of human life, its struggle, conflict, and difficulty, rather than positing opposites or rejecting



elements of life as evil to be eliminated in a world vastly different from the present modern era. In other words, that affirms life as a great boon, in spite of all its terrors; this shows great strength and a remarkable and noble freedom from resentment. Nobility stands above truthfulness in Nietzsche's estimation of claims about the world; it stands above good and evil as a measure of human lives and psychological types. As Nietzsche presents in BGE:

The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating and we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include the synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for us; that without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live — that renouncing false judgments would mean renouncing life and a denial of life. To recognize untruth as a condition of life — that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil.

(11-12)

This passage illustrates Nietzschean new measure that stands beyond truth and falsity. He abandons the philosophical idea of truth as the measure of things and as a critical tool for philosophical theories and arguments. The measure of what is life-promoting makes possible judgments among illusions. Myths and perspectives need to be evaluated by measure of life.

After establishing the highest standard and demonstrating its use. Nietzsche recounts the history of religious sacrifice as “a great ladder of religious cruelty” (BGE 67). After sacrificing God himself, there remains no reason to sacrifice the earth, and a new life-affirming possibility emerges. The mention of eternal return follows this account of religious cruelty, for out of deepest depths of nihilism and pessimism come the greatest heights and joy in the most life-affirming overcoming of despair:

Whoever has endeavored with some enigmatic longing, as I have, to think pessimism through to its depths and to liberate it from the half-Christian, half-German narrowness and simplicity in which it has finally presented itself to our century, namely, in the form of Schopenhauer’s philosophy; whoever has really, with an Asiatic and supra-Asiatic eye, looked into, down into the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking beyond good and evil and no longer, like the Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the spell and delusion of morality may just thereby, without really meaning to do so, have opened his eyes to the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is but who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably *da capo* not only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle, and not only to a spectacle but at bottom to him who needs precisely this spectacle and who makes it necessary because again and again he needs himself and makes himself necessary what? And this wouldn’t be *circulus vitiosus duos*? (BGE 68)

This passage demonstrates that the ideal of what wants life to be repeated for all eternity is the opposite ideal to the whole ladder of cruelty, rising out of nihilistic life-denial for

once it has sacrificed God it has eliminated the ideal opposed to life. Nietzsche wants to provide the ground where individuals can feel strong or healthy enough to affirm the thought of an eternally recurring life. Due to their base-line life-impoverishment, modern individuals are far from being well-enough disposed towards themselves and their lives to desire their identical return. Thus, the measure of perspectives becomes human life and its capacity instead of self-legislation of superhuman authority. It comes to transform perspective from ahistorical to historical realm and thereby posits a high sense of responsibility on the part of individual to march modernity ahead with a higher sense of humanity. No longer supposing an otherworld different from this world, it may embrace this world and celebrate life rather than sacrifice human basic nature and instinct to an ideal opposed to the world. The overcoming of the philosopher's prejudices of opposites opens the possibility of affirming this life. The life affirming spirit characteristic of Greek religion or those who embrace eternal return distinguishes a noble way of life, the aim Nietzsche locates higher than the aim of truth.

Nietzsche presents a new description of philosophers who carries the Nietzschean goal noble affirmation of life:

The philosophers as we understand him, we free spirits as the man of the most comprehensive responsibility who has the conscience for the over-all development of man this philosopher will make use of religions for his project of cultivation and education, just as he will make use of whatever political and economic states are at hand. The selective and cultivating influence, always destructive as well as creative and form-giving, which can be exerted with the help of religions, is always multiple and different according to the sort of human beings who are placed under its spell and protection. For the strong and independent who are prepared and

predestined to command and in whom the reason and art of a overcoming resistances, for the ability to rule as a bound that unites rulers and subjects and betrays and delivers the consciences of the latter, that which is most concealed and intimate and would like to elude obedience, to the former. (BGE 72)

This passage is a clear evidence that the new philosophers use and even form religions for the sake of promoting life- affirming human beings, far from being bound by truthfulness. The achievement of freedom in Nietzsche's account is possible only by those who can embrace the higher goal of comprehensive responsibility.

Nietzsche presents love for life as a worthy goal not necessarily compatible with freedom from fictions or accord with the whole of the world. His estimation of value presents the priority of good, now presented as noble, to separate it from moral fictions while preparing the grounds for the superiority of one perspectival interpretation to another. What Nietzsche values is how far perspectives give service to a noble way of life. The noble offers a category for judgment that is apart from good and evil. Genealogically prior, such evaluation stands after the overcoming, beyond good and evil. Nietzsche reveals that what is beyond good and evil is what is noble. Nietzsche assesses the criterion for nobility in BGE:

The noble type of man experiences *itself* as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is *value-creating*. Everything it knows as part of itself it honors: such a morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow: the noble human

being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power. The noble human being honors itself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness. ‘A hard heart Wotan put into my breast,’ says an old Scandinavian saga: a fitting poetic expression, seeing that it comes from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is actually proud of the fact that he is not made for pity, and the hero of the saga therefore adds as a warning: ‘if the heart is not hard in youth it will never harden.’ Noble and courageous human beings who think that way are furthest removed from that morality which finds the distinction of morality precisely in pity, or in acting for others, or in *désintéressement* faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a fundamental hostility and irony against ‘selflessness’ belong just as definitely to noble morality as does a slight disdain and caution regarding compassionate feelings and a ‘warm heart.’ (205)

This passage is a brilliant piece of Nietzschean expression of nobility. Assessing nobility involves describing a character type, one who experiences itself as value-creating. The noble human being has reverence for himself and honor himself as one who is powerful. As such he exemplifies the height of the most fundamental drive, the will to power. The noble is one who has power over himself. The capacity for power over the self is an important criterion for nobility. The only way not to be commanded by others is to become capable of command over himself. In those circumstances, the man becomes “commanding and obeying party” (BGE 26) at the same time. A man who will command something within himself that renders obedience belongs to the category of nobility who

alone can direct the goal of modernity. It allows us to see that the capacity for self-command also entails the capacity to obey oneself. Here the double phenomenon is experienced as willing. Nietzsche's attention to the multiplicity of drives within a self serves the purpose of considering the establishment of rule and order among the warring drives. His presentation of warring drives and growth elucidates the contest of self-overcoming. The self-overcoming necessary for strength and growth requires confrontation with the difficulties of a particular age. Nietzsche's own work exhibits exactly such confrontations as it builds through contests with the prejudices of the age toward new nobility and responsibility.

It comes out that a sense of obligation is one of the most important of Nietzsche's indications or signs, of the noble soul: "signs of nobility : never thinking of degrading our duties into duties for everybody; not wanting to delegate, to share, one's own responsibilities; counting ones privileges and their exercise among ones *duties*" (BGE 221). A high sense of responsibility, thus, comes out as the clearest criterion for nobility. The account of Nietzsche transforms freedom understood as liberation and independence into the responsibility for command characteristics of the noble soul. The first responsibility of noble soul is to create order among the drives in itself. The genuinely noble individuals have a high sense of duty for commanding, ordering, and directing the path of human lives. In the height of this responsibility, the distinguished individual's are marked by their capacity for self-command. Beyond the freedom sought by modern men, the noble individuals understand that their privileges come with duties, come as duties. Beyond morality of good and evil, the noble individuals do not understand these duties as universal. Beyond good and evil and beyond mere freedom lies the nobility of the most comprehensive responsibility.

Nietzsche's chief objection to the enlightenment project is not its self-

contradiction, although he uses this as a wedge against it, but rather its irresponsibility. The quest for objectivity is not only impossible but irresponsible as it ignores its effects and justifies such irresponsibility on the grounds of truthfulness. In promoting nobility and responsibility through his critique of enlightenment, Nietzsche teaches his age the responsibility to consider the effects of interpretations. Nietzschean noble individuals' strivings to posit goal for humanity do not represent their thought experiment, their values are tested against public that whether they are life-promoting, life-affirming or not. Nietzsche necessitates the values to have value for life.

For Nietzsche philosophy bears the task of establishing the basis for rule. The will to power gives an interpretive name to this striving which unifies the soul when it is successful and attaches it to successful projects within life. As Nietzsche claims in BGE:

Suppose, finally we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of *one* basic form of the will — namely, of the will to power, as *my* proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and once could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment — it is *one* problem — then one would have gained the right to determine *all* efficient force univocally as — will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its 'intelligible character' — it would be 'will to power' and nothing else. (48)

The psychological effects of interpreting human action as flowing from the will to power provide the reason to interpret. The world as will to power, corresponding to an interpretation of our psychic structure, for it promotes the striving of life-affirming projects. It may be mere image, but it is one design to promote responsible action to bring about healthy, strong, and noble lives rather than those that merely condemn the

alternatives as evil or uphold the goodness of their own soul in its powerfulness. Healthy, strong, and noble drives do not be content with declaring their own goodness, they seek to rule. Presenting the soul as the contest for power reminds us that life entails such contested striving; confronting life without the responsibility to engage in such aims is ignoble. Nietzsche presents the comprehensive responsibility of philosophy; it must bear the burden for the interpretations it offers.

Human life and its capacity becomes the measure for noble responsibility. As Nietzsche presents the modern ideas in a way that that would provide guidance only in a most negative way, he sets human aims against the prevailing ethos. But as a negative guide, modern ethos remains instructive understood as defining the limits of current moral frameworks. Noble aims lie within human possibilities rather than granting some extra-natural satisfaction to our striving; not metaphysics but the psychological demands of humanity lie beyond the indifference of moral frameworks. The new philosophers as psychologists consider the limits and possibilities of humanity and the time to which they appeal. The demands of noble confrontations with this limited life and its striving are the highest demands there are. Directing modernity towards this possibility is Nietzsche's most comprehensive aim.



## Conclusion

In the seminal work *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche demonstrates his mature critique of modernity. This study reveals Nietzschean pursuit of critique of modernity is to move individuals from the prejudices of the age in favour of truthfulness. Nietzsche attempts to reveal the prejudices including the prejudices of the philosophers, moral framework, modern institutions, in order to recognize the need for the self-overcoming of those prejudices.

The chief prejudice that Nietzsche calls into question is the objectivity of truth. Nietzsche abandons the idea there exists objective truth. If there is no objective truth, no standard apart from as by which our ideas may be measured, then it logically follows that there is not an absolute standard of truth and value. Thus, Nietzsche infers that the belief in God is simply a symptom of the human craving for absolutes. Transcendental philosophy posits its truth; it is always predicated on the existence of God. God provides the basis for the transcendentalists to come up with the distinction between phenomena and noumena. They put their belief in the transcendental world because with the belief in God, they prevent themselves to venture out into the open seas of thoughts with no craft other than their own judgments and opinion. Nietzsche believes that this system of value judgment can be overcome by the measures of nobility of the new philosopher.

However, in spite of possibility of new philosophy, Nietzsche recognizes that there will still be those who feel the need for God along with the need for absolute truth and for a rational, metaphysical knowledge of the noumenal world. Nietzsche thinks that humanity falls into two categories. The first category consists of those who need wear the masks of objectivity to hide the awesome responsibilities of their own subjectivity. He calls these people 'the herd,' 'the lower types,' and 'the slaves.' The second category consists of the new philosophers, people who are self-affirming, who need no

philosophical or spiritual clutches, and who celebrate both the limits and the glories of their humanity. Nietzsche calls them ‘the noble,’ ‘the higher types,’ ‘the masters.’

This dualistic personality theory, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, amplifies Nietzsche’s theme that philosophy is a personal confession and that all thought is a reflection of the type of person we are—psychologically weak or strong. Nietzsche’s insight into modern ideas makes us face ourselves, along with our beliefs, convictions, and sacred idols. Even if we find his ideas challenging, intoxicating, and life-enhancing or we find them terrifying, offensive, and abhorrent, he is nonetheless successful in evoking this form of self revaluations: his pursuit to reveal the prejudices of modern ideas is handled.

Nietzsche wants to free his age from the moral prejudices that put overemphasis on the ethic of self-denial. For Nietzsche, the ethic of self-denial is a goalless humanity because the universal empathy is inaccessible to most, for the majority is simply concerned with themselves, and their immediate interests, provided that they lack the will or imagination to venture beyond. The professed claim about the feeling for others is void at the centre and therefore valueless. Nietzsche rather takes different attitude towards life which will make such empathetic feelings pointless. The thing to do is to move to a height of maturity where the ethic of self-denial does not arise as a concern. Nietzsche wants to develop a new account of humanity where individuals can embrace all aspects of life and achieve the unprecedented happiness.

Modern men obtuse with the Christian nomenclature, put faith in the values of altruism and self-sacrifice which, according to Nietzsche, has violated the fundamental will to life. As such, that morality is no-saying to life and with that no-saying comes the celebration of equality among individuals, suspicion of the individual who excels, and a commitment to mediocrity which means erosion of civilization. Nietzsche prefers the

measures of nobility in the affirmation of the basic will to life and celebration of individual's excellence.

Nietzsche baptizes new philosophers who discerns the current deterioration of civilization, stands apart from the mediocrity of the herd, legislates for himself what is right and wrong, and thereby sets himself beyond prevailing good and evil. The important thing for the new philosopher is not whether they are 'true' but whether they help us, whether they further our life and strengthen our mind. The values have worth, for the new philosophers, only if they make us strong. Nietzsche holds the view that man chooses what he needs; the value of knowing also lies beyond true and false. The new philosophers begin, therefore, the overturning and re-valuation of all values. Here the philosopher becomes a reformer of ideas, the legislator and creator of a new civilization from which springs a prelude to a new philosophy of modernity.

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