

# **ROLE OF NEPAL GOVERNMENT TO CRUSH THE KHAMPA INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATION TO NEPAL**

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**LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION**

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I recommend this thesis for its final evaluation and acceptance.

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**LETTER OF APPROVAL**

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## ABSTRACT

Once in a history, northern parts of Nepalese border especially Mustang has been complained as a prolific field to promote vested interest of foreign intelligence agencies. Outcomes of their planned covert activities resulted political havoc and misfortunes. Political instability simmered after 1980 still hammering Nepal. Upper part of Mustang, which is known by 'LO' in Tibet, is still remote by many reasons where Khampa resistance against the Maoist regime of China was entrenched. During cold war era Central Intelligence Agency of (CIA) USA with Revolutionary Analysis Wing (RAW) mastered this low profiled guerrilla warfare against Chinese communism.

Insurgent buildup of Khampas along the Northern border at Himalayan frontier mostly remained secret until Nepalese Government mobilized Nepal Army to destroy the Khampas hideouts from Mustang. Clandestine buildup made India, worried that china could send military in to Nepal. This issue become cross cutting issue to Nepalese Government which might have becomes diplomatic concern for Nepalese sovereignty. With this pressure Nepalese Government then decided to launch offensive military operation along Northern border of Nepal against Khampa insurgents.

During this Khampa operation Nepal Army had divided military offensive plan into two phases and launched operation simultaneously at Mustang and Tinker. Until the end of 1976, before mobilizing Nepal Army, Khampas were opportune by limited presence of local administration. Then time Nepalese government remained unnoticed with insurgent movements and foreign involvement. In the period of ten years Khampas freedom fighters were successful to establish numerous operating bases and hideouts in Nepal and bordering areas of Mustang.

As the insurgency was reaching at more crucial height, many refugees along with Khampa insurgents fled in to Nepal. Deteriorating situation here at Tibet was manipulated by CIA and RAW trained Khampa insurgents. Khampas had limited choice to reach India when, massive and rapid PLA deployment was in place. In order to avoid PLA concentration at south of Lasha, Khampa insurgents decided to take circuitous south west route to Mustang and surroundings. As Khampa insurgents and their arrogant activities was widening, Nepal Government decided to launch operation to stamp out Khampa activities.

After offensive military campaign against this insurgency diplomatic history of two countries implicated in different folds. Political reversals in USA also had brought shocking impact for this deliberated uprising. Unfortunate consequences also matched with the official state visit to China by our Late King Birendra. It was his first state visit after he ascended into the throne. Diplomatic course with neighboring countries had already been framed by his late father King Mahendra. Specially with China foreseeing possible disturbances that India would exploit. Immediately on his return he ordered to mobilize Nepal Army against the Khampa rebels operating in the remote regions along Nepal Tibet border.

Over the issue of Khampas India and USA became secret partners for long and exercised their power relationship. In an attempt to support underground guerilla warfare, intelligence agencies of US and India established training camps in Hale Colorado USA and Chakrata in India. This reflects clear aim of the western world over the Khampa uprising. Clandestine operations launched against PLA eventually remained limited only to secure Dalai Lama's safe passage to India. At time when Tibetan issue became a contentious issue for world, Nepalese Political rhythm went complete against the western world and their allies. Successful offensive operation launched by Nepal Army against Khampa insurgency had drawn assertive political implications to the history of Nepal-China diplomatic relation. Action taken by Nepalese government was undermined by secret partners which had shaped the clear diplomatic path of Nepal-China bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, suspicious Chinese government always reacted far from distance.

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## ACRONYMS

AD	After Death
BS	Bikram Sambat
Capt.	Captain
CCP	Communist Party of China
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIA	Central intelligence Agency
Col.	Colonel
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
HQ	Headquarter
INHURED	International Institute for Human Rights, Environment and Development
INSEC	Information Sector Service Center
KM	Kilometer
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
Maj.	Major
NA	Nepal Army
NC	Nepali Congress
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
TAR	Tibetan Autonomous Region
UN	United Nation
US	United States
VFF	Volunteer Freedom Fighter
ZOP	Zone of Peace

# **CHAPTER I**

## **INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH STUDY**

### **1.1 Background**

The territory of Nepal, has been sometimes criticized as fertile land in order to foster the vested interest of foreign interventions, which has often resulted into political turmoil and reversals in Nepal. Once in the history Nepal, upper part of Mustang which is still remote by many reasons and its westwards up to Tinker pass along Nepal-Tibet border was badly affected due to Khampa Insurgency. Initially, this insurgency was raised in eastern part of Tibet by local monastic elites but, later; it was reinforced by intelligences agencies of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) against communist regime of China (Conboy & Morison, 2006).

Capital of Tibet, 'Lasha' is the origin of Tibetan uprising in 1959 popularly known as Dalai Lama's plight. Before that, in 1956 in the name of social reform; there were several armed conflicts between Tibetan rebels and Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) in Kham and Amdo region (Dhungel, 2002). Continuation of intermittent confrontations existed until Khampa Operation executed by Nepal Government in 1974. During this period, northern portion of Nepal bordering with Tibet served safe sanctuary for Khampa rebels. American and Indian intelligence departments were engaged to recruit and train them for the secret operation to be launched in future against the PLA.

The remote region remained in isolation for foreigners until 1992 as a Forbidden Kingdom. Due to the absence of government activism, this part of the Himalayan range remained disconnected from rest of the world. However, having the strong cultural ties with Tibetan culture, religion and unique heritage, upper Mustang was controlled by the local administration for long (Clara, 1995). Such a remotely controlled administrative set-up had offered the ample opportunities for clandestine activities.

This insurgency was raised in eastern part of Tibet by local monastic elites initially. However, later; it was reinforced by US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Indian

Intelligence Agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) against the Maoist regime of China (Conboy & Morison, 2006). This research will attempt to explore the geopolitical importance and sensitivity of Trans-Himalayan region of western Nepal through the study of low-profile guerrilla warfare which was drawn to check communism by CIA and RAW. In order to stamp out this Insurgency, the Government of Nepal had ordered Nepal Army to launch military offensive operation. This entire military operation concluded with grand victory, where main leader of Khampa and his team eliminated. Contributions waged by Nepal Government in this regard, not only determined Nepal-China bilateral relationship but also became the term card in time of dire need when our southern neighbor disdained our fundamental rights. Unlike Indian internal defense policy, non-interference Chinese foreign policy has become more supportive for political stability in Nepal.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Nepal, in its glorious history was never colonized and it remained undefeated. However, the domestic political turmoil created favorable environment for international clusters to act against their political foe. After the second World War, dynamics of conflict turned into different shapes. World power rivals were engaged to expand their area of influence by any possible means. In course of power rivalries, the leading power of the then period USA was engaged in covert activities in order to check the communism in South Asia. During this time, China remained intact as consolidated power, which had posed considerable threat to World. With the realization of this fact, renowned super power USA, and India conducted the low-profile guerilla operation in remote areas, in the surroundings of Nepal-Tibet border.

During Khampa offensive, Nepal government stood strong and determined, however was unable to remain untouched by contemporary world politics. CIA of USA mastered the insurgency and RAW of India supported to create clandestine platforms exploiting Nepalese territory. Collaborated efforts of USA and India moved parallelly. Nepal, situated between two giant Asian rivals, was pacified to fall silent in confused political scenario for the time being. Initially, it seemed like Nepali government turned its' eyes for Khampa issue and even offered refugee status then compelled for logistical sustainment. After the sudden death of King Mahendra in 1971, the total game flipped into the other side. Identically, political requirements of sponsored countries also took

paradigm shift with its changed political leadership and then the basic support to Khampas was interrupted. Western world and India were revolving within this periphery Nepal was forced to assimilate this global phenomenon, nevertheless, Government of Nepal stamped out this Tibetan insurgency in its territory which had politically implicated to shape Nepal- China bilateral relationship.

Firm dedication and commitment projected by Nepal Government turned as detrimental blow for Westerner and its allies. The entire attempt was evaluated as incredible by the Chinese government. Thereafter, whenever Nepal deflated or misjudged by the southern neighbor, China always stood supportive to Nepal in return. China also had granted access to various ports for commercial purpose which had reduced Nepal's total dependence on India for commerce. This was reflected in 2015 during India's embargo to Nepal (INHURED, 2016).

During colonial era, British military strategists tried to explore the advantages for their further expansion. In this run, the most of the Asian countries remained under the British rule except Nepal. It had projected its bold national image; therefore, Nepal was perceived as an only country where colonialist was badly defeated. However, after 1950 during Cold War era, Nepal was weakened by its own political instability. Rulers had to battle for their containment at rule. This type of fragile political environment enticed the platform for international actors to play with. In this pretext, upper parts of Nepalese terrain bordering with China were exploited by foreign intelligence agencies. Until up to 1960, various parts of northern border of Nepal remained out of contact for stranger (Dhungel, 2002). The Existence of government administration was also shallow and narrow. Taking advantages of this geo-condition, CIA along with RAW launched anti-communist movement. Despite the enormous efforts of foreign intelligence agencies to raise this Khampa insurgency, they could not take height as desired rather it rolled back. This research will focus to discover national and international political circumstances, and contributions of Nepalese government while launching counter offensive steps to stamp out this insurgency.

During this operation, Nepalese territory was exploited and remained undetected for long. The sovereignty of country somehow is twisted in questions. At uttermost of this counter insurgency, Chinese government was compelled to ask for support from Nepal with deterrence to invade, which has laid distinct platform for Nepal to demonstrate

fair-mind to formulate unbiased foreign policies. Indeed, Nepal became successful. The contributions made by Nepal to crush this insurgency played a vital role to shape up Nepal-China relation. On this backdrop, the following questions arise:

- a. What was Khampa insurgency?
- b. How it became a threat to national sovereignty of Nepal?
- c. What was the role of Nepal Government while crushing this insurgency?
- d. Eventually, can we infer that the endeavors made by Government of Nepal during this operation helped to shape the foreign policy of Nepal?

The dissertation attempts to address the above-mentioned questions.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

Primarily, the research has tried to explore the outcomes and contributions of the Government of Nepal during Khampa Insurgency. To be specific, the principle objectives of the research are as follows:

- a. To analyze the total environment and concept of low profile Khampa insurgency.
- b. To explore the threats imposed by Khampa insurgency to the sovereignty of Nepal.
- c. To assess the contributions made by Government of Nepal to crush this insurgency and its implications to Nepal foreign policy.

### **1.4 Research Methodology**

#### **1.4.1 Justification of the Study**

The topic and the study of this research are related with the researcher's profession. Researcher was posted there in Mustang for two years (Aug 1914 to Aug 1916). During this two years' tenure, the researcher had opportunities to have interview with local survivors and eyewitnesses of that insurgency. Researcher physically visited old camps of Khampas and studied about how they conducted various small-scale operations against Chinese Army (PLA). The government of Nepal crushed this insurgency by offensive operation with outstanding result. Contributions made by Government had set the impressive example to shape up the diplomatic relation with northern neighbor,

whereas southern neighbor became susceptible as always. Whenever Nepal faced political or economic criticality sponsored by foreign agents, China always reacted promptly with return gift. The Contribution made by Government of Nepal to stamp out the insurgency, attracted physical supports from Chinese government in the time of real crisis. This research revolves around the outcomes of Nepal's contributions while eliminating this insurgency.

#### **1.4.2 Research Design**

The research frame aims to analyze the behavior of foreign intelligence agencies and their attempts to undermine Nepalese security apparatus. Citing the example of Nepalese support provided to Chinese government during Khampa period; India political elites often blame Nepal for using China card against India. In order to meet the objectives of this study, this research has explained the conditions- How was Nepal forced to conduct the offensive operation against the Khampas? Furthermore, it explores the implications of Nepalese contribution in the arena of Nepal-China relation.

#### **1.4.3 Methods of the Data Collection**


Descriptive and explanatory research methods are applied in this study. Many documents maintained by Nepal Army at central library regarding Khampa operations are most reliable and pioneer to this research. During the offensive operation, captured Khampa fighters were interrogated. Information furnished by them is also taken as primary data source to produce this document. Interview, observation and documentary methods are used to obtain the required data in fulfillment of the objectives of this study. During the fieldwork researcher visited Mustang, Khampa's headquarter Kaisang and up to Tibetan Border. Researcher personally interviewed few locals who had witnessed and survived from that insurgency. Among them are *Chandra Bahadur Thakali* (Whose father was killed by Khampa), *Nar Bahadur Hirachan* (Main food supplier) and *Bishnu Bahadur Hirachan* (Brother of Nar Bahadur Hirachan). They provided thoughtful documents and photographs about Khampas. Few Nepal Army Rtd. Generals, participants of Khampa operation and historians were also interviewed while preparing this research. Besides this, the relevant literatures available in central libraries of Tribhuvan University and Nepal Army supplemented the required data in this study. All personnel involved in interview are listed in reference.

#### **1.4.4 Presentation and Analysis**

Entire research is prepared as prescribed by the Department of Political Science, Prithvi Narayan Campus, Pokhara. Logical reasoning is supplied through the descriptive justifications. During research, sequential connection of historical events and its implications to Nepal China bilateral relation is discussed. For this purpose, available photographs and hand written evidences/documents are also annexed for more clarification. Collected data from scholarly articles, dissertation and books published so far, are elaborated systematically. Primary data are also analyzed to relate the events through interview with, victims, and survivors of this insurgency in Mustang. Additionally, in order to discuss the political implications historians along with political analyst are consulted. Therefore, the combination of primary and secondary data sources is in place to make this study more realistic.



### 1.4.5 Format of Research Methodology



*Flowchart Regarding Research Methodology*

## 1.5 Review of Literature

This research is an outcome of the review of different research papers, articles, interview with local victims and eyewitness of Khampa insurgency in Mustang. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical base and project the viability of primary data collection procedures for the understanding of the research problems. It also aims to review the critical and the current knowledge including the substantive findings, critical ideas as well as theoretical and methodological contribution to the particular topic.

The book, ‘*The CIA’s secret War in Tibet*’ written by Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison (2002) is a concrete evidence to explore Tibet and activities of Khampa fighters. This has revealed the American and Indian policies, supported by various means during cold war era before Vietnam. The support campaign remained critically

important to American Army and government in order to test modern weapon system like M16's and Military Aircraft, C-130 in extreme weather condition. Moreover, paramilitary capabilities and performance were also tested, the lessons were drawn from campaign and applied to subsequent other CIA covert campaigns such like in Vietnam, Philippines and Thailand.

The book, '*Kingdom of Lo (Mustang)*' is another firm document written by Ramesh K Dhungel-2002. Pertinent historians have revealed the Nepalese history, culture and local cultural practices of Tibetan region. In his book, he has described the geopolitical situation of that period from which we can draw clear picture of local environment and political mechanism of Nepal. This book also reveals how the isolated environment of northern border areas contributed to flourish covert operations in Mustang.

The book, '*Buddha's Warriors*' written by Mikel Dunham (2005) had revealed various activities of CIA and RAW backed Tibetan insurgents. This book has shedded the light to the life of Tibetan before Chinese aggression and peaceful transition of spiritual monks to guerilla fighters. It also has attempted to clarify some mystified and politicized issues of Tibet in cold war era. The book Buddha's warriors tell us in-depth story of chronological developments of insurgent movements of Tibet regarding Khampa insurgency.

Book written by Prem Singh Basnyat, '*Nepalese Army in Tibetan Khampa Disarming Mission* (2013) explores the role of Royal Nepalese Army to destroy the Khampa freedom fighters in northern border of Nepal. Nepal Army had deployed its special task force to launch offensive operation in 1976. There were certain circumstances which forced Nepal to conduct this offensive. How troops had mobilized under various commander and their action during this offensive operation have dealt in this book.

The book *Nepali Military History Part-II* co-authored by three writers Tulsi Ram Baidhya, Bijay Kumar Manandhar and Prem Singh Basnyat has described the detail account of Khampa activities and Nepal's contributions during offensive operation. Likewise, book written by Bhimnath Baral *Dimensions of Nepal China Relations, Zone of Peace: An Emerging Theme of International Law*, authored by Yuba Raj Sangroula has shaded lights regarding the dimensions of Nepal China relation and basic concepts of zone of peace proposal.

*Nepal: Struggle for Existence* written by Jagadish Sharma, *The Art of Survival: Foreign Policy Choices for Nepal* written by Devraj Dahal and *Foreign Policy of Nepal* written by S.D. Muni has explored how Nepal shaped its foreign policy. All accounts described in these books somehow refers to the circumstances that laid Nepal to determine its relationship with world.

Regarding Khampa insurgency, not much written documents are available, however, researcher has taken bulk support from web articles and Google. *A forgotten history* (2019) by Prem Singh Basnyat has revealed detail troops mobilization plan of Nepal Army. Various articles written on *Nepal as a zone of peace* have described the profound implications of Nepalese contribution while eliminating this docile insurgency. Likewise, '*Raid into Tibet*' by Sam Cowan has presented the conditions how westerners were operating into Nepal Tibet border. He also has mentioned the curious case of Mustang incident which justifies the Chinese aggression while countering Khampas. *The Khampa Uprising: Tibetan Resistance Against the Chinese Invasion* by Yulia Babayeva describes differences between Lasha's elite who had political control over Tibet for centuries and main Khampa insurgents' reaction against Chinese aggression.

## **1.6 Limitations of Study**

After the annexation of Sikkim by India in 1975, Nepal has maintained the policy of balancing the competing influences of our two giant neighbors. During this period, Nepal had demonstrated full-fledged support to China. Since 1975 onwards Sino-Nepal relations have been close and grown up significantly. This research has focused on implications over contributions made by the Government of Nepal supporting to counter this insurgency. Therefore, the scope of the study has mainly confined within the efforts made by Government of Nepal during Khampa insurgency, and its implications and issues on foreign policies. There are some limitations regarding the preparation of the dissertation, which are;

- a. The topic covers a wide range for better understanding, but focused only to contribution of the Government of Nepal to stamp out this insurgency and its implications at present scenario.

- b. Every well-known individual had different views and perspective, explanation and definition regarding Khampa insurgents and clandestine support to them.
- c. Amongst the stockpiles of papers, books & online materials published mainly by western authors on the subject, are limited, therefore they are taken just as references while preparing this paper.
- d. Due to the nature of this work, required commitment in terms of time; researcher had to rely on available web materials.

### **1.7 Significance of the Study**

Our relation with giant northern neighbor has been shaped by contribution provided by the Government of Nepal at that time. Diplomatic dealings with our two giant neighbors remained always critical for Nepal to maintain. In a process of research, data used are based on primary and secondary sources both. Most of the references and historical documents are found in central library of Nepal Army and Army museum. Aforementioned research attempts shaded logical and factual lights for this dissertation.

- a. This research will explore how CIA and RAW found common platform to check the Chinese communism. Scholars eager to explore these facts will certainly be benefitted.
- b. Earlier, the Government of Nepal offered refugee status for ex-Khampa fighters but suddenly after the state visit of King Birendra to China in 1974, situation turned into unexpected milieu which made Nepal to conduct offensive operation against Khampa insurgency. The facts and figures revealed during this research seem interesting to the readers.
- c. Political implications as tractable gifts about how China reflects its supports to Government of Nepal will be highlighted in this dissertation which may help policy makers in Nepal.
- d. Scholars of political science and military students who intend to do research of Army engagement during this Khampa insurgency will be benefitted.

### **1.8 Organization of the Study**

The study is structured into the following five chapters:

Chapter – I is the Introduction where it explains the Introduction of the Study, Statement of the Problem, Objectives of the Study, Methodology of the Study, Review of the Literature, Limitation of the Study, Significance of the Study and Organization of the Study.

Chapter – II is concerned with theoretical and conceptual framework of military support while crushing Khampa insurgency. It deals with introduction of insurgency, causes, characteristics, pre-requisites and stages of development. It also exemplifies few insurgencies fought in Asian region. Furthermore, it explains the historical overview regarding periodical development of this insurgency in different phases and co-related events about how Nepalese government forced to launch this offensive operation against Khampa insurgents.

Chapter – III is related to execution of offensive operation. In order to response the Chinese government, Nepalese government decided to launch military offensive to crush the Khampa insurgency. Various units of Nepal Army were tasked to conduct the operation. Finally, task force comprised of different units and supported by Nepal Amy headquarter destroyed entire Khampa fleeing convoy of guerilla leader and their hideouts in Mustang.

Chapter – IV deals with effects and influences on foreign relation. During that operation, some of those injured fighters were rescued by Indian Army helicopters as they were entering the Indian Territory (Mikel Dunham, 2005). Khampa insurgency was political problem of Chinese government and khampas were supported by CIA and RAW. However, the Government of Nepal had played pivotal role to destroy this Khampa insurgency. Action taken by the Government to destroy this low-profile insurgency demonstrated clear support to our northern neighbor.

Chapter –V This chapter summarizes the key discussions made throughout the research. Finally, research will be concluded by major findings, suggestions and courses to magnify international relationship with our friendly neighbors’.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THEORITICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF KHAMPA INSURGENCY**

#### **2.1 What is Insurgency?**

As famous British writer Gerald Seymour quoted, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Seymour, 2005).. Insurgency is a multidimensional phenomenon which would span in several disciplines. Social, political, economic, cultural and ethnic aspects are standard elements to initiate the insurgency. Normally, it is defined as the actions of minority groups within state that are intending on forcing various change by means of mixture of subversion, propaganda and military actions against established authority. Insurgency, term historically restricted to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions of an organized revolution. It has subsequently been applied to any such armed uprising, typically guerilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency>.

Some insurgencies aim for a straight forward to overthrow the existing government though complete revolutionary take over like a decade long Maoist insurgency in Nepal. In some instances, an insurgency may strive to extract wide ranging political concession which are unattainable through less violent means like Tibetan uprising in 1959. Success of insurgency rests on its dimensions such as leadership, cause and support from external sources in certain contexts it is also referred as war of liberation. This context has been assimilated during Bangladesh partition from east Pakistan in 1971.

Insurgency may well graduate into conventional tactics in course of time, however, the conventional understanding of insurgency is rising up in opposition to established ruling regime with section of people rebelling against legally constituted government. To this purpose support or sympathy of local population is obtained voluntarily or by coercion. Insurgency covers the full spectrum of conflict from subversion to full scale guerilla warfare including emergence of guerilla bands into regular units Headquarters, Nepal Army (2063 BS) *Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare field Manual Part I*

(FM 100-20). Khampa insurgency was one attempt to rebel against Chinese leader Mao's established authority in China to liberate Tibet. In order to have ethnic freedom from hard communist rule they had revolted with western supports.

## **2.2 Causes of Insurgency**

Normally, in insurgency period revolutionary mass, creates chaotic movement demanding drastic political, economic and social changes in the nation and is often directed towards overthrowing of existing regime. Then the movement is formed through the progressive, methodical and secret mobilization of a vulnerable population by well discipline and motivated leaders. Generally, it involves gradual destruction or erosion of government authority through violence, political and psychological actions. In order to fulfil the demanded aspiration vulnerable groups might have been manipulated by different actors. Following are the possible causes that may include. (Sinai, 2008)

- a. Nationalist, ethnic and cultural separatist movements based on strong feeling of identity to the limited dominant group within state.
- b. Some group might have been motivated by religious fundamentalists like in Afghanistan.
- c. Maladministration, rampant corruption discrimination and repression like Nepalese Maoist in Nepal.
- d. Social and economic derailment or in state failure.
- e. Distinct class differences in society. Extremism, within and poverty, especially in countries where the upper and lower classes are of different ethnic origins like Iran and Iraq.
- f. Neo colonialism: the control of key sectors or presence of allied troops and their bases with the terms of unpopular treaties and negotiations like Korean peninsula, Thailand and Vietnam.

## **2.3 Pre-requisites of Insurgency**

As per the world insurgency history, it is seen that in the initial stage the insurgents are extremely weak and they face a grave disastrous moment for survival while countering with enormous strength of counter insurgents. They must be able to draw

complete attention of public in their favor and should be able to control and mobilize it effectively. Their ideal cause to involve in any insurgency should have impressive reasons only then insurgent leaders get popular support from people. Cause should be long lasting. We have seen in history that many insurgencies which had deep rooted pre-text also spoiled by government forces like Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Srilanka. However, in the Nepalese environment after restoration of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy in 1990, the country enjoyed all political economic and social freedom but later, the CPN (Maoist) with a view to establish the communist regime exploited all the weaknesses of multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society of Nepal. They also had ventilated caste, culture, economic disparity, unemployment, and poverty as the primary cause of their movement. (Nepal Army Headquarters, 2063 BS)

Role of geography is also very important in insurgency. If insurgency is not acquainted with geographic condition of terrain they might be condemned to failure. Likewise, morale, political economic and diplomatic supports from outside are also in extreme need for successful insurgency. In the initial stage the insurgents cannot absorb large scale military equipment but with the passage of time they need it. Generally, they acquire either by confiscation or outside support. During Vietnam war, Vietnamese got arms initially from China and then from USSR. Popular public supports attributed by dynamic leaders with attractive personalities dictates the longevity of insurgency. Following are the pre-requisites of insurgency: (Galula, 1964)

- a. Popular Cause
- b. Weakness of the counter insurgency
- c. Leadership and organization
- d. Favorable geographical conditions
- e. Foreign Support

## **2.4 Development of Insurgency**

Insurgency is usually, protracted and expands from initial stage subversion through the immediate stage of resistance then insurrection to final civil war. It goes through mainly three stages, strategic defenses, strategic stalemate and strategic counter offensive. (Nepal Army Headquarters, 2063 BS)



**Stage-1 Strategic Defense;** The insurgency crystallizes and takes shape in this stage. The movement thrives discontentment to mass people which creates popular support to then and hits on unpopularity or ineffectiveness of the government. Since this is primary stage insurgents will establish the intelligence network. They will engage for survival and recognition. Mounting anti-governmental activities, subversion, strikes riots and civil unrest are the primary features of this stage.

- **Stage-2 Strategic Stalemate:** This is the start off stage of protected guerilla warfare. Discontented groups are militarized and raise arms against security forces. They don't attempt to fight pitched battles but adopt hit and run tactics. Insurgents attempt to show inability of security forces that they cannot protect the people. The main aim of this stage is to irritate security forces all time. During this stage guerilla forces try to reorganize, train and equip in secure hide outs.
- **Stage-3 Strategic Counter Offensive.** This is the final stage where hostiles build up their full strength and are in a position to fight against full scale war against government forces. It may take several years to reach. Tactics up to this level transformed in conventional from hit and run guerilla warfare. In this stage bulk a of mass might have turned in to them. Day to day life of general people might have been disputed by ineffective or collapsed structure of government. Then the stage will reach in a condition where regime has to act as the manner desired by insurgents.

## **2.5 Other Insurgencies in the Contemporary World**

Almost immediately after Second World War, Tibet was in isolation. Entire Tibet was enjoying in unique style among the various political systems of the modern world. Had this been equipped with economic prosperity it would have been colonized much earlier. Imperialist maneuvering in Asia between British, Chinese and Russian directly attributed to Tibetan sovereignty. Both the Anglo Tibetan convention of 1904 and the Anglo- Russian Convention of 1907 were basically aimed at making Tibet area free from any struggle. However, as the time passed we faced the consequences; World power rivals put Tibet in a hyperbole almost for next decade after sixties. Indirect interest of US and rival India joined hands to destabilize the patron authority of China

over Tibet. Along with monastic anti-Chinese movement, with the support of CIA and RAW; discontented Khampa of eastern Tibet were manipulated to raise insurgency. It was intended to check communist expansion. Later in their course Khampas were also manipulating Nepali territory for their safe hideout. Following are few examples of insurgency in the world where insurgents attempted to establish their own government (U.S. Government, 2012).

### **2.5.1 Communist Insurgency in Thailand**

Communist insurgency in Thailand was a guerilla war lasting from 1965 until 1983. This insurgency fought between government and communist party of Thailand. The war declined in 1980 following the declaration of an amnesty. And by 1983 the CPT had abandoned the insurgency. During this movement the Thailand independence movement issued a manifesto demanding the withdrawal of US military personal from Thailand. This ex-military officer also joined this movement. Combinedly they established the Thailand patriotic front and called for regime change too. Retrieved from [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist\\_insurgency\\_in\\_Thailand](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Thailand). Here, world witnessed the combination of hills tribesmen, Chinese and Vietnamese minorities making backbone for this movement.

### **2.5.2 Communist Insurgency in Vietnam**

Communist insurgency in Vietnam was raised almost in the same time when Khampa insurgency was shaping its size in Tibet. It was decisive conflict between government of North Vietnam and South Vietnam with its principal ally the United States. The conflict was intensified more by ongoing cold more between US and USSR. It is said that more than 3 million people were killed including 58,000 US soldiers. More than half of dead were Vietnamese civilian. Issue to involve in this bloody war divided US officials badly. This war ended with the withdrawal of US forces in 1973 and seizing control of Vietnam in 1975. Then entire North and South Vietnam unified as socialist republic of Vietnam (Joseph, 1967).

### **2.5.3 Communist Insurgency in Philippines**

The Communist party of Philippines and its people's Army launched an armed struggle against the Philippines government. The government had hard time to control this insurgency. The conflict had been lasted for more than 40 years and killed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians. Insurgency in this run in Philippines took various roots securing arms, weapons and funds locally in the different regions. They planned to attack government forces and proved hard to defeat. Counter insurgency by government forces could not destroy their organization completely. Neither side won militarily. Finally, communist insurgency ended with negotiation between warring parties. In fact, history of insurgency in Philippines has complex dimension. Many break away factions of communist are still in existence (Alvin H. Bernstein & Armando B. Heredia, 2007).

### **2.6 Concept of Khampa Insurgency**

While other parts of World were being conquered and colonized by Britishers, Nepal continued to retain its sovereignty through bravery and courage shown by Nepalese with whole of the nation approach which was duly recognized by foes. Then conditions were set that they would be allowed to recruit Gorkhas in their own military. It was when the world just had introduced itself and great two world war were just being over. But post-world war environment derived different kind of battle field with unconventional maneuvering and world wars concluded simultaneously originating more detrimental low-profile cold war in the power race while competing for super power in world.

Meanwhile in sixties, World had witnessed the captivated Tibetan uprising. It was conducted and sponsored by westerners exploiting Nepalese territory at Mustang. Number of small-scale attacks against the PLA by Khampas were launched from upper parts of Mustang. This made the World surprised; especially to Britain, how Nepal would let its territory being exploited? One fine day for reason best known to them, it was CIA in conjunction with RAW, upstretched an armed insurgency in South Asian continent in order to check the communism. But again, Nepalese government sent Nepal Army to crush this particular insurgency before it could get any kind of momentum at all.

Khampa insurgency was violent rebellion act against the Chinese authority. Till the time, Chinese religious leader Dalai Lama remained in Tibet; exhausted all his endeavors to strengthen his combatants by training and equipping with modern weapons. In this course, Dalai Lama, in order to maintain the Tibetan integrity intact, contacted foreign invaders to support. World power rivals, US along with India mastered this insurgency without wasting time over Dalai Lama's initiative.

Concept of the Khampa insurgency initially started with the aim to liberate Tibet from communist authority. Ever since from 1956 when Dalai Lama lost his confidence with PRC; at in the Kham region volunteer Tibetan fighters were organizing the formal Army called 'Four Rivers Six Ranges'. Officially this development announced in 16 Jun 2058. Nevertheless, entire objectives of this armed militants under this umbrella wandered just into a containment. Insurgents led by Kham born Tibetan insurgent leader Ge-Wandu started migrating down in the adjoining Nepalese border then they started anti-Chinese activities from different places along Nepal-Tibet border. Around that time Indian troops were also deployed in Nepal China border areas. They were to feed military intelligence to the Khampa fighters. As a matter of fact, these activities were against the foreign policy of Nepal (Bansal, 2017).

During the time of this insurgency, due to the security risks the government of China made an agreement with Nepalese government to control Khampa activities. As per this agreement Nepal Government decided to operate Nepal Army to disarm the Khampa insurgency.

In the beginning of 1974 king Birendra issued an order for his government to disarm Khampas in Mustang peacefully and bring them near Pokhara in order to prohibit them from proceeding China. Accordingly, Nepal Army made plan to disarm but, in latter it went in aggressive turn. Then Nepal Army troops were forced to conduct offensive ambushes. Finally, main commander and his entire team fell in ambush at Tinkar pass while trying to cross the Nepalese border to Indian side.

## **2.7 Political History of Khampa Insurgency**

People's republic of China started gaining control over Tibet through incorporation campaign after 1950. Political upheavals followed by military clashes and confrontations have intensively marked in Tibet just after the Second World War. Entire Tibet incorporation process lasted with acceptance of the Seventeen Point Agreement in 1951 after the negotiation between Government of Tibet and PRC (See Appendix 'A' for details). However, attempts by then temporary government of Tibet to gain international identity and efforts to modernize its military strength were in place until Dalai Lama, exiled from Tibet in 1959. Two side intermittent confrontations then later full-size guerilla warfare also waged in course of Tibetan uprising. Decade long clashes have been observed in Tibetan history. Eventually traditional Tibetan government was dismissed after Dalai Lama left Tibet. Tibetan uprising of 1959 had set clear passage to exit him from Tibet to Dharamshala Himanchal Pradesh, India (Babayeva, 2006). Central administration of Tibet commonly known as the Tibetan government-in-exile, headed by the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama and prime minister Lobsang Sangay the president of Central Administration of Tibet is now struggling to get Tibetan territorial integrity from Indian territory which, China never recognized.

Entire Tibet is known as Land of devotion to Buddhism and Spiritual leader Dalai Lama. Moreover, this beautiful Himalayan region with extreme climate was also well known worldwide long before Khampa insurgency against Chinese rule. It's existence became contemporary issue for US and its allies, then laid wonderful platform to check the Chinese Communism (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

During the colonial era Tibet was able to maintain freedom from British influence, but most of the nineteenth century British government dealt Tibet through government of China. This pacified protectorate status of china over Tibet. Traditional aristocrats and powerful monks in Tibet always objected to enlarge and modernize its national security elements. Despite the enormous effort made by 13<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama to modernize its political system inhouse, centrifugal force drove Tibet into de-facto independence for long (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

Until middle of the nineteenth century, government of PRC had no effective control over Tibet due to its engagement with warlords in other parts of China. Japanese

invasion and civil war also contained China for long (Conboy & Morrison, 2002). When Tibet was in the context of Chinese suzerainty, other portions also were in similar status. Social structural components of Tibetan government and its power players displayed turbulent mind-set regarding independent status of Tibet. This fragile bonding among social and cultural leaders inhouse indicated their willingness to accept subordinate status of China, with condition that internal systems were left untouched and China relinquished control over number of ethnic groups in Tibet (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

Tibet had witnessed the year 1959 as a turning point in its independent history. Tribal religious beliefs and monastic communicating network have been intensively used to foster political and armed uprising. Middle class peasant and farmer population of Tibet mobilized to organize revolt against the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

### **2.7.1 Root Causes of Khampa Insurgency**

The seventeen-points agreement signed on 23 may 1951 between Chinese government and representatives of Tibetan government (See Appendix 'A' for details). This agreement placed them into the control of CCP and took away incredible amount of their fundamental political and religious rights. PLA deployed in every major city were forcing them to change their usual way of life. Gradually Tibetan leadership being forced to accept the Chinese suzerainty to work with People's Republic of China (PRC), but at the same time this was not accepted by local level particularly in eastern part of Tibet and observed growing resistance. As the passage of time, atrocities more recorded in daily basis. PLA started arresting local leaders selectively and tortured. Their monasteries were destroyed. Monks and nuns were imprisoned. In a way, situation arise to feel that Tibet was invaded in real sense.

Progressively, Khampas and Amdowas were forced to embrace communism, which irritated them supremely. In return, situation turned violent. They were becoming more aggressive to kill Chinese political leaders and members of security forces. To meet this purpose, retaliatory guerilla activities emerged from the ranks of merchants and middle-class peasants. They even had spent their own wealth. Later this resistance movement united to form a stronger guerilla band as known by Khampa guerilla fighters (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

At least five years passed with small-scale clashes between PLA and Khampa insurgents after issue of Tibet, first raised in 1950. Since early 1956 Chinese outpost were being targeted by unsatisfied youth of Khampas. Main supply root and communication network in Tibet started being cut off and Chinese garrisons stationed in several areas of Kham also being targeted. Taking advantage of lack of the sophisticated communication means and technology within Tibet disgruntled groups of people in Kham organized through tribal and familial grids (Conboy & Morrison, 2002). Monasterial set-ups helped guerilla forces to be able to move from place to place unnoticed. Khampa guerilla band was not well-equipped with arms and ammunition, but blessed with knowledge of terrain and physical stamina that came from a high altitude in a harsh climate.

Dalai lama as a young boy and had no prior knowledge of functioning administration and government as well. He was easily intimidated by charismatic political icon of communist Mao Ze- dong at that time. Though Dalai Lama was carefully protected by his government officials of Lasha he still had to maintain the isolation for long in 1956. During his isolation, Dalai lama only heard the news of Khampa's confrontation with PLA. In between 1955-60 Dalai lama himself travelled to Kham which portrayed clear picture of entire Tibet. What he had seen during his visit was far from the truth and totally opposite what was promised by Chinese leader during his China visit to Beijing (Conboy & Morrison, 2002). This eye-opening visit made him aware of future possible deception. Furthermore, he was inspired by the growing spirit of revolt and claim for independence. Strong anti-Chinese feeling circulating in Kham and Amdo region somehow assimilated by Dalai lama. Moreover, this visit made him to realize his guardianship over faithful devotees fighting for Tibetan cause too.

### **2.7.2 Establishment of Guerilla Band**

After Dalai Lama's return from Kham, deteriorating political situation of Tibet and Military action against Tibetan populace put Dalai Lama into dilemma. He could not support Khampas openly fearing that, Chinese security forces would further accelerate their military campaign for Tibet takeover. Due to this dreadful situation in Tibet, Dalai Lama was enforced to take command of religious and political leadership as well. Meanwhile increasing number of unsatisfied youths of Tibet started organizing guerilla band naming volunteer freedom fighter (VFF). Khampa fighters made a guerilla band

called Four rivers and Six Ranges with the interpretation which covers the territory within four rivers and six known and famous ranges in Tibet. This organization was created on 16 Jun 1958. This was an organization of Tibetan volunteer under the spiritual leader Dalai Lama against PLA since 1956 (Van Horn & Tyler G., 2011). VFF leaders started sensitizing Tibetan people to fight against Chinese government harder and encourage to be friends with local supporters. This was the clear demonstration of importance of tribal and monasterial network which extended along upper parts of Nepal border. The year 1958 observed as a flash point of a Tibetan Khampa insurgency. VVF, started increasing their size and strength. Volunteers called to join more, then existing tribal leaders helped them to organize and set up the communication network. In the starting launch, resistance was limited then they adopted hit and run tactic to attack PLA post. Gradually Khampa guerilla band was becoming well-organized to dispose for more anarchic.

### **2.7.3 Response of Capital Lasha towards Khampa Volunteer Freedom Fighter (VFF)**

Political dilemma was still there with various factions of Tibetan power players. Tribal and Monasterial head feared to upset the central government assuming that they would face more brutality and lose existing economic and political freedom. Therefore, Lasha elite frightened to support the VFF and turned their eyes for long. Same time refugee influx from Kham and Amdo congested the capital city. All the time whenever VFF asked support from central government, they received negative response. However, their effort to strengthen the VVF organization had never been diminished rather extended to walk for extra miles seeking foreign support (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

In the year 1959 the situation has turned worse than ever. Heavy confrontation between two forces recorded randomly. Chinese troops started bombarding shells to the palace of Dalai lama which made him to think leaving Tibet for safe heaven. This uprising is being international news with dissolvment of Dalai Lama's local government.

After Dalai lama exiled from Tibet, westerners along with Indian intelligence agencies tried to internationalize the Tibetan issue. However, Indians leader Jawaharlal Nehru desired to refrain from provoking Chinese leadership initially. Assuming this would have been detrimental to Indo-China relation. Similarly, Bhutan and Sikkim both were



under the Indian influence therefore use of these territories also remained out of question. In this pretext remotely administered Nepalese border area of upper Mustang left only staging area by default for CIA and RAW.

In the first two years of Dalai lama's exile numbers of Tibetan refugee influx increased to 20 thousand around. Nearby cities along the northern border visualized refugee movement where central control was not proper. Particularly enclave of Mustang surrounded three sides by Tibet was the perfect hyperbole for all these foreign agents. Geographically Mustang consisted of twelve large villages and walled capital Lo-Manthang with nearly 500 residents. This area maintained something very important; culturally with quasi-independence status. Its ethnic king Lo-Mangthang was generally supportive to Tibetan refugee and inhabitants. Capital city has clear link with Tibetan border. Moreover, its remote location kept this place secret for foreigner and remained out of reach for central government of Nepal for long. With these attributes Mustang was a sure bet for a guerilla base (Dhungel, 2002).

#### **2.7.4 Groundwork for Khampa Insurgency**

Nepal as a tiny Hindu Kingdom tempered its neutrality with a pro- Indian bias however, after the death of king Tribhuvan his bolder son King Mahendra diversified the kingdom's foreign policy. In 1956 king established diplomatic relation with China and signed a Sino- Nepalese trade agreement. This way Nepal had moved closer to China which had been monitored closely by Us and India.

Undermining the Nepal China relation CIA started recruiting Khampas for insurgency purpose. CIA task force during it recruiting campaign found forty-three-year-old Baba Yashi as leader to control the guerilla band in Mustang. Baba Yashi was from central Kham and played important role in entire Khampa insurgency in Tibet. He was the one who had arranged various rally points for supreme leader Dalai lamas' safe passage to India. He also had opportunity to get audience with US president and his visiting dignitary in 1959 December in India. This time he had handed over a letter calling for U.S. support, but it was defected (Conboy & Morrison, 2002). All these activities were directed by CIA station at New Delhi and its outpost to Nepal without prior knowledge of Indian capital base embassies. Later with some reluctance, embassies were made

forceful to follow the high-level directives following the same path of two intelligence agencies.

Here, at Kathmandu outpost of Khampas, received a diplomatic pouch of 2 radio sets and handed over to Baba Yashi at Swoyambhu Nath Temple. Two radio men with 12 Khampas divided into two groups. One left with backpack putting radios on it and setting off for Mustang. Next group, Baba Yashi with remaining radiomen waited for plane to get Pokhara. During this time Baba Yashi was nearly caught with suspicion but survived for the reason that Tibetan exiles were doing all they could do for their fellow refugee in different refugee camps in Nepal (Conboy & Morrison, 2002). Same time there were also the tensions increased along Sino-Nepalese frontier due to Khampa and Tibetan uprising. Chinese had closed the border even for grazing which was in common practice. In this growing tensions and clashes, PLA patrol used to cross the border and stormed up to Lo-Manthang with a belief that Khampas had been taking shelter. In this course, Nepalese warrant officer Bom Prasad Karki got killed and took some as prisoners. Chinese government is still paying the compensation for his collateral fatality. Retrieved from <https://www.recordnepal.com/wire/indian-checkposts-lipu-lekh-and-kalapani/>.

Baba Yashi and his team were waiting for plane ticket to leave the Nepalese Capital for Pokhara. They were fearing that Nepalese authorities might have been noticed their movement. Therefore, the team went back to India and set off for Pokhara taking shortest route via Gorakhpur to Sunauli.

The first group that left Kathmandu before Baba Yashi reached Tukuche. This place lies in the gap of the Himalayas at the height of 2300 ft. This team established secured harbor and made radio contact with Darjeeling. Upon the news of successful contact with Tukuche point Lhamo Tering and Gampo Tashi active members of Tibetan Exiled Component, started recruiting Tibetan refugees from different Indian refugee camps. This team had proposed CIA for 2100 men force. But, due to the lack of equipment and financial support CIA cut it down to 400 only (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

Lhamo Tering in-charge for this initial recruiting at Darjeeling briefed those collected recruits about their trip to Nepal and they were given only a pair of shoe and small amount of money for lodging. Very quickly news of this recruitment campaign flashed

among almost all the Tibetan camps at same time. Indian media also started scratching up the issue about this mysterious departure of Tibetan refuge out of Tibetan camps in India. Then number of Khampas increased by multiple fold when they reached Nepal. Several hundred others were on the way to Mustang. While these all covert movement were on passage Nepalese administration remained overlooked.

Temporary operating base at Tukuche was fully operational after the arrival of Baba Yashi. From this base various recce team of Khampa fighters were sent to study the geographical feasibility of location for further operation. The team later discovered that area, at Yara-Gara, close to Tibetan border. It was fertile valley with innumerable natural caves. Other two were at East of Kali Gandaki, Tangya entry point to upper Mustang and Keisang which was 6-kilometer North East from district headquarter. The last one is used for long as their operational base. Data shows that in End of 1959 Baba Yashi himself made shift his camp to Yara and spent long cold winter reorganizing his fighting forces.

## **2.8 Military Build-up and Confrontation between Khampa Fighters and PLA**

By the end of 1961, Khampas gained confidence to attack the PLA outpost on south bank of Brahmaputra. They ambushed Chinese patrol and killed Chinese thirteen security forces members at that sight then ran back to Nepalese border (Cowan, 2017). Then Chinese government declared border nearby that area is off limits for grazing which was in practice earlier. Then onwards cross-grazing culture of bordering pastureland area practiced by locals never came into effect.

Confrontation between PLA and Khampa guerillas was visibly observed more afterwards. Few influential PLA commanders also got in ambushed in counter offensive. This time Khampa guerillas collected enough tangible proof for CIA's satisfaction. They had stripped and killed PLA soldiers then took away their uniforms for evidence. Few weapons were also confiscated during these fierce clashes. Moreover, they had collected classified PLA documents revealing, structure of Chinese Paramilitary units and Sino-Soviet rivalry. These visible proofs became intelligence report to CIA to be presented at US President office. RAW also had exploited the situation feeding intelligence to their respective head (Conboy & Morrison, 2002). At this moment latest development in Operation Mustang somehow gained relevancy in

Washington's view. Tibet Task force then secured final approval for another supply drop of Hercules to accelerate the covert guerilla operation in Mustang.

## **2.9 International Platform for Vested Interest**

Entire Europe was ravaged by World War II and remained susceptible to exploitation by an external and internal communist threat. Fanned by the fear of communist expansion and rapid deterioration of European economies American Congress passed the economic co-operation act in 1948 and approved to provide special fund to rebuild Europe. This Plan was the formally called by then secretary of state George C Marshall and projected to contain the communism from the world. Before this in 1947 American President Harry S Truman introduced the doctrine that US would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from internal and external authoritarian forces. It existed long, as part of US foreign Policy. So; there onwards US assumed that communism would be its great enemy on future which constituted the newly started cold war policy of United States for long. (Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, 2006). China containment US policy dug the foundation of Khampa Insurgency since then.

China wanted to launch modernization campaign into Tibet, but held back by traditional way of their life. Monastic elite of Tibet took this as a direct threat to their traditional and religious way of life. They were also intimidated by tax system introduced by Chinese government. In time ahead more fragmented groups appeared and stood against the modernization. That time entire Tibetan history missed that opportunity while choosing the fundamental way of life. It was considered that modernization might weaken its sovereignty in future. In fact, Khampa insurgency was the main cause that let the foreign intelligence agencies to infiltrate into Tibet and paved the way for anti-communist movement for vested interest. Tibetan struggle did not start from capital city of Lasha nor from the Dalai Lama's initiative, it was waged, by the small guerilla band from isolated eastern region of Tibet called Kham and Amdo (Yulia, 2006).

In order to retaliate the Chinese incorporation campaign these guerilla fighters were first to fight back. Later this insurgency movement more organized with the support

from intelligence agencies of India, RAW and US, CIA even violating Nepalese territory.

When Tibet was in battle for its legitimate existence, all political and administrative power had been in limited reach to elite group of Lasha. Central government of China had partial control over eastern region Particularly Kham and Amdo (See the picture no. 3 of Amdo in Appendix 'C'). Then time Tibetan government headed by Dalai Lama decentralized powers to local states, where heads of feudal state-maintained monopoly of power over all local administration. This type of weak control mechanism allowed considerable autonomy for local governmental bodies. Only mode of functioning government was tribal and monastic networks. Real measurement of property was land which considered the wealth. At this situation Khampas and Amdowas were seen visibly upset when their land possession was threatened by lower class farmers and peasants. Then nomads of Kham and Amdowas turned aggressive over Lasha government. Hereditary local chiefs or monastic lords felt more superior with limited independency status (Sources). Changing political status in Kham region conserved Khampa population in distinctive position than the elite group of Lasha. Then this region didn't get afraid to stand against the PLA as they were being threatened. However, Lasha elite pushed Dalai lama towards collaboration, due to their fear of losing their property and socio-economic feudal power. This growing discontentment created void with Lasha's central mechanism and eastern Tibet, which further deteriorated badly (Conboy & Morission, 2002).

In 1950 when Dalai Lama was fifteen years old, he considered himself as an incarnation of Lord Buddha. Inner circle of monastic feuds defined him as a god rather than an effective ruler. Everyday life of the people of eastern part of the people of Tibet was rarely affected during his jurisdiction, however Buddhism and devotion to Dalai lama was always remained imperative to Khampas. The entire educational system had its basis in religion. Monasteries were built everywhere. Further it is empowered as major source of local government. During Khampa uprising tribal and monastic network exploited to relay message and seen as safe hideout for guerilla activities. Such were the environment when PLA invaded Tibet in October 1950. Then hostility and small-scale skirmishes started in various parts of Tibet (Cowan, 2014).

Actually, Khampas were strongly devoted to the Dalai Lama but paid nominal commitment to Tibetan establishment. Because of differences between two visible factions of rival, Lasha elite and Khampas Tibet faced unfavorable outcomes while Chinese troops were invading into Tibetan region. In this way none of the rebellious guerilla activities were officially supported by Dalai Lama and Lasha authorities. But, Khampas more supported and maltreated by foreign forces for their vested interest.

The Tibetan struggle for independence attracted the world's attention for different reasons. Britain, United states of America and India were in prime concern regarding their respective foreign policies towards Tibet. UN remained least bothered to their independent issue. However, US and India engaged constantly supporting this issue with whatever way possible. They had offered weapon support and safe refugee status to those Tibetan high profiles (Yulia, 2006). Chinese's takeover of Tibet questioned after almost a decade. Meantime, they closely monitored the hostile attitude of Tibetan activities searching to have good opportunity to exploit. Total political scenario of Tibet of that time opened possible passage to foreigner for infiltration, however both countries didn't commit official support to Khampa and Tibetan administration openly (Cowan, 2014).

## **2.10 CIA Support to Khampa Build-up**

Back at Tangbya, Baba Yashi's radiomen had already received the information regarding this incoming drop. According to Conboy & Morrison, almost the double of their estimated numbers 800 recruits infiltrated into Tibet by land and waited for supply drop. But reception committee designated for drop zone frustrated, by atmospheric condition of Mustang. Moreover, radio contact also gone dead. Dozen among them suffered by frostbite. Due to its large size of cargo boarded into aircraft it was divided for two Hercules transports. This drop became successful only in 2nd of April. Nick named by Sally the Tibetan Khampa member, graduate of camp Hale Colorado, was first to out from plane. All pallets drop secured quickly. As porters, Khampas recruits swarmed over the bundles and divided their loads and set off the arduous journey back to Mustang. In this operation out of 27 Trainer group who were trained in Hale, four were able to jump in 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2064. Rest 23 remained back in Colorado. Onset of monsoon prevented parachute jump then CIA intended to smuggle them through East Pakistan and let them entering via Nepalese territory on foot. Finally, by end of august

Khampa fighters made their way through East Pakistan into Mustang. By that time Yara Gara had already harbored 8 companies with 100 each having few weapons received from air drop in Tibet (Conboy & Morrison, 2002).

### **2.11 Summary of Conceptual framework**

This full-fledged Khampa insurgency tried to take different chapter but couldn't run as expected, which has taught world that; how much price to be reimbursed while engaging in unwanted interest. Khampas were supported by world power but, it was for their vested reasons. US and its allies wanted to check communism in world but rolled back with humiliation. In this purpose CIA and RAW joined. Disputed Himalayan region including Nepali border areas always remained heated with Sino Indian border conflict especially after Dalai Lama's exile from Tibet. Following the Indo-China war India initiated the forward policy placing out posts along the border. In this process Indian security posts existed in Nepal Tibet border. Taking advantage of unattained Government presence in Mustang and upper parts of Nepalese territory RAW and CIA planted this Tibetan insurgency with forward policy simply undermining the Chinese sovereignty. However, environment didn't run as per projected interest, but indifference paid to address Khampa issue in time by Chinese authority had some cost to pay either.

In 1961 when Khampa insurgency is shaping its base, it had differentiated itself from other conventional wars like conflict of Korea and World War-II. As insurgency was taking its height covert supports from CIA was more focused to sustain for their logical existence. High ambition for CIA to achieve its ultimate aim turned down right at the bottom with few Khampa fighters' fatalities.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **ROLE OF NEPALI GOVERNMENT TO CRUSH THE KHAMPA INSURGENCY IN MUSTANG**

#### **3.1 Establishment of Northern Administration Control Center**

After Dalai Lama exiled from Tibet, Khampa offensive activities became intensive, especially in Kham and Amdo region of Tibet. Different places aligning Trans-Himalayan border turned into Sanctuary for Khampa insurgents. Many clashes of CIA supported Khampas with PLA were flashed in different places of northern border in Nepal. Failure to the effective government presence in remote border areas provided ample opportunities for foreigner and Khampas to continue armed defiance against Chinese security forces. Nevertheless; fully equipped PLA with artillery and the ground forces compelling Khampa insurgents to withdraw into northern India (Mikel, 2005).

Due to lack of Nepal government's presence, existing Indian Check Post and armed Khampas had restricted normal movements for civilians. The area above Kagbeni of Mustang was declared restricted for foreign tourists and trekkers but, various suspicious movements of US related INGOs were detected. Realizing the fact that, those covert activities would become harmful to Nepal China relations, then Nepal government decided to establish effective Northern Administration Control Center to monitor the Khampa activities in the year 2022 BS.

In this run four northern administration control centers were established initially at four different places. Lungthung in Olangchunggola was the first in East, Namche in Solukhumbhu, Jomsom in Mustang and Soru in Humla (latter Mugu). Four members along with one civilian and three from retired military members comprised that administrative control center. Honorary Col. Sailendra Bhadrur Mahat was given command to Olangchunggola. Col Chakra Bahadur Bista was designated for Namche. Maj. Bhojendra Bahadur Khand was appointed in Mustang, and Jag Bahadur Budhathoki sent in Humla Soru to take command of administrative control centers. Each Command was authorized to exercise their administrative power, parallel as Chief District Officer of that particular district. The team also comprised of one police and Medical officer. Their individual task was to provide limited government services from



that outpost and show the government's presence. They were equipped with necessary communication equipment to relay the information regarding Khampa activities to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ukab, 2019).

The establishment of Northern Administration Control Center was King Mahendra's initiative which remained productive to crush this insurgency. This team also operated effectively to accomplish their implied task. Stationing of Administrative Control Center reflected government presence around that vicinity. Northern Administrative Control Centers existed until the year 1975 and closed after Ge-Wandu and his entire team eliminated by Royal Nepalese Army.

### **3.2 Contextual Motive to Crush Khampa Insurgency**

In 1976, Late King Birendra made his state visit to China, which had become detrimental flash point against the CIA/RAW supported secret Tibet Mission. Visionary King Birendra envisioned the campaign to be introduced Nepal as a zone of peace in World before his coronation. He was quite aware of the Khampa activities and China was bearing this insurgency. Immediately after his return to country he made strong determination to stamp out all the Khampa activities being conducted within the kingdom. Entire secret mission in Tibet suffered with other consequences as well like change of guard in US.

Since the beginning Nepal government had strong objection regarding Khampa settlement while Khampas were infiltrating into Nepalese border. However, the request made by Indian government to Nepalese govt left ample ground for Khampas to settle in refugee status. But the condition laid for them were badly exploited by foreign intelligence agencies taking advantage of limited government presence in that remote region. Then Khampas started building their permanent settlements and dominated Mustang area aggressively. Due to their cultural ties with locals, Khampas were better enjoying in their disguise (Hirachan, 2016, July 19).

After his arrival from China, King Birendra tasked his government to mobilize unified campaign in order to crush Khampa covert activities and chase them away from Nepalese soil. Then Nepal government decided to launch effective military operation against them. This aggressive mission took different folds once it was started. Due to

geo-climatic situation that time, campaign was launched from Mustang and finally completed at Tinker pass after the death of main Khampa leader Ge-Wandu.

### **3.3 Execution of Military Operation**

No. 3 and 4 brigade of Nepal Army were tasked to launch the offensive military operation against the Khampa insurgents. The battle group under No. 3 Brigade left Pokhara on 15<sup>th</sup> June 1974 for Mustang. The taskforce was based under Shree Nath battalion accompanying the elements of Raj Dal, Bhairab Nath, Kali Prasad, Ganesh Dal, First Rifle battalion and some elements from Indra Dhoj, Ahridaman and Chandan Nath companies. While in advance, proceeding to Mustang Indra Dhoj company served as a van guard in long difficult terrain. Start point was at Pokhara. Task force followed the route, Naudanda hill, Ghodepane, Dana, Ghansa, Lete, Marpha up to Mustang District Headquarter Jamsom.

This Mustang task force was commanded by Shree Nath Battalion Commander Sachit Sumsher Rana. They established the Temporary operating base at Jomsom around at the end of June. Task force was fully operational by first week of July, but seemed confused by political dilemma whether to launch offensive operation directly or not. Meanwhile, Khampa side too remained in muddle. Both sides were facing communication challenge with their immediate commander in their chain of Command. Nepal Army task force was asked to initiate dialogue earlier. This team also furnished with the recorded Tape of Khampa supreme leader Dalai Lama conveying the message to those Tibetan resistance fighters not to fight ahead for the sake of human blood. In his Message Khampa were requested to surrender with Nepal Government's representative there (Thakali, 2015, December 25)

Nepalese troops first sent surrender pamphlets to Khampa upon their arrival at Mustang. Realizing the fact that they would need more muscle and intelligence, Nepalese Army began mobilizing military reinforcements from Pokhara. Nepalese Army slowly started developing critical security elements along the western border with the views of impending confrontation with Khampas. Meantime, Dalai lama from Dharmasala intervened. He had sent recorded a personal plea to Khampa fighters through his channel for disarmament. It was disgusting shot for Tibetan freedom fighters. Four companies out of six did as they were instructed. One Khampa officer

shot himself in the head rather than to turn weapon to Nepalese security forces. Two hailed into freezing water of Kali Gandaki (Conboy& Morrison, 2002).

Initial task of Nepal Army was to disarm the Khampa insurgents. This team dispatched letter to Khampa leader Ge-Wandu for surrender along with recorded tape message. This time Ge-Wandu was in Keisang camp which is located at 6 km North-East of Jomsom. He was residing in his well secured bungalow with guarded sentry outpost since couple weeks before (See the picture no in appendix 'C' that shows the well secured Khampa hideouts protected with surrounded sentry posts). Ge-Wandu replied with positive notes remarking we Khampas are ready to surrender and handover the weapons. So, both teams agreed for the date June 20 for weapon handover. But Ge-Wandu sent a request to extend by few days and proposed new date for 26 June. He cited reason that he should talk with his other comrades and sub ordinates who were in other different Khampa Camps in Mustang. As the dead line was approaching Ge-Wandu demanded more additional time again with new condition to handover the weaponry except few for their personal safety on 31<sup>st</sup> July (Cowan, 2016).

As time gaining by, Ge-Wandu's intention was seen little susceptible. Then Nepal Army decided to cordon the entire Khampa Camp in Keisang by mid night of 31<sup>st</sup> July. Mean time rumor reached to Nepalese Task Force Commander Lt Col Sachit Shumsher Rana that main Khampa commander managed to flee from the Keisang Camp. At Eleventh hour before expiring deadline Wandu with his two company commanders and other forty followers unpacked their recoilless rifles and dashed for west to Lupra through Vrapasa hill. (Thakali, P.2016, Jan 17).

There after extensive search operation lunched by early dawn of 1<sup>st</sup> Aug 1974. Nepalese force surrounded the Keisang Khampa headquarter at 0300 hour of 1<sup>st</sup> August. In the Final assault, only rear party of Khampa guerillas surrendered to Nepalese forces with huge number of rifles, Bren guns, pistols, mortars, and ammunitions along with their communication equipment (See appendix 'B' for details of confiscated weapons from Khampas during Mustang operation).

This part of offensive action ended here with few Khampa surrendering and major portion of their weapons being supported by CIA confiscated. However, prime commander of Khampa, Ge-Wandu's scape from that scene made Nepal Army to

extend its area of operation further west along his probable escape route that Wandu might have taken.

### **3.4 Ge-Wandu's Successful Exit**

Ge-Wandu with 50 to 60 Khampa combatants took north west exit route from Keisang to the Vrapasa hill and walked down to Lupra Valley covertly (Thakali, C. 2016, July 25). Ultimate destination of this team was to enter India. Small band of Khampa rebels quipped with their personal weapons hit the Kagbeni first then started climbing to Chharkabhot. As they were heading further west, they had set the route plan to march through Phindubas, Se-Foksundo, Nisham, Mugu, Munchu Pass, Simikot, Yari and Tinker-Lipu Lekh. Their luck ran out with Ge-Wandu's blunder when he attempted to attack isolated Nepal Police post at Munchu in 7<sup>th</sup> of September 1974. They were successful to vandalize the post and communication equipment there but their action left the opportunity for chasing force of Nepal Army to track their possible escaping route and direction. Immediately after the Munchu attack message, quickly reported to Nepal Army Headquarter for intensive operation, then no 4 brigade at Nepalgunj tasked to carry out further offensive.

### **3.5 Ge-Wandu's Execution**

Two company commanders who were escaped with Ge-Wandu later channelized to Pokhara. However, Mustang leader remained still at escape with a band of horsemen riding west. Finally, after few days of his escaping attempt he was spotted in route to Tinker Pass. Assuming that escaping band might have destined for India, Military Headquarter tasked No.4 Brigade to cover possible passes along the North western border of the Kingdom.

Nepal Army then tasked No. 4 Brigade commander Aditya Shumsher Rana to carry out further search and destroy operation then issued task order to shoot at sight. After receiving operation task order from Military headquarter, No. 4 Brigade tasked its respective units to carry out necessary action. Chandan Nath company and Aridhaman, were in front line. It was tasked to conduct patrolling in affected areas later redeployed at Manchu Pass to block the backward movement and conducted area domination patrol. Concurrently Aridhaman Company was tasked to establish the blocking position

at four different places. At Lipu Pass there was a team of 27 personnel under command of Subedar Dan Bahadur Chand. At Tinker Pass 33 personnel were deployed under command of Captain Bhakta Bahadur Raut. Likewise, 31 personnel were sent at Kambala area and 28 personnel at Chhangu area 9<sup>th</sup> September 1974 (Conboy & Morrison, 2002). A chill foggy morning of 9<sup>th</sup> of September, early warning team of Khampa which, was tasked to dominate front road ahead got in silent caught and interrogated by Nepalese security forces on the spot. After the interrogation they came to know that main team was in just behind and would arrive this area after 3 hours. All team remained more alert. At around early afternoon of that day entire team of Ge-Wandu with his horses, mules and porters were crushed in offensive ambush. Journey of Wandu and his entire team of Khampa cadres ended before reaching their final destination. There was no one who could identify his body. Therefore, Nepal Army asked Ge-Yashi to come at sight from Kathmandu. Next day he was taken to Tinker Pass, latter he identified the body of his rival then buried right at that site (Basnyat, 2019).

PLA deployed at southern border of Tibet along Himalayan frontier was in close vicinity of Ge-Wandu's clash site and monitoring all the developing events regarding this Mustang operation. They well-read Ge-Wandu's escaping attempt. In order to check upward infiltration massive PLA movement observed in surrounding of Taklakot towards Tibetan side. Meanwhile they came to know about elimination of Wandu's convey at Tinker pass. Immediately after this confrontation Chinese authority had sent a letter of appreciation to the blockade commander for his gallantry (Panta, 2015, Nov 16). With this contribution made by Nepali government to stamp out Tibetan Khampa Insurgency had played significant roles to strengthen the diplomatic relation with northern Neighbor.

### **3.6 Post Keisang Operation**

Follow up operation by Royal Nepalese Army marching along the east bank of the Kali Gandaki eventually reached Tyangbya at mid of August. Few Khampas remaining in different camps surrendered without fighting. New types of weapons also appeared to be counted at Nepal Army side. No bullet fire recorded afterward, but two of Nepal Army soldier succumbed to altitude sickness. Then Nepal Army learnt the urgency of High-Altitude Mountain Training School. (See appendix C picture 11 of war memorial

at Pokhara made by Shree Nath Battalion for their gallantry during Khampa operation in Mustang). Locals of Mustang also demanded for permanent military base at Mustang. (Hirachan, 2016, July 19). As a result of these consequences Khampa guerillas Headquarters at Keisang turned into High Altitude Mountain Warfare School of Royal Nepalese Army.

After Wandu's elimination Indian SFF unit deployed near at Nepal border to assist safe passage for Wandu pulled back immediately fearing that SFF might stage reprisal forays against Royal Nepalese Army. It is also noticed that Indian security team with helicopter to assist Wandu returned with empty hand.

Back in Kathmandu at the conclusion ceremony of Mustang Operation King Birendra awarded medals certificates and cash to participants. Main commander of Tinker pass was elevated one level up to subedar. A tent display with confiscated items during this Mustang operation was unveiled at Tundikhel after Wandu's execution (Basnyat, 2019).

of future of ex-Khampa guerillas some were taken to temporary rfugee settlement at Pokhara. Nearly half of those left for India. Various other places of Kingdom, selected for Khampa refugee settlement with the help of United Nations. Later some of those were given permanent nationality of Nepal.

Among all the veterans involved in Khampa insurgency main leader Ge-Yashi became winner. He was offered with house in Kathmandu and retreated well, then apparently received forgiveness in one of the audiences with his supreme leader Dalai Lama in 1991 for his action against Wandu and Khampa guerilla band (Hirachan, 2016, July 19).

### **3.7 Causes of Failure of Khampa Insurgency**

Main cause of failure of this US designed Tibetan mission was personality clash of two main Khampa leaders Ge-Wandu and Ge-Yashi. Signs of discord over Ge-Yashi were observed dated back to 1962, when he reduced food supplies issued to individuals supported by CIA. Consequences of financial mismanagement by their Mustang chieftain reflected as rustling of Yak and goats at Nepal-Tibet border both sides. As a

chieftain who was responsible to control their misdeed turned his eyes blind. This had raised great question over Hale trained cadre violating direct instructions not to disturb normal livelihood of local inhabitants. This had contributed negative impacts to Khampa activities and Ge-Yashi's chain of command. Later in 1967 his entire financial audit demanded (Thakali, 2016, July 19). Almost all the radio team commander placed in different camps turned negative to him. A year after word of complaints were received back to Mustang. Then he started becoming receptive than earlier however, with the fear of having strong coup against him by his subordinates, he maintained his chieftain anyway.

After the audio message to submission from Dalai Lama, Wandu was hurt gravely. Decision of closing down the Mustang Project also had socked him. Then he started defying orders even from Dalai Lama and retained 6 companies of about 600 men under his command. He had survived with extra money which had been saved last few years. Worst of all, not a single weapon had been handed back to Royal Nepalese Army except in Keisang insurrection where insurgents were forced to surrender (Hirachan, 2016).

A new set of new geopolitical realities were also conspiring against the Tibetan insurgents. Following current diplomatic development Wandu's residual force at Mustang started isolating by early fall of 1974. Local population of Mustang started turning against them. Land owner of Keisang which was confiscated previous year by Khampa insurgents pressured them for compensation. Store and grinding facility offered by Thini villages (*Village located at 3 km North East of Jomsom*) denied them to utilize further. Khampas were being charged with cattle rustling and rape cases. This was a total scenario when then Royal Nepal Army was there in offensive operation (Hirachan, 2016).

Mustang's previous Chieftain Baba Yashi was in home retreat at Kathmandu from early 1970, yet maintaining intermittent contact with a small band of his loyalist in different Camps of Mustang. Moreover, he had also been in touch with Nepalese government forces and offered them covert assistance during the confrontation with his rival. He had been conveying substantial classified information to Nepalese security forces, which made security task force to move ahead effectively (Panta, 2015, Nov 16).

### **3.8 Mal-Treatment of Khampa Insurgents by RAW**

Special frontier force (SFF) began its operation 'EAGLE' at beginning of September 1971 in East Pakistan, which was specially designed to disintegrate the Pakistani sovereignty. Primary intent was to create new nation Bangladesh. Innocent Khampa fighters recruited for Tibetan issues then started getting exploited for Bangladeshi campaign. Few Bangladeshi unsatisfied youths along with Khampa fighters led by SFF Commander conducted offensive strike and overran some of the isolated-out posts. This offensive spirit of the team was seen uncontrolled for the time being. On 14<sup>th</sup> November 1971 the lead element lead by cousin of Ge-Wandu while returning to Indian border got into counter ambush of Pakistani forces (Conboy& Morrison, 2002). A Hale graduate and senior political leader of Khampa insurgent got killed for the differently vested cause.

By the end of November 1971 all-out war was declared in East Pakistan. Entire SFF team inside East Pakistan was supported by Indian security forces. The operation went by more aggressive than ever. Insurgents pinned down the Pakistani brigade deployed at Chittagong Port. In this victory few Indian officers and Tibetans were awarded for their gallantry. Tibetan Khampas were more blessed with cash bonus. Forty-nine Tibetans sacrificed their lives for the birth of a new country in south Asia which, was not their own (Rizwana, 2017).

Fallout of the operation Eagle came into ground with mutual furor between CIA and RAW over the issue of Tibetan Khampa insurgents participating in operation Eagle. Special Center of joint operating base at Delhi lost all financial, official and advisory support from CIA. Especially RAW faced official protest over this issue (Conboy& Morrison, 2002).

Dharmasala along with RAW were also confronting mounting criticism from allying partners. Furthermore, Tibetan refugee community who were having peaceful life at different parts of globe raised protest against operation Eagle. Ill intention of mobilization of Khampa guerillas by RAW now forced CIA to demobilize those fighters. US government then started seeking to rehabilitate them peacefully. Bilateral ties between two intelligence agencies were never improved during Nixon 'presidency, rather India came on suspicion that why all US support was diverting to Pakistan. In this way later parts of CIA/RAW collaboration for Khampa insurgency rolled back.



### 3.9 Game Change

Tibetan Khampa issue was in consideration during President Eisenhower's tenure (1953-61) when, foundation of this guerilla war was set to counter the Chinese communist expansion. CIA always hesitated to take permission for supply drop as they planned earlier due to prohibition against over flights following U-2 affair in Russian border (US U-2 spy plane was shot down by the Soviet Air Defense forces while performing photographic aerial reconnaissance of military bases deep into Soviet territory (Pocock, 2000). After the President Kennedy assumed presidency, Khampa issue had taken another flip. Kennedy administration even divided into two sects over the issue whether Mustang plan should continue or not. President thought that his predecessor had all but lost India while Cultivating Pakistan (ibid). In this pretext, supporting Tibet operation especially Mustang component meant harm to Indo-U.S. relations. They had to violate Indian air space to conduct covert operation at Tibet. Crossing Nepalese airspace was in great question too. Despite the relevancy to have joint efforts regarding Tibet operation, Indian leadership seemed more willing to turn blind eyes on CIA's secret collaboration with Khampa guerillas afterwards.

US President Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972. However, this visit was not directly linked with Mustang operation but resulted, to normalize diplomatic ties with PRC. Then entire US administration contained in least bothering mood to continue covert operation in Mustang.

In 1960 head of intelligence agencies of India B.N. Mullick and CIA's chief of operation Richard Helms had met discreetly during an Interpol conference in Hawaii. Outcome of this secret meeting U.S. over flights over India resumed. Anti-CIA slant was seen little quiet. Tibetan Task force started using Indian and East Pakistani airspace as well regularly.

At second week of March 1961 finally President Kennedy approved an initial supply drop to Mustang. Total of 29000 Pounds of arms and ammunition for 400 Khampas. US army C-130 Hercules plane carrying few bolt action Springfield rifles, Bren light machine guns and carbine including seven Hale graduate Khampas flew to Okinawa and waited for better weather condition about a week (Conboy& Morrison, 2002).

### 3.10 Leadership Crisis

Khampas were somehow gaining success in small-scale offensive hit and run attack against PLA, but were indulged in leadership crisis since from beginning. In 1961 first group of Khampa insurgency were in training at camp Hale in Colorado. After the graduation they were briefed on future mission to Mustang. Among those recruit a forty-year-old Lobsang Jampa nick named by Sally impressed the CIA instructor much. They revised their plan that he would be parachuted into Mustang and assume the role of field commander. Baba Yashi who was commanding guerilla at Mustang meanwhile would be relegated to look after administrative issues at their rear bases (Conboy& Morrison, 2002). Probably this was the serious blunder they made while raising this insurgency into the successful height. Here, at operating base of Yara, Baba Yashi was totally unaware with the latest development regarding new leadership. His efforts were concentrated to arrange enough food stock (Hirachan, 2016, July 19). Previous year in 1960 when they shifted their camp from Tukuche to Yara none of them brought food but, little cash to purchase basic essentials. As time passed by numbers of Khampa guerillas puffed-up at Yara and two other bases faced extreme food shortages. (See the appendix 'C' pic no. showing different Khampa locations in Mustang) Shortly after this situation Khampas who had close cultural ties with Mustang population started their aggressive move in search of food essentials.

From mid-April 1961 onwards crisis of confidence between two leaders bubbled seriously. Their infighting seen at every action on ground. As per the CIA's plan Hale graduates, 8 of those appointed as a Company Commanders rest acted as trainers and influential headquarter staffs. In contrast to promising start, Baba Yashi had not responded well to CIA's plan. Defying the orders from higher formation, he established alternative chain of command. His maneuvering was to take total control of both administration and field operation. As crisis on command disrupted Khampa guerillas engaged randomly in unwanted activities. Several were caught stealing animals and jewelry on the Chinese side of the border further. Its effect spilled down to the Mustang local community (Thakali, 2015, December 25). Young Khampas with CIA supported 400 weapons started patrolling haphazardly around Mustang. CIA couriered cash increased their buying capacity and they were also free to purchase their need especially horses in Mustang. While patrolling at Mustang Khampa youth started engaging

looting and raping Thakali girls at Jomsom and Thini areas. Hostility between two leaders let other cadres becoming more uncontrolled. Divided sects of fighters engaged in plotting against each other. Their classified detail plan and activities leaked to Nepal government aimlessly (Sherchan, 2016, Jan 17).

### **3.11 Summary of Chapter III**

Nepalese land became fertile recruiting ground to harbor Tibetan insurgents for several reasons. First, it was only nation to maintain a trade mission and consulate general in Lasha that time. Second; Nepalese capital, Kathmandu, was full of Tibetan ethnic communities who had opted for Nepalese citizenship after political turmoil at Tibet in 1959. Finally, China had decreed that those Tibetans who were holding Nepalese Passport are allowed to visit their friends and family or conduct business in Tibet once a year. Exploiting these advantages to mobilize Khampa insurgents, US intelligence agency CIA recruited a Nepalese trader who had good contacts at the Nepalese mission in Lasha. Lack of effective administrative control and monitoring mechanism over government components at remote areas of Mustang served for easy access to build foreign vested interest. Later in history decades of political instability in Nepal down played the Nepal-China mutual trust into doubt for mutual security concerns. Nepal is still facing implication of political wavering by India after the Khampa elimination.

Tibetan Khampa were recruited in India first. Most of them were working in road building camp in different places of India. Some were assembled from different refugee camps like Darjeeling-Kalimpong, Bomdila, Misamari and Mussoorie. All those recruited youths had been part of Khampa guerilla band inside Tibet which had been formed before Dalai Lama's exile. Main purpose of this was to fight against PLA. A team comprised with Indian intelligence bureau and Indian air force was sent to Washington in mid-March 1963 to be the cadre for the covert airlift cell. After three months they were escorted back to Indian airborne school at Agra and training site at Chakrata, where Nepalese Maoist had also been trained by Indian security forces during Maoist insurgency in Nepal.



## **CHAPTER IV**

### **IMPLICATIONS OF KHAMPA OPERATION TO NEPAL GOVERNMENT**

#### **4.1 Basic Foundation of Nepal- China Relation**

First time after II World War in December 1946 a Chinese goodwill entourage was received in Kathmandu. Next it was reciprocated with the discussion of availability of diplomatic relation. Nothing materialized significantly, yet China and Tibet both were referred to as Nepal's friendly neighbors (14) foreign policy of Nepal.

On August 1955 Nepal had established diplomatic relationship with People's Republic of China officially and exchanged residential ambassadors from 1960. Since then Nepal had supported Chinese interest always in international arena. Both countries remain ideal neighbor, intimate friend and reliable partners. Nepal also has realized reflection of its implications in time of dire need. The treaty of friendship signed at 1960 had set clear boundary and settlement agreement, unlike Nepal facing complicated border dispute with southern neighbor. During the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Nepal had maintained neutrality. Since then Nepalese sovereignty has maintained mutual support with our neighbors. Since 1975, Nepal has upheld a policy of neutrality, while dealing competing influence of China and India (INHURED, 2016).

Important footing of Nepal-China relation is Sino-Nepal Treaty of peace and friendship signed on 28 April 1960 by two countries. Relations between two countries empowered when both stood unified to solve all the border disputes by signing Sino-Nepal boundary agreement on March 21, 1960. This had been ratified on 5 October, 1961. Nepal Government had demonstrated its commitment in 1974, during Khampa operation. Efforts contributed to stamp out Khampa Insurgency in Nepalese soil had paved extra miles for Nepal-China diplomatic relations.

#### **4.2 Proposal of King Birendra, Nepal As a Zone of Peace**

Treaty of Peace and friendship was signed on 31 July 1950 between Nepal and India while Rana rulers were in power. Exploiting by feudally hanged political situation of Nepal, Indian leaders began to reconsider their northern defensive frontiers lay in mountains of the Himalayas. This treaty defines neither government shall to pose any threat for other by a foreign aggressor. It never became compatible to Indian leaders. Though, they pretended to uphold the special relationship with Nepal, yet tend to put us under their direct influence. After Khampa operation, unstable political setting in Nepal has always been in Indian initiative. As a result, Indian military mission and its advisory group reorganized then deployed five intelligence posts along the Nepal Tibet border till 1974.

China viewed this kind of development in central Himalayas differently. Indo-China war of 1962 and 64 had laid susceptible ground over Indian ambition and its influence over Nepal which had been playing strategic security roles between two countries.

Considering the facts that Nepal never can play with giant neighbors, Late King Birendra had proposed Nepal be declared as a zone of peace. The concept was first mooted in 1973 at the non-align summit at Algiers. It was King Birendra who forwarded the idea on the coronation his juncture held in Kathmandu, on 25<sup>th</sup> February, 1975 (Sharma, 2006: 239). The main theme of declaring Nepal as 'Zone of Peace' was to maintain neutrality in all possible regional conflicts and also ensure domestic political stability and economic development. It was also the concept introduced as the outcome of the event introduced in the neighborhood. India's assertion of its position following its policy tilt to the Soviet Union in 1971. India's role to divide Pakistan, annexation of Sikkim and nuclear test of 1974 inspired Nepal to introduce this concept (Dahal, 2011:14). Beside these the Khampa issue in northern border of Nepal was more responsible behind the emergence of this proposal (Sangroula, 1989:46). The proposal itself was neither agreement nor treaty; it was just a proposal that implies Nepal will never allow any nation to use its territory against the interest of any other foreign nations. The proposal had been endorsed by 116 countries but could not be materialized as proposal is yet not welcomed by India, immediate southern neighbor. US and India were prime actors to bother Nepalese internal defense using Khampa insurgents in order to check the communist expansion in China.

Then Nepal's relation with India continued to be plagued more when Nepal protested the Sikkim affair in 1974 (Sunanda, 1984). Whereas China Nepal's relation continued to be warm with visits of high-level delegation to both countries. Nepal strongly adopted one China Policy, in return China always stood with Nepal in time of need especially during the time of economic blocked imposed by southern neighbor.

In 1972, after King Birendra's accession to the throne he appointed highly educated and nationalist elite as his advisers. King himself was well educated fellow graduated from US, Tokyo and India. He emphasized on political discipline efficient administration and economic development in his entire tenure with a view to maintain the equidistance between India and China. He had retained this basic tenet for foreign policy which always irked India.

Since 1976, when Nepalese Government eliminated Khampa Insurgency in Mustang, India started manipulating by closing the trade and transit points citing the reason of Expiry of agreement. But Nepalese history had witnessed, when similar situation had occurred in 1971 India continued supplying basic commodities to Nepal. The hardship due to closure of trade and transit points rested on King's responsibility. Miseries faced due to this 18-month blockade translated into the reason for a mass movement for democracy and multiparty system in 1990. Political opponents of King in Nepal were instigated by India. Main political turmoil started in Nepal subsequently.

In 1990, India had offered (Then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi) a platform to unite Nepal's main political rivals mainly Nepali Congress and Communist group to launch movement for democracy. In between the blockade and the united mass movement of political parties of Nepal, India had proposed if the King of Nepal was willing to have Nepal under India's security umbrella like Bhutan (Ghimire, 2017). King Birendra's response came out differently. He turned down the Indian proposal expressing that he would not do anything that is in contradiction of the Nepalese interest (Subedi, 2016).

King Birendra's balanced foreign policy pronouncements were considered not in the India's favor. As a result, India infiltrated into internal politics for micro management and supported opposition to destabilize the law and order situation in Nepal. In 1971 supreme leader of Nepali congress Bisheswor Prasad Koirala threatened to instigate armed insurrection against King's regime. This was interpreted as an Indian support to

political opponents against regime's interest. Like this few incidents made Nepal to suspect India's involvement in supporting political opponents. In August 1972 armed Nepali Congress cadres from Indian territory attacked police substation at Haripur Sarlahi. In June 1973, a plane of Royal Nepal Airlines carrying money belonging to Nepal's state bank was hijacked and taken to Gorakhpur. In December 1974 Royal Nepal Army encountered in Okhaldhunga with NC cadre led by rebelled captain of Army Yegya Bahadur Thapa. In all these incidents India was alleged to be involved, providing safe sanctuary for NC workers in India. In order to empower political opponent of Nepalese ruling elite it raised various anti-actors to play with its vested interest. Every event that designed by Indian foreign policy then seemed furnished with revenge motives in return of Khampa suppression by Nepalese government.

The anti-monarchical activities from the Indian Territory and Indian indifference to prevent them were the source of insecurity to Nepal. Despite these activities Nepalese fear more exacerbated over the integration of Himalayan Kingdom Sikkim into Indian Union (Sunanda, 1984).

Since Indo-Pak war, India was emerged as a regional power following its military victory. Then India started supporting Mukti Bahini with a view to create new state Bangladesh. In 1975 Sikkim was taken over (Sunanda, 1984). Onwards, Indian expansionism was terrorizing the neighboring states. Undermining the Nepalese sovereignty, India shifted its focus on Indo-Nepal border to Nepal Tibet border at north however; Nepal had always maintained balanced relation with neighbors and never let other countries to misjudge the importance of geo-strategic location of Nepal against each other's security interest. Removing US and Indian sponsored, Khampa guerilla band from Nepal established major barricade to accept zone of peace proposal.

Center of gravity regarding zone of peace proposal lies on the point that says no hostile activity would take place by any countries against Nepal nor we do let to carry out hostile activities against another country from Nepalese territory. Validating this was directly related to Indian expansionism. It might have raised question to Indian superiority in south Asian region too. But for Nepal there is no reason to suppose that Nepal's geo political importance in India is greater than it is to China. Though Nepal was careful in not directing the proposal against any of its neighbors, but India refrained to adopt it and forced Nepal to roll back.



### **4.3 International Response to Zone of Peace Proposal**

Zone of peace proposal had been in process for long time in King Birendra's tenure. His diplomatic efforts to get through this proposal was commendable in Nepalese diplomatic history to pursue however, big Boss attitude of India influenced with colonial legacy played important role to nip down. This issue had been discussed with UN secretary General KURT WALDHEIRO on 13 Feb 1981, (Khanal, 1996) but he asked Nepal to get neighboring support indicating India importantly. Response from US and USSR came as non-committal way. Neither they rejected the proposal, nor supported openly. France responded in a similar way. Their reluctance was directing to encourage Nepal to work closely with its neighbor India. Firm dedication of Nepal not to let hostile activities against neighboring countries using its territory had levelled negative connotation to Indian future collaboration with other foreign countries for vested interest. China and other 116 countries of the world firmly supported the proposal declaring Nepal as a Zone of peace in may 1976, almost immediately after this proposal came out to the public except Indian and its western allies (Sharma, 2004).

### **4.4 The Indian Response**

All the countries in South Asia, with the exception of Bhutan and India, had endorsed Nepal's Zone of Peace proposal just before it was tendered to world community. That time Nepal Government had just completed Mustang Operation where CIA/RAW sponsored Khampa insurgents from Northern border were eliminated. Likewise, it also had demonstrated its firm stand to the world especially for India Nepalese commitment to non-alignment movement. By this time effort made by Nepal Government had challenged all the covert and hostile activities targeting another neighbor China using Nepali territory. In this way change in the direction of Nepalese policy pronounced via zone of peace proposal seemed as ambiguous to India. Then they blamed the proposal was lacking clarity then asked for more clarification from Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. India also blamed that Nepal had certain other objectives (Muni, 2016:23-25). Again, in the Big Boss mindset India rejected the zone of peace proposal. Instead of accepting this proposal India desired entire area which India and Nepal belong to become one. Nepal then had considered this Indian attitude as hegemonic, connecting the event of integration of Sikkim into Indian Union. But unfortunately none of our

political leaders seen true nationalist to remain united, rather they leaned with India for their political survival.

Entire decade of seventies witnessed significant changes in pattern of power equation in the World especially in South Asian region. One moment brought India and Pakistan to the brink of open conflict leading to full-fledged war. There emerged new nation Bangladesh and Sikkim integrated. India established herself as a dominant power in South Asia. India's role in the liberation war in Bangladesh and undertaking Sikkim were critically reviewed by our visionary late King Mahendra and his son late King Birendra both. Foreseeing the possibilities of Indian and US bonding to foster Tibetan Khampa Insurgency for anti-communist move, Nepal decided to stamp out this insurgency right at the bottom.

#### **4.5 Arm Purchase**

During Panchayat era, King had courageously maneuvered using China as term card visa Vis India. Late King Birendra dared to violate somehow 1950 treaty and made agreement via defense deal in 1965 (Graver, 1991). Chinese arms support to Nepal in 1988, considered friendship benefit after Nepal scaled full-fledged military sweep operation against CIA and RAW sponsored Khampa Insurgency in Mustang. The arms deal between Nepal and China included military hardware like, anti-aircraft guns and some anti-tank rocket launcher besides its trainings that were supposed to be conducted by People's liberation Army (PLA) had become major objections for India.

India has been the primary supplier of arms to Nepal since long in history. Pursuing this Nepal had handed over list of defense stores requesting infantry weapons along with anti-aircraft guns in 1975 and 1978 to India (Singh, P. 2016 Jan 3). This had been delayed by decade citing the reason that Nepal was not clear to place its demand and mode of payments. Nepalese expectations of desired arms especially anti-aircraft guns were further brushed by India stating that it was not necessary.

The need of these anti-aircraft gun was realized during Khampa cleansing operation when Indian SFF in conjunction with CIA were dropping weapons ammunitions and administrative requirements for Khampa insurgents in upper parts of Mustang near Tibetan border. At this end Nepal approached China for Arms in march 1988 when

India turned blind eyes for Nepalese arms demand. Diplomatic and strategic concerns between Nepal and India further eroded when India imposed 18 months economic embargo in Nepal as the consequences of arms deal with China. Furthermore, Nepal started accepting Chinese bid to construct highways and other developmental infrastructure in Tarai close to Indian border.

In eighties China emerged as main exporter of arms in the region. Inherited rival of India; Pakistan and new nation Bangladesh also started purchasing major military hardware from China. In between Indo-China rivalry Chinese military superiority became major subject which had irritated Indian security concerns mostly in later half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In this pretext Nepal's arms and ammunitions purchase deal from China distressed India badly.

In fact, outdated military weapons that Nepal was to buy from China wouldn't pose any threat to India however, military friendship built between Nepal and China, in the future would be more detrimental to Indian security threat. Indian observation was, that could be the beginning of sophisticated Chinese arms supply to Nepal. Increasing military relationship of Nepal with India's political adversaries endured unacceptable to Indian security interest.

India tried its level best to restrain Nepal buying weapons from China then asked with the King, for assurance, this was one-time affair. But it was instantly refused by late King Birendra, insisting that purchasing arms and ammunitions to defend state is sovereign and independent right. Procurement of anti-aircraft guns, keeping India in dark had hit the center stage during this entire arms deal (INSEC & DFHRI, 2016).

Nepalese concern to have anti-aircraft weapon was directly noting to check future covert airdrop operation as they had in Khampa Insurgency earlier. Whereas, Indian concern to refrain Nepal to have these types of weapons was to limit Nepal for anti-aircraft activities.

Nepal's decision to purchase arms and ammunition including anti-aircraft guns was guided more by late King Birendra's desire to assert its independency and sovereignty in the region. Furthermore, it was intended to identify King's administrative show off to pro-democratic movement which was against the King's rule and instigated by India.

As a matter of fact, Khampa Insurgency was not in grand scale but the impacts it after it had crushed, shattered hegemonic adventure of Indo-US bonding at least .

#### **4.6 Socio Economic Implications to Nepal**

Indian unofficial or undeclared embargo over Nepal in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century was terrible diplomatic move to bargain for Indian favor, starting from 1970 when Nepalese government about to blow Khampas. Almost all the blockades had led to severe humanitarian crisis in Nepal. Nepal as a landlocked country in the world was severely hit by Indian economic hegemony and this type of blockade had always been in practices whenever, India needed to treat Nepal negatively thinking that it did not pay their favor.

Nepal is an important commercial point for both India and China however, close tie with India from socio-cultural perspective kept India closer than China geographically and linguistically. India along with western allies had taken Khampa issue to check the Chinese communism for further expansion. In Nepalese history rulers of Nepal also tried to influence China more against India especially at a time of crisis but China always maintained its neutrality to other countries' internal issues. Nevertheless, in order to repay Nepalese contribution while brushing western sponsored Khampa Insurgency from Tibetan border, China stood at Nepalese favor to relieve the economic hardship. On the other hand while southern alley was kicking its goal, Nepal was always influenced by conspiracy theory and that resulted our political stability weaker as days passed by (Basnyat, 2016).

Ironically Nepal India tie is very strong from social cultural, geographical, political and linguistic perspective, however Nepal had difficult time while dealing with Indian embargo. Humanitarian crisis created by Indian blockade in 1915 directly served to hurt Nepali people who were still recovering from devastating earthquake. Since 1970 whenever Nepal government refused to go Indian favor, India had imposed border blockade for four times 1969, 1989, and 2015 (Dahal, 2018:159-191).

#### **4.7 Chronology of Indian Blockade**

The obstructions started in 1969 and 70. For the first obstruction in 1969, India had put the reason that it was because of expiration of 1960 trade and transit treaty. In order to return this Indian diplomatic move, Nepal signaled China to build the Araniko highway linking Kathmandu with China and opened Tatopani transit as a main trade point. This diplomatic maneuver of Nepal Government gained extra miles to check unwanted activities in Nepal but was severely hit by western strategic move using Nepalese territory.

India and Nepal both attempted to maneuver at their best. In this pretext Nepalese move to buy Chinese weaponry including anti-aircraft guns took center stage of debate in 1989. In a counter move India imposed 15 months long embargo which had created shortages of essential commodities like food product, salt, oil, and supply of petroleum products. This type of economic impasse spanned over decades with multiple instances of frictions. All these were seen especially after the Khampa operation from Mustang. Anti-aircraft gun bought from China was the significant objection for India. Main idea to have anti-aircraft weapons for Nepalese security dynamics was lesson, drawn from Khampa operation and justified with important to counter the undesirable air operation (Conboy & Morison, 2002).

Most inhumane practice of economic blockade so far was seen in 2015. During the very difficult time of the mega earthquake of April 2015 followed by aftershocks, India imposed an economic blockade against Nepal. Unlike China India wanted to adjust Nepalese internal issues from distance raising the issue of Madhesis who have age old affinities and relationship with India. It had carried old grievances of Terai based political leader's conception being ignored by the dominant hill tribe. They were in struggle to have larger socio-political space under the new constitution. Madhesi centric political parties together with Janajati and so-called marginalized minority communities were on agitation for proportional representation under new constitution and even autonomy for the province.

For this internal issue India played a big brother role and even intervened in socio-cultural management. State of confusion reached at its highest level in the history of Indo-Nepalese relationship since 1950. This blockade had puzzled more, while people of Terai supported this blockade (Ghimire, 2017). Blockade and humanitarian crisis had meant Nepal to seek long term alternative investment from its other neighbor

China. Then situation came to return the gift that had been presented by the Nepalese government during Khampa elimination.

#### **4.8 Summary**

Whatever the reasons for economic blockade over Nepal by India, almost all had become counter Productive to India itself. Nepal-India relation are over shadowed many times by personalized politics and short-term gains. New Delhi is the one who has lost credibility more and Nepal is facing severe humanitarian crisis time and again. History of bilateral relationship between two countries is getting worse because of lack of trust and mutual co-operation which was fueled since Khampa period.

Nepalese land became fertile recruiting ground to harbor Tibetan insurgents for several reasons. First, it was only nation to maintain a trade mission and consulate general in Lasha that time. Second, Nepalese capital, Kathmandu, was full of Tibetan ethnic communities who had opted for Nepalese citizenship after political turmoil at Tibet in 1959. Finally, China had decreed that those Tibetans who were holding Nepalese passport were allowed to visit their friends and family or conduct business in Tibet once a year. Exploiting these advantages to mobilize Khampa insurgents, US intelligence agency CIA recruited a Nepalese trader who had good contacts at the Nepalese mission in Lasha. Lack of effective administrative control and monitoring mechanism over government components at remote areas of Mustang served for easy access to build foreign vested interest. Later in history decades of political instability in Nepal down played the Nepal-China mutual trust into doubt for mutual security concerns. Nepal is still facing implication of political wavering by India after the Khampas were eliminated by Nepali Army.

## **CHAPTER V**

## **CONCLUSION**

## 5.1 Major Findings and Lessons from this Proxy War

After 1959, during Tibetan uprising Nepal had been allowing the inflow of Tibetan refugees into various parts of the country. Tibetan guerilla fighters were mobilized by westerner to destabilize the Chinese control over Tibetan territory. It was sovereign question for Nepalese authority not to permit its' soil for guerilla hide outs. Therefore, to this end Nepal Army was called to disarm the armed Khampa guerillas operating in Nepal.

In order to fuel the Khampa Insurgency Tibet joint Task force selected Khampa recruits on the ground and took them for training in US and different places of Indian security camps. After graduation they were employed for small scale offensive operation against Chinese administration in Tibet. India established different Tibetan refugee settlement in various parts of its territory for their support. In this run Nepal also harbored some Tibetan refugee camps in different parts of country. Actually, it was asked by Indian administration. As per international rules and regulations all those who were eligible, given refugee status. After the mission rolled with huge failure, as part of US rehabilitation plan remnants of Khampa insurgents were allowed to establish settlement camps all around Nepal. Further the Tibetans who were exiled from Tibet during this insurgency period established the exiled government in Dharmashala and given autonomous status for international recognition by India and its western allies.

5.1.1 CIA's secret involvement in Khampa issue in conjunction with RAW to check Chinese communism in South Asian region, was lucky investment which didn't produce harm like Vietnam. Great power policy during cold war era was to compete with peer state adversaries by proxy employment. US initiative to support anti-Chinese resistance in Tibet from 1956 to 1974 might have accomplished the limited objective of disrupting Chinese ambitions of communist expansion, however endeavor came at the expense of 37 Tibetan casualties killed out of 49 agents dropped into Tibet by parachute since 1957 to 1974 (Conboy & Morison, 2002). Furthermore, main commander Ge-Wandu sacrificed his life in offensive ambush with Nepal Army at Tinker pass of Nepal. These reasons made them failed to achieve the main objective of independent Tibet. The first lesson from US China Proxy Competition in Khampa issue draws

attention to sponsor that not to deviate from proper goal and undermine the each other's sovereignty.

5.1.2 Tibetan proxies established the contact with Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thundup in Calcutta on 1956 (Knaus, 1999). This was inspired by the outcomes of failure of acceptable peace negotiation between Dalai Lama and PRC representatives. Meanwhile, India also joined hands with US to counter the immediate proxy. Indo-US bonding served as sponsor and provided sanctuary for Tibetan government in-exile. This Mechanism also managed a platform for guerilla training aiming to unified 5000 volunteers with the purpose of independent Tibet. The establishment of combined operation center in New Delhi in 1964 formalized Indo-US relationship towards the Tibetan co-operation. As time passed Indian influence dominated subsequently over operation. Indo US relation started deteriorating from mid-1965's and became more suspicious in 1971 when India used Khampa fighters to liberate east Pakistan. So, second lesson learned from this Khampa operation is using intermediaries will always reduce sponsor's control and create distance to achieve the ultimate aim.

5.1.3 Entire CIA mission attributed the overall failures due to several factors. Commander to lead the cadre didn't listen to advice from the field and continued to engage with Chinese frontal assaults. Resistance itself had no choices except to operate infertile country side where it resided. There was no communication among different operating guerilla bands to synchronize their efforts. Finally, clash between two main commanders Ge-Wandu and Ge-Yashi visibly disappointed their cadre on the ground. These subsequent losses forced CIA to re-evaluate its overall strategy for Tibetan support. Lesson to embed with this failure is, advisors may reduce the control over the proxy if they are controlled from distance.

**5.1.4** Geo-political location of Nepal between two giants of Asia is paramount for our neighbors. This has been realized in Indo-China conventional battle of 1962 and 64. Indian Military polity roamed around British colonial legacy which led to confrontation with China and got tested its military capability with defeat in first two major wars of 1962 and 64. In this context India along with US intelligence agency was lined up to wage intermittent insurgency to subvert the Chinese control



over Tibet. During this course, Nepalese soil have been exploited by foreign operator covertly for their vested interest. There is no doubt that Nepal lacks clarity and consistency in its behavior and approaches towards neighboring countries. There have been allegations by India for Nepal that being proactive to play China card against India. But in Indo-Nepal bilateral history, it is also the fact that Indian means, applying to counter the Nepalese maneuver like economic blockade becoming counterproductive to India.

**5.1.5** This particular Khampa Insurgency was perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre 1949 status quo at Tibet. What we know for certain is that the CIA/RAW sponsored Khampa Insurgency in Mustang started from principal of anti-communist conspiracy. Worldwide communist expansionism was becoming undesirably burdensome for democratic block during cold war era. Almost all endeavors conducted by westerners in Mustang engineered to their own advantage, but became counterproductive.

**5.1.6** In order to stamp out this Insurgency Nepal government had ordered Nepal Army to launch military offensive. This entire military operation concluded with grand victory, where main leader of Khampa and his team were eliminated. Contributions waged by Nepal government in this regard, not only had determined Nepal-China bilateral relationship it also had become term card as it alleged by India in time of dire need when our India disdained our fundamental rights. Unlike Indian foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy non-interference had become more supportive for political stability in Nepal.

**5.1.7** Notable point, regarding this Khampa Insurgency; unlike Nepal and other refugee hosting countries, India did not adopt the policy of integrating Tibetan refugee into main stream Indian society. Rather, it facilitated, preserved and promoted their distinctive culture, tradition and identity by setting up separate Tibetan settlement and offered independent status for Tibetan government in exile. This led the entire Tibetans youth generations facing difficulties to travel aboard for study, visiting relatives and other social engagements. Foreign vested interest over this Khampa uprising obstructed with state lessness status for Tibetan refugee communities which disqualifies them from job opportunities even in India. Whole movement of this

insurgency derailed at one point when Nepal Government stamped out Khampas from Mustang and its western border.

#### **5.1.8 Establishment of High-Altitude Mountain Warfare Training School (HAMWS)**

The history of HAMWS is dated back to 1974, when Nepal Army (NA) mobilized its personnel to stamp out the Khampa insurgency in Mustang. Nepal government had realized its importance during this offensive operation after two army soldiers died due to high altitude sickness in Tyanbya 23 KM north of Jomsom. Army team was there to conduct extensive search operation after main Khampa Commander Ge-Wandu escaped from Khampa camp of Keisang. This operation in fact tested operational competence of Nepalese Army and its operation readiness in high-altitude then necessitated the establishment of a training institute. Contribution of Nepal government to crush this insurgency and Nepal Army's experience in this offensive operation laid the foundation stone for the establishment of the HAMWS in 1975.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

Ever since the Indian and Chinese sovereign states have been in existence after the colonial era our two close neighbors have waged war against each other four times. The main causes of war are territorial disputes and contemporary international political situation. Much of the battles took place in harsh mountains of Indo-Tibetan border which is still in tense. Indian attempt to destabilize the Tibetan community of Tibetan Autonomous Region of China by provoking the Chinese sovereignty during Cold War era, have charged more to India than China itself.

India always supported Nepalese political opponent, using them as a relevant term card against the ruling government of Nepal. During Rana regime then King Tribhuwan with other democratic forces especially Nepali Congress took the anti Rana frontage. During the monarchical era pro-democratic forces were supported by India. When multi party democratic parties were agitation almost all were given security guidance and harbored their leaders by our southern neighbor. Internal politics of Nepal was always has been under the influence of Indian ruling administration. Our ruling elites have not been able to break the influence of Indian political shelter while saving their own ruling appliance. This kind of feudal and familial foe within our ruling elite created

effective platform for Indian elites to play with political upheavals in Nepal. In this pretext India was playing key role endowing the favorable ground to Khampa insurgency against the Chinese government which, later was grounded by Nepalese security forces.

With the support of Nepal Government, attempt to disturb and capture Tibetan region through the Khampa insurgency proved to be unsuccessful. Since Nepal is between two giant nations, when the interest of one of the neighbors is affected, Nepali territory is used to play their game. Though constrains appearing time and again in Nepal due to its neighboring countries, Nepal has always been playing neutral role and keeping balanced relation with both the countries which is a sign of good neighborhood and peaceful co-existence.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **Appendix-A**

The seventeen points Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the Motherland the People's Republic of China (PRC).
2. The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defenses.
3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government (CPG) of the PRC.
4. The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.
5. The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.
6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the thirteenth Dalai Lama and the ninth Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they had friendly and amicable relations with each other.
7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the common program of the CPC shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not affect a change in the income of the monasteries.
8. Tibetan troops shall be reorganized step by step into the PLA and become a part of the defense force of the PRC.

9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
11. In matters relating to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet shall carry out reforms of its own accord, and, when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.
12. In so far as former pro-imperialists and pro-Kuomintang (KMT) officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.
13. The PLA entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people.
14. The CPG shall have centralized handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.
15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the CPG shall set up a Military and Administrative Committee and a Military Area HQ in Tibet and – apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG – shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries; the name list shall be set forth after consultation between the representatives designated by the CPG and various quarters concerned and shall be submitted to the CPG for appointment.
16. Funds needed by the military and Administrative Committee, the Military Area HQ and the PLA entering Tibet shall be provided by the CPG. The local

government of Tibet should assist the PLA in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signature and seals are affixed to it.

## **Appendix-B**

Confiscated Weapons from Khampa guerillas during Mustang Operation by Nepal Army

1. Rifles - 543
2. Bren Guns - 75
3. Sten Guns -35
4. Pistols - 16
5. 60 mm Mortars - 8 (385 bombs)
6. 57 mm RCL - 7 (320 shells)
7. Communication sets - 5
8. All types of ammunition - 2,02,349.


## Appendix-C




**1. Ge-Wandu (Center) Main Commander of Khampa (Courtesy, BishnuHirachan, Mustang)**



**2. SFF marksmen at his sniper course, December 1967. Standing at center is Jamba Kalden, the SFF's senior.**



**3. Kham and Amdo region which had turned violent in Tibet uprising.**



**4. The location of the sixteen guerrilla companies in Mustang, 1968**



**5. Bunglow of Khampa leaders at KeisangCapm Mustang (Courtesy Nepal Army)**




6. Store room / Armory.




7. Khampa look out Post at main gate of Keisang Camp.



8. Khampa sentry post to guard their HQ, elements before reaching Main building at Keisang



9. Khampa look out Post at main gate of Keisang Camp



10. Mustang guerrillas in training, 1968.



11. Tibetan paratroopers during the first SFF freefall course, 1976




9. Mustang guerrillas in training, 1968.

10. Tibetan paratroopers during the first SFF freefall course, 1976





12. Wangdu Gyatotsang (right), leader of the Saipan-trained team dropped in Kham, with his two brothers. (Courtesy CIA's secret war in Tibet)



13. War Monument describing two fatal injuries succumbed to death



14. Mustang guerrillas' practice with a recoilless rifle.



15 Overview of Camp Hale. (Caurtesy: CIA's secret war in Tibet)



16. A C130 at Kadena, Base working for Khampa support in Tibet



17. T. J. Thompson with two Tibetan student riggers, Agra airbase, summer 1963.



**18. Khmpa Fighter during Bangladesh Campaign**



**19. Babayashi the first commander of Mustang.**



### List of Interviewees

<b>Name of Informants</b>	<b>Interview Date</b>	<b>Place</b>
Panta, Amar	Nov. 16, 2015	
Thakali, Indra P.	January 17, 2016	
Thakali, Purna	January 17, 2016	
Sherchan, Birendra	January 17, 2016	
Hirachan, Nar B.	July 19, 2016	
Thakali, Chandra P.	Dec. 25, 2016	