

TRIBHUVAN UNIVERSITY

**Crisis of Enlightenment Rationality in High Modernism: A Case Study in
Literature, Philosophy and Art**

**A Thesis Submitted to the Central Department of English
in the Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in English**

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Letter of Approval

This thesis titled "Crisis of Enlightenment Rationality in High Modernism: A Case Study in Literature, Philosophy and Art" submitted to the Central Department of English, Tribhuvan University by Yubraj Aryal, has been approved by the undersigned members of the research committee.

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Abstract

The main objective of the research is to explore the contingency of Enlightenment-constituted rationality. It drives home the fact that reasonable is not reasonable absolute rather it is contingent to unreason. The failure of this recognition by Enlightenment *philosophies* ultimately leads the entire Enlightenment project at crisis in the latter modernist phase. This fact has been explored taking particularly three disciplines of knowledge: literature, philosophy and art from the two periods—Enlightenment and High Modernism for comparison and contrast.

The first chapter puts forth the proposition of the research and introduces the general ideas over both cults of reason and unreason that almost go parallel in the Western intellectual tradition; the second exhibits how reason takes precedence over the tradition of unreason in Enlightenment period; the third shows how it works in reverse in High Modernist phase; the fourth concludes the research restating the proposition advanced in the first chapter.

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CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter I: Introduction	1
Chapter II: Enlightenment Modernity and Cult of Reason	12
Chapter III: Cult of Unreason in High Modernism	24
Chapter IV: Conclusion	41

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Enlightenment-constituted modernity unequivocally emphasises reason as absolute and takes refuge in it as the adequate source of knowledge. It turns blind to the condition of reason, being oblivious to the fact that what is reasonable is reasonable within limit. But latter modernists expose the prevalence of the unreasonable in what is reasonable that subsequently leads the Enlightenment-emphasised reason at crisis in the high modernist phase in Western Humanities.

From the very emergence of philosophical thinking in Greece, myth-making vision of the "first men" has been crushed (Vico 294). Reason has termed everything away from it as irrational. Imagination, fancy and mythological sensibility have been lost. Human being's creativity has been narrowly reduced to reason-confined thinking. Human sensibility itself has been put into the mathematical propositions and calculative reasonings trying to keep emotion, feeling, imagination, vision and what is unreason as a whole far at bay. This practice continues from Greek natural philosophers down to High Enlightenment.

Giambattista Vico writes about this harmful consequence of reason that crushes mythical thinking in us, the primitive imagination that William Blake resonates in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*. Vico claims that first mode of expression is poeticality but no sooner reason was born, humanity lost the mode of poetic understanding:

". . .these vast imaginations shrank and the power of abstraction grew, the personifications were reduced to diminutive signs.

Metonymy drew a cloak of learning over the prevailing ignorance of these origins of human institutions, which have remained buried until now. Jove becomes so small and light that he is flown about by an eagle. (295)

The reason plays instrumental role on the surface of Western mainstream intellectual tradition, however, the resonance of unreason from the margin goes parallel to the mainstream tradition, and sometimes unreason coming on the mainstream tradition. This parallel development can be better understood in the tables below:

The above tables illustrate the fact that the cult of reason begins with the Greek natural philosophers who began to reason over the mysteries of the universe subsequently ending the era of mythic cult before. In its growing emphasis on reason, the philosophical development reached to its emphatic phase with Cartesian philosophy coming to the climax point in Hegel. Likewise, the cult of unreason runs parallel as an oppositional force along with. The age of myth saw its ruin with the birth of philosophical reasoning cultivated first by

Greek natural philosophers, Aristotle's logic and Augustine's hermeneutics, Baconian science, Cartesian rationalism and finally with Hegelian dialectics. Against all this Vico revolts, trying to regain the cult of unreason. He advocates for mythopoic imagination that can retain the lost part of our own humanity—the mythmaking power that can create or see universe in a tiny speck of sand. He shows how reason cut off the wings of myth.

Then the wind of revolution against unreason comes to Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. Schopenhauer shows how all-pervasive will is a governing principle of the world embodied in the very structure of the universe. Kierkegaard goes against the logical conformity of Christianity. For him, truth is individual intuition not logically validated entity. Here, he means obviously that individual conviction, emotion, feeling and intuitive judgement must be the basis of the truth. He says, "Truth is subjectivity" (qtd. in Hannay and Marino 155). Truth is individually mediated intuition, which is not reached with reasoning.

For Spinoza, knowledge is system of ideas logically ordered. Human mind reflects the logical structure of the universe being connected with the province of reason whose connection with the natural universe is clear and structural. For him an idea "is one and the same thing with its object" because it is intelligible expression mathematically mediated (qtd. in Randall 438). He says, "It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain aspect of eternity" (qtd. in Garrett 121). As L. A. Lastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino rightly point out ". . . 'Richard Rorty identifies Kierkegaard as one who rejects the Socratic assumption that humans have a timeless truth tracking faculty called Reason' . . ." (155).

After a short glimpse of the parallel developments of the cult of reason and of unreason, the paper concentrates on Enlightenment for a brief time. The Enlightenment begins with Kant in its unequivocal emphasis on reason as an adequate means for human emancipation not only from unreasonable individual prejudices but also from all kinds of social problem. Whenever there is reason, there is solution to the problem of life. Kant says, "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage" (154).

But Enlightenment forgets that what is reasonable is reasonable within the limits. It becomes oblivion to see the conditions of reason. Indeed the formative conditions of reason are unreason. In other words, emotion, sentiment, feeling, imagination and intuition constitute the background in which reason is built. Even mathematical propositions and logical outcomes are conceptual and perceptual in nature. This extreme oblivion towards other side of reason is the main cause behind the crisis that high modernism brings in the nature of truth.

In the effort to show how reason/intellect is conditioned by unreason, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud unveil the contingency of reason—limits of to be reasonable. In literature, host of writers contributed to expose the conditions of reason, for example, Joyce's *Ulysses*, Kafka's *The Metamorphosis* and Kate Chopin's *Awakening* exemplify the dominance of unreason over human life and in turn the contingency of the reasonable. The characters in them are forced to listen to the call of immediate thoughts than logically mediated reasonable thinking. For them it appears that truth is unreasonable immediacy of self consciousness. To illustrate it, the narrator's statement about Mallard's epiphany

in *Story of an Hour* can be cited "It was not a glance of reflection, but rather indicated a suspension of intelligent thought" (320).

Mallard's knowledge is not mediated logically and reasonably rather it is intuitive and sudden realisation of the truth of life. Similar is the case with the protagonists of *Ulysses* and of *The Metamorphosis*. They grasp truth as intuitive and sudden realisation in a flash unmediated with reason. Truth is for them unreasonable realisation.

The paper then takes some philosophical texts into account. Then it will again return to the literary contexts with the single aim to expose the prevalence of unreason as an intellectual force to put modernity at crisis in high modernism in Western Humanities. The paper reads Nietzsche's declaration of the "death of God" in its own terms. It claims that the death of God is death of reason (or Leibniz's monad). Subsequently, it is the birth of unreason (Schopenhauer's will or Vico's mytho- meosis). The proclamation of the death of God is man's frantic effort to return to the realm of myth where unreason becomes the basis of truth. The death of God heralds a revolt against "abstract man stripped of myth, abstract mores, abstract law, abstract government, the random vagaries of the artistic imagination unchanneled by any native myth. . . ." ("The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music" 634).

Nietzsche actually mocks at reason showing its conditions out of which it is created: ". . . there was once a star upon which clever animals invented cognition" ("Truth and Morality in an Ultramoral Sense" 634). He goes on to

expose the shrewd motive behind the construction of the truth. Nietzsche regards "Truth are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions" (636).

Heidegger refutes Enlightenment heritage in Western philosophical tradition claiming that not reason but language is the basis of truth. For him, modernity is not process of freedom but one of forgetting the meaning of ontological truth—the question of being. Heidegger takes modernity as the split of subject and object. He calls for the return to Pre-Socratic Greek notion of being found in ancient thought as an intricate unity of subject and object, which was destroyed from Socrates onwards. The modernity tried to objectify the world with reason keeping away from subjectivism. Heidegger writes in the *Age of the World Picture*, "the fundamental event of the modern age is the world as picture" (qtd.in Delanty 23).

Freud gave a major onslaught on the idea of modernity. His critique of civilisation throws light on how beneath the rational consciousness and the unity and coherence of personality are the deep irrational forces of the unconsciousness where the prehistorical conflicts of civilisation are played out. He effectively undermined one of the major premises of freedom through reason. "Modernity is based on a lost object and the desire for its recovery places civilisation ever under the strain of a pathology" (Delanty 24). Freud, thus discovers that beneath the surface of human consciousness (ego) 'lurks' a set of innate instinctual drives/unreason (id), which is at constant war with what is reasonably civilised. Freud says, "In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilised society is perpetually threatened with disintegration . . . instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests" (213). In this way, Freud tries to

destroy one of the premises of the Enlightenment construction of rationality showing how unreasonable instincts are primal to truth.

The paper then comes back to the literary context so as to show how the philosophy of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud became the context for literary development of high modernism. Since the paper observed how Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud have dissolved the foundations of reason as a source of truth, this has consequent impact on literature. Kate Chopin's protagonist Mrs. Mallard in "The Story of an Hour" grasps the intuitive truth at once without letting the news of her husband's death to be realised reasonably in her consciousness. Chopin states, "It was not a glance of reflection but rather indicated a suspension of intelligent thought" (216). Actually, the subtle and 'elusive' quality of her feelings that she neither knows with reason nor can name it because it evades any categorical imperatives.

In Kafka's "The Metamorphosis" the absolute truth and reasonable human behaviours are suspended. Kafka's characters live in the world in which truth is revealed in some illogical human activities. If they perceive truth of life, it is revealed in trivial human actions. Therefore, truth is not logical understanding of divine rather comes to be revealed in unreasonable happenings. In the story, the protagonist's abnormal behaviours trouble all because he cannot follow reasonable routine patterns of his office. Mrs. Samsa says to Gregory:

What's the matter ? You barricade your cause your parents serious, unnecessary worry and you neglect . . . your duties to the firm . . .

I'm amazed, amazed. I thought I knew you quite reasonable

person, and how you suddenly seem to want to start structting
about, flaunting strange whims. (Kafka 226)

Romanticism appears against neoclassical restraints on art. It also revolts against Enlightenment cry for reason and restraints. Celebrating unreason in its ethos, Romanticism revolts against the cult of reason owing emphasis on desires, fancies, feelings, imagination, yearning, and vision. However, in its attempt to gospel for idealism through the faculty of unreason, it belongs to Enlightenment heritage. Yet, it can be conceived as a revolt against Enlightenment emphasis on reason. John Keats says:

Philosophy will clip an angel's wings,

conquer all mysteries by rule and line,

Empty the haunted air, the gnomed mine

Unweave a rainbow. (qtd. in Lyon 41)

This way, romantics directly go against the reason, for reason destroys the 'mysteries' of existence. The restrains of rule and regulation drift away the intuitive perception of the truth.

Existential Philosophy too questions the reasonableness of the reason. It shows that there is no absolute truth that reason can grasp. Rather truth is revealed in retrospect—a moment of a brief pause of life in which one reflects the absurdity of human existence and the summation of life's response to the value of living. Albert Camus says:

It is natural to give a clear view of the world after accepting the idea that it must be clear. That is even legitimate, but does not concern the reasoning we are following out here. In fact, our aim is to shed light upon the step taken by the mind when, starting from a philosophy of the world's lack of meaning. . . . The most touching of those steps is religious in essence; it becomes obvious in the theme of the irrational. But the most paradoxical and most significant is certainly the one that attributes rational reasons to a world it originally imagined as devoid of any guiding principle. It is impossible in any case to reach the consequences that concern us without having given an idea of this new attainment of the spirit of nostalgia. (28)

Hegel views that progress on history is the progress on reason (spirit). Though Hegel seems not to deny the role of unreason as he says that passions are the driving force in history, he seems emphasising on reasonable thinking. For Hegel, Reason, Spirit, Idea, Thought, Nature and God are synonymous. He says:

The purest form in which the Idea manifests itself is thought itself. In this aspect the Idea is treated in Logic. Another form is that of physical Nature. The third form, finally is that of Spirit in general. ("History as the Progress of Spirit" 171)

The division of the research is as follows: Chapter I entails introductory overview on two things—on the one hand, it gives a glimpse on the overall scheme of the thesis in which it is developed; on the other, it briefly, after establishing the

main thesis, proceeds to give a survey view of how the cults of reason and unreason simultaneously go along with the progress on knowledge in Western intellectual tradition.

It also briefly describes how the Enlightenment heritage's unequivocal emphasis on reason leads the Enlightenment construction of rationality at crisis in high modernism along with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud, and how that crisis also reflects in the literature of Kafka and Chopin. By the way, the chapter also makes clear how the cult of unreason becomes dominant to judge truth-value of the life-world; how unreason plays the vital role in the theory of knowledge.

Chapter II is the explicit textual analysis, where the research limits itself mainly in the three disciplines (however, it sometimes crossed the disciplinary borders): philosophy, art and literature. Therefore, the research makes a selection of the text from the said disciplines. The research purposefully makes selection from two different heritages—Enlightenment and high modernism so as to evaluate how the latter puts the former at crisis showing the conditions of reason.

The research includes Hegel's "History as the Self-realisation of the Spirit" from philosophy; Johannes Vermeer's "Christ in the House of Martha and Mary": from art; Maupassant's "Moonlight" from literature. All the texts belong to Enlightenment heritage because the research in this chapter concentrates on only the texts that belong to Enlightenment period so as to expose how Enlightenment emphasises rationality terming everything away from it as irrational and locating reason at the centre of knowledge.

Chapter III focuses on the texts from high modernism. It makes explicit study on Nietzsche's "Truth and Morality in the Ultramoral Sense" from the discipline of philosophy and in literature, it analyses Kate Chopin's "The Story of an Hour" and in art it will examine Picasso's painting "Gurnica." The research examines how the texts show the conditions of reason and what is truth behind reason. In so doing, it occasionally passes the references to the earlier chapter in contrasts so that the research can be able to prove its hypothesis: the emergence of unreason as an intellectual expression in the Western Humanities puts the Enlightenment construction of modernity at crisis in high modernism. The final chapter is the conclusion, where major argument is restated.

CHAPTER - II

ENLIGHTENMENT MODERNITY AND CULT OF REASON

The cult of reason that begins with Pythagorean tradition claims that what is real must have a definable form. Things are in virtue of their forms. The classification of moral concepts is the first step to any improvement in practice. For Plato, geometry is the model science. It is believed that even God geometrises the mode of knowing. Aristotle invents the science of logic. For him, man is preeminently a rational animal.

Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists are persuaded that logical knowledge alone is inadequate. Neo-platonism presents a more organic view and stocks logical processes on the certainty of immediate experience. But the post scholastic philosophers emphasises a purely rationalistic approach to certainty, and the attempt to ground philosophy in science becomes more popular with the growth of natural sciences, which are actually engaged in emphasising the frontiers of knowledge through observation and experimental verification. Though the methodology of the sciences studies the processes by which beliefs grow and thoughts evolves, its actual interest is more in the grammar of discovery than the life of it. The latter by its very nature sets limits to logical exposition.

For Descartes, with whom modern European philosophy takes a new direction, truth means clearness and distinctness. Whatever can be expressed in mathematical form is clear and distinct. Descartes sets forth a system of

universal notion of reason, which is derived from a consideration of certain fundamental, logical and mathematical relationships. For Spinoza, even ethics should be treated by the geometrical method. For Leibniz, again, the monads or perceiving minds differ in nothing other than the form of perception, for each monad resembles the others as regards the content of its perception. Divine cognition consists in completely distinct and adequate ideas. Kant's logic of synthesis postulates an intelligible world as the foundation of ethics. In Hegel, logic ceases to be a mere theory of thought, but becomes an account of reality. It is an abstract representation of an actual process by which the absolute spirit reveals itself as the universe in the different forms which the universe assumes to human consciousness, nature, history, society, art and religion. What is rational is real and vice versa. Hegel's concept of history as the manifestation of spirit in the three fold moments of thesis, antithesis and synthesis is an intellectual scheme, which gives reason a supreme place in the world history of knowledge has led the realistic thinkers to devote their major energies to the precise formulation of specialised problems.

Spinoza too conceives knowledge as a logically mediated system of ideas. The intelligibility of the structure of the universe reflects the intelligibility of the human mind. Fichte attributes Ego as the source of knowledge. Fichtean Ego is the rational intelligibility of the universe, which is immanent in each individual self. Actually Kant believes that reason can be a true means for emancipation. Reason liberates us from our ignorance and superstition and guides us towards freedom. This is the belief shared by *Philosophes* like Voltaire etc. Voltaire holds

that certain forms of mental activity are primitive and can be enlightened with reasonable thinking.

Thus, it seems that from the Socratic insistence on the concept to Russell's mathematical logic, the history of Western thought has been a supreme illustration of the primacy of the logical.

Literature and art of the Enlightenment era are strictly guided by form. And clarity and simplicity are the characteristic features of them. The purpose of literature and art is emancipation from prejudices and ignorance. The realists are the worshippers of logic and the scientific method. They do have a strong faith in the logical intellect as the supreme instrument. Thus, rationalism is deep in the Western thought to feel secure about scientific knowledge.

The research then, focuses on illustrating how the cult of reason has been expressed in philosophy, literature and art.

A) EXPRESSION OF REASON IN HEGEL'S "HISTORY AS THE SELF-REALISATION OF THE SPIRIT": A CASE STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY

With Hegel, Enlightenment's advocacy for reason reaches to the zenith. He regards reason as spirit manifested in both substance and matter. He tries to interpret reason in terms of historical process. Human history is, for Hegel, nothing but a rational principle that unfolds as a process. Reason embodies essence of being. Hegel writes:

. . . Reason is the sovereign of the world; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process. . .Reason... is

Substance, as well as Infinite Power; its own infinite Material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the *Infinite Form*—that which sets this Material in motion. . . . Reason is the substance of the Universe; viz. that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. . . it is the infinite Energy of the Universe; since reason is not so powerless as to be incapable of producing anything but a mere ideas, a mere intention. . . . It is *the infinite complex of things*, their Essence and Truth. . . . That this "Idea" or "Reason" is the *True*, the *Eternal*, the absolutely *Powerful* essence; that it reveals itself in the world. . . . (457)

Hegel, hence, conceives Reason as Truth or Essence. He holds that reason is embodied in the structure of the universe and governs the conditions of material things and their activities. Reason is self-governed and autonomous entity that operates freely in every cause and effect in nature. It manifests as the spirit in the nature and moves towards the higher realisation of its manifested objects.

The world is rational because reason operates elsewhere. In other words, every object in natural world is manifestation of the Reason. There is nothing unreason in the nature. Everything is reasonable and what is reasonable is truth in the world process. Truth is not outside the province of human reason.

The reason or spirit has its ultimate goal in freedom. Freedom is the essence of the spirit. Spirit is self-contained existential entity. Spirit is unity with

its centre in itself. Every thing that is matter (or unreason) consists many parts which strives in self-destructive way to reach to the point of unity. It has its unity outside itself therefore moves towards that unity to merge with when it no longer reaches to the point of unity, it loses its properties of matter or unreason. Hegel says:

. . . the essence of spirit i.e. freedom. . . spirit is also endowed with Freedom . . . all the qualities of spirit exist only through Freedom; that all are but means for attaining Freedom. . . Freedom is the sole truth of spirit. . . spirit. . . habits centre in itself. . . it exists in and with itself. . . spirit is self contained existence. . . . (457-458).

Hegel terms the "self contained existence of Spirit" as the "self-consciousness" that matter comes in a certain stage of its development (458). Spirit knows nothing other than itself. It appreciates its own nature. 'Universal History' is the exhibition of the spirit in its self-consciousness. The essential nature of freedom is moving gradually towards self-consciousness and human history unfolds that self-realisation. Hegel states:

But for spirit, the highest attainment is self-knowledge; an advance not only to the intuition, but to the thought. . . This it must and is also destined to accomplish; but the accomplishment is at the same time its dissolution, and the rise of another spirit, another world historical people, another epoch of Universal History. This transition and connection leads us to the connection of the whole. .

. which we have now to consider more closely and of which we have to give a representation.

History in general is therefore the development of spirit in Time . . . (460).

Thus spirit develops itself through historical events. The spirit is 'self-contained' entity, it is realised through "phenomenon of history" (*Readings 172*). One can witness with his/her own eyes how world spirit presents itself in history. Roy T. Matthews and F. DeWitt Plat sum up, "Thus history is created by the World Spirit, and at the same time the world spirit reaches self-awareness through the unfolding of historical events" (170). Spirit unfolds and 'erects' its monument in the phenomenon world. Hegel views:

The very essence of Spirit is activity; it realizes its potentiality makes itself its own deed its own work- and thus it becomes an object itself; contemplates itself as an objective existence. Thus is it with the Spirit of a people: it is a Spirit having strictly defined characteristics, which erects itself into an objective world, that exists and persists in a particular religious form of worship, customs, constitution and political laws in the whole complex of its institutions—in the events and transactions that make up its history. (461)

People and their institutions may 'perish'; they meet natural death but the spirit continues in being rather it advances to the higher and new purpose. It will be a new order and a new Nation spirit in human history. For instance, German

Imperial cities, the German Imperial Constitution and German People of Imperial era met a violent death but German National Spirit never dies. It is eternal and immutable substance. Hegel says:

It is not of the nature of the all pervading spirit to die this merely natural death; it does not simply sink into the senile life of mere custom, but.. as being a National Spirit belonging to Universal History attains to the consciousness of what its work is; it attains to a conception of itself. (462)

Hegel further clarifies the eternal nature of the spirit, which transcends death: "Spirit . . . is the transcending of immediate, simple, unreflected existence, the negation of that existence, and the returning into itself. We may compare it with the seed; for with this the plant begins, yet it is also the result of the plant's entire life. . . Spirit is immortal, with it there is no past, no future, but an essential now" (464).

Being and non-being are aspects of one concrete movement seen from two points of view. At one end there is being; at the other non-being, but the real is neither pure being nor pure non-being, but a concrete becoming. Mere being and mere non-being as understanding takes them are meaningless. The opposites are mutually dependent though antagonistic movements of the real becoming, and their unending strife constitute the genius of creation. For Hegel, the whole life process is a strife of opposites and a labouring to overcome the opposition. The conflict and the transitoriness of all things proceed from the attempt to overcome the opposition and effect a reconciliation. If the reconciliation were complete

there would be no world order. The process of becoming is either being in the act of overcoming non-being or non-being in the act of overcoming being. This overcoming is never at an end, for were it ever complete, were there not a non-being for being to overcome or a being for non-being to overcome, there would result either pure being or pure non-being, which are both meaningless abstractions. The world process is a strife of the two, and can be truly conceived only by thinking out completely the mutual indispensability of the concepts whose seeming negation of each other expresses the aspect of strife in the real.

B) EXPRESSION OF REASON IN MAUPASSANT'S "MOONLIGHT": A CASE STUDY OF LITERATURE

Guy De Maupassant's story "Moonlight" is a realistic story which is strongly influenced by the Enlightenment conception of progress on human rationality. It is the story that deals with the triumph of reason over unreason.

Marignan is a priest with prejudice. He has a belief that God creates everything with certain purpose. Everything in nature has some goal to play, for instance, morning, day, rain, evening, night, season and so many other things in nature have proper 'reason' for their existence.

He has a mind-set against woman. He hates womankind. A woman is temptress, who had already deceived the first man and is a dangerous creature. According to him, God had created women only to taste the virtue of men. He even hates nuns. He always keeps away from women, the low creature.

Marignan has a niece to whom he wanted to make a sister of charity. He speaks to her about God. One day, Marignan is informed about her love affair and where she goes to meet her lover in the moonlight after her mother went to sleep. The news makes him angry and he decides to punish the lovers that night. He takes up his dinner and goes out after dinner. The sudden exposure to the moonlight holds him surprised. He is confused to find such a soothing and tender light in the calm night. He feels a kind of intoxication and simply sits on the grass forgetting his niece. He cannot understand the purpose behind the creation of moonlight.

Suddenly he sees two shadows walking side by side. The lover kisses. He knows they are his niece and her lover. Their exposure self-evidently explains him the purpose. He murmurs to himself that moonlight is created to hide the lover with ideal beauty.

The story thus presents the protagonist who undergoes the process of education. He appears as a misogynist in the beginning but at the ending because of the understanding of the moonlight, he goes under a complete transformation. Thus the story advocates the importance of lover for the whole creation.

This is a realistic story, which consists of ordinary events, recognizable geography, and real characters. This realistic character of the story is one of the characteristics of Enlightenment literary heritage. Moreover, there is certain patterns in the story that has to follow by the literature of Enlightenment period. For instance, the story has three sections of almost equal length, of which the first is entirely devoted to the presentation of the Abbe's character, the other is the

priest's attitude towards women and love and the final section is about the priest's enlightenment.

The story absorbs Enlightenment concept of education. To be knowledgeable means to be constantly keeping away from superstition. The protagonist undergoes the changes in his belief. It is a kind of self-realisation of the Spirit in Hegelian sense. As Enlightenment holds that reason can lead one from prejudice to knowledge, Enlightenment literature portrays the similar kind of transformation of the protagonist who undergoes change from prejudice to Enlightenment. The instrument of the change is nothing than the proper use of reason. Thus, literature of Enlightenment period conveys that emancipation from superstitions and false beliefs are possible if one applies reason properly. Marignan's education is not emotionally derived sudden insight. It's his long interrogation to know the purpose of every thing in nature. He gets knowledge as answer of his questions, not as intuitive insight into the purpose of God. This is the way one uses his/her own reason and comes to the closer to truth.

Why had God done this? Since the night is intended for sleep, for unconscious, for repose, for oblivion, why make it more charming than the day, sweeter than dawn or evening? . . .

Why should the loveliest of songbirds not go to sleep with others but linger on to sing in the disturbing shade? Why this half-veil thrown over the world? Why this thrill in the heart. . . this tangor of the flesh?

Why this display of delights that men never see. . .? For whom was it intended, this sublime spectacle, this flood of poetry poured from the sky over the earth? (Maupassant 180).

Marignan finally realises, "Perhaps God has made such nights to veil the loves of men with ideal beauty." (189).

C) EXPRESSION OF REASON IN JOHANNES

VERMEER'S "CHRIST IN THE HOUSE OF MARTHA AND MARY"¹: A CASE STUDY OF ART

In art, Enlightenment removes all mythological and idyllic references. The obscurity and roughness are overshadowed by clarity and crystallisation. The mysticism and supernatural elements are rejected and the distant and supernatural settings are replaced with the settings of new commercial market complexes. The Baroque painting of Renaissance is dynamic, open-ended and exploded the formal boundaries. Enlightenment art shows a particular still-life element that can have a variety of possible meanings and which one applies has to be deduced from the context of other objects and from searching out other comparable representations. Johannes Vermeer and the other leading Dutch artists of Enlightenment period show us aspects of everyday reality.

Vermeer's paintings are clearly based on the observation of reality. His paintings use objects and walls, and the textures of rugs and clothing directly derived from observation. He observes these things with extraordinary concentration and clarity. He works in a selective way, combining different aspects of the things he has seen.

Vermeer's range as a painter is not limited to genre. Early in his career he does a painting of a mythological subject, "Diana and Her Companions," which shows the goddess being washed by her maidens. He also does a religious subject, "Christ in the House of Martha and Mary." The choice of subject is an interesting one. Vermeer's maturity, we have a painting which is actually just such an allegory, an allegory of the Faith. Though the setting is one of Vermeer's usual interiors, with tiled floor, a great woven hanging, and still-life object throughout the room, the woman who appears in this setting is an allegorical figure. This can be clearly recognised from the fact that she has one foot on a globe, that she sit beside an alter with a crucifix and chalice on it, and also from her gesture of hand to breast, and eyes turned upwards.

With clarity and intelligibility in perception, Vermeer's painting, "Christ in the House of Martha and Mary" exhibits the cult of reason. The brightness, symmetrical patterns of the lines in the painting and perceptual quality of experience is rational. The painting also exhibits the living standard of the Enlightenment people who live in the comfortable mansion with decorated interiors. They are fashionable people of high class. The painting exhibits no obscurity and an irrational part of human behaviour. It takes the subject matter of spiritual kind but makes it intelligible with reasonable exhibition.

CHAPTER III

CULT OF UNREASON IN HIGH MODERNISM

Anti-Hegelian philosophers emphasise emotion than reason, intuition than intellect. They revolt against Hegelian notion of reason as the all pervasive force that governs the universe. The world-process works with rational governing principles. Everything has purpose in the order of the things. If any irrationality exists in the world, that too has purpose in the set of things and it finally comes to the unity of consciousness. Hegel calls unreason as 'contrite consciousness' and explains:

. . . it seems to have come to victory and unity, it finds no rest there, but is forth with driven over to the other. Its true home-coming its true reconciliation with itself, will, however, display to us the law of the spirit, as he will appear when, having come to life, he has entered the world of his manifestation. For it already belongs to the contrite consciousness to be one undivided soul in the midst of its doubleness. ("Contrite Consciousness" 739-740)

Anti-Enlightenment philosophers believe that there is knowledge which is different from the conceptual, a knowledge by which we see things as they are, as unique individuals and not as members of a class or units in a crowd. It is non-sensuous, immediate knowledge. It is knowledge not mediated by senses or by symbols. It is awareness of the truth of things by identity. We become one with the truth, one with the object of knowledge. The object known is seen not as an

object outside the self, but as a part of the self. What intuition expresses is not so much a doctrine as a consciousness; it is a state of mind and not a definition of the object. Logic and language are a lower form, a diminution of this kind of knowledge. Thought is a means of partially manifesting and presenting what is concealed in this greater self-existent knowledge. Knowledge is an intense and close communion between the knower and the known. In logical knowledge there is always the duality, the distinction between the knowledge of a thing and its being. For instances, Croce views that logical knowing takes us away from the individual and the actual into a world of abstractions, while intuitive knowledge gives us an insight into the individual. He divides knowledge into two: intuitive knowledge and logical knowledge; knowledge one acquires by imagination and knowledge obtained by intellect; knowledge of individual and knowledge of the universal. Bergson suggests that intuition is not to be confused with a primitive, abstract sub-intellectual immediacy, but is to be understood as indicating a higher immediacy which supervenes on intellectual analysis. While Bradley is right in his view that genuine immediacy (unreason) gives truth and reality. Intellectual analysis breaks up the unity and the immediacy which appears at the supra-intellectual level. All dynamic acts of thinking, whether in a game of chess or a mathematical problem, are controlled by an intuitive grasp of the situation as a whole.

With the emphasis of unreasonable side of human experience, various movements appeared in the intellectual scene of the Europe. For instances, Dadaism rejects reason as 'Savage logic' and "Always destroy what you have in you" (Tzara 598). It destroys organic expression of our anti-objective impulses—

those impulses that Dadaism emphasises. Therefore, Tzara further says, "Logic imprisoned by the senses is an organic diseases" (597). Dadaism puts reason aside and emphasises emotion:

Dadaism's abolition of logic, which is the dance of those impotent to create: Dada; of every social hierarchy and equation set up for the sale of values by our valets: Dada; every object, all objects, sentiments, obscurities, apparitions and the precise.

Clash of parallel lines are weapons for the fight: Dada; abolition of memory: Dada; abolition of archaeology: Dada; abolition of prophets; Dada; abolition of the future: Dada; absolute and unquestionable faith in every god that is the immediate product of spontaneity . . . Freedom: Dada Dada Dada, a roaring of tense colors, and interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions, grotesques, inconsistencies: life. (597)

Thus, dada exhibits the cult of unreason as the best way of expression. Reason is banished from either mind or its cultural expression. Tzara sums up, "I tell you that Dada is a virgin microbe that penetrates with the insistence of air into all the space that reason has not been able to fill with words or conventions" (601). Life itself is irrational and anarchy. Therefore, logic does not work in the province of life and art as well. The acts of life have no beginning or end. Everything happens in a completely idiotic way:

Any attempt to conciliate an inexplicable momentary state with logic strikes me as a boring kind of game. The convention of the

spoken language is ample and adequate for us, but for our solitude, for our intimate games and our literature we no longer need it.

(600)

Like Dadaism, another artistic movement that is known as Surrealism also goes vehemently against the cult of reason. The mode of life and its expressive faculty are illogical and thus follow no pattern. Life is incoherent and its expression, most irrational. Therefore, Andre Breton writes:

We still live under the reign of logic, but the methods of logic are applied nowadays only to the resolution of problems of secondary interest. The absolute rationalism which is still the fashion does not permit consideration of any facts but those strictly relevant to our experience. Logical ends . . . escape us . . . Under colour of civilization, under pretext of progress, all that rightly or wrongly may be regarded as fantasy or super has been banished from the mind, all uncustomary searching after truth has been proscribed.

(604).

Surrealism revolts against logical thinking for free and autonomous expression that can be seen in surrealist innovations in art and literature such as free association of ideas to things, broken syntactic structures, nonlogical and disorder patterns, dreamlike and nightmarish settings and inconsecutive of images.

The tendency to term unreason as irrational has been challenged by Goethe, Blake, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Unreason is not unmoral and

bestly attributes rather a vital creative energy of the universe. Goethe's 'Demonic' is a primal, undifferentiated force, which takes precedence over any rational and moral categories. It is the seductive and terrifying energy, which predominates individual character. Those whose characters are shaped by demonical energy, "such persons are not always the most eminent men, either morally or intellectually; and it is seldom that they recommend themselves to our affections by goodness heart: a tremendous energy seems to be seated in them; and they exercise a wonderful power over all creatures, and even over the element; and, indeed, who shall say how much farther such influence may extend? All the moral power combined are of no avail against them" (543-544).

Similarly Blake conceives irrational force as a vital energy that breaks traditional so-called rational distinction "between body and soul, physical evil and spiritual good" (539). For him, the vital energy of the universe is the essence of the unity of body and soul, reason and unreason, evil and good, and a synthesis of opposites.

Schopenhauer casts the reason into suspension. Reason and knowledge are secondary, the primary thing is unreasonable will which is the primary force that governs the universe. The will is inborn and real. The entire body of a person is objectified will. On the contrary, intellect is acquired and pretentious. Schopenhauer even uncovers the unmoral will that governs either Fitchian Ego or Hegelian Absolute.

In this regard, human knowledge is mediated by unreasonable will, not by reason. Reason never renders us immediate knowledge." Reason is not the

basic substance of the universe because seemingly reasonable thoughts are mere willful/unreasonable reality.

Heidegger disagrees that reason is the rightful location that the reality exists. It is language, not reason is the foundation of ontology of human being. To be reasonable is not freedom, but is to be oblivion to the truth. Truth is perceived by unconscious mode of existence. Life goes on without being reasonably conscious. It is just like 'hammering'. One becomes reasonable only for a short lapse of time if some surprising event occurs. Therefore, Heidegger rejects Enlightenment heritage simply because it does not secure the freedom it once promised, contrarily pushes into 'forgetting.'

The pragmatism initiated by America philosopher William James also celebrates the cult of unreason. Reality is what serves one's purpose of living and truth is what one want to believe. This way pragmatism regards the nature of truth and reality quite subjective. This way, Pragmatism also thwarts a serious blow upon Enlightenment rationality which is thought to be absolute source of truth and reality.

Nietzsche, however, emphasises a blending of reason (Apollo) and unreason (Dionysius) in a good work of art. His praise takes the side of unreason. He conceives Dionysoiac impulse as the "genius of the heart," the manifestation of dynamic existence that unites man with nature - the impulse is strong, profound, evil and beautiful. Nietzsche really celebrates the cult of unreason in a frantic craze:

Man now expresses himself through song and dance as the member of a higher community; he has forgotten how to walk, how to speak, and is on the brink of taking wing as he dances. Each of his gestures betokens enchantment; through him sounds a supernatural power. . . He feels himself to be godlike and strides with the same elation and ecstasy as the gods he seen in his dreams. No longer the artist, he has himself become a work of art: the productive power of the whole universe is now manifest in his transport, to the glorious satisfaction of the primordial one. (549)

Thus, the cult of unreason in its linear development particularly with Vico as anti-Cartesians finally puts the entire project of Enlightenment at crisis unveiling the contingency of reason. It provokes that what is seemingly reasonable is not reasonable absolute rather depends upon unreasonable variables. This cult is the intensification of the revolt against reason propelled by romanticism earlier. Anti-rationalism not only banishes intellectualism from human discourse but also forces us to see its positive side. It holds that if human beings can be true to their self or to their nature as human beings, they can lead for better and richer lives than Enlightenment project envisaged. One can imagine the image of Blakean-Shavian-Lawrencean-Nietzscnean individual who is the very embodiment of creative force of the universe, and despised reason and rests his/her energy on instinct/unreason. It thus proves that everything keeping away from reason is not irrational and uncivilised but unreason and creative force of a vital life. David Hume and Kant from within Enlightenment heritage exposes the limitations of reason. Hume emphasises faith in natural law than the belief in reason. Hume

particularly in *Philosophies* claims that the laws of justice are not absolute and unchanged rather they are contingent to the so many variables. He claims.:

Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessities, that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery; it will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessary and self-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of property? (qtd in Brinton, Christopher and Wolff 78).

Hume, thus comes to the conclusion that reason cannot govern human nature as it can do with the factual truth of geometry or algebra. The truth of human nature may only be rediscovered with sentiments and feelings, the subjective experience of the mind.

Likewise, Kant is another philosopher who shows limitations of reason. His famous maxim that tells that an individual is bound by the moral law within and starry heaven above him/her indicates that reason is not adequate source of knowledge. When confronted with ethical choice, one has to take refuge in faith, not in reason. This insufficiency of reason further exemplifies the philosophical revolt against the cult of reason.

Against Enlightenment cult of reason, Romanticism values imaginative and spiritual aspirations, emotional depths, artistic creativity and powers of self-

expression and self-creation. Romanticism enters into the translucent source of mystery and revelation. Richard Tarnas writes that Romanticism values "emotion and imagination, rather than reason and perception, were of prime importance. New concern arose not only with the exalted and noble but with the contraries and darkness in the human soul, with evils, death, the demonic and the irrational" (368). Kant's assertion that ego contributes to knowledge or cognition leads the Romantic artists for cognition to 'ego-worship,' exalting free artistic capacities. Schelling, Schiller and Schlegel contribute a lot to the cult of unreason in their romantic theories. Each tries to be away from abstract reasoning to celebrate the cult of spirit. However, their idealism still provokes a unified sensibility. Therefore, Romanticism cannot be a radical break from Enlightenment because it only challenges reason exalting the ineffability of inspiration.

The research then, concentrates on showing how the cult of unreason has been articulated in philosophy, literature and art.

A) EXPRESSION OF UNREASON IN NIETZSCHE'S "TRUTH AND FALSITY IN AN ULTRA MORAL SENSE": A CASE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

Fredrich Nietzsche rejects the reason as the best of all possible achievements of human beings and in so doing valorises the other side of reason i.e. unreason. Reason is impure from its root. It is not out of true intention reason is born in human mind. There were eras "during which this intellect did not exist. . ." ("Truth and Morality in the Ultra Moral Sense" 634). Everything in Nature would exist and "understand each other" (634) in a kind of warmly

intimate and purely wholistic way. Unreason was the way of communicating and understanding each other. It is the most unfortunate moment in the history of human civilisation when human beings invented reason because it caused the death of unreason-the most pure and authentic mode of human expression.

"Nothing in Nature is so bad or so insignificant that it will not, at the smallest puff of that force cognition, immediately swell up like a balloon. . ." (634)

Nietzsche thus stands up anti-Hegelian going against the cult of reason emphasising emotion than reason, intuition than intellect. Nietzsche looks at the formation of reason. It is not simply the question of drifting away from reason but rather it is the question of looking at the conditions of reason. Nietzsche when looks at the conditions of reason finds the prevalence of the unreasonable in what is reasonable Nietzsche says:

The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, develops its chief power in dissimulation, for it is by dissimulation that the feebler and less robust individuals preserve themselves. . . In man this art of dissimulation reaches its as me of perfection: in him deception, flattery, falsehood and fraud, slander, display, pretentiousness, disguise, cloaking convention. . . vanity: all these things are so much the rule, and the law, that few things are more incomprehensible than the way in which an honest and pure impulse to truth could have arisen among men. (634)

Human beings are beasts who take refuge on the cruelty, greed, murder and killing. It is among such beastly "state of affairs, arises the impulse to truth" (635).

Nietzsche presents the world full of struggles for existence harking back to the world that Schopenhauer describes in *The World as Will and Idea*. Every creature is deadly locked up in a struggle for existence. Life destroys life to serve the purpose of will to live. Even beneath the thin veneer of civilisation, one can observe the ruthless war, ceaseless strive and unquenchable will to live.

Nietzsche presents the backdrop of such warring world in which shrewd person first created reason. He says, "As far as the individual tries to preserve himself against other individuals, in the natural state of things he uses the intellect in most cases only for dissimulation" (635).

It is the self-preserving instinct that works strongly in human beings. They dare to cheat and deceive others in order to keep themselves survive. "They desire truth only if it can safe-guard their interest. Otherwise he is indifferent towards pure, ineffective knowledge. He is even inimical toward truths which possibly might prove harmful or destroying" (635).

In order to show the conditions of reason, he then begins to talk about the nature of truth that language carries out from one to another. He asserts that language cannot be an adequate means of expression of truth(s). Words are arbitrary demarcation. Nietzsche writes:

What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors,
metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human
relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified,
metamorphosed, adorned. . . truths are illusions of which one has
forgotten that they are illusions. . . Still we do not yet know

whence the impulse to truth comes, for up to now we have heard only about the obligation which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful. . . Now man . . . forgets that matters are going thus with him. . . by this very forgetting, he arrives at a sense for truth. . . Now as a "rational" being he submits his actions to the sway of abstraction. . ."Truth" means to use every die as it is designated, to count its points carefully, to form exact classification, and never to violate the order of castes and the sequences of rank. (636).

Nietzsche thus demystifies the impurity and impossibility lie in the very condition of reasonable truth. It is the anti-Hegelian way of thinking about the nature of truth. Nietzsche thus exposes that what is reasonable is reasonable within limits. He shows the limits even going against science which is the real foundation of Enlightenment idealism. He says:

. . . science works irresistibly at that great columbarium of ideas, the cemetery of perceptions; builds ever newer and higher stories; supports, purifies, renews the old cells, and endeavors above all to fill that gigantic framework and to arrange within it the whole of the empiric world, i.e., the anthropomorphic world. And as the man of action binds his life to reason and its ideas. . . so the seeker after truth builds his hut close to the towering edifice of science. . . (638).

Thus Nietzsche shows the conditions of reason exposing how there is prevalence of the unreason in what is rational. He means that what is reasonable

is contingent upon several unreasonable variables and no reason can make an exhaustive list of the variables in advance. This departure from reason puts reason-constituted Enlightenment at crisis in high modernism exposing how truth is emotional and intuitive phenomenon than reason-derived abstraction.

B) EXPRESSION OF UNREASON IN CHOPIN'S "STORY OF AN HOUR": A CASE STUDY OF LITERATURE

When her sister Josephine gently and cautiously gives Mrs. Mallard the news of her husband's death, she falls into her sister's arms, then, goes to her room. Mrs. Mallard has loved her husband, who has in turn loved her and treated her kindly, but she is not scraped by her husband's death, nor do her reflections make her sick.

In fact, she initially hesitates to admit to herself that she is not distressed. She begins to repeat single word: "free" Her life is her own again; no longer will she have to bow down to other's will. Only yesterday she had regarded life as tedious and feared it was long. Now she craves for long life.

Finally, she obeys to her sister's repeated pleas to open her room door. Louise embraces her sister, and together they go downstairs to rejoin Richards. As they reach the bottom of the stairs, Brentley comes through the door, unaware of the accident that supposedly has claimed his life. Mrs. Mallard screams and falls down dead when she saw her husband.

This piece of literature has exposed the cult of unreason. Truth that Mrs. Mallard perceives is not something that she got in a question and answer form as

in the case of Marighn in Maupassant's "Moonlight" rather it is a sudden realisation, an intuitive flash or an emotional attachment to higher truth. "She wept at once, with sudden, wild abandonment, in her sister's arms. It is a kind of instant action. It is unreasonable therefore happens at a flick of time. It is not her unconscious decision rather she weeps 'at once.' It is the moment of suspension of reason. "It was not a glance of Reflection, but rather indicated a suspension of intelligent thought" (Chopin 305). She is possessed by a vision, which is beyond one's intelligibility. The text claims it:

There was something coming to her and she was waiting for it, fearfully. What was it? She did not know, it was too subtle and elusive to name. But she felt it, creeping out of the sky; reaching toward her through the sounds, the scents, the color that filled the air. (305)

She is completely possessed by the vision of her remaining days on earth. Which are completely her own. She pronounced same worry time and again "free, free, free!" (305). Her bodily activity too is completely suspended. It begins to work unconsciously, therefore, ". . . she opened and spread her arms out to them in welcome" (305). Her arms 'welcome' a long procession of year to come as if they are her human guest. The unconscious activation of her mind mistakenly shows humanely gesture to the non-human entity.

Her husband represents the reason in human being which tries to dictate others. She wants to free from the clutches of reason because she knows the harmful effects of rationality on her own life. She wants to perceive the world

with her own emotion and intuition. No reason, she likes to dictate her beliefs to life. She wants to redefine the social structure with her emotional attachment with them, unwilling to obey the reason-bounded rules and regulations. The narrator claims it:

There would be no one live for during those coming years; she would live for herself, them . . . be no powerful will bending hers in that blind persistence with which men and women believe they have a right to impose a private will upon a fellow-creature. (305)

This way the story denies a room for reason, appealing for the emotional and intuitive part of one's humanity, which is the advocacy for unreason. It also puts the Enlightenment continued rationality at crisis emphasising the unreasonable side of our intuitive judgement keeping away from reason.

C) EXPRESSION OF UNREASON IN PICASSO'S

"GUERNICA"²: A CASE STUDY OF ART

In April 1937, at the zenith of the Spanish Civil War, German bombers under the command of General Franco, attacks and ruins the ancient Spanish town of Guernica. The bombing has no military justification. Franco deliberately strikes at one of the prides of Spain; and through the bombing, which is quite unheralded and unexpected, large numbers of civilians are killed, particularly women and children. Shock at the ire is incredible. It has its implications for every thinking man concerns with the state of Europe.

Picasso dates every one of his preliminary studies for the wall painting, and he also has it photographed at each stage, so that we can follow in detail the emergence of the picture. This is something which is specifically modern in its implications. Since the Romantic movement in the nineteenth century, emphasis has fallen, with ever increasing intensity, on the artist's individuality and consciousness of himself, to the point where an artist such as Picasso can think that everything he does is worth preserving for posterity as a record of his creativity. With Picasso, also, we are dealing with an artist who is much more self-consciously enunciate about the ideas and beliefs behind his work than artists tended to be in earlier times.

The earliest drawing, those of 1 May, one of which is illustrated in the painting, shows that Picasso has resolved from the beginning that he incorporates a horse, and a woman with a lamp stretching out of a window. Thus, though news photos may have had some effect on Picasso's choice of images, as we shall see, there is no question of a composition recording the actual historical event: the fall of bombs or the ruin and burning of the city. Two of the horse studies already contain the idea of a horse shooting its head straight up, while its entrails pour out of a hole in its stomach; and by 2 May one gets a powerfully muscled bull and a fallen warrior clutching a broken spear, who lies beneath a horse with grotesque pincer-like jaws. The first complete compositional study done on 9 May includes a running woman and a blaze of fire to the right and a shrieking woman with bare breasts at the left. From this point on, then, Picasso has determined that a cast of women would stand for the fact that many innocent women were victims of the outrage.

Comparison with traditional ways of doing preparatory work will bring out the modernity of Picasso's method. In the past, a painter would have worked on the scale represented by *Guernica* by first making a series of notes and sketches, then composing a smaller and freely done version of the whole work; and finally a full-scale 'cartoon' for transfer on the canvas. But they all involve the idea of a logical and steady progress towards achieving a clearly conceived end result. In their place, Picasso adopts a working method which permits numerous shifts and changes all along the way. Roy T. Matthews and F. DeWitt Platt writes, "Picasso's Gurnica is a vivid symbol of the unarmed town of Gurnica by Nazi planes during the Spanish Civil War, the painting transforms the local struggle into an international battle between totalitarianism and human freedom—the issue that also dominated the age's ideological debates" (542).

Thus the painting exhibits the cult of unreason by exhibits the overcharge of unconscious. The distorted figures, the animal images and geometrical presentation of shapes are obscure, which deceive our intelligibility. The demonic-like figures are irrational expression of human mind.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Hegel is inclined to make reason organic to reality. He forms logical opposition the prime condition of all being:

Dialectic becomes for Hegel not merely a method of philosophical discovery and exposition but also a description of the way in which things habitually come into being and grow. While it may not be true to say that Hegel reduces the rich life of concrete nature to a bloodless dialectic of categories. In Hegel logic rules, turning life itself into an argument, converting the living truth into an abstract formula. (Radhakrishna 150-151)

If life can only be expressed in terms of a logical system, it stops to be life. Hegel's dialectic does not begin from the totality in which the opposite terms manifest themselves, but stands with one side which takes us over into its opposite and later builds a unity that holds them together. The primary reality, for Hegel, is something which is built up out of opposite parts which are logically prior to the whole. The unity appears as the result of a synthesis, the members of which are apprehended prior to the whole—the insight into the synthetic whole.

Here, "by reducing reality to a set of relations which can be dialectically understood, Hegel ignores the elements of feeling and will and psychological inwardness" (Radhakrishna 151), Truth becomes incarnation of the thought;

it is an all-inclusive rational experience of mind. The world process is a rational process. There is no room for unreason or unpredictability in the cosmic process.

But the cult of unreason that attacks Enlightenment heritage views:

If life is history, if reality is genuine becoming, a perpetual renewal, and not mere repetition, then its apprehension cannot be merely dialectical. Absolute knowledge in its concreteness is more in the form of effortless insight or intuition. It is more immediate than mediate, perceptual than conceptual. (Radhakrishna 152)

The truest record of reality which is of the nature of life partakes of the character of a historical narrative rather than dialectical development. Any historical view that reduces real growth to a logical scheme is pseudo-history. If the real/truth is a genuine becoming, then knowledge can only be an insight, not absolute. The Enlightenment rationalisation of experience is not its whole truth. There is limitation of what is rational. Anything cannot be rational beyond limits. What is reasonable depends on so many contingent variables, which are purely unreasonable in their nature. Most of the time human mind is dominated by the instinctual impulses as Freud has exposed. Consciousness works very rarely in human life, our existence goes on unconsciously most of the time. This is what has been articulated by the Dadaism and Surrealism in the history of the Western modernist art owing emphasis on primitivism and fantasy of the human mind. The Modernists' admiration for primitivism actually leads to Dada, the most unusual art movement of the twentieth century. By its outrageous depiction, it conveys the message that World War I has made all values meaningless. The

Dada artists no longer uphold the spiritual claims and traditional beliefs of Western humanism. The Dada group embraces anti-art as the only ethical position possible for an artist in the modern era.

Dada finally leads to Surrealism, an art movement that started in the 1920s. Surrealism is basically a pictorial art. "Inspired by Freud's teaching that the human mind conceals hidden depths, the Surrealists wanted to create a vision of reality that also included the truths harbored in the unconscious. They portrayed dream imagery, fantasies, and hallucinations in a direct fashion that made their paintings more startling than Dada" (Mathews and Platt 560). The Spanish painter Salvador Dali focuses on subjects that scratches the surface from his lively imagination and often encloses thinly camouflaged sexual symbols. His art work "The Persistence of Memory," which depicts soft, melting watches in a desert like setting. Sexual themes can be offered in the limp images of watches that indicate sexual impotence. Whatever may be the meaning, the painting passes a strange twist to ordinary things evoking the sense of a half remembered dream. Dali cultures a controversial, even scandalous, personal image.

Thus, it seems that from the beginning of philosophical thinking, the cults of reason and unreason run parallel but dominated by socraticism (rationality) keeping the cult of unreason aside. It is only with Freud, Heidegger and Nietzsche, the tradition-constituted emphasis on reason gets a serious blow. These three intellectual giants thus beome the harbingers of the cult of unreason, which destroys every vestigo of Greco-Roman cult of rationality leading the reason to the crisis in modernism. Freud exposes the predominance of primordialism beneath the restriant of civilisation; Heidegger suspends the reason

as a home of reality/being replacing it with language; Nietzsche exposes the contingency of reason particularly in his naturalistic epistemology. Thus, the research safely drives home to the fact that reason can never be reason absolute, and it is contingent. Modernism exposes the contingency of what is reasonable putting the entire heritage of Enlightenment rationality at crisis.

Footnotes:

1. Johannes Vermeer's painting *Christ in Mary and Martha's House* adopted from Mark Roskill's *What is Art History?* exhibits the cult of reason.

2. Picasso's painting *Gurnica* adopted from Roy T. Matthew and F. Dewitt Platt's *The Western Humanities* exhibits the cult of unreason.

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