Asymmetry Of Power And Interest: A Case Of 2015 Indian Blockade On Nepal

Abstract

2015 Indian blockade on Nepal was a historic event in the realm of Nepal’s foreign policy. The blockade that was imposed at the backdrop of devastating earthquake rendered humanitarian cost to Nepal. However, it has also provided significant geopolitical leverage to Nepal. In the discipline of International Relations, the conventional wisdom is that countries with relative power capabilities always turn the crisis into their favor. Despite that, the 2015 Indian blockade on Nepal stands contrary to this. This demands alternative explanations to understand the interstate crisis which is characterized by asymmetry of power. This study has explained the geopolitical context of Indian blockade on Nepal and explored the Indian interest associated with it. As the study suggests, India has imposed blockade, basically, because of its concern over the newly promulgated constitution of Nepal. There were other concerns of India associated with it such as security concern, Hindutva, Madhes factor, Bihar election etc. The study proceeds by comparing the relative power and interest of Nepal associated with the blockade. Although India is relatively more powerful than Nepal in terms of material capabilities, Nepal was asymmetrically favored by interest variable in this game of blockade. This explanation gives important insight to the principal question of this study. The study finds out that Indian blockade was a failed example of employing coercive measures in the inter-state crisis. Although the direct cost of the blockade was to be borne by Nepal, India had to pay a huge strategic cost. In this game of blockade India has to lose the issue at stake and bear audience cost in foreign policy regime. This anomaly has been explained in terms of asymmetry of interests. Finally, the study concludes with an alternative explanation of Indian blockade on Nepal. This suggests that smaller states find it hard to compromise on core issues of national interest despite coercion from larger power. They are instead willing to bear the direct costs of coercive measures imposed by larger power. Secondly, larger power could back down if the issue at stake is not of primary concern.